that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code
However, the order was still unconstitutional as it violates the due
process of law on the imposition of its penalty. Even with a claimed
energy crisis which forced a demand on traditional beasts of burden,
the Court found no time pressure requiring the disposition of the
property or that it was even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction, necessary for the circumnavigation of due process. The
Court further states that due process was violated because the owner
of the property confiscated was denied the right to be heard in his
defense and was immediately condemned and punished. In Pesigan v.
Angeles, penalties for violations that were penal in nature should be
pronounced by a court and not by the police, the former even requiring
a trial and conviction.
To add, there was also an undue delegation on the authority conferred
to the Chairman of National Meat Inspection Commission as it gave the
said officer unlimited discretion as to the disposition of confiscated
property. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality
and abuse, and even corruption.
The police station commander is not liable for damages however as the
order was presumed to be valid at the time.
26. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOH
G.R. No. 173034 ǀ October 9, 2007
FACTS:
Historical Background:
The Milk Code was issued by President Corazon Aquino in 1986 by
virtue of legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
Petition:
The petitioner, Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines, representing manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51,
Otherwise Known as the "Milk Code," Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes
(RIRR). They argue that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions
that are unconstitutional.
The petitioner argues that the RIRR is unconstitutional as it goes
beyond the scope of The Milk code and thereby amending the said law
which is beyond the powers of the Department of Health as they can
only implement the same.
DOH argues that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also
various international Instruments regarding infant and young child
nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments
are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR.
DOH invokes the following international instruments:
1. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child;
2. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; and
1F CASE DIGESTS | 35
 3. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
These instruments only provide in general terms that steps must be
taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform
society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-
being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services
and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. The
international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding
breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether pertinent international agreements entered into by
the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may be
implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; If in the
affirmative, whether the RIRR is in accord with the
international agreements
RATIO:
1. The WHA Resolutions are considered “soft laws” or non-binding
and are merely recommendatory and so are not part of the law
of the land. The Milk Code has the force and effect of law in
such jurisdiction.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. As
international instruments the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions to have the
force of law in the Philippines, they have to be transformed into a local
law or to be incorporated.
Transformation:
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not
been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate
as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in
this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. The Milk Code was an
almost verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS save for the provision in the
ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to
the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead,
the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other
marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
Incorporation:
For an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they
consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris).
Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in
fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states;
neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member
states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the
legislature enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk
Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, specially providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up
to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
Section 4. Declaration of Principles –
xxx
1F CASE DIGESTS | 36

(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula,
breastmilk substitutes and other related products are prohibited.
Section 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions,
sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for
breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children
up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed, because they
tend to convey or give subliminal messages or impressions that
undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise
exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as well
as related products covered within the scope of this Code.
Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. – The following
administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon any person,
juridical or natural, found to have violated the provisions of the
Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations:
a) 1st violation – Warning;
b) 2nd violation – Administrative fine of a minimum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos,
depending on the gravity and extent of the violation, including
the recall of the offending product;
c) 3rd violation – Administrative Fine of a minimum of Sixty
Thousand (P60,000.00) to One Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P150,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of
the violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of the offending
product, and suspension of the Certificate of Product
Registration (CPR);
d) 4th violation – Administrative Fine of a minimum of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) to Five Hundred
(P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos, depending on the gravity and
extent of the violation; and in addition, thereto, the recall of the
product, revocation of the CPR, suspension of the License to
Operate (LTO) for one year;
e) 5th and succeeding repeated violations – Administrative Fine
of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the offending
product, cancellation of the CPR, revocation of the License to
Operate (LTO) of the company concerned, including the
blacklisting of the company to be furnished the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) and the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI);
f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred
(P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be made for every day the
violation continues after having received the order from the IAC
or other such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing the
company for the infraction.
For purposes of determining whether or not there is "repeated"
violation, each product violation belonging or owned by a
company, including those of their subsidiaries, are deemed to
be violations of the concerned milk company and shall not be
based on the specific violating product alone.
The provisions above show that the DOH evidently arrogated to itself
not only the regulatory authority given to the Inter-Agency
Committee but also imposed an absolute prohibition on
advertising, promotion, and marketing. These sections are clearly
violative of the Milk Code. As stated by the petitioners, The Milk Code
only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for
advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such
activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24
months old or beyond and forbids the use of health and nutritional
claims.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 37
RULING:
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared
NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
27. ABAKADA v. PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 ǀ August 14, 2008
Ponente: Corona, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005) was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and encourage their
employees to exceed their revenue targets by a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides for the creation of the
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve its IRR composed
of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the
House of Representatives.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee
on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While
the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed after
the enactment of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law, which is vested on the Executive.
ISSUE:
Whether there is encroachment of judicial power upon the creation of
the Congressional Oversight Committee.
RULING:
Yes. Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should
be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) Scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation40 and
(2) Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in
a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in
the executive branch.
However, to prevent the danger of congressional encroachment
"beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and
related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified
1F CASE DIGESTS | 38
under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws
and presentment.
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce
have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as
if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in
an appropriate case by a competent court.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may
not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval (by Legislative Veto) without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the
provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto
itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
In the Considered Opinion of Justice Dante O. Tinga, from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members
to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress
or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members
of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Thus, Section 12 of RA 9335 (creation of Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve IRR) is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD (pursuant to its Separability Clause
in Section 13).
NOTES:
Legislative Veto - A statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed IRR to Congress which,
by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power"
to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As
such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to
attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of
the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
28. PHIL. COCONUT V. REPUBLIC
GR No. 178193 ǀ January 24, 2012
Undue delegation - UCPB shares distribution
Ponente: Velasco, Jr. J.
FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6260 was enacted creating the
Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF). Several presidential decrees (PDs) were issued
during martial law purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry
through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. The Philippine
Coconut Administration (PHILCOA, now PCA) was charged with the
duty of collecting and administering the Fund.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 39
Among the PDs issued is PD 755 which, under Section 1, authorized
PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a
commercial bank to provide coco farmers with "readily available credit
facilities at preferential rate," and deposit the CCSF levy collections in
said bank, interest free. The bank acquired is First United Bank (FUB),
later renamed UCPB. PD 755 also authorized the distribution of UCPB
shares of stock free to coconut farmers.
The manner of how the shares ended up in possession of the
petitioners are provided below:
1. The farmers' UCPB shares were originally registered in the
name of PCA for the eventual free distribution thereof to and
registration in the individual names of the coconut farmers in
accordance with PD 755 and the IRR that PCA shall issue;
2. Pursuant to the stock distribution procedures set out in PCA
Administrative Order No. 1, s. of 1975, (PCA AO 1), farmers
who had paid to the CIF under RA 6260 and registered their
COCOFUND (CIF) receipts with PCA were given their
corresponding UCPB stock certificates. As of June 1976, the
cut-off date for the extended registration, only 16 million worth
of COCOFUND receipts were registered, leaving over 50 million
shares undistributed;
3. PCA would later pass Res. 074-78, s. of 1978, to allocate the
50 million undistributed shares to (a) farmers who were already
recipients thereof and (b) qualified farmers to be identified by
COCOFED after a national census.
4. As of May 1981, some 15.6 million shares were still held by and
registered in the name of COCOFED "in behalf of coconut
farmers" for distribution immediately after the completion of the
national census, to all those determined by the PCA to be
bonafide coconut farmers, but who have not received the bank
shares; 45 and
5. Prior to June 1986, a large number of coconut farmers opted to
sell all/part of their UCPB shares below their par value. This
prompted the UCPB Board to authorize the CIIF companies to
buy these shares. Some 40.34 million common voting shares of
UCPB ended up with these CIIF companies albeit initially
registered in the name of UCPB.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1 of PD No. 755, as well as PCA Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1975 (PCA AO 1), and Resolution No. 074-75,
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the
distribution of the UCPB shares to the coconut farmers? [YES]
RULING:
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1)
the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
The PD lacks the requisites or standards for a valid delegation of
legislative power. As can be noted, PD 755 authorizes the PCA to
distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB
and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the
coconut farmers under the agreement for the acquisition of such bank.
Yet, it does not even state who are to be considered as coconut
farmers. The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the
number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important
variables to be determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion
of the implementing agency.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 40

Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition
as to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into
private ownership will redound to the advancement of the national
policy declared under it. To recall, P.D. No. 755 seeks to "accelerate
the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a
vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development."
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used
for public purpose. They are special public funds of the government.
Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be
given for free to private individuals. Taxes are imposed only for a public
purpose and cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the
exclusive benefit of private persons. When a law imposes taxes or
levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage
to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law
cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose.
29. DEUTSCHE BANK AG v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 188550 | August 19, 2013
Ponente: Sereno, CJ.
FACTS
 Deutsche Bank Manila withheld and remitted to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) PHP67,688,553.51
for the fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT)
on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to
Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior
taxable years.
 The petitioner, believing it made an overpayment of the BPRT,
filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and
Investigation Division an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate of PHP22,562,851.17.
 Petitioner also asked for a confirmation of its entitlement to the
preferential tax rate of 10% provided in the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty to the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD)
 Petitioner reiterated its administrative claim for the refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate before the Court of Tax
Appeals after the alleged inaction of the BIR.
 CTA Second Division denied the claim of Deutsche Bank
because:
o a tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD before the
payment of Deutsche of its BPRT and actual remittance
of its branch profits to DB Germany, or before the
availment of the preferential rate of ten percent (10%)
under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. RMO No. 1-2000 of
the CIR mandates that application should be made 15
days prior to availment.
o Based on the Mirant v. CIR, petitioner should first invoke
the provisions of the tax treaty through an application
before they avail the benefits of such tax treaty.
 CTA En Banc confirmed
ISSUES
Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive
persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty. (NO)
RULING
 Tax treaties are entered into to minimize, if not eliminate the
harshness of international juridical double taxation, which is why
they are also known as double tax treaty or double tax
agreements. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must
take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000. Our
Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. Principle of pacta
sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty
1F CASE DIGESTS | 41
 obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement.
 Application is not a prerequisite before gaining the benefits of
the tax treaty. RMO No. 1-2000 was implemented to obviate any
erroneous interpretation and/or application of the treaty
provisions. However, Deutsche could not have applied for a tax
treaty relief within the 15 days prior to the payment of its BPRT,
precisely because it erroneously paid the BPRT not on the basis
of the preferential tax rate under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty,
but on the regular rate as prescribed by the NIRC. Hence, the
prior application requirement becomes illogical.
 The minute resolution in the Mirant case is not a precedent to
this case. Even if this Court had affirmed the CTA in Mirant, the
doctrine laid down in that Decision cannot bind this Court in
cases of a similar nature. There are differences in parties, taxes,
taxable periods, and treaties involved; more importantly, the
disposition of that case was made only through a minute
resolution.
30. BELGICA v. OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566 ǀ November 19, 2013
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
The Pork Barrel is commonly referred to as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the Members of the Legislature. The usage of the Pork Barrel
evolved to include certain funds of the Executive.
The earliest form of the “Congressional Pork Barrel” dates back to the
Public Works Act of 1922 which were subject to post-enactment
legislator approval. The funds appropriated for certain public works
projects subject to the approval of a joint committee from the Senate
and the House of Representatives.
