G.R. No.
137457 - November 21, 2001 consolidated and jointly tried against accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSAURO SIA y
DICHOSO, JOHNNY BALALIO y DEZA, JIMMY PONCE y TOL and JOHN
DOE @ PEDRO MUÑOZ (at large), accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Christian Bermudez was beaten to death and the taxicab he was driving was
taken by the assailants. His lifeless body, wrapped in a carton box, was
recovered several days later in a fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. For the
felonies, the above-named accused were indicted for violation of R.A. 6539,
otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and Murder in two (2) separate
Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. Q-95-63962 for Violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law:
That on or about August 23, 1995, in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, herein accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one (1) motor
vehicle described as Toyota Tamaraw FX; Motor No. 2C-2983302; Chassis
No. CF50-0014375; Plate No. NYT-243, owned by BIENVENIDO CRUZ,
killing the driver Christian Bermudez in the process, to the damage and
prejudice of the registered owner thereof and the heirs of Christian Bermudez.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. Q-95-63963 for Murder:
That on or about 23 August 1995, in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill qualified by treachery, evident premeditation,
taking advantage of superior strength, employing means to weaken the
defense or of means of persons to insure or afford impunity, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use violence upon the person of
CHRISTIAN BERMUDEZ by beating him on the head and other parts of the
body, thereby causing his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
At the arraignment, only Johnny Balalio y Deza and Jimmy Ponce y Tol
appeared and pleaded "Not Guilty."3 The third accused, Rosauro Sia y
Dichoso, escaped from police custody while on the way to the hospital for
treatment.4 As a consequence, the two (2) cases were subsequently
Ponce only.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment against both accused imposing
upon them the supreme penalty of Death, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as principals by conspiracy of violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended and
hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Accused are likewise adjudged jointly and severally [liable] to pay to Agripina
Bermudez, the mother of the deceased Christian Bermudez the sums of:
a. P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the death of Christian Bermudez;
b. P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses incurred in connection with the
death of Christian; and
c. P3,307,199.60 (2/3 x [80-27] x 300 per day x 26 days (excluding Sundays)
x 12 months) representing the loss of earning capacity of Christian Bermudez
as taxi driver.
Costs against accused.
The cases of accused Rosauro Sia who escaped from custody before he was
arraigned and as against Peter Doe who was never apprehended and whose
identity has never been known are hereby ordered ARCHIVED, subject to
activation when they are arrested and brought before the bar of justice.
SO ORDERED.5
On automatic review before this Court, accused-appellants raised the lone
assigned error that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS FOR VIOLATION OF RA 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW)
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF
ACCUSED ROSAURO SIA AND JIMMY PONCE (EXHIBITS C AND D,
RESPECTIVELY) WHICH ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.6
The facts as summed up by the trial court are as follows:
The vehicle claimed as carnapped is registered in the name of complainant
Bienvenido C. Cruz of No. 1125 Primero de Mayo Street, Tondo, Manila7 and
operated as a taxi being Unit 2 of KIRBEE TAXI and bearing the following
description:
 Toyota Tamaraw FX
Make/Type : Wagon
Motor Number : 2-C 2983302
Chassis No. : CF 50-0014375
Plate No. : NYT-243
Color : Maroon
The said taxi was taken from the garage and driven by its regular driver,
Christian Bermudez, the alleged murder victim at about 6:00 a.m. on August
23, 1995. The taxi was last seen at the vicinity of the Pegasus Night Club in
Quezon City at about 10:30 p.m. on the said date with an unidentified
passenger who surfaced later as the accused Rosauro Sia, whose true name
is allegedly Antonio Labrador (Mang Tony) and who resides at San Francisco
Del Monte. Accused Rosauro Sia appears to have gypped driver Christian
Bermudez to service him the following day (August 24, 1995) in the morning
and to be paid P150.00 per hour which was apparently accepted because
Rosauro gave instructions to accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce to wait
for him (Christian) that following morning. When Christian returned to Sia's
residence in San Francisco Del Monte that morning, he was told to come back
in the afternoon because that was the instruction given him by accused
Rosauro Sia. When Christian returned in the afternoon in the Sia residence,
he was asked to get inside. As soon as he alighted from the Tamaraw FX taxi
he was driving, his hands were tied by Johnny Balalio and was handed to a
certain "Pedro", the accused Peter Doe who has not been arrested and who
told Johnny Balalio and Johnny (sic) Ponce "Ako na'ng bahala dito". Christian
was taken to accused Rosauro and shortly afterwards, the latter was seen
lugging with him a big carton box from which blood was dripping. Accused
Jimmy Ponce saw Rosauro hand the carton-wrapped lifeless body of Christian
inside the carnapped FX taxi. Before leaving with the lifeless body of Christian
loaded in the taxi, accused Sia gave P3,000.00 each to Jimmy Ponce, Johnny
Balalio and "Pedro" and admonished them not to say anything about what
happened. The ring taken from Christians8was given to accused Jimmy Ponce
by Rosauro Sia.
On August 26, 1995, the lifeless body of Christian Bermudez was found and
retrieved from a fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. This fact was broadcast
over the radio and, after hearing the same, Agripina Bermudez went to see the
lifeless body retrieved from the fishpond and confirmed it to be that of Christian,
whom she claims is her eldest son who was earning about P650.00 a day as
a taxi driver.
Photographs were taken on the carton-wrapped body of Christian including
one position which shows the latter's body.9
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico Legal Officer of Bulacan, conducted a
postmortem examination of the deceased body of Christian and found that the
latter's death was due to shock caused by massive external and intracranial
hemorrhage on account of multiple lacerations on the head and fracture of the
skull due to use of hard object, possibly iron, for which he issued certificates
of death and postmortem death certificate.10
In the meantime, Bienvenido Cruz, the owner of the carnapped vehicle,
reported to the police authorities in Camp Crame the loss of his taxi.11 On
September 21, 1995, at about 10:30 p.m., the carnapped taxi was intercepted
being driven by accused Rosauro Sia, who was immediately placed in custody
of the anti-carnapping authorities. While in custody, Rosauro Sia managed to
escape but he was recaptured on November 15, 1995 by the manhunt team
created for that purpose. As accused Rosauro Sia claimed that he bought the
hot car from his co-accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce, the latter were
picked up from their residence in Baseco, Isla Tawid, Port Area, Tondo, Manila
and investigated. Sworn Statement of the accused Rosauro Sia and Jimmy
Ponce were taken12 narrating their respective participations such as Sia's
instruction to Jimmy to guard his (Sia's) gate to deter passersby from snooping
around and describing what transpired inside Sia's residence at San Francisco
Del Monte when Christian was tied and killed. The Sworn Statement of
Bienvenido Cruz, owner of the missing vehicle, was likewise taken. On the
basis of the sworn statements of accused Rosauro Sia and Jimmy Ponce, Dr.
Benito Caballero, Provincial Health Officer of Bulacan, together with the
Certificate of Registration of the FX Taxi and the Death and Postmortem
Certificates mentioned heretofore, the Special Operations Unit, Traffic
Management Command, PNP, Camp Crame, referred the matter to the
authorities of the Department of Justice who, after finding probable cause in
the preliminary investigation, filed these cases of Violation of R.A. 6539, as
amended, and of Murder against the above-named accused which were
consolidated together in this Branch for joint trial.13
In their lone assigned error, accused-appellants contend in sum that the extra-
judicial confessions of accused Rosauro Sia and Johnny Balalio, which the
trial court heavily relied upon, are inadmissible in evidence since they were
executed in violation of their right to counsel. Specifically, accused-appellants
argue that the said extra-judicial statements are inadmissible because they
were obtained without compliance with the requirements of the law for their
admissibility.14
The Solicitor General agrees, stating that during the custodial investigation,
Ponce and Sia were not assisted by counsel as required by the Constitution.
The trial court's finding that Sia and Ponce were assisted by Prosecutor
Pormento when they executed their extra-judicial confessions did not meet the
requirement of the law. The Solicitor General further contends that, during his
testimony, Ponce vehemently denied having voluntarily executed his alleged
statement; rather, he maintained that he was coerced to sign the same and
that he did not even know its contents.
Extra-judicial confessions must conform to the requirements of the
Constitution.15 Indeed, a suspect's confession, whether verbal or non-verbal
when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such
assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion or the fact that it had
been voluntarily given,16 is inadmissible in evidence,17 even if appellant's
confession were gospel truth.18
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial statements of Sia and
Ponce will not absolve accused-appellants from criminal liability because, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, there still is independent evidence to
establish their authorship of the victim's killing on the occasion of the
carnapping. The Solicitor General asserts that while there was no prosecution
witness who positively identified accused-appellants as particeps criminis,
their culpability was nonetheless proven through circumstantial evidence.
We agree.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 19 The rules
on evidence20 and case law sustain the conviction of the accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must
be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 21
A circumspect scrutiny of the testimonies of the witnesses of both prosecution
and defense shows adequate evidentiary bases to establish the
aforementioned circumstances.
First, when the police apprehended accused Rosauro Sia while he was in
possession of the carnapped vehicle, he immediately pointed to accused-
appellants as his accomplices in taking away the victim's vehicle. 22 Notably,
accused-appellants claimed to have met Sia for the first time on August 24,
1995, when Sia supposedly passed by them looking for a certain person. They
saw Sia for the second time on November 15, 1995, when Sia and some
policemen came to their place to arrest them. If accused-appellants did not
actually participate in the perpetration of the crime, it certainly defies reason
why Sia would implicate them in so serious an offense when they were
practically strangers to him. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the
fact that a witness may have been a co-conspirator in the commission of the
offense is not in itself sufficient to dilute the credibility of or, much less, be a
ground to disregard altogether his testimony.23 Indeed:
By way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if
uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself,
because given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of
details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought.24
Second, defense witness Porferio Fernando testified that accused-appellants
were with Rosauro Sia from August 25-28, 1995.25 When accused-appellants
came back on August 28, 1995; they informed him that they were to guard
a bodega owned by Sia, which contained a carnapped vehicle.26 This
testimony of Fernando confirms the fact that accused-appellants were in the
company of Rosauro Sia during that critical period when the crime was
perpetrated.
Third, upon his arrest, accused-appellant Jimmy Ponce voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities a ring,27 admittedly belonging to the
victim.28 It is a well-settled rule that when a person is found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act, he is presumed to be the
taker and doer of the whole act.29 Thus, when property stolen is found in the
possession of a person who is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his
possession thereof, he may be deemed to have committed the crime of theft
of said property.30 More apropos to the peculiar facts prevailing herein is the
case of People v. Prado,31 where we stated:
In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of
stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he
must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the
said person and of the robbery committed on him.
The application of this presumption validly applies to a case of carnapping for,
indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the
same and, had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle would certainly fall within the purview of
either theft or robbery.32
All told, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the court a quoinsofar
as the crimes were committed. What remains to be determined is the propriety
of the penalty imposed on accused-appellants.
In connection with the penalty imposed, the Solicitor General invites the
Court's attention to the erroneous imposition by the trial court of death on the
accused-appellants. He points out that while the sentence was meted upon a
finding that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime,
these were not duly established in the case at bar.
The observation is well-taken. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances
which are taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of
the penalty imposed must be proven with equal certainty as the commission
of the act charged as criminal offense.33
With regard to alevosia, there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.34 Treachery is considered present when: (1) there is employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means or method of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the culprit. 35 For treachery to be
appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception
of the attack.36 Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its
perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed.37
In this case, there was neither a description of how the attack was commenced
- whether it was sudden, unexpected and whether the victim was caught totally
unaware - nor has there been a showing that the method of execution in the
commission of the crime was consciously or deliberately adopted by the
malefactors. To reiterate, alevosia cannot be established where no particulars
are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was carried out or
how it developed.38 It must be based on positive or conclusive proof, not mere
suppositions or speculations,39 and must be proved as clearly and as
convincingly as the killing itself.40
Similarly, the elements of evident premeditation must be established with
equal certainty as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance.41 These elements are: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that they
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of
time between the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act.42The essence
of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.43
In this case, there is no showing that the killing of Christian Bermudez was the
product of cool thought and reflection. There is absolutely no showing how and
when the plan was hatched or how long a time had elapsed before the crime
was carried out. On the contrary, what appears very much evident is that he
was killed on the occasion of the carnapping itself. Without such evidence,
mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will
not suffice to warrant the appreciation of this qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation.44
Abuse of superior strength cannot likewise be appreciated. In People v.
Flores,45 this Court pointed out that this aggravating circumstance
necessitates the showing of the relative disparity in physical characteristics,
usually translating into the age, gender, the physical size and the strength of
the aggressor and the victim. There is no proof that accused-appellant utilized
any notorious inequality to his advantage. In other words, mere superiority in
number is not enough to constitute superior strength. 46
To be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, what should be considered is
not that there were three or more assailants of one victim, but whether the
aggressors purposely took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the offense.47 In this case, the prosecution did not present any
direct proof that there was a deliberate intent on the part of accused-appellants
to take advantage of the obvious inequality of force between them and the
victim.
In the absence of any qualifying or aggravating circumstances which would
merit the imposition of death, the proper imposable penalty should
be reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, viz:
Penalty for Carnapping - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as the
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment of not less than fourteen
years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months,
when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years
and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof. (Italics ours)
On the other hand, Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:
Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx - xxx - xxx
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (gross
annual income - reasonable and necessary
living expenses)]59
In this case, the Court notes that the victim was 27 years old at the time of his
death and his mother testified that as a driver of the Tamaraw FX taxi, he was
earning P650.00 a day.60 Hence, the damages payable for the loss of the
victim's earning capacity is computed thus:

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the Gross Annual Earnings = P650 x 261 working days in a year
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. = P169,650.00

Anent the civil indemnity award, this Court finds the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity proper, following prevailing jurisprudence, 48 and in line with
controlling policy.49 The award of civil indemnity may be granted without any
need of proof other than the death of the victim.50 Though not awarded by the
trial court, the victim's heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages, pegged at
P50,000.00 by controlling case law,51 taking into consideration the pain and
anguish of the victim's family52 brought about by his death.53
However, the award of P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim must be deleted. The records are bereft
of any receipt or voucher to justify the trial court's award of burial and other
expenses incurred in connection with the victim's death. The rule is that every
pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence before it may be
awarded.54 Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts or other credible evidence.55
The trial court was correct in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity
despite the non-availability of documentary evidence.56 Damages
representing net earning capacity have been awarded by the Court based on
testimony in several cases.57 However, the amount of the trial court's award
needs to be recomputed and modified accordingly.
Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80-27) x [P169,650.00 - P84,825.00]
= 35.33 x 84,825.00
= P2,996,867.20
Based on the foregoing computation, the award of the trial court with regard to
lost income is thus modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
85, in Criminal Cases No. Q-95-63963, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (The Anti-
Carnapping Law) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants
are SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and are
ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of the victim Christian
Bermudez the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the sum of P50,000.00
as moral damages, and the sum of P2,996,867.20 representing lost earnings.
The award of P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses is DELETED for lack
of substantial proof.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Trinidad

