SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, vs.

JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She
alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan,
she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without
prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get
her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was
told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her,
Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner
and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the
NLRC finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her 3 months’ worth of salary, the
reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled
that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.” Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar
law or provision.

The Court declared the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
I. THE FACTS The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the
Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of
the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”

II. THE ISSUE Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING : NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must
be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate
for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure,
as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement
is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard,
has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Facts:
• Pursuant to the privatization program under proclamation No. 50, GSIS decided to sell
thru public bidding 30 to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
Among others, the winning bidder is to provide management/expertise to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
• On Sept. 18, 1995, a close bidding was held with only 2 bidders participating: Manila
Prince hotel Corp., a Fil. Corporation which offered to buy of the MHC or 15, 300 shares at P41.58 and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm which bid for the same number of shares at P44 shares or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
• On Sept. 28, 1995, Pet. Sent a letter to GSIS matching the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad and later sent a manager’s check which GSIS refused to accept.
• Pet. Came to the court on prohibition and mandamus enjoining respondent from
consummating the sale to the Malaysian Firm on the grounds that Petioner should be preferred as Sec.
10, 2nd par. of Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution gave Filipinos prederence over foreign corporations; and
that Manila Hotel has become part of national patrimony, being a part of the tourism industry, the hotel
business of the respondent GSIS is part of the national economy which is covered in the aforementioned
consti. provision.
• Respondents argued that said consti prov. Is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and required enacting legislations; that manila Hotel does not
fall under national patrimony.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 10m 2nd par. of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision?

RULING:
1.Yes, the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
2. Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Planas vs. Commission on Elections , [GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]

Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1
dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions

FACTS:

• On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by
Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved
on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was
held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on 1
June 971.

• While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation
1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved
its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the
President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973.

• Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-
35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General,
to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree 73, in any manner,
until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force
and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the
same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress,"
and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed.

• Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending
the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973,
when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January
1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime"
the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes
of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement
of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither
the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced
officially.

• Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular
session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President
does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the
Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying
that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged
in said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86
organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions; and that
thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose — [1] The
New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed
new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite
from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session
slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law."

ISSUE [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.

HELD [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue
on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in
which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also,
of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly
provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.

ISSUE [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the
Constitution proposed by the Convention.

HELD [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the
Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is
unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said
Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later,
the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.

ISSUE [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification
of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution.

HELD [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the
cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation,
although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution
to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15,
1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and
it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion
possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the
surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners
should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.
HELD (TOTALITY): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this:
(1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2)
On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and
Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic,
whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On the
authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate
therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and
Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando,
likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the
performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo,
Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law
affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom
essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the
election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and
would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and
Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and
that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the
purposes contemplated. (6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:
[a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of the
opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court,
which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court,
and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens'
Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant
circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in
force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified
in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect
whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the
Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially
discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question
whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices
Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which
they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate
pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar
favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he
believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under
consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Javellana vs Executive Secretary
Facts: The Plebiscite Case

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August
24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held
on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June
1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081
placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution
on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter
alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite,
the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the
question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the
Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of
said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.

On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,
when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15,
1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the
meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.
1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed
it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22,
1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have
the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission
on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent
motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,
1973.”

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later
than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the
petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order
and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and
restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and
its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado
Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their
deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task,
from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned,
the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to
have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions
quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case
G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16,
1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being
heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion
and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the
writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the
writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch
as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President
had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102,
earlier that morning.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases,
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions
of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him
as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of
all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the
immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to
ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree,
and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

Issues:

Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.

Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by
the people.

It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well
settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the
provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.

The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age
can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the
persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American
regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform
official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage
of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is
void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention
of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of
those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no
reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the
fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and
honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null
and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution

No majority vote has been reached by the Court.

The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department,
in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress
do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.
The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence
to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as
regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees
and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently
thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation
is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of
conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same
refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of
the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of
the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given
due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been
acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect;
and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the
submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in
accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised
Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.
Aquino Jr. v. Enrile,
Decided by the Supreme Court in 1974. When martial law was proclaimed in September 21, 1972,
Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., together with Ramon Mitra Jr., Francisco Rodrigo, and Napoleon Rama,
the stalwarts of the opposition fighting against the dictatorship, were arrested and held pursuant to
General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), “for being participants or for having given
aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the
government by force.

