FGU VS ALDAY

FACTS: ALDAY is an agent of FGU. FGU filed a complaint against Alday for the unliquidated cash
advances, unremitted costs of premium incurred by her. Alday filed a counterclaim for her right for
payment of direct commissions and contingent bonuses and premium reserves. FGU filed a Motion to
Strike Out Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and to Declare Defendant in Default which was
dismissed by RTC Makati. FGU filed a MTD for Alday's counterclaim contending that RTC didn’t acquire
jurisdiction for the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. Alday asked RTC to declare her
counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be
declared in default for failing to answer her counterclaim.

RTC granted FGU MTD and denied Alday's motion since the counterclaim is permissive in nature and
held that petitioner's failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over
the same. CA found that the counterclaim is permissive.

RULING: The Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion ruled:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within
a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the
records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for
her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss
petitioner's counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a
motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and
therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its
failure to answer her counterclaim.29However, the trial court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim.
Pursuant to this Court's ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given petitioner
a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay
the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for having failed to
answer her counterclaim.30 Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there
is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only
then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.31 Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim
of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious
suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent. If respondent were
to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading
the same facts raised in its complaint.32

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 23 December 1998
and its 19 May 1999 Resolution are hereby MODIFIED. The compulsory counterclaim of
petitioner for damages filed in Civil Case No. 89-3816 is ordered REINSTATED. Meanwhile,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 134) is ordered to require petitioner to pay the
prescribed docket fees for her permissive counterclaim (direct commissions, profit commissions,
contingent bonuses and accumulated premium reserves), after ascertaining that the applicable
prescriptive period has not yet set in.3

KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO A. LERMA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, and
PACIFIC GENERAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation which is engaged in
the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants,
while private respondent Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic
corporation. On March 5, 1997, PGSMC and KOGIES executed a Contract1 whereby KOGIES would
set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. Subsequently, the machineries,
equipment, and facilities for the manufacture of LPG cylinders were shipped, delivered, and
installed in the Carmona plant. PGSMC paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000. However, gleaned from the
Certificate4 executed by the parties on January 22, 1998, after the installation of the plant, the initial
operation could not be conducted as PGSMC encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply
of materials, thus forcing the parties to agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely
complied with the terms and conditions of the KOGIE FILED ESTAFA AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
PGSMC filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim9 asserting that it had the full right to dismantle
and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the
contract. KOGIES strongly argues that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid
docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal
defect.

On the issue of nonpayment of docket fees and non-attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping
by PGSMC, the CA held that the counterclaims of PGSMC were compulsory ones and payment of docket
fees was not required since the Answer with counterclaim was not an initiatory pleading. For the same
reason, the CA said a certificate of non-forum shopping was also not required.

RULING: We disagree with KOGIES.

As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with
Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, "A compulsory
counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall
be contained therein."

On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against
KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature.
We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M.
No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or crossclaims.
As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory
pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not
commit reversible error in denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory
counterclaims.

CIRIACO L. MERCADO, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL

QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., Respondents

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co- plaintiff-appellants Ana
Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee
Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the
Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. A ‘pitogo’, which figures prominently in this
case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22,
1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a ‘pitogo’. As a result,
Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

x
"The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of plaintiffsappellant’s
complaint come under the class of moral damages.

PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, AUTOMOTIVE PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE CORPORATION and

AUTOCORP, Petitioners, v. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS,1 Respondent

FACTS: Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of herein
respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-
petitioners Automotive Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea) and
Autocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee2 to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP
and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements dated June 4, 1996,3 January
14, 1997,4 and April 24, 1997.5

Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger
motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject
to the condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its
obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together
with all the accompanying documents of title.

Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles.
Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the
payment of the amount of US$1,544,984.406 representing Proton's total outstanding
obligations. These guarantors refused to pay, however. Hence, BNP filed on September 7, 1998
before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against petitioners praying that they
be ordered to pay (1) US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest and other related charges thereon
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid and (2) an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums
due from petitioners as attorney's fees.

