Lawsuit Against Collier County Sheriff's Office

Case 2:19-cv-00551-TPB-MRM Document 1 Filed 08/06/19 Page 1 of 42 PageID 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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FABIANO B. PINTO,
COMPLAINT AND JURY
DEMAND
Plaintiff,
-vs- ECF CASE

Docket No.
COLLIER COUNTY, SLR NAPLES CORP.,
individually and in their official capacities, KEVIN J.
RAMBOSK, MATTHEW A. KINNEY, JOSHUA
CAMPOLO, ADAM J. DILLMAN, STEVE
MAHOLTZ, FRANK C. PISANO, JR., BECKI A.
THOMAN, JAY MULHOLLAND, JAMES BYERS,
STERGIOS TALLIDES, and JASON BURO,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, Fabiano B. Pinto, by and through the undersigned attorneys, Vargas Gonzalez
Hevia Baldwin, LLP, for his complaint against the Defendants, Collier County, SLR Naples Corp.,
individually and in their official capacities, Kevin J. Rambosk, Matthew A. Kinney, Joshua
Campolo, Adam J. Dillman, Steve Maholtz, Frank C. Pisano, Jr., Becki A. Thoman, Jay
Mulholland, James Byers, Stergios Tallides and Jason Buro, alleges and states as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This is a civil rights action in which Plaintiff seeks relief through 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1983,
1985, 1986 and 1988 for injuries sustained due to the violations of his civil rights protected by the
First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, in addition to the Laws of the State of Florida.
2. These claims arise from a December 17, 2017 incident in which defendants, acting under
color of state law, unlawfully arrested and detained Mr. Pinto without a valid warrant or probable
cause. Mr. Pinto was subsequently maliciously prosecuted for Battery on Law Enforcement
Officer, a Third-Degree Felony, and Disorderly Intoxication, a Second Degree Misdemeanor. As
a result, Mr. Pinto was wrongfully incarcerated for approximately sixteen (16) hours. His
malicious prosecution persisted, until Assistant State Attorney, Garrett E. Cutler, filed a Notice of
Nolle Prosequi on, or about, October 4, 2018.
3. The above referenced acts caused Mr. Pinto to be deprived of his liberty and to sustain
various emotional, physical and financial injuries.
4. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages (compensatory and punitive) against Defendants, as well
as an award of costs and attorneys’ fees, and such other and further relief as the Court deems just
and proper.
JURISDICTION
5. This action arises under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988, as well as the Constitution
and Laws of the State of Florida.
6. The jurisdiction of this Court is predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4),
1367(a) and the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.
VENUE
7. Venue is laid within the Middle District of Florida in that Defendant Collier County is
located within and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred within the
boundaries of the Middle District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c).
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PARTIES
8. Plaintiff, Fabiano B. Pinto (“Mr. Pinto”), is a thirty-one-year-old male Hispanic or Latino,
who was born in the South American country of Brazil and who presently resides in Collier
County, within the State of Florida.
9. Defendant, Collier County (“County”), is a subdivision of the State of Florida, created and
authorized pursuant to the laws and Constitution of the State of Florida. Defendant County is
authorized by law to maintain a Sheriff’s Office, known as the Collier County Sheriff’s Office
(CCSO), which serves as the means by which Defendant County fulfills its policing function, and
for which Defendant County is responsible and liable.
10. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant County, acting through the CCSO, was responsible
for the policy, practice, supervision, implementation, and conduct of all CCSO matters and was
responsible for the appointment, hiring, training, supervision, discipline and retention and conduct
of all CCSO personnel, including police officers, deputies, corporals, detectives, and supervisory
officers as well as the individually named CCSO Defendants herein.
11. In addition, at all times here relevant, Defendant County was responsible for enforcing the
rules of the CCSO, and for ensuring that the CCSO personnel obey the laws of the United States
and the State of Florida.
12. Defendant, SLR Naples Corp. (“SLR”), was, at all relevant times herein, a Florida for profit
corporation, created and authorized to conduct business pursuant to the laws of Florida and the
United States. SLR has a principal address of 9108 Strada Place, #14120, Naples, Florida 34108
and is licensed or authorized to conduct business, and does operate a restaurant business, under
the fictitious name of “Cavo Lounge,” also with a listed address of 9108 Strada Place, #14120,
Naples, Florida 34108. SLR has a mailing and registered agent address of 10960 Harmony Park
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Drive, Bonita Springs, Florida 34135. The registered agent for SLR is listed as Bharat Muchhala
by the Florida Secretary of State.
13. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant SLR, acting through Defendants Tallides and Buro,
was responsible for the policy, practice, supervision, implementation, and conduct of all SLR and
Cavo Lounge matters and was responsible for the appointment, hiring, training, supervision,
discipline and retention and conduct of all SLR and Cavo Lounge personnel, including managers
and security guards, as well as the hiring, training, supervision, and retention of police officers,
sheriff’s deputies, corporals, detectives, and supervisory officers, including the individually named
CCSO Defendants herein, to provide additional security for SLR and Cavo Lounge in exchange
for monetary compensation or other benefits.
14. In addition, at all times here relevant, Defendant County was responsible for enforcing the
rules of the CCSO, and for ensuring that the CCSO personnel obey the laws of the United States
and the State of Florida.
15. Defendant, Kevin J. Rambosk (“Rambosk”), was, at all relevant times herein, the Sheriff
of Collier County and as such was acting in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of
Collier County. Defendant Rambosk enjoyed final policymaking authority with respect to public
safety, policing and law enforcement matters for Defendant County. Defendant Rambosk was, at
all relevant times herein, responsible for the training, discipline, and supervision of all Collier
County Sheriff’s Office law enforcement personnel, including the named CCSO defendants herein.
assigned to the Sheriff’s Office, located at 3319 Tamiami Trail East, Building J, Naples, Florida
34112. Defendant Rambosk is being sued in his individual and official capacities.
16. Defendant, Matthew A. Kinney (“Kinney”), was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy,
officer, corporal, or detective employed by the CCSO and Defendant SLR and as such was acting
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in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of defendant County. Defendant Kinney was, at
all relevant times herein, a deputy, officer, corporal, or detective, with Identification No. 3573 and
believed to be assigned to the CCSO Street Gangs Unit, located at 3319 Tamiami Trail East,
Building J, Naples, Florida 34112. Defendant Kinney is being sued in his individual and official
capacities.
17. Defendant, Joshua Campolo (“Campolo”), was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy,
in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of defendant County. Defendant Campolo was,
at all relevant times herein, a deputy, officer, corporal, or detective, with Identification No. 3713
and believed to be assigned to the CCSO District 3, located at 8075 Lely Cultural Parkway, Naples,
Florida 34113. Defendant Campolo is being sued in his individual and official capacities.
18. Defendant, Adam J. Dillman (“Dillman”), was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy,
in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of Defendants County and SLR. Defendant
Dillman was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy, officer, corporal, or detective, with
Identification No. 2964 and believed to be assigned to the CCSO Street Gangs Unit, located at
3319 Tamiami Trail East, Building J, Naples, Florida 34112. Defendant Dillman is being sued in
his individual and official capacities.
19. Defendant, Steve Maholtz (“Maholtz”), was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy, officer,
corporal, detective or supervisory officer employed by the CCSO and Defendant SLR and as such
was acting in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of defendant County. Defendant
Maholtz was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy, officer, corporal, detective or supervisory
officer, with Identification No. 3645 and believed to be assigned to the CCSO District 3, located
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at 8075 Lely Cultural Parkway, Naples, Florida 34113. Defendant Maholtz is being sued in his
individual and official capacities.
20. Defendant, Frank C. Pisano, Jr. (“Pisano”), was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy,
in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of defendant County. Defendant Pisano was, at
all relevant times herein, a deputy, officer, corporal, or detective, with Identification No. 3664 and
believed to be assigned to the CCSO District 3, located at 8075 Lely Cultural Parkway, Naples,
