Constitutional Law II: Due Process
Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano,
NBI & People of the Philippines
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of
Right to Due Process
FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan,
Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The
counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change
of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the
change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an
affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on
with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case
was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had
ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had
attested the voluntariness of her desistance the
same being due to media pressure and that they
would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was
then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced
both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details
of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied
criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit
himself from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties. There is no
showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard
of waiver requires that it “not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so
construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by
repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by
Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for
retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
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NOTES:
Due process in criminal proceedings
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court
“Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the
following order:
“(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove
the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
“(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his
defense, and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
“(c) The parties may then respectively present
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
“(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall
be deemed submitted for decision unless the court
directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
“(e) However, when the accused admits the act or
omission charged in the complaint or information
but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified accordingly.”
Aniag vs. Commission on Elections [GR 104961, 7
October 1994]
En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 6 concur, 3 on leave
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national
and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11
December 1991 Resolution 2323 (”Gun Ban”),
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
Constitutional Law II: Due Process
carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly
weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on
bearing arms by members of security agencies or
police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election
period. Subsequently, on 26 December 1991
COMELEC issued Resolution 2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of candidates engaged in
gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing
spot checkpoints. On 10 January 1992, pursuant to
the “Gun Ban,” Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-
Arms, House of Representatives, wrote Congressman
Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who was then Congressman of
the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of
the 2 firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Upon being advised of the request
on 13 January 1992 by his staff, Aniag immediately
instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the
firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return
them to Congress. Meanwhile, at about 5:00 p,.m. of
the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set
up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some
20 meters away from its entrance. About 30 minutes
later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged
down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the
checkpoint. They searched the car and found the
firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed
in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then
apprehended and detained. He explained that he
was ordered by Aniag to get the firearms from the
house and return them to Sergeant-at Arms Taccad
of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano’s case to the
Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral
did not include Aniag as among those charged with
an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City
Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after
finding the latter’s sworn explanation meritorious.
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor
invited Aniag to shed light on the circumstances
mentioned in Arellano’s sworn
explanation. Aniag not only appeared at the
preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano’s
statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging
him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that
Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact
was complying with it when apprehended by
returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he
was Aniag’s driver, not a security officer nor a
bodyguard. On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City
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Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other
matters, recommended that the case against
Arellano be dismissed and that the “unofficial”
charge against Aniag be also dismissed.
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon
recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC
issued Resolution 92-0829 directing the filing of
information against Aniag and Arellano for violation
of Sec. 261, par. (q), of BP 881 otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of
RA 7166; and Aniag to show cause why he should
not be disqualified from running for an elective
position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 2327, in
relation to Secs. 32, 33 and 35 of RA 7166, and Sec.
52, par. (c), of BP 881. On 13 April 1992,
Aniag moved for reconsideration and to hold in
abeyance the administrative proceedings as well
as the filing of the information in court. On 23 April
1992, the COMELEC denied Aniag’s motion for
reconsideration. Aniag filed a petition for declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition against the
COMELEC.
Issue: Whether the search of Aniag’s car that yielded
the firarms which were to be returned to the House
of Representatives within the purview of the
exception as to the search of moving vehicles.
Held: As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by
a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles
and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as
the search conducted at police or military
checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se,
and stressed that the warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search. As there was no
evidence to show that the policemen were impelled
to do so because of a confidential report leading
them to reasonably believe that certain motorists
matching the description furnished by their
informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor
was there any indication from the package or
behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying
circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability
of Aniag and Arellano, the search could not be valid.
The action then of the policemen unreasonably
Constitutional Law II: Due Process
intruded into Aniag’s privacy and the security of his
property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation
of Aniag’s right against warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
PHILCOMSAT VS ANIAG.
FACTS:
• By virtue of R.A No. 5514, philcomsat was granted
a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and
operate in the Philippines, at such places the grantee
may select, station or stations and or associated
equipment andinternational satellite
communications. under this franchise, it was likewise
granted the authority to "construct and operate such
ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications
Services from the communications satellite system
and the ground terminals.
• The satellite service thus provided by petitioner
enable international carriers to serve the public with
indespensible communications service
• Under sec. 5 of RA 5514, petitioner was exempt
from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
commission. Now respondent NTC
• Pursuant EO 196 petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction and control and regulation of the
respondent NTC
• Respondent NTC ordered the petitoner to apply
for the requisite certificate of public convenience
and necessity covering its facilities and the services it
renders, as well as the corresponding authority to
charge rates
•September 9, 1987, pending hearing, petitioner
filed with the NTC an application to continue