In determining the amount of lost income, the following must be taken into G.R. No. L-25459 August 10, 1926
account: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have
lived; and (2) the rate of the loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. The THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
second variable is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net vs.
earnings of the deceased, meaning total earnings less expenses necessary in RAMON MABUG-AT, defendant-appellant.
the creation of such earnings or income less living and other incidental Vicente Sotto for appellant.
expenses. Considering that there is no proof of living expenses of the Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
deceased, net earnings are computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross
earnings.58 The formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning ROMUALDEZ, J.:
capacity is:
The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon Mabug-
at the penalty of twelve years and one day cadena temporal, with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P700 and
to pay the costs, for the crime of frustrated murder.
The appellant appealed from this judgment, making two assignments of error
as committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder, and
2. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the defense, finding
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana Buralo
was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of the
latter having frequently visited the house of one Carmen. Their relations were
such that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August
9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the third
day, or the night of August 11th, the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo
Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion.
There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask
Juana to come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said:
"If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend
her I will kill him."
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came
downstairs, when they went in the direction of their house. The accused, who
was seen by the two girls, followed them without saying a word. It is only a
short distance from the house where the devotion took place to that of the
offended party, the houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs,
the accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his
revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of
her neck, having entered the posterior region thereof and coming out through
the left eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical attention,
Perfecta Buralo did not die and is on e of the witnesses who testified at the
trial of this case.
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not
responsible for the crime, contends that the crime proven is not frustrated
murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven
that it was the accused's intention to kill.
The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his
disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that
the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the house
where the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and
especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our
opinion, permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the
accused's intention to kill.
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15
Phil., 1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm
at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill,
and there are many cases in the books wherein the attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was
not in fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the
intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and
necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence; and where, as in
the case at bar, a revolver is twice discharged point-blank at the body of
another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the body, it needs but
little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does
not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.)
The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are evidence
premeditation and treachery. Even when there is sufficient proof of
premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently established), yet,
it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case,
because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta Buralo,
who was hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana Buralo. Had evident
premeditation been proven, and there being no other qualifying circumstance
of frustrated murder present in this case, the acts should be held to be
frustrated homicide and punished with the maximum degree of the penalty
prescribed by law. (Question 2, p. 28, 1890 ed., Viada's Penal Code.) But, the
fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this
case, because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which
tended to insure the execution of the crime without running any risk himself
from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. The
treachery which, according to the evidence, would have attended the crime
had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this case because the offended
party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards
the accused when he fired his revolver. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a
decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp. 29, 30), in holding a crime to be
murder and not homicide, stated the following:
Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as it is explained in
article 10 of the Civil code dealing with said circumstance, it is evident that in
firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused the death of
Nazario Iñigo, he employed means which tended to insure the commission of
the crime without any risk to himself arising from any defense that might be
made by the offended party, for neither the wounded party Bartolome
Lobejano, at whom the shot was aimed in order to kill him so that he might not
testify as to the assault committed upon him shortly before, as held by the trial
court, was not in a position to defend himself in any way, nor could Nazario
Iñigo become aware of any attack so unjustified, rapid and unforeseen;
considering, further, that the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of
the shot a person other than the one intended was killed, does not modify, in
the instant case, the elements constituting the crime of murder qualified by the
treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted, whether with respect to the
wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the deceased Nazario Iñigo, for which
reason the rules of article 65 are not applicable herein, the culprit not having,
in fact, committed a crime different from that which he intended, taking into
consideration the substantial and intrinsical meaning thereof, etc.
Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated murder, the
doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case at bar so far as the
concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is concerned.
The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended to
kill and performed all the acts of execution, which would have produced the
crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)
We find no merit in the first assignment of error.
In regard to the second, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts
enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated murder.
With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no other
aggravating circumstance.
The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts
proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Silvestre L. Tagarao for appellant Pablito Domasian.
Lino M. Patajo for appellant Dr. Samson Tan.
CRUZ, J.:
The boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even
before his parents received the ransom note. But it spawned a protracted trial
spanning all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two accused.1
The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the time of the
incident in question. The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan,
the latter then a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's parents.
They were represented by separate lawyers at the trial and filed separate
briefs in this appeal.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982,
while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion
of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance
in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help
and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside
while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became
apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital,
the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the
while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father.
When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for
the municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here the man
talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr.
Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San
Vicente, with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This
aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man
about his relationship with the boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers,
making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical differences between
the two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the
matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle.
Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy.
Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their
pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving
Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met
his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for
him.2
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra
received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1
million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be
killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing
it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which
referred it to the NBI for examination.3
The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4 On the other
hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be could
identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito
Domasian.5 Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon.6
The defense of both accused was denial and alibi. Domasian claimed that at
the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's house
and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his
eyeglasses.7 Dr. Tan for his part said he was in Manila.8
After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both accused guilty as charged and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory
penalties. They were also required to pay P200,000.00 to Dr. and Mrs. Enrique
Agra as actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.
In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate their denial of any
participation in the incident in question. They belittle the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and submit that their own witnesses are more
believable. Tan specifically challenges the findings of the NBI and offers anew
the opposite findings of the PC/INP showing that he was not the writer of the
ransom note. He maintains that in any case, the crime alleged is not
kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in an enclosure was
involved. If at all, it should be denominated and punished only as grave
coercion. Finally, both Domasian and Tan insist that there is no basis for the
finding of a conspiracy between them to make them criminally liable in equal
degree.
First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed in the first instance
by the trial judge, whose finding in this regard is received with much respect
by the appellate court because of his opportunity to directly observe the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.
In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the testimony of the victim
himself, who positively identified Domasian as the person who detained him
for three hours. The trial court observed that the boy was "straight-forward,
natural and consistent" in the narration of his detention. The boy's naivete
made him even more believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's classmate and also
his age, pointed to Domasian with equal certainty, as the man who approached
Enrico when they were walking together that morning of March 11, 1982. Grate,
the tricycle driver who suspected Enrico's companion and later chased him,
was also positive in identifying Domasian. All these three witnesses did not
know Domasian until that same morning and could have no ill motive in
testifying against him. By contrast, Eugenia Agtay, who testified for the
defense, can hardly be considered a disinterested witness because she
admitted she had known Domasian for 3 years.
The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to several public places
if the intention was to kidnap and detain him. That is for Domasian himself to
answer. We do no have to probe the reasons for the irrational conduct of an
accused. The more important question, as we see it, is why Domasian
detained Enrico in the first place after pretending he needed the boy's help.
That is also for Domasian to explain. As for Enrico's alleged willingness to go
with Domasian, this was manifested only at the beginning, when he believed
the man sincerely needed his assistance. But he was soon disabused. His
initial confidence gave way to fear when Domasian, after taking him so far
away from the hospital where he was going, restrained and threatened him if
he did not stop crying.
Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive identification by Enrico,
Grate and Ferreras, let alone the contradictions made by his corroborating
witness, Dr. Irene Argosino, regarding the time he was in the optical clinic and
the manner of his payment for the refraction.9 Tan's alibi is not convincing
either. The circumstance that he may have been in Manila at the time of the
incident does not prove that he could not have written the ransom note except
at that time.
Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of Court provides as
follows:
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to
be the handwriting of such person and has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar, one from the
NBI, 10 who opined that the ransom note and the standard documents were
written by one and the same person, and another from the PC/INP 11 who
expressed a contrary conclusion. The trial court chose to believe the NBI
expert because his examination and analysis "was more comprehensive than
the one conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert, who virtually limited his
reliance on the perceived similarities and dissimilarities in the pattern and style
of the writing, thereby disregarding the basic principle in handwriting
identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone feature but rather a
combination of all the qualities that identify."
We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon
the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from
an unpracticed observer. 12 The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the
general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and
unconscious result
of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself
permanent. 13
Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the case at bar, the
Court feels that the scales should tilt in favor of the prosecution. Significantly,
the NBI opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra, who believed that the
ransom note was written by Tan, with whose handwriting he was familiar
because they had been working in the hospital for four years and he had seen
that handwriting every day in Tan's prescriptions and daily reports. 14
Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 15 is not applicable because that case involved a
forgery or the deliberate imitation of another person's signature. In the case
before us, there was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note writer's
penmanship to prevent his discovery.
As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code provides as follows:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; of if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; even
if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission
of the offense.
Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not only in placing a
person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty. 16 In the case at bar, it is noted that although the victim
was not confined in an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when
Domasian restrained him from going home and dragged him first into the
minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca, thence to the
market and then into the tricycle bound for San Vicente. The detention was
committed by Domasian, who was a private individual, and Enrico was a minor
at that time. The crime clearly comes under Par. 4 of the above-quoted article.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the
ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable. His
reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an
act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against
persons or property but against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the
said provision.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly
applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability
of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means.
The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish
the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived
Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect
only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267
although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it, whether they act through physical volition of one or all,
proceeding severally or collectively. 17
It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interests. 18 In the instant case, the trial
court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in
detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by
Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other and geared
toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the
ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan
approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a loan
of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did
not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he
really wanted to help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap
Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.
The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the decision in this
case. His claim that he was arrested without warrant and then tortured and
held incommunicado to extort a confession from him does not vitiate his
conviction. He never gave any confession. As for the allegation that the seizure
of the documents used for comparison with the ransom note was made without
a search warrant, it suffices to say that such documents were taken by Agra
himself and not by the NBI agents or other police authorities. We held in the
case of People vs. Andre Marti, 20 that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked
against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the government
and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on official action.
We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each other,
committed the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon them by
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
accused-appellants.
Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human Rights for
investigation of the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of Pablito
Domasian.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54090 May 9, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABRAHAM SERANILLA Y PAPA, ELY SANCHEZ Y IBARRIENTOS and
FRANK DE JOYA Y BORBON, respondents.
TheSolicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Syquia law Office for respondents.
GUTTIERREZ, JR., J,:
This is an appeal from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 28, Pasay City finding "the accused ELY SANCHEZ and ABRAHAM
SERANILLA guilty of qualified theft and FRANK DE JOYA guilty of simple theft
beyond reasonable doubt" and sentencing "them to suffer LIFE
IMPRISONMENT for the accused SANCHEZ and SERANILLA and from
TWELVE" (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for the accused DE JOYA and
all ... to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused-appellants alleged:
That on or bout the 3rd day of August, 1973, in Pasay City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
grave abuse of confidence being then employees of the Philippine Air Lines
as manifesting clerk and cargo checker, respectively, and as such has access
to the Air Cargo Office at the Philippine Air Lines at the Manila International
Airport, aided and abetted by their co-accused, Frank Mafincode Joya y
Borbon, to whom some of the said checks were delivered for encashment
and/or negotiation and who had prior knowledge and was a participant in the
criminal design of his co-accused to commit the offense and with intent to gain,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away from said Air Cargo Office of the Philippine Air Lines, MIA, a cargo freight
consisting of packages containing dollar checks of different denominations
amounting to $127,450.51, part of which is hereto attached and marked Annex
"A" and made an integral part of the information, belonging to the First National
City Bank, Manila and being sent by it via air freight of the Philippine Air Lines
to the United States, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Air Lines
and the First National City Bank." (Rollo, p. 7)
The prosecution presented witnesses who testified as summarized by the
lower court in the following manner:
Leonardo Lansang, Deposit Teller of the Clark Field Branch of the First
National City Bank, on his having dispatched cashed checks to their main
office in Manila after taking taped listing thereof duly accompanied by the
corresponding ticket (Exhs. C and C-1);
Amable Malicsi, Pro-Manager of the Control Division of the First National City
Bank, Manila, on the shipment of the checks in question consigned to their
office in San Francisco, California for clearing via PAL thru the Emery Freight
Corporation; the non-receipt by their San Francisco office of the same as per
cable advises (Exhs. D-1, X. and X-1); and the damage suffered by their office
on the peso equivalent of $127,450.51 as well as interest and the margin
between the buying and selling rate of said checks for failure of their account
to be creditted and the drawer of said checks to be debited by the respective
value thereof;
Paul Katigbak, Manila Manager of the Emery Freight Corporation, on their
having handled a package for FNCB for air shipment to the United States as
per `Shippers Letter of Instruction.for Contract of Carriage' (Exh. Z) for which
they cut out Air WaybilI No. 079-50746345 (Exh.W-13-A); their having turned
over said package to PAL as per transfer manifest (Exh. W-13); and PAL
Cargo Supervisor Meynard Halili having wrote (sic) him a letter to the effect
that said package did not reach its destination (Exh. Y);
Maynard M. Halili, Supervisor of the Cargo Handling Section of PAL, on
Abraham Seranilla being a manifest clerk of PAL whose duty was to accept
shipment and document the transfer while Ely Sanchez was a cargo checker
whose duty was to insure that whatever is manifested for the flight is loaded in
the pushcart for towing to the aircraft; and their having received on August 3,
1973 from Emery Freight Corporation the shipment of the package of checks
in question consigned to FNCB San Francisco but which was never received
by the latter and their investigation showed that it was never loaded in the
aircraft as per his letter to Paul Katigbak of the Emery Freight Corporation (Exh.
Y);
Sgt. Ernesto B. Balaquiao, Investigator of the 2nd C.I.S. District in Canlubang,
Laguna, also on the manner they effected the arrest of the accused Frank de
Joya and Abraham Seranilla and their having confiscated from them dollar
checks as per the inventory thereof he prepared (Exhs. K [same as Exh.K-T];
U (same as Exh. K-1 and his having taken the statement of Abraham Seranilla
(Exh. 0 and P) and that of Ely Sanchez (Exhs. Q and R); and
Frisco P. Fallore, Supervising Investigation Agent and Assistant Chief of
Investigation of the 2nd C.I.S. District at Canlubang, Laguna, also on the
manner they effected the arrest of Frank de Joya and Abraham Seranilla as
per mission order dated August 22, 1973 (Exhibit w-1) and the Arrest, Search
and Seizure Order and his having taken the statement of Frank De Joya (Exh.
W-6).<äre||anº•1àw> ' (Rollo, pp. 12-14)
The finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the three accused is based on
the prosecution's evidence, and the admission made by them in their
respective statements (Exhs. W-6, P, Q and R) which they executed after their
arrest and the fact that bunches of the stolen checks in question were
confiscated from accused Frank De Joya andAbraham Seranilla (Exhs. K and
L1) without any satisfying explanation as to their possession of missing checks.
All of the three accused appealed from the lower court's decision and each
filed a separate brief.
The accused De Joya raises the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
STATEMENTS OF THE THREE ACCUSED AND OF THE WIFE OF
ACCUSED ELY SANCHEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONSPIRACY AMONG THE
THREE ACCUSED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.IN
THE INFORMATION.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPECTIVE
STATEMENTS OF THE THREE ACCUSED ARE COMPLETE WITH
DETAILS WHICH ONLY THOSE WHO HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
THEM CAN TESTIFY TO AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED BY THE
INVESTIGATORS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BUNCHES OF THE
STOLEN CHECKS WERE CONFISCATED FROM THE ACCUSED FRANK
DE JOYA.
V THEFT INSTEAD OF SIMPLE THEFT. (Brief for accused-appellant Ely
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BUNCHES ACCUSED
FRANK DE JOYA DID NOT PROFESS HIS INNOCENCE RIGHT THEN AND
THERE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST IN HOLIDAY HILLS.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED FRANK
DE JOYA IS NOT A CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE WITNESS.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CIS INFORMER DING
NACO HAD THEN NO MOTIVE TO IMPLICATE THE ACCUSED FRANK DE
JOYA.
VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
CHECKS ARE WITHOUT VALUE.
IX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED FRANK
DE JOYA IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
SIMPLE THEFT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, (Brief for accused-
appellant Frank de Joya, pp. 1-3)
Meanwhile, the accused Sanchez states in his assignments of errors that:
I The alleged repudiation by appellants of their respective confessions on the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY AMONG
THE THREE ACCUSED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED
MafincoS BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT AS SHOWN BY THE VERY
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION THAT THE CHECKS IN QUESTION
ARE WITHOUT COMMERCIAL VALUE.
III
ASSUMING THE CULPABILITY OF APPELLANT SANCHEZ, THE LOWER
COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF QUALIFIED
Sanchez, pp. 1-2)
Appellant Seranilla, raises as assignment of errors, the following:
I
THE LOWER COURT, ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ALLEGEDLY EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT
ABILMafincoLkM SERANILLA y PAPA.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED
CHECKS OBTAINED ILLEGALLY FROM THE APPELLANT ABRAHAM
SERANILLA y PAPA.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT
ABRAHAM SERANILLA y PAPA. (Brief for accused-appellant Abraham
Seranilla y pp. 1-2)
The uniform and principal argument of the appellants is that their extrajudicial
confessions were improperly admitted as evidence against them and used to
prove the existence of conspiracy. These statements were allegedly obtained
through threats, intimidation and violence and are, therefore, inadmissible as
evidence.
We find no merit in the argument.
ground that these were extorted by force, coercion and intimidation is as noted
by the lower court negated by their statements which contained details which
only they could have known. (People v. Toledo, 140 SCRA 259; People v.
Ribadajo, 142 SCRA 637).
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
The confessions of appellants contain details which were known to them only
and could not have been supplied by the investigating agents of the CIS.
For example when de Joya was asked:
Q. From the time you were introduced by your friend with Mr. Seranilla, will
you tell us if you have been with a business transaction with him?
He answered,
A. I have no business transaction with him except when on the middle part of
july 1973, when I cashed for him a Travelers check worth $200.00"(Exh. W-6)
The above answer of de Joya revealing his transaction with Seranilla a month
before the crime at hand was committed is a fact that shows the spontaneity
of de Joya's confession. The answer of 'de Joya could not have been invented
by the investigators. (People v. Ty Siu Wong, L-32529, May 12, 1978, 83
SCRA 125).
Likewise, the confessions of Seranilla and Sanchez contain badges of
voluntariness.
Seranilia's statement contains the following:
xxx xxx xxx
T. Na ang sabi niya (Mr. de Joya) na noong kayo ay magkakilala na, mayroon
kang ibinigay sa kanya na Traveller's check na nagkakahalaga ng $200.00
upang palitan totoo rin ba ito?
S. Totoo pong mayroon akong ibinigay sa kanya na Traveller's Check ngunit
hindi ko sinabi sa kanya na palitan.
xxx xxx xxx
T. Papano naman napunta sa iyo ang mga chekeng dolyar na nakumpiska ng
mga ahente ng CIS kay Frank de Joya na ayon kay Frank de Joya ay
nanggaling sa iyo?
A. Ang nasabing chekeng dolyar pong iyan ay ibinigay sa akin ni Ely Sanchez
noong Agosto 3,1973, at makalipas nga po ang mga ilang araw ay bumalik si
FRANK DE JOYA sa aming bahay at tinanong sa akin kung mayroon na. Ang
sabi ko naman sa kanya ay mayroon na, at kanyang tiningnan ang nasabing
cheke. Matapos na makita ang mga cheke ay sinabi sa akin na dadalhin na
raw niya ang mga chekeng nabanggit at saka sinabi pa niya sa akin na wala
pa raw siyang pera na maibibigay sa akin sa oras na iyon. Ang sabi ko naman
po sa kanya ay maghanap ka muna ng pera bago ko ibigay ang cheke. Ngayon
sa ayaw ko pong ibigay ay inuperan po niya ako ng lupa. Ngunit sinabi ko sa
kanya na ako ay hindi interesado sa lupa. Ngayon sa pagpupumilit ni FRANK
DE JOYA na ibigay ko sa kanya ang mga chekeng dolyar at napilitan ako na
ibigay sa kanya dahil sa pangako na siya (FRANK DE JOYA) ay babalik
kaagad para bigyan ako ng kanyang pangako sa akin, hanggang sa noong
bumalik si FRANK DE JOYA noong gabi ng Agosto 22,1973 at kasama ng
mga CIS.
(Exh. P)
And the sworn statement of Sanchez declares the following points which could
not have been fabricated by the CIS agents:
xxx xxx xxx
T. Sabihin mo nga sa amin kung ano ang inyong lihim na transaksiyon ni
Abraham Seranilla tungkol sa mga tsekeng nabanggit?
S. Nagpunta po sa bahay namin sina Abe may kasamang nagngangalang
Frank na pinakilala niya sa akin at sinabi nilang dalawa na ako ay inuperan na
kung ikukuha ko raw sila ng Tseke at may binanggit pang presyo na kung
maganda raw at P1.00sa bawat 'dolyar at PO.50 sentimos bawat dolyar kung
hindi maganda at may binanggit pang tungkol sa lupa. Ang sabi ko naman
wala akong kaalam-alam sa mga bagay na iyan at hindi linya ang ganoong
trabaho. At noong maglalast week ng Julio 1973 ay pumunta ulit silang dalawa
sa aming bahay at ganoon din po ang sabi sa akin katulad noong una
nagpoporsigi sa ganoong transaksiyon. Ang sabi ko ng ulit hindi ako maaring
gumawa ng ganyan dahil ibig kung ng malinis (At this juncture the affiant cries)
at bilang tiyo ko siya pinipilit niya akong gumawa ng trabaho at maganda raw
pagkakitaan. Ngayon noong unang linggo nga ng Agosto 1973, bandang mga
hapon ng ako'y galing sa eroplanong sinalubong ko na galing sa abroad na
nakaassigned sa aking schedule, pagpasok ko po sa officina dala-dala ko ang
mga papeles ng eroplano na incoming. Sinabi sa akin ni Abraham at tinuro sa
akin ang isang pakete na nasa loob ng aming compound ng aming officina na
kunin ko raw. Gayon pa man din hindi ko binigyan ng pansin ang kanyang
sinabi at tuloy tuloy akong nagayos ng aking papeles at saka lumabas ulit ako
sa officina papuntang eroplano para chekin ko ang kargamentong ibinaba na
galing sa ibang bansa at doon ko nakita iyong mga kargamentong seguro po
may mga tatlong postcard at nakita ko na may nalaglag na kargamento at
aking pinulot at sa mga oras na iyon ay nandodoon din si Abraham Seranilla
at aking ibinigay sa kanya. Pagkatapos po umalis na ako at nag-check na ako
ng kargamento na ibinaba sa eroplano na kasama ko ang custom guard
papunta sa Bonded warehouse. Sinabi ko po naman sa kay Abraham Seranilla
noon pa na hindi ako maaaring kumuha ng hindi ko pagaari dahil ibig kung
mabuhay ang pamilya sa mabuting paraan.
xxx xxx xxx
T. Noong maiabot mo ang kahon kay Abraham, saan naman niya dinala?
S. Noong iabot ko po sa kanya ay inipit niya sa kanyang kilikili at lumakad
papuntang eroplano sa loob ng MIA.
(Exh. Q)
xxx xxx xxx
T. Matapos halughugin ang inyong bahay ng mga CIS agent, ano ang nangyari?
S. Sila po ay nakakuha ng aking ari-arian katulad ng mga sumusunod: 1. Isang
(1) Baril na Dibola (S & W) Caliber 38; 21 bala ng calibre 38; Lima (5) na basyo
ng bala ng calibre 38; $101.00 cash na dollar (U.S.); Apat na pirasong Relos
na Citizen na panglalaki at isang pirasong Relo na Orient na pangbabae.
xxx xxx xxx
T. Mayroon ka bang pinanghahawakang katibayan na dokumento sa inyong
baril na ito?
S. Opo Iyan ay lisensiyado sa pangalan ko at iyan ay aking ipinabago ang
lisensiya at katunayan na ito ang kopya ng (Request for Renewal of License)
ng aking baril, (Affiant exhibiting to the investigation (sic) a duplicate copy of
Request for Renewal of License in the name of Ely 1. Sanchez for his FA
Revolver S & W Cal. 38 SN-739163 dated 29 May 1973 which has a mark
'This will serve as a temporary license to possess your FAS good for 60 days
pending approval of your renewal lic and verified by: Illigible' at FEU, PC on
13 June 1973).
T. Ang mga relong nakumpiska sa inyo, mayroon ka rin bang katibayan na
makapagpapatunay na binili ninyo?
S. Opo. Katunayan na ito ang resibo noong bilhin ng aking asawa na si
Concepcion S. Sanchez sa Alfa Trading sa 653 Quezon Blvd., Manila noong
ika-5 ng Julio 1973, (Affiant showing to the Investigator Invoice Receipt No.
1420 dated July 1973 for purposes of identification).
T. Papaano mo naman nakuha ang Isang Daan at Isang Dolyar ($101.00) na
cash na ito?
S. Ipinadala po sa akin ng aking mga kamag-anak sa America, noong
Deciembre 1972.
T. Sino-sino ang iyong mga kamag-anak sa America na nagpadala sa iyo ng
mga salaping Dolyar na ito?
S. Sina Ginoo at Ginang Bienvenido Trajano at ang kanyang anak na si
Christopher Trajano na iyan pong dolyar na nabanggit sa itaas na nakumpiska
ng mga CIS Agents ay iniregalo sa aking asawa at mga anak noon nga pong
nakaraan na Deciembre 1972.
(Exh. R)
xxx xxx xxx
(Consolidated Brief for the Appellee, pp. 5-11)
It is significant that the alleged involuntary confessions contained both
admissions and denials. (People v. Banaan, 142 SCRA 410).
In the transaction between Seranilla and De Joya a month before the crime,
De Joya claimed that he cashed the $200.00 Traveller's check of Seranilla. On
the other hand, Seranilla stated that he merely asked De Joya to check
whether or not it was negotiable.
Also, another factor indicating voluntariness of the confessions is that the
appellants tried to minimize their roles in the offense or tried to exculpate
themselves. (People v. Ty Siu Wong, supra).<äre||anº•1àw>
Appellant de Joya stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Will you tell us, why you are sic in possession of this (sic) Dollar Checks
when you are (sic) caught or arrested by a team of CIS Agents?
A. I was informed by Mr. Abraham Seranilla, that he had $200.00 Traveller's
Cheek and he asked me to cash it for him. After agreeing that he (Mr. Seranilla)
would give me P50.00 as my commission, I agreed and had it changed with
my friend. Then at about the first week of August, he showed me this batch of
dollars which I contacted Mr. (Ding Nacu) when if it could be cashed and Mr.
Nacu called me up last Saturday that it would be cashed So I told Mr. Abraham
Seranilla about it. That's why, Mr. illa gave it to me to have it cashed with Mr.
Nacu. This is the reason why it is in my possession this afternoon (Exh. W-6)
Appellant Serarilla said:
T. Ipaliwanag mo nga sa amin kung ano ang tunay mong nalalaman tungkol
sa mga chekeng nakumpiska kay FRANK DE JOYA ng mga Ahente ng CIS
noong Agosto 22,1973 sa Holiday Hills, San Pedro, Laguna at ang 70 pirasong
checking dollar na nakumpiska sa iyo ng mga ahente ng CIS noong 22 Agosto
1973 sa inyong bahay sa 3643 Lt. Garcia St., Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal?
S. Mangyari po noong kami nga po ay magkakilala nitong si FRANK DE JOYA
doon sa aking Barberia sa Quirino Avenue, Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal ay
madalas niya akong pinupuntahan sa aming bahay sa 3643 Lt. Garcia St.,
Baclaran, Paranñque, Rizal at iyon ay humantong sa paghihikayat niya sa akin
na kumuha ng mga chekeng dolyar sa MIA na aking pinapasukang trabaho sa
paliwanag at kondisyon na ibinigay niya sa akin na ako ay kanyang bibigyan
ng P O.50 sa bawat isang (1) dolyar kung mababa raw ang bili sa kanya at
kung maganda raw ang bili sa kanya ay gagawin niya ng P l.00 sa bawa't isang
(1) dolyar. Matapos na sabihin niya sa akin ang kondesiyon na ito, sinabi ko
sa kanya na titignan ko kung magagawa ko, at siya (FRANK) ay nagpaalam
na sa akin. Nang makaalis po si FRANK DE JOYA, ako po ay pumasok na rin
sa aming officina sa Mia. Pagdating ko po sa officina, nakita ko po itong si ELY
SANCHEZ at ikunuwento ko sa kay ELY ang sinabi sa akin ni FRANK DE
JOYA. Ang sagot po sa akin ni ELY SANCHEZ ay titingnan daw po niya kung
magagawa niya at ang maganda raw ang kondisyon na ibinigay ni FRANK DE
JOYA.
xxx xxx xxx
T. Anong nangyari matapos na sabihin mo kay ELY SANCHEZ ang sinabi sa
iyo nitong si FRANK DE JOYA?
S. Pansamantalang nakalimutan ko po ang transaksiyon na ito hanggang sa
mulina bumalik sa aking bahay itong FRANK DE JOYA at tinanong sa akin
kung mayroon na raw akong nakuhang mga chekeng dolyar.
T. Kailan bumalik sa inyong bahay itong si FRANK DE JOYA?
S. Mga huling linggo na po ng buwan ng Julio 1973. T. Ano naman ang isinagot
mo kay FRANK DE JOYA?
T. Ang sabi ko po sa kanya ay wala akong nakuha kaya ang ginawa ko
sinamahan ko siya (FRANK DE JOYA) sa bahay ni ELY SANCHEZ.
S. Pagdating na pagdating ninyo ni FRANK DE JOYA sa bahay ni ELY
SANCHEZ, ano ang nangyari?
T. kinausap po rin FRANK DE JOYA si ELY SANCHEZ.
S. Narinig mo ba ang pinag-usapan nila?
T. Opo at iyon ay tungkol din sa kondisyon na ibinigay sa akin ni FRANK DE
JOYA.
S. Matapos na magusap sina ELY SANCHEZ at FRANK DE JOYA, anong
nangyari?
T. Naghiwalay na po kami.
S. Papaano naman napunta sa iyo ang mga chekeng dolyar na nakumpiska
ng mga Ahente ng CIS kay Frank de Joya na ayon kay Frank de Joya ay
nanggaling sa iyo?
T. Ang nasabing chekeng dolyar pong iyan ay ibinigay sa akin ni ELY
SANCHEZ noong Agosto 3, 1973, at makalipas nga po ang mga limang araw
ay bumalik si FRANK DE JOYA sa aming bahay at tinanong sa akin kung
mayroon na. Ang sagot ko naman sa kanya ay mayroon na, at kanyang
tiningnan ang nasabing cheke. Matapos na makita ang mga cheke ay sinabi
sa akin na dadalhin na raw niya ang mga chekeng nabanggit at sinabi pa niya
sa akin na wala pa raw siyang pera na maibibigay sa akin sa oras na iyon. Ang
sabi ko naman po sa kanya ay mag-hanap ka muna ng pera bago ko ibigay
ang cheke. Ngayon sa ayaw ko pong ibigay ay inuperan po niya ako ng lupa.
Ngunit sinabi ko sa kanya na ako ay hindi interesado sa lupa. Ngayon sa
pagpupumilit ni FRANK DE JOYA na ibigay ko sa kanya ang mga chekeng
dolyar at napilitan ako na ibigay sa kanya dahil sa pangako na siya (FRANK
DE JOYA) ay babalik kaagad para bigyan ako ng kanyang pangako sa akin,
hanggang sa noong bumalik si FRANK DE JOYA noong gabi ng Agosto
22,1973 ay kasama ng mga CIS.' (Exhibit P, (Consolidated Brief for the
Appellee, pp. 11-16)
Also, as held in the case of People v. Ladrera (150) SCRA 113, 126):
The records are bereft of any reason why the rule enunciated in the cases
of People v. Mada-ISantalani (93 SCRA 317), People v. Balane (123 SCRA
614) and People v. Villanueva (128 SCRA 488) should not be applied 'that
where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion of duress nor
violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who
administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where
there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did
not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim,
all these were considered by this Court as factors indicating voluntariness.
The trial court did not commit any error in admitting the extrajudicial
confessions in the instant case even if the accused were not assisted by
counsel inasmuch as said confessions were executed before April 26, 1983.
(People. v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446).
Conspiracy is present in the commission of the offense as, shown by the
appellants' extrajudicial confessions. (People v. Cortaya, 134 SCRA 526). As
noted by the lower court, the interlocking confessions give no room for doubt
of appellants' conspiracy. (See People v. Rodriguez, 135 SCRA 483).
The accused De Joya contends that the lower court itself doubts the existence
of conspiracy considering the variance in the penalties and considering that
Sanchez and Seranilla were held guilty for qualified theft while he was held
guilty for simple theft only.
Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of
execution (People v. Mojica, 10 SCRA 515). Therefore, the trial court did not
err in convicting the three accused of theft. And since there was abuse of
confidence in the cases of Sanchez and Seranilla considering that they were
PAL employees at the time of the offense, the lower court properly convicted
them of qualified theft.
Apellant Sanchez contends thet asumming without admiting that he was guilty
of theft, he should be guilty only of simple theft. He alleges that theft by an
employee does not necessarily designate the crime as qualified theft. The bag
containing the subject checks is part of the outgoing cargo of which he was
not in-charge, considering that he is an "incoming clerk." Also, the offended
party in this case is the First National City Bank (being the owner of the checks)
with which Sanchez has no ties whatsoever.
As noted by the Solicitor General:
The foregoing arguments of Sanchez are effectively refuted by the fact that he
had access to the place where the taking took place. Such access changes
the complexion of the crime committed to that of qualified theft. (Decisions of
Supreme Court of Spain, July 14, 1904 and Oct. 24, 1904; People v. Jimenez,
CA-G.R. No. 12094-R, Jan. 29, 1955, cited in the Revised Penal Code, by LB
Reyes, Bk. II, 1971 Ed., p. 604).<äre||anº•1àw> Sanchez testified on his
access to the negotiable instruments herein involved as follows:
Q. Now, will you inform the Honorable Court the nature of your work with PAL
sometime in August, 1973
A. I was a cargo clerk at that time assigned as incoming cargo checker.
Q. Will you tell us some of your duties as such incoming cargo checker?
A. To receive all papers regarding incoming shipments, to take care of those
papers and turn over the same to the Customs authorities, like for example,
the Customs inspector, the Customs guard and the representative of the
bonded warehouse. (Tsn, pp. 35-36, July 9, 1977)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. While performing your duties as incoming cargo clerk do you recall of any
unusual incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that incident you were referring to, please tell this Honorable
Court?
A. After I have fixed the papers regarding the incoming shipment I went on my
way to the bonded warehouse to check the cargoes and it was then that I saw
a cargo fall from a pushchart.
Q. Now, did you know where was this pushcart you mentioned going then
when one of the packages feflt down?
A. It was bound for an airplane which was scheduled to depart for a foreign
country. (Tsn., pp. 37-38, July 19,1977)
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q. Did you pick it up?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
(P. 42, T.S.N., July 9, 1977)
The fact that the FNCB which is the owner of the stolen negotiable notes is not
the employer of appellant Sanchez is of no moment. The relation of
independence, guardianship, or vigilance between the accused and the
offended party' makes the offense that of qualified theft. (People v. Koc Song,
63 Phil. 369; III Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1532 (1976 ed.)
(Consolidated Brief for the Appellee, pp. 30-31).
The appellants next question the cheeks subject other the crime.
Appellant Seranflla contends that the checks were Illegally seized from him
and are, therefore, inadmissible. There is no merit to this contention. The
search and seizure made were by virtue of the arrest, search and seizure order
(ASSO) No. 1240 as mentioned in the operation investigation report (Exhibit
10) of the CIS agents (Tsn., November 4, 1976, pp. 3-15).
On the other hand, the accused De Joya and Sanchez allege that there was
