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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 283
G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*
.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.—In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.—It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to
prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.—
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged
_______________
* EN BANC.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong,
no right to bail shall be recognized.
Same; Same; Same; All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to
try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.—All
criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
Same; Same; Same; The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;
or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, provided none
of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.—The
granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or vio-
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284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
lated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while
under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.—For
purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995), “such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should
be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its
grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997).—In
resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with
the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997), to wit: 1. In all cases, whether
bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 285
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
Same; Same; Same; This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing:
(1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.—This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized
the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon
a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our
view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction
is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also
do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because
he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives,
his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification
for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Same; Same; Same; Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.—Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
286
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during
the trial.
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that bail is not a matter of right in cases where
the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.—This Petition for
Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix
Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the
Sandiganbayan when it failed to release accused on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons.
His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion
to Fix Bail filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in
this Petition on his medical condition.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special
accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan
or in the pleadings filed before the Supreme Court (SC).—The grant of bail, therefore, by the
majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before
the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not be
faulted for not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to
find what it deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution and the
people they represent.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided
in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.—The majority’s
opinion — other than the invocation of a general human rights principle — does not provide clear
legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian considerations is
neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution. This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad
hoc: only for one person — petitioner in this case.
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Same; Same; Same; View that the mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of
bail when it is a matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an
accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only
to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.—
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right.
On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical
condition or for humanitarian reasons; Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant
of bail.—The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to release
petitioner on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted
because of his medical condition or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the
prosecution as respondent developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in
this court to establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of bail in this case. Yet, it
now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant of bail.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Dissenting Opinions; The Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court (SC) allows one (1) week for the submission of a dissenting opinion.—The
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a dissenting opinion.
Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC: SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring
opinion.—A Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the disposition
of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting
forth the reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of the case,
but based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a concurrence “in the
result” should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who agrees with the
main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may submit a concurring
opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must be submitted within one week from
the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the decision for the signature of the Members.
(Em-
288
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
phasis supplied) But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and
suggestions of other dissenting justices within two days from the circulation of the majority
opinion.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that nowhere in the rules of procedure do we
allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s certification.—In essence, the majority
now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the certification in a Manifestation and
Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that
petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. This certification was submitted as
an annex to a Manifestation before this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight
of the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments. Nowhere in the rules
of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s certification. In
doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination
and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’ findings on petitioner’s health in a hearing whose main
purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant
issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that
may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by petitioner
in this Court. Due process requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr.
Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at present.—
Petitioner’s medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general notoriety. Assuming that the
medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a
fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other
medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we remand
this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is still the
condition that prevails at present. That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant
provisional liberty to one who is obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the
presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the accused, without the prosecution being
granted the op-
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
portunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without consideration of any rebutting evidence
that may have been presented should a hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our neutrality
and objectivity.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical
condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder.—It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all
those who have similar conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether
petitioner’s incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his medical conditions are
simply conditions which come with advanced age. The majority has not set specific bases for
finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those
who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no showing as to how
grave his conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made available to him. There is also
no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually aggravating in spite of the best
care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his detention that is the
most significant factor or cause for such deterioration. Usually, when there is a medical
emergency that would make detention in the hospital necessary, courts do not grant bail. They
merely modify the conditions for the accused’s detention. There is now no clarity as to when
special bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest should be imposed.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons.—Bail is
not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573 (2006):
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside
the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is
for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing
proposition for the “selective decarceration of older prisoners” based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.
Same; Same; Same; View that before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and
this dissent has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that
he would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the major-
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
ity’s inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too
speculative or premature.—Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this
dissent has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he
would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the majority’s inference as to the
existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled
motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that motion to cancel bail should
be filed before the Sandiganbayan or before this court.
Same; Same; Same; View that the crime charged in petitioner’s case is one where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted
after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special
grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional.—The crime
charged in petitioner’s case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted after granting the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical
conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other
duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the basis of
humanitarian considerations extends even after the medical emergency has passed. Again, a
case of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; View that the more prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not the Supreme Court (SC), to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of
bail.—There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount for
bail. The original proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to
P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of
one member who voted with the majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00. The rules
guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. The majority opinion is sparse
on the evidence it considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
more prudent course of action would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to
exercise its discretion in setting the amount of bail.
Same; Same; Same; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; View that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general declaration to
uphold the value and dignity of every person. It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based
on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person accused of crimes.—There are
no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court to release petitioner
given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the
majority opinion, is a general declaration to uphold the value and dignity of every person. It does
not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention
of any person accused of crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention must be carried out
in a dignified and humane manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that even the Supreme Court (SC) in Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007), was wary to grant bail
without evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk.—In any case, even this court
in Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470
(2007), was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk.
For this reason, it remanded the case to the trial court instead of applying the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating that based on these principles
alone, the accused was entitled to bail. It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions
on both the respect for human dignity and the protection of human rights. These rights are
applicable to those who, during the dark days of Martial Law, were illegally detained, tortured,
and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for these rights and the
invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to Senators of our Republic.
Same; Same; Same; View that suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of
how these provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.—The mere
292
invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not shibboleth. It should not be cause for
us to be nonchalant about the existence of other constitutional and statutory provisions and the
norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights does not mean that the Rule
of Law is suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want. Rather, BERSAMIN, J.:
human rights are best entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear
legal provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious
and rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
Same; Same; Same; View that those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
legal issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing
obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and the law.— harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent accused appears at trial.1
may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious political accommodation
rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one powerful
public official at the cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts
to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will
weaken the administration of justice because the judicial standards are not clear. The Case

Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text
of the Constitution.—The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own opinions on or predilections for how
the balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations should be. It may be that, as citizens,
such opinions are founded on our wealth of knowledge and experience.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and
annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along
with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To
Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
_______________
1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State
Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1, pp. 307-309 (2009).

