TABLE OF CONTENTS
40 - MALOTO VS. CA 1
41 - MOLO VS. MOLO 2
42 - SAMSON VS. NAVAL 4
43 - GAGO VS. MAMUYAC 5
44 - LIPANA VS. CFI OF CAVITE 6
45 - CANIZA VS. CA 7
46 - AGTARAP VS. AGTARAP 9
47 - LUZON SURETY VS QUEBRAR 10
48 - GUEVARA VS GUEVARA 11
49 - EUSEBIO VS. VALMORES 12
50 - NITTSCHER VS. NITTSCHER 14
51 - MERCADO VS. SANTOS 15
52 - URIARTE VS CFI OF NEGROS 16
53 - PECSON VS CORONEL 17
54 - PASCUAL VS DELA CRUZ 18
55 - ICASIANO VS ICASIANO 21
56 - REY VS CARTAGENA 22
40 - MALOTO VS. CA
FACTS:
[ INTRO/OVERVIEW OF THE WHOLE CASE:
Prior to this case, two other cases directly
related to the present case, involving the
same parties had already been decided by
the SC. In G.R. No. L-30479, which was a
petition for certiorari and mandamus
instituted by the petitioners herein, we
dismissed the petition ruling that the more
appropriate remedy of the petitioners is a
separate proceeding for the probate of the
will in question. Pursuant to the said
ruling, petitioners commenced a special
proceeding for the probate of the will,
which was opposed by the private
respondents. The trial court dismissed the
petition. The petitioners then came to the
SC on a petition for review by certiorari.
SC then set aside the trial court’s order
and directed it to proceed to hear the case
on the merits. The trial court found that
the will have already been revoked by the
testatrix and thus, denied the petition. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the
order. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.
In 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as
heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and
Constancio Maloto, and the private
respondents PanClo Maloto and Felino
Maloto. The heirs thought that Adriana did
not leave a last will and testament, hence
the four heirs instituted an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their
aunt’s estate in the CFI of Iloilo.
However, while the case was still in
progress, the parties — Aldina, Constancio,
PanClo, and Felino — executed an
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of
Adriana's estate. The agreement provided
for the division of the estate into four
equal parts among the parties. The
Malotos then presented the extrajudicial
settlement to the court for approval which
the court did.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a
former associate of Adriana’s counsel, the
late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a
document entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBULUT-AN (Testamento),” and
purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed
that he found the testament, the original
copy, while he was going through some
materials inside the cabinet drawer of Atty.
Hervas.
The document was submitted to the office
of the clerk CFI Iloilo. In the document,
while all four of them were named as
heirs, Aldina and Constancio are
bequeathed much bigger and more
valuable shares in the estate of Adriana
than what they received by virtue of the
extrajudicial agreement they had earlier
signed. The will likewise gives devises and
legacies to other parties, among them
being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and
Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other
devisees and legatees named in the will,
filed a motion for reconsideration and
annulment of the proceedings therein and
for the allowance of the will.
The trial court denied their motion. Hence,
they filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus to SC assailing the orders of
the trial court. SC dismissed the petition
and advised that a separate proceeding for
the probate of the alleged will would be
the appropriate way to solve the matters
raised by the petitioners.
(CFI – ruled that the will was revoked,
hence denied petition; IAC – affirmed the
trial court’s order)
Although the appellate court found as
inconclusive the matter on whether or not
the document or papers allegedly burned
by the househelp of Adriana, upon her
instructions, was indeed the will, still it
ruled that the will had been revoked. The
respondent court stated that the presence
of animus revocandi in the destruction of
the will had, nevertheless been sufficiently
proven.
The appellate court based its findings on
the facts that the document was not found
in the two safes of Adriana and that
Adriana went to Atty. Hervas to retrieve a
copy of her will and sought the services of
Atty. Palma in order to execute a new one.
ISSUE:
WON Adriana Maloto’s will had been
effectively revoked
RULING:
No. The facts on which the appellate
court’s decision was based, even
considered collectively, were not sufficient
basis for the conclusion that Adriana’s will
had been effectively revoked.
In relation to Art. 830 of the new Civil
Code, SC ruled that the physical act of
destruction of a will, like burning in this
case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction
is coupled with animus revocandi on the
part of the testator. It is not imperative
that the physical destruction be done by
the testator himself. It may be performed
by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the
testator.
In this case, while animus revocandi, or
the intention to revoke, may be conceded,
for that is a state of mind, yet that
requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus
revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a
last will and testament. The intention to
revoke must be accompanied by the overt
physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in
his presence and under his express
direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show
compliance with these requirements. For
one, the document or papers burned by
Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established to be a will at all,
much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to
have been done under the express
direction of Adriana. And then, the burning
was not in her presence. Both witnesses,
Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating
that they were the only ones present at
the place where the stove (presumably in
the kitchen) was located in which the
papers proffered as a will were burned.
The testimony of the two witnesses who
testified in favor of the will’s revocation
was concluded to be inconclusive. Nowhere
in the records does it appear that the two
witnesses, both illiterates were
unequivocably positive that the document
burned was indeed Adriana’s will.
(RES JUDICATA ARGUMENT) The private
respondents argued that the petition is
already barred by res judicata. They claim
that this bar was brought about by the
petitioners' failure to appeal timely from
the order dated November 16, 1968 of the
trial court in the intestate proceeding
(Special Proceeding No. 1736) denying
their (petitioners') motion to reopen the
case, and their prayer to annul the
previous proceedings therein and to allow
the last will and testament of the late
Adriana Maloto. This is untenable for the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application
in the present controversy. Strictly
speaking no final judgment has been
rendered insofar as the probate of
Adriana’s will is concerned. The decision of
the trial court in Special Proceeding No.
1736, although final, involved only the
intestate settlement of the estate of
Adriana.
41 - MOLO VS. MOLO
Doctrine: A subsequent will containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having
been disallowed for not being executed in
conformity with the formalities of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annulling the
previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory
clause is void (Samson v. Naval)
Facts:
Mariano Molo died without leaving any
forced heir. He was however survived by
his wife, Juana Molo (petitioner) and by his
nieces and nephew (oppositors), Luz,
Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo.
Molo left two wills, one executed in Aug.
17, 1918 and the other on June 20, 1939.
The 1939 will contains a clause which
expressly revokes the will executed in
1918.
Juana filed in the CFI - Riza a petition for
the probate of the will in 1939. Since there
was no opposition, it was probated.
However, upon petition by the oppositors,
the probate was set aside and the case
was reopened wherein the court denied
the probate of the will on the ground that
petitioner failed to prove that it was
executed in accordance with the law.
In view of the disallowance of the 1939,
Juana filed another petition for the probate
of the will executed in 1918. Again, the
oppositors filed an opposition based on the
three grounds:
petitioner is now estopped from seeking
probate of the will of 1918;
the 1918 will has not been executed in the
manner required by law; and
the 1918 will has been subsequently
revoked.
Before the second petition could be heard,
the battle for liberation came and the
records of the case was destroyed. As a
result of this, a new petition was filed to
which the oppositors filed an opposition
based on the same grounds above. The
lower court admitted the probate of the
will. Because of this, oppositors filed an
appeal.
Issue:
WoN the probate court erred in not holding
that the petitioner voluntarily and
deliberately frustrated the probate of the
will of 1939 to enable her to obtain the
probate of the will of 1918.
WoN Molo’s will of 1918 was not executed
in the manner required by law
WoN the probate court erred in not holding
that Molo’s 1918 will was subsequently
revoked by the decedent’s will of 1939.
Ruling: No.
Oppositors contend that Juana connived
with witness Canuto Perez in an effort to
defeat and frustrate the probate of 1939
will because of her knowledge that said will
was intrinsically defective in that the only
testamentary disposition therein was a
“disposicion captatoria”.
The SC found that there is no evidence
which could justify the oppositor’s
insinuation. In fact, it should be recalled
that if it were not for oppositor’s opposition
of the 1918 will’s probate, and had just
limited their objection to the intrinsic
validity of the said will, their plan to defeat
the will and secure the intestacy of the
deceased would have perhaps been
accomplished. The 1918 will was denied
probate due to their own efforts, not
Juana’s. It is unfair to impute bad faith to
Juana simply because she exerted every
effort to protect her own interest and
prevent the intestacy of the deceased.
Yes. The will in question was
attested by three witnesses,
Lorenzo Morales, Rufino Enriquez
and Angel Cuenca. The first two
witnesses died before the present
proceedings. so The only
instrumental witness presented
was Angel Cuenca, and under our
laws, his testimony is sufficient to
prove the due execution of the
Will. Juana even presented Juan
Salcedo, the notary public who
prepared and notarized the will
upon the express desire and
instruction of the testator. The
testimony of these witnesses
shows that the will was executed
in the manner required by law.