operating andmaintaining its facilities including a
provisional authorityto continue to provide the
services and the charges it wasthen charging
•September 16, 1988 the petitioner was granted a
provisional authority and was valid for 6 months,
when the provisional authority expired, it was
extended for another6 months.
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•However the NTC directed the petitioner to charge
modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15%
on the authorized rates
Issues:
1. WON EO 546 and EO 196 are unconstitutional on
the ground that the same do not fix a standard for
the
excercise of the power therein conferred? NO
2. WON the questioned order violates Due process
because it was issued without notice to petitioner
and without the benefit of a hearing? YES
3. WON the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its
implementation would virtually result in a cessation
of its opeartions and eventual closure of business?
YES
Held:
a. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of
legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed manner of the exercise of
the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in
this case, establishes a rarte, its act must be both
non-confiscatory and must have been established in
the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise ,
in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of
power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation ofrate-fixing power, the only standard
which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the
rate be reasonable and just . However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied.
b) under Sec. 15 EO 546 and Sec. 16 thereof,
Respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing
power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and
reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy
the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power.
Constitutional Law II: Due Process
2.a)The function involved in the rate fixing power of
the NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not
quasi legislative; thus hearings are necessary and the
abscence thereof results in the violation of due
process.
b)The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribal " In
so far sa generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be
stated as a general rule that the notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the
excercise of executive, administrative, or legislative
functions; but where public adminitrative body acts in
a judicial or quasi-judicial mater, and its acts ar
eparticular and immediate rather than general and
prospective, the person whos rights or property may
be affected by the action is entitiled to notice and
hearing"
c)Even if respondents insist that notice of
hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and
therefore temporary in nature, it is still mot exempt
from the statutory procedural requirements of notice
and hearing as well as the requirement o
reasonableness.
d.) it is thus clear that with regard to rate-
fixing, respondent has no authority to make such
order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order the be temporary or permanent,
and it is immaterial wheter the same is made upon a
complaint, a summary investigation,
or upon the comissions own motion.
3.
a.) What the petitioner has is a grant or
privilege granted by the State and may revoke it at
will there is no question in that, however such grant
cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that
the termination of the opeartion of said utility is
required by common good. The rule is that the
power of the State to regulate the conduct and
business of public utilities is limited by the
consideration that it is not the owner of the property
of the utility, or clothed with the general power of
management incident to ownership, since the
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private right of ownership to such property remains
and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power.
The power to regulate is not the power to destroy
useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with
due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and its patrons. any
regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringerement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
b.)A cursory persual of the assailed order
reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily
based on the initial evaluation made on the financial
statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent
NTC's allegation that it has several other sources.
Further more, it did not as much as make an attempt
to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed
rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the
financial statements, there is merit for a
ratereduction without any elucidation on what
implifications and conclutions were necessariy
inferred by it from said staements. Nor did it deign to
explain how the datareflected in the financial
statements influenced its decision to impose rate
reduction.
c.) The challenged order, particularly on
the rates provided therein, being violative of the due
process clause is void and should be nullified.
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR
FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a
leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused
the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc.
NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not
within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in
Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood.
That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it
over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they
Constitutional Law II: Due Process
were able to come up with new evidence/documents
that they were not able to obtain before as they
were inaccessible and they were not able to present
it before in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process
of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial
in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative
bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
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ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE
IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R.
99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts:
Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of
Petitioner University, died of serious
physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez
was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical
Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the
serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the
same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo
created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on
the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. Said notice also required respondent students
to submit their written statements within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent
students received a copy of the written notice, they
failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were
placed on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written statements
and hearing the testimonies of several witness,
found a prima facie case against respondent students
for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then
required to file their written answers to the formal
charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board
to hear the charges against respondent students. The
Board found respondent students guilty of violating
Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing
activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the
penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly,
Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with
RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled.
This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining
petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day
after the expiration of the temporary restraining
order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to
be stricken out by the respondents and argued that
the creation of the Special Board was totally
unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack
Constitutional Law II: Due Process

of due process. This was granted and reinstatement

of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the

respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more

particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause
of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of
notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not

in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby
by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is
accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case
involves a question of law, as in this case, where the
issue is whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition

of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions,
such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the

nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of counsel,
if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.