Florida 34113. Defendant Pisano is being sued in his individual and official capacities.
21. Defendant, Becki A. Thoman (“Thoman”), was, at all relevant times herein, a deputy,
officer, corporal, or detective employed by the CCSO and as such was acting in the capacity of an
agent, servant and employee of defendant County. Defendant Thoman was, at all relevant times
herein, a deputy, officer, corporal, or detective, with Identification No. 3173 and believed to be
assigned to the CCSO District 1, located at 7765 Vanderbilt Beach Road, Naples, Florida 34108.
Defendant Thoman is being sued in her individual and official capacities.
22. Defendant, Jay Mulholland (“Mulholland”), was, at all relevant times herein, a lieutenant,
supervisory officer, deputy, officer, corporal, or detective employed by the CCSO and as such was
acting in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of defendant County. Defendant
Mulholland was, at all relevant times herein, a lieutenant, supervisory officer, deputy, officer,
corporal, or detective and believed to be assigned to the CCSO District 3, located at 8075 Lely
Cultural Parkway, Naples, Florida 34113. Defendant Mulholland is being sued in his individual
and official capacities.
23. Defendant, James Byers (“Byers”), was, at all relevant times herein, a sergeant, supervisory
officer, deputy, officer, corporal, or detective employed by the CCSO and Defendant SLR and as
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such was acting in the capacity of an agent, servant and employee of Defendants County and SLR.
Defendant Byers was, at all relevant times herein, a sergeant, supervisory officer, deputy, officer,
corporal, or detective and believed to be assigned to the CCSO District 3, located at 8075 Lely
Cultural Parkway, Naples, Florida 34113. Defendant Byers is being sued in his individual and
official capacities.
24. Defendant, Stergios Tallides (“Tallides”), was, at all relevant times herein, the principal
owner, shareholder, member, president, director or operator of Defendant SLR and its alter ego,
the fictitious entity known as “Cavo Lounge.” Defendant Tallides enjoyed final policymaking
authority with respect to the hiring, training, retention and supervision of all SLR and Cavo Lounge
employees and security personnel. Upon information and belief, Defendants SLR and Tallides
acted as an employer or supervisor to the individual CCSO defendants and provided them with
compensation, supervision or direction, while they were specially assigned to provide additional
security for Cavo Lounge.
25. Defendant, Jason Buro (“Buro”), was, at all relevant times herein, the general manager,
security guard, or other employee of SLR and its fictitious entity alter ego, known as “Cavo
Lounge.” Upon information and belief, Defendant Buro was acting in a supervisory or employer
capacity to the law enforcement officers from the CCSO, who were assigned to Cavo Lounge on
a “special detail” and provided them with direction or supervision. Upon information and belief,
Defendant Buro resides in Collier County, Florida. Defendant Buro is being sued in his individual
and official capacities.
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FACTUAL CHARGES
26. On December 17, 2017, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Mr. Pinto was outside of 9108 Strada
Place, Naples, Florida, in close proximity to the entrance to Cavo Lounge and within the Mercato
complex.
27. Also present at the above location, on said date and time, were Defendants, Kinney,
Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, and Byer, of the CCSO.
28. At all times herein mentioned, Mr. Pinto was in obeyance of laws, local ordinances, rules
and regulations.
29. At the above referenced date and time, Mr. Pinto was waving to his sister, brother-in-law
and two friends, who were inside of Cavo Lounge.
30. Mr. Pinto was attempting to notify them that he had procured a table in another restaurant
nearby and that they should exit Cavo Lounge.
31. As Mr. Pinto was waving to his companions, Defendant Buro walked towards Mr. Pinto
and forcefully struck his hand with no justification for doing so.
32. Mr. Pinto then inquired as to why Mr. Buro violently struck his hand.
33. Defendant Buro replied that he struck Mr. Pinto’s hand, because it ventured too close to
him, which was untrue, as Defendant Buro was required to walk towards Mr. Pinto in order to
strike his hand.
34. Mr. Pinto responded that he was only trying to get his friends’ and family’s attention so
that they will exit Cavo Lounge and that Defendant Buro should not strike a regular patron of Cavo
Lounge’s hand in such an aggressive and violent manner.
35. Defendant Buro, ostensibly displeased that Mr. Pinto was attempting to have patrons exit
his establishment, began to insult and yell profanities at Mr. Pinto, at which point Mr. Pinto turned
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to walk away towards a nearby establishment, where he had a table reserved for his friends and
family.
36. Within one (1) minute of Defendant Buro striking Mr. Pinto’s hand and immediately after
Mr. Pinto turned to walk away from Defendant Buro, Defendant Kinney aggressively approached
Mr. Pinto from his left side.
37. Defendant Kinney, instead of identifying himself as a law enforcement official or
performing any inquiry into the nature of the interaction between Defendant Buro and Mr. Pinto,
proceeded to violently and forcefully strike or shove Mr. Pinto’s arm and shoulder area, causing
Mr. Pinto to stumble several feet, until his momentum was stopped from making physical contact
with his sister-in-law, Sarah Pinto.
38. Immediately after being violently struck by Defendant Kinney, Mr. Pinto, still unaware as
to who struck him or why he was struck, involuntarily or reactively raised his right arm,
unintentionally making slight and incidental contact with Defendant Kinney’s bullet proof vest.
39. Mr. Pinto then regained his balance, turned around and realized that he unintentionally
made incidental contact with a law enforcement official.
40. Mr. Pinto began to apologize for the incidental and unintentional contact to Defendant
Kinney, who immediately rushed towards Mr. Pinto.
41. Defendant Kinney proceeded to violently and aggressively grab Mr. Pinto’s left arm,
yanking and twisting it behind Mr. Pinto’s back.
42. Defendant Kinney proceeded to violently shove or push Mr. Pinto, before he could finish
his apology, and while having Mr. Pinto’s arm painfully contorted behind his back.
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43. As Defendant Kinney was applying an extreme amount of pressure to Mr. Pinto’s left arm
behind his back and forcefully pushing Mr. Pinto, Defendant Campolo grabbed Mr. Pinto’s right
arm, violently twisting it behind his back.
44. Immediately subsequent to Defendant Campolo’s grasp of Mr. Pinto’s right arm,
Defendant Kinney began to incessantly yell for Mr. Pinto to “stop resisting,” despite Mr. Pinto
offering no resistance to the unlawful and excessive actions being perpetrated by Defendants
Kinney and Campolo.
45. Defendants Kinney and Campolo proceeded to forcefully maneuver Mr. Pinto to a law
enforcement vehicle, while still applying an excessive amount of pressure to Mr. Pinto’s arms
behind his back and causing Mr. Pinto to suffer a substantial of amount physical pain to both of
his shoulders and arms.
46. Upon arrival at the law enforcement vehicle, Defendants Kinney and Campolo pinned Mr.
Pinto face first against the vehicle.
47. Defendants Kinney and Campolo then rear handcuffed Mr. Pinto in an excessively tight
fashion.
48. Prior to, during and subsequent to the application of the handcuffs, Defendant Kinney
repeatedly and gratuitously slammed Mr. Pinto’s face and head into the vehicle, causing Mr. Pinto
to suffer substantial physical pain.
49. As a result of Defendant Kinney’s and Campolo’s flagrant and unwarranted use of
excessive force, particularly their physical contact with Mr. Pinto’s shoulders, Mr. Pinto was
caused to suffer an exacerbation to a pre-existing shoulder injury sustained while he was in high
school.
50. Defendants Kinney and Campolo next placed Mr. Pinto into the vehicle.
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51. Defendant Campolo proceeded to transport Mr. Pinto to the Naples Jail Center.
52. Subsequent to being handcuffed, Mr. Pinto complained to Defendant Campolo in excess
of fifteen (15) times, regarding the excessively tight handcuffs affixed to wrists behind his back.
53. Defendant Campolo ignored each of Mr. Pinto’s complaints.
54. As a result, Mr. Pinto was forced to endure substantial pain to his wrists for approximately
one (1) hour, until the handcuffs were removed.
55. Due to the handcuffs being applied in an excessively tight fashion, Mr. Pinto sustained
numbness to his fingers that persisted for three (3) days, as well as swelling, redness and lacerations
to his wrists.
56. Mr. Pinto never offered any resistance to any defendant, including Kinney and Campolo,
prior to, or during, his arrest by defendants.
57. Defendants, including Kinney and Campolo, never observed Mr. Pinto commit any crimes
or violations of the law.
58. Defendants, including Kinney and Campolo, were never informed by any witnesses that
Mr. Pinto committed any crimes or violations of the law, as Defendant Buro informed Defendant
Kinney that Mr. Pinto “accidentally gestured his hand in my face.”
59. Defendant Buro further stated that Defendant Kinney “came over and pushed the
gentleman back from the ropes area.”
60. Defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Pisano, Maholtz and Byers, each gave
