Case # 141

DEWARA VS LAMELA
G.R. NO. 179010 April 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483

FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) were married before the enactment of the Family
Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to
work in California, United States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.

Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Eduardo found Eduardo guilty of the charge and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two months and one (1) day to (3) months, and to pay civil indemnity of
Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P62, 598.70) levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the
Bacolod Cadastre... l... in the name of "ELENITA M. DEWARA... married to Eduardo Dewara.

Thus, Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale. Petitioner claimed
that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because the said property was her paraphernalia or exclusive property and
could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she
received no notice of the execution sale.

Respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that
the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo
because, at the time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was
registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on execution of the
property.

There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage

Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father and her aunt was in the nature of a donation
because of the alleged gross disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary consideration for the sale, there
is no other evidence that would convince this Court of the paraphernalia character of the property.

The records are bereft of proof that the consent of petitioner's father and her aunt were vitiated or that, in reality, they intended
the sale to be a donation or some other contract.

ISSUE:
The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the paraphernalia/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.

RULING:
It is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that even
though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus,
she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardo's liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be held
accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in his name.

Case # 142
TARROSA V. DE LEON
G.R. NO. 185063 July 23, 2009 593 SCRA 768
FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered
into a Conditional Contract to sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968,
Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the
name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix
Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio
died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them
was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they
were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio
and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although some installments were
paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal property

HELD:
Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to sell was only
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he
had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage
to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership
to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

Case # 143
VILLEGAS VS LINGAN
GR# 153839 June 29, 2007
526 SCRA 63
FACTS:
Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of
a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Isaac constituted a real estate mortgage over the said
parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home
Mutual Development Fund (HMDF).When the Isaac failed to settle his loan, the real estate mortgage he constituted over
the property was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at
such public auction, a certificate of sheriffs sale was issued and, thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on
March 8, 1996.

By virtue of a power of attorney executed by Villegas ‘wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the latter
redeemed the property from the HMDF.

On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed a Deed of Sale in favor
of respondent.

Isaac claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral, his mother-in-law, created a principal-agent
relationship only between his wife, Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as principal, and Catral, as agent, and then only for
the latter to administer the properties of the former; that he never authorized Catral to administer his properties,
particularly, herein subject property; and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
the respondent, since from the very wordings of the power of attorney, she had no special authority to sell or convey
any specific real property.

On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint and on appeal, CA affirmed into the RTC Judgment. Hence,
this petition for review.

ISSUE:
(1) WON the wife of the petitioner Isaac, as successor-in-interest, may validly redeem the property in question
(2) WON the petitioner husband Isaac has a cause of action against his respondent wife Marilou
HELD:
1. YES.
Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides that “in all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor,
or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption
shall be governed by the provisions of section 464 to 466, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “real property sold as provided in the last
preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the
following persons: a)The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property;

The successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor referred to in the above provision includes a person who succeeds to
his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs.

Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The
pleadings filed and the records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as correctly
held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are
transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right
of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property.

2. NO.
A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.

A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.

In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the petitioner, and, with more reason, no such
obligation arises in behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right. There was no violation of a legal
right of the petitioner.

It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petitioner.
Marilou did not act as agent of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as successor-
in-interest of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, should there be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou,
petitioners wife. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption. Thus,
petitioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent.

Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity
of the sale. Moreover, since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting parties, then
only the parties, as well as the third person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of the
agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the
rights of real parties in interest. Petition is denied.

Case # 144
TAN VS. CA
273 SCRA 229, 236 (1997)

FACTS:
On May 14, 1978, petitioner Antonio Tan, obtained two (2) loans in the total principal amount of four (4) million pesos
from respondent Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), evidenced by 2 promissory notes with maturity dates on
May 14, 1979 and July 6, 1979, respectively. Petitioner defaulted but after a few partial payments he had the loans
restructured by respondent CCP, and petitioner accordingly executed a promissory note on August 31, 1979 in the
amount of P3,411,421.32 payable in five (5) installments. Petitioner Tan, however, failed to pay any of the supposed
installments and again offered another mode of paying restructured loan which respondent CCP refused to consent.
On May 3, 1984, respondent, thru counsel wrote petitioner demanding the full payment, within ten (10) days, from
receipt of the letter, of the latter’s restructured loan which as of April 30, 1984 amounted to P6, 088,735.03.
On August 29, 1984, respondent CCP filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for a collection of a sum of money.
Eventually, petitioner was ordered to pay said amount, with 25% thereof as attorney’s fees and P500, 000 as exemplary
damages. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, reduced the attorney’s fees to 5% of the principal amount to be collected
from petitioner and deleted the exemplary damages.
Still unsatisfied with the decision, petitioner comes to this Court seeking for the deletion of the attorney’s fees and
the reduction of the penalties.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not interests and penalties may be both awarded in the case at bar.
HELD:
YES. Article 1226 of the New Civil Code provided that in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute
the indemnity for damages and the payment of interest! In case of non - compliance, if there is no stipulation to the
contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refused to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the
fulfillment of the obligation. The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. In the case at bar, the promissory note expressly provides for the imposition of both interest
and penalties in case of default on the part of the petitioner in the payment of the subject restructured loan, and since
the said stipulation has the force of law between the parties and does not appear to be inequitable or unjust, the said
stipulation must be respected.

