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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Saripada, Najmah
Case No. 42
Spouses Hernandez vs Spouses Dolor
G.R.No.160286 July 30, 3004

FACTS:
Lorenzo Menard Boyet Dolor, Jr. was driving an owner-type jeepney owned by her mother, Margarita,
towards Anilao, Batangas. As he was traversing the road, his vehicle collided with a passenger jeepney driven
by petitioner Juan Gonzales and owned by his co-petitioner Fransisco Hernandez. Boyet and his passengers
died. Passengers also on board the owner-type jeep which was totally wrecked, suffered physical injuries. The
collision also damaged the passenger jeepney of Fransisco Hernandez and caused physical injuries to its
passengers.
Respondents commenced an action for damages alleging that driver Juan Gonzales was guilty of
negligence and lack of care and that Hernandez spouses were guilty of negligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. Petitioners countered that the proximate cause of the death and injuries
sustained by the passengers of both vehicles was the recklessness of Boyet who was driving in a zigzagging
manner under the influence of alcohol.
Petitioners also alleged that Gonzales was not the driver-employee of Hernandez spouse, as the former
only leased the jeepney on a daily basis. They further claim that even if an employer-employee relationship is
found to exist between the, they cannot be held liable because as employers, they exercised due care in the
selection and supervision of their employee. The trial rendered decision in favor of respondents. Court of
Appeals affirmed with modifications. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hernandez spouses are solidarily liable with Juan Gonzales
HELD:
Yes. Spouses Hernadez are solidarily liable even though they were not in the jeepney during the
accident. They are still answerable to someprovisions of the Civil Code, Article 2180 and 2176. While the
above provisions do not provide for the solidary liability, they should be read in consonance with first paragraph
of Article 2180—one can be liable for the acts or omission of another whom he is responsible for, meaning that
an employer is accountable for the actions of his employees. Moreover, Article 2194 categorically states that
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quisi-delict is solidary.

The Hernandez spouses maintained that Julian Gonzales is not their employee because the latter pays
them daily for the use of the jeepney. They argued that they are practicing a lease agreement using the boundary
system. The Supreme Court held that there exists an employer-employee relationship because by exempting
spouses Hernandez from liability, there would be a violation of the Public Service Law and the riding public is
placed at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers. Reckless because the measure of their earnings depend
largely upon the numbers of trips they make and hence, the speed at which they drive; irresponsible because
most if not all of them are in no position to pay damages they might cause.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Campong, Johairah
Case No. 43
ERNESTO SYKI vs. SALVADOR BEGASA
G.R. No. 149149 October 23, 2003

FACTS:
On June 22, 1992, around 11:20 a.m.,near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod City,
respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companion flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by Joaquin
Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney, a truck driven by
ElizaldeSablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney.
Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone. He also suffered lacerations and abrasions in his left leg.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carrier’s contractual
obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, Ernesto Syki, and ElizaldeSablayan. The Trial Court
dismissed the complaint for damages for breach of common carrier’s contractual obligations and quasi-delict
against Aurora Pisuena but ordered Ernesto Syki and ElizaldeSablayan to pay respondent Salvador Begasa.
Petitioner Syki and his driver appealed to the Court of appeals. However, said court affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Petitioner Ernesto Syki and his driver liable for injuries sustained by respondent?
2. Whether or not Respondent Begasa is guilty of contributory negligence?

RULING:

1. Yes, petitioner and his driver are liable for injuries sustained by Salvador Begasa.

The sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner’s driver who, did not slow
down when he was already approaching a busy intersection within the city proper. The impact of the
bump was so strong such that the respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone, and suffered severely
wounds in his left knee and leg. No doubt that petitioner’s driver was recklessly speeding.

 Employer Syki’s Liability

From the provision of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/ or
supervision of his said employee duties. However, this may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the
part of the employer that he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of
negligence, he is relieved of liability.

Based on jurisprudential law, to prove that employer observed the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and/or supervision of his employee, employer must present testimonial evidence
supported with concrete and documentary evidence.In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

the other hand, in the supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
In this case, petitioner’s evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence. He testified that before he
hired ElizaldeSablayan, petitioner required respondent to submit police clearance and undergo driving
test. However, petitioner never presented the alleged police clearance nor the result of Sablayan’s
driving test.
The unsubstantiated and self-serving testimonies of petitioner were insufficient to overcome the legal
presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver. Thus, petitioner
is liable for the injuries suffered by respondent.