The system has developed into the Priority Development Assistance
Funds (PDAF) in 2000. The PDAF Article includes the express
statement of the lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators
and the Vice President for “hard” and “soft” projects. Certain funds of
the executive are included such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
Controversies have surfaced with regard to the Pork Barrel as Former
Marikina Representative Romeo Candazo and an anonymous source
reported that huge sums of government money regularly went into the
pockets of the legislators in the form of kickbacks. The National Bureau
of Investigation began to probe into the allegations that on syndicates
using funds from the pork barrel and various government agencies
through ghost projects. This was due to the affidavits of six whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation had swindled billions of
pesos for ghost projects and not less than 20 dummy NGOs for an
entire decade. Cases against other lawmakers were filed for Plunder,
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as well as against public officials implementing agencies
and NGOs set up by Napoles.
On August 16, 2013, The Commission on Audit released the results of
the three-year audit investigation on the PDAF. The highlights revolved
around projects which exceeded their respective allocations and the
non-compliance regarding disbursement of funds outside to NGOs,
legislative districts and without the endorsement of implementing
agencies. The “Presidential Pork Barrel” whistle-blowers alleged that
P900 Million royalties on the Malampaya gas project went into a dummy
NGO.
Thus, the case at bar challenges the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System and to cease any expenditure under the Pork Barrel System.
ISSUE/S:
1F CASE DIGESTS | 42

Whether or not the PDAF Article and other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws are unconstitutional based on:
1. Separation of Powers (YES)
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Powers (YES)
3. Check and Balance (YES)
4. Political Dynasties (NO)
5. Local Autonomy (YES)
RULING:
1. Separation of Powers
The Legislative branch, or any of its members, should not cross the
field of implementing the budget since that is executive in nature. The
enforcement of the National Budget as contained in the GAA, is solely
on the shoulders of the Executive Branch. Upon the passage of the
GAA, the legislative’s role should have ended, and the Executive’s role
in implementation should begin. The Congress may however continue
to utilize its oversight function in accordance with the Constitution, but
this is only in an effort to maintain checks and balances and their role
must only be confined to such.
The post-enactment feature of implementation of the Congressional
Pork Barrel entails that each individual legislator identifies the projects
where the specific allotment goes to, post-GAA. This coupled with their
post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment
are all not related to the function of mere congressional oversight. This
effectively allows legislators to not only intervene, but also to assume
duties in the sphere of budget execution, thus allowing legislators to
exercise powers not given to them by the Constitution.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
It is clear that the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation from Section 29, Article 6 of the Constitution. Appropriation,
in this sense, means the setting apart by law of a certain sum for public
revenue for Specified purpose
The problem with the GAA was that it only had a lump-sum fund, but
the appropriation of itemizing how much such fund would go to which
specific purpose was entirely upon the discretion of each INDIVIDUAL
legislator. As such, they are no longer enacting the appropriation as
Congress, the body, but rather as an individual. This then violates the
non-delegability of legislative power.
3. Check and Balance
The case has multiple reasons for being unconstitutional on the basis
of checks and balance.
4. Denying Veto Power
The GAA doesn’t necessarily allow any specific item to be vetoed.
Given that the nature is one big lump-sum of funds, it’s either all or
nothing. Additionally, since the funding has yet to been itemized into
their specific appropriations in the construction of the GAA, there are
nothing itemized for the President to exercise his item veto power on
as there are no “items” (the particulars and severable parts of
appropriation of the bill) which may be the object of a veto.
In order for the President to be fully capable of exercising his veto
power, it follows that it is essential for the appropriation to already be
itemized into “specific appropriations of money”, and not just “general
provisions” which provide for the parameters of appropriation.
In its application, the PDAF, consisting of P24.79B, would be
subdivided among the individual legislators. The individual legislators
would then have each of their own individual lump-sum allocations and
may then appropriate the said funds on their own discretion once the
GAA has been passed.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 43
Being that these final appropriations to the specific projects chosen by
the individual legislators are made after the passage of the GAA, there
is no longer a chance for the final appropriations to be vetoed, hence
outside of the law. This then presents the dilemma of having a budget
within a main budget which effectively forces the President to either
accept the entire PDAF allocation as a whole without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be in line with
his national agenda or rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.
Additionally, on the application of accountability, CoA mentions that this
vague lump-sum budgeting scheme makes it difficult for auditors to
obtain the data they need to aid in their function of auditing the projects.
The purpose that this budgeting scheme should allow for more flexibility
in the delegation of funds for future contingencies does not outweigh
what the Constitution requires.
5. Accountability
The Court agreed in part with claim of the petitioners that the
Congressional Pork Barrel defies public accountability. But use of the
funds aimed at self-perpetuation and re-election must be taken on a
case-to-case basis. It was claimed that legislators have turned from
fiscalizers to financially-interested partners. Given post-enactment
authority, they would be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. With this, legislators are allowed to intervene in the phases
of project implementation making them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
6. Political Dynasties
It was alleged that the Congressional Pork Barrel System enables
politicians who are members of political dynasties to perpetuate
themselves into power. There is no standing law on the policy on
political dynasties and it was not properly demonstrated how the
system would propagate political dynasties. The Court deferred from
ruling on this issue.
7. Local Autonomy
The Congressional Pork Barrel system goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives,
who are national officers, to substitute their judgements in utilizing
public funds for local development. President Aquino stated that the
establishment of the system had a worthy goal in mind, for
representatives to be able to identify projects for communities that
LGUs could not afford.
A problem associated with this is the same amount of funding given to
representatives. Not taking into consideration the type of districts they
represent as well as public officers who receive the same amount of
funding but do not represent any district at all. The Pork Barrel Funds
have become personal funds. It conflicts with the functions of various
Local Development Councils geared towards managing local affairs.
The efforts of the LDCs should not be duplicated by individual
legislators who have no law-making authority except when acting as a
whole. Thus, being able to intervene in purely local matters, the result
is the ability of individual legislators to bypass the LDCs and take sole
credit in the projects he or she initiated. This is against genuine local
autonomy.
31. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 136781 ǀ October 6, 2001
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
1F CASE DIGESTS | 44
Four inviolable parameters mandated by the Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941 to determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list
election:
 First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.
 Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering
a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
 Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
 Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which
a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion
to their total number of votes."
May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. 123 parties,
organizations, and coalitions participated. After elections, only 14
party-list representatives were proclaimed from 13 parties and
organizations who were able to reach the 2% threshold.
Party-lists that did not reach the 2% threshold requirement, starting
with PAG-ASA, filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution”. The Constitution allegedly mandates that 20% of the
composition of the HRep be party-list representatives. Thus, PAG-
ASA asks that the 52 seats available for party-list representatives
be filled up. They also claimed that the requirement under R.A. No.
7941 to have a minimum of 2% of the total valid number of votes in
order for a party-list to be entitled 1 seat in the HRep goes against
the Constitution since the seats for party-list representatives in the
current election would not get filled up (only 14 of the 52 seats).
October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a
Resolution granting PAG-ASA’s petition. It ordered the
proclamation of the next 38 party-list representatives to complete
the 52 seats of the party-lists. By doing so, they disregarded the 2%
threshold rule under R.A. 7941.
The top 12 parties who won fair and square, complying with the 2%
threshold rule, assailed this Resolution and objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that R.A. 7941 mandates that (1)
only parties that got at least 2% of the votes for the party-list system
were entitled to seats in the HRep and (2) additional seats, should
there be any, should be allocated to those same parties who got at
least 2% of the votes. In essence, the top 12 parties wanted the 38
seats for their 2 other representatives on the ground that they were
the only one who complied with all 4 of the inviolable parameters
set by the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Constitution mandates that the 52 seats it provides
for party-list representatives be filled up all the time. NO
2. WON the 2% threshold requirement and the 3-seat limit
provided in R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. NO
RULING:
1. NO. The 20% allocation of the HRep to party-list representatives is
merely an indication of the maximum amount of party-list
representatives the House can hold at a given time, which is in
proportion with the number of district representatives.
2. NO. The Congress was granted by the Constitution the power and
the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the
1F CASE DIGESTS | 45
party-list system. They did not abuse their discretion in determining
the minimum-vote requirement for a party-list to be eligible for a seat
in the HRep. With the basis of 20 million voters at that time, having
2% votes would mean the party-list needs to have the support of
400,000 votes to merit a seat. Having another 2% would merit the
same party another seat upto a maximum of 3 seats per party-list.
Disposition of SC:
 Petitions are partially GRANTED.
 Assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC are SET ASIDE and
NULLIFIED
 The proclamations of the 14 party-list representatives from the
13 parties are AFFIRMED.
32. PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD,
INC v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529 ǀ April 29, 2010
Ponente: Brion, J.
FACTS:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this
petition for certiorari and in the motion for reconsideration it
subsequently filed to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated
October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated
December 9, 2009 denying PGBI's motion for reconsideration. Via
these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued
on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list
groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get
2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that
any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions
adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit. As
regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the
COMELEC found the motion to have been filed out of time, as August
17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution
8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline.
PGBI came to Court in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same
positions it raised with the COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its
delisting. PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its
situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one (1) but not in
the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to
secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2)
preceding elections. Considering PGBI’s arguments, the Court granted
the motion and reinstated the petition in the court’s docket.
ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI (NO)
 Whether or not PGBI's right to due process was violated (NO)
RATIO:
The Minero Ruling
The Minero Ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA
7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 46
First, the law is clear - the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it:
a. fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections; or
b. fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the 2 preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.
The law provides for 2 separate reasons for delisting; the word "or" is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one
thing from the other things enumerated.
Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI's cited congressional deliberations
clearly show.
MINERO therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its
characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in
an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list
vote. What MINERO effectively holds is that a party-list organization
that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less
than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused
interpretation of the law, given the law's clear and categorical language
and the Legislative's intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A
delisting based on a mixture or jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation
not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a
gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to
support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood,
in light of the Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) ruling, to mean failure to qualify for
a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which
it has registered. This, as the Court declared, is how Section 6(8) of RA
7941 should be understood and applied. The Court does so under its
authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application
of the principle of stare decisis.
The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO exists: it was clearly
an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of
stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did
unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, the Court cannot
allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous
ruling. Thus, the Court now abandons MINERO and strike it out from
the ruling case law.
The Court is aware that PGBI's situation - a party-list group or
organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election - is something
that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective,
it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for
Congress to address. The Court cannot and do not address matters
over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the
Legislature. to do will offend the separation of powers. If a gap indeed
exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the
Legislature's office.
The Issue of Due Process
PGBI's right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No.
8679. The essence of due process is the simply the opportunity to be
heard. As applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
1F CASE DIGESTS | 47
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and result:
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing. The Court
found it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not
denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution,
PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

 The Court must not abandon Minero. I vote to deny PGBI’s

HELD:
motion for reconsideration.
The Court granted the petition and accordingly annul COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner
is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which 33. BANAT v. COMELEC
denied PGBI's motion for consideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MPI). PGBI
is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the NO DIGEST AVAILABLE
coming May 2010 elections.
34. ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC
DISSENTING OPINION G.R. No. 190582 ǀ April 8, 2010
ABAD, J.:
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
 Disagrees with the ponencia’s view that the Court should
reverse the Minero ruling that invoked Section 6(8) of R.A. FACTS:
7941.
 This means that, to remain in the party-list register and enjoy This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
the right to take part in the party-list election, a party must prove an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by
by the results of the preceding two elections that it retains the Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of
required level of voters’ preference. Failing in this, such party COMELEC wherein COMELEC refuses to accredit Ang Ladlad as a
shall be dropped by the COMELEC, without prejudice to its party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
applying for new registration after a mandatory one-term rest. known as the Party-List System Act.