knowingly false sworn statements or testimony that they observed Defendant Kinney maneuver
between Defendant Buro and Mr. Pinto in an attempt to first deescalate the situation, before he
struck or shoved Mr. Pinto.
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61. Defendant Buro’s statement to the CCSO, as well as the incontrovertible video evidence,
directly contradict the sworn statements and testimony of defendants, including, Kinney, Campolo,
Dillman, Pisano, Maholtz and Byers.
62. Upon information and belief, Defendant Kinney violently struck and arrested Mr. Pinto,
because Defendant Kinney was monetarily compensated by Defendant Buro or enjoyed a friendly
or employment-based relationship with Defendant Buro, due to working in close proximity to one
another and Defendant Kinney sought to punish Mr. Pinto for expressing a negative opinion toward
Defendant Buro.
63. Upon information and belief, Defendants Rambosk and Mulholland, as supervisors within
the CCSO, authorized and approved of Mr. Pinto’s arrest, despite the clear absence of probable
cause to believe any crime was committed and clear evidence that Defendant Kinney acted
unreasonably in his use of excessive force against Mr. Pinto.
64. Predicated on the false sworn statements offered by defendants, including Kinney,
Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro, namely that Mr. Pinto intentionally
struck Defendant Kinney in the chest and was resisting a lawful arrest, Mr. Pinto was arrested,
criminally charged and arraigned for Felony Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer and other
related charges.
65. Defendant Kinney admitted during his sworn deposition testimony that Mr. Pinto’s
physical contact with the chest area of his bullet proof vest was involuntary or reactive, as opposed
to deliberate.
66. Defendant Kinney, in a sworn written statement, further admitted that Mr. Pinto’s physical
contact with Defendant Kinney’s chest, “had no effect due to my vest.”
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67. Under Florida law, the felonious crime of Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer requires
either the intentional striking or touching of an officer against said officer’s will or the intentional
causation of bodily harm to said officer, while said officer is engaged in the lawful performance
of said officer’s duties.
68. Defendant Kinney’s own admissions conclusively prove that said crime was never
committed, as Defendant Kinney admitted that the contact was unintentional and that it did not
injure him due to his bullet proof vest.
69. Accordingly, Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Pinto for the most serious
crime alleged against him, Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer.
70. Defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Pisano, Maholtz, and Byers, each
submitted sworn statements to the State Attorney’s Office that were bereft of any indication that
Mr. Pinto was intoxicated at any point prior to, or during, his arrest.
71. Defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Pisano, Maholtz, and Byers, never
observed Mr. Pinto drinking any alcoholic beverages or even inside an establishment that serves
alcohol.
72. Defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Pisano, Maholtz, and Byers, were never
informed by any witnesses that Mr. Pinto was intoxicated, that he was drinking alcoholic beverages
or even that he was inside any establishment that served alcoholic beverages.
73. Mr. Pinto was not intoxicated at any point prior to, or during, his unlawful by defendants.
74. Accordingly, Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Pinto for Disorderly
Intoxication.
75. After Mr. Pinto’s unlawful arrest, Defendant Byers, the CCSO sergeant supervisor on
scene, reviewed video surveillance of the incident procured by Cavo Lounge’s security personnel.
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76. Defendant Byers inexplicably decided to approve Mr. Pinto’s arrest, despite the video
surveillance’s clear contradiction of Defendant Kinney’s version of events, its overwhelming
corroboration of Mr. Pinto’s complete innocence, and defendants abject lack of probable cause.
77. Upon information and belief, Defendant Thoman reviewed Mr. Pinto’s arrest reports and
discussed the circumstances of his arrest with the CCSO defendants present at the scene.
78. Upon information and belief, Defendant Thoman recognized the illegality of Mr. Pinto’s
arrest due to the obvious absence of probable cause, yet still decided to process the arrest and
forward allegations she knew, or should have known, to be false to state prosecutors.
79. Mr. Pinto had his bail set in the amount of $56,000.00, which he was able pay via a bail
bonds company.
80. After being unlawfully detained for approximately sixteen (16) hours, Mr. Pinto was
released from custody on December 17, 2017, at approximately 5:00 p.m.
81. On, or about, January 30, 2018, Assistant State Attorney, Laura N. Mason, filed a criminal
information against Mr. Pinto, formally charging him with Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer,
a Third Degree Felony, and Disorderly Intoxication, a Second Degree Misdemeanor.
82. Said criminal information was predicated on the false, misleading or incomplete
information forwarded by defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano,
Byers, Thoman and Buro, namely that Mr. Pinto intentionally struck Defendant Kinney against his
will or intentionally caused bodily harm to Defendant Kinney, while he was engaged in the lawful
performance of his duties as a law enforcement officer; and that Mr. Pinto, while intoxicated,
endangered the safety of another person or property, or caused a public disturbance in a public
place or upon a public conveyance.
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83. Defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman,
Mulholland and Rambosk, did not arrest and cause a criminal prosecution to be initiated against
Mr. Pinto, because he committed any crimes or violations of the law, but because of their desire
to incur favor and to continue their lucrative business relationships with Defendants Buro, Tallides
and SLR Naples, Corp., as well as the other restaurants, lounges or bars within the Mercato, Blue
Martini and Burn.
Mulholland and Rambosk, sought the favor of the aforementioned individuals and business
entities, because they provide the defendants from the CCSO with additional compensation or
benefits, beyond or in addition to those afforded by the CCSO and Collier County.
85. Accordingly, the CCSO defendants were extremely disincentivized from taking any action
against, or not explicitly or tacitly approved by, Defendants Buro, Tallides, and SLR Naples Corp.
86. At the time of Mr. Pinto’s arrest, the CCSO defendants, while ostensibly on-duty and in
uniform, were being additionally supervised, directed and compensated by Defendants Buro,
Tallides or other employees of Cavo Lounge and SLR Naples, Corp.
87. Mr. Pinto asserts that Defendants, including Kinney and Campolo, arrested and detained
him with the full knowledge that he committed no crimes or violations of the law.
88. Defendants, including Kinney and Campolo, never observed Mr. Pinto to commit crimes
or violations of the law, including Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, Resisting a Law
Enforcement Officer Without Violence, or Disorderly Intoxication.
89. No civilian witnesses ever informed Defendants, including Kinney and Campolo, that Mr.
Pinto committed any crimes or violations of the law, including Battery on a Law Enforcement
Officer, Resisting a Law Enforcement Officer Without Violence, or Disorderly Intoxication.
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90. Mr. Pinto was compelled to contest the unfounded criminal charges against him for
approximately ten (10) months, until a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was filed with the court, on, or
about, October 4, 2018, representing a termination of the criminal action and all criminal charges,
in favor of Mr. Pinto.
91. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman,
Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman, Mulholland and Rambosk, were involved in the decision to
arrest Plaintiff without probable cause, or failed to intervene when they observed others arresting
Plaintiff without probable cause.
92. Defendants, including Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano and Byers, observed Defendant
Kinney utilizing excessive force during Mr. Pinto’s unlawful arrest, had an opportunity and duty
to intervene, and failed to intervene.
93. Defendants, including Kinney, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano and Byers, observed Defendant
Campolo utilizing excessive force during Mr. Pinto’s unlawful arrest, had an opportunity and duty
to intervene, and failed to intervene.
94. Defendant County has tacitly authorized a policy or custom of falsely arresting and
applying excessive force against individuals, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do
so or predicated solely on their race, color, ethnicity or national origin.
95. Mr. Pinto asserts that the aforementioned unlawful acts committed by defendants are
representative of a pervasive policy, custom or pattern and practice within Defendant County and
the CCSO.
96. Mr. Pinto asserts that Defendant Kinney unlawfully struck him in the arm and shoulder,
arrested him without probable cause and caused the commencement of the original criminal
judicial proceeding against him, due solely to his racial, ethnic or national origin based