No.
Petitioner’s counsel rely on the
argument that the instant case is
on all fours with the case of
Samson v. Naval, thus the doctrine
therein should be controlling.
Oppositors argue that even though
they do not disagree with the
soundness of the ruling laid down
in the Samson case, there is a
reason to abandon the ruling there
since it is already antiquated and
runs counter to the modern trend
prevailing in American
Jurisprudence. They contend that
regardless of the revocatory
clause, the 1918 will cannot be
given effect because of the
presumption that it was
deliberately revoked by the
testator himself.
The SC is reluctant to fall in line
with the assertion that is now
prevailing in the United States. The
Court is of the impression that the
doctrine in the Samson case is still
a good law.
Samson Ruling:
"A subsequent will, containing a
clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed, for the
reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of
wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory
clause is void."
If the destruction of the 1918 will
was a consequence of the
testator’s belief that the revocatory
clause in the 1939 will was valid
and would be given effect, the
Court is of the opinion that the
earlier will can still be admitted to
probate under the principle of
“dependent relative revocation”.
Dependent Relative Revocation
This is usually applied where the
testator cancels or destroys a will
or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a
present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a
substitute for the old, and the new
disposition is not made, or if made,
fails of effect for some reason.
Where the act of destruction is
connected with the making of
another will, the testator mean the
revocation of the old will to depend
on the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to be
substitued, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon
the efficacy of the new disposition;
and if for any reason that the new
will is inoperative, the revocation
fails and the original will remains
in full force.
Even in the supposition that the
destruction of the original will by
the testator could be presumed,
such destruction cannot have the
effect of defeating the prior will of
1918 because of the fact that it is
founded on the mistaken belief
that the will of 1939 has been
validly executed and would be
given due effect. By this, it can be
shown that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. His
execution of 2 wills on 2 different
occasions and instituted his wife as
his universal heir bolsters his
intention to die testate.
42 - SAMSON VS. NAVAL
Doctrine: In order that a former will may
be revoked by operation of law by a
subsequent will, it is necessary that the
latter should be-valid and executed with
the formalities required for the making of
wills.
On September 1915, Atty. Gabriel, the
executor, presented in court for allowance,
a document executed by decedent
Simeona Naval who passed away 2 days
earlier. It was executed February 1915.
It was disallowed by the court on the
ground that said document was not duly
executed by the deceased as her last will
and testament, inasmuch as she did not
sign it in the presence of 3 witnesses and
the 2 witnesses did not sign it in the
presence of each other.
Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the
same deceased filed in the same court for
allowance as her will, another document
executed by her on October 1914. The
petition for allowance was opposed by
Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina
Naval on the ground that the 1914 will, the
allowance of which is asked, could not be
allowed, because of the existence of
another will of subsequent date (1915
will), executed during her lifetime by the
same Simeona F. Naval, and because said
will has been revoked by another executed
subsequently by her during her lifetime,
and, further, because said will has not
been executed with the formalities
required by existing laws.
CFI Manila: Allowed the second document
(October 1914).
Issue: The court erred in disallowing the
will dated February 1915 (1 document
st
presented) on the ground that it was not
executed in such form that it could
transmit real and personal property.
Held: CFI Manila was correct in allowing
the October 1914 will to be the last will
and testament of the deceased.
A subsequent will containing a clause
revoking an earlier will must, as a general
rule, be admitted to probate before the
clause of revocation can have any effect,
and the same kind, quality, and method of
proof is required for the establishment of
the subsequent will as was required for the
establishment of the former will.
Therefore, in order that the will of
February 1915, the first document
presented as the will of the deceased
Simeona F. Naval, could have the effect of
revoking that which was presented
afterwards by the petitioners as executed
by the same deceased on October 1914,
that is, on a date previous to the execution
of the first, it was necessary and
indispensable that the later will that was
first presented for allowance should be
perfect or valid and executed as provided
by law in case of wills.
In the case at bar, the document,
executed by the deceased, Simeona F.
Naval, as her last will and testament,
dated February 1915, has been presented
for allowance, its validity has been proved
by means of said procedure in the Court of
Probate of Manila, but the court denied its
allowance as her last will and testament,
on the ground that the document in
question had not been duly executed by
the deceased, because she did not sign in
the presence of three witnesses, and two
of these witnesses did not sign in the
presence of each other. That said
document had not been attested and
subscribed in the manner established by
law for the execution of wills.
"If the instrument propounded as a
revocation be in form a will, it must be
perfect as such, and be subscribed and
attested as is required by the statute. An
instrument intended to be a will, but
failing of its effect as such on account of
some imperfection in its structure or for
want of due execution, cannot be set up
for the purpose of revoking a former will."
43 - GAGO VS. MAMUYAC
FACTS:
The purpose of this action was to obtain
the probation of a last will and testament
of Miguel Mamuyac. On or about the 27th
day of July, 1918, the said Miguel
Mamuyac executed a last will and
testament (Exhibit A). In the month of
January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago
presented a petition in the CFI of the
Province of La Union for the probation of
that will. This was opposed by Cornelio
Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana
Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause
No. 1144, Province of La Union).
After hearing all of the parties the petition
for the probation of
said will was denied by the Honorable C.
M. Villareal upon the ground that the
deceased had on the 16th day of April,
1919, executed a new will and testament.
Thus, the present action was commenced.
To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac,
Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac presented their
oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will
is a copy of the second will and testament
executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b )
that the
same had been cancelled and revoked
during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and
(c) that the said will was not the last will
and testament of the deceased Miguel
Mamuyac.
Upon the issue thus presented, the
Honorable Anastasio R. Teodoro, judge
denied the probation of said will of April
16, 1919, upon the ground that the same
had been cancelled and revoked in the
year 1920. After examining the evidence
adduced, found that the following facts
had been satisfactorily proved:
"That Exhibit A is a mere carbon copy of its
original which remained in the possession
of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac,
who revoked it before his death as per
testimony of witnesses Jose Fenoy, who
typed the will of the testator on April 16,
1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on
December 30, 1920, the original of Exhibit
A (will of 1919) actually cancelled by the
testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured
Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold
him a house and the land where the house
was built, he had to cancel it the will of
1919, executing thereby a new testament.
Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates the
testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that
the will executed by the deceased (Miguel
Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in the
possession of father Miguel Mamuyac.
The opponents have successfully
established the fact that father Miguel
Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another
will. The same Narcisa Gago, the sister of
the deceased, who was living in the house
with him, when cross-examined by
attorney for the opponents, testified that
the original of Exhibit A could not be
found.
From that order the petitioner appealed.
ISSUE:
WON that the will had been revoked and
cancelled in 1920 before his death; that
the said will was a mere carbon copy and
that the oppositors were not estopped
from alleging that fact. (YES)

HELD:
With reference to the said cancellation, it
may be stated that there is positive proof,
not denied, which was accepted by the
lower court, that the will in question had
been cancelled in 1920. The law does not
require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved. The
fact that such cancellation or revocation
has taken place must either remain
unproved or be inferred from evidence
showing that after due search the original
will cannot be found.
Where a will which cannot be found is
shown to have been in the possession of
the testator, when last seen, the
presumption
is, in the absence of other competent
evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death.
It will not be presumed that such will has
been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the
testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator,
is never conclusive, but may be overcome
by proof that the will was not destroyed by
the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of
1919 could not be found after the death of
the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view
of the positive proof that the same had
been cancelled, we are forced to the
conclusion that the conclusions of the
lower court are in accordance with the
weight of the evidence.
Having proved its execution by the
proponents, the burden is on thec
ontestant to show that it has been
revoked. In a great majority of instances
in which wills are destroyed for the
purpose of revoking them, there is no
witness to the act of cancellation or
destruction and all evidence of its
cancellation perishes with the testator.
Copies of wills should be admitted by the
courts with great caution. When it is
proven that a will was executed in
duplicate and each copy was executed with
all the formalities and requirements of the
law, the duplicate may be admitted in
evidence when it is made to appear that
the original has been lost and was not
cancelled or destroyed by the testator
After a careful examination of the entire
record, we are fully persuaded that the will
presented for probate had been cancelled
by the testator in 1920.
44 - LIPANA VS. CFI OF CAVITE
Facts:
Petitioner Eliodora Lipana filed an
application for probate of a will supposedly
of the deceased Manuel Lipana, a carbon
copy of which was attached to the
application. Natividad Lipana filed an
opposition contending that the copy of the
will attached in the application shows that
the will had not been executed in
accordance with law. The CFI, upon
inspection of the copy of the will,
dismissed the application on the ground
that the will was not signed by the
testatrix and the witnesses at the end and
at the left margin of each page. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1) WON a petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy to contest the CFI’s order
of dismissal.
