ESHEATS
She paid a total amount
CASTORIO ALVARICO, Petitioner, vs. AMELITA L. SOLA, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 23, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54624, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, for reconveyance. Also sought to be reversed is the CA
resolution dated June 8, 1999 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita Sola while
Fermina Lopez is petitioners aunt, and also Amelitas adoptive mother.
On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales
Application (MSA) of Fermina over Lot 5, SGS-3451, with an area of 152 sq. m. at the
Waterfront, Cebu City.1cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 28, 1983,2 Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of
Rights3 over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties,
and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The
document of transfer was filed with the Bureau of Lands.4 The pertinent portions of the
deed provide:
xxx
That I, FERMINA A. LOPEZ, of legal age, Filipino, widow of Pedro C. Lopez and a
resident of Port San Pedro, Cebu City, Philippines, am the AWARDEE of Lots Nos. 4,
5, 3-B, 3-C and 6-B, Sgs-3451 And being the winning bidder at the auction sale of
these parcels by the Bureau of Lands held on May 12, 1982, at the price of P150.00
per square meter taking a purchase price of P282,900.00 for the tract; That I have
made as my partial payment the sum of P28,290.00 evidenced by Official Receipt No.
1357764-B representing ten (10%) per cent of my bid, leaving a balance
of P254,610.00 that shall be in not more than ten (10) years at an equal installments
of P25,461.00 beginning June 17, 1983 until the full amount is paid.
the Transferee Mrs. Amelita L. Sola, agrees to assume, all the obligations, duties and
conditions imposed upon the Awardee in relation to the MSA Application No. V-81066
entered in their records as Sales Entry No. 20476.
[I] hereby declare that I accept this Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights
and further agree to all conditions provided therein.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands.
of P282,900.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights
and granting the amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. 7 On May 2,
1989, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor of
Amelita.8cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 24, 1993,9 herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-1419110 for
reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated
the land to him11 and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same. He
averred that the donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to
Amelita.12cräläwvirtualibräry
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina
was no longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the
property having been transferred earlier to her.13 She added that the donation was void
because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly
acquired the land as Ferminas rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the
land for petitioner.14cräläwvirtualibräry
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against the defendant. Lot 5, Sgs-3451, is hereby declared as lawfully owned by
plaintiff and defendant is directed to reconvey the same to the former.
No pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees, plaintiff having opted to forego
such claims.
SO ORDERED.15cräläwvirtualibräry
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated March 23, 1999 reversed the
RTC. Thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by plaintiff-appellee against defendant-appellant is
hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner sought reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari seasonably filed on the following grounds:
 I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR,
REFLECTIVE OF UNMINDFUL RECKLESSNESS WHICH IS THE VERY OPPOSITE
OF JUDICIAL CIRCUMSPECTION, IN DECLARING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION
DATED JANUARY 4, 1984 (ANNEX C) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WAS EMBODIED
ONLY IN A PRIVATE DOCUMENT (Page 6, Decision, Annex A), ALTHOUGH, BY A
MERE CASUAL LOOK AT THE DOCUMENT, IT CAN BE READILY DISCERNED
THAT IT IS NOTARIZED;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
APPLYING ON THE CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE IN LAW THAT IT IS
REGISTRATION OF THE SALES PATENT THAT CONSTITUTE THE OPERATIVE
ACT THAT WOULD CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND TO THE APPLICANT (Pp.
3-6, Decision, Annex A) BECAUSE THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DOES NOT INVOLVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ON
SALES PATENT APPLICATIONS;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN MAKING A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
ACQUIRED THE LAND IN QUESTION, IN GOOD FAITH (Page 7, Decision, Annex A),
ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO BASIS NOR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A FINDING; and
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
ENUNCIATING THAT POSSESSION MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 1544 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE INCLUDE SYMBOLIC POSSESSION, UPON WHICH THE APPELLATE
COURT BASED ITS CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT WAS FIRST IN
POSSESSION BECAUSE THE DEED OF SELF-ADJUDICATION AND TRANSFER
OF RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT DATED MAY 28, 1983 WAS EXECUTED
MUCH EARLIER THAN THE DEED OF DONATION IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
DATED JANUARY 4, 1984 (Pages 7-8, Decision, Annex A).18cräläwvirtualibräry
The crucial issue to be resolved in an action for reconveyance is: Who between
petitioner and respondent has a better claim to the land?
To prove she has a better claim, respondent Amelita Sola submitted a copy of OCT No.
3439 in her name and her husbands,19 a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of
Rights20 over the property dated 1983 executed by Fermina in her favor, and a
certification from the municipal treasurer that she had been declaring the land as her
and her husbands property for tax purposes since 1993. 21cräläwvirtualibräry
For his part, petitioner Castorio Alvarico presented a Deed of Donation22 dated January
4, 1984, showing that the lot was given to him by Fermina and according to him, he
immediately took possession in 1985 and continues in possession up to the
present.23cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner further contests the CA ruling that declared as a private document said Deed
of Donation dated January 4, 1984, despite the fact that a certified true and correct
copy of the same was obtained from the Notarial Records Office, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City on June 11, 1993 and acknowledged before Atty. Numeriano
Capangpangan, then Notary Public for Cebu.24cräläwvirtualibräry
Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of the parties, we find that no
reversible error was committed by the appellate court in holding that herein petitioners
complaint against respondent should be dismissed. The evidence on record and the
applicable law indubitably favor respondent.
Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, which
provide:
Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be
governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more
different persons.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she registered the land in her
name and, based on the abovementioned rules, he has a better right over the property
because he was first in material possession in good faith. However, this allegation of
bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary
support. For one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of
Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is
required to assail and controvert them.25 Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439
was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioners bare
allegation to defeat the Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity of issuance.26 A Torrens title, once registered, serves as
notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance
of its registration.27cräläwvirtualibräry
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in
bad faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the
Public Land Act.28 Thus:
Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in
his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action
which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate
of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form
part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may do so.29 Since Amelita Solas title originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.30 Clearly then, petitioner
has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelitas title. It follows that he cannot
recover the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful
owner thereof.
Anent petitioners contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the
property in trust for him, we held that if this was really the intention of Fermina, then this
should have been clearly stated in the Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in
the Deed of Donation executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any
persuasive proof of that intention in any written instrument, we are not prepared to
accept petitioners bare allegation concerning the donors state of mind.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54624 is hereby AFFIRMED. The complaint filed by herein petitioner against
respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-14191 is declared properly DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
BORROMEO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during the five-year
prohibitory period under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the parcel of land is
proper. However, reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act is not automatic.