Aquino and colleagues filed petitions for habeas corpus. But while eventually all the petitioners were
either permitted to withdraw their petitions or released from detention subject to certain restrictions,
Aquino remained in detention. In fact, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of
firearms were lodged against him forcing him to challenge the jurisdiction of the Military Commission
trying him.

Faced with Aquino’s remaining legal challenge, the court had to confront the issue of whether or not the
court could inquire into the validity of Proclamation No. 1081. Put more simply, is the question political
or justiciable in character? Paraphrased another way, are not the issues raised in the petitions related to
the propriety or constitutional sufficiency of the issuance of the proclamation purely political, which are
not for the Judiciary, but for the people and the political departments of the government to determine?

Five justices, namely, Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino held that the question
was political and therefore its determination was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court. Arrayed on
the side of justiciability were four justices including Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz
Palma who held that the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the
Highest Court.

Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believed that political questions were not per se beyond the Court’s
jurisdiction, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from
interfering with the Executive’s proclamation.

Justice Makalintal who penned the decision sided with non-justiciability when he opined that the
political-or-justiciable-question controversy has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the
general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. With the ruling of non-justiciability having attained the majority
vote, the High Court decided to dismiss all petitions.

An interesting side story of this case involved Senator Jose W. Diokno. He was one of the original
petitioners but later he withdrew from the case, stating that he had lost confidence in the Supreme Court
after it ruled that the 1973 Constitution was in effect.

Almost 10 years later, the Supreme Court would revisit the issue of illegal detentions in Garcia-Padilla
v. Enrile. In 1982, Sabino Padilla and eight others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference
in the dining room at Dr. Parong’s residence. These individuals, together with a few others totaling 14,
were previously under surveillance by the authorities as they were suspected of engaging in subversive
activities being members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. It was during this meeting that they
were arrested by the Philippine Constabulary by authority of a Presidential Commitment Order and
brought to an undisclosed location.
Not knowing the whereabouts of her son Sabino, Josefina Padilla, went to the Court praying for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to direct respondents then-Minister of National Defense Enrile, Gen.
Fabian Ver, Gen. Fidel Ramos and Lt. Col. Colonel to produce the bodies of the missing individuals.

In the resolution of the Court, the writ of habeas corpus was issued and respondents were required to
make a return of the writ. At the hearing of the petition, the Solicitor General contended that the so-
named persons were arrested and are being detained for offenses with respect to which under
Proclamation No. 2045, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continues to be suspended; in effect
saying that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to them. Hence, courts cannot
inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and detention.

Before the Court, the legality of the Presidential Commitment Order was put in issue.

Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice De Castro said that the arrest of persons involved in the
rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance
of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. Hence, according
to J. De Castro, the arrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the issuance of
Presidential Commitment Order PCO is merely preventive. The majority further stated that a Presidential
Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the exclusive prerogative of the President under the
Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of “political question.”

Disagreeing with the majority, Justice Teehankee opined that notwithstanding the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution guarantees
the right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not
be removed nor diminished nor abdicated.
Phil. Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December 20, 1985
Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for
President and Vice-President on February 7, 1986. The law was enacted following the
letter of President Marcos to the BP that he was "irrevocably vacating the position of
President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation."

The principal ground for the challenge to the validity of the statute was that the conditional
resignation of the President did not create a vacancy required by Article VII, Sec. 9 which
authorized the calling of a special election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to run
on that said special election.

HELD: After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted
to declare the statute unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana v. Executive
Secretary, of the view that as there were less than ten votes for declaring BP 883
unconstitutional. The petitions should be dismissed.

On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question. It can only be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. Thus, it is outside the ambit
of the courts.

The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either
to the give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated
items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the
alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings
allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO
No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through
its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.2

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on
its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the
Resolution reads:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St.,
La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area
of 3,327 square meters. The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at
₱700,000.00. The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered
by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items
could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Aside from the military equipment/items and
communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano
in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth
Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas. Sworn statement in
the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized
in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. In view of the
foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

The Issue;

RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS
SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND
TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These
are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under
EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term ‘subordinate.’ The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or
his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
or nominees have any interest or participation.’

Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against private
respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if
these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid
but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items:
one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure
"on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same
in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government,
as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation
of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill
of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the
"people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in
fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be
said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the
administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military
signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. To hold
that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would
render void all sequestration orders issued by the ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private
property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search
and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights
of the Freedom Constitution.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,53 and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these
items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Renato S. Puno, A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29, 1992

FACTS:

• Petitioner Puno, a member of the CA wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the court
seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. Petitioner was first appointed as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980 but took his oath for said position only in Nov. 29, 1982 after
serving in the office of the SolGen. On June 17, 1983, the CA was reorganized and became IAC pursuant
to Batasan Pambansa Blg. 129 “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary…”

• The EDSA Revolution in 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire govt. including the
judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33,
as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11
from being the assoc. justice of the new CA.

• However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that
the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino.
The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos
and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim
such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his
last appointment.

ISSUES: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would
negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.

RULING:

• The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created
in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino
in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence.

• It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state”
and from there is derived “the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution.” It is assumed that the legal order remains as a
“culture system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and that a point may be reached, however,
where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by the population nor
enforced by the officials.

• Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved
in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier
declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus, it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure
of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the
legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011
Facts: In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and
classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1; 2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent
and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community
of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international
law norms operate. the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not
place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art
2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

[B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997)
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people”
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people
by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure
for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity
is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Bacani v. National Coconut Corp., G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956
Facts: Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National
Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant ,requested
said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing
714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut
Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts
on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the
National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in
question.

Issue : WON NACOCO is a Government Entity

Held: They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification
of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was
organized with the purpose of ³adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States´ and of providing ³Facilities for the better curing of copra products and
the proper utilization of coconut by-products´, a function which our government has chosen to exercise
to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our
government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No.
518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is
an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, ³The mere fact that the Government
happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public. the term ³Government of the Republic of
the Philippines´ used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government
entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in
this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be
provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations.
They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, dutie sand liabilities
have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not there forecome
within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court
ACCFA v. FLU, 30 SCRA 649
FACTS:

ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its administrative
machinery was reorganized and its named changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land
Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association were
referred to as Union in the ACCFA.

The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of
one year. Few months have passed, however,The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint
against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and non implementation
of said agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing further acts
tending to discourage the Union members in the exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to comply
with and implement the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good faith with the complainants.
ACCFA moved to reconsider but it was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental functions.

RULING:

Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic
Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive
Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration.

The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies,
plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the
National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to
Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of
doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
PVTA v. CIR, 65 SCRA 416
Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime
services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for
certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore
exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become
obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of
the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner
can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private
respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because
petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was
beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation
that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it
has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can
hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause
for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot
suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945
FACTS: The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts
of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and jurisdiction
of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they
administered and enforced.

ISSUE: Whether the governments established in the Philippines (Philippine Executive Commission and
Republic of the Philippines) during the Japanese military regime were de facto governments.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by
Order No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military
forces and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The source of its authority comes from
the Japanese military, it is a government imposed by the laws of war. The same is true with the Republic
of the Philippines. Apparently, established and organized as a sovereign state, independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the
Japanese forces of occupation.
In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial
department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its
control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and
control of said government, remain good.
All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before
and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original
sovereign.
Peralta v. Director, 75 Phil 285
FACTS: William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the
Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military
forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does
not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE: Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the
criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the
usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid
since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All
judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

Alcantara v. Director, 75 Phil 749

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the
ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of
Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of
illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790)and sentence the petitioner to an
indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three
years, nine months and three days ofprison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on
September 12, 1944, and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.

Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the
sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by
Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the
majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of
said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944,
which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No.
L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes.
In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-called
Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines
during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the
judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion. In that the same case this Court held
that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court
of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37.
The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of the
number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called Republic effected no substantial
change in its nature and jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent
occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the
court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and
valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that
such judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its decision in the
abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the
authorities therein cited.

Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged
with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised
Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court
of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not
defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offenses committed against
belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory
and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private
reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the
welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national security
, such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes
against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were
made crimes against the belligerent occupant.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, theaccusedadhered to
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that hecannot be tried fortreason since his
allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a
change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was
replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine
government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or
eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather,it was the exercise of sovereignty
that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there
is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What happened was a mere
change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the land
are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t
sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the acts of
treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed sovereign.

Lawyer’s League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, 5/22/86

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the
Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the new government.
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146710, 3/2/01
FACTS:

This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo
as the de jure 14th President of the Republic.
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she
is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Chavit Singson, a
longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19,
the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after
taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD:

The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de
jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. As per reference in Section 11, “Whenever the President transmits
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.”
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference
to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes,
limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit,
restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article
VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

Held: No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty,
particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the
proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level,
it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a
hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with
all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and
most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be
performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to
make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit
of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning
such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the
termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the
very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As
aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient
nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination”
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply
to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the
fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of
the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of
laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered
that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
– edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied
in the case at bar?