293 2 Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and concurred in
by Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires and Alex L. Quiroz.
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 293
3 Id., at pp. 89-102.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A. Mendoza, Lorenzo G. Timbol, Ma. Donnabel T. Tan, Marie
Krizel P. Malabanan, Eleazar B. Reyes, Joseph B. Sagandoy, Jr., Edwardson L. Ong, Erwin G.
Matib and Kay Angela R. Peñaflorida for Juan Ponce Enrile.

The Solicitor General for respondents. 294

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder
in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6
praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against
him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly
on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General
Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital,11 and his Motion
to Fix Bail,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 107-108.
5 Id., at pp. 103-157.
6 Id., at pp. 163-192.
7 Id., at pp. 193-221.
8 Id., at pp. 222-241.
9 Id., at p. 241.
10 Id., at pp. 242-243.
11 Id., at pp. 244-247.
12 Id., at pp. 249-256.
295
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 295
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion
to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the
amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not
filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged
with plunder, “the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal,
not reclusion perpetua.” He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and SO ORDERED.14
on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered.
“Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and thus bailable.”
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s
The argument has no merit. motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15

xxxx Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:

_______________ A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.

Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two
13 Id., at p. 13. (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
(ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

_______________

14 Id., at pp. 84-88.

296
15 Id., at pp. 89-102.
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x 297

xxxx VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 297

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight
risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court. xxxx

Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors
that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence
of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July
7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he
would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled
to bail as a matter of right.
xxxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 xxxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right;
that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances — his age and his voluntary
surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account
that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 16-19.
17 Id., at pp. 526-542.
298
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused
to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.21 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a rec-
_______________
18 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
19 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24,
2002, 389 SCRA 623, where the Court said that the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt; see also Baradaran, Shima, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, Ohio
State Law Journal, Vol. 72, p. 728 (2011).
20 Baradaran, id., at p. 736.
21 Id., at p. 731. Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
22 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564, 572. perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25
299
_______________
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 299
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) 23 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 628.

onciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before 24 As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.
or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23
25 Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

2.

Bail may be granted as a matter

300
of right or of discretion
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution,
viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to
bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court, as of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
follows: with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28 (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

_______________ (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

26 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra note 19 at p. 693.

27 Id. 3.

28 Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: Admission to bail in offenses punished

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or
this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong
in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma,30 “such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called
to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be
301 granted provi-

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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
29 Section 5, paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC 30 A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
302
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
sional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the
Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in
Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People v.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who
is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on
the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment,
as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the
complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing.
Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for
prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be
established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To
appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted
or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
xxxx
_______________
31 Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 (formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-RTJ), October
5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32 A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.
303
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 303
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules
of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex parte
determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means —
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion
_______________
33 Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined
in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
4.
Enrile’s poor health justifies
his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years
at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the
Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that —
_______________
34 Id., at p. 18.
35 Rollo, pp. 252-253.
305
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 305
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be
imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed
worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is “charged with an offense punishable
by.” It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has
bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being
appreciated in the accused’s favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence
of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against
him being punishable with reclusion perpetua,37 simply because the determination, being
primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
_______________
36 Id., at p. 260.
37 Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in People v. Genosa (G.R. No.
135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal prosecution for parricide in which the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, appreciated
the concurrence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance as a
privileged mitigating circumstance, and consequently lowered the penalty imposed on the
accused to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
“The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country.
We also do not ignore that at an ear-
_______________
38 Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675,
April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
39 Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R. No. 157977, February 27, 2006,
483 SCRA 290, 298.
307
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 307
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
lier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a
flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of
public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical
examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral
artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
 (3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent
_______________ ultrasound).42

40 Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.

41 Id., at pp. 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014). Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead
to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could
lead to fatal or nonfatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk
for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could
be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure)
308 which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43

308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
42 Id., at pp. 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;

43 Id., at pp. 334-335, 374-375.
(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p

Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
309
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1,
3.2) VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 309
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications; special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia; of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their
testimonies ran as follows:
c. Alpha thalassemia;
xxxx
d. Gait/balance disorder;
JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of
Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
310
DR. SERVILLANO:
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
No, Your Honor.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement
of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital? That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

PSUPT. JOCSON: DR. SERVILLANO:

No, Your Honor. Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably
if the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those
things, Your Honor.45
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
xxxx
Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
best. to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
xxxx
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already
JUSTICE MARTIRES: held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46

At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile,
are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the
accused vis-à-vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness
of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the
charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its
discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; x x x47
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).
46 77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case against the petitioner was
for treason.
47 Id., at p. 462.
311
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 311
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the
petitioner “is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and
chronic, granular pharyngitis,” and that in said institute they “have seen similar cases, later
progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail”;
taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the People’s
Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis,
and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute
for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify
whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding
his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s Court has adopted and applied
the well-established doctrine cited in our above quoted resolution, in several cases, among them,
the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the
said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued
confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is
evident and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the appli-
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 465-466.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
cation for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail —
whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice
— that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the
trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the
People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the
ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
_______________
49 Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the Court Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
observed:
Peralta, J., For humanitarian reasons.
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration
not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the
judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively observed by
the Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the Villarama, Jr., J., On Official Leave.
accused to provisional liberty pending trial.
Reyes, J., On Sick Leave.
50 Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA
119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
494.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.