To the complaint, the defendants-herein petitioners filed on October 12, 1998 a Motion to
Dismiss9 on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees to thus prevent the trial
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.10 As additional ground, petitioners raised
prematurity of the complaint, BNP not having priorly sent any demand letter.11

RULING: Resolving the first ground relied upon by the defendant, this court believes and so hold
that the docket fees were properly paid. It is the Office of the Clerk of Court of this station that
computes the correct docket fees, and it is their duty to assess the docket fees correctly, which
they did. Even granting arguendo that the docket fees were not properly paid, the court cannot just
dismiss the case. The Court has not yet ordered (and it will not in this case) to pay the correct
docket fees, thus the Motion to dismiss is premature, aside from being without any legal basis.

Petitioners thereupon brought the case on certiorari and mandamus 16 to the Court of Appeals
which, by Decision17 of July 25, 2001, denied it in this wise: Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-
94,23 petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees as the said circular provides
that in the assessment thereof, interest claimed should be included. There being an underpayment
of the docket fees, petitioners conclude, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:

In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which
turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of
reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the
complaint merits dismissal.
Parenthetically, in the complaint, respondent prayed for "accrued interest' subsequent to
August 15, 1998 until fully paid." The complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998,
respondent's claim includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding to its claim for interest from
August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed,
this is required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, which was
the rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands, respondent cannot
claim the interest from August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless respondent is allowed
by motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of
interest petitioners owe from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 199842 and pay the corresponding
docket fee therefor.
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same can only be
determined after a final judgment has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to
pay the corresponding docket fee therefor. Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay additional
fees which shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to
interest accruing after the filing of the complaint.

'The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint
or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages
as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of
the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court
may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket
fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are
left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing
of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify
nor speculate as to the amount thereof.44

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. The July 25, 2001 Decision and the December
18, 2001 Resolution of the Court Appeals are hereby MODIFIED. The Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City is ordered to reassess and determine the docket fees that
should be paid by respondent, BNP, in accordance with the Decision of this Court, and direct
respondent to pay the same within fifteen (15) days, provided the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ordered to proceed with
the case with utmost dispatch.

G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 21, Naga
City, as Pairing Judge for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly Presided By HON.
NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May 2006), ROMEO Y. TAN, ROBERTO L.
OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES, Respondents.

FACTS: PETITIONER HAD LOAN FROM RESPONDENT TAN SECURED BY REM OVER 5 PARCELS OF
LAND IN NAGA. WHEN PETITIONER WAS UNABLE TO PAY THEY ENTERED INTO A MOA FOR
PETITIONER TO PAY ITS DEBT FROM OCTOBER 1 2004 TO DECEMBER 1 2005 AND TO HAVE IT
DACION EN PAGO
PURSUANT TO MOA PETITIONER REPRESENTED BY MR. SIA (PRES) EXECUTED DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE. ON THE BLANK SPACES SOMEBODY WROTE JAN. 3 2006 AS THE DATE OF EXECUTION AND
THE SAME WERE NOTARIZED BY RESPONDENT ATTY. REYES ON JAN 3 2006.
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF THE PETITIONERS, THE RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO GET HOLD OF THE
PROPERTIES

PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT BEFORE EXECUTION THEY HAD A MEETING BUT CANT COME UP
WITH FINAL AMOUNT OF THE LOAN BUT RESPONDENTS HAD ALREADY DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
NOTARIZED BY ATTY. REYES
THEY CONTEND THAT THE MOA CONSTITUTED PACTUM COMMISSORIUM AND THAT THEY ARE
DEPRIVED OF FORECLOSURE
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC on 16 March 2006, petitioner paid the sum of ₱13,644.25
for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of
Court initially considered Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section
7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Only respondent Tan filed an Answer15 to the Complaint of petitioner

Respondent Tan, thus, sought not just the dismissal of the Complaint of petitioner, but also the
grant of his counterclaim. Thereafter, respondent Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in
which he contended
that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be
computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since petitioner did
not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order
requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended; and should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and dismiss
the prayer of petitioner for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been
executed in contravention of the law or of the Memorandum of Agreement as pactum
commisorium.

Since [herein respondent], Romeo Tan in his Answer has a counterclaim against the plaintiff,
the former must likewise pay the necessary filling (sic) fees as provided for under Section 7 (A)
of Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 issued by the Supreme Court.18
Consequently, the RTC decreed on the matter of docket/filing fees:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [herein petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay additional
filing fee and the [herein respondent], Romeo Tan is also ordered to pay docket and filing fees
on his counterclaim, both computed based on Section 7(a) of the Supreme Court Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Naga City and for the latter to compute and to collect the
said fees accordingly.