HELD: No. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted
to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present
case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in
nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and
cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77
Facts: On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final
for lack of an appeal. On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The
project of partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of
plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23,
1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated
as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer
of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon
sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and
Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing &
Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The
Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. On November 2,
1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling: No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming
a Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from
Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on
March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in
Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no
longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance from
the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.
Vilas v. City of Manila, 42 Phil 953
FACTS:

• Prior to the incorporation of the City of manila under RA mo. 183, Vilas is the creditor of the City
of Manila. After incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the
city.
• The City of Manila contended that the liabilities have been extinguished by virtue of change of
sovereignty after cession of the Philippines by the Treaty of Paris.

ISSUE:

Whether the change of sovereignty extinguished the previous liability of City of Manila to its creditor?

RULING:

• No, the mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the
successor of the old city. Thus, the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation including its liabilities.
• Only the laws and regulations pertaining to governmental functions that are not compatible with
the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the
predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

Gov’t v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil 728

Facts:

On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Dominions then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn
invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said
amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The bank argued that the Philippine government is not
an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. Bank argues that the government was not
the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent
bank?

HELD:

The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance
with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has
the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has
been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back
the money intended for the people.
Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94
Facts: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise
indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of
Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance
policy?

YES. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected
then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the
minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would
be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a
parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such
is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the
State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 US 349
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree
of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17
Haw. 82. The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the mortgage
a part of the mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory
of Hawaii, and was now part of a public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the
territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was argued. Then
the plea was overruled, and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made, the appellants
having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory, and
directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay
the debt. Eq. Rule 92.

The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the mortgage land must
be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be entered until all the mortgaged premises have been
sold. In aid of their contention they argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal
corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which does not extend to this case. They
liken the territory to the District of Columbia (Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 ,
33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it has been a party to suits that have been before
this court (Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200
U.S. 255 , 50 L. ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248).

The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 , 44 L. ed. 1140, 20
Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so.
See act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in the case at bar it did object, and
the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to
the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer
has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
'Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.' Bodin,
Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132;

As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in
the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate
and change at their will the law of contract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction
derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course it
cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not the case with a territory of the United States,
because the territory itself is the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might
intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the Constitution does, and the power that can alter the Constitution
might. But the rights that exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349, 354] Congress or the Constitution,
except to the extent of certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia is different, because there
the body of private rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District.
But for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339,
6, 55. 31. However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to sell all the
land is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to the territory, the court is not thereby
deprived of ability to proceed. Decree affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.
Garcia v. Chief of Staff 16 SCRA 120
FACTS:

• On Dec. 1, 1961, Petitioner Garcia filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action
to collect a sum of money against the Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the AFP.

• Petitioner claimed that sometime in July 1948, he suffered injuries (deprivation of sight rendering
him permanently disabled) while undergoing the 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca,
Pampanga.

• He then filed his claim under Commonwealth Act 400, but the Adjutant General sent a letter
disallowing his claim for disability benefits.

• The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action has prescribed.

ISSUE:

Whether the court has jurisdiction over the money claim of Garcia against the AFP should be granted?

RULING:

• No, although the Court of First Instance denied the money claim on prescription, the Court of
First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as it is a money claim against the government.

• In New Manila Lumber Co. Inc. v. Republic, a claim for the recovery of money against the
government should be filed with the Auditor-General, in line with the principle that the State cannot be
sued without its consent.

• Commonwealth Act 327 provides:

SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable
officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. . . .

SEC. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account
or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing:

xxx xxx x x x.