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discriminatory prejudices and his desire to incur favor and monetary benefits from Defendants
Buro, Tallides and SLR Naples Corp.
97. Mr. Pinto further asserts that Defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz,
Pisano and Byers, acted in such an unlawfully reprehensible manner, due to their assumption that
defendants’ version of events would undoubtedly and unduly be credited over Mr. Pinto’s, solely
because Mr. Pinto is a Latino or Hispanic male or was born in Brazil.
Mulholland and Rambosk, arrested and maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff, not because of any
probable cause to believe Plaintiff had committed any crimes or violations of the law, but because
Plaintiff is a Latino or Hispanic male or was born in Brazil.
Mulholland and Rambosk, discriminated against Plaintiff by arresting, assaulting, battering, and
maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff, solely due to defendants’ perception or consideration of
Plaintiff’s race, color, ethnicity, national origin, immigration status, gender or age.
100. Defendants, including Kinney and Campolo, perpetrated multiple overt acts in furtherance
of their obviously discriminatory inclinations and motivations, namely their use of derogatory
insults towards Plaintiff and members of his family, their arrest and use of excessive of force
against Mr. Pinto in the clear absence of any probable cause, and their submission of falsified
sworn incident and arrest reports accusing Mr. Pinto of crimes that never occurred.
101. Defendants Kinney and Campolo unlawfully grabbed, seized, arrested, and maliciously
prosecuted Plaintiff, due solely to defendants’ perception or consideration of Plaintiff’s race, color,
ethnicity, national origin, immigration status, gender or age.
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102. Defendants Kinney and Campolo possessed no valid reason to touch, strike or arrest
Plaintiff, which gives rise to the strong inference that the unlawful acts committed by Defendants
Kinney and Campolo against Plaintiff were discriminatorily motivated and enacted upon.
103. Defendants Kinney and Campolo subjected Plaintiff to disparate treatment compared to
other individuals similarly situated, because defendants did not strike, grab, seize or arrest any
non-Latino or non-Hispanic individuals, who were acting similarly to Plaintiff.
104. Upon information and belief, the CCSO, Defendant County, and their respective policy
and decision makers and supervisors have imposed, acquiesced or were deliberately indifferent to
policies or customs within the CCSO that resulted in the violations of Plaintiff’s Constitutional
rights, including the explicit or tacit approval of the individual CCSO defendants’ employment
arrangement with Cavo Lounge to provide additional security, the assignment of CCSO defendants
to maintain crowd control, who were obviously unfit for such an assignment involving significant
interaction with members of the public, and the failure to correct the known Constitutionally
violative behavioral proclivities of the individual CCSO defendants prior to putting them in
positions for such violations to recur.
105. Upon information and belief, the CCSO, Defendant County, and their respective policy
and decision makers and supervisors have failed to provide adequate training or supervision in the
identification of probable cause or reasonable suspicion and the appropriate amount of force to be
used during arrests, which will virtually assure the occurrence of Constitutional rights violations
when such failures involve law enforcement officers.
106. The instant arrest and application of excessive force against Plaintiff, without even the
semblance of probable cause, was so egregious as to amount to deliberate indifference by the
policy and decision makers within the CCSO and Defendant County, because the need for
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enhanced training and supervision is obvious due to the clear lack of any probable cause to arrest
or prosecute Plaintiff.
107. Upon information and belief, further details and factual allegations will become available
after discovery is completed, as the current policies, customs, patterns and practices and
procedures of the CCSO and Defendant County are within the exclusive possession and knowledge
of Defendants.
108. Upon information and belief, the personnel files and records of the individual CCSO
defendants involved in Plaintiff’s arrest will reveal a history of similar Constitutional violations or
a severe lack of comprehension for the laws and rights they are sworn to protect, therefore
indicating that Defendants County and Rambosk knew, or should have known that the individual
CCSO defendants were unfit for employment as law enforcement officials or supervisors and
would be likely to commit Constitutional violations similar to the violations that were committed
against Mr. Pinto.
109. Upon information and belief, Defendants County and Rambosk have failed to adequately
train Defendant Kinney to comprehend or recognize the distinction between Constitutionally
protected conduct and illegal conduct, an assertion strongly supported by Defendant Kinney’s
flagrantly egregious actions towards Mr. Pinto.
110. Upon information and belief, Defendants County and Rambosk disregarded known and
obvious consequences of hiring the individual CCSO defendants, which reflects their deliberate
indifference to the risk that the individual defendants would violate the Constitutional or statutory
rights of others as a result their hiring decisions.
111. Upon information and belief, Defendants County and Rambosk had, or should have had,
knowledge of prior Constitutional violations committed by the CCSO defendants in the form of
19
prior lawsuits, civilian complaints, internal complaints, background checks, their own personal
observations or internal performance reviews procedures and failed to take any action to correct
the offensive behavior or prevent similar violations from recurring, which is tantamount to
Defendants County and Rambosk’s tacit authorization of such misconduct or their deliberate
indifference towards it.
112. Plaintiff’s assertion that the aforementioned Constitutional violations constituted an
unofficial policy or custom within the CCSO is corroborated by the presence of at least five (5)
other law enforcement officials from the CCSO, who witnessed the egregiously unlawful acts of
Defendant Kinney were widespread, yet proceeded to aid and assist Defendant Kinney, rather than
intervene on Mr. Pinto’s behalf.
113. Upon information and belief, Defendants County and Rambosk’s tacit authorization or
deliberate indifference to the repeated Constitutional violations committed by their employees is
further supported by Defendants County and Rambosk’s failure to discipline, admonish, retrain or
punish the CCSO defendants involved in Mr. Pinto’s arrest or other arrests in which Constitutional
violations were committed.
114. At all times here mentioned Defendants were acting under color of state law, to wit, under
color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, customs and usages of the City of Naples,
Collier County and State of Florida.
115. Plaintiff has complied with all required conditions precedent prior to commencing the
instant action and claims, including those set forth by Florida Statute Chapter 768.
116. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of Defendants Plaintiff sustained the following
injuries and damages: deprivations of his rights pursuant to the First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, violations of the laws and Constitution of the State
20
of Florida, loss of liberty, reputational harm, monetary loss, physical injury, physical pain and
suffering, as well as emotional and psychological trauma and suffering, including fear,
embarrassment, humiliation, emotional distress, frustration, extreme inconvenience, and anxiety.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of First Amendment Rights Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Kinney in his Individual Capacity
117. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers Paragraphs 1 through 116 of this Complaint, as if fully set
forth herein.
118. Plaintiff’s speech and acts were Constitutionally protected, as Plaintiff was merely
expressing his opinion regarding Defendant Buro’s conduct.
119. Defendant Kinney intervened and prevented Plaintiff from exercising his right to engage
in protected speech and acts by physically attacking and arresting Plaintiff.
120. Defendant Kinney physically attacked and arrested Plaintiff, because he disagreed with
Plaintiff’s opinion of Defendant Buro’s behavior and sought to prevent Plaintiff from expressing
himself further and to punish Plaintiff for his past expression of his negative opinion towards
Defendant Buro’s conduct.
121. Plaintiff’s protected conduct, the expression of his opinion towards Defendant Buro’s
behavior, was the motivating factor behind Defendant Kinney’s physical attack and forceful arrest
of Plaintiff.
122. Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to express his opinion regarding the conduct of an
employee of an establishment open to the public was clearly established at the time of Defendant
Kinney’s violation.
123. Accordingly, Defendant Kinney violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to engage in
protected speech and acts.
21
124. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful conduct, Plaintiff sustained the damages
hereinbefore alleged.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