The Office of the Solicitor General must first file an action for reversion.
On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent No. 586681 over a
piece of agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-9053.1
On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold
the land to Eliseo Maltos.2
Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death,
he allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo,3 and his children to nullify the sale made
to Eliseo Maltos and have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled
because the sale was within the five-year prohibitory period.4
On June 23, 1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a
Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita
Maltos, and the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur.5 The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 946.6
Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the
sale was made in good faith and that in purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio
Borromeo's title. Further, the parties were in pari delicto. Since the sale was made
during the five-year prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public domain and
the proper party to institute reversion proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor
General.7
The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that the deed of
sale was presented for Registration after the five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was
ministerial on its part to register the deed.8
The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense because the
prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the property.9
The Regional Trial Court10 of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur narrowed down the issues
to the following:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late Eusebio Borromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property within the prohibitory period is valid
or binding.11

The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action.12 Also, the heirs of Borromeo did not have a right of action because they were
unable to establish their status as heirs of the late Eusebio Borromeo.13 They may have
declared themselves the legal heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, but they did not present
evidence to prove their allegation.14 Further, the determination of their rights to
succession must be established in special proceedings.15
The trial court also ruled that "[t]he sale was null and void because it was within the five
(5) year prohibitionary [sic] period"16 under the Public Land Act.17 The defense of
indefeasibility of title was unavailing because the title to the property stated that it was
"subject to the provisions of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124" 18 of the Public Land
Act.19 Since the property was sold within the five-year prohibitory period, such transfer
"result[ed] in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public
domain."20
As to the defense of in pari delicto, the trial court ruled against its
applicability,21 citing Egao v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division).22
The rule of pari delicto non oritur action (where two persons are equally at fault neither
party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of exceptions and does not apply
to an inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act, when
its enforcement or application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the
grantee's right to the land under the homestead law.23 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court further held that since the sale was null and void, no title passed from
Eusebio Borromeo to Eliseo Maltos.24 The dispositive portion of the trial court's
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the complaint under consideration is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.25
On appeal, the heirs of Borromeo argued that they were able to prove their status as
heirs through the testimony of their mother, Norberta Borromeo. 26
The heirs of Borromeo also argued that the trial court should have ordered the "revival
of [Original Certificate of Title] No. P-9053 in the name of the Heirs of EUSEBIO
BORROMEO."27
The Court of Appeals28 reversed the Decision of the trial court and held that since
Eusebio Borromeo sold his property within the five-year prohibitory period, the property
should revert to the state.29 However, the government has to file an action for reversion
because "reversion is not automatic."30 While there is yet no action for reversion
instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General, the property should be returned to the
heirs of Borromeo.31 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of
the court a quo in Civil Case No. 946 is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is entered
(1) ordering Appellee ELISEO MALTOS to reconvey the property subject matter of this
litigation to Appellants upon the refund by the latter to Appellee ELISEO MALTOS the
sum of P36,863.00, all expenses for the reconveyance to be borne by the buyer,
ELISEO MALTOS, herein Appellee and (2) ordering the Register of Deeds of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur to cancel TCT No. T-5477 and revive OCT No. P-9053.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished! the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for its
information and appropriate action and to inform this court within a period of thirty (30)
days from receipt hereof of the action done under the premises.
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis supplied)
The Maltos Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that since the
prohibition on transfers of property is provided by law, only the heirs of Borromeo
should be punished.33 Punishment, in this case, would come in the form of preventing
the heirs of Borromeo from re-acquiring the land.34 Instead, the land should revert back
to the state.35 The Maltos Spouses also prayed that they be reimbursed for the
improvements they introduced on the land.36 Assuming that they would be found to be
also at fault, the principle of in pari delicto should apply. 37
The Court of Appeals38 denied the Motion for Reconsideration,39 reasoning that it could
not rule on the issue of who between the parties had the better right to the
property.40 Also, it was the government who should decide whether the heirs of
Borromeo "should retain ownership of the land."41 With regard to the applicability of the
in pari delicto doctrine, the Court of Appeals held that in pari delicto does not apply in
cases where its application will violate the policy of the state. 42
On May 10, 2006, the Maltos Spouses |filed a Petition 43 for Review before this court,
questioning the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
77142.44
This court, in a Resolution45 dated July 5, 2006, required the heirs of Borromeo to file
their Comment.
The heirs of Borromeo filed their Comment,46 which was noted by this court in a
Resolution47 dated September 25, 2006. In the same Resolution, this court required the
Maltos Spouses to file their Reply.48
In a Resolution dated March 28, 2007, this court required Attys. Ma. Cherell L. De
Castro and Gener C. Sansaet, counsels for the Maltos Spouses, to show cause why
they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for their failure to file a Reply. They were also
required to comply with the Resolution dated September 25, 2006. 50
Counsels for the Maltos Spouses filed a] Compliance,51 together with the Reply.52 In a
Resolution53 dated August 15, 2007, this court noted and accepted the Compliance,
and also noted the Reply.
I
The Maltos Spouses argue that the heirs of Borromeo did not present evidence to
prove that they are indeed the heirs of Eusebio Borromeo. The heirs of Borromeo did
not present the death certificate of Eusebio Borromeo, the marriage certificate of
Eusebio Borromeo and Norberta Borromeo, or any of the birth certificates of the
children of Eusebio.54 While Norberta Borromeo and two of her children testified,55 their
testimonies should be considered as self-serving.56 The Maltos Spouses cite Article
17257 of the Family Code, which enumerates how filiation may be established. 58
The Maltos Spouses also contest the Court of Appeals' ruling stating that they did not
rebut the testimonies of the heirs of Borromeo because they continuously argued that
the heirs of Borromeo were unable to prove their status as heirs. 59
The Maltos Spouses further argue that it was error for the Court of Appeals not to apply
the in pari delicto rule, considering that the sale violated Section 118 60 of the Public
Land Act.61 Since both parties are at fault, it follows that Article 1412 62 of the Civil Code
applies.63
In addition, the Maltos Spouses pray for the reimbursement of the value of the
improvements on the property to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the heirs of
Borromeo.64 The Maltos Spouses enumerate the following circumstances to show why
they should be reimbursed:
a. EUSEBIO has already long received and enjoyed the amount of the purchase price
of the subject land from petitioners.
