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G.R. No. 191714 February 26, 2014

In their desire to improve their working conditions, respondents and other

employees of held their first formal meeting on November 23, 2003 to discuss the formation of a
union. The following day, seventeen (17) employees were barred from entering petitioners’ factory
premises located in Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters’ warehouse
at Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) purportedly because of its expansion. Afterwards, the said
seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced leave due to the
unavailability of work.
Respondents contended that the affected employees were not given regular work
assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their functions.
Respondents sought the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Subsequently, an agreement between petitioners and THS-GQ Union was reached. Petitioners
agreed to give priority to regular employees in the distribution of work assignments. Respondents
averred, however, that petitioners never complied with its commitment but instead hired
contractual workers. Instead, Respondents claimed that the work weeks of those employees in
the SBFZ plant were drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.

On March 24, 2004, THS-GQ Union filed a petition for certification election
and an order was issued to hold the certification election in both T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen.
On October 10, 2004, petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for its employees. The
officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were purportedly excluded from the field trip. On the
evening of the field trip, a certain Angel Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned
against the union in the forthcoming certification election.
When the certification election was scheduled on October 11, 2004, the employees were
escorted from the field trip to the polling center in Zambales to cast their votes. The remaining
employees situated at the SBFZ plant cast their votes as well. Due to the heavy pressure exerted
by petitioners, the votes for “no union” prevailed.

A memorandum was issued by petitioner Ben Huang (Huang), Director for

Gin Queen, informed its employees of the expiration of the lease contract between Gin Queen
and its lessor in Castillejos, Zambales and announced the relocation of its office and workers to
Cabangan, Zambales.
When the respondents, visited the site in Cabangan, discovered that it was a “talahiban” or
grassland. The said union officers and members were made to work as grass cutters in
Cabangan, under the supervision of a certain Barangay Captain Greg Pangan. Due to these
circumstances, the employees assigned in Cabangan did not report for work. The other
employees who likewise failed to report in Cabangan were meted out with suspension.

On September 7, 2004, the T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen Corporation workers
union (THS-GQ Union) filed their Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) by way of union
busting, and Illegal Lockout, with moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, against T&H
Shopfitters Corporation (T&H Shopfitters) and Gin Queen Corporation before the Labor Arbiter
In its defense, Petitioners also stress that they cannot be held liable for ULP for the
reason that there is no employer-employee relationship between the former and respondents.
Further, Gin Queen avers that its decision to implement an enforced rotation of work assignments
for respondents was a management prerogative permitted by law, justified due to the decrease in
orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to avoid anticipated
financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational basis. It explains that its failure to present
concrete proof of its decreasing orders was due to the impossibility of proving a negative
assertion. It also asserts that the transfer from Castillejos to Cabangan was made in good faith
and solely because of the expiration of its lease contract in Castillejos. It was of the impression
that the employees, who opposed its economic measures, were merely motivated by spite in filing
the complaint for ULP against it.
Whether or not ULP acts were committed by petitioners against respondents.
ULP were committed by petitioners against respondents.Petitioners are being accused of
violations of paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of Article 257 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code,13
to wit:
Article 257. Unfair labor practices of employers.—It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
© To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such
will interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. x x x
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its
employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election; 2) the
active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining
agent during the field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; 4) the
continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents’ functions; 5) assigning union
members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a
rotational basis for union members, taken together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed,
such were all orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-organization.
The Court is of the considered view that petitioners’ undisputed actions prior and immediately
before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly innocuous, unduly meddled in the
affairs of its employees in selecting their exclusive bargaining representative.

2. G.R. No. 179146 : July 23, 2013

HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, Petitioner, v. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG
TELU-PIGLAS), Respondents.


On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig
at Lakas ng Anakpawis Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-
TELUPIGLAS). In its Comment and Position Paper, petitioner raised that the members of the union
are a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees as three (3) are vice-principals,
one (1) is a department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinators. It is likewise a mixture of
teaching and non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 245 of the
Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a
petition for certification election, as held in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Labor Union and in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and

The med arbiter denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the bargaining unit
is inappropriate. Private respondent appealed to the SOLE and the latter reversed the ruling of the
med arbiter and ordered two certification elections, one among teaching personnel and another for
non- teaching personnel. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The CA dismissed the petition and ruled
that the vice-principals, coordinators and department heads are not managerial nor supervisory
employees. Anent the alleged mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel, the CA agreed with
petitioner that the nature of the formers work does not coincide with that of the latter.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition before
the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in allowing the conduct of certification election


Labor Law

When the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore in Toyota, the Court, citing Article
245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, it was held:

Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor
organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to
file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.