Jardeleza, J., No part. Prior OSG action.

313

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 313

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) 314

power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51 314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ of certiorari
ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) DISSENTING OPINION
in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon
posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate
release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause. LEONEN, J.:

No pronouncement on costs of suit. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
SO ORDERED. released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. — Const., Art. III, Sec. 13
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Sereno, CJ., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.

The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal bread. — The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France,
French novelist (1844-1924)
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan in denying
the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged
is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed to release
accused on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian
reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail1 filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this Petition on his medical
condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based
on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court.
The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for
_______________
1 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.
315
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to find what it
deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution and the people they
represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very special treatment
is a question of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth contained in a certification coming
from one doctor. This doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who will be subjected to
both direct and cross-examination so that he can properly manifest to the court the physical
basis for his inferences as well as the nature of the medical condition of petitioner. Rebutting
evidence that may be presented by the prosecution should also be considered. All this would be
proper before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was considered by the Sandiganbayan
because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right on grounds other than
his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majority’s opinion — other than the invocation of a general human rights
principle — does not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail
for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in
any statute or provision of the Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad hoc: only for
one person — petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged
with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have
to decide, without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age,
hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those
accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention,
315
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will have to decide
whether this is applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities and not to the aging
or sick detainees in overcrowded detention facilities all over this country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of personal discretion causing
petitions for certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher in an era of truly selective justice
not based on clear legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded
on the presence or absence of human compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate
and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and the stability of
our entire judicial system.
I On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to the Criminal
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime of plunder
punishable under Republic Act No. 7080.2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan, praying that he
be allowed to post bail if
_______________
2 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as Amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993).
317
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against him.3 On July 3, 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no warrant of
arrest had been issued at that time. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile’s
arrest.4
Investigation and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon
City.5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and voluntary
surrender were mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would lower the imposable
penalty to reclusion temporal.6 He also argued that his alleged age and physical condition
indicated that he was not a flight risk.7 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post bail, and
forthwith set the amount of bail pending determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b)
uncontroverted mitigating circumstances of at least 70 years old and voluntary surrender will not
lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail9 dated July 9, 2014.
Enrile filed a Reply10 dated July 11, 2014.
_______________
3 Ponencia, p. 294.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5.
7 Id., at p. 5.
8 Id., at pp. 6-7. 11 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

9 Petition for Certiorari, Annex J. 12 Id., at p. 2.

10 Petition for Certiorari, Annex K. 13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id., at p. 3.

318 16 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital11 dated July 4, 2014, arguing that “his advanced age and frail medical 319
condition”12 merit hospital arrest in the Philippine National Police General Hospital under such
conditions that may be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan.13 He also prayed that in the event of VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 319
a medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the Philippine National Police General
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside medical facility.14 His prayer states:

WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily place him under
hospital confinement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing
authority given to the hospital head or administrator to exercise his professional medical
judgment or discretion to allow Enrile’s immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another
medical facility outside of Camp Crame, in case of emergency or necessity, secured with
appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate medical treatment or procedure, he
be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.15
After the prosecution’s submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to resolve this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at the Philippine
National Police General Hospital for medical examination until further orders of the court.16
This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police General Hospital is not the
subject of this Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this Order be declared invalid
or null and void.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution17 denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix
Bail for being premature,18 stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made
a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his
bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not
filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.19

_______________
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 reiterating that there were mitigating and extenuating
circumstances that would modify the imposable penalty and that his frail health proved that he
was not a flight risk.21 The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Motion on August 8, 2014.22
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari was filed.
II
was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail based upon the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
A trial court — in this case, the Sandiganbayan — acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused through his or her arrest.23 The consequent detention is to ensure that the accused
will appear when required by the Rules and by order of the court trying the offense.24 The
provisions on bail provide a balance between the accused’s right to be presumed innocent on
one hand and the due process rights of the state to be able to effect the accused’s prosecution
on the other hand. That balance is not exclusively judicially determined. The Constitution frames
judicial discretion.

Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:

The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion to Fix
Bail for prematurity. It
ARTICLE III
_______________
Bill of Rights
17 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.
....
18 Id., at pp. 6 and 10.
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
19 Id., at p. 6. sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
20 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L. shall not be required.

21 Id., at pp. 3-5.

22 Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14. The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our Rules of Court. The grant of
bail is ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as a matter of right and (2) bail as
a matter of discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 provide:

_______________

320 23 See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 243 Phil. 274, 278; 160 SCRA 1, 4 (1988) [Per J. Gancayco, En
Banc].

