People vs.

De Fernando

FACTS: The accused, a policeman, was informed that three convicts had
escaped. In the dark, he saw a person going up the stairs of a house, carrying
a bolo and calling for someone inside. The daughter of the owner of the house
was at that time with the accused who fired a shot in the air. As the unknown
person continued to ascend the stairs and believing that he was one of the
escaped convicts, the accused fired directly at the man who turned out to be
the nephew of the owner of the house

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability due to
mistake of fact.

HELD: An agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of
suspicious looking persons, who might be escaped prisoners from a nearby
penitentiary, prowling around the vicinity, and who enters a house to keep
watch, and later in the evening sees a person with a bolo in hand,
approaching the house in the attitude of going up the stairs, who does not
answer the challenge of the officer of the law, and continues his advance
notwithstanding that the latter had fired a shot into the air, and the said agent
of the law considering that the said stranger has not been recognized by any
person in the household, and thinking him to be an evil-doer, shoots and kills
him, is not guilty of murder or homicide.

Taking into consideration the state of the mind of the accused at the time, and
the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting
the latter, he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of
the house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the
crime of murder, but only that of a simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty,
however as principal, with malicious intent, because he thought at the time
that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed
to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should
have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he
thought him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable
diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.

The crime committed by the accused, therefore is homicide though reckless

negligence defined and punished in Article 568, in relation with Art. 404, of
the Penal Code.

THE PEOPLE vs. VICENTE P. CASTRO and PEDRO A. PACANA

FACTS: These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of
public documents and estafa committed by means of falsification of public
documents in which the accused are Pedro A. Pacana, secretary of the
provincial board of Misamis, Isidro Adorable, member of the provincial board
of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member of the provincial board of
Misamis. Should convictions be sustained, Pacana will receive sentences
totalling forty-four years and five days imprisonment, and Adorable and Castro
for the alleged unlawful taking of P25 each will receive sentences of ten years
and one day imprisonment.

The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana relates to the
falsification by the accused of minutes of the meeting of the provincial board
on June 9, 1923, for the alleged purpose of permitting the district engineer to
incur illegal expenses in the reconstruction of a provincial road. The charge in
the second case against the same accused relates to the falsification of
minutes of the provincial board on June 16, 1923. The charge in the third case
against the same accused relates to the falsification of an excerpt from the
minutes of the provincial board of June 9, 1923. And the last two cases, one
against provincial board member Isidro Adorable and Pedro A. Pacana, and
the other against provincial board member Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A.
Pacana, relate to the crimes of estafa committed by means of falsification of
public documents, whereby it is alleged Adorable and Castro were each able
to collect the sum of P25 as per diems for two fictitious meetings of the
provincial board. Since the first three cases were tried together and the last
two together, and since the facts of all of them are closely interwoven, for
convenience sake a general statement will first be made, leaving for special
mention certain circumstances affecting particular cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty for the crimes of falsification of
public documents and estafa through falsification of public documents.

DECISION: It must be admitted that the physical facts are mostly in favor of
the accused. The documents, Exhibits C and D, could not have been
fabricated on June 9 and June 16, if the matters to which they relate were not
then before the provincial board for action. Unless by supernatural means,
that would be an utter impossibility. Just how we can reconcile these
circumstances with the strong oral testimony, mostly circumstantial in nature,
presented by the prosecution, is hard to say, unless there was exaggeration
on the part of some of the witnesses. Now as to the motive, recognizing that a
quarrel was on between two provincial officers, and that possibly the
provincial board was siding with the district engineer and against the district
auditor, just why was it necessary to make meetings out of the air to serve this
purpose when actual meetings would have served the same purpose just as
effectively? The resolution approving of the acts of the district engineer had to
be made public and copies of it had to be sent to the proper authorities. Just
why two members of the provincial board would care to certify to the
correctness of meetings which were never held, in order to benefit themselves
in the paltry amount of P25 each, when they could have recovered the same
amount for actual meetings, is also difficult to understand. The whole case
impresses us as a job bunglingly performed by the provincial secretary. He is
a man who should not be entrusted with official responsibility. He has none of
the qualifications which fit one of public office. But it is a far cry from hopeless
ineptitude and hopeless stupidity to criminal intent and criminal responsibility.
Still, even under the most favorable aspect, the facts skirt perilously near to
the Penal Code crime of reckless imprudence.
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be crime.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest
and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal responsibility.
The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference
to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent. The element of
malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence. It is
a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to prison for long
terms. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime
should be indulged in to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government
has suffered no loss. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. The court cannot bring themselves to find these accused
guilty on the facts of record. As a results, therefore, that the court must, as
they hereby do, reverse the judgments appealed from and acquit the accused
of the charges laid against them.