Petitioner moved20 for the partial reconsideration of the 24 March 2006 Order of the RTC,
arguing that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 was principally for the annulment of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale and, as such, incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner submitted that the
RTC erred in applying Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to petitioner’s
first cause of action in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
In a letter dated 19 April 2006, the RTC Clerk of Court computed, upon the request of counsel

for the petitioner, the additional docket fees petitioner must pay for in Civil Case No. 2006-0030

as directed in the afore-mentioned RTC Orders. Per the computation of the RTC Clerk of Court,

after excluding the amount petitioner previously paid on 16 March 2006, petitioner must still

pay the amount of .720,392.60 as docket fees.

Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be assessed in accordance

with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section 7(a) must be applied in the assessment and payment

of the proper docket fee.

RULING: The dictum adhered to in this

jurisdiction is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the

pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.32However, the Court finds it

necessary, in ascertaining the true nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030, to take into account significant
facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint of petitioner, facts and circumstances

which petitioner failed to state in its Complaint but were disclosed in the preliminary

proceedings before the court a quo.

What petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint was that respondents Tan and Obiedo

already had the Memorandum of Agreement, which clearly provided for the execution of the

Deeds of Absolute Sale, registered on the TCTs over the five parcels of land, then still in the

name of petitioner.

A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated in

what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to

or recovery of possession of real property.

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value

thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.

In Paderanga vs.
Buissan, we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as
stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one ‘affecting title
to real property or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property.’"

Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed
value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees."

A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still
be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only
difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases
involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value,
would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration
or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the
absence thereof, the stated value of the same.

In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against
respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action
necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance
with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
did not commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional
docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.

G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., Petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE C.
COBARRUBIAS, Respondent.

FACTS: RESPONDENT IS AN ASSOCIATE PROF OF COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES-MEMBER OF

UFESLU. SHE FAILED THE EVALUATION WHICH REQUIRED RATING OF 87 PTS. SHE WAS FORCED BY
SLU TO LEAVE FOR FIRST SEM. SHE SOUGHT RECOURSE TO CBA'S GRIEVANCE MACHINERY. DESPITE
CONFERENCES, IT FAILED TO SETTLE. SHE FILED A CASE FOR ILLEGAL FORCED LEAVE OR ILLEGAL
SUSPENSION WITH DOLE BAGUIO.

Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between
the parties, CA-G.R. SP No. 90596,8 ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their
evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in
force during the same five-year period.9

SLU, for its part, countered that the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90596 cannot be considered
in deciding the present case since it is presently on appeal with this Court (G.R. No.
176717)10 and, thus, is not yet final. It argued that the forced leave provision applies
irrespective of which CBA is applicable, provided the employee fails her evaluation three (3)
times in five (5) years.

On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, but failed to pay the required filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of
the material portions of the record.14

On February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
ground cited is technical. She, nonetheless, attached to her motion copies of the material
portions of the record and the postal money orders for ₱4,230.00. She maintained that the ends
of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits.17
On July 30, 2008, the CA reinstated the petition. It found that Cobarrubias substantially
complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in
her motion for reconsideration.18
SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for Cobarrubias’ failure to pay
the docket fees on time.

SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the appeal since Cobarrubias failed to pay
the docket fees within the prescribed period, and rendered the VA decision final and executory.

The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite
her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period, and in reversing the VA
decision.

RULING: Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made
strictly
in accordance with the provision set by law.25 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that
appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment.26Furthermore, upon the filing
of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful
fees;27 non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the
petition’s dismissal.28 Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.29 It is an essential requirement, without which, the
decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.30

In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full only
after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2008
and attached the postal money orders for ₱4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late,
and without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the
reglementary period.
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance,
such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of
the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the
attendant circumstances.52 Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking
liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with
the rules

ALONZO GIPA, IMELDA MARO LLANO, JUANITO LUDOVICE, VIRGILIO GOJIT, DEMAR
BIT ANGCOR, FELIPE MONTALBAN AND DAISY M. PLACER,1 Petitioners,
vs.
SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE as represented by its Vice-President For Operations and
Corporate Secretary, RUBEN G. ASUNCION, Respondent.