no crime committed considering the finding that the checks were of no
commercial value.
It is of no moment that there was real or actual gain. The important
consideration is that there was an intent to gain. It is one of the essential
elements of theft. (People v. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665).
The other assigned errors center on the factual findings of the trial court.
We have carefully studied the records of this case and we find no reason to
deviate from the well- settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded respect because of its
privilege of examining the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify (People
v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 414).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168932 October 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLIE BUTIONG, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who,
although 29 years of age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six-
to seven-year old.
The man, Charlie Butiong, seeks the review and reversal of the judgment
promulgated on May 18, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
his conviction for rape handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
258, in Parañaque City, for which he was imposed reclusion perpetua. He
insists that the State did not duly establish that the woman had been a mental
retardate.
The records show that Butiong had been arraigned and tried under an
information that alleged:
xxxx
That on or about the 7th day of October 1998, in the City of Parañaque,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant [AAA], a mental retardate, against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Antecedents
In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA,3 then a 29-year-old mental retardate,
was invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house
because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as
soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and
the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of
her. AAA remembered that she then felt pain in her abdomen and became
angry at him for what he had done.4
Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened.
Her sister brought AAA to the police station,5 and later on to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where AAA underwent a medico-legal
examination by Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil. The medico-legal examination
revealed that AAA’s hymen was intact but "distensible and its orifice wide (2.5
cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized adult
Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury."6 Noticing AAA’s disorientation and incoherence, Dr. Soreta-Umil
endorsed her to the NBI Psychiatric Section for evaluation.7 AAA also
underwent a series of psychological tests at the National Mental Hospital. The
tests included the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test, Bender Visual Motor
Gestalt Test, and Draw a Person Test. A Rorschach Psycho-Diagnostic Test
was not used because AAA was not able to answer.8 Another test, the Sack’s
Sentence Completion Test, was not used because of AAA’s inability to comply
with the instructions.9 The results of the psychological tests showed that she
had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a
child aged from six to seven years; she was unaware of what went on around
her and was interested only in gratifying her own needs.10
The Defense presented only one witness in the person of Dr. Natividad Dayan,
whom it offered as an expert psychologist. She concluded that the Raven’s
Progressive Matrices Test and the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
administered on AAA were unreliable for determining the existence of mental
retardation. She based her conclusion on James Morizon’s DSM-4 Made Easy:
The Clinician’s Guide for Diagnosis, and Jay Siskin’s Coping With Psychiatric
and Psychological Testimony.11 According to her, an individually administered
intelligence test, like the Stamp Intelligence Scale or the Weschler Adult
Intelligence Scale, as well as projective techniques, like the Rorschach
Psychodiagnostic Test and the Thematic Perception Test, should have been
instead administered to appropriately determine AAA’s mental age.12
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having been able to prove the guilt of the
accused CHARLIE BUTIONG beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple
RAPE defined and punishable under Art. 266-A par. 1 in relation to Art. 266-B
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 8353, accused
CHARLIE BUTIONG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
Pursuant to the existing jurisprudence, accused CHARLIE BUTIONG is further
ordered to indemnify the private complainant, AAA, the amount of ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as and by
way of exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC noted that nothing in Dr. Dayan’s testimony on the unreliability of the
tests administered on AAA would invalidate the findings of psychologist Nimia
de Guzman and Dr. Diana de Castro, both of the National Center for Mental
Health, to the effect that AAA had mild level retardation with a mental age of a
six- to seven-year old person; and that such findings were admissible and had
more than sufficiently complied with the required historical and physical
examination for determining AAA’s mental condition. The trial judge himself
held,14 based on his personal observation of AAA as a witness in court, that
she was a retardate who could narrate what had transpired albeit with some
difficulty about how she had been sexually abused. He considered AAA as a
competent witness whose behavior and appearance manifested no possibility
for her to concoct a story of her defloration at the hands of the accused.
Ruling of the CA
Butiong appealed, but the CA affirmed the conviction on May 18, 2005,15 to
wit:
In sum, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the well-entrenched
doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
accorded great respect because of its opportunity to hear their testimonies and
observe their demeanor and manner of testifying. Absent any showing that the
trial court overlooked or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which would affect the result of the case, the Court sees no
reason to alter the findings of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 24, 2003 is affirmed in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
The CA considered the State’s evidence sufficient to support the conclusion
that AAA was mentally retarded. It concluded that the State’s expert witness
psychologist de Guzman had not only interviewed AAA and a relative of AAA
but had also administered a series of tests on AAA upon which to base her
findings about AAA’s mental condition; that the results of the psychiatric
examination done by Dr. de Castro, as well as the trial judge’s personal
observation that AAA was a mental retardate supported the findings of
psychologist de Guzman; and that AAA could not legally give her consent to
the sexual act, as held in People v. Asturias,16 because the clinical findings
showed her mentality to be at par with that of a six- or seven-year-old.
The CA rejected Butiong’s argument that rape was not established because
no semen had been taken from AAA, stressing that the fact of rape depended
not on the presence of spermatozoa but on the fact of unlawful penetration of
the female genitalia by the male organ, which the State amply proved.
Issues
In this appeal, Butiong submits that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PROOF OF THE DATE OF
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE IS NOT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
CONVICT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY IS
A MENTAL RETARDATE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A MENTAL RETARDATE IS
IN THE SAME CLASS AS A WOMAN DEPRIVED OF REASON OR
OTHERWISE UNCONSCIOUS.
Anent the first assigned error, Butiong contends that the State did not establish
rape because there was no evidence showing the exact date when the rape
occurred. Under the second assigned error, he disputes the RTC’s conclusion
that AAA was a mental retardate by focusing on the inconclusiveness of the
findings of psychologist de Guzman brought about by her failure to ascertain
AAA’s personal history and by her computing AAA’s mental age upon
inaccurate and unverified information. He notes that two other physicians who
had examined AAA, one from the NBI and the other from the National Center
for Mental Health, were not presented as witnesses. He insists on his
innocence, and emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Dayan on the unreliability of
the tests administered on AAA. He maintains that the unreliability of the tests
administered on AAA for determining the presence of mental retardation
should be appreciated in his favor in accordance with People v. Cartuano,
Jr.,17 which required that a diagnosis of mental retardation should be made
after a thorough evaluation based on history, and physical and laboratory
examinations by a clinician. Lastly, he posits that the State did not establish
the elements of rape, considering that a mental retardate qualified neither as
a "woman deprived of reason" nor as "a woman under twelve years of age" as
provided under Article 266-A par. 1(b) nor of par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
I outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the
Exact date of rape and absence of spermatozoa
from victim’s genitalia are not elements of rape
Butiong argues that the State did not duly establish the fact of rape because
the exact date of the incident was indeterminate, and because no spermatozoa
was found in AAA’s genital organ.
The argument deserves no consideration.
The CA fully debunked the argument on the exact date of the rape not being
established by simply quoting from AAA’s testimony that the rape had occurred
on October 7, 1998.18 We need to emphasize, however, that the date of the
rape need not be precisely proved considering that date is not an element of
rape.19
Nor did the absence of spermatozoa from the genitalia of AAA negate or
disprove the rape.20 The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse, not ejaculation.21 Carnal knowledge is defined as "the act of a man
having sexual bodily connections with a woman."22 This explains why the
slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. As such,
a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated
rape.23 People v. Campuhan24 has aimed to remove any confusion as to the
extent of "touching" in rape:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis
on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched
the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the
labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural
situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them
with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface,
hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that
are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora,
the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded
eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the
surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ
composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the
inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many
sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.25 [emphasis supplied]
That AAA’s recollection on the rape was corroborated by the results of the
medico-legal examination was sufficient proof of the consummation of rape.
We have ruled that rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim
that is credible and untainted with serious uncertainty.26 With more reason is
this true when the medical findings supported the testimony of the victim, 27 like
herein.
II
Rape was committed because AAA
was a mental retardate
One of Butiong’s contentions is that having sexual intercourse with AAA, a
mental retardate, did not amount to a rape, because it could not be considered
as carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason or of a female under
twelve years of age as provided under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
The contention cannot be sustained.
Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is,
against the will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation
when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her
consent. This understanding of the commission of rape has been prevalent in
both the common law and the statutory law systems. As Corpus Juris
Secundum has summed up:28
At common law rape could be committed only where the unlawful carnal
knowledge of a female was had without her consent or against her will; lack of
consent was an essential element of the offense; and there can be no rape in
the common-law sense without the element of lack of consent. Under the
statutes punishing the offense, an essential element of the crime of rape is that
the act was committed without the consent of the female, or, as it is otherwise
expressed, against her will. The act of sexual intercourse is against the
female’s will or without her consent when, for any cause, she is not in a position
to exercise any judgment about the matter.
Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is
above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent.
Thus, mere copulation, with the woman passively acquiescent, does not
constitute rape. The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given
at any time prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied
with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from being rape,
provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion. Thus, where a man
takes hold of a woman against her will and she afterward consents to
intercourse before the act is committed, his act is not rape. However, where
the female consents, but then withdraws her consent before penetration, and
the act is accomplished by force, it is rape; and where a woman offers to allow
a man to have intercourse with her on certain conditions and he refuses to
comply with the conditions, but accomplishes the act without her consent, he
is guilty of rape. [emphasis supplied]
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code,29 Justice Aquino discusses the
concept of committing rape against the female’s will or without her consent, to
wit:
In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed.
Hence, the necessity of proving real and constant resistance on the part of the
woman to establish that the act was committed against her will. On the other
hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim
has no will. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such
lack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived
of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her
reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real
opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge
of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes
rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an
idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the
act did not mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or
deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape.
Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a
deafmute is not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be
proven. Intercourse with a deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason,
in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada says that the rape under
par. 2 may be committed when the offended woman is deprived of reason due
to any cause such as when she is asleep, or due to lethargy produced by
sickness or narcotics administered to her by the accused. xxx [emphasis
supplied]
Butiong was arraigned, tried and convicted of the crime of rape as defined and
penalized under paragraph 1, Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 1, Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under an amended
information that plainly averred that AAA was a "mental retardate." The
insertion of the phrase in the amended information was significant, because
the phrase put him on sufficient notice that the victim "was not in full
possession of her normal reasoning faculty."30 The phrase further specifically
indicated which of the four modes of committing the crime of rape as provided
in paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, applied
in his case, namely:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances first mentioned is present.
Yet, Butiong’s contention is that his case did not come under any of the four
modes due to carnal knowledge of a mental retardate not being either carnal
knowledge of a female deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or of a
female under 12 years of age or demented.
The contention is unwarranted.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. ̶ Rape is committed –
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another person.
Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353
because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual
act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the
State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the
victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. 31 It should no longer be
debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article
266-A, supra, because the provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived of
reason," a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. 32
Who, then, is a mental retardate within the context of the phrase "deprived of
reason" used in the Revised Penal Code?
In People v. Dalandas,33 the Court renders the following exposition on mental
retardation and its various levels, viz:
Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood
and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by
standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental
retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as
well as impaired learning capacity.
Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental
deficiency," the latter term is usually reserved for those without recognizable
brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their level of
intellectual function are illustrated, thus:
Mental Retardation
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT
(IQ RANGE)
I Profound Below 20
II Severe 20-35
III Moderate 36-52
IV Mild 53-68
xxxx
The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental
retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0 to 19, and a maximum intellectual
factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b)
imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life
equivalent to that of the average seven-year old child; moron or feebleminded,
having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life
equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and
psychologists apply the term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ between
70 to 89. In People vs. Palma, we ruled that a person is guilty of rape when he
had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a "borderline
mental deficiency." [emphasis supplied]
Considering the findings of psychologist de Guzman to the effect that AAA had
the mental age of a six- to seven-year old, an age equated with imbecility under
the previous classification, her mental age was even lower than that of a
borderline mental deficiency within the context of that term as characterized in
People v. Dalandas, supra.34 As such, Butiong’s carnal knowledge of AAA
amounted to rape of a person deprived of reason.
The ability of the female to given rational consent to carnal intercourse
determines if carnal knowledge of a mental retardate like AAA is rape. Indeed,
the Court has consistently considered carnal knowledge of a female mental
retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age as rape of a woman
deprived of reason.35 As the Court aptly stated in People v. Manlapaz,36 where
the victim was a 13-year old girl with the mentality of a five-year-old, that ability
to give rational consent was not present, viz:
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or with a girl who
is below twelve years of age is rape because she is incapable of giving rational
consent to the carnal intercourse. "Las mujeres privadas de razon, enajenadas,
idiotas, imbeciles, son incapaces por su estado mental de apreciar la ofensa
que el culpable infiere a su honestidad y, por tanto, incapaces de consentir.
Pero no es condicion precisa que la carencia de razon sea completa, basta la
abnormalidad o deficiencia mental que solo la disminuye, sin embargo, la
jurisprudence es discordante" (II Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 14th Ed., 1975,
pp. 538-9).
"Comete violacion el que yace mujer que no tiene normalmente desarrolladas
sus facultades mentales (19 nov. 1930); aqui esta comprendido el yacimiento
con debiles o retrasados mentales (11 mayo 1932, 25 feb. 1948, 27 sept.
1951); constituye este delito el coito con una niña de 15 años enferma de
epilepsia genuina que carece de capacidad para conocer el valor de sus actos
(2 marzo 1953); el yacimiento con oligofrenicas (mentally deficient persons)
28 abril, 24 octubre, 1956, 19 feb. 1958); xxx" (ibid., note 3).
The same rule prevails in American jurisprudence. "There can be no question
but that a copulation with a woman known to be mentally incapable of giving
even an imperfect consent is rape" (State vs. Jewett, 192 At. 7).
"An accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had
sexual intercourse with a female who was mentally incapable of validly
consenting to or opposing the carnal act" (65 Am Jur 2nd 766 citing State vs.
Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86, 187 NW 971; Cokeley vs. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 256,
220 SW 1099; 31 ALR 3rd 1227, sec. 3).
"In this species of rape neither force upon the part of a man nor resistance
upon the part of a woman forms an element of the crime. If, by reason of any
mental weakness, she is incapable of legally consenting, resistance is not
expected any more than it is in the case of one who has been drugged to
unconsciousness, or robbed of judgment by intoxicants. Nor will an apparent
consent in such a case avail any more than in the case of a child who may
actually consent, but who by law is conclusively held incapable of legal consent.
Whether the woman possessed mental capacity sufficient to give legal consent
must, saving in exceptional cases, remain a question of fact xxx. It need but
be said that legal consent presupposes an intelligence capable of
understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences. This degree of
intelligence may exist with an impaired and weakened intellect, or it may not"
(People vs. Boggs, 290 Pac. 618 citing People vs. Griffin, 49 Pac. 711 and
People vs. Peery, 146 Pac. 44). [emphasis supplied]
III
People v. Cartuano was not applicable
To boost his challenge to the finding that AAA was a mental retardate, Butiong
cites People v. Cartuano,37 a case where the Court ruled that a diagnosis of
mental retardation required a thorough evaluation of the history of the victim,
and held that a physical and laboratory examination by a clinician was
necessary. He insists that the findings of the psychologist and the physicians
who had examined AAA fell short of the requirements set in People v.
Cartuano, considering that psychologist de Guzman did not try to locate the
biological parents of AAA for the purpose of ascertaining her personal history,
and did not base her findings on reliable data.
Butiong’s reliance on People v. Cartuano does not advance his cause.
People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical
records to sustain a finding of mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has
clarified so in People v. Delos Santos,38 declaring that the records in People v.
Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to
sustain a finding that the victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It
is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld the finding that the
victim had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had been
able to identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain
the results of the tests to the trial court. 39
In direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did not lack clinical findings
on the mentality of the victim.1awphi1
Moreover, as clarified in People v. Dalandas,40 People v. Cartuano does not
preclude the presentation by the State of proof other than clinical evidence to
establish the mental retardation of the victim. For sure, the courts are not
entirely dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing
mental retardation. In People v. Almacin,41for instance, the Court took into
consideration the fact that the victim was illiterate and unschooled in
concluding that she was mentally incapable of assenting to or dissenting from
the sexual intercourse.42 Also, in People v. Dumanon,43 the Court concurred in
the trial court’s observation and conclusion that the victim was a mental
retardate based on her physical appearance and on her difficulty to understand
and answer the questions during her testimony.44
Here, the State’s witnesses sufficiently explained the psychological tests
conducted to establish AAA’s mental retardation with the mentality of a six- or
seven-year-old. The trial judge himself reached a conclusion on AAA’s
mentality from his close personal observation of her as a witness in court,
noting that she manifested a difficulty in responding to the questions,
especially those bearing on her being sexually abused. 45 The trial judge’s
observation to the effect that she had no notion of the wrong that had been
done to her was validated by the clinical findings. As such, the totality of the
evidence presented by the State established beyond reasonable doubt AAA’s
deficient mental condition.
IV
Presumption of innocence was overcome
by sufficient evidence of guilt
Notable is that Butiong did not testify. He offered neither alibi nor denial despite
the strong charge of rape brought against him. His defense was purposely
limited to his submission, through Dr. Dayan, that AAA had not been
established to be a mental retardate. Thereby, he did not refute that he had
carnal knowledge of AAA. Having earlier demonstrated the futility of Dr.
Dayan’s discounting of the State’s evidence of AAA’s mental retardation, we
can justifiably consider the presumption of innocence in favor of Butiong as
overcome.
Still, even if he had asserted alibi and denial, his guilt for the rape of AAA would
not be reversed in the face of AAA’s unwavering testimony and of her very
positive and firm identification of him as the man who had undressed her and
sexually gratified himself off her.46 He could no longer hide behind the
protective shield of his presumed innocence, but should have come forward
with credible and strong evidence of his lack of authorship of the crime.
Considering that the burden of the evidence had shifted to him but he did not
discharge his burden at all, there is no other outcome except to affirm his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 18,
2005 in CA-GR CR HC No. 00862.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188978 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,
vs.
MARCIAL BAYRANTE Y BOAQUINA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals’ Decision 1 dated November 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina, which affirmed with modification the Joint
Judgment2 dated February 7, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili,
Camarines Sur, Branch 31 in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286 & P-3287. The trial
court found appellant Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed November 11, 2008 Decision
of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On April 3, 2000, AAA3 filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pili,
Camarines, two (2) separate complaints against Accused-Appellant Marcial
Bayrante y Boaquina for the crime of Rape. Finding probable cause that the
Accused-Appellant may have committed the crimes charged, the Presiding
Judge of the MTC ordered the filing of the appropriate Information(s), to which
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor concurred.
Consequently, on September 4, 2002, two (2) separate Informations were filed
before the RTC charging the Accused-Appellant of two (2) counts of Rape
under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353. The Information in Crim. Case No. P-3286, which was raffled off to Br.
31, reads:
That on or about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of February 19, 2002 at Brgy. Old
San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design using force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with his niece [AAA], a 20[-]year[-]old mental retardate
whose mental age is 9 to 10 years of age, against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other Information, which was raffled off to Br. 32 of the RTC and docketed
as Crim. Case No. P-3287, is similarly worded as to date, place, the elements
of the crime charged, and the persons involved, except for the time of the
commission of the crime, which is at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
February 19, 2002.
As the cases involved the same parties, cause of action, and reliefs sought, a
consolidation thereof was decreed. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant, duly
assisted by counsel during the arraignment, pleaded not guilty to both charges.
After the pre-trial, proceedings on the merits ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution:
AAA testified that at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of February 19, 2002,
the Accused-Appellant brought her to Poblacion, Pili, Camarines Sur,
particularly to a house, which she described to have many rooms. Thereat, the
Accused-Appellant undressed her and himself, laid on top of her, and inserted
his penis inside her vagina, during which she felt pain in her organ. She
resisted the Accused-Appellant’s ravage acts by kicking him several times, but
was overcome with fear because he had a knife about five (5) inches long.
After an hour or so, or at about 9:00 or 10:00 o’clock in the same evening, the
Accused-Appellant again raped her by undressing her and inserting his penis
into her vagina. Again, she felt pain in her vagina. Thereafter, the Accused-
Appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident.
AAA also testified, among others, that the Accused-Appellant took her away
from their house in one (1) evening of February 2002 when her parents were
then already asleep. They walked the streets and later rode a Palces bus in
which no other passengers were on board as it was already nighttime.
BBB, mother of AAA, stated in open court that the Accused-Appellant, who
had been staying in their house, is AAA’s uncle because the Accused-
Appellant and her husband, CCC, are first cousins. Preliminarily, BBB testified
that AAA, who was born on April 16, 1982, attained an educational level of
Grade 6 only because of her low comprehension and that she cannot even be
relied upon to run errands as she can only follow simple instructions or tasks
if well-explained to her. AAA is unlike any normal child because she cries and
scampers away when there are visitors around; she has never attended any
party, dance events, or any social gathering; and had poor grades in school.
BBB also testified that the Accused-Appellant disappeared in the evening of
February 14, 2002, together with her daughter, AAA. She and CCC looked for
their whereabouts, but located them only on February 20, 2002, in Poblacion,
Pili, Camarines Sur. When they saw AAA and the Accused-Appellant standing
near a market, waiting for a ride going to Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur,
they immediately approached and embraced AAA and took her away from the
latter. Forthwith, they reported the matter to the Barangay Tanod of the place
whereupon the Accused-Appellant was brought to the police station for
questioning.
At home, BBB interviewed her daughter as to where the Accused-Appellant
brought her, to which AAA replied that she was brought to a certain place in
Pili, Camarines Sur, where the Accused-Appellant raped her twice and
threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident. Upon learning the
same, she brought AAA to Dr. Pablo B. Filio, Jr. (Dr. Filio) on the following day
for a physical examination and, thereafter, to Dr. Imelda Escuadra (Dr.
Escuadra) for further check-up.
Dr. Escuadra, a Medical Specialist II at the Bicol Medical Center and in charge
of the Women and Children Protection Unit, particularly in the psychiatric
evaluation and management of patients, is the one who conducted psychiatric
and psychological tests on AAA. Dr. Escuadra testified that AAA suffers from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She also diagnosed AAA with mild
mental retardation because of her intellectual quotient (IQ) of only 55, which
meant that her mental age is equivalent to that of nine (9) to ten (10) – year
old child. Dr. Escuadra elaborated that the psychiatric tests and psychological
tests performed on AAA are different from each other because the former
refers to the examination of the patient’s mental capacity while the latter refers
to the evaluation of the patient’s intelligence quotient. She also averred that
AAA was poor in arithmetic and economics; that it took her some time to
answer even simple questions; that her answers were short and monosyllabic;
and that AAA cooperated during the sessions only when BBB is present.
Finally, Dr. Escuadra testified that AAA disclosed to her the events that
transpired during the rape incident in February 2002.
Dr. Filio, an Assistant City Health Officer in Iriga City who conducted a physical
examination on AAA, testified in fine that he did not find any laceration on the
victim’s vagina or seminal fluid inside it.
Finally, Carlos Bayrante, an uncle of the Accused-Appellant, corroborated
BBB’s testimony that at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of February 20, 2002,
they saw AAA and the Accused-Appellant together. He wondered why the two
(2) were together, but he did not bother to ask anyway.
The Version of the Defense:
The Accused-Appellant testified that he and CCC are cousins and that he
stayed in the house of the latter and his [CCC’s] family since October 2001 to
help in lumber-cutting. He denied forcing AAA into a relationship with him and
added that during his stay with CCC’s family, he courted a female neighbor
with whom AAA later quarreled because [AAA] had feelings for him. He
dissuaded her at first, but AAA threatened to commit suicide if they do not
become sweethearts. He even consulted a friend for he entertained the idea
that AAA might actually carry out her threat to commit suicide. Also, on one
occasion, AAA went inside his bedroom and suggested that they should leave
the place since her parents will not approve of their relationship.
The Accused-Appellant further testified that on or about February 9, 2002, he
and AAA left the house, stopped by at Baao and proceeded to Pili, Camarines
Sur at about 5:00 or 6:00 o’clock the following morning. They first went to his
friend’s house where AAA changed her clothes and, later, to his uncle’s house
in Minalabac, Camarines Sur, where he left AAA because he had to go back
to Baao to get his own clothes. He returned to his uncle’s house in the
afternoon of the same day and stayed there with AAA for five (5) more days.
While in Manapao, AAA suggested that they go to the office of the Barangay
Captain to execute an affidavit to the effect that AAA’s act of going with him
was voluntary.
The Accused-Appellant further testified that he and AAA went to Old San
Roque when they learned that the latter’s parents were looking for them. They
checked in at El Alma Hotel in Pili, Camarines Sur, where they spent the night
and checked out of the following morning on February 20, 2002. In the said
morning, however, when they went to the house of his cousin, William Rañon
(Rañon), to pick up their personal belongings, AAA’s parents were there.
Marilyn Mendoza (Mendoza) testified that she personally knows AAA as she
(Mendoza) was previously introduced to her by the Accused-Appellant. The
next time that she met AAA was sometime on February 12 or 13, 2002 when
the Accused-Appellant requested if they could stay at her (Mendoza) parent’s
house. She, however, refused to entertain them because her parents will not
approve of it. Thus, AAA and the Accused-Appellant stayed there only for a
while.
Rañon, a Barangay Tanod in Old San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, testified
that at about 6:30 in the morning of February 19, 2002, he was in front of the
store of his relative in Old San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, when the Accused-
Appellant arrived together with a woman (referring to AAA). He noticed that
when the Accused-Appellant left some things in the store, the latter’s right arm
was placed on AAA’s shoulder. When he saw them again at about 5:00 o’clock
in the morning of the following day, in front of the public market, the Accused-
Appellant’s right arm was lazing on the woman’s shoulder while the latter were
leaning on the Accused-Appellant’s shoulder. At around 7:00 o’clock in the
morning of even date, BBB and her husband CCC approached him and sought
his help in apprehending the Accused-Appellant on the allegation that the latter
raped their daughter. As the Accused-Appellant was only about ten (10) to
fifteen (15) meters away from him, he called the former and told him to place
his hands on his head. He then conducted a body search, and thereafter,
brought him to the police station in Pili, Camarines Sur, for an investigation.
The woman, who was with the Accused-Appellant at the time, said that she
will go with him at the police station because they love each other.
Barangay Captain Zenaida Regis (Brgy. Capt. Regis) of Barangay Manapao,
Minalabac, Camarines Sur, testified that on February 19, 2002, the Accused-
Appellant, together with AAA, came to her office requesting the preparation of
an affidavit to the effect that AAA voluntarily went with the Accused-Appellant.
While interviewing AAA, Brgy. Capt. Regis noticed that it took some time for
AAA to answer the question of whether or not she was forced to go with the
Accused-Appellant. She qualified, however, that AAA finally answered in the
negative.4 (Citations omitted.)
After due proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286 and P-3287, the trial court
found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of Rape that were charged against him. We quote the dispositive portion of the
trial court’s Joint Judgment dated February 7, 2007 here:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered convicting
the accused for TWO (2) Counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each count. To pay [AAA] the amount
of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count, or in the total amount
of ₱250,000.00.
With cost de oficio.5
Unperturbed, appellant elevated his case to the Court of Appeals but the trial
court’s ruling was merely affirmed with modification by the appellate court in
its Decision dated November 11, 2008. The appellate court disallowed the
award of exemplary damages for the reason that the same may be awarded
only when one or more aggravating circumstances exist and that no such
circumstance is present in the case at bar. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) as exemplary
damages is DELETED. No costs.6
Thus, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court. He merely adopted
his Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals and no longer filed a
supplemental brief on the belief that the Appellant’s Brief had adequately
discussed all matters that are pertinent to his defense.1awp++i1 In the present
appeal, he put forth a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WHOSE GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.7
In his Brief, appellant maintains that AAA was his lover and that she voluntarily
eloped with him as evidenced by the affidavit she signed before Brgy. Capt.
Regis. Furthermore, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish
the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he raped a woman
who is of the legal age but otherwise deprived of reason. In other words, he
asserts that the prosecution was not able to prove that AAA suffers from
mental retardation. For these reasons, appellant urges this Court to exculpate
him from guilt.
We are not persuaded.
The provision of law pertinent in this case is Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, which states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is settled in jurisprudence that, under the foregoing provision of law, carnal
knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape because
such a person is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. 8 In a recent
case, we had declared that in cases of rape involving a victim suffering from
mental retardation, proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being
sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between the
accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim. 9
Previously in People v. Dalandas,10 we described in detail the nature of mental
retardation as well as its different degrees as defined in the modern and the
old intelligence quotient (IQ) scales:
Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood
and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by
standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental
retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as
well as impaired learning capacity.
Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental
deficiency," the latter term is usually reserved for those without recognizable
brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their level of
intellectual function are illustrated, thus:
Mental Retardation
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT
(IQ RANGE)
I Profound Below 20
II Severe 20-35
III Moderate 36-52
IV Mild 53-68
A normal mind is one which in strength and capacity ranks reasonably well
with the average of the great body of men and women who make up organized
human society in general, and are by common consent recognized as sane
and competent to perform the ordinary duties and assume the ordinary
responsibilities of life.
The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental
retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0-19, and a maximum intellectual
factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b)
imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life
equivalent to that of the average seven-year old child; (c) moron or
feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in
adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists
and psychologists apply the term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ
between 70 to 89. In People v. Palma, we ruled that a person is guilty of rape
when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a
"borderline mental deficiency."11
In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony of Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a
Medical Specialist II and officer-in-charge of the Women and Children
Protection Unit at the Bicol Medical Center who personally conducted the
psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly established that the victim is afflicted with mild
mental retardation. She further testified that AAA was also suffering from post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that AAA possesses an IQ of 55 with a
mental age equivalent to that of a normal 9 to 10-year-old person.12
In an attempt to discredit Dr. Escuadra’s testimony, appellant argued that Dr.
Escuadra admitted that the psychological test result was only furnished to her
by the psychologist who conducted AAA’s psychological exam and that the
said psychologist was not presented in court.13 We find this argument
unmeritorious. What was clear from Dr. Escuadra’s testimony was that her
psychiatric evaluation yielded the same diagnosis as the psychological
examination with respect to the victim’s mental retardation.14 The presentation
of the psychologist who conducted the psychological examination could be
dispensed with as the same would have merely been corroborative.
In any event, notwithstanding the fact that the determination of mental
retardation is deeply rooted in medical psychology, we had previously ruled
that evidence other than a psychometric evaluation can prove mental
retardation or abnormality.15 Furthermore, we held that mental retardation can
be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the
testimony of witnesses and even the observation of the trial court. 16 We find
no error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it likewise gave weight to the
testimony of BBB (AAA’s mother) regarding AAA’s difficulties in school due to
low comprehension and failure to complete even simple chores.17
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the mental retardation of Reform.
the victim was not proven, we likewise uphold the appellate court in finding
that AAA’s testimony adequately showed how appellant utilized force and Pros. Solano:
intimidation to succeed in having carnal knowledge with her. AAA testified that Q – As you were there as you said tell us what happened?
she initially resisted appellant’s carnal desire but was eventually overcome by
the latter because he used a knife to threaten her. At one point in her testimony, A – I was undressed.
AAA could not continue with her narration of the events that transpired during
Q – By whom?
the alleged rape incidents as she was overwhelmed by emotion, even weeping
on the witness stand. Consequently, it was necessary for the trial court to call A – By Marcial, sir.
a recess in order to give AAA the chance to collect herself. These were evident
in the following excerpts from the court transcript: Q – After you were undressed by Marcial, tell us what happened?