False Arrest and False Imprisonment Under Florida State Law Against
Defendants County, SLR, Rambosk, Buro, Tallides, Kinney and Campolo, each in their
Individual and Official Capacities
125. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers Paragraph 1 through 124 of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
126. Defendants Kinney and Campolo unlawfully restrained Plaintiff without legal authority
and against his will by twisting his arms behind his back, handcuffing him and confining him to a
jail cell.
127. Defendants Kinney and Campolo subjected Plaintiff to false arrest, false imprisonment,
and deprivation of liberty without a valid warrant or probable cause.
128. Defendant Buro is directly liable for Mr. Pinto’s false arrest, because Defendant Buro
instigated and caused Plaintiff’s arrest by requesting or directing the CCSO defendants’ physical
removal or arrest of Plaintiff and offering false allegations to said CCSO defendants intended to
result in the arrest of Plaintiff.
129. Plaintiff was conscious of his confinement.
130. Plaintiff did not consent to his confinement.
131. Plaintiff’s arrest and false imprisonment were not otherwise privileged.
132. Defendants Kinney and Campolo acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, and in a
manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.
133. Alternatively, and to the extent that Defendants Kinney and Campolo did not act in bad
faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for Plaintiff’s
22
rights, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kinney and Campolo acted within the scope of their
employment and are liable in their official capacities.
134. Defendants County and Rambosk, as employers of Defendants Kinney and Campolo, are
responsible for their wrongdoings under the doctrines of respondeat superior and vicarious
liability.
135. Defendants SLR, Tallides and Buro, as employers of Defendants Kinney and Campolo, are
liability.
136. Defendants SLR and Tallides, as employers of Defendant Buro, are responsible for his
wrongdoing under the doctrines of respondeat superior and vicarious liability.
138. This is a state law claim for damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