Case # 145
IMANI VS MBTC
GR # 187023/Nov. 17, 2010
635 SCRA 357
FACTS:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent
Metrobank, with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas
Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo
Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6, 000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,
000.00 and P63, 825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo.
CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no
avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. RTC
ruled in favor of Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which was granted on
December 7, 1999. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property
covering a lot registered in the name of petitioner. Petitioner argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal
partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it
be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution
and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank.

ISSUE:
WON or not the property in question is conjugal.

RULING:
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes
it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when
the property was acquired is material. Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly
ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is
no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof
are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
Case # 166
MBTC VS PASCUAL
G.R. NO 163744 February 29, 2008
555 SCRA 453

FACTS:
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from
spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati
City. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. On April
30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed
several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving a lot. Florencia secured a waiver from
Nicholson. Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due,
Metrobank, initiated a foreclosure proceedings over the properties. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings,
Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of
the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his
consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties in contest form part of the conjugal properties of Nicholson and Florencia.

RULING:
The property is deemed conjugal. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital
bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues
to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.

Case # 167
DINO VS DINO
G.R. NO 178044 January 19, 2011
640 SCRA 178

FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together
again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. On 30 May 2001,
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. On a motion for reconsideration, the Trial court rendered a decision that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property
relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1)
of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute
nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Case # 146
PISUENA VS HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING
G.R NO 132803 August 31, 1999
313 SCRA 384

FACTS:
Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista are the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar. They claimed that the land in
dispute known as Lot 1201 was registered in the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. However, sometime
in 1950, after the death of Petra Unating, Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten years with
Agustin Navarra involving the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four hectares which was
converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of Agustin Navarra and the net income shall be divided equally
between Aquilino Villar and his children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar on one hand, and Agustin Navarra on the other
hand.

In 1958 when Agustin Navarra died, the heirs of Petra Unating repossessed the land in question until the defendant
Jessie Pisueña, son-in-law of Agustin Navarra, disturbed their possession sometime in 1974. And finally, sometime in
1982, the defendant, with the company of several men, including policemen, forcibly took physical possession of the
said land from the heirs of Petra Unating. Thus, they filed the instant action for recovery of possession and ownership
of a parcel of land against Jessie Pisueña.

On the other hand, defendant countered that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to
Agustin Navarra, as evidenced by Escritura de Venta Absoluta. And he and his wife purchased the said land from the
heirs of Agustin Navarra.

After trial, the court a quo ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and
Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar, to Agustin Navarra could be considered as valid. However,
this validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar
was still alive. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the said decision.

ISSUE:
W/N the lot in dispute is paraphernal property of Petra Unating hence would be covered by the CPG.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the lot in dispute can properly be considered as a paraphernal property of Petra Unating.
Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. However, this prima facie
presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral court’s specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings, that the lot
was inherited by Petra Unating from her mother.

Consequently, by virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra
on February 4, 1949, their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not have disposed of
their father’s share in the same property at the time, as they were not yet owners. At the most, being the only children,
they had an inchoate interest in their father’s share. When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third
share in the disputed property, Felix and Catalina’s inchoate interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in
them the title to their father’s share and, consequently, to the entire lot. Thus, that title passed to Agustin Navarra,
pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code, which was already in force at the time of Aquilino’s death in 1953.
Case # 151
CHING VS CA
G.R. NO 124642 February 23, 2004
423 SCRA 356

FACTS:
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated November 27, 1995, as well as the Resolution on April 2, 1996 denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The impugned decision granted the private respondent’s petition for certiorari and set aside the Orders of the trial court
dated December 15, 1993 and February 17, 1994 nullifying the attachment of 100,000 shares of stocks of the Citycorp
Investment Philippines under the name of petitioner Alfredo Ching.