2. Contributory Negligence of respondent

Petitioner’s contention that, had respondent flagged down the passenger jeepney at the proper place, the
accident could have been avoided is not tenable.

There was no evidence that respondent Begasa flagged down the passenger jeepney at or in prohibited
area. No city resolution, traffic regulation or DPWH Memorandum was presented to show that the
passenger jeepney picked up and his three companions at a prohibited area. Thus, there is no negligence
on the part of respondent.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Dasmarinas, Merriam J.
Case No. 44

SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION vs. TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC.,


INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and BLACK SEA SHIPPING AND DODWELL now
INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES
G..R. No. 150255 April 22, 2005

FACTS:

On September 25, 1991, SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V
―Alexander Saveliev, owned by respondent Black Sea, 545 rolled steel sheets. The cargoes, which were to be
discharged at the port of Manila, in favor of consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation, were insured
against all risks with Industrial Insurance Company Ltd.

On October 24, 1991, the vessel arrived at the port of Manila and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned
it a place of berth at the outside breakwater at the Manila South Harbor. Petitioner Schmitz Transport, engaged
by Little Giants Steel Pipe Corporation to secure the requisite clearances, receive the cargoes from the shipside,
and deliver them to Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation‘s warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, likewise engaged the
services of respondent Transport Venture Inc. (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside.
TVI’s tugboat towed its barge to shipside and positioned it along the side of MV Saveliev, after which it left and
returned to port terminal. Arrastre operator Ocean Services, Inc began to unload the 37 steel sheets unto the
barge. After a few hours, with the weather becoming inclement due to an approaching storm, the unloading of
the 37 steel sheets was done. However, the barge was not towed back to the pier. Hours later, due to the strong
waves, the crew had to leave the barge and transfer to the vessel. The barge pitched and rolled with the waves
and eventually capsized, the rolled steel sheets were washed into the sea. Efforts made to salvage the coils were
futile. After the filing of formal claim ensued the payment of Industrial Insurance to Little Giants the amount of
P5, 246,113.11, for the value of the 37 rolled steel sheets, who issued a subrogation receipt in favor of the
former.
Industrial Insurance filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI and Black Sea, for the recovery of the
amount paid to Little Giants, charging the defendants with fault for causing the hauling despite the raised storm
signal warning. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants filed an MR assailing the
finding that they are common carriers and that they were not acting with gross or evident bad faith because the
incident was caused by fortuitous event. Defendants’ MR was denied. They appealed to the CA which affirmed
in toto the decision of the trial court. After MR was denied, petitioner, Schmitz transport filed a petition against
TVI, Industrial Insurance and Black sea, asserting that the chartering of tugboat and barge of TVI was acting for
its principal/consignee, Little Giants, hence transport contract was between TVI and Little Giants.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event, independent of any act of negligence on the
part of petitioner, Black Sea and TVI, and
(2) If there was negligence, whether liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea, petitioner and TVI.
HELD:
The unloading of the cargoes outside the breakwater happened without issue. That no tugboat towed back the
barge to the pier after the cargoes were completely loaded to the barge and was left floating in open sea until big
waves set in, causing it to sink with the cargoes, was a material fact embracing negligence.
Petitioner and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the cargoes. Between the liability of common carrier on
one hand and the independent contractor on the other, the nature should be solidary. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of
the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. In this case, there was failure of observance of high
diligence required.
As for Black Sea, its duty extended only from the time the goods were unconditionally placed in its possession
and received for transportation until they were delivered actually or constructively to consignee, Little Giant,
which was discharged accordingly, thus no liability may attach to it.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Macumbal, Hanimai I.
Case No. 45

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181
G.R. 116100 Feb. 9, 1996

FACTS:

Pacifico Mabasa, later substituted by Ofelia after his death, owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment
situated at P. Burgos St. As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from
Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between a row of houses, including that of
herein petitioners. Tenants in the apartment allegedly eventually vacated the place because an adobe fence was
constructed by the petitioners in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed.

RTC: Awarded Mabasa permanent access to ingress and egress; ordered Mabasa to pay idemnity in return.