FACTS: SLI AN OWNER OF A PROPERTY. DEFENDANTS OCCUPIED IT AND DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE
THE PREMISES. DEFENDANT RELIED ON OCCUPATION. NHA DECLARED SLI AS OWNER FOR THE MSA
AND THE PROPERTY OCCUPIED BY THE DEFENDANTS BELONG TO SLI. SLI WON IN RTC.

DEFENDANTS APPEALED. DISMISSED BY CA REASONING THAT THEY DID NOT PAY THE
CORRESPONDING DOCKET FEES IN WHICH RESPONDENTS FILED A MOTION FOR RECON WHICH THEY
ARGUED THAT THEY PAID THE APPEAL FEE. CA ISSUED A MINUTE RESO FOR THE PETITIONER TO
REMIT THE 30PESOS LEGAL RESEARCH FUND. THE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS RECEIVED IT BUT IT
NONETHELESS WAS ABLE TO SUBMIT WHAT WAS REQUIRED.

Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 invoking the principle
of liberality in the application of technical rules considering that they have paid the substantial
amount of ₱3,000.00 for docket and other legal fees and fell short only by the meager amount
of ₱30.00. Ascompliance, they attached to the said motion a postal money order in the sum of
₱30.00 payable to the Clerk of Court of the CA.24

ISSUE: WHETHERTHE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL

FILED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR FAILURE TO REMIT THE MEAGERAMOUNT OF
THIRTY PESOS (₱30.00) AFTER HAVING ADVANCED A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF
THE DOCKET FEES.26

Later in their
Reply,32 however, petitioners concede that the payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality.
Nevertheless, they point out that while full payment of docket fees is indispensable in the
perfection of an appeal, the same admits of exceptions.33 Their case falls under one of the
exceptions, that is, in the name of substantial justice and fair play. According to petitioners,
the dismissal of their appeal for failure to pay ₱30.00 runs counter to substantial justice and
fair play as the same would deprive them of their right to justice and render ineffective the
amount of ₱3,000.00, which despite being indigents, they undertook to pay.

For its part, SLI argues that since petitioners’ appeal was not perfected due to insufficient
payment of docket and other legal fees, the January 5, 2005 Decision of the RTC had already
become final and executory. Further, the CA correctly dismissed petitioners’ appeal because
aside from the fact that petitioners failed to comply with the CA’s directive to pay the lacking
amount of ₱30.00 for a period of more than nine months from their counsel’s receipt of notice,
no plausible explanation was tendered by them for such failure

RULING: Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of
said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the
record on appeal.

In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court
explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory,
as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory
and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory
privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made
within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket
fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment
of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without
such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final
and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on
its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.39

The CA’s leniency over petitioners’ cause did not end there. Although they were given only 10
days to remit the ₱30.00 deficiency, the said court allowed an even longer period of nine months
to lapse, apparently in the hope that petitioners’ compliance would be on its way. But as no
payment was remitted, it was constrained to finally dismiss the appeal for non-perfection.
Surprisingly, petitioners were again heard of when they filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
which they attached a postal money order of ₱30.00. Nevertheless, they did not offer any
plausible explanation either as to why they, at the start, failed to pay the correct docket fees or
why they failed to comply with the CA’s directive for them to remit the ₱30.00-deficiency.
Instead, they focused on begging the CA for leniency, arguing that the meager amount of the
deficiency involved justifies relaxation of the rules. What is worse is that even if the CA already
took note of the lack of such explanation in its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, petitioners, up to now, have not attempted to tender one in this Petition and
instead continue to capitalize on substantial justice, fair play and equity to secure a reversal of
the dismissal of their appeal. The Court cannot, therefore, help but conclude that there is really
no plausible reason behind the said omission

RODGING REYES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SALUD M.

GEGATO, Respondents.