2) WON the order of dismissal is legally
correct.
Ruling:
1) Yes. A writ of certiorari may be granted
only where "there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy by bill of exceptions, or
appeal, or otherwise." This rule, however,
recognizes an exception. There the order
or judgment is a nullity by virtue of its own
recitals, as, in the instant case, wherein
the order complained of recites that there
had been no hearing of the facts alleged in
the application, it may be attacked in any
way and at any time, even when no appeal
has been taken.
A judgment with absolutely nothing to
support it, is a nullity, and may be voided
at least by a proceeding in certiorari.
2) No. CFI acted in excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the
application without a previous
hearing. The CFI’s pronouncement
that the will had not been executed
in accordance with law, is founded
undoubtedly on the erroneous
assumption that the probate of the
carbon copy of the will was being
applied for. Such copy was
attached to the application merely
to corroborate the allegation as to
the existence of its original and not
 to establish a full compliance with (4) by the defendants' act of unlawfully
the requirements of the law as to
the execution of the will. Such
requirements are alleged in the
application to have been complied
with and may be proved at the
hearing.
It is apparent from the application that
what is sought to be admitted to probate is (5) complaint was filed within one year from
the original of the will. It is alleged therein
that the original was in the possession of a
third person or that it was either lost or
destroyed by some person other than the
testatrix.
Under section 623 of Act No. 190, if a will
is shown to have been torn by some other
person without the express direction of the (2)
testator, it may be admitted to probate, if
its contents, due execution and its
unauthorized destruction are established
by satisfactory evidence. The applicant,
therefore, was entitled to hearing to prove
the due execution of the original will and
its loss or destruction, and the respondent
court had no statutory authority to dismiss
the application without such hearing.
45 - CANIZA VS. CA
FACTS: Carmen Cañiza being then 94
years of age was declared incompetent by
judgment of the RTC Quezon City in a
guardianship proceeding instituted by her
niece, Amparo Evangelista. She was so
adjudged because of her advanced age
and physical infirmities which included
cataracts in both eyes and senile
dementia. Amparo Evangelista was
appointed legal guardian of her person and
estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot.
Her guardian, Evangelista, commenced a
suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MetroTC) of Quezon City to eject
spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada
from said premises. The complaint was
later amended to identify the incompetent
Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal
guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
The amended complaint pertinently alleged
that:
(1) plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of
the property in question
(2) out of kindness, she had allowed the
Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free
(3) Cañiza already had urgent need of the
house on account of her advanced age
and failing health, "so funds could be
raised to meet her expenses for
support, maintenance and medical
treatment
depriving plaintiff of the possession of the
house in question, they were enriching
themselves at the expense of the
incompetent, because, while they
were saving money by not paying any
rent for the house, the incompetent
Cañiza was losing much money as her
house could not be rented by others
date of first letter of demand
The defendants in their Answer with
Counterclaim argued:
(1) In consideration of their faithful service,
they had been considered by Cañiza as her
own family
Cañiza in fact executed a
holographic will by which she
bequeathed to the Estradas the house
and lot in question
MetroTC – rendered judgment in favor of
Cañiza, the Estradas being ordered to
vacate the premises.
RTC Quezon City – reversed the decision
CA – affirmed RTC’s judgment in toto. It
ruled that:
(a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was
indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not
an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since
the "defendants have not been in the
subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have
been there as a sort of adopted family
of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by
what purports to be the holographic
will of the Cañiza; and
(b) while "said will, unless and until it has
passed probate by the proper court, could
not be the basis of defendants' claim to
the property, . . . it is indicative of
intent and desire on the part of
Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to
remain and are to continue in their
occupancy and possession, so much so
that Cañiza's supervening incompetency
can not be said to have vested in her
guardian the right or authority to drive the
defendants out.
Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this
Court praying for reversal of the Appellate
Court's judgment. She contends in the
main that the latter erred in (a) holding
that she should have pursued an accion
publiciana, and not an accion interdictal;
and in (b) giving much weight to "a
xerox copy of an alleged holographic
will, which is irrelevant to this case.
Estradas insist that the case against them
was really not one of unlawful detainer and
 neither one of forcible entry because they
had been occupying the property with
the prior consent of the "real owner,"
Carmen Cañiza, which "occupancy can
even ripen into full ownership once
the holographic will of petitioner
Carmen Cañiza is admitted to
probate." They conclude, on those
postulates, that it is beyond the power of
Cañiza's legal guardian to oust them from
the disputed premises.
Carmen Cañiza died and she was
substituted by her heirs, the
aforementioned guardian Amparo
Evangelista and her other nephew, Ramon
Nevado, respectively.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Estradas have a right to remain
in possession of the property by virtue of
the alleged holographic will, which was not
probated, bequeathing them the same –
NO
(2) WON Evangelista can continue to represent
Cañiza after the latter’s death – YES
RULING:
(1) No. The Estradas' possession of the
house stemmed from the owner's express
permission. That permission was
subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as
was her right; and it is immaterial that the
withdrawal was made through her judicial
guardian, the latter being indisputably
clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it
of any consequence that Carmen
Cañiza had executed a will
bequeathing the disputed property to
the Estradas; that circumstance did
not give them the right to stay in the
premises after demand to vacate on
the theory that they might in future
become owners thereof, that right of
ownership being at best inchoate, no
transfer of ownership being possible
unless and until the will is duly
probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the
action of desahucio, the Estradas had no
legal right to the property, whether as
possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or
as owners. They could not claim the right
of possession by sufferance,that had been
legally ended. They could not assert any
right of possession flowing from their
ownership of the house; their status as
owners is dependent on the probate of
the holographic will by which the
property had allegedly been
bequeathed to them — an event which
still has to take place; in other words;
prior to the probate of the will, any
assertion of possession by them would
be premature and inefficacious.
The Estradas insist that the devise of
the house to them by Cañiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain
in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting
them therefrom, since their ouster
would be inconsistent with the ward's
will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any
time prior to the testator's death, it may
be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART.
838, Id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the
future to persons possessing property by
his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the
former's taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that in this case there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption
of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on
account of the physical infirmities afflicting
her, arising from her extreme age.
(2) Yes. As already stated, Carmen Cañiza
passed away during the pendency of this
appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to
dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's
death automatically terminated the
guardianship, Amparo Evangelista lost all
authority as her judicial guardian, and
ceased to have legal personality to
represent her in the present appeal.
The motion is without merit. While it is
indeed well-established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of
either the guardian or the ward, the rule
affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of
Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's
only two (2) surviving heirs, the other
being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C.
Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court, they were in fact
substituted as parties in the appeal in
place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the ROC.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the
death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by
her through her guardian. That action, not
being a purely personal one, survived her
death; her heirs have taken her place and
now represent her interests in the appeal
at bar.
Decision: Petition is granted. The CA
decision affirming the RTC’s Judgment is
reversed and set aside. Metropolitan Trial
Court’s decision is reinstated and affirmed.
46 - AGTARAP VS. AGTARAP - wait sa guys
haha in the making pa sorry po
Facts:
The case is a petition for review on
certiorari.
Eduardo Agtarap (child of the first
marriage) filed a case with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for judicial settlement
of estate of his deceased father,
Joaquin.
He died intestate without any debts or
obligations. He contracted two
marriages with Lucia Garcia, then
Cardidad Garcia.
He had three children with Lucia (two
died, one of them had 3 children) and
another three children with Cardidad
(one died, leaving one child).
He left two parcels of land during his
death in Pasay City. His grandson from
the first marriage leased and improved the
realties while receiving P26,000.00 pesos
per month.
Eduardo claimed there was an
imperative need to appoint him as
special administrator to take possession
and charge of estate assets and civil fruits
while a regular administrator was to be
selected.
Further, he prayed for a confirmation
and declaration of compulsory heirs,
dividing the shares, and giving the right to
receive and possess the property given to
hem.
(RTC RULING) Issued an order for initial
hearing.
While one of the heirs (Sebastian)
admitted to the facts, the grandchildren
of the first marriage filed their
opposition.
They claim that the parcels of land
belong to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage, and upon Lucia’s
death, they became co-owners. The
improvements and the residence, as well
as the restaurant, were made with their
money.
An opposition was made against
Eduardo becoming an administrator
because (a) he is not mentally/physically
fit, (2) minimal interest over the lots, (3)
no desire to earn.
(RTC DECISION) Issued a resolution
appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator and issued him letters of
administration. Furthermore, it issued an
Order of Partition after receiving the
proposed projects [they affirmed the
position that the properties were part of
the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage].