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 24 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 3.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

321
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as
a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or
this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right.
On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first addressed in the 1945 case of Herras
Teehankee v. Rovira25 where this court ordered the People’s Court to conduct a bail hearing
despite the accused being charged with a capital offense.26 This court reasoned that “the
hearing is for the purpose of enabling the People’s Court to exercise its sound discretion as to
whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional
release under bail.”27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the People’s Court and gave the following
instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for
release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant
the release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor’s attitude is not justified,
it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or to judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the
ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or
jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits
a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special
Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at
the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce —
provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or
detainee.28
_______________
25 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
26 Id., at p. 644.
27 Id.
28 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
323
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe:29
We have held in Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, that all persons shall before conviction
be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The
general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charged, are, before their
conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is
a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application
for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution,
according to Rule 110, Section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion,
by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that
a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay
evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al.31 and Siazon v. Hon.
Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.32
_______________
29 77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per CJ. Moran, En Banc].
30 Id., at p. 58.
31 112 Phil. 781, 782-783; 2 SCRA 888, 889 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].
32 149 Phil. 241, 247; 42 SCRA 184, 186 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this court’s instructions on the application of
the constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines these administrative cases promulgated from 1981 to
1996.34 Unfortunately, there were still administrative complaints filed against judges for failing
to hold a hearing for bail even after the promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for
granting bail to the ac-
_______________
33 336 Phil. 214; 269 SCRA 220 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
34 Id., at pp. 221-227; pp. 227-233, citing People v. Sola, 191 Phil. 21; 103 SCRA 393 (1981)
[Per CJ. Fernando, En Banc], People v. San Diego, 135 Phil. 514; 26 SCRA 522 (1968) [Per J.
Capistrano, En Banc], People v. Dacudao, 252 Phil. 507; 170 SCRA 489 (1989) [Per J.
Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007; 186 SCRA 620 (1990) [Per J.
Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48 [Per
J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per
J. Bidin, Third Division], Pico v. Combong, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992, 215
SCRA 421 [Per Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang, A.M. No. RTJ-89-306, March 1,
1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Borinaga v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936,
September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 216 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco,
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Estoya v.
Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 1 [Per Curiam, En
Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778 [Per J.
Regalado, En Banc], Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238
SCRA 640 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176; 240 SCRA 154
(1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division], Santos v. Ofilada, 315 Phil. 11; 245 SCRA 56
(1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Sule v. Biteng, 313 Phil. 398; 243 SCRA 524 (1995) [Per J.
Davide, Jr., En Banc], and Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco, 323 Phil. 724; 253 SCRA 601 (1996) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc].
35 344 Phil. 415; 279 SCRA 1 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
325
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 325
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
cused charged with capital offenses.36 This court could only lament on the deluge of these
administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through
its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular
seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial
judge in case an application for bail is filed:
“1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section
7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.”
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are
enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to
account for an erroneous decision ren-
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 430-431; p. 12.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
dered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number
of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge
their duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants are
convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charged with a deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.37
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases continued to be filed against
judges who failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the accused was charged with murder.39 Judge Bugtas
initially denied the accused’s petition for bail but granted his motion for reconsideration and set
his bail without a hearing.40 As a result, Judge Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.0041 for being “grossly ignorant of the rules and procedures in granting or denying
bail[.]”42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the erring judge was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
for granting bail to the accused charged with rape without a hearing.44
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing
_______________ should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient
37 Id., citing Basco v. Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214, 237; 269 SCRA 220, 243-244 (1997) [Per J. ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused
Romero, Second Division]. is probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of
its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
38 448 Phil. 45; 400 SCRA 37 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
....
39 Id., at p. 48; p. 41.
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the Supreme
Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have
40 Id., at pp. 49-50; p. 46. remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to
determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing
41 Id., at pp. 56-57; p. 48. with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.48

42 Id., at p. 56; p. 47. _______________

43 389 Phil. 372; 334 SCRA 1 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]. 45 486 Phil. 605; 444 SCRA 382 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

44 Id., at pp. 375 and 388; p. 13. 46 Id., at pp. 611 and 618; p. 385.

47 674 Phil. 324; 658 SCRA 535 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

48 Id., at pp. 340-341; p. 550, citing Directo v. Bautista, 400 Phil. 1, 5; 346 SCRA 223, 228-229
(2000) [Per J. Melo, Third Division] and Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, supra note 43 at p. 381; p.
327 19.