False Arrest and False Imprisonment Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against
Defendants Kinney and Campolo in their Individual Capacities
forth herein.
140. The Defendants violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
by intentionally, wrongfully and illegally grabbing, seizing, handcuffing, arresting, detaining and
imprisoning Plaintiff.
141. Defendants deliberately restrained Plaintiff without legal authority and against his will by
twisting his arms behind his back, rear handcuffing him and confining him to a jail cell.
23
142. The wrongful, unjustifiable, and unlawful apprehension, arrest, detention, and
imprisonment of Plaintiff was carried out without a valid warrant, without Plaintiff’s consent, and
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
143. At all relevant times, Defendants acted forcibly in apprehending, arresting, and
imprisoning Plaintiff.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Assault and Battery Under Florida State Law Against
Defendants County, SLR, Rambosk, Buro, Tallides, Kinney and Campolo, each in their
Individual and Official Capacities
forth herein.
146. At all relevant times, Defendants Kinney, Campolo and Buro caused Plaintiff to fear for
his physical well-being and safety and placed him in apprehension of immediate harmful and/or
offensive physical contact.
147. Defendants Kinney, Campolo and Buro intentionally engaged in and subjected Plaintiff to
immediate harmful and/or offensive physical contact and battered him without his consent or legal
justification to do so.
148. Defendant Campolo aggressively grabbed, twisted and contorted Plaintiff’s other arm
behind his back, using said arm as the focal point to violently push and maneuver Plaintiff to
another location, causing Plaintiff to suffer substantial pain and injury to said arm.
149. Defendants Kinney and Campolo both applied handcuffs to Plaintiff’s wrists while behind
his back in an excessively tight fashion, causing Plaintiff to endure substantial pain and suffering.
24
150. Defendant Buro intentionally and forcefully struck Mr. Pinto’s arm/hand with no
justification or legitimate reason to do so.
151. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants Kinney, Campolo and Buro,
Plaintiff suffered damages.
152. Defendants Kinney, Campolo and Buro acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, and in
a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.
153. Alternatively, and to the extent that Defendants Kinney, Campolo and Buro did not act in
bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for
Plaintiff’s rights, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kinney, Campolo and Buro acted within the
scope of their employment and are liable in their official capacities.
154. Defendants County and Rambosk, as employers of Defendants Kinney and Campolo, are
liability.
155. Defendants SLR, Tallides and Buro, as employers of Defendants Kinney and Campolo, are
liability.
156. Defendant SLR and Tallides, as employers of Defendant Buro, are responsible for
157. As a direct and proximate result of this breach, Plaintiff sustained the damages hereinbefore
alleged.
25
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Excessive Force Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against
Defendants Kinney and Campolo in their Individual Capacities
forth herein.
160. The Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
because they used excessive and unreasonable force without Plaintiff’s consent.
161. Defendants engaged in and subjected Plaintiff to immediate harmful and/or offensive
touching and battered him without his consent.
162. Defendant Kinney violently struck Plaintiff in the shoulder, aggressively contorted and
twisted Plaintiff’s arm behind his back, forcefully pushed Plaintiff to another location with his arm
behind his back and gratuitously and forcefully slammed Plaintiff’s face and head into a motor
vehicle, all causing Plaintiff to suffer substantial pain and injury to his person.
163. Defendant Campolo aggressively grabbed, twisted and contorted Plaintiff’s other arm
behind his back, using said arm as the focal point to violently push and maneuver Plaintiff to
another location, causing Plaintiff to suffer substantial pain and injury to said arm.
164. Defendants Kinney and Campolo both applied handcuffs to Plaintiff’s wrists while behind
his back in an excessively tight fashion, causing Plaintiff to endure substantial pain and suffering.
alleged.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Malicious Prosecution Under Florida State Law
Against All Defendants, each in their Individual and Official Capacities
forth herein.
26
167. An original judicial proceeding was commenced against Plaintiff in the form of a criminal
prosecution within the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County,
Florida, under case number 17-002385CF – (FRH).
168. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro were
the legal causes of the original judicial proceeding by each falsely alleging to prosecutors and
filing false police reports or offering false statements that Plaintiff committed the crimes of Battery
on a Law Enforcement Officer, Resisting or Obstructing an Officer without Violence and
Disorderly Intoxication.
169. The termination of the original judicial proceeding, via a Nolle Prosequi, constituted a bona
fide termination of the proceeding in favor of Plaintiff.
170. There was an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding against Plaintiff, as he
had committed no crimes or violations of the law.
171. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro lacked
probable cause to believe Plaintiff was guilty or that the prosecution would succeed.
172. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro acted
with malice.
173. In the absence of probable cause, malice may be inferred.
174. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman,
Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro, Plaintiff suffered significant damages.
175. Defendants, Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro, acted
in bad faith, with malicious purpose, and in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for
Plaintiff’s rights.
27
176. Alternatively, and to the extent that Defendants, Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz,
Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro, did not act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for Plaintiff’s rights, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted
within the scope of their employment and are liable in their official capacities
177. Defendants County and Rambosk, as employers of the individual CCSO defendants, are
liability.
178. Defendants SLR, Tallides and Buro, as employers or supervisors of the individual CCSO
defendants, are responsible for their wrongdoings under the doctrines of respondeat superior and
vicarious liability.
wrongdoing under the doctrines or respondeat superior and vicarious liability.
alleged.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Malicious Prosecution Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman,
Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Thoman in their Individual Capacities
forth herein.
183. An original judicial proceeding was commenced against Plaintiff in the form of a criminal
prosecution within the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County,
Florida, under case number 17-002385CF – (FRH).
28
184. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers, Thoman and Buro were
the legal causes of the original judicial proceeding by each falsely alleging to prosecutors and
filing false police reports that Plaintiff committed the crimes of Battery on a Law Enforcement
Officer, Resisting or Obstructing an Officer without Violence and Disorderly Intoxication.
185. The termination of the original judicial proceeding, via a Nolle Prosequi, constituted a bona
fide termination of the proceeding in favor of Plaintiff.
186. There was an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding.
187. Defendants lacked probable cause to believe Plaintiff was guilty or that the prosecution
would succeed.
188. Defendants acted with malice.
189. In the absence of probable cause, malice may be inferred.
190. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff suffered
significant damages.
191. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by causing
Plaintiff to have bail set in the amount of $56,000.00, to remain incarcerated after his arraignment,
and to return to court and contest the charges remaining against him after his arraignment.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Abuse of Process Under Florida State Law
Against All Defendants, each in their Individual and Official Capacities
forth herein.
29
194. Defendants, Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Buro made an illegal,
improper or perverted use of the criminal process issued against Plaintiff.
195. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Buro possessed
ulterior motives or purposes in exercising such illegal, improper or perverted use of process.
196. As a result of defendants illegal, improper or perverted use of process, Plaintiff suffered
damages.
197. After Plaintiff’s arraignment and release from custody, Defendants, Kinney, Campolo,
Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Buro submitted sworn statements containing false allegations
against Plaintiff to incur favor or additional benefits from their de facto employers, Defendants
SLR, Tallides and Buro and, also because Plaintiff was born in Brazil and is a male Hispanic or
Latino.
198. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Buro acted in bad
faith, with malicious purpose, and in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for
199. Alternatively, and to the extent that Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz,
Pisano, Byers and Buro did not act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard for Plaintiff’s rights, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kinney,
Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Buro acted within the scope of their employment
and are liable in their official capacities
200. Defendants County and Rambosk, as employers of Defendants, Kinney, Campolo,
Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, and Byers, are responsible for their wrongdoings under the doctrines of
respondeat superior and vicarious liability.
30
201. Defendants SLR, Tallides and Buro, as employers of Defendants, Kinney, Campolo,
Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, and Byers, are responsible for their wrongdoings under the doctrines of
respondeat superior and vicarious liability.
wrongdoing under the doctrines or respondeat superior and vicarious liability.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Abuse of Process Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman,
Maholtz, Pisano, and Byers in their Individual Capacities
forth herein.
206. Defendants made an illegal, improper or perverted use of process.
207. Defendants possessed ulterior motives or purposes in exercising such illegal, improper or
perverted use of process.
208. As a result of defendants illegal, improper or perverted use of process, Plaintiff suffered
damages.
209. After Plaintiff’s arraignment and release from custody, Defendants, Kinney, Campolo,
Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, and Byers , submitted sworn statements containing false allegations
against Plaintiff to incur favor or additional benefits from their de facto employers, Defendants
SLR, Tallides and Buro and, also because Plaintiff was born in Brazil and is a male Hispanic or
Latino.
31
210. Defendants’ actions compelled Plaintiff to continue to contest the false criminal charges
against him until a Nolle Proesqui was filed on October 4, 2018, terminating the prosecution
against Plaintiff in his favor.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Deprivation of Rights and Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws under
Florida State law (Fla. Stat. §§ 760.07 and 760.08) and Against All Defendants in their Individual
and Official Capacities
forth herein.
213. Plaintiff, as a Hispanic or Latino male, who was born in Brazil, is a member of a racial
minority and protected class.
214. Defendant Buro intentionally and violently struck Mr. Pinto’s hand, offered false
statements to law enforcement officials against him, ordered him to vacate premises open to the
public, verbally denigrated him, maliciously prosecuted him, and improperly used his relationship
with the individual CCSO defendants to cause Mr. Pinto’s wrongful arrest, all because of his
discriminatory proclivities towards individuals of the same race, color, ethnicity, or national origin
as Mr. Pinto.
215. As a result of Defendant Buro’s discriminatorily motivated actions, Mr. Pinto was
physically injured and forcefully removed from the premises, thereby being denied the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, privileges, advantages and accommodations of Cavo
Lounge and other nearby establishments within the Mercato, a place of public accommodation.
216. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, and Byers participated, ratified,