b. The value of the purchase price of PHP36,863.00 paid in 1983 have since then
greatly depreciated. If petitioners had deposited that money in bank or loaned it to
another person instead of purchasing EUSEBIO's property, it would have at least
earned some interest. However, the Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the
return of the purchase price would be sufficient compensation to the petitioners.
c. The value of the improvements introduced by petitioners on the subject property is
much greater than the purchase price that they initially paid on the land. Petitioners
estimate the value of the improvements, including hundreds of various fruit-bearing
trees and four residential houses, to be at least PHP900,000.00. Because of these
improvements, not only can respondents sell the land at a much higher price, they can
even sell the improvements and profit from them. It would be the height of injustice if all
the petitioners would receive in turning over the subject property to the respondents is
the purchase price that was previously paid EUSEBIO under the deed of
sale.65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, the heirs of Borromeo argue that the testimonies of Norberta
Borromeo and Susan Borromeo Morales on their relationship to Eusebio Borromeo
were not refuted by the Malios Spouses. Thus, they were able to prove their status as
heirs.66
The heirs of Borromeo also argue that the in pari delicto rule is not applicable because
in Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al.,67 this court stated that the in
pari delicto rule does not apply if its application will have the effect of violating public
policy.68
With regard to the claim for reimbursements, the heirs of Borromeo argue that the
Maltos Spouses did not raise their claim for reimbursement in their Answer to the
Complaint. They are now barred from claiming reimbursement since this was not raised
at the first instance.69
Based on the arguments of the parties, the issues for resolution are:
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the trial court and
ordering the reconveyance of the property from petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and
Rosita Maltos to respondents heirs of Eusebio Borromeo;cralawlawlibrary
Second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine of in pari
delicto; and
Finally, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners Spouses Eliseo
Maltos and Rosita Maltos are not entitled to reimbursement for the improvements they
introduced on the land.
II
The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under homestead or free
patent is provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance1 of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction
of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or
crops on the land may be mortgaged] or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.
The reason for prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of properties covered by
patent or grant was explained in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Viray.70
In Metropolitan Bank, Edgardo D. Viray and his wife contracted several loans with
Metrobank which they failed to pay.71 Metrobank filed a Complaint for sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court in Manila.72 In 1982, during the pendency of the case,
free patents over three parcels of land were issued in favor of Viray. 73 The Complaint
for sum of money was decided in 1983 in favor of Metrobank.74 In 1984, the trial court
issued a writ of execution over the parcels of land.75 An auction sale was held, and
Metrobank emerged as the winning bidder.76 Viray filed an action for annulment of
sale.77 This court ruled that the auction sale was made within the five-year prohibitory
period78 and explained that:
[T]he main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of homestead is to preserve and keep
in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to
him so he may have a place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and a
useful member of the society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation of a
family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster,
families as the foundation of society, and thus promote general welfare. . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its violation gives rise
to the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land and its improvements to
the government at the instance of the latter. The provision that "nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to that expiration of the five-year
period" is mandatory and any sale made in violation of such provision is void and
produces no effect whatsoever, just like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not
within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to
preserve.79 (Citations omitted)
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,80 Josefina L. Morato applied for free patent over a
parcel which was granted.81 Morato mortgaged and leased a portion of the land within
the five-year prohibitory period.82 Later on, it would also be discovered that Morato's
land formed part of Calauag Bay.83 The Republic filed a Complaint for cancellation of
title and reversion of the parcel of land.84 This court held that "lease" and "mortgage"
were encumbrances on the parcel of land.85 This court also discussed the policy behind
the five-year prohibitory period:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.
Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of
the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that
five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in line with
the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that
such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase
by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of
the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to
him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold,
that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the
conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly
deducible from the terms of the statute.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided under Section 124 of
the Public Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract
made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and
eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and
twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this. Act shall be unlawful and null
and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the
grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the
State.
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title already vested
in Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
the sale was made within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause
to revert the property in favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion
of the property in favor of the state in view of the limitation imposed by Section 101 that
an action for reversion must first be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.
III
The doctrine of in pari delicto non oritur actio is inapplicable when public policy will be
violated.
constitute criminal offenses.
The in pari delicto rule is provided under Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code.
Article 1411 pertains to acts that constitute criminal offenses, while Article 1412
pertains to acts that do not These provisions state:
ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto,
they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover,
the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a
crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one
may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what
he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's
undertaking;cralawlawlibrary
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has
given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfilment of what has been promised him.
The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any
obligation to comply with his promise.
Santos involved the sale of a parcel of land within the five-year prohibitory period.88 The
Roman Catholic Church raised the defense of in pari delicto.89 It was also argued by
the Rornan Catholic Church that the effect of the sale would be the reversion of the]
property to the state.90 This court held that:
Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any acquisition, conveyance or
transfer executed in violation of any of its provisions shall be null and void and shall
produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the
reversion of the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has been applied
by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to
be guilty of effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. But we
doubt if these principles can now be invoked considering the philosophy and the policy
behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as
known here and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It recognizes
certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs counter
to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa
case, "This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, [']whenever public
policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the
transaction[']"
The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here
appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the
law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-
in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but
because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires
that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to
her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law
is predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any
citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve." We are, therefore,
constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present action it being in furtherance
of this fundamental aim of our homestead law.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The non-application of the in pari delicto rule where public policy would be violated has
also been applied in other cases.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,92 this court held that in pari delicto "is not [applicable to
[e]jectment [c]ases"93 and cited Drilon v. Gaurana,94 which discussed the policy behind
ejectment cases:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that,
regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording
this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace
and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the
reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to
those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort
to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to
assert their claims.95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court elucidated that:
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between
squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari
delicto would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another
squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by
the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then
stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases or
actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent. Even the owner who has title over
the disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of
his property. The owner must go to court.96 (Citation omitted)
In Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.,97 Carlos Loria asked Ludolfo Muñoz, Jr. "to advance
[P]2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a [P]50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in
Guinobatan."98 Loria informed Muñoz that the project would be awarded to Sunwest
Construction and Development Corporation, and Sunwest would subcontract to
Muñoz.99 Muñoz agreed to Loria's proposal.100 When the river-dredging project was
finished, Loria did not return the P2,000,000.00 despite Muñoz's demand. 101 Complaint
for sum of money.102 Loria raised the argument that Muñoz "should not be allowed to
recover the money"103 since they were in pari delicto.104 This court held that under the
principle of unjust enrichment, the sum of money should be returned. 105 In so ruling, this
court cited Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.106 where it was explained that:
. . . the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted
exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy. In this
jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that principle of the law which holds that
no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to hi injurious to the
public or against the public good."ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the
State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other meins, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him." It is wel I to note that Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the
Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden
threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the
sway and dominance of justice."107ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to who between
the parties have a better right to possess the subject parcel of land. This issue was
addressed in Santos:
What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the
possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the
homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the
purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no
more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants.
Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee and,
therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee during
and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the State. 108 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
In Binayug v. Ugaddan,109 which involved the sale of two properties covered by a
homestead patent,110 this court cited jurisprudence showing that in cases involving the
sale of a property covered by the five-year prohibitory period, the property should be
returned to the grantee.111
Applying the ruling in Santos and Binayug, this court makes it clear that petitioners
have no better right to remain in possession of the property against respondents.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that while there is yet no action for
reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the property should be conveyed
by petitioners to respondents.
III
Petitioners' argument that respondents failed to establish their status as heirs is belied
by their admissions during trial and in their pleadings. Petitioners t know the identity of
Eusebio Borromeo's wife. As quoted in the trial court's Decision, petitioners alleged in
their Answer that:
[I]t was the late Eusebio Borromeo and his wife who came along in Bayugan 2, San enunciated in the homestead law, the loss of the products realized by the defendants
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, requesting the said defendants to purchase their land and the value of the necessary improvements made by them on the land should not be
because they badly need money and notwithstanding the fact that they have a little excepted from the application of the said rule because no cause or reason can be cited
amount and out of pity bought the said land.112ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary to justify an exception. It has been held that the rule of in pari delicto is inapplicable
only where the same violates a well-established public policy.
In the Reply, respondents alleged:
....
The allegation that the late Eusebio Borrjomeo and his wife went to Bayugan II, San
We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should be declared to
Francisco, Agusan del Sur in order to sell the land to the defendant Eliseo Maltos has
have lost and forfeited the value of the products gathered from the land, and so should
no factual basis, the truth of the matter is that the late Eusebio Borromeo, together with
the defendants lose the value of the necessary improvements that they have made
defendant Eliseo Maltos went to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat to secure the signature of
thereon.121ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the wife.113
In Arsenal, the property covered by a homestead patent had been sold to Suralta in
In addition, when petitioner Eliseo Maltos was presented in court, he identified the
1957,122 while the Complaint was filed before the trial court in 1974.123 The case was
signatures of the witnesses on the deed of sale as the signatures of Eusebio
decided by this court in 1986.124 Thus, Suralta had been in possession of the property
Borromeo's children, namely, Susan, Ana, and Nicolas Borromeo. 114
for approximately 17 years before a Complaint was filed. This court held that:
Respondents' allegation that they are the heirs of Borromeo is admitted by petitioners.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that "the fact that Appellants [referring to The value of any improvements made on the land and the interests on the purchase
respondents] are the spouse and children of the late EUSEBIO remains unrebutted." 115 price are compensated by the fruits the respondent Suralta and his heirs received from
their long possession of the homestead.125ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IV
Angeles and Arsenal both involved the sale of a parcel of land covered by a homestead
patent within the five-year prohibitory period. These cases also involved the introduction
With regard to the claim for reimbursement, respondents argue that it was not raised as
of improvements on the parcel of land by the buyer.
a counterclaim in the Answer to the Complaint.
Restating the rulings in Angeles and Arsenal, this court finds that while the rule on in
During trial, petitioner Eliseo Maltos testified that when he entered the land, there were
pari delicto does not apply policy, if its effect is to violate public policy it is applicable
around 100 trees, including coconut trees and a few banana trees. He then planted
with regard to value of the improvements introduced by petitioner Eliseo Maltos.
additional coconut trees which, at the time of the trial, were already bearing
Petitioners had been in possession of the land for 20 years before the heirs of
fruit.116 Petitioner Eliseo Maltos' testimony was not rebutted by respondents.
Borromeo filed a Complaint. The expenses incurred by petitioners in introducing
improvements on the land for which they seek reimbursement should already be
The general rule is that "[a] compulsory counterclaim . . . not set up shall be
compensated by the fruits they received from the improvements.
barred."117 Further, the computation of the value of the improvements on the land
entails findings of fact.
V
In any case, the Court of Appeals did not err when it stated in its Resolution dated April
7, 2006 that: Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:

With respect to Appellees' claim for the reimbursement of the improvements on the land SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
in question, they are hereby declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the
necessary improvements that they made thereon in the same manner that Appellants officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of Commonwealth of the
should lose the value of the products gathered by the Appellees from the said land. 118 Philippines.

The Court of Appeals cited Angeles, et at v. Court of Appeals, et al.119 and Arsenal v. The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed
Intermediate Appellate Court.120 In Angeles, this court discussed that: of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain." 126

The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and the Office of
The question that now poses is whether the return of the value of the products gathered
the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for reversion.
from the land by the defendants and the expenses incurred in the construction of the
dike—all useful and necessary expenses—should be ordered to be returned by the
In Villacorta v. Ulanday,127 defendant-appellee Vicente Ulanday admitted that his
defendants to the plaintiffs. While we believe that the rule of in pari delicto should not
purchase of a parcel of land covered by a homestead patent was made within the five-
apply to the sale of the homestead, because such sale is contrary to the public policy
year prohibitory period, but argued that since the sale was in violation of law, 128 the
property should automatically revert to the state.129 This court held that reversion was
not automatic, and government must file an appropriate action so that the land may be
reverted to the state.130
Ortega v. Tan131 involved the sale and mortgage of a parcel of land covered by a free
patent.132 The series of transactions for the sale and mortgage of the property had been
initiated within the five-year prohibitory period but was finalized after the prohibitory
period.133 This court held that the sale and mortgage violated Section 118 of the Public
Land Act and that reversion was proper.134 This court also clarified that:
[Reversion] is not automatic. The government has to take action to cancel the patent
and the certificate of title in order that the land involved may be reverted to it.