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan ofP9, 000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation
(ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory
note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As added
security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua,
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all
the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38, 000,000.00.

On December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount ofP13, 000,000.00 payable in
eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a
promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981.

PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans, hence ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank
charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their
capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000
shares of stocks in the City corp Investment Philippines;
2. Whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed orders.

HELD:
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had the right to file the said motion, although she
was not a party in Civil Case.
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in
the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the
account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife
had the right to file the motion for said relief.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. The presumption
of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome the same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp
Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when
the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the
petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive
money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment
Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the
conjugal partnership, owned the same.
The ruling of this Court in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court buttresses the case for the petitioners. In that case,
we ruled that he who claims that property acquired by the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership
property but belongs to one of them as his personal property is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to
purchase the same. In this case, the private respondent claimed that the petitioner-husband acquired the shares of
stocks from the Citycorp Investment Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof. It was, thus, the burden of the
private respondent to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of
the petitioner-husband alone. As held by the trial court, the private respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove this
assertion.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a
liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to
assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and surety ship agreement with the private respondent for
and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit
of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private
respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top
twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if the
PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husband’s career would be enhanced
should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by
Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be
a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan
contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.

On the second issue, we find and so hold that the CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of the RTC. The
private respondent, the petitioner in the CA, was burdened to prove that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal
purpose to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the tribunal, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment and is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the RTC acted
whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy before certiorari will lie. A
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed.
After a comprehensive review of the records of the RTC and of the CA, we find and so hold that the RTC did not commit
any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.

Case # 147
FERRER VS FERRER
G.R. NO 166496 November 29, 2006
508 SCRA 356

FACTS:
Petitioner id the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a half- brother of Respondents. She filed a Complaint for payment of conjugal
improvements, sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction and damages. She alleged that before her
marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He
applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment
building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couple’s conjugal funds.
From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred
that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September
1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed
of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was
cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered in the names of respondents.

According to petitioner, that when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot. She alleged that the
cost of the improvements amounted to P500, 000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by
respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo’s lot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner has the right to be reimbursed for the cost of improvements under Article 120 of the Family
Code?
HELD:
No. Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate
her right. The right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested.
There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.

Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the
separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the
cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis
of Article 120 of the Family Code.

What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the
buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner’s spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon
whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise
stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner’s right to be reimbursed.

Case # 150
Ayala Invest & Dev't. Corp. vs. CA
GR# 118305 February 12, 1998
286 SCRA 272

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements making himself
jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the
court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,
300,000.00 with interests. Pending appeal and upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution and the
Deputy Sheriff caused the issuance and service upon spouses Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their
conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction to enjoin the auction sale alleging that the judgment cannot
be enforced against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound
to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.

Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Ching is not liable for the payment of
the debts secured by the husband Alfredo Ching.

ISSUE:
Whether the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement entered into by the husband in
favor of his employer.

HELD:
Yes. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to
be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to
benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety
or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an
act of administration for the benefit of the family.

Case # 152
Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR# 146504 / April 09, 2002
380 SCRA 361

FACTS:
Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989, respondent and his
wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of
US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights
Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to them,
the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite
settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner's inquiries on
the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner.
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00
but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, on October 13, 1994, petitioner filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife
As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and
his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with
her husband, from petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis
so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount.
Defendant was made to believe that the earnings derived from such construction will be for him and his
family since he was the one working to secure the contract and its completion, he was allowed to use
the facilities of the plaintiff;
Respondent denied having made death threats to petitioner and by way of compulsory counterclaim, he
asked for moral damages from petitioner for causing the alienation of his wife's love and affection,
attorney's fees and costs of suit. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's decision
and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed
loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife. The Court of Appeals found that the amount of
US$25,000.00 was respondent's share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction. The dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals' decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch
172 in Civil Case No. 4490-V-94 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING the Complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
As gleaned from the records, the following facts are undisputed: (1) there was a check in the amount of
US$25,000.00 issued by petitioner; (2) this amount was received by respondent and his wife and given
to a certain Pura Vallejo for the full payment of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street,
Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila; (3) this house and lot became the conjugal dwelling
of respondent and his wife; and (4) respondent's wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan
but which respondent did not sign.
All these pieces of evidence, taken together with respondent's admission that he and his wife received
the subject amount and used the same to purchase their house and lot, sufficiently prove by a
preponderance of evidence petitioner's claim that the amount of US$25,000.00 was really in the nature
of a loan.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE AMOUNT OF
US$25,000.00 WAS A LOAN OBTAINED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND HIS WIFE FROM PETITIONER.