Both parties filed for a motion for
reconsideration, which denied Eduardo
and Sebastian’s motion but granted the
oppositors’.
(CA DECISION) Before RTC could issue a
new order, the petitioners appealed to
the CA, who dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit. Motions for reconsideration
were denied.
(Sebastian)Contentions: (1)
Grandchildren failed to establish that
they are legitimate heirs of their father
and thus their grandfather [marriage
contracts presented were not
authenticated and formally offered in
evidence], (2) the certificates of title of
the property recognize the second
marriage – a conclusive proof of their
ownership, (3) estate must have been
settled already since the estate and
inheritance tax have already been paid
which resulted in the issuance of TCTs (4)
estoppel applies to the children of the
first marriage because they did not object
to the issuance of TCTs recognizing the
second marriage, (5) res judicata
applies to the court order replacing
Lucia’s name with Caridad in the TCTs.
(Eduardo)Contentions: (1) CA cannot
settle multiple estates in one proceeding
[along with their grandfather’s, CA also
settled the estates of the grandfather’s
deceased children], pointing out that
one estate was already conducted in
another proceeding for probate of will.
This violates the rule on precedence of
testate over intestate proceedings, (2)
RTC cannot decide questions of
ownership when it acts as an intestate
court with limited jurisdiction; instead,
it must be conferred to a court of general
jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the
 estate of Agtarap and erred in the
distribution of inheritance
Whether or not the probate court has
the power to determine ownership of
property under a certificate of title
Ruling:
RTC HAS THE JURISDICTION TO
RESOLVE QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP
AS AN INTESTATE COURT UNDER A
FEW EXCEPTIONS; ALL INTERESTED
PARTIES ARE HEIRS AND NO THIRD
PARTIES ARE INJURED THROUGH THE
RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION ON
OWNERSHIP
GR: The general rule is that the
jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate/probate court is only with
regard to the probate of will or
settlement of estate of deceased
persons but not questions of
ownership.
EXCEPTIONS: (1) It may pass on the
question over a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action; (2) If
the interested parties are all heirs or if it
is a question of collation, or if the
parties consent to assumption of
jurisdiction where the rights of third
parties are not impaired, it is competent
to pass on issues of ownership.
In this case, the general rule does not
apply since all of the parties are heirs
and no rights of third parties are
impaired through the resolution of the
issue of ownership. The determination of
whether or not the properties are conjugal
is merely collateral to the jurisdiction to
settle the estate.
CA ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING
MILAGROS’S SHARE IN THE ESTATE
SINCE HER WILL HAS NOT YET
CONCLUDED PROBATE IN A SEPARATE
PROCEEDING
HOWEVER, with regard to Milagros’s estate
(the one where a proceeding was already
conducted), the CA erred in distributing
Joaquin’s estate with regard to the share
allotted in favor of Milagros. Although her
will has not yet been probated and
approved, the court should refrain from
distributing her share in Joaquin’s estate.
MISCELLANEOUS COURT RULINGS
With regard to the TCTs referring to the
second marriage, it deserves scant
consideration. Simple possession of a
certificate is not conclusive of true
ownership. Furthermore, it cannot be
said that Lucia left her ½ of her conjugal
share in the TCT. It was carried over to the
certificates derived from said TCT.
According to the Rules of Court, in
intestate proceedings, the conjugal
properties should be liquidated. So, RTC
had the jurisdiction to determine
whether the properties were conjugal
since it had to liquidate the
partnership to determine the estate.
With regard to the payment of taxes as
proof of estate being settled, it is only
settled after payment of debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to widow, and inheritance tax
have all been complied with. Records
show that these have not been
complied with in 1965.
On the legitimacy of the grandchildren,
both of the lower courts affirmed their
legitimacy. There is no compelling reason
to sway from that decision since the court
is not a trier of facts.
On the issue of settling multiple estates in
one proceeding, the court does not agree.
The CA decision shows that the
disposition of properties only related
to the settlement of estate of Joaquin.
The inclusion of the deceased was merely
a consequence of the settlement since
they were the decedent’s legal heirs.
Petition is partially granted to modify the
shares distributed in the estate. It is
remanded to RTC for further proceedings
in the settlement.
47 - LUZON SURETY VS QUEBRAR
Facts: Luzon Surety issued two
administrator's bond in behalf of defendant
Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates
(Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both
Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves
solidarily after executing an indemnity
agreement where both the defendants
agreed to pay the premiums every year. In
the years 1954-55, the defendants paid
the premiums and the documnetary
stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the
project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon
Surety demanded payments of premiums
from 1955 onwards. It was also in the
same year when the court granted the
motion of the defendants to have both
bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff file a case
in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the
plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in
force and effect from the filing until 1962.
The Court of Appeals certified the case to
the Supreme Court on questions of law.
Issue: Are the bonds still in force and
effect from 1955 to 1962?
Held: YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the
Rules of COurt, the administrator is
required to put up a bond for the purpose
of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees
and the estate. It is conditioned uponthe
faithful performance of the administrator's
trust. Hence, the surety is then liable
udner the administrator's bond.
Even after the approved project of partitio,
Quebrar as administrator still had
something to do. The administration is for
the purpose of liquidation of the estate and
the distribution of the residue among the
heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the
determination of all the assets of the
estate and the payment of all debts and
expenses. it appears that there are still
deblts and expenses to be paid after 1957.
Moreover, the bond stipulationdd not
provide that it will terminate at the end of
the 1st year if the premium remains
unpaid. Hence, it does not necessariy
extinguish or terminate the effectivity of
the coutner bond in the absence of an
express stipualtion to this effect. As such,
as long as the defendant remains the
administrator of the estate, the bond will
be held liable and the plaintiff's liabilities
subsist being the co-extensive with the
administrator.
48 - GUEVARA VS GUEVARA G.R. No. L-
48840, 29 December 1943
Facts: On August 26, 1931, Victorino L.
Guevara executed a will, apparently with
all the formalities of the law. On
September 27, 1933, he died. In his will,
he made various devises and bequeaths to
his his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd
marriage. It is also in this will that he
acknowledge Rosario Guevara as her
“natural daughter”. His last will and
testament, however, was never presented
to the court for probate, nor has any
administration proceeding ever been
instituted for the settlement of his estate.
Whether the various legatees mentioned in
the will have received their respective
legacies or have even been given due
notice of the execution of said will and of
the dispositions therein made in their
favor, does not affirmatively appear from
the record of this case. Ever since the
death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only
legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears
to have possessed the land adjudicated to
him in the registration proceeding and to
have disposed of various portions thereof
for the purpose of paying the debts left by
his father. In the meantime Rosario
Guevara, who appears to have had her
father’s last will and testament in her
custody, over a little four years after the
testor's demise, commenced the present
action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone
for the purpose hereinbefore indicated;
and it was only during the trial of this case
that she presented the will to the court,
not for the purpose of having it probated
but only to prove that the deceased
Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her
as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of
the inheritance from him, but on the
theory or assumption that he died
intestate, because the will had not been
probated, for which reason, she asserted,
the betterment therein made by the
testator in favor of his legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.
Both the trial court and the Court of
appeals sustained that theory.
Issue: Whether or not the procedure
adopted by Rosario Guevara was legal?
Ruling: No. The court explained that they
cannot sanction the procedure adopted by
the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being
in our opinion in violation of procedural law
and an attempt to circumvent and
disregard the last will and testament of the
decedent. The code of civil procedure,
which was in force up to the time this case
was decided by the trial court, provides
that No will shall pass either the real or
personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the Court of First Instance, or
by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the
allowance by the court of a will of real and
personal estate shall be conclusive as to its
due execution. The proceeding for the
probate of a will is one in rem, with notice
by publication to the whole world and with
personal notice to each of the known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. The
court further noted that in the instant case
there is no showing that the various
legatees other than the present litigants
had received their respective legacies or
that they had knowledge of the existence
and of the provisions of the will. Their right
under the will cannot be disregarded, nor
may those rights be obliterated on account
of the failure or refusal of the custodian of
the will to present it to the court for
probate. Even if the decedent left no debts
and nobdy raises any question as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will,
none of the heirs may sue for the partition
of the estate in accordance with that will
without first securing its allowance or
probate by the court, first, because the law
expressly provides that "no will shall pass
either real or personal estate unless it is
proved and allowed in the proper court";
and, second, because the probate of a will,
which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be
dispensed with the substituted by any
other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial,
without offending against public policy
designed to effectuate the testator's right
to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the
rights of the heirs and legatees under the
will thru the means provided by law,
among which are the publication and the
personal notices to each and all of said
heirs and legatees. Nor may the court
approve and allow the will presented in
evidence in such an action for partition,
which is one in personam, any more than
it could decree the registration under the
Torrens system of the land involved in an
ordinary action for reinvindicacion or
partition.