 If the ponencia’s views were to be followed, petitioner PGBI
would be able to circumvent the voters’ preference test that it Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of individuals who identify
needs to pass to remain in the register of party-list themselves as LGBT. Incorporated in 2003, it applied for
organizations. It would succeed in putting one over the parties registration/accreditation with the COMELEC in 2006 but was denied
that exerted efforts to get the required level of voters’ on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
preference. The following example should illustrate the unfair base. Ang Ladlad filed nonetheless another petition for registration in
COMELEC.

1F CASE DIGESTS | 48
Petitioner argues that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual
orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8- point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership
base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters,
and outlined its platform of governance.
To which the COMELEC dismissed the petition on the following
moral grounds:
(1) To COMELEC, the provided definition of the LGBT sector makes it
crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious
beliefs (Cited Romans 1:26-27 and the Quran) as ANG LADLAD
apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition's
par. 6F: 'Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age'. (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah). Respondent suggests that although the moral
condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be
religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted
public morals.
(2) ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which
defines nuisance as 'Any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which . . . (3) shocks, defines; or
disregards decency or morality . . .; It also collides with Article 1306 of
the Civil Code: 'The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. Art. 1409 of the Civil Code provides that 'Contracts whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy' are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, penalizes 'Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows' as follows in Art. 201.
(3) Not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-
list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
(4) It exposes our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith agency of the government, ours too is the State's
avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect
our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.
Ang Ladlad has been again denied on its reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not ANG LADLAD’s application for accreditation be granted
(YES)
RULING:
On the compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and
R.A. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the
ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution
and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors
in the enumeration.The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
that it had nationwide existence through its members and a liate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field
personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the
country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the
country." Nonetheless, we find that there has been no
1F CASE DIGESTS | 49
misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad's initial petition
shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines composed of various LGBT networks"
Ang Ladlad has demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC's moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad's morality, or lack
thereof.
On Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad's
Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, that "[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." — calling for "government neutrality in religious matters."
Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality." This is a grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular
purpose. Justification for its rulings is needed beyond mere conformity
to religious doctrine. If the government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals
would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled
to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e.,
to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or
even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are
second-class citizens.
On Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
While homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves,
have borne the brunt of societal disapproval mainly due to religious
beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and
their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, the Philippines has not seen fit
to criminalize homosexual conduct. Thus, these "generally accepted
public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm
of law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither
has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner's
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Moral disapproval, without
more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of
Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool
to further any substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC
targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act.
On Equal Protection:
1F CASE DIGESTS | 50
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population
considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the
respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No
law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties
about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that
public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here — that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority —
is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC's
differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike
for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the LGBT have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not
imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail.
On Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its
agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position
through normal democratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of
a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that
are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb.
Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not
for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one. This position gains even more force if
one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It
follows that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality and the
activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals
are protected as well.
A number of citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and
express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in
all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between
individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view.
However, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views
of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values
of other members of the community.
On Non-Discrimination and International Law
The decision is fully in accord with international obligations to protect
and promote human rights. In particular, the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation,
enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. (The principle of non-
discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR). In this context, the
principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation.
However, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines' international law
obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the
panacea for all social ills. Moreover, not everything that society — or a
certain segment of society — wants or demands is automatically a
1F CASE DIGESTS | 51
human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be
added to or subtracted from at will.
Petition is granted.
35. MAGDALO v. COMELEC
GR NO. 190793 | June 19, 2012
Ponente: Sereno J.
Petition: The following invokes the writ of Certiorari assailing the
COMELEC Resolutions dated 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010
that denied MAGDALO’s registration and accreditation.
FACTS: Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO), aims to be
registered and accredited by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) as a regional political party in the National Capital Region
(NCR) for the 2010 National and Local Elections. COMELEC then
directed MAGDALO to show cause of publication and presented the
following documents: HATAW! No. 1 sa Balita; Saksi sa Balita; and
BOMBA BALITA (Saksi sa Katotohanan). A hearing ensued in which
MAGDALO: (a) established its compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements; (b) presented Acedillo as its witness; and (c) marked its
documentary evidence in support of its Petition for Registration.
However, On 26 October 2009, COMELEC resolved to deny
MAGDALO’s registration and accreditation pursuant to Art. IX(C),
Section 2(5) of the Constitution since “it is common knowledge that the
party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and
some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments (Oakwood) in Ayala Center, Makati City on 27 July 2003,
that hostaged several innocent civilian personnel. This and the fact that
they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their
purpose in employing violence and unlawful means to achieve their
goals.” MAGDALO then moved for reconsideration, supplemented by a
manifestation under “ex abutanti cautelam (out of the abundance of
caution)” as “it is not in anyway intended to preempt the ruling of the
Honorable Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of
pursuing the Party’s participation in the Party-List System of
Representation in the eventuality that their petition is approved,” which
COMELEC denied altogether on 4 January 2010.
Accordingly, MAGDALO invoked the writ of certiorari and asserted that:
(a) the Resolutions were not based on the record or evidence
presented; (b) the Resolutions preempted the decision in Criminal Case
No. 03-2784 about the alleged involvement of some of their members
in the Oakwood siege; and (c) it has expressly renounced the use of
force, violence and other forms of unlawful means to achieve its goals.
This was countered by COMELEC’s assertion that “it had the power to
ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation
as a political party” to which MAGDALO agreed with reservations. They
claim that the COMELEC has the authority to assess whether parties
applying for registration possess either qualifications or
disqualifications as provided by but still committed grave abuse of
discretion in using pure conjectures instead of evidence on record.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied
MAGDALO’s registration and accreditation. - NO
RATIO: The Court ruled that COMELEC has a constitutional and
statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and
organizations to participate in the elections based on the following.