(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

Actions; Money claim against the government should be filed with the Auditor General. – A claim for
the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the
principle that State cannot sued without its consent.
Ruiz vs. Cabahug 102 Phil 110
Facts:

The secretary of National Defense, Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug accepted the bid of Allied Technologists
Inc, on July 31, 1950 for the furnishing of the architectural and engineering services in the construction
of the Veterans Hospital at the price of Php 302, 700. The architectural requirements were submitted by
Allied Technologies through Enrique Ruiz, Jose Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and were approved by the
United States Veterans Administration and a contract was signed due to the technical objection to the
capacity of the said company in the practice of architecture and upon the advice of the Secretary of
Justice. The defendants allegedly took 15% of the sum due to Allied Technologies, Inc. at the time of the
payment of the contract price for the reason that Panlillo asserted that he is the sole architect of the
Veterans Hospital, excluding Ruiz and Herrera, the assertion of which was abetted by defendant Jimenez.
The plaintiffs were to be deprived of their share of professional services and their professional prestige
and standing were to be gravely damaged unless they are prevented from recognizing Panlillo as the sole
architect. The second cause of action is Title II of the contract where at any time prior to six months
after completion and acceptance of the work under Title I, the government may direct Allied
Technologists, Inc. to do the services stated in said Title II yet nevertheless the completion the
government declined to direct the plaintiffs to perform the job.

Issue:

Whether or not the government can be sued for withholding the 15% of the sum and depriving the
plaintiffs of their share.

Held:

The case is not a suit against the government, which in turn, could not be sued without it’s consent. It
was found that the government has already allotted the full amount for the contract price; it was the
defendant-officials which are responsible for the allegation. This was to be directed to the officials alone,
where they are compelled to act in accordance with the rights established by Ruiz and Herrera or to desist
them from praying and recognizing the rights and interest in the funds retained and the credit for the job
finished. The order of dismissal was reversed and set aside, and the case remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings with costs against defendants.
Republic vs. Sandoval GR No. 84607
Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority

FACTS:

• Farmer-rallyists (KMP), led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and
demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords;
and (c) stop amortizations of land payments;
• There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and few
were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission
for the purpose of conducting an investigation.
• The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of
Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers
involved in the incident.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit considering that, as Petitioners argue, the
recommendation of the commission to indemnify would mean its consent?

(2) Whether or not this qualifies as a suit against the state?

RULING:

• No, Art. 14, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the state may not be sued without its
consent. The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does
not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation
of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for
a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the
Commission does not in any way bind the State
• Although the military officers were discharging their official functions during the incident, their
functions ceased to be official, the moment they exceeded their authority. The principle will not apply
when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the state nor
the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity. The military
forces unjustifiably fired at the rallyist- acts beyond their official capacity.
Sanders v. Veridiano GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988
FACTS:

Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo
city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing
in the Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of
the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents
allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed
for damages against petitioners.

ISSUE:

1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for
which the private respondents sued them for damages?

2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters,
the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As such,
the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its
consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance
with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged
offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

a. Effect when public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction

Carmen Festejo vs. Isaias Fernando GR No. L-5156
FACTS:
• Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau of Public
Works, for taking possession of three parcels of land she owned and causing an irrigation canal to be
constructed thereon without obtaining first a right of way, without her consent and knowledge, and
against her express objection.
• Plaintiff demanded the return of the land and its restoration to its former condition.

ISSUE: Whether or not this is a suit against the state?

RULING:
• No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant
committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of
way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be
held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore and may be sued as
any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act. It is a
general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts
outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself
amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot
shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally.
In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.
xxx
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Separate Opinions CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:

To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias
Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government.
According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works."
Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged: 4. That the defendant as Director of the
Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for
the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines;
The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were performed by said
defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly shows that the designation of his office
was included in the title of the case to indicate that he was being sued in his official capacity
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system referred to in the
complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in charge" and
for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated
with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the
manner in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system
or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government.
Bermoy v. PNC GR No. L – 8670
FACTS:
• Twenty-four employees from its dormitory known as Normal Hall of the Philippine Normal
College, filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against the PNC for the recovery
of salary differentials and overtime pay.
• The court ordered it dismissed before the case was tried on the merits, on the ground that neither
one of the defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued.
• The plaintiffs took an appeal to Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case
on the ground that, R.A. No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC, thus created a Board of
Trustees to administer the affairs as a corporation under section 13 of the amended Act 1455 (Corporate
Law), with the power “to sue and to be sued in any court.”

ISSUES:
Whether PNC as a government corporation can be sued?

RULING:
• Yes, the state has already given the consent by investing the college with express power to be
sued in the court. RA no. 416 Authorizes the College to be sued, specifically in section 6, where it
provided that “all process against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or Secretary
thereof”. The order appealed from is re revoked and the case remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.

Arcega v CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Arcega, doing a business under the firm name “Fairmont Ice Cream Company”
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Central Bank of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Bank for the refund of 18,030.13 pesos representing allegedly
unauthorized payments made by her in the concept of the 17% special excise tax on foreign
exchange levied under section 1 R.A 601. Defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint
since it will constitute a financial charge against the government. Therefore, the suit is one
against the government which cannot prosper without its consent.