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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

In Chief State Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge Cabebe,45 Judge Cabebe was fined P20,000.00 for 328
granting bail, without the requisite hearing, to the accused charged with possession of illegal
drugs.46
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an application for bail or the Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
prosecutor already recommends an amount for bail.
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court justify that bail be granted
without any hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. During
the hearing on petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that any grant of bail should
be based only on their failure to establish the strength of the evidence against him.49 The
prosecution had no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the
Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner’s Motion to Fix
Bail for being premature. The denial is neither “capricious, whimsical, arbitrary [nor] despotic”50
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. It was in accord with the clear provisions of the
Constitution, jurisprudence, and long-standing rules of procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion when it denied petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail.
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to release petitioner
on bail for medical or
_______________
49 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.
50 People v. Sandiganbayan, 490 Phil. 105, 116; 467 SCRA 137, 165 (2005) [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, Second Division], citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004,
431 SCRA 610, 616 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division], Matugas v. Commission on Elections, 465 Phil. 299, 313; 420 SCRA 365, 378 (2004)
[Per J. Tinga, En Banc], Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil.
541, 553; 423 SCRA 122, 133 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], and Condo Suite
Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 660, 667; 323 SCRA 679,
686 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
329
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 329
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical
condition or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent
developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to establish the
legal and factual basis for this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be
deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where
the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
 It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
falls within the exception and exclusion from the right; and not the burden of Enrile to
show entitlement to his right.
 The prosecution failed to establish that Enrile’s case falls within the exception; hence,
denial of his right to bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of discretion.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
 The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty prescribed by the Anti-Plunder Law
itself for the crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but also the penalty next
lower in degree (or reclusion temporal) by “consider(ing) the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code.”
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
 Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating circumstances is a needless
formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever)
is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence failed to raise in issue, in its
Opposition to Enrile’s motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is strong, in the light of the
prosecution’s continuing muteness to the defense’s repeated challenge for the
prosecution to produce any “single piece of paper showing that Enrile received even a
single peso of kickback,” the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted that Enrile must first
initiate, and formally apply for, the formal proceedings (“bail hearing”) before the
prosecution may be called upon to discharge its duty of proving evidence of guilt is
strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
 The exception to, or exclusion from, the right (“shall be bailable”) does not become a
prohibition (“shall not be bailable”). Indeed, the exception to a mandatory right (“shall”) is
a permissive right (“may”).
 A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to presumptive innocence and non-
deprivation of liberty without due process, and the theory behind the exception to right-
to-bail.
 Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is demonstrated
not being a flight risk), then bail may be granted to him.
331
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
 Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age, frail physical and medical condition,
and having voluntarily surrendered.
 Circumstances of official and social standing shows that Enrile is not a flight risk.
 Other circumstances negating Enrile’s disposition to become a fugitive from justice are
also present.
 The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court show that at this stage of
the proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of right.51
The prayer in his Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the Honorable Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated July 14, 2014, and the Resolution dated
August 8, 2014, and forthwith GRANT BAIL in favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.52
IV
This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the justices of this court in and
out of formal deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the discussion
_______________
51 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-12.
52 Id., at p. 64.
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was triggered by the submission of the member in charge of a draft early this year. The draft
mainly adopted the legal arguments of the Petition which was centered on this court taking
judicial notice of evidence to establish two generic mitigating circumstances that would lower the
penalty to be imposed even before trial or a hearing for the determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong happened before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-
Bernabe and this member submitted their reflections on this issue. Refutations and arguments
were vigorously exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the common position that
there was no grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition should be dismissed. At most,
the Motion to Fix Bail could be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or application for bail
as in all cases where the statutorily imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death, or life
imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member differed only in the
treatment of mitigating circumstances and the interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et
al.53
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on August 11,
2015, the member-in-charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of dropping all discussion on
the legal points pertaining to whether bail was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on
“humanitarian” grounds. The member-in-charge committed to circulate a draft for the
consideration of all justices. This member expressed that he was open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical condition of petitioner
was circulated on August 14, 2015. After considered reflection, this member responded with a
letter addressed to all the justices, which stated:
_______________
53 219 Phil. 432; 134 SCRA 466 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the revisions in the proposed ponencia
that need to be threshed out thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when
an accused charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua should be released on
bail “for humanitarian reasons.”
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it applied the text of the Constitution, the rules of court, and the present canonical
interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the certification of a certain
Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our rules on evidence, that is, doing away with cross-
examination and not appreciating rebutting evidence that may be or have been presented by the
prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in appreciating the facts relating
to the medical condition of the accused? Or are we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the Sandiganbayan which authorizes the accused
to be brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms which cannot be treated by
the PNP hospital subject only to reportorial requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that
the Sandiganbayan’s decisions in relation to their supervision of the detention of the accused
were tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases on bail? Or if we are able to hurdle
the factual issues and find that there is actually a medical necessity, should his detention rather
be modified? Do we have clear judicial precedents for hospital or house arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so that his medical condition can be
attended to,
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
should he be returned to detention when he becomes well? If he reports for work, does this not
nullify the very basis of the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have established rules on what to
consider when setting the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his circumstances, what
is our basis for setting this amount? What evidence have we considered? Should this Court
rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise this discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the medical condition of the accused entitles
him to treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for
plunder? Is it simply his advanced age? What qualifies for advanced age? Is it the medical
conditions that come with advanced age? Would this apply to all those who have similar
conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder? Is he suffering from a unique debilitating
disease which cannot be accommodated by the best care provided by our detention facilities or