HELD:
Respondent fails to convince this Court.
All the checks presented by respondent, which he claims to be his share in the profits of petitioner's company, were all
in the account of H.L. Carlos Construction. On the other hand, the Banker's Trust Check in the amount of US$25,000.00
was drawn from the personal account of petitioner.
Moreover, respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of the corporation.
There was no showing that respondent was a stockholder of H.L. Carlos Construction. His name does not appear in the
Articles of Incorporation as well as the Organizational Profile of said company either as stockholder or officer.
Not being a stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits or income of said corporation. Neither did respondent prove
that he was an employee or an agent so as to be entitled to salaries or commissions from the corporation.
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot.
They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle,
acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded
to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment
of the loan.
While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the
loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the
conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under
Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarity liable for such loan together with his wife.

Case # 153
SBTC v. Mar Tierra Corp
GR# 143382 / NOV. 29, 2006
508 SCRA 419

FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12, 000,000 credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). Petitioner approved the application and
entered into a credit line agreement with Respondent Corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed
by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly
and severally with Respondent Corporation for the payment of the loan. The respondent corporation finally availed of
its credit line and received P9M. Out of that amount, it was able to pay about P4M while the remaining balance remained
outstanding as the corporation suffered business reversals and eventually ceased operating. To enforce its claim against
the corporation on the remaining balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against Respondent Corporation and individual respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati. The RTC rendered a decision holding Respondent Corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and
severally liable to petitioner for the remaining balance of the loan including interest and attorney’s fee. It, however, found
that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision
in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party?

HELD:
NO. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations contracted by the
husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety
agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation
of the said provision?

We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia 9 that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another,
the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 10 we ruled that, if the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business
or profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." In other words,
where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such
obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety
or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must
be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit
received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party.

In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and Respondent Corporation, was solely
for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for Respondent Corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner
had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed
to discharge that burden.

To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil
Code to protect the solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation
of the conjugal partnership. [16] Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Case # 160
Roxas vs. CA
GR# 92245 / JUNE 26, 1991
198 SCRA 541
FACTS:
Melania Roxa (Petitioner) is married to Antonio Roxas, but are living separately. Melania found out that Antonio had
entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a portion of
their conjugal lot situated in Quezon City without her previous knowledge, much less her marital consent. Apparently,
she was to put up a flea market in the lot and has already filed for a Mayor’s permit but the same was denied on renewal
because Cayetano also applied for the same permit and was earlier granted. She then filed a complaint for annulment
of the contract of lease entered into without her consent against Cayetano, who filed a motion to dismiss the same on
the ground of lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:
W/N a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving
conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife.

HELD:
Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in view of
the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the conjugal
partnership does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that is responsible for such support, not the
paraphernalia property. Responsibility should carry authority with it.

The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise
alienate the property being administered, the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by
law to render an accounting. Acts done under administration do not need the prior consent of the wife.

However, administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets
unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has
been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of
the husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the property,
particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and
subject to annulment at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code)

Case # 161
GUIANG VS CA
G.R. NO 125172 June 26, 1998
291 SCRA 372

FACTS:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of
one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA affirming the lower court and denying reconsideration, declaring a
certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.

Plaintiff Gilda and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses and have three children, namely: Junie, Harriet and Jodie
or Joji, 18, 17 and 15 years old respectively. The couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, from
Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The
consideration was payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three
successive installments.
Gilda and Judie sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio
and Luzviminda Guiang, who have since then occupied the one-half portion and built their house thereon and are thus
adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda left for Manila in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in the Middle East, with the consent of her
husband. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She
stayed for sometime in Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, on March 11, 1990.
After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at
his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went
to school at King's College, Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as household help
of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was
going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money
January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their
house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her, who then replied that she
was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs.
Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would advise her father.
However, Judie pushed through and sold to Luzviminda on March 1, 1990 thru a document known as "Deed of Transfer
of Rights" the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of
P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's children Junie and Harriet
signed the document as witness.
4 days after the deed of transfer, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz's title over the lot
transferred, Luzviminda as vendee executed another agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408, this time with
Manuel Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz
originally bought the lot, who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a
witness to the sale. The new sale describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the
mass of evidence that the correct lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple Gilda
and Judie Corpuz.
March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home and found her children staying with other households. Gilda gathered her
children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children
that their father had a wife already.
For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and
her husband Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General Paulino Santos, for trespassing. On
March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a document known as "amicable settlement". In full, the settlement provides
for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the
house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any charge, on or before April 7,
1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino
Santos to question her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred however to the Officer-In-Charge, Mr.
de la Cruz, who in turn told her that he could not do anything on the matter. This particular point not rebutted. The
Barangay Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement.
He merely said he forgot whether Mrs. Corpuz had approached him. We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, plaintiff stayed
put in her house and lot.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable.
2. Whether the contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable settlement with them.