ISSUE:
Whether a suit against the Central Bank for the refund of the 17% foreign exchange tax
collected under R.A. 601 is actually a suit against the State.

RULING:
YES. Section 5 of R.A. 601 directs that refund of taxes be made by the Central Bank. As
held in Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, the Central Bank of
the Philippines is authorized by its charter to sue and be sued. Thus, the consent of the State to
be sued has been given.
GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN
FACTS:
• At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the
three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of
said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the
respondent corporation.
• Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and contended that
the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic act,
it can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the management and
operation of the Angat Dam.
2. W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power
to be sued for tort.

HELD:
• The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue
and be sued in any court under its charter.
• As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any
court.

PNR v. IAC GR No. 70547; January 22, 1993

FACTS:
The passenger express train of Philippine National Railways (PNR) and a passenger bus of
Baliwag Transit Inc. collided at the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan at 1:30 in
the afternoon of August 10, 1947 causing damage to the bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53
suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the negligence and imprudence
of PNR and its engineer Honorio Cirbado in operating in a busy intersection without any bars,
semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman.

ISSUE:
1) Who between the petitioner and respondent was negligent?
2) Is PNR immune from suit?

HELD:
There is no admissible evidence to show that the bus driver did not take necessary precaution in
traversing the track. Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver for he had taken
necessary precautions before passing over the railway track. The failure of PNR, on the other hand, to
put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman, or switchman or semaphores is evidence of negligence on their
part.
By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to
transact private business. PNR is not exercising governmental powers, as such it is not immune from
suit.
Bureau of Printing v Bureau of Printing Employees
Association 1 SCRA, 340
FACTS:

• BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against
petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and Director of BOP). The complaint
alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor
practices.
• Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices
attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of
administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP
is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing governmental
functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
• But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the
court on the theory that the functions of the BOP are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since they
receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days
and holidays, therefore consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners
(BOP) to present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.

HELD:

• As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the BOP cannot
be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).
• It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime
work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions
are “exclusively proprietary in nature”. Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the
service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but
such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so
that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character.
• Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit,
action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be
sued without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction.
Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and
the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents
other than the respondent court.
Mobil Phils. V Customs Arrastre Service 18 SCRA 340
FACTS:
• This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service
and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.
• Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service,
the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre
Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case plus
other damages.
• Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons
under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are
immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the
Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private
individuals.

ISSUES:
Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can invoke state
immunity.

Discussions:
The Bureau of Custom, is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical
personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in the law, agencies of the government
is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated government
entity without a separate juridical personality.

RULINGS:
• Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of
money and damages involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function
of the Bureau of Customs.
• The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function
proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Supreme Court ruled
that the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for
money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which
money claims against the Government may be filed.
Air Transportation Office v. Sps. Ramos GR No. 159402
FACTS:
• Sps. Ramos discovered that a portion of their land (somewhere in Baguio) was being used as part
of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport which is operated by ATO. Respondents
agreed to convey the subject portion by deed of sale to ATO in consideration of the amount of
Php778,150.00.
• However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus, an action for
collection against ATO was filed by the respondents before the RTC. ATO’s primary contention was that
the deed of sale was entered into the performance of governmental functions. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents. CA affirmed RTC. Hence, the petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not ATO could be sued without the state’s consent?

RULING:
• Yes, an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a
claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has
not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business.

• Two cases are very much telling regarding ATO as an agency not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign action:
a. National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro- it was not merely the collection of landing and parking fees which
was declared as proprietary in nature by the High Court in Teodoro, but management and maintenance
of airport operations as a whole, as well
b. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals- the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency
not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity x x x The Civil
Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate
it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise
which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads,
be undertaken by private concerns. x x x
Syquia vs Lopez 84 Phil 312
FACTS:

• Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila,
namely, the North Qyauia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they
executed contracts for lease of the apartments to USA, with the term being until the war has ended and
six months after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were used for billeting and
quartering officers of the US armed forces stationed in the Manila Area.
• George Moore, a Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real
Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the command of Moore, was said to be in
control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign officers of the army
to the buildings or order them to vacate the same.
• When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease would be terminated six months after.
The petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested the buildings to be
returned to them, as per contract agreement. However, they were advised that the US Army wanted to
continue their occupancy of the buildings and refused to execute new leases but advised that they will
vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the contract agreement.
• Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the
properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals until the
premises were vacated.
• Respondent-defendants were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The MC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained
by the CFI of Manila, hence the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.