49 - EUSEBIO VS. VALMORES
Facts: The proceedings were instituted in
the CFI of Rizal, upon petition of
Francisco Valmores, who claims to be
the adopted son of the spouses
Domingo Valmores and Rosalia
Saquitan. The petition alleges that Rosalia
Saquitan died in Pasig, Rizal without
leaving any decendant or ascendant;
that the nearest relatives of said decedent
are the husband, Domingo Valmores, and
the petitioner Francisco Valmores; and that
the surviving spouse, Domingo Valmores is
more than 80 years of age and physically
unfit to discharge the duties of
administrator, so the petitioner
recommends the appointment of Eulogio
Eusebio as administrator.
On the same day of the presentation of the
petition, the Clerk of court issued a notice
setting a date (August 1952) for the
hearing of the petition and ordering the
publication of the notice in the newspaper
"La Opinion." On the day set for the
hearing, no one appeared except
counsel for the petitioner Francisco
Valmores. Francisco Valmores himself did
not appear.
Counsel for the petitioner proved the
publication of the notice of hearing and,
afterwards, presented his witness, one by
the name of Raymundo Delmindo, who
declared that he is the brother of Francisco
Valmores that his brother had been
adopted by the spouses Domingo Valmores
and Rosalia Saquitan, that Rosalia
Saquitan did not leave any will, that her
nearest relative is her surviving husband
who is 80 years of age and incapable of
administering the estate. Upon the
presentation of the said testimony and the
above manifestation of counsel for
petitioner, the court entered an order
that same date, August 1952,
appointing Eulogio Eusebio
administrator of the estate of the
deceased.
Thereafter the following proceedings for
the settlement of the estate took place in
rapid succession: (1) oath of administrator
and filing of bond by him; (2) issuance of
letters of administration; (3) notice issued
by Clerk of Court to creditors to file their
claims; (4) inventory filed by
administrator; (5) supplemental inventory
filed by the administrator; (6) final
accounts presented by administrator; (7)
project of partition filed by the
administrator; (8) opposition of Domingo
Valmores; and (11) approval of accounting
and project of partition.
On March 1953 the surviving spouse
Domingo Valmores presented an
opposition impugning the appointment of
Eulogio Eusebio as administrator on the
ground that he is a stranger to the
family and to himself, and praying that
he be appointed administrator of the
properties of the deceased, and that the
case be set for hearing so that he can
present his evidence. He presented an
amended opposition, alleging that Rosalia
Saquitan had died more than two years
before, that he had been administering the
properties of her deceased wife, that he is
now the owner and possessor of the
properties in question The opposition must
have been denied because on April 1953
counsel for Domingo Valmores filed a
motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
(1) The trial court deprived him
(oppositor-appellant) of the right to
present evidence to support his
allegations, in violation of Sections 1, 3, 5
and 6 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
(2) The trial court erred in appointing a
stranger as administrator of the properties
for the reason that the person to be
appointed should be her surviving spouse.
Held: After consideration of the
circumstances as above set forth, the
Court finds that all the proceedings
subsequent to the petition are void
and should be, as they hereby are,
annulled, and it is ordered that the case
be remanded to the court of origin for
the hearing of the original petition
together with the opposition thereto of
Domingo Valmores, with previous notice
to all parties interest, including the
widow of Domingo Valmores and Maximo
Saquitan, as required by the Rules.
Since the pendency of the case, the
following events have happened:
Domingo Valmores died at 85 years old
and appears that the said oppositor was
married for the second time to Jacinta
Siscar. Upon being notified of the death of
Domingo Valmores, this Court ordered the
widow substituted for the deceased
appellant. The Court also granted the
request of Atty. A. G. Gavieres to be
separated as counsel for the deceased
Domingo Valmores based on an order of
the court finding Atty. A. G. Gavieres to
be physically unfit to handle the
defense. because of age, filed by the
counsel for said Jacinta Siscar through a
memorandum; a certification of the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasig, Rizal was also filed
to the effect that there is no record of
adoption of one Francisco Valmores by
Domingo Valmores.
Maximo Saquitan filed a petition in this
Court, alleging that he is a nephew of
the deceased Rosalia Saquitan and is
her nearest heir; that the real name of
Francisco Valmores, who filed the petition,
is Francisco Delmindo; that Francisco
Delmindo changed his name and
surreptitiously filed the petition for
administration; that movant is the only
nephew of Rosalia Saquitan and is the heir
at law of the latter and Delmindo knew
these facts; that despite said knowledge,
Francisco Delmindo failed to give
notice to him of the proceedings as
required by the Rules; and that the
newspaper La Opinion is not a
newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Rizal. He prayed that the
proceedings in the Court of First Instance,
be set aside and the petition be reinstated
for a trial de novo, and that the records be
remanded to the court of origin for said
purpose.
Records of the case discloses the following
irregularities:
(1) The person who filed the original
petition, whose real name appears to be
Francisco Delmindo, never appeared in
court to prove the supposed adoption of
him by the spouses Rosalia Saquitan and
Domingo Valmores. The supposed
adoption was also only testified to by
the brother and no competent
evidence thereof was presented as
required by law.
If adoption was legally made, the records
thereof should have existed in the Court of
First Instance. No such record were
presented at the hearing, or subsequent
thereto. Neither was evidence submitted to
prove that the records of the adoption
proceedings were lost or destroyed. These
circumstances engender the belief in our
minds that the person who instituted the
petition, Francisco Delmindo, was not
at all adopted by the deceased Rosalia
Saquitan, or had any interest in her
properties. Section 2 of Rule 80 of the
Rules of Court provides as follows:
A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person
and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
The evidence submitted in the hearing
does not satisfactorily prove that the
petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he
did not have any interest in the
properties of the deceased Rosalia
Saquitan. Under ordinary circumstances,
such defect would authorize the dismissal
of the proceedings. However, Counsel for
Domingo Valmores had not objected
to the application for the appointment
of an administrator; he only objected
to the appointment of the said
stranger Eulogio Eusebio as
administrator, claiming to have the
right as surviving spouse to be
appointed as such administrator. By
this act of Domingo Valmores, surviving
spouse of the deceased, therefore, the
fatal defect in the petition may be
considered, as cured. In other words,
the filing of the petition for the
appointment of an administrator may be
considered as having been ratified by
the surviving husband, Domingo
Valmores, and for this reason the
proceedings may not be dismissed.
(2) A study of the records also discloses
fatal irregularities in the notice required to
be given. Thus nowhere does it appear
from the record that Domingo Valmores
was ever personally notified of the
filing of the petition or of the time and
place for hearing the same. His first
opposition shows that he was not aware of
the hearing at all and was notified of the
proceedings for the first time when the
inventory was sent him. Section 3 of Rule
80 of the RoC provides:
When a petition for letters of
administration is filed in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and
place for hearing the petition, and shall
cause notice thereof to be given to the
known heirs and creditors of the decedent
and to any other persons believed to have
an interest in the estate, in the manner
provided in Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 77.
The known heir in this case was
Domingo Valmores and notice should
have been given him in accordance with
Section 3 and 4 of Rule 77. Section 4 of
Rule 77 specially provides:
The Court shall also cause copies of the
notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the
known heirs, legatees and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines at their
place of residence, and deposited in the
post office with the postage prepaid at
least twenty days before the hearing, if
such places of residence be known.
. . ..Personal service of copied of the
notice at least ten days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
Section 5 of the same rule also requires:
At the hearing compliance with the
provisions of the last two preceding
sections must be shown before the
introduction of testimony in support of the
will. All such testimony shall be taken
under oath and reduced to writing.
The records of the hearing do not show
that the notices as above required had
been given to Domingo Valmores or
Maximo Saquitan.
The Court found that the error imputed to
the trial court in oppositor-appellant's brief
that the court has failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 3 and 5 of Rule 80
had not been complied with, was actually
committed. The requirement as to
notice is essential to the validity of the
proceedings in order that no person
may be deprived of his right or
property without due process of law.
Be it as it may, there is still time to correct
the errors committed and right the wrongs
and injustices caused to the parties legally
entitled to the estate.
50 - NITTSCHER VS. NITTSCHER
Facts:
Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a
petition for the probate of his holographic
will, and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to herein respondent Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales. The probate court
issued an order allowing the said
holographic will.
On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher
died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition
for letters testamentary for the
administration of the estate of the
deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse
Cynthia V. Nittscher, she moved for the
dismissal of the said petition. However, the
court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss,
and granted respondent’s petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary. Motion
for reconsideration was filed, and denied
for lack of merit. The petitioner appealed
the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed.