hospital or house arrest? Are there sufficient evidence and rules to support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international law provisions, other than the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of an accused in his
condition? Or are we now reading the general tenor of the declaration of human rights to apply
specifically to the condition of this accused? What entitles the accused in this case to a liberal
application of very general statements on human rights?54
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August 18, 2015. The member-in-
charge, however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written reflection on the points
raised. Insisting on a vote, he thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14, 2015
circulated draft centering on release on bail on humanitarian \
_______________
54 J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.
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grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea that bail was a matter of right based
on judicial notice and the judicial declaration of the existence of two mitigating
circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The only amendment
to the majority opinion accepted by the member-in-charge was the increase of the proposed
amount of bail to P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the member-in-charge,
emerging as the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the ponente
passed around a final copy of the majority opinion which was not the version voted upon
during the morning’s deliberation. Rather, the copy offered for signature was substantially the
August 14, 2015 circulated version granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioner’s entire argument, stating that:
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence
of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against
him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily
factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of the court at
the time that the case was voted upon. But because the final version for signing was
_______________
55 Ponencia, p. 305.
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336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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not the version voted upon, this member had to substantially revise his dissent. Since the issue
of mitigating circumstances and bail as a matter of right was no longer the basis of the ponencia,
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to graciously offer her points for the drafting
of a single Dissenting Opinion and to abandon her filing of a Separate Opinion and joining this
member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a dissenting
opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion.—A Member who disagrees with the
majority opinion, its conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice
or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason or reasons for such dissent.
A Member who agrees with the result of the case, but based on different reason or reasons may
submit a separate opinion; a concurrence “in the result” should state the reason for the qualified
concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express other reasons
for concurrence may submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring
opinion must be submitted within one week from the date the writer of the majority opinion
presents the decision for the signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and suggestions of
other dissenting justices within two days from the circulation of the majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote and started to speculate
on the contents of the majority opinion. This may have created expectations on the part of
petitioner’s friends, family, and counsel. The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while
admitting that the Decision had as yet not been promulgated and served, made announcements
as to their readiness to receive the cash bond and process the release of the accused even if
August 19, 2015
337
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
happened to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements regarding the vote and the date
of promulgation of this judgment.
V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioner’s arguments, the majority, instead of denying the Petition
for Certiorari, grants it on some other ground that was not even argued nor prayed for by
petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the certification in a
Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales)
stating that petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating conditions.56 This certification was
submitted as an annex to a Manifestation57 before this court regarding the remoteness of the
possibility of flight of the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a
doctor’s certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away
with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’ findings on petitioner’s health in a
hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
_______________
56 The enumeration of diseases on pages 307-308 of the ponencia is based on the certification
of Dr. Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the purpose of determining whether hospital arrest
can continue. The hearing was not for the purpose of determining whether bail should be granted
on the basis of his medical condition.
57 Rollo, p. 373.
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338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.—A court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety.59
Petitioner’s medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is
now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr.
Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process
requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to
ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at present.
_______________
58 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
59 Id., at pp. 521-522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v. Gallun, 109 U.S. 99,
27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7, 823.
339
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That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is
obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the presentation of evidence by both the
prosecution and the accused, without the prosecution being granted the opportunity to cross-
examine the evidence, and without consideration of any rebutting evidence that may have been
presented should a hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our neutrality and objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and
canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after a
petition for bail is filed by the accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be
pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that require immediate medical
attention, this court has not established clear guidelines for such releases. The closest that the
majority opinion reaches for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during trial.60
(Emphasis in the original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its premises:
_______________
60 Ponencia, p. 310.
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340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to their
health OR whose lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners are humanely treated.
Under A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC,61 judges of lower courts are mandated to conduct monthly jail
visitations in order to “[e]nsure the promotion and protection of the dignity and well-being”62 of
detention prisoners. Detention prisoners may also be released to a medical facility on
humanitarian grounds “if their continuous confinement during the pendency of their case would
be injurious to their health or endanger their life.”63
In many instances, alternative detention — whether temporary or permanent — is granted upon
a clear showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that the physical condition of the
accused, as proven through evidence presented in open court, is absolutely requiring medical
attention that could not be accommodated within the current custodial arrangements. Care
should, however, be taken that such alternative custodial arrangements do not take place more
than the time necessary to address the medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the
Sandiganbayan should ensure that alternative custodial arrangements are not borne by the state
and, therefore, should be sensitive to the possibility that these alternatives are not seen as a
privilege given to the wealthy or powerful detainees.
_______________
61 Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New guidelines are stated in OCA
Circular No. 107-2013.
62 A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), Sec. 1(3)
63 De la Rama v. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
341
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65 the Sandiganbayan already issued Resolutions allowing
accused to remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital and continue medical
examinations until further orders from the court, subject to reportorial requirements and at
accused’s personal expense. In particular, the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzales’s report], the Court will hold in abeyance action on
accused Enrile’s motion for detention at the PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed to
remain thereat until further orders from this Court. The Director or Administrator of PNP General
Hospital is GRANTED AUTHORITY to allow accused Enrile to access another medical facility Pending the completion of the aforesaid medical examination/s and/or procedure/s and
outside Camp Crame only (1) in case of emergency or necessity, and (2) the medical procedure submission of the required report and recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed
required to be administered on accused Enrile is not available at, or cannot be provided for by to remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject to conditions earlier imposed
the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF by the Court in its Resolution dated July 9, 2014.
ACCUSED ENRILE. After completion of the medical treatment or procedure outside Camp
Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital. The said SO ORDERED.67
director or administrator is DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such visit/s of
accused Enrile to another medical facility on the day following the said visit/s.66
(Emphasis in the original)