HELD:
First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good
faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed voidable
under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts
visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or
absent. This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was
correctly applied by the lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disgreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.

The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same
with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot
generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. The alienation
or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action
to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)

This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance
was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988
when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife
is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay
authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not
alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later.
The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a
valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent,
the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

Second Issue: Amicable Settlement

Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties
through the "amicable settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private
respondent. Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. Neither can the "amicable settlement" be
considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private
respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC
a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By
no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Case # 162
JADER – MANALO VS CAMAISA
G.R. NO 147978 January 23, 2002
374 SCRA 498

FACTS:
Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity
of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price
of the property to be paid on installment basis. Such agreement was a handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.
When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife’s conformity and
consent to the sale.

The formal typewritten Contracts to sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner.She and Edilberto met for the formal
signing of the typewritten Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks.
The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife’s signature.

The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma (wife), requesting a meeting to clarify some
provisions of the contracts. During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they
arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts.

When petitioner met again with respondent spouses for the formal affixing of Norma’s signature, she was surprised
when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed “spot cash”
for the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already
been duly perfected and Norma’s refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign
the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses
before the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a perfected contract to sell of the conjugal property?

HELD:
There is no perfected sale.

The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must concur.

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus,

Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offers. (Underscoring ours.)

Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent
to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the
contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties.
However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.

Case # 165
De la Cruz v. Segovia
GR# 149801 / JUNE 26, 2008
555 SCRA 453

FACTS:
Sometime in July 1985, Florindala wanted to purchase the Lot 503 and 505 located in Sta Mesa Manila for P180, 000.00.
Short of fund, she asked her sister Leonila to take the Lot 503 for P80, 000. But Leonila with only P36, 000 hard=earned
savings, Florinda advanced her P64, 000 for the full payment of the said lot. It was only on September 1991, did these
sisters entered a payment scheme agreement. However, Florinda filed with RTC on March 1996, a complaint annulling
said agreement on the ground, among others that since her husband, Renato did not sign, it is void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not subject Agreement is void absent the husband’s signature.

HELD:
No. The absence of Renato’s signature in the agreement bears little significance to its validity. Art 124 of the FC
provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife, in
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does
not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. It requires the WRITTEN
consent of the other spouse, of authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property, without
which the disposition is void. The foregoing the foregoing provision finds no application in this case because the
transaction between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve any disposition of property belonging toFlorinda. At
the outset, by paying the P36, 000, Leonila shall have the Lot 503 and remaining balance be paid subsequently. Clearly,
the transaction between sisters is that of a loan and not a sale of property. Though the lots are named under Florinda
and her husband, it merely served as a security over the P64, 000 advanced by Florinda. Even assuming that the
transaction involves disposition of asset, the mere fact of Renato, not signing on the agreement cannot negate the fact
of his consent. First, he was present when the agreement was drawn by his wife and Leonila. Second, it was in fact
presented to him for signature, but Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband.

Case # 164
Ravina v. Villa Abrille
GR# 160708 / OCT. 16, 2009
604 SCRA 120

FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who
are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.

In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street,
Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names.
Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in
his name under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses
built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made
improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables
to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to
herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but
Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated
June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed
members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began
transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.

When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited
outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities
refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and
anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.

During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that
they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when
they bought the property.

ISSUE:
• The court of appeals erred when it declared the sale of lot covered by tct no. 88674 in favor of spouses ravina, together
with the house thereon, as null and void since it is clearly contrary to law and evidence.
.
• The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioner’s patrocin a ravina and wilfredo ravina are not innocent
purchasers for value, the same being contrary to law and evidence.

• The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioner’s patrocin a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages,
the same being contrary to law and evidence.

HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”

There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having
been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in
1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence
of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is
exclusively owned by Pedro. Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No.
T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal
property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house.

Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectively of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without
the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Article
124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was
not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property
by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.

Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife,
sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby
resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date
the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and
execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not
include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of
freely without Mary Ann’s consent.