CA: Awarded damages in favor of Mabasa.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the award of damages in favor of Mabasa is valid

RULING: NO

I. Damnun absque injuria. Mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages.

To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both:

a.) right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant;

b.) and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.

Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

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In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

II. Act of fencing is a valid exercise of petitioner’s right. Contrary to the claim of private respondents,
petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following
requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff .

As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as
such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Sampaco, Sharah Myellah


Case No. 46

MARITER MENDOZA, v. ADRIANO, JENNIFER ADRIANE and


JOHN ANDRE, all surnamed CASUMPANG,
G.R. No. 197987 March 19, 2012

FACTS:

On February 13, 1993, the petitioner, Mariter Mendoza, performed hysterectomy and myomectomy on
Josephine Casumpang. After the operation, the latter experienced recurring fever, nausea, and vomiting. Three
months after the operation, she noticed something protruding in her genital. She called Mendoza, but was not
available, and went to another physician, who extracted a foul-smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her
cervix.

Josephine filed a damage suit against the petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo City. She died before the case was
decided and was substituted by her husband and children, herein respondents. The RTC ruled on her side, on
MR, the lower court reversed itself and dismissed the complaint in an order. On appeal, CA reinstated RTC’s
original decision. MR was denied, thus the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages on account of the complaint filed by the deceased and
substituted plaintiff

HELD:

SC decided against petitioner. The questions of facts raised on SC level did not qualify amongst those
exemptions against the general rule that findings of the lower courts are binding.

A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He must personally ascertain that the
counts of instruments and materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up have been
correctly done.

Decision of the CA was affirmed with modification awarding exemplary damages by way of example or
correction for the public good, which may also be awarded in cases of gross negligence.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Javien, Sam Joshua


Case No. 47

Crescencia Achevera, Alfredo Achevera and Benigno Valdez


versus
Elvira Ramos, John Arnel Ramos and Khristine Camille Ramos
G.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009

FACTS:
On April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger-type jeep owned by the Achevera’s
southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos coming from the
south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a
collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type
jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep resulting to the
death of Arnulfo Ramos.During the trial it was established thatArnulfo Ramos was careless and negligent in
driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect.
RTC decided in favor of the respondents (Ramos) and against the petitioner, the latter to account for and
to pay jointly and solidarily to the respondents, however the amount was reduced because of the contributory
negligence of Ramos. Consequently, the trial court held that, as contended by respondents, the doctrine of last
clear chance was applicable to this case.
In appeal,CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the trial court and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration of the Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez was denied by the same court. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners (Achevera’s and Valdez) are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a
result of the vehicular accident?
HELD:
No, the doctrine of last clear chance applies only to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed
to do so − is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and
the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was
Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the
western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision, considering that
the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of
seconds.
Moreover, Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and
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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken
to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence
of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages
pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and CA’s decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Tomawis, Raffy
Case No. 48

SPOUSES FREDELICTO AND FELICISIMA FLORES V. PINEDA


G.R. No. 158996 Nov. 14, 2008

FACTS:
Teresita Pineda was a 51 year old unmarried woman living in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. On April 17, 1987
she consulted her town mate Dr. Fredelicto Flores regarding her medical condition. She complained of her
general body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent urination and thirst and an on-and-off vaginal bleeding. Dr.
Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked for the history of her monthly period to analyze the
probable cause of the vaginal bleeding and advised Teresita to go to United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC)
for a general check-up however, Teresita did go to the hospital as advised, for Dr. Flores suspected her of having
diabetes other than her vaginal bleeding.

On April 28, 1987, travelling for at least two hours from Nueva Ecija, Teresita went to UDMC with her sister
Lucena Pineda. When they arrived, after Dr. Flores did a routine check-up on Teresita, she was then admitted
and was being prepared for an operation called a D&C to be performed by then the wife Dr. Felicisima, an
obstetrician and gynecologist, staff forthwith took samples of her blood and urine before the operation. After the
operation, Dr. Felicisima advised Teresita that she could spend her recovery period at home, but still feeling
week a day after, Teresita opted to be confined at the hospital. On April 29, 1987, Teresita’s examination results
came out, with an indication that she had a very high sugar urine and was placed then under the care of Dr.
Amado Jorge, an internist. By April 30, 1987, Teresita’s condition worsened as she experienced difficulty in
breathing thus was rushed to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) as it was confirmed that she was suffering from
Diabetes Mellitus Type II. On May 6, 1987, Teresita died.