These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to be brought to any
hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated at the Philippine National
Police General Hospital subject only to reportorial requirements to the court. In granting bail to
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states: petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring that the Sandiganbayan’s decisions in relation to its
supervision of the accused’s detention were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his duly authorized
representative/s from the Philippine General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue with the medical However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit a report and recommendation
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it, accused does not seem to be
_______________ suffering from a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be provided for by our
detention facilities and temporary hospital arrest in accordance with their order. How the
64 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O. majority arrived at a conclusion different from the Sandiganbayan has not been
thoroughly explained. Neither did this issue become the subject of intense discussion by
65 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P. the parties through their pleadings.

66 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5. _______________

67 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 2-3.

342

343
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. The necessary medical examination/s
and/or procedure/s as determined the said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any
government hospital, which the medical team may deem to have the appropriate, suitable and/or It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have similar conditions and are
modern equipment or medical apparatus and competent personnel to undertake the also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioner’s incarceration aggravates his
procedure/s, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE ENRILE.
medical conditions or if his medical conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced
age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles
him to treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for
plunder. There is no showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to the facilities that
are made available to him. There is also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments
is actually aggravating in spite of the best care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no
showing that it is his detention that is the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the hospital
necessary, courts do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the accused’s
detention. There is now no clarity as to when special bail based on medical conditions and
modified arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on medical condition is
applicable only to those of advanced age and whether that advanced age is beyond 90 or 91
years old. There is no guidance as to whether this is applicable only to cases involving plunder.
There is no guidance in the majority’s opinion as to whether this is only applicable to the medical
conditions or stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of
bail on the ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald:68
_______________
68 536 Phil. 413; 505 SCRA 573 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside
the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is
for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing
proposition for the “selective decarceration of older prisoners” based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.69
VII
Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for this special kind of bail.
Thus, the majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.70
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has dried, friends,
family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he would report immediately for
work. This strongly indicates that the majority’s
_______________
69 Id., at p. 428; pp. 585-586, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro in Non-Bailable
Offense, 419 Phil. 567, 581; 367 SCRA 285, 299 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Gako,
Jr., 401 Phil. 514, 541; 348 SCRA 334, 352 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division],
Pineda, Ernesto, The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, p. 193 (2003), which in turn cited
De la Rama v. People’s Court, supra note 63, Archer’s case, 6 Gratt 705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max Rothman, Burton Dunlop, and Pamela Entzel, Elders, Crime
and The Criminal Justice System, pp. 233-234 (2000).
70 Ponencia, p. 311.
 71 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 9, which states:

345 SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines.—The judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall fix a reasonable
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 345
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative
or premature.
346
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled
motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that motion to cancel bail should 346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
be filed before the Sandiganbayan or before this court. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

The crime charged in petitioner’s case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted after granting the prosecution
the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical
conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other
duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the basis of
humanitarian considerations extends even after the medical emergency has passed. Again, a
case of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
VIII
considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the more prudent course of action would have
been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of
bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court to release
petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon
in the majority opinion, is a general declaration72 to uphold the value and dignity of every
person.73 It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does it
prohibit the detention of any person accused of crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention
must be carried out in a dignified and humane manner.

_______________
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The
original proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to P500,000.00 amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member
who voted with the majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00.
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail.71 The majority
opinion is sparse on the evidence it (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

_______________ (c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused; court, however, does not state that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates that
bail must be granted in instances where the accused is of advanced age and frail health.
(e) Age and health of the accused;
Petitioner’s remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that safeguard his
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; fundamental right to liberty are qualified by the Constitution. Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution clearly states that bail is available to all persons before conviction “except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong[.]” Even
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the same document used by the
majority opinion, provides that:
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. the general welfare in a democratic society.

Excessive bail shall not be required.

72 In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545; 407 SCRA 10, 57 (2003) [Per J. Carpio,
En Banc], this court stated: “Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.”
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong was wary to grant bail without evidence
presented that the accused was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded
_______________

73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1 states that “[a]ll human beings are born free 74 550 Phil. 63, 72; 521 SCRA 470, 482 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
and equal in dignity and rights.”
75 Ponencia, pp. 305-306.

347
348
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The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon.
Olalia, Jr.74 as basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.75 However, Government of the case to the trial court76 instead of applying the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Hong Kong does not apply to this case because the issue was on whether bail could apply to Human Rights and categorically stating that based on these principles alone, the accused was
extradition cases. This court stated that because of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, entitled to bail.
whose principles are now embodied in the Constitution, bail applies to all instances where an
accused is detained pending trial, including administrative proceedings such as extradition. This
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the respect for human dignity and
the protection of human rights. These rights are applicable to those who, during the dark days
of Martial Law, were illegally detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of
course, no reason for these rights and the invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to
Senators of our Republic.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our individual and collective meaningful existence, is
put at risk if justice is wanting. Special privileges may be granted only under clear, transparent,
and reasoned circumstances. Otherwise, we accept that there are just some among us who are
elite. Otherwise, we concede that there are those among us who are powerful and networked
enough to enjoy privileges not shared by all.