On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good faith. Accordingly, they need not
inquire whether the lot was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses
and may rely on the certificates of title.

The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered
in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller’s certificate of title. But
for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted,
such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into
the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.

In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny
knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity
did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the
exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still
proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann’s written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in
actual, visible and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of
sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her
conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good
faith.

Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the
parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and
fair dealing. Hence, in consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s
expense, we sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the
consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.

However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their
good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements
and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued
introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, “he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.”

On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence
on record.

The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the
family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out and her children were in school,
Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to
another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their
impassioned pleas.

Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” When a right
is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damages caused. It is patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law
standards.
Case # 148
ALIPIO VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO 134100 September 29, 2000

FACTS:
Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14.5 hec fishpond in Barito,Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. Lease was for 5 yrs ending
on Sep. 12, 1990. In June 19, 1987 til the end of the lease period, Jaring subleased the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps
Manuel. The stipulated rent is P485, 600.00 payable in 2 installments of P300k and P185, 600.00. The second
installment due on June 30, 1989.

Sublessees failed to pay entire second installment, leaving a balance of P50, 600.00 w/c they failed to pay despite
Alipio’s demands. Thus, he filed a case against said sublessees asking for payment of the balance or rescission of the
contract should they fail to pay the balance.

Purita Alipio petitioned for the dismissal of the case invoking Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court claiming that
such was applicable since her husband and co-sublessee passed away prior tothe filing of this action. Said rule has
been amended by Rule 3, Sec. 20, and 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Trial court denied Alipio’s petition because she was a party to the contract & should be independently impleaded
together w/the Manuel sps. Death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. Petitioner & Manuels
were ordered to pay balance and P10k atty’s fees and costs of suit.

On appeal, the CA dismissed the case and held that the rule invoked is not applicable. The action for recovery of a sum
of money does not survive the death of the defendant, thus the remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming
thatsuch death totally extinguished their obligation. When the action is solidary, creditor may bring his action against
any of the debtors obligated insolidum. Alipio’s liability is independent of & separate from her husband’s. (Climaco vs.
Siy Uy, Imperial vs. David, and Agacoili vs. Vda de Agcaoili)

ISSUE:
W/N a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of
money chargeable against the conjugal partnership.

HELD:
NO. Proper remedy would be to file aclaim in the settlement of the decedent’s estate or if none has beencommenced,
he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will, depending on whether
itstestate/intestate. No shortcut by lumping claim against Alipios with those against the Manuels.

CC Art. 161 (1) provides that the obligation of the Alipios is chargeable against their conjugal partnership since it was
contracted by the spouses for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. When petitioner’s spouse died, their CPG was
dissolved & debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance w/ Rule
73, Sec.2 w/c provides that the community property will be inventoried, administered, & liquidated and debts thereof
paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.

In Calma vs.Tanedo the Court held that no complaint for collection of indebtedness chargeable to the CPG can be
brought against the surviving spouse. Claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation & settlement of the
CPG. Surviving spouse’s powers of administration ceases & is passed on to court-appointed administrator. This was
affirmed in Ventura vs. Militante where Court held that lack of liquidation proceedings does not mean that the CPG
continues. Creditor may apply for letters of admin in his capacity as a principal creditor.

Note that for marriages governed by CPG, obligations entered into by sps are chargeable against their CPG & the
partnership is primarily bound for the repayments. They’ll be impleaded as representatives of the CPG and concept of
joint/solidary liability does not apply. At best, it will not be solidary but joint.
Case # 149
HOMEOWNERS’ SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK VS DAILO
453 SCRA 283 (2005)

FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased
a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment
purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to
obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot
in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo
executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the
knowledge and consent of respondent.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner
as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the
ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner
had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.

Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further
ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff
the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney’s fees for lack
of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-
OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.

HELD:
NO. ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void

In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the
sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. Were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent
and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in
a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband
and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property
wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse,
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct
in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.

2. NO. (1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited;

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat
and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being
of the family as a unit.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the
construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of
the principal obligation.

Case # 154
ROS VS PNB LAOAG BR.
G.R. NO 170166 April 6, 2011 647

FACTS:
Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage against
PNB
Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115, 000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as
security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land -
Lot No. 9161 of... the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a
result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property - a complaint was filed
to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property - interposing
the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound
to the benefit of the family.

ISSUES:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring, without basis, that the loan contracted by husband
Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine National Bank - Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family,
aside from the fact that such had not been raised by respondent in its appeal.

RULING:
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguete's marriage.