Believing that Teresita’s death was a result of negligent handling, her family (respondents) instituted an action
for damages against the Drs. Spouses (Flores) before the RTC of Nueva Ecija and was ruled in favor of the
respondents and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs. CA affirmed
judgment but modified the amount of damages awarded and deleted the award for attorney’s fees and costs of
suit.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

ISSUE:

Whether the decision to proceed with the D&C operation was an honest mistake of judgment or one amounting
to negligence.

RULING:

The court did not find the petition of Spouses Flores to be meritorious.

The respondents claim for damages is predicated on their allegation that the decision of the petitioner spouses to
proceed with the D&C operation, notwithstanding Teresita’s condition and the laboratory test results, thus
amounted to negligence. The Court further elaborated on the Medical Negligence Case namely that in a medical
negligence case it must involve: duty, breach, injury, and proximate cause.

On the breach of duty, the court said that if a patient suffers from some disability that increases the magnitude of
risk to him, that disability must be taken into account so long as it is or should have been known to the
physician. And when the patient is exposed to an increased risk, it is incumbent upon the physician to take
commensurate and adequate precautions. Taking into account Teresita’s high blood sugar, the attending
physician should have postponed the D&C operation in order to conduct a confirmatory test to make a
conclusive diagnosis of diabetes and to refer the case to an internist or diabetologist.

As to Injury and Causation, the plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he had been injured and defendant
has been at fault, but also that the defendants fault caused the injury. A verdict in malpractice action cannot be
based on speculation or conjecture. The trial court and the appellate court pinned the liability for Teresita’s
death on both the petitioner spouses and this court finds no reason to rule otherwise. If Dr. Fredelicto believed
himself to be incompetent to treat diabetes, not being an internist or a diabetologist, he should have likewise
refrained from making a decision to proceed with D&C operation since he was neither an obstetrician nor a
gynecologist.

As to the liability of the hospital, UDMC and spouses Flores were co-defendants, and the RTC found the
hospital jointly and severally liable which decision the CA confirmed.

Awards of damages were granted to respondents (family) for Actual damages of Php. 36,000; Death Indemnity
for Php 50,000; moral damages of Php 400,000; and exemplary damages of Php 100,000; and attorney’s fees
with grant of court for Php 100,000 also for costs and restoration.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Oclarit, Rizan P.
Case No. 49

Bank of America vs. Philippine Racing Club


G.R. 150228 July 30, 2009

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellee PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains a current account with defendant-appellant
Bank of America. Its authorized joint signatories are the company President (Antonia Reyes) and Vice-President
for Finance (Gregorio Reyes). These officers were scheduled to go out the country. They pre-signed checks to
insure continuity and accommodate any expenses that may come up while they were abroad for a business trip.
The said pre-signed checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs accounting officer. It turned out that, the two (2)
of said checks came into the hands of one of its employees who managed to encash it with petitioner bank. In
the said check, the space where the name of the payee should be indicated (Pay To The Order Of) the following
2-line were instead typewritten, on the upper line was the word CASH while the lower line had the typewritten
amount in words.

There was an apparent irregularity with the filling up of the blank checks as both showed similar infirmities and
irregularities but still the petitioner bank did not try to verify with the corporation and encashed the said checks.
PRCI filed an action for damages against the bank. The RTC Makati rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court's decision and held that the bank was negligent. Now
the petitioner bank comes before the SC and contends that it was merely fulfill its obligation under the law and
contract when it encashed the checks, since the signatures in the checks were genuine.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was negligent.

HELD:

Both parties were guilty of negligent act but the petitioner has the last clear chance to prevent the fraudulent
encashment of checks. It is the petitioner as the party foremost liable.

There is no dispute that the signatures in the checks were genuine but the presence of irregularities on the face
of the check should have alerted the petitioner to be cautious before proceeding to encash them. It is well-settled
that banks are in the business impressed with public interest that they are duty bound to protect their clients and
their deposits at all times. They must treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest
degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks is more
than that of a good father of a family. However the court agrees that respondent officers' practice of pre-signing
checks is a seriously negligent and highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. Its own
negligence must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability. In addition, the person who stole the checks is also
an employee of the plaintiff, a clerk in its accounting department at that. As the employer, PRC supposedly
should have control and supervision over its own employees.