In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for certification election was one for
supervisory employees, but in which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the Court
reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right to file a certification election to represent a
bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file employees among its
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop
were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was
applied in both cases.

But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department
Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules).

Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO
in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its
right to file a petition for certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court
abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while
there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof.

Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights
and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for
cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San
Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the Court
explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide
a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter
on account of any question pertaining to its individual members.

More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, the Court therein
reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is
not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the
Labor Code.

All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, as interpreted
by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone for it.
Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the law and the rules.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an
employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the unions certificate of
registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated
in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly
issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality
which may not be attacked collaterally.

On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all
the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited to serve
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."
Petitioner appears to have confused the concepts of membership in a bargaining unit and
membership in a union. In emphasizing the phrase "to the exclusion of academic employees" stated
in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, petitioner believed that the petitioning union could not admit academic
employees of the university to its membership. But such was not the intention of the Supreme Court.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented by a petitioning union. Such

employees need not be members of a union seeking the conduct of a certification election. A union
certified as an exclusive bargaining agent represents not only its members but also other employees
who are not union members.

In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner school must form
separate bargaining units. Thus, the order for the conduct of two separate certification elections,
one involving teaching personnel and the other involving non-teaching personnel. It should be
stressed that in the subject petition, private respondent union sought the conduct of a certification
election among all the rank-and-file personnel of petitioner school. Since the decision of the
Supreme Court in the U.P. case prohibits us from commingling teaching and non-teaching personnel
in one bargaining unit, they have to be separated into two separate bargaining units with two
separate certification elections to determine whether the employees in the respective bargaining
units desired to be represented by private respondent.

G.R. No. 196276 June 4, 2014

(SALAMAT), Respondents

Takata Corp. v. BLR and SALAMAT G.R. No. 196276 June 4, 2014 Peralta, J. TOPIC IN SYLLABUS:
Cancellation of Union Certificate Registration - Grounds SUMMARY: Takata Corp. filed with DOLE to
cancel the certificate of union registration of SALAMAT (Union) due to their misrepresentation, false
statements, and fraud. Takata claims that only 68 of the 119 members attended the organizational
meeting; less than 20% of 369 employees. SC held that 20% requirement does not apply to Art 234 (b) or
to those who joined the org. meeting. 20% only applies to 234 (c) or all employees in the bargaining
unit. The “Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon” showed 119 names; more than 20% of 396. No proof that
members did not understand what they were signing. The two repeated names is not a valid ground for
cancellation because they do not constitute grave misrepresentation.
FACTS: • July 7, 2009 – Takata Corp filed with DOLE a petition for cancellation of Certificate of Union
Registration of respondent SALAMAT (Union)
• They alleged that SALAMAT was guilty of misrepresentation, false statements, and fraud with respect
to the number of those who participated in their organizational meeting, the adoption and ratification
of its Constitution and by-laws, and in the election of its officers.
• Takata’s contentions o In the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting, only 68 signed the attendance sheet
out of 396 rank-and-file employees.1 o “Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon” (PKU) bore no signatures of
the 119 members and that the employees were not given sufficient information on the document they
o The document “Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi” (SPP) was not submitted at the time of
application for union registration
o 119 members were only 117 o total number of employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, not 396.
• DOLE Director Atty. Ricardo Martinez granted petition for cancellation
• 68 is less than 20% of 396 hence, short of union registration requirement
• The attendance sheet containing the names and signatures of 68 members contradicted list of
names in the PKU
• SPP was not attached to the application for registration; only submitted in the petition for
certification election *Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP) Paralegal Officer Domingo Mole filed
an appeal on behalf of SALAMAT to BLR. Later, the counsel of SALAMAT filed own appeal w/ BLR. Takata
opposed on ground of forum shopping. Bureau of Labor Relations:
• Reversed DOLE Director
• Takata failed to prove the deliberate and malicious misrepresentation of number of r-a-f
• List of employees who participated in the organizational meeting is a separate and disctinct
requirement from list of names comprising at least 20% of employees in the bargaining unit
• No evidence that employees assailed their inclusion in the list of union members
• W/N SALAMAT committed misrepresentation, false statements, or fraud as a ground for cancelling
their registration? NO
• W/N SALAMAT is guilty of forum shopping? - NO
• It does not appear in Art 2342 (b) that attendees in the organizational meeting must compirse at
least 20% of the bargaining unit
• Only in Art 234 (c) that requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum
requirement pertains to the employees’ membership in the union and not to the list of workers who
participated in the organizational meeting.
• (b) and (c) provide for separate requirements.
• Total number of employees was 396: 20% of which is about 79. The 119 member who signed the
PKU sufficiently complied with the 20% requirement.
• The 68 members who attended the org meeting was enough to constitute a quorum to validly
ratify their Constitution and its by-laws of the union.
• For fraud and misrepresentation to be a grounds for cancellation under Art 2393, nature must be
grave and compelling enough to vitiate consent of a mojority of union members
• No proof as to the lack of information given to those who signed PKU. No member came forward
to deny their membership in SALAMAT. Signing the SPP show their strengthening of desire to joing
• The two repeated names cannot be considered misrepresentation absent any showing that
SALAMAT did so deliberately to increase union membership.
• Even if the employees were 470, instead of 396, 117 (without two repeated names) is still more
than 20%