However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not shibboleth. It should This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled with discomfort with the consequences of
not be cause for us to be nonchalant about the existence of other constitutional and statutory the majority’s position. It cannot accept any form of impunity.
provisions and the norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights does not
mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result
that we want. Rather, human rights are best entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending the
applicability of clear legal provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels this court to
do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate specific binding X
human rights norms.

The majority opinion fails in this respect.

Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with the imposable penalty of reclusion
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic part of our humanity to fight for it and ensure perpetua or life imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the following crimes, among
that it allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will consider meaningful. others, carry this as maximum penalty:

_______________ (1) Parricide;77

76 See Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 550 Phil. 63, 77; (2) Murder;78
521 SCRA 470, 488 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]. The dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to (3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention;79
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of ‘clear and convincing
evidence.’ If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate (4) Robbery with homicide;80
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.”

(5) Robbery with rape;81

_______________
349

77 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 246.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 349
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) 78 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 248, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 6, and Rep. Act
No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
This applies to petitioner as accused. Yet it also applies with equal force to all the individuals in
our communities and in this society.
79 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 267, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 8, and Rep. Act (3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10 grams or more of cocaine, 50 grams or
No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1. more of shabu, 500 grams or more of marijuana, or 10 grams or more of ecstasy;90

80 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 9. (4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams of shabu;91

81 Id. _______________

82 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 9.

83 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 297.

350 84 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 85 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(1)(d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
86 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.
(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries;82
87 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-B(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.
(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide;83
88 Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 20 and
Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
(8) Rape;84
89 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 5.
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old;85
90 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 1st par. (3)(4)(5)(7)(8).
(10) Sexual assault;86 and
91 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).
(11) Incestuous rape.87

Under special laws, the following crimes, among others, carry the maximum penalty of life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua:
351
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape;88
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 351
(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and purity;89 Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of heroin, cocaine, shabu, or ecstasy;92
(6) Child prostitution;93
(7) Child trafficking;94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use begging as a means of living;95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in drug trafficking or pushing;96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any illegal activities;97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries of a child under
12 years old.98
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it should be that there are those accused of
murder, trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape of minors, multiple counts of
rape, or even serious illegal detention who languish in overcrowded detention facilities all over
our country. We know this because the members of this court encounter them through cases
appealed on a daily basis. Many of them suffer from diseases that they may have contracted
because of the conditions of their jails. But they and their families cannot afford hospitals better
than what government can provide them. After all, they remain in jail because they may not have
the resources to launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the creativity of well-networked
defense counsel. After all,
_______________
92 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).
93 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 5.
94 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 7.
95 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(1).
96 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(2).
97 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(3).
98 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10.
352
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
they may have committed acts driven by the twin evils of greed or lust on one hand and poverty
on the other hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The application of the law to them is often brute, banal,
and canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts.
Our precedents show that when there are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer accused, this
court has had no difficulty denying a motion to fix bail or motion to set bail where the crime
charged carries the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua. With less powerful accused, we
have had no difficulty reading the plain meaning of Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution. With
those who are less fortunate in life, there are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the right, just, and legal result. In my view, it
is not right, just, and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00, without clearly articulating why
the Sandiganbayan’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and with sufficient compassion. It did
not gravely abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be dismissed.
XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent
may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious political accommodation
rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one powerful
public official at the cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts
to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will
weaken the administration of justice because the judicial standards are not clear.
353
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 353
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Without further clarity, our signal to the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan hearing these
complex and politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted. Rather than apply the Rule
of Law without fear or favor, the sitting justices will become more sensitive to the demands of
those who have political influence. After all, in their minds, even if they do what is expected of
them, this court may still declare that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed within the bounds of the Constitution. Our
duty is to ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in difficult cases. This case does not
really present any kind of legal complexity if we blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is
complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of whether the evidence
of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the Constitution. It may be that, as
citizens, we have our own opinions on or predilections for how the balance of fundamental rights,
liberties, and obligations should be. It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our
wealth of knowledge and experience.
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the exact textual formulation of the
fundamental document written and ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to the text of the
Constitution will provide us with a stable anchor despite the potential political controversies that
swirl over the legal questions that we need to decide. It is also this fealty to the text of the
Constitution that gives this court the legitimacy as the final bastion and the ultimate sentinel of
the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the Rule of Law, the court from whom all other
courts — like the Sandiganbayan — should find inspiration and courage, we should apply the
law squarely and without fear or favor. We should have collectively carried the burden of doing
justice properly and denied this Petition.
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However, mercy and compassion should never
replace justice. There is injustice when we, as the court of last resort, conveniently rid ourselves
of the burden of enforcing the Rule of Law by neglecting to do the kind of rigorous, deliberate,
and conscious analysis of the issues raised by the parties. There is injustice when we justify the
result we want with ambiguous and unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us as justices of this court. It also fails us in
our own humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail should be treated by the
Sandiganbayan as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
Petition granted, resolutions of Sandiganbayan (Third Division) annulled and set aside.
Notes.—After a judgment of conviction has been rendered by the trial court and cancellation of
the bail bond of the accused, his appropriate remedy against the court’s order cancelling his
bond is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same regular
appeal proceedings, as an incident of his appeal — the filing of a separate petition via a special
civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order before the appellate court is
proscribed. (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 520 SCRA 729 [2007])
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; The allowance of
bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. (Qui vs.
People, 682 SCRA 94 [2012])