Pros. Solano: A – He got on top of me, sir.

Q – Miss Witness, sometime on February 19, 2002 at about 8:00 o’clock in the Q – After Marcial Bayrante got on top of you as you said tell us what happened
evening do you recall where were you? next?

A – I was at Centro Pili, sir. Pros. Solano:

Q – You are referring to Pili, Camarines Sur? I will withdraw that question.

A – Yes, sir. Pros. Solano:

Q – Particularly where in Pili, Camarines Sur were you at that time? Q – What happened to Marcial Bayrante when you were already undressed,
what did he do, if any?
A – In the house.
A – He also undressed himself, sir.
Q – Why were you in that house located at Pili, Camarines Sur on that
particular date and time? Q – After Marcial Bayrante undressed himself as you said, what next
happened?
A – I was brought there by Marcial.
A – (At this juncture, the witness is crying.)
Q – When you said Marcial you are referring to Marcial the accused in these
two (2) cases? Court:

A – Yes, sir. Q – Why are you crying?

Q – By the way, have you gone to El Alma Hotel? A – Because I remembered what he did to me, your honor.

Atty. Obias: Q – And so tell us what did he do to you, the accused in this case?

No basis, your honor. A – (No answer.)

Pros. Solano: Court:

Preliminary, your honor. Continue.

Court: Pros. Solano:

Q – You testified earlier that you were undressed by the accused and he Q – If you can estimate the penis of the accused inserted to your vagina on
himself undressed also and so what happened to his penis and your vagina, if February 19, 2002 at Pili, Camarines Sur as you can estimate these two (2)
any? insertion was made by the accused?

A – (No answer.) A – (No answer.)

Atty. Obias:
Maybe, your honor we can suspend the proceedings.
Court:
To give the private complainant witness to regain composure as she is crying
and cannot answer to the question of the public prosecutor, the hearing is
suspended for ten (10) minutes after which we will resume the hearing of the
same.
Q – Now, after the accused inserted his penis to your vagina at 8:00 o’clock
on February 19, 2002 in that house, what happened as you said was painful?
A – I got pregnant, sir.
Q – And what happened to your pregnancy?
A – And so I gave birth to a baby girl.
Q – Do you know the name?

Hearing resumed at 10:00 in the morning. A – Yes sir, Jose.

Pros. Solano: Court:

Q – Miss witness, you testified that accused undressed you and after he Q – Where is now the child?
undressed you he also undressed himself, what happened next, if any? A – He died.
A – He inserted his penis to my vagina. Q – When did your child died?
Q – So what did you feel, if any? A – Right after my delivery, your honor.
A – I felt painful. Court:
Q – Now, at about 10:00 o’clock of the same night, February 19, 2002, where Continue.
were you at that time?
Pros. Solano:
A – I was still at the house, sir.
Q – Do you have any death certificate?
Q – Tell us what happened, if any?
A – Yes sir, I have. (At this juncture, the witness is producing her birth
A – Again, I was undressed by accused. certificate.)
Q – After you were undressed again by the accused as you said, what else Q – And so, as far as you can recall miss witness during these two (2) incidents
happened, if any? that the penis of the accused inserted to your vagina, did you not resist?
A – Again he inserted his penis to my vagina. A – Yes, sir.
Q – Again, what did you feel? Q – And what happened to your resistance?
A – It was painful, sir. A – I was afraid.

Q – Why were you afraid?

A – Because he had with him a knife. A – (At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man who when asked his
name responded as Marcial Bayrante.)18
Q – What kind of knife, how long was it?
In People v. Manjares,19 we reiterated the basic principles that:
A – (At this juncture, the witness is demonstrating the length of the knife which
is about five (5) inches long including the handle.) In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of
the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
Court: human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. There is a
Q – You said that you resisted how did you resist? plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding
that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all
A – (No answer.) that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the
Q – You said that when the accused inserted his penis to your vagina, how
basis thereof. x x x.
were you resisted?
That the victim suffers from a mental abnormality or deficiency would not
A – I was kicking at him, your honor.
detract from the reliability of her testimony. We observed in a similar case that:
Q – Was he hit when you kicked him?
While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental retardate may be
A – Yes, your honor. difficult to determine, still, it can be ascertained by deducing from the manner
she testifies in court as to the surrounding facts of the crime committed. For
Q – How many times did you kick him? as long as her testimony is straightforward, candid and unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, and her demeanor is
A – Many times, your honor.
consistent with one who has been a victim of rape, bolsters her credibility with
xxxx the verity born[e] out of human nature and experience, thus, must be given full
faith and credit.
Court:
Moreover, mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally
Q – You said that you were raped, do you recall where was that house where… retarded [person] may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony
you were brought by the accused located? depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them
known to the court.20
A – There at Pili, Camarines Sur.
In People v. Arpon,21 we discussed the jurisprudential principle of affording
Q – Do you know who owns that house?
great respect and even finality to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
A – No, your honor. of witnesses:

Q – Can you describe that house? Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the
credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's
A – Plenty of rooms, your honor. observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded
Q – Does it has name? finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment
and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
A – I was not able to see, your honor. hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a
Q – And you said you bore a child that died right after you gave birth tell us the witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine
father of your child? if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must
be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
[Court of Appeals].22
We further agree with the Court of Appeals that AAA’s emotional outburst on
the witness stand strengthens the trustworthiness of her testimony. According
to jurisprudence, the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the
credibility of the rape charge with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience.23
In a seemingly desperate effort to secure an acquittal, appellant maintains that
the alleged rape could not have occurred because both he and AAA were
lovers. In other words, he proffers the "sweetheart theory" as a defense but his
assertion is bereft of substantial proof. The appellate court did not err in finding
that the testimony of the witnesses presented by appellant utterly failed to
satisfactorily prove the alleged romantic relationship.
Witness Marilyn Mendoza’s testimony revealed that it was only appellant who
claimed that AAA was his sweetheart and that AAA never spoke to her much
less told her that both she and appellant were romantically involved with each
other.24 Likewise, witness William Rañon’s testimony is afflicted with the same
infirmity. He merely averred that he saw appellant’s arm on AAA’s shoulder
and from that fact assumed that they had a relationship. Still he admitted in
open court that he had no personal knowledge of the purported love affair
between appellant and AAA.25
Neither could the purported affidavit signed by AAA before Brgy. Captain
Regis be relied upon by appellant. All that the affidavit stated was that AAA
"voluntarily went with [appellant]"26 but such statement does not preclude that
any sexual relation between them was not consensual. Moreover, given AAA’s
mental state, it was highly doubtful that she understood the significance of the
affidavit that she signed or that she signed it voluntarily. We note, too, Brgy.
Captain Regis’s testimony that (a) it was appellant who insisted on the
execution of the affidavit27 and (b) the reason AAA was asked to sign the
affidavit was so that appellant would have no responsibility or liability as
regards AAA.28
We have previously held that:
For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed
relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to
adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative
value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by their
common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship
such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.29
Significantly, this Court has decreed that even if the alleged romantic
relationship were true, this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man
cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and worse, employ violence
upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license for lust. 30
As to the civil liability, we affirm the trial court’s award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages for each count of simple rape that appellant
had been proven to have committed. However, we disagree with the Court of
Appeal’s decision to delete the trial court’s award of exemplary damages in
the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00).
In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein
exemplary damages are awarded in order to set a public example and to
protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation, we agree with the trial
court regarding the propriety of the award of exemplary damages but
increased the same from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00).31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 11, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Appellant Marcial Bayrante is ordered to pay Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages for each count of SIMPLE RAPE, and
(2) Appellant Marcial Bayrante is further ordered to pay the private offended
party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 112429-30. July 23, 1997.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL
NUÑEZ y SEVILLA, Accused, RODOLFO CAYETANO y PANGILINAN,
Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Roberto B. Salcedo for Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Stealing with intent to gain, from being a simple, uncomplicated act in times
past, albeit unlawful, has evolved into more elaborate schemes guaranteed to
filch money from a person with the least risk of being caught on the part of the
felon.
Those with grandiose designs of victimizing the wealthy have, with alarming
frequency, resorted to kidnapping, snatching not only their intended victims,
but the families of the latter, as well. Within the past few years, so steep has
been the incidence in the crime of kidnapping for ransom that on December
31, 1993, Republic Act No. 7659 went into effect, categorizing the same as a
heinous crime punishable by death. 1
In the instant case which occurred before said law was passed, two high
school lads were duped by the accused into going with him. One was to be
used for purposes of extricating ransom from his businessman father. But the
other, the son of impecunious parents, was subsequently bound hands and
feet, gagged and drowned in a river like a rat, with absolutely no chance of
survival.
The facts of this shocking case are as follows:
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano, together with his co-accused Michael
Nuñez (Nuñez) and Ismael Santos alias "Ka Tony," were charged with the
crimes of Kidnapping for Ransom (Criminal Case No. 12778-MN) 2 and
Kidnapping with Murder (Criminal Case No. 12779-MN). 3 Only accused-
appellant and Nuñez were convicted and accordingly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay damages. Accused Santos remains at large.
The prosecution was able to establish that at around 1:15 in the afternoon of
January 21, 1993 inside the compound of Immaculate Concepcion Parochial
School, Accused Nuñez persuaded the victim, fourteen-year old high school
student Joseph Rivera, to go with him on the pretext that he would turn over
the proceeds of the sale of a gun to the latter’s father. He was likewise able to
persuade Joseph Rivera to bring along the latter’s classmate, another fourteen
year-old student Neil Patrick Quillosa on the pretext that Neil would be
Joseph’s companion in going home later.
The two boys were brought to a nipa hut in the middle of a fishpond in Dampalit,
Malabon to await a certain "Ka Tony." As the two boys attempted to go home,
they were told to go back as "Ka Tony" was coming. When they were asked in
jest about their preference if they were to be killed either with a knife or with a
gun, Neil answered that he would prefer a gun pointed at his head.
Thereafter, Accused Nuñez told them that "Ka Tony" would not enter the hut
unless they were blindfolded and tied. They protested but were assured by
accused Nuñez that they would not be harmed. Both victims’ hands and feet
were tied with wire and rope.
Accused-appellant came and checked if the two victims were tied securely,
after which, Accused Nuñez played a tape demanding three million pesos in
five hundred and one thousand peso bills from the parents of Rivera in
exchange for his release. Rivera was likewise made to record his own voice
pleading to his parents to pay the ransom demanded. Thereafter, Accused
Nuñez, who was then in possession of a gun, fired the same towards the
window, hitting the casette recorder.
The victims were then brought to the river by accused and Accused-Appellant.
Accused Nuñez dragged Neil by the neck towards the middle of the river and
left him there to drown while accused-appellant stood guard over Rivera.
Quillosa’s cries for help and Rivera’s pleas for their captors to save Quillosa
went unheeded.
In the nipa hut, Rivera was made to record his own voice saying, "Mommy,
Daddy, para makilala ninyo na sanay silang pumatay, pinatay na nila si Neil."
Thereafter, he managed to untie his feet and asked accused-appellant to
remove the wire around his hands on the assurance that he would not escape.
The following morning, Accused Nuñez went to deliver the tape to Rivera’s
house.
While accused-appellant was busy cutting grass near the river, Rivera
escaped and proceeded to the house of accused Nuñez where he called up
his grandmother. Thereupon, he was fetched by his grandmother and with his
father, they proceeded to the Malabon Police Station and reported the
kidnapping. The policemen who responded recovered the casette recorder
from the nipa hut but failed to find both accused and Accused-Appellant.
Neil Patrick Quillosa’s body was recovered on January 23, 1993 at Chungkang
River, Malabon with both hands and feet still bound with wires and his mouth
gagged. Dr. Juanito Sacdalan testified that the cause of death was asphyxia
due to strangulation and that the wire tied around the hands of the victim was
the same wire tied around the neck.
Accused-appellant, however, denied the accusation against him claiming that
on the day he arrived at the nipa hut, Accused Nuñez poked a gun at him and
threatened to kill him if he squeals. He also claimed that accused Nuñez
recorded something on a casette and he saw two children with him whose
hands and feet were tied with wires. Thereafter, Accused Nuñez instructed
one of the children, whom he came to know during the trial of this case to be
Joseph Rivera, to record something which he did not hear as accused Nuñez
ordered him to keep his distance. He averred that when Nuñez brought the
children to the river, he was just watching and following them; that from his
position atop the paddy, he saw accused Nuñez in the middle of the river
release one of the children, whom he came to know during the trial to be Neil
Patrick Quillosa, as a result of which the latter drowned.
The following morning, Accused Nuñez told him to guard Rivera after which
the former left. However, he claimed that he left Rivera inside the nipa hut to
cut grass around the fishpond. When accused Nuñez returned and learned
from him that Rivera had left, the former likewise disappeared. Moments later,
Accused Nuñez’ father arrived and told him that he would get the casette. He
was likewise told to leave as policemen will be coming. As a result, he left and
went to his grandmother’s place, after which he was surrendered by his uncle
to Vice President Joseph Estrada. He likewise claims that he does not know
how to read and that he can write only his name and count up to fifty only. He
claims to know Michael Nuñez as he usually sees him when he buys "kakanin"
from the latter’s family.
The lower court in a joint decision 4 convicted both accused and accused-
appellant with Kidnapping for Ransom and accordingly sentenced both to
reclusion perpetua. Both were also found to have committed the complex
crime of Kidnapping with Murder and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. They were also ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the victims in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay actual damages in the
amount of P41,700.00 and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, as well
as the costs of the suit.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding that accused-appellant’s low level of intelligence/state of
imbecility exempts him from any criminal liability.
2. In not finding that the records of the case are not sufficient to hold a finding
of conspiracy against the Accused-Appellant.
3. In not acquitting the accused by reason of an exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
In the first submission of error, Accused-appellant claims that he possesses a
very low level of intelligence as revealed in his direct testimony and cross-
examination, indicating a mental age of between six (6) to ten (10) years of
age. To prove his imbecility, he cited his act of cutting grass when he should
be guarding his victim. As such, he should be exempted from criminal liability
under the Revised Penal Code. Even assuming that he is liable, the lower court
should have proceeded against him pursuant to the Child and Youth Welfare
Code.
In his second submission, Accused-appellant declares that he could not have
conspired with accused Nuñez for the following reasons: (1) accused-
appellant would rather cut grass than guard his victim, as indicative of his low
mental age; (2) the act of kidnapping itself was already executed and perfected
by accused Nuñez when the accused-appellant arrived in the nipa hut several
hours after the kidnapping; (3) the testimonies of private complainant Joseph
Rivera and the accused-appellant were consistent with the fact that accused-
appellant was nowhere near accused Nuñez when he was recording the
alleged demand for payment.
In his third submission, Accused-appellant testified that accused Nuñez poked
a gun at him and threatened him with death; so he had no alternative but to
follow the orders of accused Nuñez, specially considering his mental capacity.
The Court is not persuaded by such remonstrations. The defense counsel’s
attribution of imbecility is not supported by evidence. Imbecility, one of the
exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, is
defined as feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching that of one
who is insane. It is analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile, within
the meaning of Article 12, is one who must be deprived completely of reason
or discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. 5 He is
one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to
that of children between two and seven years of age. 6
Accused-appellant’s act of cutting grass rather than guarding his victim could
hardly be indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may be considered as negligence
but definitely not childishness or even that of one completely deprived of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will. In fact, Accused-appellant
admitted on cross-examination that he can tell what is right and what is wrong.
7 Assuming arguendo that accused-appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded
person, in the case of People v. Formigones, 8 it was held that
feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the offender could distinguish
right from wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot. In any case, Article 800 of
the Civil Code provides that "the law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary." The allegation of insanity or
imbecility must be clearly proved. Moreover, the law presumes all acts to be
voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously."
9
Neither will this Court subscribe to accused-appellant’s third submission that
he was prompted to act the way he did due to uncontrollable fear of an equal
or greater injury. Accused-appellant’s claim that accused Nuñez poked a gun
at him and threatened him with death is belied by testimonial evidence.
Granting that accused-appellant was forced to do what he did on account of
fear, duress or intimidation such that he could not possibly have any
opportunity to defend himself in equal combat, testimonial evidence show that
he had at least four opportunities to escape. The first was when accused
Nuñez allegedly brought the two victims to the river while he remained on the
rice paddy. 10 The second was when accused Nuñez and the victim Joseph
Rivera were sleeping in the nipa hut. 11 The third was when accused Nuñez
asked him to look for the necklace of Neil Patrick Quillosa on the river bank
while the former was in the nipa hut together with the victim Joseph Rivera. 12
The fourth was when accused Nuñez left him and the victim the following
morning to deliver the taped or recorded ransom demand to the victim’s family.
13 Accused-appellant could have easily taken advantage of any of these
opportunities considering that only accused Nuñez threatened him. By not
availing of these chances to escape, his allegation of fear or duress becomes
incredible under the circumstances.
In People v. Villanueva, 14 this Court stated that:
"Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done.
A threat of future injury is not enough. (16 C.J., 91).
To be available as a defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate
and actual danger of death or great bodily harm must be present and the
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused
for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule
if a defendant could shield himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting
up a fear from or because of a threat of a third person. (Wharton’s Criminal
Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384).
Fear as an excuse for crime has never been received by the law. No man,
from fear or circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to
committing mischief upon mankind. (Lord Denman in Reg. v. Tyler, 8 Car. and
P. [Eng.] 616, v. Duddely, L.R. 14, Q.B. Div. [Eng.] 273)."
Accused-appellant’s knowledge of what is right or wrong, as well as his failure
to escape bolsters the prosecution’s evidence that he conspired with accused
Nuñez to commit the crimes being charged against them, contrary to the
former’s second submission. The records show the presence of conspiracy.
First, when accused-appellant arrived at the hut where the victims were being
held, the first thing he did was to check if the victims were securely tied. 15
Second, Accused-appellant carried the victim Neil Patrick Quillosa to the river.
16 Third, Accused-appellant kicked the victim Joseph Rivera when the latter
was ordered to go to the river. 17 It may be deduced from those acts by
accused-appellant that he conspired with accused Nuñez to commit the crimes.
While it is true that a finding of criminal conspiracy must be supported by
evidence constituting proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is equally true that
such evidence need not be direct evidence. It may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. The conditions attending its
commission and the acts executed may be indicative of the common design to
accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of
circumstances to that effect, then, conspiracy has been established.
To exempt himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed
an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit
the felony. 19 Nowhere in the records does it show that accused-appellant
ever did anything to dissuade accused Nuñez from killing Neil Patrick Quillosa
or to escape in order to report the crime despite at least four opportunities to
do so.
This Court fully agrees with the lower court that Kidnapping for Ransom was
committed against Joseph Rivera, as the essential element that the victim
must have been restrained or deprived of his liberty was present when both
victims were tied and when the gun was brandished and fired to intimidate
them. 20 In addition, Accused Nuñez and accused-appellant recorded a
ransom demand with the intention of sending it to Rivera’s parents. 21 The
records indicate that accused Nuñez and accused-appellant intended to detain
only Rivera and hold him for ransom as he was the son of a gasoline owner
having a net income of P24,000.00 a month and owning several properties. 22
The same, however, cannot be said of Neil Patrick Quillosa. The records show
that the intent of accused Nuñez and that of accused-appellant was to kill
Quillosa and not to detain him for ransom. Quillosa was a stranger to them and
they merely persuaded Rivera to take him along so he could have a companion
in going home. 23 In any case, they could not have possibly intended to detain
Quillosa and hold him for ransom as he was only a son of a jeepney driver. 24
Thus, the crime committed by accused Nuñez and accused-appellant with
respect to the victim Quillosa should be Homicide and not Kidnapping with
Murder since they never intended to hold Quillosa for ransom. Nuñez’ query
as to Quillosa’s preference on the manner of his death shows the formers’
intention to kill the latter. As treachery was not alleged in the information, then
it could not have qualified the crime to murder.
However, treachery should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code states that
there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In the instant case,
treachery was evident when the accused Nuñez led the victims to believe that
it was necessary for them to be blindfolded and tied first with wires and a rope
before a certain Ka Tony would agree to meet them. Having thus placed the
victims, particularly Quillosa, in a helpless condition, Accused Nuñez and
accused-appellant were able to carry out with ease their common design to kill
Quillosa without any risk to themselves arising from any struggle the boy might
make.
Craft should also be appreciated as aggravating the crime of homicide since it
was shown that the victims, particularly the unsuspecting Quillosa, were lured
by the accused into coming with them on the pretext that the former would only
accompany Rivera to accept the proceeds of the sale of a gun.
With respect to accused-appellant, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should be appreciated in his favor.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 12778-MN, the decision of the trial court
is AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 12779-MN, the decision of the trial court
is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano y Pangilinan is
CONVICTED of the crime of homicide and IMPOSING upon him the prison
term ranging from 10 years and 1 day to 12 years, prision mayor maximum,
as minimum up to 18 years, 6 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum.
Costs against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
Luis Contreras for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V.
Makasiar for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur finding the appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and
to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was
living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur,
with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live
in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian
of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay.
After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the
afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused,
without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the
wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating
the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long
thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms,
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay
down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in
response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones,
who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written
statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was
admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have
quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of
his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit
relations because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him
(defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of
Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the
case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty,
but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the
provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there
was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes
he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow
prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his
surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until
forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus
with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and
that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside
into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and
therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree
with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr.
Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was
suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could
distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability,
he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the
will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of
the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and
applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the
Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts;
that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence
of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or
freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be
equaled to imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented,
a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always
reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming
that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his
being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by
remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar
(27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to
indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger
or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting
trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the
defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement
appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not
an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years,
he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an
opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his
farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in
school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as
a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to
take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions
were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was
not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as
that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition
to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is
said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother,
Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house
was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house,
Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights.
All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of
Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those
unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not
been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell
down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying
beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved
one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly
surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police
to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted
that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate
said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense
of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that
the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the
crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said
aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice
of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him
the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this
aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is
feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance
provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which
thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow
beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To
this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article,
— that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit
of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of
the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the
purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for
parricide, which is reclusion perpetuato death. It will be observed however,
that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties,
each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles
76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable
for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand,
article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties
whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that
of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one
applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of
the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a
similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80,
paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63,
paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice
Arellano said the following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two
mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to
overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the
next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court
of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that
contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.)
(Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is
inevitable and which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts
to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal
Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order
that a proper petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in
order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative
vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next
lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide
case, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing
defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous
mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide
as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two
indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of
article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has
exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore
under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully
invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive
clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the
judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be
credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the
two cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter
penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive
who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion
perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he
sees fit.
G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without
proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to
kill may be established through the overt and external acts and conduct of the
offender before, during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and
number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on
September 27, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo under the
judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.2
Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:
x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at aboutten o’clock in the evening, Alexander
Flojo (hereafter "Alexander") was fetching water below his rented house at 443
Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De
Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista
(hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what
Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na
Mang Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went
upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to
12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring
water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and
stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left
portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that
Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle
(backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon
arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to
Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about
30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital
where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to
the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further
medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the
zygoma, left side, and aboutone (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left
chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular
line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated
the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in
the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube
toremove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who
treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound
was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical
intervention. (Tsn, July 8, 1998, p.8).
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to
him, on December 25,1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who
was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s
back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted,
thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo
hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face. 3
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis
a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised
Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1)
day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One
(1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered topay the private complainant compensatory
damages in the amount of ₱14,170.35 representing the actual pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proven.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of the crime charged,
was not established; that the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere
scuffmarks inflicted in the heatof anger during the fist fight between them; that
he did not inflict the stabwounds, insisting that another person could have
inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries on
Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmedthe petitioner’s conviction, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.6
Issue
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide?
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) noneof the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as
the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in
murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain
the presence of the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the
fistfight between him and Alexander.1âwphi1 He claims that the heightened
emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he
maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab
wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable
only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary
element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established.
He avers that such intentto kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime
of physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide
only if the intent to kill is competently shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the
offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege
in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence,
as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is
discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and
conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter.
In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2)
the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the
victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors
the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the
injuries on the victim.10
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present.
We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds
sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger
or as the result ofa fistfight between them. The petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records
indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one
on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s
attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds,
thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill.
There is also to beno doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being
sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a
consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly
found guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the
trial and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It is not
disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness
sufficed to support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more
compelling application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct
and positive identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with
indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek
justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to
recall the manner in which the latter committed the crime.11 Moreover, it is
significant that the petitioner’s mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack
was contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s
statements. Under the circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s
conviction for frustrated homicide. The affirmance of the conviction
notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One
(1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and
One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM"12 fixed by the RTC erroneous
despite the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.13 The maximum
term is the penaltyproperly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed. Conformably with Article
50 of the Revised Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is punished by prision
mayor, which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances present, however, prision mayorin its medium period
– from eight years and one day to 10 years – is proper. As can be seen, the
maximum of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA was not within the medium period of prision mayor.
Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
the maximum.
The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of
₱14,170.35 as compensatory damages "representing the actual pecuniary
loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven."15 We need to revise such
civil liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we emphatically declared to be
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless
there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver
of its recovery." We explained why in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment,
if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted
by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after
the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their
disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen
as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action
because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs
that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established
facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for
only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true
to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should
then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in
criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of
the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of
the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always
entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or
waived.17
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because
the offender committed violence that nearly took away the victim’s life. "Moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act for omission."18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly
recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in physical
injuries.19 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the records,
decrees that ₱30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages. 20 In
addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00. 21 Both of
these awards did not require allegation and proof.
In addition, the amounts awarded ascivil liability of the petitioner shall earn
interest of 6% per annumreckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment by the accused. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and
SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity
of ₱30,000.00; moral damages of ₱30,000.00; and compensatory damages of
Pl4,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum on all such awards from the finality
of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167766 April 7, 2010
ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
February 18, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27458, which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. VI-984, finding petitioner Engr.
Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries
instead of attempted murder, and the Resolution3 dated April 19, 2005,
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his brother-in-law. After
consuming ½ bottle of gin, he left and went to the house of a certain Siababa
to buy coffee and sugar. He was accompanied by his four- year-old son. On
their way there, a gray automobile coming from the opposite direction passed
by them. After a while, he noticed that the vehicle was moving backward
towards them. When the car was about two arms’ length from where they were,
it stopped and he heard the driver of the vehicle call him by his
nickname Parrod. Rudy came closer, but after taking one step, the driver,
which he identified as the petitioner, opened the door and while still in the car
drew a gun and shot him once, hitting him just below the left armpit. Rudy
immediately ran at the back of the car, while petitioner sped away. After
petitioner left, Rudy and his son headed to the seashore. Rudy later went back
to the place where he was shot and shouted for help.4
The people who assisted him initially brought him to the Municipal Hall of
Gonzaga, Cagayan, where he was interrogated by a policeman who asked
him to identify his assailant. He informed the policeman that petitioner was the
one who shot him. After he was interrogated, he was later brought to the Don
Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan. The following day,
he was discharged from the hospital.5
On June 1, 1999, an Information6 was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Aparri, Cagayan, charging the petitioner of frustrated murder, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
That on or about September 2, 1998, in the [M]unicipality of Gonzaga,
[P]rovince of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rudy Baclig, inflicting upon the latter
gunshot injuries.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have
produce[d] the crime of Murder as a consequence, but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will.
That the same was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.7
During the trial, it was established that at the time the incident occurred,
petitioner was employed by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) as
Irrigation Superintendent assigned at the Baua River Irrigation System (BRIS).
Petitioner vehemently denied any involvement in the incident, alleging that he
was in Quezon City at the time the crime was being committed. He contended
that he was following-up the funding for one of the projects of NIA in Gonzaga,
Cagayan. He insisted that he reported at the NIA Central Office on September
1, 1998 and stayed in Manila until the afternoon of September 4, 1998. To
buttress his allegations, the petitioner presented a Certificate of
Appearance8 issued by Engr. Orlando C. Hondrade, then NIA Deputy
Administrator, who testified thru a deposition that he indeed signed the
document. Engr. Hondrade testified that he specifically remembered that
petitioner personally appeared before him on the 1st and 4th days of
September for a duration of 10 to 15 minutes. Petitioner also submitted his
daily time record to prove that he was not at their office in Cagayan from the
afternoon of August 31, 1998, claiming that he traveled to Quezon City
pursuant to a travel authority issued by his superior.9
On February 27, 2003, after presentation of the parties’ respective evidence,
the RTC rendered a Decision10 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
attempted murder. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Attempted Murder and
sentences him the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. Further, the accused is ordered to pay private complainant Rudy
Baclig the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC concluded that Rudy positively identified the petitioner as the one
who shot him − there was sufficient lighting for Rudy to identify the perpetrator
and he knew petitioner ever since he attained the age of reason. As to
petitioner’s defense of alibi, the RTC ratiocinated that when petitioner
personally appeared before Engr. Hondrade on September 1, 1998, it would
not be impossible for him to immediately return to Gonzaga, Cagayan that
afternoon and commit the crime in the evening of September 2, 1998.12
Petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, arguing that the RTC
committed serious errors in finding that he was guilty of attempted murder and
that the RTC failed to consider the testimonies of his witnesses and the
documentary evidence presented in his favor.13
On February 18, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification
the decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 27 February
2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Pentecostes
is only found GUILTY OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
there being one aggravating and no mitigating circumstance to offset it.
SO ORDERED.14
In convicting the petitioner to a lesser offence, the CA opined that it was not
established that petitioner intended to kill Rudy when he shot him. Petitioner’s
act of shooting Rudy once was not followed by any other assault or any act
which would ensure his death. Considering that petitioner was driving a car,
he could have chased Rudy if he really intended to kill the latter, or run him
over since Rudy went to the rear of the car. Petitioner’s desistance displayed
his nonchalance to cause the death of Rudy. Moreover, Rudy only sustained
a gunshot wound on the arm, which required only 10 days of medical
attendance.15
Not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 but was denied in
a Resolution dated April 9, 2005.
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
The honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, committed a grave abuse
of discretion when it gives credence to the statement of the private
complainant presuming that the petitioner-appellant is the assailant allegedly
due to his voice and his alleged ownership of the vehicle, and considering that
the private complainant was then intoxicated, and the crime was committed at
nighttime, such conclusion is entirely grounded on speculations, surmises and
conjectures.
The honorable fourteenth division committed grave abuse of discretion when
it failed to give weight, discuss and consider the arguments and defenses
made the petitioner-appellant in our brief, vis-à-vis the manifestation and
motion of the solicitor general.
The honorable fourteenth division committed an error when it relied heavily on
an unfounded, baseless and alleged motive of petitioner, being a crusader of
illegal drugs in their own town, to be the basis that he is the assailant.17
Petitioner questions the conclusion of the CA when it found him guilty of the
crime of less serious physical injuries. He argues that Rudy failed to positively
identify him as the assailant, since Rudy never admitted that he was able to
identify the petitioner through his physical appearance, but only through his
voice, despite the fact that it was the first time Rudy heard petitioner’s voice
when he allegedly shot him. Petitioner also insists that when the incident
occurred, Rudy’s vision was impaired as he just drank half a bottle of gin and
the place was not properly lit. Rudy also failed to identify the type of gun used
during the shooting. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that the car
used by the perpetrator was owned by the petitioner.
Further, petitioner maintains that it was impossible for him to have shot the
victim on the night of September 2, 1998, since he was not in the Province of
Cagayan Valley from September 1, 1998 to September 4, 1998.
The petition is bereft merit.
In sum, petitioner submits before this Court two issues for resolution. First,
whether or not the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner was the one who shot the victim; Second, whether or not petitioner’s
defense of alibi would prosper.
As regards the first issue, this Court finds that the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one who shot Rudy that
fateful night of September 2, 1998. Both the RTC and the CA found that
petitioner indeed shot Rudy. In arriving at this conclusion, the RTC ratiocinated
in this wise:
Private complainant Rudy Baclig averred that he personally knew the accused
since he was of the age of reason. Rudy knew accused Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes Jr. to be working with the NIA at Sta. Cruz, Gonzaga, Cagayan.
Both private complainant Rudy Baclig and accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes
Jr. were residents of Gonzaga, Cagayan, although they reside in different
barangays. Rudy was residing at Brgy. Batangan, while the accused was living
two-and-a-half kilometers away at Brgy. Flourishing. Rudy Baclig categorically
stated that when the car of the accused passed by him, it slowly stopped then
moved backward and when the car was at a distance of about two arms’ length,
which was about three (3) meters, the accused called Rudy’s nickname Parrod.
Hearing his nickname, Rudy went towards the car, but he was only able to
take one step, accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. opened the door of the
car and shot Rudy once and afterwards the accused hurriedly sped away.
Asked how he was able to identify Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. to be the
person who shot him when it was night time, Rudy said that he was able to
identify the accused through the lights of the car and on cross-examination he
said that aside from the lights of the car, there were also lights coming from a
store nearby the place of the incident. The Court believes that with these kinds
of lights, Rudy Baclig was able to identify the accused, considering the
distance between the assailant and the victim was only three (3) meters.
x x x x.
Rudy Baclig was not telling a lie when he declared that he was shot at about
two arms’ length only because the doctor who treated him, Dr. Mila M.
Marantan, declared that Rudy Baclig suffered a gunshot wound, the entry was
with powder burns which is an evidence that Rudy Baclig was shot at a close
range.
The defense harped on the fact that the private complainant smelled liquor.
The complainant at first denied having taken liquor, but he admitted he took
one-half bottle of gin before he went to buy coffee and sugar. On cross-
examination, the complainant admitted also that every afternoon, he drank
liquor. He admitted that he could still walk naturally a distance of about one
kilometer. He also said that his vision might be affected. This testimony of
Rudy Baclig cannot be considered as evidence that he was not able to identify
the accused. He was categorical in stating that he was able to identify the
accused. The doctor who treated Rudy of his injury declared the patient
smelled liquor, but she could not tell how much liquor the patient took, however,
the patient could answer all her questions.
x x x x.
There are other evidences that tend to show that Rudy Baclig was able to
identify the assailant. Immediately after he was shot, Rudy told a police
investigator, a certain Torres and Dr. Mila Marantan that it was Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes, Jr. who shot him.18
This conclusion was concurred into by the CA, which categorically stated in its
decision that "[t]he prosecution was able to present a witness, in the person of
Baclig, who categorically identified petitioner as his assailant and whose
testimony was characterized by frankness."19 Contrary to petitioner’s
contention, Rudy saw him and positively identified him as his shooter, viz:
Q: When you heard the driver of the car calling you by your nickname Parrod,
what was your reaction?
A: I went near because I thought he was telling me something.
Q: And what made you decide to go near the driver of the vehicle?
A: Because he called me by my name, Sir.
Q: When the driver of the car called you by your [nickname], were you able to
recognize the driver of the car who called you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And who was that person who called you by your name Parrod?
A: It was Engr. Pentecostes, Sir.
Q: The same person you identified a while ago?
A: Yes, Sir.20
Corollarilly, petitioner already raised these arguments in his motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the court a quo, which the CA addressed
point by point in the assailed resolution denying the motion. We quote with
approval the following discussion of the CA:
On the first allegation, accused-appellant wrongly read the decision. The Court
upheld the trial court’s finding that it was indeed accused-appellant who
attacked the private complainant, not because the latter heard accused-
appellant’s voice but that he was able to see him through the lights of the car
when he opened the window and the door. x x x
xxxx
Clearly, it was not merely hearing the assailant’s voice, but that he was able
to see him, that private-complainant was able to identify the accused-appellant.
It was admittedly a fact that private complainant had a drink but it does not
mean that he was intoxicated, especially since he admitted that he drinks
everyday. Thus, his body’s tolerance to alcohol is probably heightened. There
was also no proof that his vision had been affected by the alcohol intake, and
that he would have mistaken someone else for the accused.
Again, positive declaration is given more weight than the denial of the accused-
appellant. In addition, the same findings were previously reached by the trial
court which had the opportunity to observe first-hand the demeanor of the
witnesses, and assess their credibility.
Regarding the Solicitor General’s recommendation, the Court is not bound to
follow it although in some cases, we are persuaded by the same. However, in
this case, it was not able to persuade Us as it only adopted the same
arguments advanced by accused- appellant’s counsel.
Some of these arguments include the failure to present any document or
evidence showing that the car used was owned by the accused-appellant. The
ownership of the car, however, is immaterial in the light of the positive
identification of the accused. In addition, the statement of the prosecution’s
witnesses that the car was often used by accused-appellant’s father does not
remove the possibility that he may also use it.
On the third allegation of error, again, accused-appellant has misread the
decision and exaggerated by accusing us of relying heavily on the existence
of a probable motive on the part of accused-appellant to commit the act
complained of. This is clear in the decision that the same was meant to assess
whether there was a probable motive for the private complainant to lie.21
It is clear that the arguments advanced by the petitioner in the case at bar,
questioning the conclusion of the RTC and the CA that petitioner shot the
victim, are trivial. The fact remains that Rudy has been shot with a gun and he
positively identified his shooter as the petitioner. Petitioner faulted the RTC
and the CA for giving credence to the testimony of Rudy. However, it is to be
noted that even the lone declaration of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to convict
if that testimony is found to be credible. Credibility of witnesses is to be
weighed and should not be based on numbers. The matter of assigning values
to declaration on the witness stand is best and most competently performed
by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses
and to assess their credibility by various indicia available but not reflected on
the record.22
This Court has meticulously scrutinized the transcripts of stenographic notes
of this case and finds that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no error in
giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court has long
adhered to the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case. This deference to the trial court’s appreciation of
the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that
when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is
sufficient to convict the accused.23 This is especially true when the factual
findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate court. 24
As regards petitioner’s defense of alibi, well settled is the rule that alibi is an
inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the accused by the victim.25 Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the petitioner was somewhere else when
the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was
so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at
the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.26 In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner personally
appeared before Engr. Hondrade only on September 1 and 4, 1998. His
whereabouts for the two days in between the said dates are unaccounted for.
There was no showing that he could not have gone back to Cagayan,
committed the crime, and went back to Quezon City during those two days.
Petitioner’s defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail as against the positive,
straightforward and consistent testimony of Rudy that it was petitioner who
shot him on the night of September 2, 1998.
As to the crime committed by petitioner, this Court also concurs with the
conclusion of the CA that petitioner is guilty of the crime of less serious
physical injuries, not attempted murder.
The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the
intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such
intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.27 In the present case, intent
to kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.
Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latter’s
body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple
times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference
that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. 28 When such intent is
lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted
murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate29 issued
by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten
(10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following
day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious
physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts upon another
physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall
require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."1avvphi1
As to the aggravating circumstance of treachery, this Court finds that the CA
erroneously concluded that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
To establish treachery, the following must be proven: (1) the employment of
such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of
the means of execution.30 The circumstances attending the commission of the
crime negate the existence of treachery in its execution. Although petitioner
deliberately assaulted Rudy and there was suddenness in his attack, he did
not logically plan to assault the latter when he chanced upon him while he was
driving. In treachery, the perpetrator intentionally and purposely employs ways
and means to commit the crime. There was no evidence, however, to show
that petitioner employed such means of execution that would ensure the
commission of the crime without harm to his person. Thus, treachery did not
attend the commission of the crime.
There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty for
the crime of less serious physical injuries should be taken from the medium
period of arresto mayor, which is from two (2) months and one (1) day to four
(4) months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in the case
at bar, since it does not apply to those whose maximum term of imprisonment
is less than one year.31
As regards the awards for damages, moral damages may be recovered in
criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries, but there must be a factual basis
for the award.32 We have studied the records and find no factual basis for the
award of moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated February 18, 2005, and the Resolution dated April 19, 2005 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 27458, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes, Jr. is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of three (3) months
of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013
FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 from the Decision2 and
Resolution3 dated October 26, 2010 and August 11, 2011, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN affirming with
modifications the conviction4 by the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Misamis
Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39 of Fe Abella y Perpetua petitioner)
for the crime of frustrated homicide committed against his younger brother,
Benigno Abella Benigno). The RTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six 6) years and one 1) day to eight 8) years of prision
mayor as minimum, to ten 10) years and one 1) day to twelve 12) years of
prision mayor as maximum, and to pay Benigno ₱100,000.00 as consequential
damages, ₱10,000.00 for the medical expenses he incurred, plus the costs of
suit.5 The CA concurred with the RTC’s factual findings. However, the CA
modified the penalty imposed to six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor in its medium period as maximum. The CA also deleted the RTC’s
award in favor of Benigno of (a) ₱10,000.00 as actual damages corresponding
to the medical expenses allegedly incurred; and (b) ₱100,000.00 as
consequential damages. In lieu of the preceding, the CA ordered the petitioner
to pay Benigno ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate
damages.6
Antecedent Facts
On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker
and trisicad driver, was charged with frustrated homicide in an
Information7 which reads:
That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or
less, at Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
with intent to kill, attack, assault, harm and hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA y
PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck, thereby inflicting
the injury described below, to wit:
• hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and
• incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able intervention
of the medical attendance rendered to the said victim.
Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC.8
After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only
arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002. 9
During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.
The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno; 10 (b) Amelita
Abella11 (Amelita), Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with
whom the petitioner had a quarrel; and (d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr.
Ardiente), a surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City,
who rendered medical assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by
the petitioner.
The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around
11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television in his house. A certain Roger
Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring
trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting
with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to
convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and
along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to
apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.
Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived
bringing with him two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed
Alejandro and Dionisio to run away and the latter two complied. The petitioner
wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked
him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held in
his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right
hand was used to hack the latter’s neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and
was immediately taken to the hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase
Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense of more than ₱10,000.00 for
hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills. 17 He further claimed that after
the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and was thus
deprived of his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter. 18
Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral
aspect neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised wound left hand dorsal aspect 4
cm".19 Benigno was initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and
was discharged on September 23, 1998.20 From Dr. Ardiente’s recollection,
since the scythe used in the hacking was not sterile, complications and
infections could have developed from the big and open wounds sustained by
Benigno, but fortunately did not.21
The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner; 22 (b) Fernando
Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the petitioner; and (c) Urbano
Cabag24 (Urbano).
The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from
September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he and his family resided in Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the
hacking incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando
testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner gathering woods to
make a hut.25 Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the
petitioner drinking tuba in the store of Clarita Perpetua.26
The RTC Ruling
On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. The
fallo of the Judgment27 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by
the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond
reasonable doubt, judgment is rendered finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and
penalized by Article 249 in relation to Article 50 and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day to Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum; to indemnify offended-party complainant
Benigno Abella the sum of Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the medical
expenses incurred; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.28
The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No
disinterested witnesses were presented to corroborate the petitioner’s claim
that he was nowhere at the scene of the hacking incident on September 6,
1998. Fernando and Urbano’s testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies.
The RTC accorded more credence to the averments of the prosecution
witnesses, who, without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner,
positively, categorically and consistently pointed at the latter as the perpetrator
of the crime. Besides, medical records show that Benigno sustained a wound
in his neck and his scar was visible when he testified during the trial.
The RTC awarded ₱10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical
expenses he incurred despite the prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as
evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay ₱100,000.00 as
consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for
the award.
The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the
claim that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on
Benigno’s neck. The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental
especially since he had no motive whatsoever which could have impelled him
to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent to
kill.
The CA Ruling
On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision30 affirming
the petitioner’s conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number
of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and
(e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him
on the victim.
Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner
attacked Benigno with deadly weapons, two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was
directed to the neck of Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting
Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to
defend himself.
Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate,
testified that Benigno suffered from a hack wound on the left neck, and an
incised wound on the left hand palm. He said that the wounds might have been
caused by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and may have
resulted to death without proper medical attendance. Benigno was
hospitalized for about a month because of the injuries. The location of the
wound (on the neck) shows the nature and seriousness of the wound suffered
by Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it not been for the timely
intervention of medical science.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum."32 The CA explained that:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime
of consummated homicide is reclusion temporal , or twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty
for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus,
frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor . To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor
should be reduced by one degree, which is prision correccional , with a range
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision
correccional.33(Citation omitted)
The CA also deleted the RTC’s order for the payment of actual and
consequential damages as there were no competent proofs to justify the
awards. The CA instead ruled that Benigno is entitled to ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages,34 the latter being awarded
when some pecuniary loss has been incurred, but the amount cannot be
proven with certainty.35
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari36 anchored on the issue of
whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in rendering judgments which are
not in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence and which if not
corrected, will cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to the petitioner. 37
In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate
relevant facts, which if considered, would justify either his acquittal or the
downgrading of his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner
points out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after
Alejandro and Dionisio leaving Benigno behind. Had there been an intent to
kill on his part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that
time, he had two scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the
hacking blow was sudden and unexpected, providing Benigno with no
opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw the petitioner arriving with
weapons on hand. Benigno could not have been unaware of the danger facing
him, but he knew that the petitioner had no intent to hurt him. Benigno thus
approached the petitioner, but in the process, the former was accidentally hit
with the latter’s scythe.
The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People38 where this Court found
the downgrading of a conviction from attempted murder to physical injuries as
proper considering that homicidal intent was absent when the accused shot
the victim once and did not hit a vital part of the latter’s body.39
Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted from
Benigno’s hacking wound in the neck and incised wound in the hand. Such
being the case, death could not have resulted. The neck wound was not "so
extensive because it did not involve a big blood vessel on its vital structure"
while the incised wound in the hand, which only required cleansing and
suturing, merely left a slight scarring.40 Besides, Benigno was only confined
for seventeen (17) days at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in
the nature of less serious ones.
In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal
of the instant petition. The OSG stresses that the petitioner raises factual
issues, which call for a re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of
a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioner’s
argument that the development of infections or complications on the wounds
is a necessary factor to determine the crime committed is specious. The
petitioner’s intent to kill Benigno can be clearly inferred from the nature of the
weapon used, the extent of injuries inflicted and the circumstances of the
aggression. Benigno could have died had there been no timely medical
assistance rendered to him.
If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able
to chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick, fist blow, push, or the use of a less
lethal weapon directed against a non-vital part of the body would have been
sufficient. However, the petitioner hacked Benigno’s neck with an unsterile
scythe, leaving behind a big, open and gaping wound.
This Court’s Ruling
The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the scope of a
petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañas 42 is instructive
anent what is the subject of review in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, viz:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a
lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances
that we admit and review questions of fact.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.43(Citations omitted)
In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of
the courts a quo that the petitioner had a homicidal intent when he hacked
Benigno’s neck with a scythe and that the wounds the latter sustained could
have caused his death had there been no prompt medical intervention. These
questions are patently factual in nature requiring no less than a re-calibration
of the contending parties’ evidence.
It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and
Benito Chua admits of exceptions, among which is, "when the judgment of the
CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to notice certain
relevant facts that would otherwise justify a different conclusion x x
x."44 However, the factual backdrop and circumstances surrounding the instant
petition do not add up to qualify the case as falling within the exceptions.
Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual
issues, still, the instant petition is susceptible to denial.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing
was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that
of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all
the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could
cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.45
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to
take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly
to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to
kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used
and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 46
The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to
attack, much less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in
Pentecostes, Jr.47 to argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where the
accused shot the victim only once when there was an opportunity to do
otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to kill
Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death,
and not leave right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.
The analogy is flawed.
In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part
of the body. The attending physician certified that the injury would require
medical attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged
from the hospital the following day.
In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the
neck and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile
scythe used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have
complications resulting from these injuries because the wounds were
extensive and they were big and they were open wounds, so there is a
possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the
instrument used was not a sterile instrument contaminated with other
things."48 No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could
have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17
days from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the
use of a scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s
homicidal intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require
imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of
a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While
no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s
neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained
were potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the
hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of
medical attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent
to kill is negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained
from further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already
delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die
from the hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention provided
to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will.1âwphi1
All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming
the RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.
The Court modifies the award of damages.
As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the
payment of the consequential damages awarded by the trial court in the
absence of proof thereof. Where the amount of actual damages cannot be
determined because of the absence of supporting receipts but entitlement is
shown by the facts of the case, temperate damages may be awarded.49 In the
instant case, Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized and
underwent medical treatment. Considering the nature of his injuries, it is
prudent to award temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, in lieu of
actual damages.50
Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount
of ₱25,000.00.51 There is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary
human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on
Benigno would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral
shock, and similar injury.52
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution,
dated October 26, 2010 and August 11 2011, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner, Fe Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY
the offended party moral damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and temperate
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards for
damages shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) p r
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.53
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184757 October 5, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANICETO BULAGAO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 which affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001
and Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006.
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in
separate Informations both dated December 21, 2000. The Informations read
as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA],3 14 years old, against the latter’s
will and consent.4
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001
That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], 14 years old, against the latter’s will
and consent.5
Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
on both counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the prosecution. AAA
was born on April 13, 1986. According to her late-registered birth certificate,
her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC (father). AAA, however, testified that
BBB and CCC are not her biological parents, as she was only adopted when
she was very young.6CCC died in December 1999.7
In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house of her
brother DDD (son of BBB and CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and accused-
appellant Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger sister, then six-year-old FFF (who
were also the children of BBB and CCC).8
On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room
which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody
enter the room. She recognized the accused-appellant as the intruder, and
saw that he was holding a knife. Accused-appellant poked the knife at AAA’s
neck, causing her to freeze in fear. Accused-appellant removed AAA’s clothes,
and then his own. Both AAA and accused-appellant were wearing t-shirt and
shorts before the undressing. Accused-appellant kissed her neck and inserted
his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but accused-appellant
did not stop and continued raping AAA for one hour.9
On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in
Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was
sleeping in the second floor of the house, where there are no rooms. AAA was
roused from her sleep when accused-appellant was already undressing her.
Accused-appellant removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA tried to resist, but accused-appellant held her hands. Accused-appellant
then touched her breasts and kissed her. Accused-appellant remained on top
of her for half an hour.10
AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape incidents.
Upon learning of the same, BBB did not believe AAA and whipped her. 11
During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the character and
chastity of AAA, asked AAA about an alleged sexual intercourse between her
and the now deceased CCC. AAA affirmed her statement in her affidavit that
CCC took advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was still alive. This
allegedly happened five times, the first of which was when she was only seven
years old.12 Answering a query from the court, AAA testified that she was
currently in the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).13
The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray as its second witness. However, the latter’s testimony was
dispensed with upon the stipulation of the parties on the fact of examination of
AAA by Dr. Viray on September 5, 2000, and the contents of the examination
report,14 which includes the finding that AAA was in a "non-virgin state."
When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a year
later, it also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the
prosecution. This time, she testified that the sexual encounters between her
and the accused-appellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of
rape against the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with
him. She also claimed that she was instructed by the police officer who
investigated the incident to say that the accused-appellant used a knife. She
also testified that she was raped by her father CCC when she was seven years
old. She was recanting her previous testimony because she purportedly was
no longer angry with accused-appellant.15
On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of rape
because she was angry with the accused-appellant for making her do laundry
work for him. However, when asked if she "consented and voluntarily
submitted" herself to the accused-appellant when she had sexual intercourse
with him, she answered in the negative. She had been released from the
custody of the DSWD and was alone by herself for some time, but she now
lives with the family of accused-appellant. 16
On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force
himself upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in his
mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant was not
her sweetheart.17
Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist.
She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12,
2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental retardation
as he had an IQ of below 50.18
Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June 15, 2005,
claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they
ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He
denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was
asking for ₱300 from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified
that there was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA ("ampun-ampunan
lang").19
On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case No.
197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and hereby sentences him
to suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is
likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱50,000.00;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is
likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱50,000.00.20
The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she
testified for the prosecution, and was returned to the family of the accused-
appellant after her original testimony. It was during the time when she was
back in the custody of the accused-appellant’s family that she recanted her
testimony for the prosecution. According to the RTC, it is clear that she had no
other place to go to as she was completely orphaned and was dependent on
the family of the accused, and it was understandable that she may have
recanted in order to remain in the good graces of the accused-appellant’s
family.21
As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from mental
retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of accused-
appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the
complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the
psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological
condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming that accused-
appellant was of such mental state at the time of the incidents, the psychologist
testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong.22
On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that of
the RTC, except with a modification on the penalty in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13, dated 23 January 2006,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and damages
awarded. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, in each of the two (2) counts of rape. He
is further directed to pay private complainant the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, for each count of rape, in addition to the civil indemnity awarded by
the court a quo.23
Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties
manifested that they are waiving their rights to file a supplemental brief, as the
same would only contain a reiteration of the arguments presented in their
appellant’s and appellee’s briefs.24
In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that the
prosecution evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAA’s withdrawal
of her original testimony.
We have recently held that "[c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or
for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply because the witness
who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or another." 25 We
have, in the past, also declared that the recantation, even of a lone eyewitness,
does not necessarily render the prosecution’s evidence inconclusive. 26 In the
often-cited Molina v. People,27 we specified how a recanted testimony should
be examined:
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the
original testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where
previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not
contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be
done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be
carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which
each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or
motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. x x x. 28 (Emphases
supplied.)
These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant is
usually the lone eyewitness. Thus, in People v. Sumingwa, 29 where the rape
victim later disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her father, this
Court held:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By
the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim
is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward
and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full
faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear,
consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a they merely kissed and that AAA’s purported motive for the rape charges was
conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere monetary.
retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original
testimony. As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the
cross-examination of AAA as a defense witness revealed that it was taken at
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is a time when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay with the family of
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation accused-appellant and upon a reliance on the family’s implied commitment to
may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through send accused-appellant to Mindanao:
intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject
to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, PROS. JOSON:
on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.30 Q: Where are you staying at present?
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of AAA’s A: In our house, sir.
accusation and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her recantation was
made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in cases where Q: And your house where you were staying is the house of the parents of the
recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the accused?
opportunity to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid
A: Yes, sir.
details of the alleged rape by her "adoptive" brother, but also when she claimed
that she made up her previous rape charges out of anger. As such, it is difficult Q: And you don’t have any relatives where you can go and stay except from
to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted accused-appellant even after that house?
examining the young witness as she made a complete turnaround and
admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial court is in the best position A: None, sir.
to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in
Q: Where [are] your parents?
this case where AAA was subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect
examinations, and re-cross examinations both as a prosecution and defense A: I do not know, sir.
witness. Still, the trial court found that the private complainant’s testimony for
the prosecution was the one that was worthy of belief. Q: Are they all dead or still alive?