Correspondingly, any new transaction would be subject to whatever steps the
government may take for the reversion to it.135 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Alvarico v. Solau136 involved a miscellaneous sales application over a parcel of land by
Fermina Lopez.137 Subsequently, Lopez executed a deed of self-adjudication and
transfer of rights in favor of Amelita Sola.138 The Bureau of Lands approved the transfer
of rights, and title was issued in Sola's name.139 Castorio Alvarico then filed an action
for reconveyance, claiming that the parcel of land was donated to him.140 He also
alleged that Sola acquired the property in bad faith.141 This court held that Alvarico's
allegation of bad faith was not supported by evidence and that in any case, "only the
State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec[tion] 101 of the Public Land
Act."142 This court restated Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
[A] private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would
have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title
issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of
the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do
so. Since [the] title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a
matter between the grantor and the grantee.143 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The rule in Alvarico was cited in Cawis, et al. v. Hon. Cerilles, et al.144 In Cawis, the
validity of a sales patent and original certificate of title over a parcel of land in Baguio
was questioned.145 This court denied the Petition146 and ruled that the Complaint was
actually a reversion suit, which can be filed only by the Office of the Solicitor General or
a person acting in its stead.147
It was also discussed in Cawis that:
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the
certificate of title an|l the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State|
This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated asj an annulment suit or a
cancellation suit.148
We clarify that the remedy of reversion is not the same as the remedy of declaration of
nullity of free patents and certificate of title. In reversion, the "allegations in the
complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land[,]"149 while in an action for
the declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title, the allegations would
include "plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of [the] free patent
and certificate of title[.]"150
Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the
state, it is proper that the action be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, being the
real party-in-interest.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic. Section 29
of the Public Land Act provides:
SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey or encumber his
rights to any person, corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act to
purchase agricultural public lands, provided such conveyance or encumbrance does
not affect any right or interest of the Government in the land: And provided, further,
That the transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due and
payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall produce the
effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights to the State,
and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be
forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire
agricultural public lands under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the necessary
qualifications. (Emphasis supplied)
In Francisco v. Rodriguez, et al,151 this court differentiated reversion under Sections 29
and 101 of the Public Land Act.152 This court explained that reversion under Section 29
is self-operative, unlike Section 101 which requires the Office of the Solicitor General to
institute reversion proceedings.153 Also, Section 101 applies in cases where "title has
already vested in the individual[.]"154 The Director of Lands sought to execute the
Decision in Francisco v. Rodriguez which petitioner Ursula Francisco opposed, arguing
that only 29 hectares were reverted to the state since she was in possession of the
remaining four hectares.155 This court held that the entire property reverted to the
state.156 This court also explained why Francisco v. Rodriguez was covered by Section
29 and not Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a dummy in the acquisition of the
land and selling the same without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, plaintiff-appellant herself [referring to Ursula Francisco] has
eliminated the very source (Sales Application) of her claim to Lot No. 595, as a
consequence of which, she cannot later assert any right or interest thereon. This is the
imperative import of the pronouncements in G.R. No. L-8263 and in G.R. No. L-15605
that the invalidity of the conveyance by plaintiff-appellant "produced as a consequence
the reversion of the property with all rights thereto to the State." As a matter of fact,
Section 29 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains that
any sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall be null and void and shall produce the effect
of annulling the acquisition and reverting property and all rights thereto to the State,
and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be
forfeited." . . . .
In fact, even if a sales application were already given due course by the Director of
Lands, the applicant is not thereby conferred any right over the land covered by the
application. It is the award made by the Director to the applicant (if he is the highest
bidder) that confers upon him a certain right over the land, namely, "to take possession
of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." It is at this
stage, when the award is made, that the land can be considered "disposed of by the
Government," since the aforestated right of the applicant has the effect of withdrawing
the land from the public domain that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. . . . However, the disposition is merely provisional
because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements prescribed by law
before . . . . any patent is issued. After the requisites of the law are complied with by the
applicant to the satisfaction of the Director [of] Lands, the patent is issued. It is then
that the land covered by the application may be considered "permanently disposed of
by the Government."157 (Citations omitted)
In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio
Borromeo. This shows that he already had title to the property when he sold it to
petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Section 101 of the Public Land Act applies.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is denied, and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77142 are AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the appropriate
institution of a case for reversion.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for its
appropriate action with respect to the reversion of the land in question.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
AURELIA NARCISE, GLORIA A. DELA CRUZ, MARITESS O. GARCIA, PHILIP
FALCON, ENRICO M. VITUG, LYNETTE C. PONTRERAS, BONIFACIO
BARRAMEDA, RAMON S. MORADA, MANUEL G. VIOLA, ZENAIDA LANUZA,
CIRILO G. SALTO, TEODORO DEL ROSARIO, NANCY G. INSIGNE, MELANIE G.
VIANA, ROMEO TICSAY, AMY J. FRANCISCO, MARIE J. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA
LANUZA, MIGUELITO B. MARTINEZ, APOLONIO SANTOS, MARIVIC TAN, JANE
CLOR DILEMA, VALENTINO DILEMA, JOSE L. PANGAN, ANTONIA M.
MANGELEN, IMELDA MANALASTAS, TEODORICO N. ANDRADE, AIDA L. CRUZ,
MANUEL YAMBOT, JAIME SERDENA, ARIEL PALACIOS, EVE BOLNEO,
LIBETINE MODESTO, MA. AILEEN VERDE, BENNY ILAGAN, MICHELLE
ROMANA, DANILO VILLANUEVA, LEO NALUGON, ROSSANA MARASIGAN,
NELIE BINAY AND ISABELITA MENDOZA, Petitioners, v. VALBUECO,
INC., Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated December 21, 2010 and Resolution2 dated May 11,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89616.
Facts
On March 8, 2005, respondent Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment of the Free
Patents, Certificates of Title and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 8144, 3 against
petitioners Narcise, et al., the Department of Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Register of Deeds of Bataan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City,
Branch 1.
In said Complaint, respondent alleged that it is the possessor of the subject lots in an
actual, peaceful, adverse and peaceful possession since 1970. 4 Respondent averred
that from 1977 until 1999, Original Certificates of Title, Free Patents and Transfer
Certificates of Title covering the lots in question were issued in the name of petitioners.5
Instead of filing their respective Answer, petitioners filed several Motions to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of cause of action, failure to state cause of action, defect in the
certificate of non-forum shopping and prescription.
On December 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order,6 granting petitioners' motions. The
RTC ruled that the instant case is an action for reversion because petitioners are not
qualified to be issued said free patents. As such, the land must revert back to the State.
Thus, it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) who is the real party-in-interest, and
not the respondent. The dispositive portion of the same
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let the instant complaint be dismissed and the
motion to declare some defendants in default is necessarily denied.
SO ORDERED.7
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its
Order8 dated March 7, 2017.
Undaunted, respondent filed an appeal9 before the CA. In a Decision10 dated
December 21, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA
maintained that respondent alleged all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of
the subject free patents. The fallo thereof reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 1 dated December 7, 2006
and March 7, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 which was denied in a
Resolution13 dated May 11, 2011.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners interposed the following grounds for review:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
Whether or not the instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case for
annulment of free patents and certificates of title;
II.