RULING:

• The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in majority the decision of the Municipal
Court of Manila.
• Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party is the United States of America,
as it was the U.S. Army who were occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their
government. USA has not given their consent to be sued in this case, and any action against them without
the consent would constitute a lack of jurisdiction.
Holy See vs. Rosario 238 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Msgr. Cirilo and the Philippine Realty Corporation agreed to sell to Mr. Ramon Licup 3 lots of
land. The agreement to sell was made on the condition that Licup pay 100,000 and that the sellers clear
the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same. Later on, Licup assigned his rights over the
property and demanded the sellers of their obligation, however, Msgr. Cirilos informed him of the
squatter’s refusal to vacate. Hence, the dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the matter at hand is the sale by the petitioner
of Lot 5-A to Tropicana.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent has trial jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying
sovereign immunity.

RULING:
NO. If the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely such transaction is an act jure gestionis. However, the Lot 5-A was acquired as a donation from
the Archdiocese of Manila for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of
the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving
state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent
disposal are clothed with governmental character. Furthermore, the petitioner’s immunity was
sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the DFA. Therefore, where the plea of
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this
claim.

USA vs. GUINTO 182 SCRA 644

FACTS:
• The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against
it to which it has not consented. The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force
in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in
the said base. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the
objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.
• The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange
(PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and
opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit
against USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts
done by them in the performance of their official duties.
Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such
affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership
in the society of nations.

RULINGS:

• The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners
cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
• Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents
of the United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States
itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
• The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity
of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it
can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly,
this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

USA v. RUIZ GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985

FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. This was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. In 1972, the
US invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman Land Co. Inc.
responded to the invitation. Subsequently, the company was requested by the US to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company to which, the former complied. However, the
company received a letter stating that they did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because
of its previous unsatisfactory performance on repairs. It further stipulated that such projects had been
awarded to third parties. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether US Naval base in bidding exercised governmental functions to be able to invoke
state immunity.

RULING:
YES. The bidding of contracts was an exercise of its governmental function. The projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of the US and the PH, a function of the
government of the highest order. They are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes. State may be aid to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign function
Merritt v Govt of the Phils. 34 Phil 311
The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work.
One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government
ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident,
Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could
never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to
earn.

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized
Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E.
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-
General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages
and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.

HELD:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
him.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer
acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. “The Government does
not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.”
LIM vs BROWNWELL
FACTS:

The Alien Property Custodian of the United States found four parcels of land in Tondo, Manila. These
lands were to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, a national of an enemy country. Hence, the
said custodian issued a vesting order on the authority of the trading with the Enemy Act of the US in
order for him to have ownership over 2 of the disputed lands. Eventually, by virtue of such act, the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the APC) issued a supplemental vesting order in
order to vest in him the title of the remaining lots. Eventually, the same administrator executed two
formal agreements, in pursuant to section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and Executive Order
No. 9921, transferring the said lots to the Republic of the Philippines to fully indemnify the US for all
claims in relation to the property which claims are payable by the latter under the Trading with the Enemy
Act. On November 15, 1948, Benito Lim filed a formal notice to claim the said property alleging that it
still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez but it was rejected by the Vested Property Claims Committee. On
November 13, 1950, the petitioner filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila against the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The defendant
Attorney General, in their answer, alleged that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the claim for
rentals since said action constituted a suit against the US to which it had not given its consent. The CFI
dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s action based on the principle
that a foreign state or its government cannot be sued without its consent.

RULING:

(Express: Thru special law)

YES. The immunity of the state from suit cannot be invoked is instituted by a person who is neither an
enemy or ally of an enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or interest in vested property
and of recovering his ownership and possession, as in the present case. Congressional consent to such
suit has expressly been given by the US. However, the court correctly dismissed the claims on damages
since the relief available to a person claiming enemy property is only limited to those expressly provided
in the Trading with the Enemy Act. Claim for damages is not one of those authorized which may be
instituted in the appropriate courts of the Philippines under the provisions of section 3 of the Philippine
Property Act of 1946. Congressional consent to such suit has not been granted.