--Article VI, Section 5(1) of the Constitution: The House of
Representatives … shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 52
 --Article IX(C), Section 2(5) of the Constitution: COMELEC shall
have the power to register, after sufficient publication, political parties
which, in relation to other requirements, must present their platform of
government and accredit citizens’ arms of the said office … Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
--Section 60 of the Omnibus Election Code: “Political party” or
“party” means an organized group of persons pursuing the same
ideology, political ideals or platforms of government … To acquire
juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and
entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted to political
parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with the
Commission.
--Section 61 of the Omnibus Election Code: “No political party
which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled
to accreditation.”
It must be noted too that a party or organization must undergo
COMELEC’s two-step process of registration (the act that gives juridical
personality for purposes of our election laws) and accreditation (the
privileged participation that our laws grant to qualified registered
parties) to participate in the election.
Accordingly, MAGDALO contends that COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied them based on mere speculation
and not evidence on record but, pursuant to the Rules of Court that
judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of “public knowledge”
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, the Oakwood incident
was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a
proper subject of judicial notice and relieved COMELEC from grave
abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge and
took cognizance without the introduction and reception of evidence.
Magdalo also contends that it did not resort to violence when it took
over Oakwood for no one was held hostage, its members immediately
evacuated the hotel and not a single shot was fired. However, such
presents a narrow interpretation of violence and unlawful means when
the incident was done for the members to express their dissatisfaction
with the government via marching with full battle gear and planting
explosives in the building that threatened public security, or at the very
least, preyed on the civilians’ vulnerability. This justified COMELEC’s
treatment of the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of MAGDALO’s
predilection for resorting to violence or threats in order to achieve its
objectives.
Moreover, MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that
the former pursues its goals via violence would lead to an unwarranted
verdict of guilt for several crimes served as a preemption of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violation of the
presumption of innocence but, by the power vested by the Constitution
and the Omnibus Election Code to COMELEC, it can assess whether
the party seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by
employing unlawful acts based on administrative standards, not a
criminal one. An administrative case only requires substantial evidence
while a criminal case needs moral certainty and declares one guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. This allowed COMELEC to resolve that
MAGDALO resorts to violence to achieve its objectives and was guided
by the qualifications and disqualifications for registration as a political
party that did not hold the MAGDALO member guilty of their alleged
crimes.
Significantly, it must be clarified that the foregoing discussion on the
COMELEC Resolutions were based on the facts available to it at the
time. These could have changed had the President and the Congress
bestowed amnesty to MAGDALO before the rejections took place.
Taking such into consideration, the Court takes cognizance of the facts
surrounding the Oakwood incident and judicial notice of the grant of
amnesty in favor of the soldiers involved. MAGDALO must then
1F CASE DIGESTS | 53
execute affidavits renouncing the use of violence to achieve the
objectives of their organization and prohibit the membership of military
officers, as it would contravene with the Constitution. However, the
events that transpired during the Oakwood incident cannot be
interpreted as acts of violence anymore in the context of
disqualifications from registration.
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the resolutions of COMELEC
dated The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 AFFIRMED, without
costs to the MAGDALO’s new Petition for Registration.
36. DAYAO v. COMELEC
GR No. 193643 ǀ January 29, 2013
Petition: Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
FACTS:
LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small
industry players in the LPG and energy sector. It sought to register as
a party-list organization for the May 10, 2010 elections and was
approved by the COMELEC. Petitioners filed a complaint and petition
before the COMELEC for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as
a party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not represent a
marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers
and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens. In
response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be
members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the
society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not
one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that
petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the
petition for registration. The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two
reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not
among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s
petition for registration which has long been approved with finality.
Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were denied. After directing the
respondents to comment on the petitions, the Court received on March
17, 2011 from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a Manifestation
and Motion to Remand (In Lieu of Comment). According to the OSG,
since the COMELEC failed to resolve the factual issue on the
qualifications of LPGMA as a registered party-list organization, the case
must be remanded to the electoral body for summary hearing and
reception of evidence on the matter. For its part, LPGMA retorted that
another hearing would be a superfluity because the COMELEC has
already heard and verified LPGMA's qualifications during the
proceedings for its petition for registration. LPGMA asserts that the
petitions should instead be dismissed as they involve factual questions
that cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. On December 26, 2012, LPGMA manifested to the
Court that pursuant to COMELEC Resolution dated December 13,
2012, LPGMA passed the recent automatic review conducted by the
COMELEC on the qualifications of party-list groups. LPGMA was found
compliant with the guidelines set by law and jurisprudence and its
accreditation was retained for purposes of the 2013 party-list elections.
Issue: Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System
Act (RA 7941) require that incorporators, officers and members of
a party-list must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.
Ratio: YES. The party-list system of representation was crafted for the
marginalized and underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate
policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that
"those who are not marginalized and underrepresented are
disqualified."
Decision:
1F CASE DIGESTS | 54
In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, the Court
explained that the "laws, rules or regulations relating to elections"
referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, which
declares the underlying policy for the law that marginalized and
underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of the House of
Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not
comply with this policy must be disqualified.
All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint for cancellation of LPGMA’s party-list
accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure, the herein complaint
should be remanded to the COMELEC. However, on August 2, 2012,
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which subjected to
summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered party-list
groups, including LPGMA, to assess their continuing compliance with
the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set in Ang
Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among others, that the
registration of all non-compliant groups shall be cancelled. LPGMA
submitted to a factual and evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC
and was deemed to have complied with all requirements for
registration.
37. PAGLAUM ET AL. v. COMELEC
G.R. NO: 203766 ǀ April 2, 3013
Ponente: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case of 54 Petitions filed by 52 party-list groups
and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the COMELEC
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation
as party-list organizations. Approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in
the said elections.
The COMELEC excluded those that did not satisfy these two criteria:
(1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and
(2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Accordingly, this is pursuant to the Party-List System Act (R.A. No.
7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531. In relation,
Section 5 of the Party-List System Act states that "the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
It was contended that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the party-list elections and that the
ruling on Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT v. COMELEC should not be
applied.
COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in these cases, which required
the political party, sector, organization or coalition running in the party-
list elections to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941, and which also required
nominees of a party or organization to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Ang Bagong Bayani set the guideline that "the political party xxx must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically
disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. Whereas, BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice
1F CASE DIGESTS | 55
when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in
the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the party-list elections? (NO)
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections (BANAT) should be applied? (NO)
RULING:
1. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In disqualifying
petitioners, it used the criteria prescribed in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Court abandons these
old parameters for the following reasons:
a. The framers of the Constitution intended the party-list system to
be composed of three different groups; (1) national; (2) regional; and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
b. The clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in the Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system
is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Furthermore, Section 3(a) of the Party-List System Act defines a party
to either be a political or sectoral party.
c. The law does not require national and regional parties to
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” and the phrase
should only refer to the sectors in Section 5 that are by their nature,
economically “marginalized and underrepresented.” They are those
that fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistics
Coordination Board.
d. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those
“marginalized and underrepresented,” both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their members to the House of
Representatives.
e. Consequently, Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited
the "first five (5) major political parties” from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited
to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties
should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their
sectoral wings, will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
f. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political
parties to participate in party-list elections to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards giving them a voice in law-making.
2. Due to the aforementioned reasons of the Court, it would not be in
accord with the 1987 Constitution and the Party-List System Act to
apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. We cannot,
however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. The case was remanded to the COMELEC
to determine who may participate in the coming and subsequent party-
list elections. The following shall be the new parameters:
1F CASE DIGESTS | 56
a. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national, (2) regional, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
b. National and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized
and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented,"
or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall
not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
38. ABANG LINGKOD v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206952 ǀ October 22, 2013
Ponente: REYES, J.
FACTS:
Abang Lingkod is a sectoral organization that represents the interests
of peasant farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-
list system on December 22, 2009. In the May 2010 elections, Abang
Lingkod failed to win a seat in the House of Representatives. Nearing
the May 2013 elections, on August 16, 2012, Abang Lingkod, filed with
the COMELEC pertinent documents required under R.A. no. 7941 to
prove its continuing compliance. However, the COMELEC En Banc
cancelled Abang Lingkod’s registration as a party-list group saying that
the photographs of some alleged activities it conducted do not to
establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented. Moreover, the photographs that were presented
were, in fact, photoshopped (logo/name of the group were added in
photos of medical and dental missions, and book giving activities to
serve as proofs that they conducted programs after the May 2010
elections). Abang Lingkod alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
Abang Lingkod’s registration under the party-list system
1F CASE DIGESTS | 57
 1. W/N the falsification or the submission of photoshopped
photos were acceptable grounds for cancellation
RULING:
1. Yes. Abang Lingkod’s registration was cancelled on the ground
that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented. The flaw
in COMELEC’s disposition lies in the fact that in insist on
requiring party-list groups to present evidence showing that they
have a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Section 5 of R.A. no. 7941 did not require
groups intending to register under the party-list system to
submit proof of their track record as a group. Groups are merely
required to attach to their verified petitions their “constitution,
by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required
by the COMELEC.” Moreover, representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral
organizations and it is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector.
1. No. As said earlier, submission of evidence to prove a
group’s track record is no longer required pursuant to
the Court’s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum.
Therefore, Abang Lingkod’s submission of
photoshopped photos is not a ground for denial or
cancellation of their registration under the party-list
system. The misrepresentation must relate to their
qualification as a party-list group.
NOTES:
 National vs. Regional vs. Sectoral parties
o National party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions.
o Regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities
and provinces compromising the region
o Sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector. The use of
platform, principles, policies, advocacy of special
interests and concerns of the sector, and the existence
of constituencies in defining parties all pertain to
evidence of a duly existing and genuine party-list group.
All these are what the law, R.A. no. 7941, requires from
parties to participate in the party-list elections
 LEONEN, J. dissents that the submission of clearly falsified
evidence (photoshopped photos)to support its Manifestation
before the COMELEC were enough grounds to cancel the
group’s registration because it betrays public trust.
39. LICO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205505 ǀ September 29, 2015
Ponente: Sereno, C.J
FACTS:
There were two rival factions of the same party list organization,
Adhikang Tinaguyod Nguyen Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is
headed by Atty. Isidro Lico (Lico Group) and the other group headed
by Atty. Amparo Rimas (Rimas Group). In 2010 Ating Koop was
declared as one of the winning parties by COMELEC where Atty. Isidro
was the first nominee thus earning a seat in the House of
Representatives. Several months prior to the elections, Ating Koop
1F CASE DIGESTS | 58
issued Central Committee 2010-01 which incorporated a term sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Lico was to serve the party list
representative for the first year of the three-year term.
On 2011 Ating Koop held its Second National Convention where it
amended its Constitution and By-laws. The amendments likewise
mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members
within six months. In effect, this cuts the three-year term of the
incumbent members.
After almost one year, Lico was expelled from the party list on the
grounds of disloyalty, on the basis that he refused to honour the time
sharing agreement. Apart from that, he was also accused of
malversation and graft and corruption.
In 2012, the Rimas group filed with COMELEC a petition against Lico
praying that Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the
House of Representatives, and the succession of Roberta Mascarina
as the party list’s representative. COMELEC resolved to declare
Mascarina as the duly qualified member and upheld the expulsion of
Lico.
ISSUE:
WoT COMELEC had jurisdiction over Lico’s expulsion from Ating
Koop? No
HELD:
According to the 1987 Constitution Section 17 Article VI, the jurisdiction
on the qualifications of members of Congress is endowed with the
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
COMELEC justified its decision on the basis that they constitutionally
had jurisdiction over intra party disputes. However, Lico was an
incumbent officer of the House of Representatives, thus it is the
HRET that had jurisdiction not COMELEC. The jurisdiction of HRET
is exclusive — it is given full authority to hear and decide cases on any
matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.