Whether or not respondent is the real party-in-interest; and
III.
Whether or not the instant case had already prescribed.14
Our Ruling
The petition is denied.
An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to
cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title,
including the transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the
same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation.15 In cancelling and
nullifying such title, it restores the public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to
private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action is filed by
the OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code. 16
On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also
seeks for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is
granted, it does not operate to revert the property back to the State, but to its lawful
owner. In such action, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that
the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence,
the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.17
Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of
ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion,
the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed
land, while in an action for annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent
allegations deal with plaintiffs ownership of the contested land prior to the issuance of
the same as well as defendant's fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these
documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. 18
A careful perusal of respondent's complaint reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3. That the herein plaintiff has been in the actual, peaceful, adverse, continuous and
peaceful possession since sometime in 1970 and up to the present time, by itself
and its predecessor-in-interest, some of which it acquired by transfer of rights, claims,
interest as evidence [sic] by the documents x x x and the rest by occupation and
planting of root crops and other including trees x x x.
4. That the plaintiff and its workers and employees of its ranches and the cultivation
and planting of different root crops and trees were always in the premises since 1970
or thereabouts, and their presence were never disturbed nor molested by anybody until
sometime in the year 2000 x x x.19 (Emphasis ours)
In this view, We hold that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles. The
allegations in the complaint show that respondent asserts its ownership over the
subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable
property by possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted.20 The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must
be one under claim of title or adverse to or in prescription.21
On this note, acquisitive prescription may either be extraordinary, which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years,22 or ordinary, which requires
possession in good faith and with a just title for a period of ten years.23
Without going into the merits of the case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint
sufficiently show that respondent claims its ownership right by expounding on its
uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of at least 35 years. Also,
respondent's claim of its possession in a public, peaceful and uninterrupted manner
constitutes an allegation of ownership by acquisitive prescription.
Being an action for annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent who is the real
party-in-interest for it is the one claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the
registered owner.24
Moreover, We agree with the CA when it declared that petitioners' argument of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is misguided.
It must be noted that the trial court has jurisdiction over an action of an owner of a piece
of land to recover it, if the Director of Lands, thinking that it is still disposable public
land, grants a free patent to the one who has occupancy and cultivation.25 The
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, contrary to petitioners' claim, covers those issues
between two or more applicants for a free patent, 26 which is not the case here. Here,
respondent claims to be the owner of the subject properties prior to the issuance of the
patents and the corresponding certificates of title. Thus, the trial court has jurisdiction to
hear the case.
Lastly, the defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature which could not be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion
to dismiss. Such issue must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein
both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and
defenses.27
Verily, the CA did not err in considering the instant case as an action for annulment of
patents and titles.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
December 21, 2010 and the Resolution dated May 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89616 are AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 218418
REPUBLIC OF THE PIDLIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION IV, MANILA, Petitioner
vs.
THE HEIRS OF MEYNARDO CABRERA, as herein represented by MEYNARDO
CABRERA, JR. and ALMA RODRIGUEZ CABRERA, THE HEIRS OF
CONSOLACION DIMACULANGAN CABRERA, as herein represented by
ALEXANDER CABRERA, MANIBI CABRERA, MILAGROS CABRERA GARA, AND
RAUL CABRERA, JACKSON CINCO DY, LORETA AGBAYANI, GLORIA SORIANO,
CRIS CALMA, NORA LIWANAG and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL
MINDORO, Respondent
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court against the Decision2 dated July 18, 2014 (Assailed Decision) and
Resolution3 dated May 20, 2015 (Assailed Resolution) in CAG. R. CV No. 98120
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) Eleventh Division and Special Former Eleventh
Division, respectively.
The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem from an appeal from the Decision4 dated
December 5, 2005 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 43 (RTC) in Civil Case No. C-358, dismissing the complaint for cancellation of
free patent and reversion filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) against the
Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera (Heirs of Meynardo), the Heirs of Consolacion
Dimaculangan Cabrera (Heirs of Consolacion), Jackson Cinco Dy (Dy), Loreta
Agbayani (Agbayani), Gloria Soriano (Soriano), Cris Calma (Calma), Nora Liwanag
(Liwanag), and the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro (ROD) (collectively,
Respondents).5
The Facts
Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free Patent concerning an
8,0726 square-meter parcel of land situated in Pining, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. 7 In said
application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in possession of such parcel of land
since 1936, through his predecessor-in-interest Marcelo Cabrera.8
In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor of
Meynardo, covering two (2) lots denominated as: (i) Lot 1 with an area of 3,591 square
meters, and (ii) Lot 2, with an area of 4,481 square meters. 9 On the basis of said
patent, the ROD issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-132 (P-9193)
covering both lots in Meynardo's name.10
Thereafter, a 2,445-square-meter portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A11 ) was transferred to
Consolacion.12 Thus, on April 6, 1982, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16580
covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion's name.13 Later still, Consolacion sold
portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers namely: Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and
Liwanag.14
Learning of the issuance of TCT No. 16580, Jose and Leticia De Castro (De Castros),
claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A, filed before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a petition urging DENR to conduct an
investigation to determine Lot 1-A's land classification status.15
Consequently, in the DENR Final Investigation Report16 (DENR Final Report) dated
November 9, 1994 issued by Erwin D. Talento of the DENR Land Management Office
(LMO), Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas
Properties), was declared null and void for having been issued over land forming part of
the public domain. The pertinent portions of the DENR Final Report read:
Sensing that they don't have any chance in the court to prove their better right to
occupy and possess [Lot 1-A] x xx the [De Castros] addressed their petitions to the
DENR basing their claim on the weight of a certification of [the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)] x x x. The [De Castros] are now seeking
administrative remedies for the issue which they have already brought to the attention
of the court and wherein they have failed to prove their priority right to occupy and
possess [Lot 1-A]. Granting that [the Roxas Properties constitute] forest land and [Free
Patent No. 516197] issued in favor of [Meynardo] be (sic) rendered null and void [ab]
initio, it (sic) doesn't warrant that they have better right to possess and occupy [Lot 1-A]
because [Meynardo, through his predecessors-in-interest] have entered [Lot 1-A] since
the year 1943 and have exercised their ownership over the same x x x.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the petition of [the De
Castros] be dismissed x x x and appropriate legal action be instituted for the
cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197 issued in favor of Meynardo x x x for the same
covers land of the public domain which is certified by the proper authority as public
forest.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter, Antonio G. Principe, the DENR Regional Executive Director of Region IV,
issued an Order18 dated August 8, 1997 declaring Free Patent No. 516197 null and
void.
