Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.

L-28196, November 9, 1967

SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three
resolutions which aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members
(First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional Convention
without forfeiting their seats (Third Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on June
17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Congress in the First and Third
Resolutions.

Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru
class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing Republic Act 4913 assailing
said law as unconstitutional.

Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails

the constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third
Resolutions.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.

2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violate
the spirit of the Constitution – NO.

RATIO:

1. RA 4913 is constitutional.

The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the amendments
are sufficient under the Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the submission
of proposals for amendment to the people except under certain conditions.

2. The submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do not violate
the spirit of the Constitution.

People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned among
the provinces of the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are interested to
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know the full details may enlighten themselves by reading copies of the amendments
readily available in the polling places. On the matter of Third Resolution, the
provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they
should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA 4913 were unconstitutional
but they did not reach specific number of votes to invalidate these congressional acts
under the 1935 Constitution, which is two-thirds of the Supreme Court.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]

En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further
than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and
Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the
Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed,
respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973
Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,
dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification,
this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It
could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It
made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force
and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the
recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only
entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the
fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that
the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so
convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can
check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the
acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there
is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
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deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning
of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied
the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely
two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present
Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC

August 28, 2018Gracezyl Blancojusticiability, justiciable question, political law

cases, sanidad vs comelec

PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO C. SANIDAD VS HONORABLE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER

G.R. NO. L-44640

OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree No. 991 to call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-
called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues
of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the
questions that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question
is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for
the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national
referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
asserting that the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during
the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-
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Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the incumbent President cannot act as a
constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for
deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not
consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to
an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens
of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the
issue raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The
Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-
plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality
of PDs 991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while
only 3 maintained it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a
political one. This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power
to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in
the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential
Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.

Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan,

City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City
of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator
National Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and
respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,
II Amendments & Revisions 4 of 13
Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain

(MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject
matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

• GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer
to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and
be open for public consultation.

• GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void
said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.

• GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the
MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.

• GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare

null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents
enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.

• GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment

prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and
executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar
thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and
impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between

the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the
Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed
the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in
1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It
was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in
Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when
the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF
suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire
between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over
his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.

• MOA-AD Overview

This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the
birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law,
international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle

II Amendments & Revisions 5 of 13

of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body
is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all

indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right
to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive
ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes
on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and
with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity"
(BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are
those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided
into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after
the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have
jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory;
they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south
west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but
no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental
cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external
defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE
shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN
and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements
or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and
revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part
of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and
that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have
the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the
GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility.
This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive
Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall

II Amendments & Revisions 6 of 13

also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details
of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise
of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the
MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

• On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for
the exercise of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court
will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic
questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for
adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create
legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty
or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by
authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and
the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for
adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made
under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that
the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of
Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga,
petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be
affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and
Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
II Amendments & Revisions 7 of 13
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to
delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing.
Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and
prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a
non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or
prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD
has already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the
SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general
rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation
of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the
power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or
injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the
GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to
further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever
provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There
is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same
problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or
any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD,
such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already complied
thereat.

• On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as
it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the
lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of
the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a
mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are
II Amendments & Revisions 8 of 13
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials
at all times accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with
reasonable safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a
statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the
State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin
rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the
plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the
right of the petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon
committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because
he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s order to the unqualified
disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such
peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels
on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD
is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free
and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially
noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—since they
allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and
compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question
that they cannot be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them:

• On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties
manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the
international law. In international law, association happens when two states of equal
power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates
certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its international status
II Amendments & Revisions 9 of 13
as state; free association is a middle ground between integration and independence.
The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international
definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the
BJE a status of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The court vehemently objects because the principle of association is not recognized
under the present Constitution.

• On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power
beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM
do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of
the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any
state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory
for independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD
merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria
of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

• On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE
includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the
ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need
not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the
Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an
expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since
those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM
and not to the BJE.

• On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the
powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec
20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in
order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court was not
persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the
Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the Constitution.
Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD.
The Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with
the authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be
amended consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the
law that promotes national unity and development. Because clearly, associative
arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of

II Amendments & Revisions 10 of 13

 semblance of unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the national
government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which,
in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.

• On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption
of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically
distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary
with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous people of
Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the
ancestral domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law
which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD.

• On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of
the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been
recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the internal
and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the
external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial
integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional
cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal
self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and
exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is essentially
an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous

peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession
from those states under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what
was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination; have the right to
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the right to
the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous
people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through
police officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With regards to the
autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.
II Amendments & Revisions 11 of 13
 • On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had,
since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the
necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of
Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in
accordance to the territorial integrity of the country—such was negated by the
provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the
suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the
query whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the
GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power
that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct peace
negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from
her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-
in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace
negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their
implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course, unilaterally implement
the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented from submitting
them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon
them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through
initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to
Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting
peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that
require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them
without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body
were assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited only to the preservation
and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but simply recommending
proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a
term because it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal
framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the
GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which changes would include
II Amendments & Revisions 12 of 13
constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the
limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a
virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-
AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

• On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral

declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders
the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the
Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact
that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a
state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign
Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process
of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

II Amendments & Revisions 13 of 13