32
approved, authorized or failed to intervene in the unlawful of Plaintiff with excessive force,
because of their discriminatory proclivities towards individuals of the same race, color, ethnicity,
or national origin as Mr. Pinto.
217. As a result of Defendants Kinney’s, Campolo’s, Dillman’s, Maholtz’, Pisano’s, and Byers’
discriminatorily motivated actions, Mr. Pinto was physically injured and forcefully removed from
the premises, thereby being denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, privileges,
advantages and accommodations of Cavo Lounge and other nearby establishments within the
Mercato, a place of public accommodation.
218. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race, color, national origin,
ethnicity, religion or sex.
219. Defendants also engaged in the selective treatment of Plaintiff, in comparison to others
similarly situated.
220. Defendants’ selective treatment of Plaintiff was based on impermissible considerations, such
as race, color, ethnicity, national origin, intent to inhibit or punish Plaintiff’s exertion of his
Constitutional rights, or a malicious or bad faith intent to injure Plaintiff.
221. Defendants applied facially neutral laws against Plaintiff in a discriminatory manner.
222. Defendants, motivated by discriminatory animus, applied facially neutral statutes with
adverse effects against Plaintiff.
223. Defendants did not possess a rational basis, excuse or justification for applying any laws or
statutes against Plaintiff.
224. Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Buro acted in bad
faith, with malicious purpose, and in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for
33
225. Alternatively, and to the extent that Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz,
Pisano, Byers and Buro did not act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard for Plaintiff’s rights, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kinney,
Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, Byers and Buro acted within the scope of their employment
and are liable in their official capacities.
226. Defendants County and Rambosk, as employers of the individual CCSO Defendants, are
liability.
227. Defendants SLR, Tallides and Buro, as employers of the individual CCSO Defendants, are
liability.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Deprivation of Rights and Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983 Against Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano and Byers
forth herein.
232. Plaintiff, as a Hispanic or Latino male, who was born in Brazil, is a member of a racial or
ethnic minority and protected class.
34
233. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race, national origin, ethnicity,
religion or sex.
234. Defendants also selectively treated Plaintiff in comparison to others similarly situated.
235. Defendants’ selective treatment of Plaintiff was based on impermissible considerations, such
as race, ethnicity, national origin, intent to inhibit or punish Plaintiff’s exertion of his Constitutional
rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure Plaintiff.
236. Defendants applied facially neutral laws against Plaintiff in a discriminatory manner.
237. Defendants, motivated by a discriminatory animus, applied facially neutral penal statutes with
adverse effects against Plaintiff.
238. Defendants did not possess a rational basis, excuse or justification for applying any laws or
statutes against Plaintiff.
239. Accordingly, Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s rights pursuant to Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights and Failure to Prevent the Conspiracy under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 Against Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz,
Pisano, Byers, Thoman, Rambosk and Mulholland
forth herein.
242. Defendants engaged in a conspiracy against Plaintiff to deprive Plaintiff of the equal
protection of the laws, or of the privileges and immunities under the laws.
35
243. Defendants committed overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff,
namely the offering of knowingly false sworn statements, accounts or testimony intended to
wrongly inculpate Mr. Pinto, while shielding Defendant Kinney from any potential ramifications
that would normally result from his unlawful actions.
244. Plaintiff sustained injuries to his person or was deprived of rights or privileges of citizens
of the United States.
245. Defendants’ conspiracy was motivated by some racial, ethnic or otherwise impermissibly
class-based, invidious or discriminatory animus.
246. The Defendants that did not engage or participate in the conspiracy to interfere with
Plaintiff’s civil rights, had knowledge that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were about to be
committed or being committed, possessed the power to prevent or aid, and neglected to do so.
THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Failure to Intervene Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendants Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano and Byers, in
their Individual Capacities
forth herein.
249. Those Defendants that were present but did not actively participate in the aforementioned
unlawful conduct observed such conduct, had an opportunity and the capability to prevent such
conduct, had a duty to intervene and prevent such conduct, and failed to intervene.
250. Accordingly, the Defendants who failed to intervene violated the First, Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
36
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention and Supervision Under Florida State Law Against
Defendants County, Rambosk, Mulholland, Byers, SLR, Tallides and Buro in their Individual
and Official Capacities
forth herein.
253. Defendants were required to conduct an appropriate investigation prior to hiring the
individual CCSO defendants and Defendant Buro and failed to do so.
254. An appropriate investigation would have revealed the unsuitability of the individual CCSO
defendants and Defendant Buro for employment assignments requiring interaction with the public
or crowd control, for employment as law enforcement officers or for employment in general.
255. It was unreasonable for Defendants to hire the individual CCSO defendants and Defendant
Buro in light of the information they knew or should have known
256. Defendants were required to properly and adequately train the individual CCSO defendants
and Defendant Buro to be fit for assignment to a crowd control situation and to interact with
members of the public without committing violations of their rights under the Constitution and the
laws of the State of Florida and failed to do so.
257. Defendants were required to properly and adequately retain and supervise the individual
CCSO defendants to ensure that they remained fit for employment in a position requiring
interaction members of the public, suitable for an assignment involving crowd control or as law
enforcement officers and failed to do so.
37
258. Defendants knew, or should have known, that the individual CCSO defendants and
Defendant Buro were not fit for employment as law enforcement officers, to handle crowd control
situations, or interact with members of the public and Defendants failed to take any action, such
as investigation, reassignment, discipline, or discharge.
259. Defendants placed the individual CCSO defendants and Defendant Buro in a position
where they could inflict foreseeable harm.
260. Defendants knew or should have known of its employee defendants’ propensity for
violating the individual rights granted under the United States Constitution and the laws of the
State of Florida, prior to the injuries incurred by Plaintiff.
261. Defendants failed to take reasonable measures in hiring, training, retaining and supervising
its employee defendants that would have prevented the aforesaid injuries to Plaintiff.
FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Governmental “Monell” Liability Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendants County and Rambosk
forth herein.
265. Defendants maintained official or unofficial policies, customs or practices that caused
Plaintiff to be deprived of his Constitutional rights to engage in protected speech, to be afforded
the equal protection of the laws and to be free from illegal or unreasonable searches and seizures.
266. Defendants were aware of the individual CCSO defendants’ propensities to arrest
individuals without probable cause, to apply excessive force during arrests and to be unable to
38
distinguish between protected and unprotected speech and failed to take any action to correct such
behavior.
267. Defendants were aware and put on notice of the individual CCSO defendants’ unlawful
propensities due to prior lawsuits, psychological exams, civilian complaints, internal performance
reviews, internal whistleblowers, or their own personal observations.
268. Despite defendants’ knowledge regarding the individual CCSO defendants’ severe
deficiencies and unsuitability for employment as law enforcement officers, especially in situations
involving interactions with members of the public, defendants have demonstrated their deliberate
indifference towards the rights of those who may come into contact with the individual CCSO
defendants by assigning them to interact with members of the public in a crowd control situation
without first correcting their violative predilections.
269. Defendants’ failure to take any action to correct the Constitutionally offensive behavior of
the individual CCSO defendants is tantamount to their tacit approval or their deliberate
indifference towards such misconduct.
270. Defendant have failed to properly train the individual CCSO defendants to properly interact
with members of the public, as it is obvious that the CCSO defendants cannot simultaneous enforce
the law while refraining from violating the Constitutional rights of those they come into contact
with.
271. Defendants have failed to train the individual CCSO defendants to properly identify the
presence of probable cause, to apply only an amount of force that is reasonable under the
circumstances and to distinguish between protected and unprotected speech, as clearly evidenced
by their interactions with Mr. Pinto.
39
272. The failure to train the CCSO defendants regarding such basic civil rights, coupled with
assigning the individual CCSO defendants to interact with members of the public in a crowd
control situation, virtually assures that Constitutional violations will occur and demonstrates
defendants’ deliberate indifference towards the rights of those who may come into contact with
the individual CCSO defendants.
273. Defendants’ failure to train is obvious in light of the individual CCSO defendants’ gross
and egregious violations of Mr. Pinto’s First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
274. Defendants disregarded known or obvious consequences of hiring the individual CCSO
defendants to such an extent that it demonstrated defendants’ deliberate indifference to the rights
of those who may come into contact with the individual CCSO defendants.
275. Defendants knew, or should have known, that the individual CCSO defendants were not
suitable to be hired as law enforcement officers, because of their prior work histories,
psychological makeups, general dispositions, references, background checks and their own
personal interactions with the individual CCSO defendants.
276. Despite being aware that the individual CCSO defendants would be highly likely to violate
the Constitutional rights of those they come into contact with, defendants decided to hire them,
regardless.
277. Defendants’ employees’ illegal practices are so consistent and widespread that they
constitute customs or usages of which a supervising policymaker must have been aware of and
took no action to correct.
278. Defendants and their policymakers failed to provide adequate training or supervision to
subordinates to such an extent that it is tantamount to their deliberate indifference towards the
rights of those who come into contact with the individual CCSO defendants.
40
279. Defendants’ employees engaged in such egregious and flagrant violations of Plaintiff’s
Constitutional rights that the need for enhanced supervision and training is obvious and therefore
tantamount to a display of deliberate indifference by Defendants and their policymakers towards
the rights of individuals who come into contact with defendants’ employees.
280. Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiff’s rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendants, jointly and
severally, as follows:
a) In favor of Plaintiff in an amount to be determined by a jury for each of Plaintiff’s causes
of action;
b) Awarding Plaintiff punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury;
c) Awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by a jury;
d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988; and
e) Granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.
Dated: August 6, 2019
Respectfully submitted,
S/ Anthony C. Hevia___________________
Anthony C. Hevia, Esq.
Fla. Bar Number: 41148
Victor A. Ruiz, Esq.
41
Fla. Bar Number: 85353