Later, on November 15, 1999, the Republic filed against the Respondents a complaint
(Complaint) for the annulment and/or cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No.
RP-132 (P-9193), and TCT No. 16580. The Complaint also prayed for the reversion of
the Roxas Properties in the State's favor.19
The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report; and (ii) NAMRIA
certifications dated January 31, 1994, February 1, 1994, and October 3, 1994, all
stating that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) had been reclassified as forest
land as early as November 24, 1949. The statements in these documents were, in turn,
based on the inscriptions appearing on Land Classification Map No. 209 (LC Map 209)
dated March 6, 1924 covering the Roxas Properties. The Republic reasoned that while
LC Map 209 indicates that the parcels of land thereunder were classified as alienable
and disposable at the time it was prepared, a subsequent annotation made thereon
indicates that they were reclassified as forest land sometime thereafter, and had thus
become inalienable.20
In their respective answers, the Respondents averred, among others, that: (i) Lot 1-A
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as evidenced by
the original statements appearing on LC Map 209; (ii) the annotations appearing on LC
Map 209 do not serve as sufficient proof of reversion; and (iii) the land area which had
been purportedly reclassified as forest land was not properly identified since the
Republic failed to present the technical description corresponding thereto. 21 In addition
to these common assertions, respondents Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, and Liwanag further
averred that they acquired portions of Lot 1-A from Consolacion in good faith, and
have, since then, been in actual, exclusive, open, and continuous possession of their
respective portions as owners.22
On December 5, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
The RTC found that the Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas Properties
(including Lot 1-A) have been reclassified as forest land. Citing Republic v.
Animas,24 (Animas) the RTC held that in order to prove reversion of alienable and
disposable land to forest land, a positive government act evincing the same is
necessary.25
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in the RTC's
Order dated October 18, 2011.26
CA Proceedings
Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case to the CA via petition for review under Rule
42, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 (Appeal).
In the Appeal, the Republic argued that the Court's ruling in Animas cannot be applied
to the present case, since, in the former, the fact sought to be established was the
classification of forest land to alienable and disposable land, and not the other way
around, as in this case.27 Further, the Republic averred that fraud must have
necessarily attended the issuance of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 and
TCT No. 16580, owing to the status of the Roxas Properties as forest land. 28
On July 18, 2014, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision dismissing the Appeal. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
December 5, 2005 of the [RTC] x x x is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.29
According to the CA, the Public Land Act vests the power to classify (and reclassify)
lands of the public domain with the President. On this score, the CA held that the
annotations appearing on LC Map 209 anent the alleged reversion of the Roxas
Properties deserve scant consideration, as they do not appear to be based on any
executive directive. Consequently, the NAMRIA certifications and DENR Final Report
relied upon by the Republic are insufficient to sustain its cause, as they are, in turn,
based solely on said annotations.30
The Republic filed an MR, which was denied by the CA in its Assailed Resolution dated
May 20, 2015. The Republic received a copy of the Assailed Resolution on June 8,
2015.31
On June 19, 2015, the Republic filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review, praying for an additional period of twenty-five (25) days from June 23, 2015, or
until July 18, 2015 within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. Subsequently,
the Republic filed a Second Motion for Extension, praying for a five (5)-day extension.32
Finally, on July 22, 2015, the Republic filed the present Petition, to which Respondents
filed their Compliance and Comment dated December 16, 2016. 33
Thereafter, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion dated May 28, 2017, adopting
the Petition as its reply to Respondents' Compliance and Comment. 34
The Issue
The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the CA erred when it held that a
positive act of government is necessary to evince the reclassification of land from
alienable and disposable to forest.
The Court's Ruling
In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court's ruling in Animas did not have the
effect of making a positive executive act a necessary requirement for the purpose of
proving the reclassification of alienable and disposable land.35 Instead, the Republic
posits that Animas affirms its right to institute reversion proceedings in instances where
portions of forest land are erroneously included within the scope of land
patents.36 Moreover, the Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State
should not be made to bear the burden of proving that the land in question constitutes
public domain (i.e., forest land).37 In any case, the Republic posits that the documentary
and testimonial evidence it had presented sufficiently proved such fact. 38
The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The CA did not err when it affirmed the
RTC Decision, as the Republic failed to establish that the Roxas Properties were
classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No. 516197 was issued.
The Republic's Petition and
Respondents ' Compliance and
Comment should be admitted in the
interest of substantial justice.
At the outset, the Court notes that the parties herein, albeit at different stages of the
proceedings, have both prayed for the relaxation of the Rules of Court (Rules).
For its part, the Republic filed two (2) motions which sought for an aggregate period of
thirty (30) days from the expiration of the initial thirty (30)-day period prescribed by the
Rules for the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. The Respondents, on the other
hand, sought the admission of their Compliance and Comment, filed more than seven
(7) months after the filing of the Petition.39
Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the lack of
evidence showing that neither the Republic's nor the Respondents' requests for
accommodation had been impelled by any ill-motive, the Court resolves to admit in the
interest of substantial justice the Republic's Petition and the Respondents' Comment
with Compliance.
The Court's ruling in Animas does not
apply to the present case.
The Republic's Petition primarily proceeds from the supposition that in ruling in favor of
Respondents, the RTC and the CA erroneously relied on Animas.
In Animas, the Republic filed an action for reversion against respondent therein,
claiming that the Free Patent issued in the latter's favor covered forest
land.1âwphi1 The Court of First Instance dismissed the Republic's action on the ground
that the original certificate of title covering said land had become indefeasible, the same
having been issued more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the Republic's action.
Hence, the issue brought before the Court in Animas was whether the lapse of said one
(1)-year period had the effect of precluding the State from initiating reversion
proceedings to recover land which had been unlawfully registered, either through fraud
or oversight. Resolving the issue, the Court held that public land fraudulently or
erroneously included in the scope of patents or certificates of title may be recovered by
the State through reversion proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.
While the Animas ruling upholds the State's right to seek reversion with respect to
fraudulently or erroneously registered lands, it does not, in any manner, lay down the
facts that must be established for an action for reversion to prosper. Undoubtedly, the
RTC and CA's reliance on the Animas ruling is misplaced.
