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Bateman 1
Cynthia Bateman
We live in an anthropocentric world, of that there can be no doubt. Our philosophical and
scientific knowledge is geared to focus upon how facts and theories affect the human race
primarily and then all other species secondarily. For some studies such an egoistic approach is
satisfactory. Say, for instance, when we attempt to theorize how memory works or how light
waves travel, a method of study that focuses on human memory or perception of light and color
seems more pertinent than a study about the memory of an ant or an oyster’s experience of color.
However, there are some areas of philosophy and science in which an anthropocentric view is
not only irresponsible, it’s downright intolerable. One such area is the realm of determining
consciousness. Since Descartes first made mention of his plan to establish whether or not he
existed, scientists and philosophers have been obsessed with answering the question: What
makes an entity conscious? Their results have been divided between the ideas of creature
consciousness and state consciousness. And while theories that depend on state consciousness
are attractive to many scientists and philosophers alike, it is in the notion of creature
consciousness that one finds the most thorough criteria for identifying grounds for establishing
consciousness. Moreover, upon close examination it is clear that state consciousness cannot exist
detail. Let us begin with creature consciousness. In his essay, “Explaining Consciousness,”
We describe people, and other creatures, as being conscious when they are awake and
their sensory systems are receptive in the way normal for a waking state. I call this
consisting in a creature’s not being unconscious- that is, roughly, in its not being asleep
Simply put, to have creature consciousness one must be in a wakeful state, able to
differentiates ordinary creatures who are either awake or in REM sleep from ordinary creatures
who are in non-REM sleep, in a coma, etc (Piccinini, 103). Under the umbrella of creature
unconscious mental states. For example, a human infant would be considered conscious when it
cries if it’s hungry even though it seems to be responding only to the biological feeling of hunger
senses movement in the waters around it. The oyster may only be responding to its biological
instinct. It may not be having a conscious mental state of danger, but it is conscious because it is
It bears mentioning that there are other more restrictive versions of creature
consciousness than the one described above. Some versions include criteria such as sentience or
essay is simply one of wakefulness. To limit creature consciousness by any means beyond a
criteria to a universal principal. For example, by what means other than our own human
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judgment can we determine whether the oyster exhibits a characteristic of sentience? We only
have our limited humans tools for observing and interpreting what we see in an oyster. Perhaps
sentience in an oyster looks much different than it does in a human being. In fact, it seems like
sentience would have to manifest itself differently in an oyster than it does in a human simply
because the biological make up of the two creature in question is so dramatically distinct. To that
end, throughout this essay, creature consciousness will be defined as a creature that is wakeful
consciousness. State consciousness is the notion that certain mental states, processes, events, and
activities are said to be either conscious or unconscious (Dreske). It is assumed that either
conscious or unconscious states occur within a conscious creature. For example, in his essay,
“What Good Is Consciousness?” Fred Dreske writes, “When we describe desires, fears, and
In order for a state to be considered conscious, one must be aware one is having such a
state. Under a concept of state consciousness, the example of the hungry infant would not qualify
as being in a conscious state because the infant is not aware of its desire to eat. It is not aware it
is in a state of hunger Similarly, the oyster in not aware it is in a state of fear when it snaps
closed. Both of these organisms would be having unconscious mental states. Simply reacting to
their environment does make a creature conscious of its mental state. The creature must be aware
it is exhibiting the state it is in order for that state to be considered a conscious state (Rosenthal,
407).
But how do we determine when a creature is conscious of its mental states? By what
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criteria do we judge that an oyster is aware of a state of fear when it snaps closed and not just
reacting to its environment? Science often disagrees as to when humans are exhibiting conscious
mental states, let alone an organism as foreign to our human make up as an oyster. Once again,
as in trying to narrow a definition or criteria for creature consciousness, the problem of limited
human knowledge and understanding becomes an issue when trying to determine when to judge
With regards to unconscious states, such a notion of whether a mental state can ever be
unconscious is a source of contention among philosophers. Dreske writes that what is considered
perceived by the creature having it. An example of this type of unperceived conscious state
would be a long-distance driver whose attention lapses but continues to be conscious of the road
ahead. The driver, however, does not seem to perceive such a conscious state (Rosenthal, 407).