The court believes that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of damages involved in this case. And
PRC should shoulder in light of its contributory negligence, bear 40% of its own loss pursuant to Article 1170
of the NCC.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Malawani, Naif
Case No. 50

Sps. Alfredo Bontilao and SherlinaBontilao vs Dr. Carlos Gerona


GR # 176675 September 25, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Dr. Gerona is an orthopedic surgeon who treated the petitioner’s son Allen Bontilao on December
28, 1991 for a fractured right wrist. Sometime on June 1992, Allen re-fractured the same and brought back to
hospital and was then allowed to go home but advised Allen’s mother to bring him back for re tightening of the
cast. However on the same month, Allen was again brought back to hospital because the cast had not been re-
tightened a rotational deformity had developed in his arm. By this time, it was agreed that a surgery will be
conducted on June 24, 1992 by the respondent and Dr. Jabagat as anesthesiologist preferred by the petitioners.
During the conduct of surgery, Dr. Jabagat failed to intubate Allen after administering anesthesia where
respondent asked Dr. Jabagat if the operation should be postponed given the failure to intubate but Dr. Jabagat
said it was alright to proceed. Later on, Allen died on the operating table and the cause of death was asphyxia.
Criminal and administrative case was then filed against the doctors where RTC decided in favor of the
petitioners on the ground of Res IpsaLoquitor but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is liable for the death of AllenBontilao?

RULING:

The court ruled in negative. The doctrine of Res IpsaLoquitoris not applicable in this case. In order for the
doctrine to exist it must concur with the following requisites; First, The accident is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. Second, It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant and lastly, the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Further, such doctrine is a rebuttable presumption. In the case at hand,
petitioner failed to present substantial evidence of any specific act of negligence on respondent’s part. In fact, it
was established that he appears to have observed proper amount of care required under the circumstances. He
even inquired Dr. Jabagat who is the expert in the matter of administering anesthesia whether the surgery should
be postponed considering the failure to intubate and before proceeding to the surgery he verified that Allen was
still breathing. Furthermore, it should be noted that the instrument which caused damage or injury was not
within the exclusive management and control of the respondent but it was on Dr. Jabagat. Respondent could
only supervise Dr. Jabagat but could not dictate him since his specialization not being in the field of
anesthesiology could be dangerous. Thus, petition is denied.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Martin Joseph M. Laya


Case No. 51

Professional Services, Inc. vs. Natividad and Enrique Egana


G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007

FACTS:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City Hospital and was diagnosed to be
suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid”. Two days later, Dr. Ampil performed surgery on Natividad and found
out that the cancer had spread to her left ovary thereby necessitating the removal of some portions of it. Dr. Juan
Fuentes, with the consent of Enrique Egana proceeded to perform hysterectomy on her. After its’ completion,
Dr. Ampil took over completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the record of operation contained a statement that the sponge count was lacking two pieces
and that the surgeon was informed of this but nevertheless proceeded to close the incision.
Sometime later after Natividad’s discharge, she complained of excrutiating pain in her Anal region.
Upon consultation with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, they said that said pain was only a natural consequence of
the operation.
On September 1984, two weeks after their return from the US, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. They immediately notified Dr. Ampil and he proceeded to their house. Dr. Ampil
managed to extract the gauze and assured Natividad that the pains would go away.
Since the pain was intensifying, Natividad went to Polymedic General Hospital, where another gauze
was found in her vagina and was successfully extracted through another operation.
Natividad and her husband proceeded to file with the RTC a complaint for damages against Professional
Service Inc., as owner of Medical City Hospital,Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for negligence and medical
malpractice.
ISSUE:
Whether Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes is liable for negligence and malpractice?
HELD:
Dr. Ampil is guilty of medical malpractice.Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all
foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties.His negligence was the proximate
cause of injury and his concealment resulted in further aggravating the injury of Natividad. Hence, all the
elements are present, namely, duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Dr. Fuentes on the other hand is not negligent since under the “Captain of the ship rule” the lead surgeon
is in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation room. Since he was
not the lead surgeon, his only duty was to obey and he had no control over the operation.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Tabao, Zahary
Group IV- Case No. 52