However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of A: They are deceased, sir.
the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this Court
Q: All?
which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was concocted. AAA’s
testimony for the prosecution, which was taken when she was in the custody A: Both are deceased, sir.
of the DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material discrepancies. All
accused-appellant can harp on in his appellant’s brief was AAA’s failure to Q: Do you mean to say that do you have full blood brother and sister?
recall the length of the knife used in the assaults, a minor and insignificant A: They all separated, sir.
detail not material to the elements of the crime of rape. She remained steadfast
on cross-examination even as defense counsel tried to discredit her by Q: Do you know where they were living?
bringing up her dark past of being sexually molested by the accused-
appellant’s father when she was seven years old. This is in stark contrast to A: No, sir.
her testimony for the defense, where AAA, now living with accused-appellant’s Q: From the time you were released from the DSWD you are alone by yourself?
family, claimed that she fabricated a revolting tale of rape simply because
accused-appellant made her do laundry. AAA’s recantation even contradicts A: Yes, sir.
the testimony of accused-appellant himself. While AAA claims in her retraction
that she had consensual sex with her brother, accused-appellant testified that Q: And the person[s] who are now taking care of you are giving you shelter
and everyday foods [sic] from the family of the accused, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be dismissed because you
testify today[, would] you admit for a fact that he [was] also staying in the house
where you are staying now?
A: No, sir.
Q: Where will he stay?
A: In Mindanao, sir.
Q: Because that was one of the promise or commitment of the family of the
accused, is it not?
A: No, sir.
Q: And how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
A: Because my other Kuya will not allow him to stay in the house, sir.
Q: Because your other Kuya does not like Aniceto Bulagao to do the things
that you have complaint [sic] against him, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what you are "isinusumbong" is the case today against him, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.31
Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial
court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree
with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental
condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence.32 Besides, this Court observes
that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his
answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free
will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason
or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the
crime.33 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time
of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity
be considered.34
As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of
death for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to
reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. It should
be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition
of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of
moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each from Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) under
prevailing jurisprudence.35
In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the
use of a deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when committed with the use
of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This crime
was proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to
have occurred on June 17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating
circumstance was alleged in the Information, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua.1awphil
On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used a
knife on June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000,
the date of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.36 As such, the crime that was proven
in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any
circumstance affecting criminal liability. However, simple rape is also
punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B.
In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even
without the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award
of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00, as well as moral damages in
the amount of ₱50,000.00, both for each count of rape. 37 In addition, we have
held that since exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender.38This Court believes that the conduct of
accused-appellant herein, who raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls
under this category and is therefore liable for exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape, in line with existing
jurisprudence. 39
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-
appellant Aniceto Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, for each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the
amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape, in
addition to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals, namely: civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00, both for each count of rape; and
2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under
review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the
exempting circumstance of insanity.
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8,
1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of
Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area
known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying:
"Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he
repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a
hammer until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom
with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room.
They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and
menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge,
and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: "Huwag
kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng
bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according
to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag
ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon
and then went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at
Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How
he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the
record.
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the
Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He
found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody.
Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of
Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp.
15- 17, Record).
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an
autopsy. He certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow
and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On opening the skull,
the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death
was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought
him to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10,
1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court
at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were
evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after
the killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He
believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and
"mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might
shrink or his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a
"mambabarang" might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can
be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to
kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two
children. He finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his
friends are drivers. (Exh- B).
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder,
Puno's eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day
while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming
towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother.
He wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another rope when
Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by
looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the
dog.
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog.
Aida observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a
ferocious expression.
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno
came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet
as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called
"Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did
not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song.
When Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later,
he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father had
been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a
moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning
by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they were
his fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that
puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that
Puno acted with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R.
Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times
between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-
patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with
"schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had
psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilia
that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his
financial problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that
Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno
was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents
complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as
kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while
Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not
socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his environment (4
tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's testimony.
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital,
testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with
discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish
between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also
concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not
mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third year high school
(8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense,
Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental
Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient
Service of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which
he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved
and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro
Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did not come
back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to information,
he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person
and without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes
evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He
knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering
from a mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several
isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic
process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a
markedly, retarded individual of which he is not.
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like
schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment
but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense
committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
and the order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental
examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he
could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of
Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by
the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old
woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had
gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he
singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he
thought that she was a witch.
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed
the conduct and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially
when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced "that the
accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered
him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos
(Criminal Case No. 509).
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the
trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating
evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as
aggravating circumstances.
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil.
547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs.
Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col
because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from
schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment
and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused
must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will
at the time of committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or
that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No.
52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57
SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental
transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal,
15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just
stated and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the
conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and
helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on
that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of
will.
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the
National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering from
schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by
Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to
work as a laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal
because the latter refused to certify him for re-employment. His plea of insanity
was rejected. He was convicted of murder.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder.
The qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco
Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior
natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who
was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim "
Diyos ko ".
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of
that superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman,
107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy
36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated
because the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58
SCRA 241, 247).
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable
juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1) "por
la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival
meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir
demostrada por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la
ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident, meaning that it should
be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello
Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3).
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old
age should be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard
of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed
manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548;
People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404, People vs,
Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by
counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or
schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil.
694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar
a un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una circunstancia
atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben ser
eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de
enfermedad morbosa pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero
imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed
(Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the
accused and hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the
observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to
Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly
discourse on the law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express my
preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited. For some
eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks with
authority. In the light of the advances in medical science there is, for me, a
need for the reexamination of what until now are authoritative pronouncements
on this subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He
was mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling
Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records, as properly evaluated and
confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who
examined and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had
been ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic
schizophrenia of the paranoid type.
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus,
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd
and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of
impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by
delusional and hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages of 15 and
30 (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase
are delusions, which are often numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality,
hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of
affect, together with negativism.
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is
characterized by poor interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn,
distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-
the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant,
resentful of suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic
remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an underlying
hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and
misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are among the first
symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an
unpleasant emotional aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may
begin to act out his hostile impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At
first his delusions are limited, but later they become numerous and
changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most prominent occurrences
in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas
and hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not uncommon. With
increasing personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical.
Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is
subjected to vague magical forces, and his explanations become extremely
vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the
value of reality. Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major
outburst some inarticulate paranoids may manifest an unpredictable
assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are irritable, discontented,
resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surely aversion to being
interviewed. Some manifest an unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude
and may have in a bitter aloofness" Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry,
Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature
with no subsequent recurrence In many instances, however, the favorable
outcome should be characterized as 'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or
as full recovery. By this it is meant that the patient is able to return to his
previous social environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with
minor symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or shallowness of
affective responses.
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon
the personality and future adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic
reaction may be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is continuously
progressive; in others it is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of
remissions and relapses in which, although from the first interests and habits
tend to be undermined insidiously, there occur periods of adjustment at a lower
level for a considerable period of time. It is estimated that 40 per cent of' the
schizophrenic patients who enter public mental hospitals or clinics recover or
improve; the other 60 per cent fail to improve or ultimately suffer that
permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately
designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to
be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within the first year
of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of continued
illness. Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during
the first year of their illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit
better and become able to return to outside life but remain damaged
personalities and may have to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp.
387-388, supraemphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962,
his father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of laughing alone and making
gestures, poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always and making
his body rigid (per consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on
aforesaid date, appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor
is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why? "hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p.
156, CCC rec.).
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28,
1962 to July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years before the alleged crime
was committed on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26,
CCC rec.). In the medical certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following
was reflected:
Diagnosis — Schizophrenic Reaction — Recovered (1962) Improved (1964)
Unimproved (1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was
described as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse"and his condition of termination was
indicated as "Unimproved".
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31,
1968 (p. 126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination was described as merely
"improved" neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968,
patient's condition of termination was also described as "improved" only and
"treatment not completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a
span of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental disease (pp-
4-5, TSN, November 12, 1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos
Vicente confirmed:
Q — From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental
Hospital and its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you
say that he was and has been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?
A — Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in 1970,
July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months'
time. His condition may simply be "in remission", which term means "social
recovery", not cured or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q — How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last at
any given time?
A — That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten days
or three months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q — Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can have
a violent reaction?
A — Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the time"
(Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1, emphasis
supplied).
Q — By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has
affected his power of control over his will?
A — During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right. He
made mistakes at the time that he was mentally sick.
Q — His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Are you sure of that?
A — Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has that
(im)pulse to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January
11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed
which is and should be considered determinative of his liability:
Q — Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he
committed the act was suffering from an onset of schizophrenic reaction from
which he has been known to be suffering since 1962"
A — It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the
schizophrenic reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6,
TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from
his last attack or relapse and September 8, 1970 when he committed the
alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically speaking,
the interval was not sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such
time give any guaranty for his mental disease to be "cured."
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He
previously suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and hostile behavior"
when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He had
the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This
delusion found its mark on the victim whom he believed was the
"mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her
in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence of his
mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he
did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made by appellant in
defending himself from the "mangkukulam".
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was
"presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the
trial, the fact remains that at the very moment of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still a mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove
otherwise against the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly
indicative of his mental psychosis.
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he
is "cured" (totally recovered) from the disease.
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.
Teehankee, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the
accused and hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the
observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to
Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly
discourse on the law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express my
preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited. For some
eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks with
authority. In the light of the advances in medical science there is, for me, a
need for the reexamination of what until now are authoritative pronouncements
on this subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He
was mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling
Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records, as properly evaluated and
confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who
examined and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had
been ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic
schizophrenia of the paranoid type.
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus,
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd
and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of
impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by
delusional and hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages of 15 and
30 (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase
are delusions, which are often numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality,
hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of
affect, together with negativism.
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is
characterized by poor interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn,
distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-
the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant,
resentful of suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic
remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an underlying
hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and
misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are among the first
symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an
unpleasant emotional aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may
begin to act out his hostile impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At
first his delusions are limited, but later they become numerous and
changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most prominent occurrences
in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas
and hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not uncommon. With
increasing personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical.
Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is
subjected to vague magical forces, and his explanations become extremely
vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the
value of reality. Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major
outburst some inarticulate paranoids may manifest an unpredictable
assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are irritable, discontented,
resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surely aversion to being
interviewed. Some manifest an unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude
and may have in a bitter aloofness" Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry,
Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature
with no subsequent recurrence In many instances, however, the favorable
outcome should be characterized as 'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or
as full recovery. By this it is meant that the patient is able to return to his
previous social environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with
minor symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or shallowness of
affective responses.
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon
the personality and future adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic
reaction may be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is continuously
progressive; in others it is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of
remissions and relapses in which, although from the first interests and habits
tend to be undermined insidiously, there occur periods of adjustment at a lower
level for a considerable period of time. It is estimated that 40 per cent of' the
schizophrenic patients who enter public mental hospitals or clinics recover or
improve; the other 60 per cent fail to improve or ultimately suffer that
permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately
designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to
be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within the first year
of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of continued
illness. Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during
the first year of their illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit
better and become able to return to outside life but remain damaged
personalities and may have to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp.
387-388, supraemphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962,
his father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of laughing alone and making
gestures, poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always and making
his body rigid (per consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on
aforesaid date, appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor
is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why? "hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p.
156, CCC rec.).
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28,
1962 to July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years before the alleged crime
was committed on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26,
CCC rec.). In the medical certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following
was reflected:
Diagnosis — Schizophrenic Reaction — Recovered (1962) Improved (1964)
Unimproved (1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was
described as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse"and his condition of termination was
indicated as "Unimproved".
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31,
1968 (p. 126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination was described as merely
"improved" neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968,
patient's condition of termination was also described as "improved" only and
"treatment not completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a
span of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental disease (pp-
4-5, TSN, November 12, 1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos
Vicente confirmed:
Q — From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental
Hospital and its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you
say that he was and has been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?
A — Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in 1970,
July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months'
time. His condition may simply be "in remission", which term means "social
recovery", not cured or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q — How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last at
any given time?
A — That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten days
or three months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q — Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can have
a violent reaction?
A — Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the time"
(Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1, emphasis
supplied).
Q — By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has
affected his power of control over his will?
A — During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right. He
made mistakes at the time that he was mentally sick.
Q — His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected? In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.

A — Yes, sir. Teehankee, J., concur.

Q — Are you sure of that? G.R. No. 185285 October 5, 2009

A — Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has that PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
(im)pulse to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January vs.
11, 1971, emphasis supplied). PAUL ALIPIO, Accused-Appellant.
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed DECISION
which is and should be considered determinative of his liability:
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Q — Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he
committed the act was suffering from an onset of schizophrenic reaction from The Case
which he has been known to be suffering since 1962"
On appeal is the June 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
A — It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02354 that affirmed the April 21, 2006 Decision2 in Criminal
schizophrenic reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, Case No. 01-427 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65 in Sorsogon
TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis supplied). City. The RTC found accused-appellant Paul Alipio guilty of rape and imposed
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from
his last attack or relapse and September 8, 1970 when he committed the The Facts
alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically speaking,
An Information filed with the RTC charged Paul with one count of rape
the interval was not sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such
allegedly committed as follows:
time give any guaranty for his mental disease to be "cured."
That sometime in the month of June, 2000 at Sitio Liman, Barangay San
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He
Francisco, Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within
previously suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and hostile behavior"
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He had
of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This
feloniously, have sexual intercourse with one [AAA], 3 a mentally retarded
delusion found its mark on the victim whom he believed was the
woman against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
"mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her
in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence of his Contrary to law.4
mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he
did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made by appellant in Arraigned on May 13, 2002 with the assistance of his counsel de officio, Paul
defending himself from the "mangkukulam". entered a plea of "not guilty."