Re: Atty Mole

• BMP officer Mole no longer authorzed to file appeal on behalf of Union because his services were
already terminated at that time. Such appeal considered not to have been filed at all. Hence, no forum
4. G.R. No. 190515 : November 15, 2010


ELECTRONICS, INC., Respondent.



Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA of respondent and petitioner, the parties renegotiated its
economic provisions but failed to reach a settlement, particularly on the issue of wage
increases. Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike.
Respondent, upon the other hand, filed a Notice of Lockout.

In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was deadlocked, petitioner went on
strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and issued a Return
to Work Order which was complied with.

Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the controversy, respondent created a Labor
Management Council through which it concluded with the remaining officers of petitioner a
Memorandum of Agreement providing for daily wage increases.

The Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a wage increase.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the Decision stating that the union members
were waiving their rights and benefits under the Secretarys Decision. Reconsideration of the
Decision was denied. Hence, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of

The appellate court ruled in favor of respondent and accordingly set aside the Decision of the
Secretary of Labor. It held that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in not
respecting the MOA.

The Supreme Court held that the order was issued in resolution of the CBA dispute over
which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction. The order is an arbitral award which can be
considered an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise
have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of a valid contract
The SC, however, clarified that the Secretary’s order should be complied not merely because
it is higher than what the MOA provides. The order was based on evidentiary documents
presented by both parties particularly on the financial outlook of Cirtek.

Respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., filed motion for reconsideration of the Courts Decision dated
November 15, 2010. It averred that petitioner erred in availing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and
that it should have dismissed the petition outright. That the MOA which was validly entered into is not a
matter covered by a petition for certiorari. It further averred that the MOA signed by the remaining officers
of petitioner Union and allegedly ratified by its members should have been given credence by the Court.
Also, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling beyond
the compromise agreement entered into by the parties; and that petitioner Union had already filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of Free
Workers resulting in the latters lack of personality to represent the workers in the present case.

whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered to give arbitral awards in the exercise of his authority
to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.

While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by
the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor
when he assumes jurisdiction, the award can be considered as an approximation of a collective
bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties. Hence, it has
the force and effect of a valid contract obligation between the parties.[5]

On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence because it was validly entered
into by the parties, the Court notes that even those who signed it expressed reservations thereto. A CBA
(assuming in this case that the MOA can be treated as one) is a contract imbued with public interest. It must
thus be given a liberal, practical and realistic, rather than a narrow and technical construction, with due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose for which it is intended. [9]

As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW during the pendency
of the case resulted in the FFW losing its personality to represent the Union, the same does not affect the
Courts upholding of the authority of the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards higher than what was
supposedly agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary to respondents assertion, the unavoidable issue of
disaffiliation bears no significant legal repercussions to warrant the reversal of the Courts Decision.

the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an
action at the instance of either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor
organization, not the employer.


ON G.R. No. 170007, 7 April 2014

In anticipation of the expiration on April 30, 2004 of the 2001-2004 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between the petitioner and the respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, the parties
started negotiations for a new CBA. After several meetings on the ground rules that would govern the
negotiations and on political items, the parties started their discussion on the economic items on July 27,
2004, their 31st meeting. The union proposed a 20o/o annual across-the-board basic salary increase for
the next three years that would be covered by the new CBA. In lieu of the annual salary increases, the
company made a counter-proposal to grant all covered employees a lump sum amount of P80,000.00
yearly for the three-year period of the new CBA.