People v. Guillen GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950

FACTS:
The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder after his attempt
to assassinate the President of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas on March 10,
1947.
During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the
opposing candidate of Manuel Roxas. According to the accused, he was
disappointed with the latter for failing to redeem and fulfill promises made by
President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, the accused determined
to assassinate the President and found the oppoturnity to do so on the night
of March 10, 1947 when the President attended a popular meeting by the
Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen first intended to
use a revolver to accomplish his goal but he had previously lost his licensed
firearm, so he thought of using two hand grenades which were given to him by
an American soldier in exchange for two bottles of whisky. The accused stood
on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade at the President
when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform
saw the smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an
open space where he thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm.
The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of persons standing close to
the platform and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who
died the next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other
persons. Guillen was arrested and he readily admitted his responsibility.

ISSUE:
WON the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in
regard to the other injured persons.
HELD:
The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In
throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him,
the appellant acted with malice and is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wronful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice. As held by thie
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless
imprudence.

The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death
sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal
Code.

US vs. Catangay

On the night of the crime the deceased, Mauricio Ramos, taking his shotgun
with him went to hunt deer in the barrio of Quinatijan, municipality of
Candelaria, Tayabas, first passing by the house of Santiago Abandia, whom
he took along with him and in his company also passed by the house of the
defendant, Joaquin Catangay, whom they both invited to bring his shotgun
and go with them for a hunt; that while the three men were passing along in
the middle of a field of talahib (high grass), the deceased in front of the
carrying lighted lantern fastened to his forehead, behind him the defendant,
and lastly Santiago Abandia, the first two men saw a deer were all mounted;
that thereupon Santiago Abandia stopped his horse and also dismounted in
order that the deer might not become aware of the presence of the hunters by
the noise; that few moments afterwards. two shots were heard in quick
succession and then the light the deceased carried went out; that Santiago
Abandia, upon noticing that the said light was extinguished, approached the
deceased; and he found the defendant alongside of him, raising him up,
saying: "What can have happened to my godfather?'; that, as the deceased
could not get up, Santiago Abandia asked the defendant for matches and lit a
little stick, by which light witness saw the wound in the back of the head of the
deceased, who was already dead; and that the said wound consisted of a
fracture of the left parietal region, the brain being exposed. It has also been
proved that there had been no previous trouble between the defendant and
the deceased, but that on the contrary they had always been on intimate
terms of friendship.

The defendant testifying in his own defense stated that upon seeing that the
deer, which the deceased had also noticed, might escape, he made haste to
approach the latter, who had his back toward him and was on his left, and
that, in taking hurried steps for that purpose, the defendant stumbled against
an embankment or pilapil that lay between him and the deceased; that
thereupon he fell on one knee, an accident which caused the shotgun, which
he had already loaded, cocked, and aimed at the deer, the half of whose body
was now lost from sight, to be discharged, this one charge striking the
deceased in the head.

The crime charged in the present case should be qualified as one of homicide
occasioned by reckless negligence — a crime provided for and punished by
article 568, in connection with article 404, of the Penal Code — for the reason
that there was no malice or criminal intention on the part of the defendant in
the discharge of his shotgun which resulted in wounding and causing the
instantaneous death of the deceased, Mauricio Ramos; but that was,
however, reckless negligence on the part of defendant, for, as the deceased
whom he was approaching, was almost directly in front of him, he should have
taken the precaution — an elemental one in handling firearms so likely to be
discharged by the slightest accident — not to have carried his shotgun cocked
and aimed, as he did on the occasion in question.

The defendant having appealed from said judgment, his counsel accepts the
finding therein made of the proved facts, but contends that the court erred in
holding that such facts constitute reckless negligence and, therefore, in
applying article 568 of the Penal Code.

According to the trial judge, the reckless negligence on the part of the
defendant consists in that latter did not take the necessary precaution, which
the court considered elemental on that occasion in view of the circumstances,
not to carry his shotgun cocked and aimed; but the court also took into
account the fact that, as testified by the defendant, the discharge of his
firearm (the shot from which wounded and killed the deceased) was caused
by his stumbling against an enbankment or pilapil that law between him and
the victim, causing him to fall to one of his knees.