Cynthia contends that Nogales petition
lacked a certification against forum
shopping. She adds, the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter
because Dr. Werner was allegedly not a
resident of the Philippines. And she was
denied due process because she did not
receive by personal service the notices of
the proceedings.
Issues:
A. Whether or not it was filed in violation
of Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
administrative circular No. 40-94?
B. Whether or not RTC has no
jurisdiction?
C. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in not concluding that the petitioner
was not deprived of due process of law by
the lower court?
Held:
A. No, there was no violation. Revised
Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 of the Court require a
certification against forum shopping for all
initiatory pleadings filed in court. However,
in this case, the petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary is not an initiatory
pleading, but a mere continuation of the
original petition for the probate of Dr.
Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure
to include a certification against forum
shopping in his petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary is not a ground for
outright dismissal of the said petition.
B. No, the RTC has jurisdiction. In this
case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are
one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was
a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the
time of his death. Hence, applying the
aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly
filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then
covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the
petition for the probate of his will and for
the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased
persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of any province in
which he had estate. … (Emphasis
supplied.)
C. No, there was no violation of due
process. Furthermore, Dr. Nittscher asked
for the allowance of his own will. In this
connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and
executors to be notified by mail or
personally. – …
If the testator asks for the allowance of his
own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner,
with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and
Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous
marriage were all duly notified, by
registered mail, of the probate
proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in
court to oppose respondent’s petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary and
she also filed a motion to dismiss the said
petition. She likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration of the issuance of the
letters testamentary and of the denial of
her motion to dismiss. We are convinced
that petitioner was accorded every
opportunity to defend her cause.
Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she
was denied due process in the probate
proceedings is without basis.
51 - MERCADO VS. SANTOS
Facts: Atilano Mercado, herein petitioner
filed with CFI petition for the probate of
the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa.
Without any opposition, the probate court
admitted the will to probate.
Intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with
the justice of the peace court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against
Mercado for falsification or forgery of the
will probated. Mercado was arrested. The
complaint was subsequently dismissed at
the instance of de Leon herself.
The same intervenor then charged the
petitioner with the same offense this time
with the court of Mexico. Petitioner was
then again arrested but the complaint was
still dismissed.
The same intervenor charged the
petitioner for a third time with the
provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the justice
of peace, court of Mexico.Petitioner was
then again arrested for the third time but
the complaint was still dismissed on
the ground that the will alleged to
have been falsified had already been
probated and there was no evidence
that the petitioner had forged the
signature of the testatrix appearing
thereon, but that, on the contrary, the
evidence satisfactorily established the
authenticity of the signature aforesaid.
Dissatisfied, same intervenor moved for
reinvestigation in CFI, Pampanga and for
the fourth time, petitioner was arrested.
CFI ordered that the case be tried on the
merits. The case proceeded to trial.
Contention of the petitioner before the CFI
with respect to his charge on forgery:
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
claiming again that the will alleged to have
been forged had already been probated
and, further, that the order probating the
will is conclusive as to the authenticity and
due execution thereof.
The motion was overruled and the
petitioner filed with CA a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the trial court from further
proceedings in the matter.
CA RULING: CA issued the injunction but
thereafter denied the petition and
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: WON the probate of Ines Basa’s
will is a bar to Mercado’s criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of said
will
Held: The American and English cases
show a conflict of authorities on the
question as to whether or not the probate
of a will bars criminal prosecution of the
alleged forger of the probated will.
However, the Philippine Supreme Court
rules that in view of the provisions of
Sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of
Civil Code Procedure, criminal action will
not lie in this jurisdiction against the
forger of a will which had been duly
admitted to probate by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
52 - URIARTE VS CFI OF NEGROS
Facts:
It appears that on November 6, 1961
petitioner filed with the Negros Court a
petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special
Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein,
inter alia, that, as a natural son of the
latter, he was his sole heir, and that,
during the lifetime of said decedent,
petitioner had instituted Civil Case No.
6142 in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son.
Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as
special administrator on November 13,
1961 and two days later it set the date for
the hearing of the petition and ordered
that the requisite notices be published in
accordance with law. The record discloses,
however, that, for one reason or another,
the Philippine, National Bank never
actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte,
one of the two private respondents herein,
filed an opposition to the above-mentioned
petition alleging that he was a nephew of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had
"executed a Last Will and Testament in
Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof
has been requested and which shall be
submitted to this Honorable Court upon
receipt thereof," and further questioning
petitioner's capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396
in the Manila Court for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following
grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there
was no legal basis to proceed with said
intestate proceedings, and (2) that
petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal
personality and interest to initiate said
intestate proceedings, he not being an
acknowledged natural son of the decedent.
A copy of the Petition for Probate and of
the alleged Will were attached to the
Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to
dismiss contending that, as the Negros
Court was first to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant
to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court
sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion
to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it.
Issue:
The principal legal questions raised in the
petition for certiorari are (a) whether or
not the Negros Court erred in dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one
hand, and on the other, (b) whether the
Manila Court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros
Court.
Rulings:
We believe in connection with the above
matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is
finally determined, or intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court,
if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening
if it has already been closed, so as to be
able to submit for determination the
question of his acknowledgment as natural
child of the deceased testator, said court
having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of
the deceased testator and whether or not
a particular party is or should be declared
his acknowledged natural child
- TESTATE OVER INTESTATE
It can not be denied that a special
proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased
person, whether in accordance with the
law on intestate succession or in
accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement
of his estate. It is equally true, however,
that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held
repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a
court of first instance it is found it hat the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings
for the probate of the latter should replace
the intestate proceedings even if at that
stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to
render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue
as an intestacy. As already adverted to,
this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings.
- IMPROPER VENUE is not NON-
JURISDICTION
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid
will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed
the petition for the purpose with the Manila
Court. We can not accept petitioner's
contention in this regard that the latter
court had no jurisdiction to consider said
petition, albeit we say that it was not the
proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that
wrong venue is merely a waiveable
procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from
doing so by laches. It is enough to
consider in this connection that petitioner
knew of the existence of a will executed by
Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19,
1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his
opposition to the initial petition filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice
of the existence (presence) of the alleged
last will in the Philippines and of the filing
of the petition for its probate with the
Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No.
6344. All these notwithstanding, it was
only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with
the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave
to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had
therein up to that date; thus enabling the
Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but
also to admit said will to probate more
than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow
him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by
the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396 would put a premium on his
negligence. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined
to annul proceedings regularly had in a
lower court even if the latter was not the
proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the
present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
53 - PECSON VS CORONEL
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga
probated the last will and testament of
Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as
her sole heir, Lorenzo Pecson, the husband
of her niece, Angela Coronel (relative by
affinity).
The blood relatives of testatrix by
consanguinity questioned the genuineness
of the will on the following grounds:
That it was improbable and exceptional
that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her
estate by excluding her blood relatives;
and,
That if such will was not expressed, it was
due to extraneous illegal influence.
Issue: WON the decedent can exclude her
blood relatives in the disposition of her
estate
Ruling:
Yes. It may be true that the ties of
relationship in the philippines are very
strong but we understand hat cases of
preterition of relatives from the inheritance
are not rare.
The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by
will when there are no compulsory heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force.
The SC held that nothing is strange in the
preterition made by Dolores of her blood
relatives nor in the designation of Pecson
as her sole beneficiary. Futhermore,
although the institution of the beneficiary
here would not seem the most usual and
customary, still this would not be null per
se:
“In the absence of any statutory
restriction, every person possesses
absolute dominion over his property and
may bestow it upon whomsoever he
pleases without regard to natural or legal
claim upon his bount. If the testator
possesses the requisite capacity to make a
will, and the disposition of his will is not
attended by fraud or undue influence, the
will is not rendered invalid by the fact that
it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust.
54 - PASCUAL VS DELA CRUZ
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in
Sp. Proc. No. 3312) admitting to probate
the purported will of Catalina de la Cruz.
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz,
single and without any surviving
descendant or ascendant, died at the age
of 89, a petition for the probate of her
alleged will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who
was named in the said will as executor and
sole heir of the decedent.
Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz
and 26 other nephews and nieces of the
late Catalina de la Cruz contested the
validity of the will on the grounds that the
formalities required by law were not
complied with; that the testatrix was
mentally incapable of disposing of her
properties by will at the time of its
execution; that the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner; and
that the signature of the testatrix was
obtained through fraud.
After hearing, during which the parties
presented their respective evidences, the
probate court rendered judgment
upholding the due execution of the will,
and, as therein provided, appointed
petitioner Andres Pascual executor and
administrator of the estate of the late
Catalina de la Cruz without bond. The
oppositors appealed directly to the Court,
the properties involved being valued at
more than P300,000.00, raising only the
issue of the due execution of the will.