If the driver were truly unconscious of the road on which he/she was driving, it seems he/she
would be unable to keep a vehicle on the road without crashing. The driver may have no
recollection of perceiving that he/she was having a conscious mental state of driving a vehicle,
but what else explains the ability of one to operate a vehicle successfully without having memory
of operating a vehicle? Dreske’s theory that unconscious states are merely unperceived conscious
mental state. He writes that there are, in fact, mental states that are unconscious. He offers the
We often consciously puzzle over a question about what to do or how to solve a problem,
only to have the answer occur to us later, without the matter having in the meantime been
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in any way consciously before our mind. Though it doesn’t seem, from a first-person
point of view, that we were thinking about the issue, it’s clear that we must have been.
And unlike the case of the long-distance driver, here no shift of attention would change
things. Also we often take in sensory information without being at all aware of doing so,
again no matter what we’re paying attention to. Since, from a first-person perspective, we
seem not to be in any relevant sensory states, those states are not conscious states (407).
Rosenthal’s theory of unconscious states does not seem to rule out the possibility that
unconscious states are just unperceived conscious states. Take, for instance, his point about the
taking in of sensory information without being aware of doing so. Dreske would respond to this
claim by saying that a creature is taking in sensory information without perceiving an awareness
that such information is being taken in. In the case of discovering an answer to a problem
without being conscious of thinking of the problem, it only seems logical that, while a creature
had no perception that it was “thinking” of a solution to its problem, it must have been doing so.
Where else would an answer to a problem come from if not from the conscious but unperceived
problem solving mental state of a creature? Rosenthal’s notion of unconscious mental states
seems to have the solution to the creature’s problem fall from the sky and seat itself into a
creature’s consciousness.
conscious states, Dreske differentiates two kinds of perceived conscious states. He continues his
theory of state consciousness by proposing that there are conscious states we are transitively
conscious of and conscious states we are not transitively conscious of. To have transitive
the definition of transitive state consciousness, “To be conscious of an F is not the same as being
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conscious that it is an F and certainly not the same as being conscious that one is conscious of an
F.” To be having a transitively conscious mental state about F, one must be conscious that what
Another example Dreske gives regarding transitive consciousness is the smelling of burnt
toast. Dreske claims that an animal may be aware that it is smelling something (the burnt toast)
without being aware that it is burnt toast that it is smelling or be able to understand that it is
aware that it is aware of something. To be transitively conscious of the burnt toast, a creature
must be aware that it smells burnt toast and be aware that it is aware that it smells burnt toast. If
the creature is only conscious that it smells something, then it is not transitively conscious of its
mental state. Nonetheless, it is still having a conscious state because it smells something. Thus,
Dreske concludes, that there are conscious states which creatures are transitively conscious of
and conscious states that creatures are intransitively conscious of. A creature may be conscious
of burning toast, but it may not be transitively conscious that it is burning toast it is conscious of
This distinction of transitive and intransitive conscious mental states has great
transitively conscious of having it, then any state of seeing hearing, smelling, etc... is appropriate
grounds for saying that an animal is having conscious mental states. Under this distinction, the
hungry infant would be considered to be having a conscious mental state because it is in a state
of hunger. It does not know what hunger is nor is it aware that it is in a state of hunger. All the
infant knows is that it is aware of being hungry. Similarly, the oyster would also be considered to
be having a conscious mental state when it snaps closed in response to vibrations in the water
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around it. The oyster may not be aware that it is having a mental state of fear or be aware that it
is fearful of something. It may just close in response to being aware of vibrations in the water.
Regardless of whether the infant’s or the oyster’s mental states are transitively conscious or
But what does it even mean for a mental state to be conscious? Is a mental state, in and of
itself, conscious? It seems that a state cannot be conscious without residing in a conscious
provided in this essay, it seems it is unable to have conscious mental states. An unconscious
creature cannot have a conscious mental state of pain because in order to be a conscious mental
state, there must exist some creature that is aware of it, whether transitively or intransitively. If
there is no conscious creature to be aware of a conscious mental state, there can be no conscious
mental state. And, as Dreske explained, since there are only conscious mental states, whether
perceived or unperceived, if there are no conscious mental states, then there are no mental states
conscious state is conscious in as much as it is the object of a creature’s awareness, not the cause
Both Rosenthal and Dreske disagree that with the statement that creatures make the states
that occur within them conscious by becoming conscious of them. He writes that the function of
state consciousness is to make creatures conscious and without state consciousness, there can be
no creature consciousness. To illustrate his point, he offers the example of the gazelle and the
When a gazelle sees a lion, its visual experience of the lion qualifies as a conscious
experience, a conscious state, because it makes the gazelle visually conscious of the lion.