Several meetings ensued presenting each others proposal and counter proposal.
On the parties’ 41st meeting, the company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and re
commended that the help of a third party be sought. The union filed a Notice of Strike in
the NCMB, alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company. The NCMB immed
iately summoned the parties for the mandatory conciliation-
mediation proceedings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. The DOLE
Sec assumed jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties. The Secretary ruled that the co
mpany is not guilty of bargaining in bad faith and also proceeded to decide on the matte
r of the wage increase and other economic issues of the new CBA.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment denied the motion for reconsideration of the union.

The union alleged in its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that the Secretary of Labor and
Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion in grossly misappreciating the facts and issue of the
case. It contended that the issue is the unfair labor practice of the company in the form of bad faith
bargaining and not the CBA deadlock. It argued that there was no CBA deadlock on account of the
union’s non-conformity with the declaration of a deadlock.

Applying St. Scholastica’s College case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the peitition and found that the
2004 CBA Official Minutes of the Meetings show that the union and the company were already discussing
the economic issues when the union accused the company of bargaining in bad faith. As such, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment had the authority to take cognizance of the economic issues, which
issues were the necessary consequence of the alleged bad faith bargaining.


Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s assumption of jurisdiction is li

mited to the subject of strike.

RULING: No. The labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the unr
esolved matters between the parties in relation to their negotiations for a new CBA. The
power of the DOLE-
Sec to assume jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to all questions and co
ntroversies arising from the said dispute, such as, but not limited to the union’s allegatio
n of bad faith bargaining. It also includes and extends to the various unresolved provisio
ns of the new CBA such as compensation, particularly the matter of annual wage increas
e or yearly lump sum payment in lieu of such wage increase, whether or not there was de
adlock in the negotiations.

As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase, the DOLE-
Sec need not wait for a deadlock in the negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. Th
at is the significance of the power of the DOLE-
Sec under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute c
ausing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national i
nterest. Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an ex
traordinary situation – a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national in
terest. This grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that
may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or
lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction”
connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all
matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it
includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from or related to the dis
pute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

6. Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs Confessor

Facts:Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a
provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the third year. Prior to the expiration of the
three-year period but within the sixty-day freedom period, the Union initiated the
negotiations. On February 18, 1993, the Union, through its President, Eddie L. Divinagracia,
sent a letter containing its proposals covering political provisions and thirty-four (34)
economic provisions. The Bank attached its counter-proposal to the non-economic provisions
proposed by the Union. The Bank posited that it would be in a better position to present its
counter-proposals on the economic items after the Union had presented its justifications for
the economic proposals.

Before the commencement of the negotiation, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested
to the Bank’s Human Resource Manager and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno,
that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded.
Meanwhile, Diokno suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the
National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated,
be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member

Except for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms, the Union and the Bank failed to
agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The Union declared a deadlock. On
the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Damages
before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila.
It contended that the Union demanded "sky high economic demands," indicative of blue-sky
bargaining. Further, the Union violated its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of
strike before the NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the
Union officers should be dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice
against the Bank arising from the latter’s alleged “interference” with its choice of negotiator;
surface bargaining; making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal to furnish the
Union with copies of the relevant data;

employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable,
medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to
self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection.

Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer
interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or
the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to
collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its
negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of
the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse
effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective
bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the
Labor Code is committed. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the
Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has
been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion
made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that
the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the
right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering
that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and
simultaneously with Divinagracia’s suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its
negotiating panel. It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The
accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic provisions
became heated and the parties had become frustrated.
The Duty to Bargain Collectively
Surface bargaining is defined as “going through the motions of negotiating” without any
legal intent to reach an agreement. The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had
done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not
want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and
the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a
deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain “does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. Hence, the parties’ failure
to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.

Estoppel not Applicable In the Case at Bar

The approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that
the Union waived its ULP claim against the Bank during the past negotiations. After all, the
conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE, while the signing bonus was
included in the CBA itself.

The Union Did Not Engage In Blue-Sky Bargaining

The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated
or unreasonable. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its economic
proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received
by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other
branches of the Bank in the Asian region.

In sum, we find that the public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned order and
resolutions. While the approval of the CBA and the release of the signing bonus did not
estop the Union from pursuing its claims of ULP against the Bank, we find that the latter did
not engage in ULP. We, likewise, hold that the Union is not guilty of ULP.

Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. (CCBPI) experienced a significant decline in profitability due
to the Asian economic crisis, thus to curb the negative effects on the company, it implemented three
(3) waves of an Early Retirement Program.
An inter-office memorandum was also issued mandating to put on hold “all requests for hiring to fill
in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions in [the] Head Office and in the Plants.”
Faced with the “freeze hiring” directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP Services
Corporation (JLBP), a manning agency.
Petitioner then filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on
the ground of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI Gen San for contracting-out services
regularly performed by union members.
In a Resolution, the NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out
jobs to JLBP.
The NLRC held that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the system was meant to
curtail the right to self-organization of petitioner’s members.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA upheld the NLRC’s finding that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice. It held that the
contract between CCBPI and JLBP did not amount to labor-only contracting. It found that JLBP was
an independent contractor and that the decision to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of
management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: whether CCBPI is guilty of unfair labor practice
The issues raised by petitioner of whether JLBP is an independent contractor, whether CCBPI’s
contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to unfair labor practice, and whether such action was a
valid exercise of management prerogative, call for a re-examination of evidence, which is not within
the ambit of this Court’s jurisdiction.
The CA squarely addressed the issue of job contracting in its assailed Decision and Resolution. The CA
itself examined the facts and evidence of the parties and found that, based on the evidence, CCBPI
did not engage in labor-only contracting and, therefore, was not guilty of unfair labor practice.
The NLRC found – and the same was sustained by the CA – that the company’s action to contract-out
the services and functions performed by Union members did not constitute unfair labor practice as
this was not directed at the members’ right to self-organization.
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the
workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are
not unfair labor practices
Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor
practice. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its
allegations of unfair labor practice,17 which burden it failed to discharge.

8. G.R. No. 139940 September 19, 2006

502 SCRA 219 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

An ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status by mere
participation in an illegal strike.

The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union), the exclusive bargaining
representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano University, Inc. (the University), filed
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the University
with Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) as follows: . Interfering in union activities; Union Busting violation
of CBAs Article IV, Section 2;[9]Union Busting disregarding the unions request to deduct penalties from its
members who were absent and without justifiable reasons during union meetings; and Contracting Workout
the management is contracting out services and functions being performed by Union members. [10]
Before the NLRC could act on the Universitys motion for consolidation, DOLE
Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, by Order[16] of August 5, 1998, certified for compulsory arbitration
to the NLRC a second Notice of Strike filed by the Union.
After several controversies and petitions, a strike was staged.
Upon the lifting of the strike, the University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC issued a Resolution holding that the
University was not guilty of ULP. Consequently, the strike was declared illegal.
The NLRC, citing an Order of March 11, 1998 issued by the DOLE Regional Director, found the
therein petitioners to have initiated, out of their own volition, the filing of the petition. It thus concluded
that there was no factual basis to hold the University guilty of interference in union activities
Also, On the allegation of union busting, the NLRC ruled that the refusal of the University to deduct
penalties from the salaries of members of the Union who failed to attend meetings was based CBA
provision. On the claim that the University had been contracting out work, the NLRC held that the
same was never raised during the conciliation meetings at the NCMB level

All the employees who participated in the illegal strike were thereafter declared to have lost
their employment status. 7

Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere participation in an
illegal strike

Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have
lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. While the University
adduced photographs[36] showing strikers picketing outside the university premises, it failed to
identify who they were. It thus failed to meet the substantiality of evidence test[37] applicable in
dismissal cases.

Petitioner-union members must thus be reinstated to their former

position, withoutbackwages. If reinstatement is no longer possible, they should receive
separation pay of One (1) Month for every year of service.

With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere participation in the illegal
strike warrants their dismissal.


G.R. No. L-22456 September 27, 1967


San Miguel Brewery (SMB) entered into a CBA with the National Brewery and Allied Industries Labor
Union of the Philippines (Union).
 Petitioner Salunga was an employee of San Miguel Brewery, Inc and a member of PAFLU.
Salunga, by being a member of PAFLU, adhered to its collective bargaining agreement that upon
resignation from latter he would be forfeiting his position in the company.
 Due to open criticism by petitioner against the union, he had been treated badly and teased by
the members of the latter, which prompt his resignation. The Union accepted the resignation
and transmitted it to the company.
 The company informed petitioner of the consequence of resignation which prompted the latter
to withdraw his resignation. The union did not accept his withdrawal and urged company to
implement the collective agreement. Petitioner notified the union that it was appealing to the
PAFLU National Convention, hence urging to defer his case pending appeal. Notwithstanding
such appeal, he was given notice of dismissed.
Hence, petitioner filed for unfair labor practice against PAFLU and the Company before the CIR.
The CIR decided in favor of Salunga. Defendants (including SMB) all guilty of ULP.