Sps. Mamaril vs. Boy Scout of the Philippines


G.R. No. 179382 January 14, 2013

FACTS:
PUJ operators Sps. Mamaril would park their 6 passenger jeepneys every night at BSP’s compound in Malate,
Manila for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. One day, one of the vehicles was missing and was never
recovered. According to the security guards Peña and Gaddi of AIB Security Agency with whom BSP had
contracted for its security and protection, a male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle
out of the compound. Sps. Mamaril prayed that Peña and Gaddi, together with AIB and BSP, be held liable for:
(a) the value of the subject vehicle; (b) amount representing daily loss of income/boundary reckoned from the
day the vehicle was lost; (c) exemplary damages; (d) moral damages; (e) attorney's fees; and (f) cost of suit.
BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to the
manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket itself expressly stated that the
"Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein." It also
claimed that Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from not being parties
thereto, its provisions cover only the protection of BSP's properties, its officers, and employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BSP may be held liable for the loss of the vehicle caused by the negligence of its security
guards.
HELD:
No, BSP may not be held liable for the loss of the vehicle caused by the negligence of its security guards.
First, the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security guards Peña
and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle. The records are bereft of any
finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180
of the Civil Code apply in this case. Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant
to the Guard Service Contract. No employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the security
guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter’s negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but should
be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi.It is settled that where the security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such
guards and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency
Second, it cannot be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP and the security guards Peña
and Gaddi as to make the former liable for the latter’s complained act. Article 1868 of the Civil Code states that
“[b]y the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation
or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.” The basis for agency therefore is
representation, which element is absent in the instant case. Records show that BSP merely hired the services of

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

AIB, which, in turn, assigned security guards, solely for the protection of its properties and premises. Nowhere
can it be inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was appointed as an agent of BSP. Instead, what the
parties intended was a pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration, AIB rendered its security
services to BSP.
Third, Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Guard Service Contract between defendant-
appellant BSP and defendant AIB Security Agency is purely between the parties therein.
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law. If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or
interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor
upon a third person.
Thus, in order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred to as a stipulation
pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in favor
of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) The contracting parties clearly
and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person - the favor is not merely incidental; (4) The favor is
unconditional and uncompensated; (5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before
its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized, by the third party.
However, none of the foregoing elements obtains in this case.There is absolutely nothing in the said contract
that would indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of the parties therein in favor of third persons such
as herein plaintiffs-appellees.
Lastly, the Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the contract between the parties herein was one of
lease as defined under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a
garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. The agreement with respect to the ingress and egress of Sps.
Mamaril's vehicles were coordinated only with AIB and its security guards, without the knowledge and consent
of BSP. Accordingly, the mishandling of the parked vehicles that resulted in herein complained loss should be
recovered only from the tortfeasors (Peña and Gaddi) and their employer, AIB; and not against the lessor, BSP

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Tabao, Moh’dAsrin A.
Case No. 53

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. IAC


GR No. 75112, Aug 17, 1992

FACTS:

DanielFuntecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He
was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.He also lives in the house of the school’s president as free board while
he was a student.

On the evening of October 20, 1977, Funtecharequested Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s president
Agustin Lasa, who is the authorize driver of the school’s jeepney, to take over the vehicle while the latter was
on his way home. Since Funtecha holds a student driver’s license, Allan allowed him to drive. Knowingly that
they both live in the same place.Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road,
negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. A fast-moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as
if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved
towards the pedestrian, PotencianoKapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular
traffic, and hit him causing the latter to hospitalized for twenty (20) days due to multiple injuries.

Kapunan filed a criminal case against Funtecha alone,and a separate independent civil action against the
latter, including Filamer and its president based on Article 2180.Funtecha are both guilty as charged, while
Filameris subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funtechaby the lower court and, hence, compelled to pay for
damages based onArticle 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages
caused bytheir employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer
assailed thedecision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the IRR of the Labor Code,
workingscholars are excluded from the employment coverage, hence no employer-employee relations
existbetween Filamer and Funtecha; and that the negligent act of Funtecha was attributable to him alone as it
isoutside his assigned task of being a school janitor. The Supreme Court agreed with the latter, hence, heirs
ofPotencianoKapunan filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Filamer is liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was
not an authorized driver and thus, Section 14, Rule X, Book III of Labor Code should apply.