(Implied: When state commences litigation)

Additionally, claim for damages against the defendant Republic of the Philippines cannot be sustained
since it constitutes a charge against or financial liability to the government and consequently cannot be
entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government. In the present case, the Republic
did not waived its right of non-suability but it merely resisted such claim and was not asked for an
affirmative relief against any party.
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental GR No. L-6060
Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co, alleging that he purchased from the vessel from the Shipping Commission for P200,000,
and payed a down of P50,000. He also agreed to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment
of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission.
For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission
tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission
later on chartered and delivered the vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. but is
still subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the
Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to
all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly
demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter
refused to do so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanied by his complaint, a writ of
replevin should be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that
after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court issued the writ of
replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its
possession of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the
reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of
said authority to the property, plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the
vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said
property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the interventor with regard to the counterclaim.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the
plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right
to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the
state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to an individual. The latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the state.

Suit allowed to avoid perpetrating an injustice

Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance G.R. No. L-31635
FACTS:

Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April
13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, alleging that in 1927 the National
Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used
it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue without paying just compensation and without any agreement,
either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or
return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused
to restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the
City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at
P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June
30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession
or the payment of the just compensation.

In the answer filed by defendants through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice,
Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the
government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969,
the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of
Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more
particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square
meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used
the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved
Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot
No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land
which is being utilized for public use."

The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly
against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to be
sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that they
are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government
immunity from suit correct?

HELD:

NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be
in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires
and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court
decided that the lower court’s decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded to
the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
AMIGABLE vs CUENCA
FACTS:

• Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement.

• Petitioner then filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in
his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
lot.

• Defendants argue that the: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first
with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed;
(3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and
costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch
as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango
Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

• The court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot
be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide
plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; and that it had
long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its
consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner Amigable, may properly sue the government?

RULING:

• Yes, considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an
action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time because possession is one of
the attributes of ownership.

• However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient
nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available
is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of
the taking.

• As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on
the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government.
In addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing
SANTIAGO vs REPUBLIC
FACTS:

Ildefonso Santiago filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga naming as defendant the government of the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation
of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse with the latter as the done. Despite the contract
stipulations, the Bureau failed to “install lighting facilities an water system on the property donated and
to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for
occupancy on or before December 7, 1974”. However, the CFI dismissed the complaint invoking the
doctrine of state immunity.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga erred in invoking the doctrine of state immunity as a
ground for dismissal on an action for revocation of a deed of donation.

RULING:

YES. The alleged failure to abide by the conditions under which a donation was given should not prove
an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent likewise being presumed. Hence, the donor, with
the Republic or any of its agency being the done, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of
the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the non-suability
doctrine could not stand. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process,
which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity.

US vs RODRIGO
REPUBLIC vs VILLASOR
PNB vs PABALAN
Shell Philippines Exploration BV vs Jalos, GR No.
179918, Sep. 8, 2010
SAEZ vs ARROYO
FACTS:

On March 6, 2008, Francisco Saez (petitioner) filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege
of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place
and production of documents. He sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court because
of his fear of being abducted and killed. He also prayed for the military to cease from further conducting
surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and
other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).The court
issued the writ of amparo commanding the respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case
to the CA. In the Return of the Writ, the respondents were claiming that the names and descriptions in
the informa-tion were insufficient to properly identify some of the persons sought to be included as
among the respondents. The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and
to determine specific acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security. During the
hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being followed
by a certain “Joel,” a former colleague at Bayan Muna. “Joel” inquired if the petitioner was still involved
with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home
to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of
Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. On July 9, 2008, the CA denied the reliefs prayed for in the petition
and dropped Pres. GMA as a respondent. According to them, they cannot just grant the privilege of the
writs without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s entitlement thereto. This Court cannot grant
the privilege of the writs applied for on mere speculation or conjecture. This Court is convinced that the
SC did not intend it to be so when the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in deleting the President as party- respondent.

RULING:

NO. The Court made it clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that the president can only invoke immunity
from suit only in the concurrence of her incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege cannot be
invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed within her term.

As ruled in the case of Rodriguez v. Arroyo, in pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the
President, as the Commander- In- Chief of the AFP can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s
right to life, liberty and security as long as substantial exist to show her involvement, or had failed to
exercise and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. In
the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party respondent without any
attempt to show her actual involvement in or knowledge of the alleged violations. While the President
cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data solely on the basis of presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner, failed to establish
accountability of the President, as commander- in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
RODRIGUEZ vs ARROYO
LOZADA vs ARROYO