While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was
"presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the
trial, the fact remains that at the very moment of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still a mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove
otherwise against the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly
indicative of his mental psychosis.
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he
is "cured" (totally recovered) from the disease.
During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted Paul’s identity and of his
being a resident of Sitio Liman, San Francisco, Bulan, Sorsogon sometime in
2000.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of
the private complainant, AAA, BBB, her mother, and Dr. Imelda Escuadra,
among others.
For its part, the defense presented in evidence the testimonies of Norma de
Leon, Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, Saul Alipio, and Jose Genagaling.
The Prosecution’s Version of Facts
AAA is a 41-year old mentally retarded woman whom Marilou Gipit Alipio often
hired to watch over her children whenever the latter is out of her house. AAA
stopped schooling after finishing Grade VI in a local public school. Marilou is
Paul’s sister.
Sometime in June 2000, Marilou sent AAA to Sitio Liman, San Francisco,
Bulan, Sorsogon to borrow money from Marilou’s father, Saul. At the copra kiln
in Sitio Laman near his house, Saul told AAA that he would give the necessary
amount to Marilou directly.
While about to head for home, AAA heard Paul calling her from his house.
Suddenly, Paul held her hand, pushed her inside and, while covering AAA’s
mouth, brought her to his bedroom. He then removed her shorts and panty
and likewise, undressed himself. Paul then went on top of her, kissed her, and
fondled her breasts. Eventually, he entered her, first using his finger, then his
penis. Before finally letting the crying AAA go, however, Paul threatened her
with death should she disclose to anybody what had just happened between
them.
Several months later, BBB, AAA’s mother, noticed that the latter had missed
her monthly period. With some coaxing, AAA told her mother what Paul had
done to her. Thereupon, AAA’s mother went to see Marilou and her father to
apprise them about AAA’s pregnancy. The Alipios promised financial help,
albeit Paul would later disown responsibility for AAA’s condition. When brought
to a doctor for medical examination, AAA was found to be seven (7) months
pregnant. AAA eventually gave birth to a baby girl.
Psychiatric evaluation done by Dr. Escuadra revealed that AAA, although 42
years old at that time, had the mental capacity and disposition of a nine or 10
year-old child. Her intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of 60 was way below the average
I.Q. of 90, clearly indicating a mental retardation case. When cross-examined,
Dr. Escuadra described AAA as possessing a certain level of comprehension
of incidents based on experience which she is capable of relaying and relating
to. To the doctor, AAA was very well qualified to be a witness provided the
questions are asked in a simple manner.5
Version of the Defense
The testimonies of the four (4) witnesses the defense presented were intended
to establish Paul’s innocence of the crime charged and that he himself was a
psychiatric case.
Norma de Leon, a laundrywoman employed by Marilou and who
acknowledged seeing AAA often in Marilou’s house, testified being in Liman
to get bamboos at the time the alleged rape incident happened. At around 12
noon of that day, while she and Paul were eating lunch at the kiosk, AAA
arrived. After they had finished eating, she saw AAA trying to drag Paul inside
his house, but the latter pushed AAA towards the wooden portion of the kiosk.
Paul then left for Polot, leaving AAA behind.
Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist at the Bicol Medical Center, conducted
a psychiatric examination on Paul. Her diagnosis: Paul was suffering from
schizoaffective disorder, a temporary and reversible psychiatric condition
affecting basically an individual’s thinking, perception, and emotion. In Paul’s
case, this psychiatric disorder manifested itself after his brother’s death in 1987,
and was aggravated when a sister committed suicide in 1990.
When recalled to the witness stand after conducting a follow-up examination,
Dr. Belmonte stated that Paul was in a much better condition and was fit to
stand trial, being free from any perceptual disturbances and acute psychotic
signs and symptoms. To Dr. Belmonte, Paul could give positive answers and
was aware of the consequences, if found guilty.
Saul Alipio, Paul’s father, expressed the belief that Paul could not have
committed the crime of which he was accused. At the time the alleged
molestation transpired, Paul was, according to Saul, at the farm gathering
coconuts.
Jose Genagaling, a coconut farmer and Saul’s compadre, testified that
sometime in June 2000, or on the day the rape incident occurred, he was
processing copra at the copra kiln of Saul. With him at the copra kiln at that
time was Paul. Nothing unusual happened in Saul’s house and copra kiln on
that day.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted Paul of rape penalized under paragraph 1(a) and
(d), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).6 The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused PAUL ALIPIO’s GUILT having
been established beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the victim
AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another [P50,000.00]
as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The preventive imprisonment already served by the accused shall be credited
in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
SO ORDERED.7
Paul filed a notice of appeal and the records of the case were transmitted to
the CA.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
By decision of June 10, 2008, the CA denied Paul’s appeal and affirmed the
RTC’s judgment.
Hence, we have this appeal.
In response to the Court’s Resolution for the submission of supplemental briefs,
both accused-appellant and plaintiff-appellee manifested that they are no
longer filing their respective supplemental briefs considering that such briefs
would only contain arguments also raised in their respective appeal briefs filed
before the CA.
It is accused-appellant’s submission that the RTC and CA gravely erred:
1. x x x in giving credence to the apparently incredible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses; and
2. x x x in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that the guilt of the
accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.8
In fine, accused-appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly that of AAA and the adequacy of its evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is denied for lack of merit.
Testimony of the Victim Is Credible
Accused-appellant maintains that the trial court erred in giving full credence to
and reliance on AAA’s inculpatory statements in the witness box, it being his
contention that her account of what purportedly happened reeks of
inconsistencies and does not jibe with the normal flow of things. As asserted,
it is quite unnatural for a woman finding herself in a sexually-charged situation
not make an outcry or use her hands to ward off the advances of a sex fiend.
According to him, it is contrary to human experience too that a person with
lustful desire would run after the intended victim in a place that is obviously not
secluded.
Accused-appellant draws attention to the fact that when she testified in court,
AAA stated that accused-appellant ran after her but did not call out to her. Yet,
in her statement before the police, she made it appear that he called out to her.
The Court is not persuaded.
First of all, the Court cannot understand how accused-appellant can talk of and
expect, as a matter of course, a "natural" reaction from AAA who is
unquestionably mentally retarded, one who does not have a good grasp of
information, and who lacks the capacity to make a mental calculation of events
unfolding before her eyes. AAA can hardly be described as a normal person
with fully developed mental faculties. Hence, it is not fair to judge her according
to what is natural or unnatural for normal persons.
As to accused-appellant’s assertion that it is contrary to human experience
that a person with lustful design would run after his prey in a place less than
private, suffice it to say that lust does not respect either time or place; 9 that
sexual abuse is committed in the most unlikely places. The evil in man has no
conscience––the beast in him bears no respect for time and place, driving him
to commit rape anywhere, even in places where people congregate such as in
parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where
there are other occupants.10
To be sure, AAA’s testimony is not without discrepancies and inconsistencies,
given of course her mental state. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that
the inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant strike this Court as trivial.
Rape is a harrowing experience, the exact details of which are usually not
remembered. Inconsistencies, even if they do exist, tend to bolster, rather than
weaken, the credibility of the witness, for they show that the testimony was not
contrived or rehearsed.11 Trivial inconsistencies, like the matter of whether or
not accused-appellant called out on AAA before he forcibly grabbed her hands,
do not, to borrow from People v. Cristobal, rock the pedestal upon which the
credibility of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest
spontaneity and lack of scheming.12
Minor inconsistencies in testimonies should be disregarded. This rule
becomes all the more applicable when the witness is mentally ill. The Court
said as much in People v. Atuel:
Complainant was mentally ill at the time of the incident, and consequently
could not be expected to remember in precise detail all that actually happened
to her. Her severe traumatic experience was too much for her unstable mental
faculties… Her testimony as to what had happened certainly cannot constitute
gospel truth… We have said that a rape victim is not and cannot be expected
to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience. And the credibility of
a rape victim is not destroyed by some inconsistencies in her testimony. On
the contrary, it is a recognized axiom in rape cases that inconsistencies in the
victim’s testimony do not detract from the vital fact that, in truth, she had been
abused. Testimonial discrepancies could have been caused by the natural
fickleness of the memory, which variances tend to strengthen rather than
weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 13
Verily, accused-appellant cannot exculpate himself by riding on the alleged
inconsistencies in AAA’s testimonies. Errorless accounts of what had
transpired cannot be expected especially when a witness is recounting
specifics of an agonizing experience. To be sure, the trial court had not made
much, as it should not have, of what accused-appellant considered
inconsistencies in AAA’s account of what happened immediately before and
during her ordeal.
The unyielding rule has been that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies is deserving of the highest respect because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. 14 Such
assessment binds the Court except when the assessment was reached
arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have
affected the results of the case.15 None of these exceptions exists in this case.
In fact, the trial court found AAA’s testimony clear, convincing, and credible.
The trial court wrote:
The very CANDID, STRAIGHTFORWARD, and CONSISTENT testimony of
the RAPE victim, [AAA], narrates with definiteness that she was sexually
abused by accused, Paul Alipio @ Ayona, in the latter’s house in Sitio Liman,
Bgy. San Francisco, Bulan, Sorsogon, sometime in June of 2000; when she
was sent by the accused’s sister Marilou Gipit Alipio to borrow money from
their father, Saul Alipio. A comparative analysis of the declarations given by
the victim before the police (See: Sworn Statement, Exhibit ‘D’, p. 10/Rollo);
as well as, the declarations she made in open court in the course of the trial
(TSN, June 23, 2003, pp. 3 to 33); REVEAL – SUBSTANTIAL similarities and
CONSISTENCY of her claim.16 x x x
AAA’s mental condition, to stress, does not prevent her from being a
competent and credible witness. As has been held, a mental retardate is not
disqualified from being a witness; the retardate’s mental condition does not,
on that ground alone, vitiate his or her credibility. 17 If the mental retardate’s
testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.18Evidently, the trial court had
ascertained the veracity and credibility of AAA’s testimony sufficient to support
a finding of conviction, thus:
To the mind of the court, the testimony alone of the retarded victim will
SUFFICE to carry solely for the prosecution the burden of proof required by
the law and rules. The victim, [AAA], was CONSISTENT in all the declarations
she executed before the police (Sworn Statement), and the testimony she
gave before this court during the trial – that she was RAPED by accused PAUL
ALIPIO @ AYONA in their house in Sitio Liman, Bgy. San Francisco, Bulan,
Sorsogon, when she was sent by the sister of the accused (Marilou Gipit) to
borrow money from their father, Saul Alipio. Notwithstanding the fact, that the
victim failed to give the approximate date of the rape incident when asked by
the prosecutor during the direct-examination, such an omission or mental
lapse on her part was supplemented by the testimonies of her mother, [BBB],
and another prosecution witness, Dr. Ma. Belen Gordola. The latter testified,
that at the time of the examination of the patient – victim, she was able to arrive
at the conclusion that the uterus was seven months old because of the
palpation she did by measuring the patient’s abdomen and palpating the fetus
inside. Considering that the fetus was seven (7) months old at the time of her
examination, the possible date of conception would be in the month of May or
in the FIRST WEEK OF JUNE or in the last week of April. Moreover, even the
substance of the testimonies of defense witnesses x x x attest to the fact – that
it was in the month of June, 2000 when they saw the victim [AAA] [come] to
Sitio Liman, bringing the vale sheet from the daughter of Saul Alipio named
Marilou Gipit who sent her for an errand. It must be emphasized likewise, that
by reason of her mental abnormality the victim is oriented to place and person
BUT NOT TO DATE (Exhibit "C-1"/p. 2 – Psychiatric Evaluation).19
To reiterate, the issue of credibility is a matter best addressed by the trial court
that has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying.
Great weight and even finality must be accorded to factual findings of the trial
court especially its assessments of witnesses and their credibility, except when
there is a clear showing of arbitrariness or oversight of some facts or
circumstances of substance.20 The Court finds no reason to overturn the
findings of the trial court.
Likewise, it is a well-entrenched jurisprudence that a medical examination of
the victim is not indispensable to the successful prosecution for rape inasmuch
as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the perpetrator of the
crime.21 Thus, accused-appellants’ insistence that there should have been a
medical examination and a medical certificate showing the condition of AAA’s
hymen to corroborate her testimony is clearly untenable. It bears stressing that
a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime of rape.22 And as aptly
observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, AAA was already pregnant
when BBB found out about the rape and that the former had already given birth
when she testified, making a hymeneal examination a worthless exercise.23
At this juncture, it bears to state that sexual intercourse with a woman who is
a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape.24 As such, the question of
whether the circumstances of force or intimidation are absent is of no moment
to accused-appellant’s liability for rape, albeit the trial court held that he
employed force and intimidation on the feebleminded AAA.
Exempting Circumstance of Insanity Is Absent
In a bid to escape from criminal liability, accused-appellant invokes insanity.
He contends that the psychiatrist who examined him consistently testified that
there was a high possibility that he was suffering from schizoaffective disorder
when the alleged rape incident happened.
We are not convinced.
The moral and legal presumption is always in favor of soundness of mind; that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. 25 It is
improper to assume the contrary.26 This presumption, however, may be
overcome by evidence of insanity, which, under Art. 12(1) of the RPC, exempts
a person from criminal liability.
In People v. Formigones,27 the Court has established a more stringent
standard for insanity to be an exempting circumstance. There, it was held that,
for insanity to be appreciated in favor of the accused, there must be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived
of reason or there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.281avvph!1
The evidence offered by the defense in this case miserably failed to establish
clearly and convincingly the presence of the stringent criterion for insanity. On
the contrary, the evidence tended to show, albeit impliedly, that accused-
appellant was not deprived of reason at all and can still distinguish right from
wrong when, after satisfying his lust, he threatened AAA not to tell anybody
about what he had done; otherwise, she would be killed. This single episode
irresistibly implies, for one, that accused-appellant knew what he was doing,
that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret. And for another, it indicated
that the crime was committed during one of accused-appellant’s lucid intervals.
In this regard, no less than his father admitted in open court that there were
times when his son was in his proper senses.29
Given the above perspective, the trial court correctly downplayed accused-
appellant’s plea of insanity. The Court cites with approval the following
excerpts from the RTC’s decision:
Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who evaluated the mental condition of the
accused testified x x x that the accused was given psychological testing to fully
assess his mental condition, and he was found to have an average mental
condition. In the intelligent quotient test accused has an average mental
function while in the projective test there were several indicators noted, since
at the time of the testing accused showed a lot of immaturity, stubbornness
and irritability. That it would be difficult for them to employ a mechanism that
would prevent selective responses on the part of the accused. They just
observed the patient and that is also the reason why they give psychological
testing, because in that way they can determine whether the subject is in
conflict with his personality. That during those times the accused had his
sessions with the psychologist and some doctors accused was barely
consistent and their evaluation shows consistent result. Schizoaffective
disorder is always precipitated by certain traumatic experience. That there is
really a need for them to gather information to know whether the accused was
already afflicted with that mental disorder sometime in 1987 or 2000. That the
schizoaffective disorder of Paul Alipio is only temporary in character hence, it
can be treated. The duration of the treatment would depend on the progress
of the patient.
The doctor further stated during the clarificatory questioning propounded by
the Court, that there is a high possibility that sometime in 2001 when the
alleged rape incident took place implicating the accused as the rapist, accused
was not in his normal mental condition. During that time this schizoaffective
disorder was already in effect. THAT SHE HAS NO CATEGORICAL
FINDINGS YET INSOFAR AS THE SENSE OF DISCERNMENT OF THE
ACCUSED BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG IS CONCERNED. x x x
Prescinding from the foregoing testimony of the doctor, it is clear therefore that
the mental disorder of accused Paul Alipio is only temporary in character and
can be treated. Moreover, although the probability is high that in year 2000
when the rape incident took place accused was already suffering from
schizoaffective disorder, said doctor has not come up with any categorical
findings yet relative to the sense of discernment of the accused when it comes
to what is RIGHT and what is WRONG.30
With the view we take of this case, we find the prosecution to have discharged
its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
And needless to stress, guilt beyond reasonable doubt only denotes moral
certainty, not absolute certainty. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which,
to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction.31
The crime committed being in the nature of simple rape, the award by the trial
court, as affirmed by the CA, of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto for the
victim and the same amount as moral damages is in line with prevailing case
law and is accordingly affirmed. Accused-appellant must, however, pay AAA
PhP 30,000 by way of exemplary damages as a measure to deter other
individuals with aberrant sexual tendencies pursuant to current
jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02354 finding accused-appellant Paul Alipio guilty of the crime charged is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay
AAA exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the
amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant
Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias "Baket Ines"
with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the
same house at Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was
then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by
the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of
their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the time was
the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the
complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied
and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and
said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do
not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo
measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the
complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced
her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening
the zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainant and succeeded having
carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual
intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to
her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did
not leave the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the
house of the accused that evening and the following morning she scrubbed
the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in
the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned
what happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita
and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to
her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went
home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It
was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant told
her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened
to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her
to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who
lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin
of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal
building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to
the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly
used in threatening the complainant. 1
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course of time, the
trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the complainant and A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to do. He was able to
her mother. do what he wanted to do.

2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and C". Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any?

3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental condition of the accused- A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Guillermo:
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from insanity. 2
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the bolo or that knife [at]
your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do immediately after placing that bolo your throat
and before having sexual intercourse you?
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he contends are
contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct examination that she immediately A He had sexual intercourse with me.
went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the effect that she had
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by
herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening
A I was wearing pants, sir.
of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home.
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?

A Yes, sir, I have a panty.

The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross examination. In any case,
the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to your pants and your

had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the complainant. 3 panty?

A He removed them, sir.

The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in this respect is Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?

clear and convincing:

A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he succeeded.

Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?

Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the
A He went on top of me, sir.
store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the
store what happened then? Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?

A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said. A He was wearing pants.

Q And what did you say? Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he still wearing his
pants?
A "I do not like," I said.

A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.

Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?

Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?
A I struggled and cried.

A I saw his penis.

Q What did the accused do after that?
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you saw, he went on top Q What else did he tell you?
of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
A I struggled.
Q After that where did you go?
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused when he was on top
of you?

A I went home already, sir. 4

A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.

xxx xxx xxx

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia
when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and
ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the
meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until
COURT:
26 June 1978.

Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition of the
appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic
Fiscal Guillermo:
Psychiatry Service, respectively.
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a leading question which
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental condition were set
is a follow-up question?
forth:
Witness:
On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever questioned but
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina. refused to answer.

Fiscal Guillermo: On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously
through the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?
inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He

A I felt something that came out from his inside. is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent
answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon,"
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:? but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought here.

A Around five minutes maybe, sir. The report then concluded:

Q After that what happened then?

A He removed it. In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found suffering from a
mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility,

A No more, sir, he sat down. seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or
insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 5
Q What, if any, did he tell you?