Lico’s expulsion from the Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualification to sit in Congress. After all, it requires one to be a bona
fide member in a party list.
Since the expulsion of Lico from Ating Koop will affect his position in
the House of Representatives, it is the jurisdiction of the HRET to
decide in the matter.
40. TOBIAS vs ABALOS
G.R No. L-114783 | December 8, 1994
Ponente: Bidin, J.
Petition: Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong."
FACTS: Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No.
7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held
on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether
they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 59
Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue
of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of specific provisions of the Constitution.
Petitioners' objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the
Constitution. Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of
the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the
House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1)
of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division
was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
ISSUES:
WoN R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, violates
Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution on the limit of
number of representatives. (NO)
WoN said division was made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. (Qualified YES)
WoN Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
(NO)
RATIO:
(1) As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit
on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter
clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased,
if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by
R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not
qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of
R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
(2) Proceeding now to the other constitutional issue raised by
petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of
any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained
the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to
strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of
the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative
districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.
(3) As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the
said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 60

HELD: The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Notes:
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own
legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next
national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the
former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the
new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be
elected at the same election.
Article VI Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Article Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standard provided in this section.
41. JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et al v. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
G.R. No. 118577 ǀ March 7, 1995
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
In this case, the petitioners are assailing certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) as
unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that Sec. 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(1) increasing the legislative district of Makati only by special law (which
is in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following
the return of every census), (2) an increase in legislative district was
not expressed in the title of the bill, and (3) the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI
of the Constitution for, as of the latest survey (which was the 1990
census at the time), the population of Makati stood at only 450,000.
The S.C. found no merit in the petitions.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional because: (a) reapportionment cannot be made by a
special law, (b) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in
the title of the bill, and (c) Makati’s population, as of the 1990 census,
stands at only 450,000.- No.
RULING:
These issues have been settled in a previous case, namely Tobias v.
Abalos. There, the S.C. ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative
districts allotted to each LGU nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be
denied of legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
1F CASE DIGESTS | 61
This situation would deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty.
The S.C. did not find merit in the petitioners’ contention that the
creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have
been expressly stated in the title of the bill. As in the case of Tobias
v. Abalos, the S.C. reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
construction of the “one title-one subject” rule so as not to impede
legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a
law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all
its details. Hence, the S.C. ruled that “it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject, and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject.”
The petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for the latest survey at the time (the 1990 census) stated
that the population of Makati only stood at 450,000. Because the said
section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall
have at least one representative. And granting that Makati’s
population as of the 1990 census only stood at 450,000, its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of 250,000.
HELD:
- The S.C. dismissed the petitions for lack of merits.
- No costs.
42. SEMA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177597 ǀ July 16, 2008
FACTS:
Under RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), otherwise known as the Organic Act,
Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM. The first legislative district of
Maguindanao consisted of Cotabato City and eight other municipalities.
Even if Cotabato City is part of Maguindanao, it is not included as part
of the ARMM but that of Region XII.
In 2001, RA 6734 was amended to RA 9054. In Sec. 19 of RA 9054 -
ARMM’s legislature, the Regional Assembly was allowed to divide,
merge, abolish, or substantially alter boundaries of provinces,
cities, municipalities, or barangays in accordance with the criteria
laid down by the LGU Code of 1991.
Following this provision, the Regional Assembly enacted Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan which shall be composed of the eight
municipalities previously included in the first district of Maguindanao.
The MMA Act 201 will only leave Magunidanao with Cotabato City as
the First legislative district, and fifteen other municipalities as the
components of its second legislative district.
On Feb 2007 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed a
resolution requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato
City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into
a regular province. With this, the COMELEC issued a Resolution 7902
renaming the legislative district as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City”
Sema, who was a candidate in the 2007 elections for the representative
of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of
the votes cast in Cotabato City. Sema asserted that the COMELEC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No.
7902 (Joining Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City) and that the
COMELEC usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion
legislative districts must be exercised by the Congress.
ISSUE/S:
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 1. Substantive: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional? – NO, it is unconstitutional
2. Substantive: Whether a province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without the
need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
province? – NO, Cotabato will be less than the required
population of 250k and cannot have one representative. Also,
reapportioning of legislative districts is vested in the Congress.
3. Procedural: Whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902. COMELEC, through the OSG assailed the
appropriateness of a writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the
resolution in the exercise of its administrative not quasi-judicial
power. – Yes
4. Standing: Whether the proclamation of Didagen P. Dilangalen
as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City mooted the petition and if Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her
certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated
that she was seeking election as representative of “Shariff
Kabunsuan including Cotabato City.”
Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari and (2) Sema’s prayer for
the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the
proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent
Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
HELD/ RATIO:
1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void
for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI.
The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to
create a legislative district. The power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. The Congress
cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create legislative districts. The creation of the ARMM, and
the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its
organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts.
2. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. MMA Act 201
apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation,
and will leave Cotabato as the lone component of the first legislative
district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because in 2000, it had a population of only
163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first
legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3) “Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have
at least one representative”. Moreover, emphasis must be made that
the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself.
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, in preserving the geographic and
legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI.
3. The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse
of discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.” The writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act “which
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the law specifically enjoins as a duty.” It is true that the COMELEC did
not issue Res 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC
to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.”
These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition
since Sema prayed for a writ of prohibition, which is the
recognized writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of
election laws, rules, and regulations.

4. It is of no merit that Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the

elections for the representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City” mooted this petition since the issue at bar does not
concern his election but the validity of the COMELEC’s resolution and
the constitutionality of MMA Act of 201. The Court’s ruling in these
petitions will not only settle the issue regarding the recently concluded
elections, but all the subsequent elections and the issue regarding the
power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create additional provinces
in the future.

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