ON Motion for Reconsideration, CIR reversed its earlier decision. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

1. WON the Union is guilty of ULP. YES.
2. WON SMB (the employer) is guilty of ULP. NO.
1. Yes
In the case of the Union, it was found that NBAILUP-PAFLU acted arbitrarily. Although Salunga had
resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted the resignation, Salunga had, soon later — upon
learning that his withdrawal from the Union would result in his separation from the Company, owing
to the closed-shop provision above referred to — revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the
Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor. The Union had not only acted
arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to continue his membership but the trial Judge also found said
refusal of the Union officers to be due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken or
sanctioned by them.
it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union
in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to
membership, without any reasonable ground therefor

2. No.
For SMB, however, it was held that it did not engage in ULP. It was shown that SMB itself was even
reluctant — if not unwilling — to discharge the petitioner. When the Union first informed SMB of
Salunga’s resignation and urged implementation of section 3 of the bargaining contract, SMB advised
Salunga of the provision, thereby intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep
his employment. Besides, SMB notified the Union that it (SMB) would not take any action on the case
and would consider Salunga "still a member" of the Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on
petitioner's discharge, SMB still demurred and explained it was not taking sides and that its stand was
prompted merely by "humane" considerations, SMB notified petitioner that it had no other alternative
but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service, although with "regret".

3. Under these circumstances, SMB was not "unfair" to the petitioner. On the contrary, it did not merely
show a commendable understanding of and sympathy for his plight. It even tried to help him, although
to such extent only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain from interfering in purely internal
affairs of the Union. At the same time, SMB could not safely inquire into the motives of the Union
officers, in refusing to allow Salunga to withdraw his resignation.
10. G.R. No. L-3021 July 13, 1950

On March 14, 1949, a number of laborers belonging to said union and working in petitioner's can
factory located at 400 Pampanga Street, Manila, staged a strike and established a picket line around
the company's compound. According to the petitioner, said strikers and picketers used threats and
intimidation to prevent the other laborers from continuing to work in the factory so that the company
officials were compelled to appeal to the police departmernt which sent policemen to the premises to
restore order and protect the loyal workers and officials. They were also notified that those who did
not return to work will be considered dismissed.

Five days later, respondent Liberal Labor Union filed a petition with the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations alleging that the Philippine Can Company had reduced the wages of seven laborers, and
that after the corresponding negotiations had failed, the strike was declared.

In its answer, the can company specially denied the allegation of labor union as having been falsely made
and constituting contempt of court. The Company further alleged: that the strike declared by several
members of the petitioning union was illegal and unjustified, the same having been declared without due
and proper notice to the management, no verbal nor written demands having been presented beforehand
to said management for its study, consideration and/or actuation;
Judge Jose S. Bautista of the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order directing the laborers
of the labor union to immediately return to work and the can company to admit them.

The can company filed a MR reiterating its contention that the strike was illegal, and that it was highly
unfair and unjust to require the can company to readmit these laborers who had been properly
discharged, without giving the can company an opportunity to be heard and prove its claim; that the
can company, because of the financial losses suffered by it, was not in a financial position to re-
employ the strikers. The Cir however denied the MR.

Petioner filed a petition for certiorari asking that the order for being an abuse of discretion and as creating
a dangerous precedent.

Issue: whether the return to work order is valid


The Supreme Court held that pending determination of the conflict, especially where public interests so
require or when the court cannot promptly decide the case, the strikers are ordered back to work.
However, The business of the can company is not such that the public is keenly interested in its
continuance . According to the can company, it manufactures tin cans for packing biscuits, candies, etc.,
and pails for carrying water and basins for washing purposes. Many similar companies have sprung up
since 1947, resulting in intense and even ruinous competition, thus explaining the downward trend in the
business of the can company and its desire to lay off laborers. After the strike was staged the can
company did not employ other laborers to take the places of the strikers. It claims that it no longer needs
the services of the strikers.
What the Court of Industrial Relations should have done as suggested by Presiding Judge Roldan, was to
give priority to this case so that it could be decided in the shortest time possible.
In the case of Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Zulueta, an employer cannot legally be compelled to
continue with employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards
his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest. The law,
in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression or self destruction of the employer.
If we now compel the can company to readmit the strikers who later on might be declared to have been
properly dismissed by their employer because they not only staged an illegal strike but because they tried
to prevent other loyal laborers from continuing to work, we will be committing a grave injustice to the
employer company without first giving it a chance to be heard, especially since it has, as already stated,
squarely raised in issue the alleged illegality of the strike.