The accidental cause, then, of the discharge of the arm was not due to the
fact of the defendant's having it cocked and aimed, but to the accident of his
stumbling against an embankment in the way. The occurrence was entirely
accidental and involuntary. Consequently, the crime charged in this
prosecution lacks the necessary element to allow of its being considered as
reckless negligence under article 568 of the Penal Code, as would have been
the case if though through no malice on the part of the defendant, the damage
had been produced, nevertheless, by some voluntary act of his. (U.S. vs.
Barnes, 12 Phil. Rep., 93; and decision of the supreme court of Spain, of June
28, 1881.)

The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern
his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and
with the importance of the act which he is to perform. (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil.
Rep., 375.)

In the judgment appealed from the statement is made that the defendant,
according to his testimony, when he stumbled against the enbankment or
pilapil and fell to the ground on one knee already had his shotgun cocked and
aimed at the deer, the half of whose body was then lost to sight.

From the foregoing questions and answers, it is seen that when the defendant
became aware of the presence of the deer he saw the deceased squatting
down, almost kneeling on the ground and aiming at the animal; that he had
been in this posture for some little time without shooting, and as the defendant
could see only half of the deer's body and the animal was about to run away,
the defendant tried to approach or get beside the deceased, in order to aim
and shoot thence; that he did in fact go toward the decease, holding the
shotgun in both hands with the barrel pointing upwards, though in the
direction of the deer, and with the safety catch closed; and that, at the
moment he pushed up the safety catch to open it, he stumbled against an
embankment, slipped and fell, and the gun he was holding in his hands was
discharged.

Neither can it be held that there was negligence or lack of care in the fact that
the defendant tried to open the safety catch of the gun while he was going
toward the deceased and when he was but a short distance from him, for, in
view of the nature of the act which he was about to perform, it was natural that
he should have the gun prepared to fire at the game, at once, or as soon as
he should have succeeded in placing himself beside his companion. So, if the
gun was discharged through the defendant's having stumbled against an
embankment there, the shot causing the death of his companion, and this
embankment cannot be attributed to a want of caution or precaution on the
part of the defendant (he did not see it, for, as he himself testified, he was
going along with his eyes fixed on the deer, and it is also understood that he
would not have been looking down, as he had his companion near at hand),
the death of the deceased can only be attributed to an unforeseen and
unfortunate accident, for which the defendant cannot be held criminally liable.

It cannot be held that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence, as charged in the complaint.

US VS. CHICO

Facts:
-Defendant is charged for violation of No 1696.—An Act to prohibit the display
of flags, banners, emblems, or devices used in the Philippine Islands for the
purpose of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States
and the display of Katipunan flags, banners, emblems, or devices, and for
other purposes.
-On August 4, 1908 , in the city of Manila, Go Chico displayed in one of the
windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario,
number of medallions.
-This medallions are in the form of small buttons, upon the faces of which are
imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner
or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Island to designate
and identify the in armed insurrection against the United states.
-Defendant contends that he should be acquitted upon two propositions:
First, that before conviction under the law cited, a criminal intent upon part of
the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Second, the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of identical
banners, devices or emblems used during the Philippine insurrection by those
against the United States.
- The court dismissed the propositions of the defendant. Thus, The Court of
first instance of Manila on 8 September 1908 charged him of violation of
section 1 of Act. 1696 No 1696 of the Philippine Commission and adjudged
him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine Php500.00 and to pay the costs of
the action, and imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place
prescribed by law until said fine should be paid.
Issue/s:
Whether or not an intent is need for defendant to be held liable of the crime
charge.
Ruling:
The court said, it is not necessary that the defendant should have acted with
criminal intent. In many crimes, made by statutory enactment, the intention of
the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. In many cases, the
act complained of is itself that which produces pernicious effect which the
statute avoids.
At that time, the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force
and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or
bad.
The display of the flags, emblems, itself without any intervention of any other
factor, is the evil.
In the case at bar, the evil to the society and governmental does not depend
upon the state of the mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the
effect which that display has upon the public minds. In one case the public is
affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the acts itself.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of
the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty days
and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary,
contends that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of
Pilar for the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a revolver that the
defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license
therefor; that he did not know there was a polling place near where he parked
his motor car; that he was called by his friend, Jose D. Benliro and aligned
his automobile, he did not leave the revolver because there were many
people in the road and he might lose it; that he was sixty-three meters from
the electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E.
Desiderio, a representative of the Secretary of the Interior.
ISSUE: W/N the defendant is liable even without criminal intent.
HELD: Yes. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision,
and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that
the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in
any other way. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those
mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care
must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico,
14 Phil., 128.)