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Without this experience, the gazelle would not be visually aware of anything, much less a
lion.
But Dreske’s gazelle example can be understood another way. A conscious state of being
visually aware of anything cannot exist if it does not take place in a conscious creature. And
while the argument between state consciousness causing creature consciousness and creature
consciousness allowing for state consciousness may seem like the proverbial chicken and the egg
problem, it is not. The gazelle could not have had the conscious state of seeing the lion if it were
not awake and reasonably responsive to its environment. If the gazelle did not possess the notion
of creature consciousness, it could not have had the conscious mental state of seeing the lion. A
mental state is only conscious when a conscious creature is aware of it. A mental state is the
In his book, Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition To Consciousness, Donald Griffin makes
the case that using state consciousness to determine whether a creature is conscious is often used
as grounds to exclude certain creatures from the realm of conscious consideration. Most often,
the excluded creatures are nonhuman animals (17). Griffin writes that when we use state
consciousness as a means for determining the existence of consciousness, we are begging the
question of what makes a state conscious and how do we know if a creature is in possession of a
conscious state. It is easy enough for us to look at the oyster and say it does not possess a
conscious mental state and therefore is not a conscious creature, but as this essay has illustrated,
First, there is the real possibility that there are no unconscious states so any wakeful creature that
is having mental activity is having conscious mental states. Second, there is the unanswered
question of how we go about determining what the oyster perceives or understands when it snaps
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its shell closed in response to the movement of water around it. As Griffin points out, a concept
of consciousness based on the presence of mental states is subject to the rules created by
Put another way, a concept of state consciousness is entirely dependent upon human
interpretation for determining what is a conscious mental state and what is not, and what
creatures have conscious mental states and which ones do not. Such a reliance on the relativity
and subjectivity of human knowledge and experience makes determining consciousness based on
the concept of state consciousness unreliable at best, and in some case, downright irresponsible.
Again, human knowledge is not complete enough to thoroughly understand the complexities of
human mental states. Science is continually revealing facts learned about the conscious
awareness of autistic people or those who suffer from other, various mental disorders. These are
individuals who, by some accounts, were not previously thought to have conscious mental states.
If we can be so wrong when it comes to determining conscious states in our own species, how
could we possibly think our knowledge about the conscious states of nonhuman creatures is
anything more than incomplete? And, if our knowledge is incomplete, it is unethical for us to
make judgments regarding whether a creature is conscious or not based on a concept of state
consciousness.
In summary, there exist two main problems with a concept of consciousness based on
state consciousness. The first is that in order for one state to be conscious, it must sit in contrast
to a state that is not conscious. As this essay has illustrated through the writings of Fred Dreske,
evidence exists that suggests that there are no such things as unconscious mental states. If there
are no such things as unconscious mental states, there can be no creature that is having an
unconscious mental state. Therefore, all creatures having mental states must be having conscious
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mental states and so must be conscious creatures. So having conscious mental states cannot be
what determines a creature’s consciousness, since all conscious creatures must have conscious
mental states.
consciousness is that states, in and of themselves, cannot be conscious. A mental state is only
conscious if it occurs within a creature that is aware of it. Therefore, a concept of state
And lastly, as demonstrated by the writing of Donald Griffin, even if one subscribes to
the notion that mental states can be conscious or unconscious, such a criteria for determining
entirely upon human observation and interpretation. Given that human judgment is prone to error
and that we are, by nature, incapable of absolute knowledge, any concept of consciousness that
depends upon our interpretation is relative to our access to and understanding of subjective
excluding some creatures from the realm of consciousness based on errors in our judgments.
In conclusion, given the evidence presented against using state consciousness as a means
as its criteria of consciousness that a creature be in a wakeful state and able to reasonably
respond to its environment offers the most inclusive definition of consciousness. Given all of the
moral and legal pitfalls that stem from a creature being excluded from the conscious world, it
seems that a concept of consciousness that allows for the most inclusion is the more responsible
theory.
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Works Cited
2010.
Readings. Ed. David Chalmers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 406-417. Print.