In this instance, oppositors-appellees claim
that the lower court erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of the
subscribing witnesses and the notary that
the will was duly executed,
notwithstanding the existence of
inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies, and in disregarding their
evidence that the will was not signed by all
the witnesses in the presence of one
another, in violation of the requirement of
the law.
On this point, the lower court said:
It is to be noted that Exhibit "D" was
signed in 1954 and that the attesting
witnesses testified in Court in 1962 or after
a lapse of eight years from the date of the
signing of the document. It is, therefore,
understandable and reasonable to expect
that said witnesses will not retain a vivid
picture of the details surrounding the
execution and signing of the will of
Catalina de la Cruz. What is important and
essential is that there be unanimity and
certainty in their testimony regarding the
identity of the signatures of the testatrix,
the attesting witnesses, and the Notary
Public, and the fact that they were all
present at the time those signatures were
affixed on the document Exhibit "D". ....
In this jurisdiction, it is the observed rule
that, where a will is contested, the
subscribing with are generally regarded as
the best qualified to testify on its due
execution. However, it is similarly
recognized that for the testimony of such
witnesses to be entitled to full credit, it
must be reasonable and unbiased, and not
overcome by competent evidence, direct or
circumstantial. For it must be remembered
that the law does not simply require the
presence of three instrumental witnesses;
it demands that the witnesses be credible.
Issue: Whether or not the will of said
Catalina de la Cruz was duly executed
without undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner,
notwithstanding the existence of
inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies, and in disregarding their
evidence that the will was not signed by all
the witnesses in the presence of one
another, in violation of the requirement of
the law.
RULING:
In connection with the issue under
consideration, we agree with the trial
judge that the contradictions and
inconsistencies appearing in the
testimonies of the witnesses and the
notary, pointed out by the oppositors-
appellants (such as the weather condition
at the time the will was executed; the
sequence of the signing by the witnesses;
and the length of time it took to complete
the act), relate to unimportant details of
the impressions of the witnesses about
certain details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory, and which
inconsistencies, by themselves, would not
alter the probative value of their
testimonies on the due execution of the
will [cf. Peo. vs. Sigue, 86 Phil. 139-140 (3
years interval)].
In Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana, L-
13781, 30 January 1960, 106 Phil. 1076,
this Court ruled:
For the purpose of determining the due
execution of a will, it is not necessary that
the instrumental witnesses should give an
accurate and detailed account of the
proceeding, such as recalling the order of
the signing of the document by the said
witnesses. It is sufficient that they have
seen or at least were so situated at the
moment that they could have seen each
other sign, had they wanted to do so. In
fact, in the instant case, at least two
witnesses, ... both testified that the
testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the
presence of each and every one of them
(Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 451; Neyra
vs. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz. 2817; Fernandez
vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.).
Neither do we believe that the fact that the
witnesses were better known to proponent
Andres Pascual than to the testatrix
suffices to render their testimony suspect.
Under the circumstances, considering the
admitted fact that when the will was
executed (1954) the testatrix was already
83 years old, suffering from rheumatism to
the extent that she had to wear thick socks
and soft shoes, it did not unlikely that she
should have entrusted the task of
requesting them to act as witnesses to
Andres Pascual himself, albeit the said
witnesses, testifying eight years later,
should have stated that they were asked
by Catalina to witness her testament. The
error of recall, considering the eight-year
interval, is consonant with the well known
vagaries of human memory and
recollection, particularly since the main
detail that must have stuck in his minds is
that they did witness the signing of the
will, upon which their attention must have
principally concentrated. That they did so
is attested by their signatures and those of
the deceased testatrix, which are nowhere
impugned; nor is there any claim by
appellants that the latter was incapable of
reading and understanding the will that
she signed. In fact, the evidence is that
she did read it before signing. The
authorities are to the effect that friendly
relations of the witnesses with the testator
or the beneficiaries do not affect the
credibility of the former, so that the
proven friendship between the proponent
and the instrumental witnesses would have
no bearing on the latter's qualification to
testify on the circumstances surrounding
the signing of the will.
Appellant's main reliance is the alleged
tape recording of a conversation between
instrumental witness Manuel Jiongco and
oppositor Pedro B. Cruz at the latter's
house sometime in 1960 (which recording
was admittedly taken without Jiongco's
knowledge) wherein said witness is
supposed to have stated that when he
signed the will the other witnesses'
signatures were already affixed, and were
not then present, and that he (Jiongco)
signed the document in 1958 or 1959
(Exhibit 22; transcription; Exhibit 23 et.
seq.).
There are two circumstances that militate
against giving credence to particular
evidence. The first is that there is no
adequate proof that the declarations tape
recorded were in fact made by Jiongco.
The latter denied that the voice was his.
Not having heard Jiongco testify, this court
is not in a position to contradict the
appreciation of the trial court that the
voice in the tape recording was not really
that of Jiongco. And considering that he
denied that fact under oath, that the tape
recording was not supported by truly
impartial evidence, and was done without
the knowledge of the witness, we cannot
see our way clear to rule that Jiongco has
been successfully impeached, and shown
guilty of false testimony. It would be
dangerous to rule otherwise.
The second point that renders incredible
the alleged assertion of Jiongco in the tape
recording, that he signed the testament
only in 1958 or 1959, is that in the
Notarial Registry of the notary, Gatdula,
the ratification of the testament appears
among the entries for 1954, as well as in
the corresponding copies (Exhibit I) filed
by him with Bonifacio Sumulong, the
employee in charge of the Notarial Section
of the Clerk of Court's office, who
produced them at the trial upon subpoena,
and who testified to his having searched
for and found them in the vaults of the
Clerk of Court's office. No evidence exists
that these documents were not
surrendered and filed at the Clerk of
Court's office, as required by law, and in
the regular course of official duty.
Certainly, the notary could not have
reported in 1954 what did not happen until
1958.
In view of the evidence, we do not feel
justified in concluding that the trial court
erred in accepting the concordant
testimony of the instrumental witnesses as
warranting the probate of the will in
question, taking into account the
unexcelled opportunity of the court a quo
to observe the demeanor, and judge the
credibility, of the witness thereby.
Contestants further assail the admission to
probate on the ground that the execution
of the will was tainted by fraud and undue
influence exerted by proponent on the
testarix, and affirm that it was error for
the lower court to have rejected their
claim.
Said the court in this regard (Record on
Appeal, page 87):
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that
the mere fact that a Will was made in
favor of a stranger is not in itself proof
that the same was obtained through fraud
and undue pressure or influence, for we
have numerous instances where strangers
are preferred to blood relatives in the
institution of heirs. But in the case at bar,
Andres Pascual, although not related by
blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz,
was definitely not a stranger to the latter
for she considered him as her own son. As
a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de
la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres
Pascual but also her sisters held him with
affection so much so that Catalina's sister,
Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole
heir to her property in her Will without any
objection from Catalina and Valentina
Cruz.
Before considering the correctness of these
findings, it is worthwhile to recall the basic
principles on undue pressure and influence
as laid down by the jurisprudence of this
Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will,
the influence exerted must be of a kind
that so overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his free
agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own (Coso vs.
Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil. 596; Icasiano vs.
Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964; Teotico
vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 196); that
the contention that a will was obtained by
undue influence or improper pressure
cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or
suspicion, as it is enough that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence, or
a possibility that it may have been
exercised (Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, L-5597, 31
May 1956); that the exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be
supported by substantial evidence that it
was actually exercised (Ozatea vs.
Cuartero, ante; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-
18753, 26 March 1965); that the burden is
on the person challenging the will to show
that such influence was exerted at the
time of its execution (Teotico vs. Del Val,
ante); that mere general or reasonable
influence is not sufficient to invalidate a
will (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, ante); nor
is moderate and reasonable solicitation
and entreaty addressed to the testator
(Barreto vs. Reyes, L-5831-31, 31 January
1956), or omission of relatives, not forced
heirs, evidence of undue influence (Bugnao
vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronel,
45 Phil. 416).
Tested against these rulings, the
circumstances marshalled by the
contestants certainly fail to establish actual
undue influence or improper pressure
exercised on the testarix by the proponent.
Their main reliance is on the assertion of
the latter, in the course of his testimony,
that the deceased "did not like to sign
anything unless I knew it" (t.s.n., page 7,
27 January 1962), which does not amount
to proof that she would sign anything that
proponent desired. On the contrary, the
evidence of contestants-appellants, that
proponent purchased a building in Manila
for the testarix, placed the title in his
name, but caused the name "Catalina de la
Cruz" to be painted thereon in bold letters
to mislead the deceased, even if true,
demonstrates that proponent's influence
was not such as to overpower to destroy
the free will of the testarix. Because if the
mind of the latter were really subjugated
by him to the extent pictured by the
contestants, then proponent had no need
to recourse to the deception averred.
Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and
not the testarix, who asked Dr. Sanchez to
be one of the instrumental witnesses
evidence of such undue influence, for the
reason that the rheumetism of the testarix
made it difficult for her to look for all the
witnesses. That she did not resort to
relatives or friends is, likewise explainable:
it would have meant the disclosure of the
terms of her will to those interested in her
succession but who were not favored by
her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant
importunity and recriminations that an
aged person would naturally seek to avoid.
The natural desire to keep the making of a
will secret can, likewise, account for the
failure to probate the testament during her
lifetime.
We conclude that the trial court committed
no error in finding the appellant's evidence
established at most grounds for suspicion
but fell far short of establishing actual
exercise of improper pressure or influence.
Considering that testarix considered
proponent as her own son, to the extent
that she expressed no objection to his
being made the sole heir of her sister,
Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own
rights, we find nothing abnormalin her
instituting proponent also as her own
beneficiary. As stated by the Court in the
Knutson case —
The truth of the matter is that bequests
and devises to those in whom the testator
has confidence and who have won his
affection are more likely to be free from
undue influence that bequests or devises
to others. (In re Knutson's Will, 41 Pac. 2d
793).
Appellants invoked presumption of undue
influence held to exist by American
authorities where the beneficiary
participates in the drafting of execution of
the will favoring him; but since the will
was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although
nephew of the proponent, we do not think
the presumption applies; for in the normal
course of events, said attorney would
follow the instructions of the testatrix; and WON the trial court was correct in
a member of the bar in good standing may admitting the will and its duplicate to
not be convicted of unprofessional probate given the allegations of forgery of
conduct, or of having conspired to falsify a the testator’s signature, or that the will
statement, except upon clear proof. was executed under circumstances
constituting fraud and undue influence and
pressure?
55 - ICASIANO VS ICASIANO
RULING:
On the allegations of forgery, fraud
FACTS:
and undue influence:
Petition for the allowance and admission to
probate of the alleged will of Josefa
The Court is satisfied that all the requisites
Villacorte, and for the appointment of
for the validity of a will have been
petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor
complied with. The opinion of a
thereof.
handwriting expert trying to prove forgery
Natividad Icasiano, led her opposition; and
of the testatrix’s signature failed to
she petitioned to have herself appointed as
convince the Court, not only because it is
a special administrator. Subsequently
directly contradicted by another expert but
Enrique Icasiano, also led a manifestation
principally because of the paucity of the
adopting as his own Natividad's opposition
standards used by him (only three other
to the probate of the alleged
signatures), considering the advanced age
Celso Icasiano commenced the
of the testatrix, the evident variability of
introduction of evidence but later on filed a
her signature, and the effect of writing
motion for the admission of an amended
fatigue.
and supplemental petition, alleging that
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in
the decedent left a will executed in
blueness of the ink in the admitted and
duplicate with all the legal requirements,
questioned signatures does not appear
which he allegedly found only on or about
reliable, considering that standard and
May 26, 1959.
challenged writings were affixed to
The records show that the original of the
different kinds of paper, with different
will, which was surrendered simultaneously
surfaces and reflecting power. On the
with the filing of the petition and marked
whole, the testimony of the oppositor’s
as Exhibit “A” consists of five pages, and
expert is insufficient to overcome that of
while signed at the end and in every page,
the notary and the two instrumental
it does not contain the signature of one of
witnesses as to the will’s execution, which
the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V.
were presented by Celso during the trial.
Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but
Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or
the duplicate copy attached to the
undue influence. The fact that some heirs
amended and supplemental petition and
are more favored than others is proof of
marked as Exhibit “A” is signed by the
neither. Diversity of apportionment is the
testatrix and her three attesting witnesses
usual reason for making a testament;
in each and every page.
otherwise, the decedent might as well die
Witness Natividad, who testified on his
intestate. The testamentary disposition
failure to sign page three (3) of the
that the heirs should not inquire into other
original, admits that he may have lifted
property and that they should respect the
two pages instead of one when he signed
distribution made in the will, under penalty
the same, but affirmed that page three (3)
of forfeiture of their shares in the free
was signed in his presence.
part, do not suffice to prove fraud or
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced
undue influence.
expert testimony to the effect that the
signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate
On the failure of a witness to sign a
(Exhibit “A”) are not genuine nor were
page in the original, but signed all
they written or affixed on the same
pages in the duplicate:
occasion as the original, and further aver
that granting that the documents were
The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page
genuine, they were executed through
three (3) was entirely through pure
mistake and with undue influence and
oversight is shown by his own testimony
pressure because the testatrix was
as well as by the duplicate copy of the will,
deceived into adopting as her last will and
which bears a complete set of signatures
testament.
in every page. The text of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment before the
ISSUE:
Notary Public likewise evidence that no one
was aware of the defect at the time.
Therefore, Atty. Natividad’s failure to sign
page 3 of the original through mere
inadvertence does not affect the will’s
validity.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only the fact that the testatrix
and two other witnesses did sign the
defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary
public before whom the testament was
ratified by testatrix and all three
witnesses. The law should not be so
strictly and literally interpreted as to
penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over
whose conduct she had no control, where
the purpose of the law to guarantee the
identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained,
no intentional or deliberate deviation
existed, and the evidence on record attests
to the full observance of the statutory
requisites.
The appellants also argue that since the
original of the will is in existence and
available, the duplicate is not entitled to
probate. Since they opposed probate of
the original because it lacked one
signature in its third page, it is easily
discerned that oppositors-appellants run
here into a dilemma: if the original is
defective and invalid, then in law there is
no other will but the duly signed carbon
duplicate, and the same is probatable. If
the original is valid and can be probated,
then the objection to the signed duplicate
need not be considered, being superfluous
and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate
serves to prove that the omission of one
signature in the third page of the original
testament was inadvertent and not
intentional.
56 - REY VS CARTAGENA
REY v. CARTAGENA, G.R. No. 34288.
November 10, 1931.
Facts: Rosario Rey filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
probate of the will of the deceased
Agustina Celiz. She also asked that she be
appointed administratrix of the estate. To
said petition Guillermo Cartagena and four
others filed an opposition, alleging that
said will was not the last will and
testament of the deceased Agustina Celiz;
that the signature appearing thereon was
not her signature, and that said will was
not executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.
After hearing the evidence the judge
assigned to the case reached the
conclusion that said will was the last will
and testament of the deceased Agustina
Celiz, and that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law, and rendered a judgment
admitting said will to probate. From that
judgment the opponents appealed, and
now allege that the lower court erred in
declaring that said will was executed in
compliance with the requisites of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the will was
executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.
Held: YES. The alleged defects in the
attestation clause are too trivial to warrant
the disallowance of the probate of the will.
The said will is in substantial conformity
with the requirements of section 618 of Act
No. 190, as amended. Said attestation
clause, among other things, states: (a)
That the will is composed of six pages; (b)
that the testatrix signed the same and on
all the margins thereof in the presence of
the witnesses; and (c) that the witnesses
also signed in the presence of the testatrix
and in the presence of each other.
The appellants earnestly contend that the
attestation clause fails to show that the
witnesses signed the will and each and
every page thereof because it simply says
that “the witnesses also signed in the
presence of the testatrix and of each
other.”
In answer to this contention it may be said
that this portion of the attestation clause
must be read in connection with the
portion preceding it, which states that the
testatrix signed the will and on all the
margins thereof in the presence of the
witnesses; especially, because the word
also used therein establishes a very close
connection between said two portions of
the attestation clause. This word also
should, therefore, be given its full meaning
which, in the instant case, is that the
witnesses signed the will in the same
manner as the testatrix did. The language
of the whole attestation clause, taken
together, clearly shows that the witnesses
signed the will and on all the margins
thereof in the presence of the testatrix and
of each other.
In the interpretation of section 618 of Act
No. 190, as amended, the court must bear
in mind that the purpose of the law is not
to curtail the exercise of the right to make
a will, but to safeguard it; and where a will
has been executed in substantial
compliance with the formalities of the law,
and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in
the exercise thereof is obviated, said will
should be admitted to probate.

During the deliberation our attention was

called to the case of Rodriguez v. Alcala
(55 Phil., 150). In that case the court
disallowed the will on the ground that in
the attestation clause there is nothing to
show in whose presence the will and the
pages thereof were signed by the testatrix
and witnesses. As will be readily seen, the
decision in that case is not applicable to
the case at bar.

Thus, the ruling of the lower court must be

AFFIRMED, and the will is hereby allowed
to be admitted into probate.