Vargas Gonzalez Hevia Baldwin, LLP
Attorneys for Mr. Pinto
815 Ponce De Leon Blvd, Third Floor
Coral Gables, Florida
T: (305) 631-2528
F: (305) 631-2741
anthony@vargasgonzalez.com
vruiz@vargasgonzalez.com
42

Lawsuit Against Collier County Sheriff's Office

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Lawsuit Against Collier County Sheriff's Office

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Case 2:19-cv-00551-TPB-MRM Document 1 Filed 08/06/19 Page 1 of 42 PageID 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

-vs- ECF CASE

Officer, a Third-Degree Felony, and Disorderly Intoxication, a Second Degree Misdemeanor. As

Nolle Prosequi on, or about, October 4, 2018.

various emotional, physical and financial injuries.

and Laws of the State of Florida.

1367(a) and the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.

boundaries of the Middle District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c).

8. Plaintiff, Fabiano B. Pinto (“Mr. Pinto”), is a thirty-one-year-old male Hispanic or Latino,

County, within the State of Florida.

for which Defendant County is responsible and liable.

officers as well as the individually named CCSO Defendants herein.

and the State of Florida.

by the Florida Secretary of State.

for monetary compensation or other benefits.

and the State of Florida.

his individual and official capacities.

individual and official capacities.

Defendant Thoman is being sued in her individual and official capacities.

and official capacities.

security for Cavo Lounge.

and official capacities.

Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano, and Byer, of the CCSO.

and two friends, who were inside of Cavo Lounge.

nearby and that they should exit Cavo Lounge.

strike his hand.

Lounge’s hand in such an aggressive and violent manner.

Mr. Pinto from his left side.

37. Defendant Kinney, instead of identifying himself as a law enforcement official or

with his sister-in-law, Sarah Pinto.

made incidental contact with a law enforcement official.

Kinney, who immediately rushed towards Mr. Pinto.

yanking and twisting it behind Mr. Pinto’s back.

arm, violently twisting it behind his back.

Kinney and Campolo.

his shoulders and arms.

Pinto face first against the vehicle.

to suffer substantial physical pain.

53. Defendant Campolo ignored each of Mr. Pinto’s complaints.

one (1) hour, until the handcuffs were removed.

prior to, or during, his arrest by defendants.

or violations of the law.

Kinney that Mr. Pinto “accidentally gestured his hand in my face.”

gentleman back from the ropes area.”

struck or shoved Mr. Pinto.

Dillman, Pisano, Maholtz and Byers.

unreasonably in his use of excessive force against Mr. Pinto.

contact with Defendant Kinney’s chest, “had no effect due to my vest.”

of said officer’s duties.

injure him due to his bullet proof vest.

crime alleged against him, Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer.

surveillance’s clear contradiction of Defendant Kinney’s version of events, its overwhelming

released from custody on December 17, 2017, at approximately 5:00 p.m.

a Third Degree Felony, and Disorderly Intoxication, a Second Degree Misdemeanor.

information forwarded by defendants, including Kinney, Campolo, Dillman, Maholtz, Pisano,

place or upon a public conveyance.

Martini and Burn.

Tallides or other employees of Cavo Lounge and SLR Naples, Corp.

Enforcement Officer Without Violence, or Disorderly Intoxication.

Officer, Resisting a Law Enforcement Officer Without Violence, or Disorderly Intoxication.

in favor of Mr. Pinto.

Plaintiff without probable cause.