FACTS: REYES THREATENED SALUD AT AVON STORE AGUSAN DEL SUR. HE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH
BUT DENIED BY THE COURT. THE MCTC RENDERED A DECISION FINDING HIM GUILTY OF GRAVE
THREATS. HE APPEALED TO RTC WHICH FOUND HIM GUILTY OF OTHER LIGHT THREATS ONLY.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and in its Amended Decision7 dated May 16,
2007, the RTC denied the motion and modified its original decision reducing the amount of
moral damages to P10,000.00 and the attorney’s fees to P10,000.00.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a petition for review within the 15-day period
allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension of Time asking for another
15 days within which to file his petition for review. Afterwhich, petitioner filed his petition.

CA DISMISSED THE PETITION. Filed beyond the reglementary period;

2. Failure of petitioner to pay complete docket fees as prescribed by law. It is deficient by
P3,530.00;

Petitioner insists that the CA erred in favoring procedural technicalities over his
constitutional right to due process.
It must be remembered that petitioner filed three (3) successive Motions for Reconsideration
before the CA on August 14, 2007, November 13, 2008, and December 28, 2009.
RULING: The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory.24 In Manchester v. Court of Appeals,25 it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this
rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,26 wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This
ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.

Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared that in
appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period
warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and that the court
shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, and
with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances

In that connection, the CA, in its discretion, may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days
only within which to file the petition for review upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglemetary period and that no further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.30 Therefore, the grant of any
extensions for the filing of the petition is discretionary and subject to the condition that the full
amount of the docket and lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the reglementary period
to file the petition.

Clearly, there are pre-requisites before a motion for extension to file a Rule 42 petition for
review could even be granted. The petitioner must pay the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period. This
requirement was not met by the petitioner as the docket fees he had paid are actually deficient
by Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Pesos (P3,530.00). Granting the petitioner's two (2)
motions for extension of time to file petition for review would have been beyond the pale of the
limits allowed by the Rules for the Court in that instance, considering that the petitioner failed
to fulfill a requirement.31
MORE ON DOCKET FEES

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF TEODULO EBESA,

NAMELY: PORFERIA L. EBESA, EFREN EBESA, DANTE EBESA AND CYNTHIA EBESA,
AND ATTY. FORTUNATO VELOSO, Respondents

FACTS: NTC FILED A CASE TO EXPROPRIATE A PROPERTY CO-OWNED BY HEIRS OF EBESA ccupied
by Atty. Fortunato Veloso (Veloso) (respondents),
who allegedly purchased the propertY. THE NTC WANTED THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE
PROPERTY FOR ITS TRANSMISSION LINE PROJECT. NTC
alleged that the acquisition of an easement right-of-way over a portion of the subject property

NTC filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession

alleging that it has deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the amount of
P11,300.00, representing the assessed value of the subject property and that it has served
Notice to Take Possession to interested parties.6
On July 15, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 21, issued an order of
expropriation, declaring that the NTC has a lawful right to take the subject property and use
the same for the intended public purpose subject to the payment of just compensation which
shall be based on its value at the time of the filing of the complaint.7

NRC FILED TO RTC COMPLIANCE CERT THAT IT ALREADY COMPLIED WITH THE PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION

The Board of Commissioners were directed to include in its report (1) the
amount of fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated, (2) the existence and
value of improvements, (3) the existence and value of consequential damages, if any, on the
remainder of the property, and (4) the existence and value of consequential benefits, if any, to
be derived by the owner of the subject property.

Both the
NTC and Veloso submitted their respective oppositions to the report RTC RULED IN FAVOR OF
VELOSO. NTC FILE A MOTION TO RECON. AND APPEALED IN CA WHICH THE CA DIRECTED NTC TO
SUBMIT PROOF OF PAYMENT OF THE APPEAL FEE.

NTC ASSEVERATED THAT IT DID NOT PAY THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES BECAUSE THE CLERK OF
COURT DID NOT ACCEPT IT REASONING THAT IT IS A GOCC THUS EXEMPT FROM PAYING DOCKET
FEES.

the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the RTC's

Decision dated January 9, 2006 has become final and executory since the payment of docket
fees is mandatory and jurisdictional and non-payment thereof will not toll the running of the
appeal period. In its Comment to the respondents' motion, the NTC claimed that it was in good faith
and
that the failure to pay the appeal docket fees was attributable to the receiving clerk of the
RTC.CA RULED THAT The CA held that the NTC's counsel should know that as a GOCC, it is not
exempted from the
payment of docket and other legal fees. Such knowledge can be presumed from the fact that
NTC was required initiatory filing fees when it filed the expropriation case and was even
prepared to defray appeal fees. The

RULING: Basically, there are three requirements in order to perfect an appeal: (1) the filing of a
notice
of appeal; (2) the payment of docket and other legal fees; and (3) in some cases, the filing of a
record on appeal, all of which must be done within the period allowed for filing an appeal.