Nevertheless, such erroneous reliance on Animas, as will be discussed below,
does not advance the Republic's cause, since the principle which serves as basis
for the decisions of the RTC and CA remains correct, albeit attributed to the
wrong case.
The power to classifY and reclassify
land lies solely with the Executive
Department.
The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic foundation of the State's
property regime,40 and has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions;41 it espouses that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
that, as a consequence thereof, any asserted right of ownership over land necessarily
traces back to the State.42
At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into five (5) categories - forest lands, agricultural lands, timber lands, mineral
lands, and national parks. The Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v.
Republic,43 instructs that in the absence of any prior classification by the State,
unclassified lands of the public domain assume the category of forest lands not open to
disposition.44
In turn, the classification of unclassified lands of the public domain, and the
reclassification of those previously classified under any of the categories set forth in the
1987 Constitution (such as the Roxas Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 14145 dated November 7, 1936, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Sections
6 and 7 thereof provide:
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation - the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, 46 and is exercised by the latter
through the President, or such other persons vested with authority to exercise the same
on his behalf.47
Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such acts,
effected without executive authority, are void, and essentially ultra vires.
In reversion proceedings, the State
bears the burden of proving that the
property in question was inalienable
at the time it was decreed or
adjudicated in favor of the defendant.
A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant confirms title to
real property. In this proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership.48 Accordingly, the applicant is bound to establish,
through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered had been
declared alienable or disposable through a positive act of the State. 49
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to
revert land to the mass of the public domain;50 it is proper when public land is
fraudulently awarded and disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations, 51 or
when a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight,
lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they form part of the
public domain.52
Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable
decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that the land previously
decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be
owned by private individuals. The Court's ruling in Republic v. Development Resources
Corporation53 is instructive:
Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles through the
cancellation of the original title and the others that emanate from it, the State bears a
heavy burden of proving the ground for its action. x x x54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Republic v. Espinosa55 (Espinosa), the Court held that the dismissal of the
Republic's action for reversion is proper since the Republic failed to establish that the
land subject thereof was classified as forest land at the time the cadastral decree in
favor of the defendant was issued:
[I]t is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently
issued OCT No. 191-N x x x. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding,
Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the
applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable
and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
xxxx
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in
Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully
included in the certificate of title because it is of the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on
the State to prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the
time it was decreed to Espinosa. To reiterate, there is no burden on [the present owner]
to prove that the property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it
is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom [the present owner] derive[s] her
title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land
considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion
proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion
of the property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent
with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. 56 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Hence, to resolve this Petition, the Court must determine whether the documentary and
testimonial evidence offered by the Republic are sufficient to sustain its cause.
The Complaint should be dismissed as
the Republic failed to show that the
Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A)
were classified as forest land at the
time Free Patent No. 516197 was
issued in Meynardo's favor.
To recall, the Republic presented the following pieces of evidence to support its
complaint for reversion: (i) DENR Final Report; (ii) NAMRIA certifications; and (iii) LC
Map 209. However, these documents, whether taken individually or collectively, do not
evince a positive act of reclassification by the Executive Department. As aptly stated by
the CA:
In this case, the Republic presented the [NAMRIA certifications], the [DENR Final
Report] and [LC Map 209] dated March 6, 1924, with an inscription that the [Roxas
Properties] [were] reverted x x x to the category of forest land on November 24, 1949.
However, it appears that the findings of the CENRO and the NAMRIA are based solely
on such mapping [LC Map 209] where eighteen (18) hectares, including the location
therein of the [Roxas Properties], [were] reclassified as forest land. Engineer [Mariano]
Mendez57 testified that:
xxxx
Q: So you don't have the law or the order reverting that portion of land to forest land on
November 24, 1949?
A: Except only that it is a swamp land. And it is shown here in our map, sir.
xxxx
PROS. MARCO:
x x x [W]hat is the basis, if any, of you (sic) in declaring that this portion of land was
reverted back from timber land to forest land on November 24, 1949?
A: Our files and records.
Q: What are these files and records?
A: As indicated in [LC Map 209].
Engineer Mendez admitted that there was no presidential order or act reverting the
classification of the subject property from alienable and disposable to forest land, thus:
Q: Did you prepare the basis of the reversion of the land from disposable to forest land
on November 24, 1949?
Even Engineer Mendez of the NAMRIA agreed that a law or proclamation is required
before a certain parcel of land is reclassified from alienable and disposable to forest
land. His insistence that because the land was (originally) swamp land that
reclassification was made (sic), is not supported by any presidential or legal
pronouncement or by practice and tradition x x x Unfortunately, the Republic failed to
present any law, presidential proclamation, order or act to prove that the subject
property was indeed within the area which is reclassified as forest land. Even an
administrative order from the Bureau of Forestry was not presented to show that the
subject property had been reclassified as forest land.58 (Additional emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The foregoing testimony, culled from the Assailed Decision, confirms that the alleged
reclassification of the Roxas Properties is bereft of basis, as it was done by Engineer
Mendez on his sole account, without any prior directive from the President, or a duly
authorized officer from the Executive Department. In fact, the annotation appearing on
LC Map 209 upon which the Republic relies does not even state upon whose authority
the alleged reclassification had been made,59 placing the annotation's validity, veracity
and worth in serious doubt.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were the basis?
A: Yes, because when I studied that, I found out that the area was a swamp land?
Q: Aside from that, that the area was a swamp land, what are your other basis?
Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A)
were classified as forest land when they were decreed in Meynardo's favor in 1971.
Thus, in accordance with the Court's ruling in Development Resources
Corporation and Espinosa, the present Petition must be, as it is hereby, denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
The Assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2014 and Resolution
dated May 20, 2015 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 are hereby AFFIRMED.

A: Nothing more, sir. As per records, that is the only basis.

SO ORDERED.

Q: Did you not research any law, decree, presidential order or act as the basis of
reverting this parcel of land to forest zone on November 24, 1949?

A: I have even decrees or law reverting certain area to forest land but not in this
particular area.

Q: So, you know that before a certain parcel of land would be reverted from alienable
and disposable to forest zone, there should be a basis for the same, like proclamation
or law. From your experience, presidential decrees?

A: Yes, sir. These are proclamation decrees regarding the reversion of certain land use.
But in this particular area, the land is swamp land.

Q: But in this particular case, did you encounter or did you see any law, executive
order, presidential proclamation declaring this parcel of land from alienable and
disposable to forest zone?

A: I have not encountered any decree or presidential proclamation or order reverting

this land to forest zone.x x x