HELD:

The court held that driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan
and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic
of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.

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Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope
of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act
done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury or damage.He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in
order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the
school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection
of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors
its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering
and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III
provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what
records should be kept, maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from,
and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.

In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court,
thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in
a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of
a school and against the school itself. In the present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by
an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

Hamed, Mohamad-Kalid
Case No. 54

JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner


vs.
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU
G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he
was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises. Petitioner
thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to
provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in
turn, filed a ThirdParty Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the
agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises to indemnify them for
whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner. RTC: FEU and its President was ordered to pay jointly and
severally Saludaga damages. Galaxy and its President was ordered to indemnify jointly and severally FEU for
such amount. CA: Dismissed, ruling that: a) the incident was a fortuitous event; b) that respondents are not
liable for damages for the injury suffered by the petitioner from the hands of their own security guard in
violation of their built-in contractual obligation to petitioner, being their law student at the time, to provide him
with a safe and secure educational environment; c) that Rosete, who shot petitioner, was not FEUʼs employee
by virtue of the contract for security services between Galaxy and FEU, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner,
not being a party to it, is not bound by the same under the principle of relativity of contracts; and, d) FEU
exercised due diligence in selecting Galaxy as the agency which would provide security services within the
respondent FEU. In his appeal, petitioner sued respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student-
school contract for a safe learning environment. Respondents aver that the shooting incident was a fortuitous
event because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he was not
their employee; and that they complied with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their
students by having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not there is a contractual obligation between Saludaga and FEU.
HELD #1: YES. It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in respondent FEU. As
such, there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On petitionerʼs part, he was obliged to
comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning
institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace
and order within the campus.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not FEU is guilty of culpa contractual.
HELD #2: YES. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Here, petitioner was shot inside the
campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima
facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to

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its students. Also, respondents failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. No evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as
security guard was presented. Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and
confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security
Service Agreement.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the presence of force majeure may absolve FEU from liability.
HELD #3: NO. In order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no negligence or
misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. Oneʼs
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless,
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not
exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a personʼs participation – whether
by active intervention, neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.
ISSUE #4: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to indemnification for damages.
HELD #4: YES. Petitioner is entitled to actual damages, moral damages, temperate damages, attorneyʼs fees,
and litigation expenses. The petitioner is not entitled to exemplary damages. Article 1170 of the Civil Code
provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.
Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, FEU is liable to
petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven
during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendantʼs acts.
Petitioner spent expenses for his hospitalization and medical expenses. Since the case involved an obligation
arising from a contract and not a loan or forbearance of money, the proper rate of legal interest is 6% per annum
of the amount demanded. The interest shall continue to run from the filing of the complaint until the finality of
the Decision. After the decision becomes final and executory, the applicable rate shall be 12% per annum until
its satisfaction. Also, transportation expenses and those incurred in the hiring of a personal assistant while
recuperating were not however supported by receipts. In the absence thereof, no actual damages may be
awarded. Nonetheless, Art. 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate damages may be recovered where it has
been shown that the claimant suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with
certainty. SC awarded petitioner moral damages for the “physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, and moral shock resulting from the shooting incident”. SC stressed that the moral damages are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty
on the wrongdoer. Attorneyʼs fees and litigation expenses were also reasonable in view of Art. 2208 of Civil
Code. However, the award of exemplary damages is deleted considering the absence of proof that the
respondents acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
ISSUE #5: Whether or not the FEU President himself is vicariously liable.

HELD#5: NO. FEU President cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of CC because respondents
are not employers of Rosete.The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondentsʼ
Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged
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TORTS AND DAMAGES Group IV

in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the
element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. Where the security agency recruits, hires
and assigns the works of its watchmen or security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen
is such agency, and not the client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from the said client.
ISSUE #6: Whether or not Galaxy and its President were liable for damages.
HELD #6: YES. For the acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified
security guard, which resulted to the latterʼs breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable
to respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner. Also,
unlike the FEU President, SC deemed Galaxy President to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly
negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency. It was the Galaxy President who assured petitioner that
his medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy, but said representations were not fulfilled because they
presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer interested in filing a formal complaint against them.

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