Verily, the payment of appeal docket fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is
mandatory as it is required in all appealed cases, otherwise, the Court does not acquire the
authority to hear and decide the appeal. The failure to pay or even the partial payment of the
appeal fees does not toll the running of the prescriptive period, hence, will not prevent
the judgment from becoming final and executory. Such was the circumstance in the instant
appeal. The NTC failed to pay the appeal fees without justifiable excuse. That its counsel or
his representative was misled by the advice of the receiving clerk of the RTC is unacceptable
as the exercise of ordinary diligence could have avoided such a blunder. It is apparent from
the records that the NTC had ample time to rectify the error or clarify its reservation
regarding the propriety of its supposed exemption from the appeal fees. It received a copy of
the RTC Decision dated January 9, 2006 on January 10, 2006 29 and the Order denying its
motion for reconsideration on February 17, 200630 and had until March 6, 2006 to file a notice
of appeal and pay the corresponding docket fees.31 NTC's counsel, through his representative,
did file a notice of appeal as early as February 17, 2006 but did not pay the docket fees
apparently because of the advice of the receiving clerk of the RTC, although he was ready and
willing to pay the amount at that time. If the NTC came prepared to the trial court with the
necessary voucher to settle the docket fees at the time of filing of the notice of appeal, it
understood that it was not exempted from paying the said fees. This can be further deduced
from the fact that the NTC was required to pay filing fees with the RTC at the commencement
of the action.
Further, NTC's counsel should have been diligent enough to inquire whether the appeal had
been properly filed and that the corresponding fees were accordingly paid blowing fully well
the significance of these considerations. Had he only bothered to do so, he would have known
about the non-payment of the filing fees and could have easily consulted with other lawyers to
settle this uncertainty. The NTC, a GOCC, maintains a pool of learned lawyers, who must
have had exposure with expropriation cases. Fie could have easily confirmed from them the
necessity of paying the docket fees and settled it promptly especially since there are still a
number of days left after the notice of appeal was filed.
The implication of the timely payment of docket fees cannot be overemphasized. "The
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is a sine qua non requirement for the perfection
of an appeal. The court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees."

WOODROW B. CAMASO, Petitioner, v. TSM SHIPPING (PHILS), INC., UTKILEN, AND/OR

JONES TULOD, Respondents.

FACTS: CAMASO WAS EMPLOYED BY TSM. HE WAS DIAGNOSED WITH TONSILAR CANCER. He
likewise received sickwage allowances
from the latter.9Thereafter, respondents refused to shoulder Camaso's medical expenses, thus,
forcing the latter to pay for his treatment. Believing that his sickness was work-related and
that respondents remained silent on their obligation, Camaso filed the instant complaint for
disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses, and
other consequential damages before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),

In a Resolution17 dated August 12, 2015, the CA dismissed Camaso's petition "for nonpayment
of the required docketing fees as required under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised
Rules of Court." In a Resolution17 dated August 12, 2015, the CA dismissed Camaso's petition "for
nonpayment
of the required docketing fees as required under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised
Rules of Court."

ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly dismissed

Camaso's petition for certiorari before it for nonpayment of docket
fees.

RULING: GRANTED. Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily
lead to the
dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing
of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees
are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant
to defraud the government.

Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via
mail, a Metrobank check dated July 6, 2015 under the account name of Pedro L. Linsangan
was attached thereto to serve as payment of docket fees.26 Although this was not an
authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule VIII27 of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of
such personal check shows that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay the required docket
fees. Clearly, this exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the government.
In this relation, the assertion of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA Receiving Section that there
was no check attached to Camaso's certiorari petition is clearly belied by the fact that when it
was examined at the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, the check was found to be still
stapled thereto.28
In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical
rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice and, hence, remands the instant case
to the CA for the resolution of its substantial merits.29 Upon remand, the CA is directed to
order Camaso to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable period of thirty (30) days
from notice of such order.