A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my

The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental condition:
mother and to anybody in their house.
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his affect and he
appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of being irritable saying —
"oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not
know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed any wrong act
and the following conclusions:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present time still
psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive,
undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved, responsive" and
"neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory
experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed with
a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been
helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and as freely with other members of the household and slept well,
although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children,
talking in a language he could not understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his
mental condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-
ups. 7
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer
talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report
concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one
or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from
schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9
The defense next presented Raquel Jovellano,
a psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that she had examined
and treated the appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense,
it was only in People vs. Formigones 10that the Court elaborated on the
required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the
Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation
of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872;
6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be
[equated with] imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented,
a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always
reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent
cases. 11 A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests
that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of
cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal]
act," and (b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom
of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition,
rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our
caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an
accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the
will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This
is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only
towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to
show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at
most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9)
of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly
called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops between the ages 15
and 30. 13
A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of
schizophrenia: a disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a
disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the
schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism
and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and
initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as the
four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia
that he considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic
value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the
hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment
on the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having
one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to others, delusions,
and the experience of having one's actions controlled or influenced from the
outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on
the basis of second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical
appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination,
perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding
external stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are
auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or
more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person.
Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and
what is going on around him, or are threatening or obscene and very disturbing
to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own
thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite
disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in
schizophrenic patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic
of affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or
during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as
much during the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost
continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in schizophrenia,
they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three
dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other
sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by
reasoning, and that are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his
cultural environment. They are among the common symptoms of
schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the
paranoid type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some
unseen mysterious power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost
pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics
at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern
schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be
preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over
his mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the
world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15
it has mostly been
rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended
to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment
was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the
consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano
declared as follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would
you say doctor that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of
whatever he did in connection with the incident in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the
victim at the time of the commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon
which he will place his penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is
schizophrenic which you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and
consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in
relation to the act is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference
only in the act of an insane and a normal individual, a normal individual will
use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society
while an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer
withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the bound
of insanity or psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the
accused here is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and
to perform all the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by
an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what
is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know
what is wrong but yet there is no inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act
they are going to commit is wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost
the inhibition. The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition
is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act
charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that
appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by
him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The
defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia
sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not believe
that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already
pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be
found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation
of insanity. 17
Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence
regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault
on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused
should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act
is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2)
physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to
characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did
not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or immediately before the
day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on
general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously,
while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant
during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to
present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction,
although not exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender
of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness
which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-
power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance,
although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied
by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that
the amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against
appellant.
G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an
information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with
the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable
motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault
and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife,
thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the
superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab
wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left
elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused.
The defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that
the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the
Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the
Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the
accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his
report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was
again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of
the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic
Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete
record pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to
this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for
the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the
court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the
mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a competent
doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order directing
that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of
the Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent
submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose
A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his
report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called
again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit
5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view
thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the
defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he
was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On
February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial
was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in
the information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following
assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the
accused has had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not
had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows
that during and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused
did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and
appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden
was on the defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the
time of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not establish
any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in
not acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino
Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a
barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the
time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you."
Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which
held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you",
but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison
thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso
Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of
the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where
he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on
December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does
not seem necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity,
the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental
corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence
required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated
generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories.
(See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p.
479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) Thefirst
view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is
established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable
doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit
the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer,
21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to
be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity
is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in
his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England
(Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and
in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must prove
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40
Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S.,
413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7
Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730).
This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the
presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every
essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one
essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused introduces
evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs.
Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but
insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes
the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests
upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs.
Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane
at the time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative
allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the
character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently
convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the
judicial mind that the accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the
offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the
act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a
reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404;
35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534;
62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific
acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established
insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we
read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to
determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing,
suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at
the time of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the
theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not
permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the
danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or
spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure,
courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the
continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the
continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the
crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there
are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The
following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority
of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court
below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the
prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods
from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was
confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods,
it is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12,
1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the
ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any
rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as
having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility
for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M.
Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I,
p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular
Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain peeriods
of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.)
and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person
becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia præcox or manic
depresive psychosis, during the period of excitement, he has no control
whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-
legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with
the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will
have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or
normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to actions
impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses"
(Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926],
vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco,
at one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately
preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was committed —
the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the
symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony
of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the
police station on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and
although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from him
(see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he
was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day
following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police
authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which
doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of
the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson,
which report was made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was
suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive psychosis.We
quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
 SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in
his bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times,
however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently
wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic
movements with the extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he
takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food offered by his
mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not
take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to have the bath, or
to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also
sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed
impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his
fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the
door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes
laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to
speak, and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him.
Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was
mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he
was seen in this condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his
hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as
for example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks
anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the
hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found
oriented as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that
he could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for
example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because
he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former
sweetheart in the hospital. There are times however when he could not hear
or see at all anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner
that he could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt
he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already
buried in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but
his memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during
his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general
information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might
have been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the
interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were,
of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has
shown marked improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent
in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering
from a form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A.
Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the
following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the
Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the
court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is
not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality
lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of
this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many times executing
it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate — beyond
normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste
and desires as to make him queer before the average conception of an earthly
man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the
accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on
policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-
appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the
defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and
would pay; that appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora
Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to kill
him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and
corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence
is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of
the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic
Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d
ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is
ussually preceded by much complaining andplanning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being
interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant
was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the
information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability.
Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In
conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the
defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other
hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine
Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of
Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
I agree with the dissenting opinions of Hustices Diaz and Concepcion.
There is not question as to the facts constituting the crime imputed to the
accused. The disagreement arises from the conclusions which both opinions
attempt to infer therefrom. The majority opinon establishes the conclusion that
the accused was not in his sound mind when he committed the crime because
he was then suffering from dementia præcox. The dissenting opinions, in
establishing the conclusion that the accused was then in the possession of his
mental facilities, or, at leats, at a lucid interval, are based on the fact admitted
by the parties and supported by expert testimony, that the accused, before the
commission of the crime, had been cured of dementia præcox and later of
manic depressive psychosis. The majority opinion admits that there is no
positive evidence regarding the mantal state of the accused when he comitted
the crime, but it infers from the facts that he must have then been deprived of
his reason. This inference is not sufficiently supported by the circumtantial
evidence. I it is admitted that the legal presumption is that a person who
commits a crime is in his right mind (U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil.,
62; U. S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil., 547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil., 218; U. S. vs.
Martinez, 34 Phil., 305; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law
presumes all acts and ommissions punishable by law to be voluntary (art. 1,
Penal Code; article 4, subsection 1, Revised Penal Code), and if, as it appears,
there is sufficient or satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally
incapacitated when he committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must be the
same presumption established by law, that is, that he was in his right mind,
and the conclusion of law must be that he is criminal liable.
There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit was given to
the conclusions of fact arrived at by the judge who tried the case. He observed
and heard the witnesses who testified and he had the advantage of testing
their credibility nearby. After weighing all the evidence he arrived at the
conclusion that the accused committed the crime while he was in his right mind.
This court generally gives much weight to the conclusions of fact of the judge
who tried the case in the first instance and does not reject them useless they
are clearly in conflict with the evidence.
DIAZ, J., dissenting:
I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed the crime while
he was sane, or at least, during a lucid interval. He did not kill his victim without
rhyme or reason and only for the sake of killing him. He did so to avenge
himself or to punish his victim for having refused, according to him, to pay a
debt of P55 after having made him many promises. He so stated clearly to the
policeman who arrested him immediately after the incident; and he made it so
understood to the witness Mariano Yamson, a friend of both the appellant and
his victim, before the commission of the crime.
The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because ordinarily such
is his normal condition. Insanity is an exception which may be said to exist only
when thereis satisfactorily evidence establishing it and it certainly is not always
permanent because there are cases in which it comes and takes place only
occasionaly and lasts more or less time according to the circumstances of the
individual, that is, the condition of his health, his environment, and the other
contributory causes thereof. The law itself recognizes this, so much so that in
establishing the rule that insane persons are excempt from criminal liability,
because they commit no crime, it also makes the exception that this is true
only when they have not acted during a lucid intervals (art. 12, subsec. 1, of
the Revised Penal Code).
The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days during the months
stated in the majority opinion; April 1922 and January 1926, but he was later
pronounced cured in the hospital where he had been confined because he had
already returned to normalcy by recovering his reason. For this one fact alone,
instead of stating that he acted during a lucid interval on said occasion, it
should be said on the contrary, taking into consideration the explanations
given by him to the policemen who arrested him and to other witnesses for the
prosecution with whom he had been talking before and after the incident, that
he acted while in the full possession of his mental faculties.
The fact that the appellant was aflicted with manic depressive psychosis after
the crime, as certified by Drs. Toribio Joson, J. A. Fernandez and Elias
Domingo who examined him, does not prove that he was so afflicted on the
date and at the time of the commission of the crime nor that said ailment, taking
for granted that he was suffering therefrom, had deprived him of his reason to
such an extent that he could not account for his acts.
There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was actually insane
when he committed the crime or that he continued to be afflicted with said
ailment for which he had to be confined in the insane asylum for some days
during the months above-stated, in 1922 and 1926. The most reasonable rule
which should be adopted in these cases is the one followed by various courts
of the United States stated in 32 C. J., 757, section 561, and 16 C. J., 538,
539, section 1012 as follows:
If the insanity, admitted, or proved, is only occassional or intermittent in its
nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise, and he who relies
on such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the
time alleged. (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)
Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that
the offense was committed in one of them. A person who has been adjudged
insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane,
is presumed to continue insane; but as in the case of prior insanity generally,
a prior adjudication of insanity does not raise a presumption of continued
insanity, where the insanity is not of a permanent or continuing character, or
where, for a considerable period of time, the person has been on parole from
the hospital or asylum to which he was committed, or where he escaped from
the asylum at a time when he was about to be discharged. (16 C. J., 538, 539,
sec. 1012.)
On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jirusprudence of Insanity (vol. 1,
pp. 482 and 484, the following appears:
Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not presumed to be continuous.
And the existence of prior or subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual,
does not suffice to change the burden of proof. And where an insane person
has lucid intervals offenses committed by him will be presumed to have been
committed in a lucid intervals unless the contrary appears. The maxim "Once
insane presumed always to be insane" does not apply where the malady or
delusion under which the alleged insane person labored was in its nature
accidental or temporary, or the effect of some sickness or disease.
And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must be of permanent
type or a continuing nature or possessed of the characteristics of an habitual
and confirmed disorder of the mind. And it must appear to have been of such
duration and character as to indicate the probability of its continuance, and not
simply the possibility or probability of its recurrence. And there should be some
evidence tending to show settled insanity as contradistinguished from
temporary aberration or hallucination, to justify an instruction which does nor
recognize such a distinction.
It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomia before he committed
the crime in question. Such condition does not necessarily prove that on the
day in question he was actually insane. Insomia, according to Dr. Elias
Domingo, is not an exlcusive symptom of insanity; other diseases and ailments
also have it (t. s. n., p.19).
In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Concepcion, I vote for the affirmance of the appealed
sentence, because in my opinion it is supported by the evidence and in
accordance with law.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) that the crime committed by the accused
is an admitted fact; and (2) that I adhere to the statement of the majority that it
is settled in this jurisdiction that a defense based upon the insanity of the
accused should be established by means of clear, indubitable and satisfactory
evidence.
On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased Carlos Guison
who, as a result the wounds received by him, died in the hospital two days
after the aggression.
It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he committed this crime.
What evidence is there of record in support of this defense? Mention has been
made of the fact that the accused had been confined in the san Lazaro Hospital
and later in the Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in the San Lazaro
Hospital from April 11 to April 26, 1922. He returned to the hospital on January
6, 1926, and left on the 10th of said month and years. Dr Elias Domingo, chief
alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital was questioned as follows:
Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he was already completely
cured of his insanity? — A. He wassocially adjustable.
Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That he could adapt himself
to environment.
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when he was
declared cured at the Psychopathic Hospital, to December 12, 1934, the date
of the crime, he had shown signs of having had a relapse. Therefore it is a
proven fact during the long period of nine years the accused had been sane.
It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the accused was under
treatment by Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco because he was suffering from
insomia. Dr. Francisco admitted that he was not a specialist in mental diseases.
He is, therefore, disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the mental
condition of the accused four days before the crime; and in fact neither has Dr.
Francisco given any convincing testimony to prove that when the accused was
under treatment by him he was suffering from dementia præcox, as the only
thing he said was that the accused-appellant had an attack of insomia which
is one of the symptoms of and may lead to dementia præcox(Exhibit 3; t. s. n.,
pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of a fact but of a mere possibility. The
innoncence of the accused cannot be based on mere theories or possibilities.
To prove insanity as a defense, material, incontrovertible facts, although
circumstantial, are necessary.
On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused committed
the crime he talked and behaved as an entirely normal man. Policemen
Damaso T. Arnoco and Benjamin Cruz testified that the accused, after having
been asked why he had attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it was because
Guison owed him P55 for a long time and did not pay him. The accused stated
that he bought the knife with which he had stabbed Guison on Tabora Street
for fifty centavos and he had been waiting for two days to kill Guison. The
accused took his dinner at noon on December 12th. The statement of the
accused which was taken in writing by detectives Charles Strubel and Manalo
on December12th was left unfinished because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor
arrived and told the accused not to be a fool and not to make any statement.
Thereafter the accused refused to continue his statement. All of these show
that on that day the accused behaved as a sane man and he even appeared
to be prudent, knowing how to take advantage of advice favorable to him, as
that given him by Cruz of the Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it cannot be said
hat the accused had stabbed Guison through hallucination because it is an
established fact that his victim really owed him money as confirmed by the fact
that when Guison was stabbed he cried to the accused "I am going to pay you",
according to the testimony of an eyewitness. Therefore the motive of the
aggression was a real and positive fact: vengeance.
Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was placed under
observation in the Psychopathic Hospital because he showed symptoms of a
form of psychosis called depressive psychosis from which he had already been
cured when the case was tried. This pyschosis is of course evidence that the
accused was afflicted with this ailment after the commission of the crime. It
would not be casual to affirm that the commission of the crime had affected his
reason. Nervous shock is one of the causes of insanity (Angeles, Legal
Medicine, p. 728); but it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the accused
was also mentally deranged on the day of the crime, aside from the
ciscumstance that the evidence shows just the contrary. I am, therefore, of the
opinion that the appealed sentence should be affirmed.
G.R. Nos. 147674-75 March 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of
Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under separate informations, the
accusatory portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road,
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill
and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon
(5" long from tip to handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim
fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which wounds resulted to his
instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 1
Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7,
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use
of a bladed weapon, locally known as ‘pisao,’ thereby inflicting upon the victim
fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which wounds resulted to
his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 2
After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued. 3
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at
about 6:30 p.m., prosecution witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons
inside his house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang were outside sitting
side by side with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles,
who was lying on a bench.4
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi’s house, shouting: "There’s a long-
haired man!" Bambi stood up and looked through the open door. He saw
appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife while the latter
appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several
stab wounds on different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run
inside Bambi’s house, with Anacito chasing him. Bambi immediately locked
the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter tried to
force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw
stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito left.5
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could
bring Allan to the hospital. He saw Anacito’s two brothers and asked for their
assistance. But one of them merely said: "Never mind because he [referring
to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced."6 As nobody from among his neighbors
responded to his plea for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and
dragged him to the lower portion of the neighborhood. Several persons, who
were having a drinking session, helped Bambi bring Allan to the hospital. Allan,
however, died about fifteen minutes later.7
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of
Barangay San Pablo, Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the latter’s wife. While there,
Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw
people running. He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.8
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw
Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place.
When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near the so-called "lover’s
lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a
knife about three to four times.9
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what
he had just witnessed. He then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents’
house, but the latter did not make it because he collapsed near the fence.
Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house
of the Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the
Samar Provincial Hospital, where he died the following day.10
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital,
conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five
stab wounds on Allan’s body, one of which was fatal because it affected the
upper lobe of the right lung and bronchial vessel.11 Demetrio Jr. sustained four
stab wounds and died of pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external
and internal hemorrhage.12
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself,
Anacito Opuran. He declared that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he
was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another barangay in Catbalogan,
Samar. He never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m.,
eight policemen entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him.
He was brought to the police station and detained there until the following
morning. He denied being present at the place and time of the stabbing
incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend
whom he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no
misunderstanding with prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that
the accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied and lowly
regarded by his accusers.13
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the
defense to present witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved
for the suspension of the hearing on the following grounds: (1) on 10 January
2000, upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order authorizing
the psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order,
Anacito underwent a psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted
by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January
2000 stating that Anacito had a "normal" mental status on that date but was
"suffering from some degree of Mental Aberration," which required further
psychiatric evaluation at Tacloban City.14
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion
for the psychiatric examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional
Medical Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.15
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn
Verona, physician-psychiatrist of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination
she conducted on Anacito. At the resumption of the hearings on 20 November
2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito three times through
interviews. From her interview with Anacito’s sister, Remedios Opuran
Manjeron, she learned of Anacito’s psychiatric history of "inability to sleep and
talking irrelevantly." She found that Anacito had a psychotic disorder
characterized by flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She confirmed her
medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission
of the crime and even up to the present so that he could not stand trial and
would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her diagnosis was that Anacito
was suffering from schizophrenia.16
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to
the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986
because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was talking
"irrelevantly."17 Anacito was treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed
thorazine and evadyne.18 They stayed in Manila for one month. In 1989, they
returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed the same medicine. Since
they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments, Remedios
requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the
NCMH, however, referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios
accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino
prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada of the
NCMH who came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year.
Since then until the year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he
subjected to examination or treatment.19
Anacito’s other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of
19 November 1998, he heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard
also the loud voices and then went out. When Francisco went out to verify, he
did not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner of the
street carrying a knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and
so he hugged him. Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought
him to Remedios’ house. Before the incident, he observed Anacito to be
"sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and sometimes
silent."20
In its decision21 of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of
murder for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death
of Allan Dacles. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes specified hereunder, to wit:
Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱43,500.00 by way of actual damages, and to pay
the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan
Dacles in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱10,000.00 for burial expenses and
to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial
court grave error in disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity. 22 He
contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore,
completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even
assuming in gratis argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is "illness as would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the
offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." He
likewise maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in the
Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for
the death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito
failed to establish with the required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of
the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. The mental state of
Anacito, as testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the
stabbing incidents. Further, Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not
grossly insane, but she was uncertain that Anacito was "unconscious" at the
time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also argues that treachery was duly
alleged and proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a
qualifying circumstance in the killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is
an essential element. Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and
the imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The
human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual
process but is dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological
appreciation. A man’s act is presumed voluntary.23 It is improper to assume
the contrary, i.e. that acts were done unconsciously,24 for the moral and legal
presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind, 25 or that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. 26 Thus,
the presumption under Article 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane.
This presumption, however, may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which
under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal
liability.27
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it,28 for insanity as a defense is in the nature of confession and
avoidance.29 An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime
but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of
an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding
or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.30 It
is, therefore, incumbent upon accused’s counsel to prove that his client was
not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity
immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him.31
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means
of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the
state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior.32 Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts,
by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person,
and then determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of
sound mind.33
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. 34 However, not every
aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. 35 As
consistently held by us, "A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is legally so."36 Thus, we had previously decreed as
insufficient or inconclusive proof of insanity certain strange behavior, such as,
taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consuming three sticks of
marijuana before raping the victim;37 slurping the victim’s blood and attempting
to commit suicide after stabbing him;38 crying, swimming in the river with
clothes on, and jumping off a jeepney.39
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones40 requires that
there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused acted without the least discernment because of a complete absence
of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,41 we analyzed the Formigones standard into two
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition – whether there was a "complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act" and (b) the test of
volition – whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We
observed that our case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition,
rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an
accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the
freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally reaches out
only towards that which is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether
that intelligence be diseased or healthy. 42
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which
may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has
rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own
perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.43
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacito’s defense of insanity.
The appellant points to the testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera
that Anacito was a silent man who would sharply stare at the lady boarders a
few days before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and
long pants when there was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant
also highlights that the testimony of prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr.,
that there was a 15-minute time interval between the two stabbing incidents
shows that the stabbing spree was without any known motive.44
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged
behavioral oddity of Anacito two to three days prior to the killing. His sister
Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he was angry with
her.45 His brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes
talk to himself, laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just
quiet.46 Also relied upon by the appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his
psychiatric history and the expert testimony of the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr.
Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was
only Bambi’s personal perception that there was no reason or occasion for
Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for
insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence,
and his acts of laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his
victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane
immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual
behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties,
which will not exclude imputability.47
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick
established by case law. What it shows is that Anacito was prescribed
thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to remedy "his lack of
sleep and noisiness." As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these
drugs were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further,
Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial
Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she requested the confinement of
Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito
was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that
there was a recommendation for Anacito’s confinement, there was no
indication in the records as to when the recommendation was made, who
made the recommendation, and the reason for the recommendation.48
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,49 we discarded the confinement of the
accused at the NCMH prior to the incident in question to be by itself proof of
his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged insane by the institute.
Applying this principle to Anacito’s case, we find another cogent reason to
reject his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment
from 1991 until 1999. While Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed
for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito
needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that
he needed the medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine
for Anacito only in April 2000 because he was "again noisy in the jail." 50 It
seems that it was only after the stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his
symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Verona’s examinations
on Anacito were based on incomplete or insufficient facts.51 For one thing, she
admitted to have examined Anacito for only three sessions lasting one to two
hours each.52 Her one-page medical report53 reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in
appearance, wearing blue shirt and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with
earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with auditory hallucination,
"kabastosan," "kanan yawa." He further said his sleep was "minanok" and
complained of occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and
insight fair. Fair impulse control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the
patient has a psychiatric disorder. It is most likely that the patient is psychotic
before and during the commission of the crime. He is presently psychotic and
cannot stand trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Verona’s conclusions have no supporting medical bases
or data. She failed to demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She
failed to show her method of testing.54 Further, she did not have Anacito’s
complete behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she
mentioned that Anacito could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not
certain that he was not conscious of killing his victims in 1998. She also
declared that Anacito had a diagnostic case of schizophrenia, but stated in the
next breath that Anacito was not grossly insane.55
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Verona’s short
psychiatric evaluation report and her testimony that Anacito’s judgment and
mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that his
mental condition in 1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when
he was psychiatrically examined. The most that we can conclude is that her
findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove
Anacito’s mental condition only for said time. It could be that Anacito was
insane at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability,
insanity could have been contracted during the period of his detention pending
trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He
was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the realization of the gravity of his
offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these
circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of the
commission of the act which is the subject of the inquiry.56 His mental condition
after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of
determining his criminal liability.57
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He
invoked it for the first time in the year 2000 and only after he had already
testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation
of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of
his mental faculties.58 Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the
hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the
questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to
a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his
earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction59or an
afterthought.60 In any event, Anacito failed to establish by convincing evidence
his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is
thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction. 61
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. In the cases where we
credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of insanity, it was
clear from the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic
mental disease that affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number
of years prior to the commission of the act he was being held for.62 The
situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in 2000 that Anacito
was diagnosed as "psychotic" with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations
and was found to be schizophrenic. There is nothing on record that he had
these symptoms the previous years or at the time he stabbed the victim.
Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her report,
only at the witness stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as
the killing of Allan is concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the
commencement of the assault.63 For treachery to be considered, it must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with
treachery cannot be supposed.64
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was
lying in wait for his victim in a dark place at the national highway. When
Demetrio Jr. reached the "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place
and stabbed the former several times. Anacito’s attack came without warning;
it was deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself.65
We do not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of
murder for the death of Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with
"specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention
is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with
the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after
the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying
or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.66
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For
the crime of murder, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he
was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two
indivisible penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance
attending the commission of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is
punishable by reclusion temporal, he may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose
maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there
being no modifying circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he
spent ₱43,500 for the wake and burial of his son, only ₱11,945 67 is
substantiated by receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we shall award to
Demetrio Jr.’s heirs temperate damages68 of ₱25,00069 conformably with
current jurisprudence.70
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he
spent ₱10,000. However, he failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim.
Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages in the amount of ₱10,000 on
the ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim incurred
expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of ₱50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr.
and Allan is affirmed in line with recent jurisprudence.71 Civil indemnity is
mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.72
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim
moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000 consistent with controlling case
law.73 Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.74
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages
in the amount of ₱25,000 in view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery.75
Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages
in the total amount of ₱161,945 and the heirs of Allan damages in the total
amount of ₱110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding
appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No.
4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer
reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from the ₱50,000 civil indemnity,
he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts
of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; (b) ₱25,000 as temperate damages; and (c)
₱25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of ₱150,000; and (2) the heirs of
Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; and (b)
₱10,000 as temperate damages, or a total of ₱110,000.
Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. 113691 February 6, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law presumes that an offender possesses full control of his mental
faculties. Thus, the exempting circumstance of insanity or imbecility under Art.
12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, must be established by clear and
competent evidence showing that the accused completely lost his reason, or
was demented immediately prior to or at the very moment the crime was
committed.
The Case
This is the legal precept relied upon by this Court in denying this appeal from
the Decision1 dated November 17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case No. 5787 convicting Alberto
Medina y Catud of murder.
In an Information dated June 10, 1992, Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Benito E. Lat charged appellant with murder allegedly committed
as follows:2
That on or about the 20th day of May, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, in Barangay Kaingin, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of
Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a balisong knife, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said balisong knife one Andres M. Dalisay, suddenly and without warning,
thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Jose Contreras, pleaded "not
guilty" to the charge.3 After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the
assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads: 4
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined and
penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal [Code] and there being no
mitigating circumstance to offset the qualifying circumstance of treachery
generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the deceased Andres M. Dalisay the sum of P50,000.00. Costs against the
deceased.
Hence, this appeal.5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts, as recounted by the solicitor general in
the appellee's brief, is as follows: 6
At around 11 pm on May 20, 1991, a party was held in the house of Sebastian
and Delia Aguila in Barangay Caingin, Balite, Batangas, to celebrate the
awarding of a championship trophy to the basketball team of Larry Andal.
Among those present during the celebration were Andres Dalisay, Edgardo
Silang, Larry Andal, Norberto Biscocho, Bayani Dorado, Salustiano Aguila and
appellant Alberto Medina (pp. 3-5, tsn, September 9, 1992, testimony of Larry
Andal). During the celebration, appellant and Dalisay danced the "cha-cha" in
the shade (sulambi) near the terrace of the house of Delia and Sebastian
Aguila. While the two were dancing, the group watched and clapped their
hands. When the dance was finished, appellant left the house of the Aguilas.
After a while, Dalisay invited Andal to go home (pp. 8-11, tsn, September 11,
1992). The two left the house of the Aguilas, with Dalisay walking ahead of
Andal. While they were walking, Andal saw appellant, who was waiting along
the way, stab Dalisay with a "balisong" in the abdominal region. Dalisay held
the hand of appellant. While they were grappling, Dalisay was able to extricate
himself and started to run away. Appellant chased him. When appellant caught
up with Dalisay, appellant stabbed Dalisay once more at the back. Dalisay fell
to the ground. He tried to get up and run, but he again fell down. Appellant
stabbed him [once more] on the chest. Then [a]ppellant fled from the scene.
Andal, who was about one meter away, was so stunned and shocked by what
he saw that he did not do anything to help Dalisay. Andal and his relatives
brought Dalisay to the Batangas Hospital, but Dalisay was pronounced dead
on arrival (pp. 2-6, tsn, Sept. 11, 1992).
At that time of the incident, prosecution witness Edgardo Silang was urinating
twenty paces away. He heard Delia Aguila, the sister of appellant, shouting,
"Husay ka Alberto pihadong makukulong ka, sinaksak mo si Andres." When
he turned to where the shout came from, he saw Dalisay running towards him,
pursued by appellant. He saw blood in front of the body of Dalisay. He held
the arm of Dalisay and tried to hug him but Dalisay fell to the ground. At that
point, he saw appellant flee (pp. 5-18, tsn, Sept. 9, 1992, testimony of Edgardo
Silang).
Dr. Benjamin M. Aguado, the Municipal Health Officer of San Pascual Rural
Health Unit, conducted post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased.
He issued a Post-Examination Report (Exhibit "C") containing the Mortem
following findings:
1. Stab Wound between the 3rd & 4th interspace at the lateral side of the body
of the sternum measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
2. Stab Wound at the left Hypochondriac region measuring 1/2 inch in length
x 2 cm in wid[th] exposing the omentum.
3. Stab Wound thigh left just below the Inguinal Hernia measuring 1 inch in
length 3 cm in wid[th] x 4cm in depth.
4. Stab Wound of the thigh left mid portion anterior surface measuring 1 inch
in length x 3 cm in wid[th] x 4 cm depth.
5. Stab Wound at the scapular region mid portion measuring 1/2 inch in length
x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
6. Stab Wound at the back left between the 7th and 8th interspace measuring
1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
7. Stab Wound at lower portion of the scapular region left measuring 1/2 inch
in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
8. Stab Wound at the back right at the level of the kidney measuring 1/2 inch
in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 4 cm in depth.
(Exhibit "C").
Version of the Defense
In his brief, appellant sets up insanity as his defense. His version of the facts
is as follows:7
1. Accused-appellant Alberto Medina testified that on the evening of May 20,
1992, he went to the house of his sister, Delia Aguila, purposely to watch t.v.
(TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 5). Upon his arrival, he saw the group of the
deceased Andres Dalisay, Larry Andal and Edgardo Silang who were then
engaged in a drinking spree at the balcony of the Aguila residence (Ibid, p. 6).
2. Accused-appellant refused the group's invitation to join them in their drinking;
however, he accepted their invitation to dance with Andres Dalisay (Ibid.). In
fact, accused-appellant danced with him for about six (6) or seven (7) times
(Ibid, p. 7).
3. As the dance and the party ended, the guests started to leave. Accused-
appellant left his sister's house to head for his home at Barangay Balete, which
was more or less 200 meters away. Among the persons left behind was Andres
Dalisay.
4. While walking along the path, accused-appellant heard Andres Dalisay say,
"Bert, sandali lang", (TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 10) prompting the former to
stop.
5. Thereupon, Andres Dalisay, who appeared to be drunk, approached
accused-appellant and uttered: "Bakit mo ako hiniya?" and hit him (accused-
appellant) on the chest (Ibid). Enraged, accused-appellant prepared to fight
back when Andres Dalisay threatened to kill him (Ibid., p. 11). At this point,
accused-appellant further testified, it looked as if Andres Dalisay was taking
something out [of] his pocket.
6. Upon seeing this, accused-appellant beat him to the draw, took out his
"balisong" and stabbed Andres Dalisay, who then looked like a devil with
"horns" (Ibid., p. 11 and 19). It was only when Andres Dalisay uttered "May
tama ako" did accused-appellant stop . . . stabbing his victim (Ibid., p. 16).
7. Upon realizing that he has stabbed a person, accused-appellant
surrendered himself and the weapon on the same evening to the authorities
(TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 20).
8. On several occasions before, specifically during the latter part of 1981,
accused-appellant had exhibited unusual behaviors. His sister Lorna
Medina testified that on June 22, 1982, she brought her brother to the National
Mental Hospital after the latter had shown unusual conduct, such as looking
blankly at a distance, hitting his wife or banging her head on the wall for no
reason and having sleepless nights (TSN, August 11, 1993, pp. 13-15).
9. From June to October of 1982, accused-appellant was confined at the
National Mental Hospital. Ms.Lourdes Palapal, the Records Officer of the
National Center for Mental Health (formerly, the National Mental Hospital)
testified on the documents issued by their office relative to the confinement of
accused-appellant for "schizophreniform disorder" during that period (Exhibits
3 to 11).
10. After his release from the hospital, accused-appellant lived with his mother
and his two children at Brgy. Balete, San Pascual, Batangas. His condition did
not seem to improve, though. Lorna Medina further testified that in January of
1992, accused-appellant again exhibited the same unusual behavior which
she had observed from him in 1982 (TSN, August 11, 1993, p. 17).
11. This prompted Lorna to refer her brother's case to Dr. Teresita Adigue, a
psychologist-friend who conducted a psychological examination on accused-
appellant (TSN, August 11, 1993, p. 17).
12. Dr. Teresita Adigue, a Doctor of Psychology and a holder of a Master's
Degree in Clinical and Industrial Psychology and another Master's Degree in
Guidance and Counselling, and an accredited psychologist of the Philippine
National Police testified that on January 20, 1992, she administered a
psychological evaluation on accused-appellant (TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 5).
13. Dr. Adigue testified that based on the evaluation of accused-appellant, the
latter has been shown to be suffering from depression and was exhibiting
homicidal tendencies, and that he did not know the difference between right
and wrong (TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 10 and TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 16). On
cross-examination, the witness affirmed that a person suffering from
depression may be insane (TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 10).
14. Dr. Adigue stated that the psychological evaluation made on accused-
appellant was based on the behavioral history of the latter furnished to her by
Lorna Medina and Leticia Regalado, (TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 11) a case study
based on the family background of accused-appellant (Ibid., p. 12), and on a
series of psychological tests ("draw a person" test, the "card" test wherein the
emotions of the subject are represented by the cards, and the thematic
perception test) (TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 7).
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court rejected the appellant's defense of insanity. It ruled that Dr.
Adigue was not properly qualified as an expert witness because: (1) she did
not have the appellant's complete behavioral history; (2) she failed to
demonstrate satisfactorily how she arrived at her conclusions; (3) her method
of testing was incomplete and inconclusive; (4) her examination lasted for only
a few hours without any follow-up evaluation; (5) the university from where she
allegedly obtained her doctoral degree is not known to specialize in
psychology or psychiatry; (6) she is not known as a psychiatrist; and (7) she
reported that 'the mental activity [of the accused was] functioning on the
normal level' at the time of the evaluation, that he comprehended instructions
fast, and that he was suffering only from mild depression.
The testimony of appellant's sister that she had observed unusual behavior on
the part of appellant did not constitute sufficient proof of his insanity, "because
not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitute[s] insanity."
That the accused was released from confinement at the National Center for
Mental Health on October 4, 1982 and was not readmitted for any mental
disorder for about ten years militated against his alleged lunacy. Additionally,
the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, appellant was attentive, well-
behaved and responsive to the questions propounded to him in English even
without translation.
On the other hand, appellant's mental agility was shown when he admitted
seeing the deceased take something our of his pocket, for which reason he
decided to beat him to the draw ("Inunahan ko na"). With his balisong, he
repeatedly stabbed the deceased. The trial court appreciated treachery based
on Andal's narration of the stabbing incident.
Assignment of Errors
The defense assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court
in convicting appellant:
A
The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting accused-appellant or mitigating
his criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
B
Assuming, arguendo, that accused-appellant is criminally liable for the death
of Andres Dalisay, the trial court nevertheless erred in convicting him of the
crime of murder by appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation despite doubt tending to show the existence of such
circumstances.
C
Assuming, arguendo, that accused-appellant is criminally liable, the trial court
likewise erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in his favor.
In short, appellant puts in issue (1) his insanity and (2) the presence and the
effect of the following circumstances: (a) treachery, (b) evident premeditation,
and (c) voluntary surrender. We shall deal with each of these issues.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We reject appellant's plea for acquittal but
accept his claim of voluntary surrender.
First Issue: Appellant's Insanity Not Proven
Appellant insists that the trial court gravely erred in refusing to consider Dr.
Adigue as an expert witness. He argues that Dr. Adigue, being an accredited
psychologist of the Philippine National Police since 1979 and a holder of a
doctorate in psychology from the University of Calcutta, India, and a master's
degree in clinical and industrial psychology, deserves credence.
Appellant misses the point. More than her academic qualifications as a
psychologist, what really matters is the failure of Dr. Adigue's testimony to
establish legal insanity on the part of the appellant. After examining the
appellant on January 20, 1992, or four months prior to the incident, and after
conducting the "Draw-a-Person" Test, the Thematic Apperception Test and the
Hand Test, she reported the results of her examination as follows:
VII. TEST RESULTS/EVALUATIONS
Psychological test results revealed that subject's mental activity is functioning
on the normal level at the time of evaluation. He can comprehend instructions
fast and [was] never hesitant to take the said examinations.
With regards to some dominant personality factors, test results revealed also
the fact that subject is suffering only from mild depression because of
problems he had encountered in life and in things around him. He had also
developed negative reactions and outlook in life, therefore he undersigned
concluded that he has some emotional disturbances.
Verily, such results do not prove the alleged insanity of the appellant. Art. 12,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a complete deprivation of rationality
in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that there
be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern.8 More relevantly, said report does not support
the claim that appellant could not distinguish right from wrong.
Thus, the trial court properly rejected appellant's defense of insanity. The
presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Civil Code, always lies in favor of sanity,
and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be
of sound mind.9
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved, 10 for there is a
presumption that acts penalized by law are voluntarily.11 Hence, in the
absence of positive evidence that the accused had previously lost his reason
or was demented moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, the
courts will always presume that he was in a normal state of mind.
In Bascos,12 the accused was exempted from criminal liability because he was
a violent maniac as confirmed by the acting district health officer who
examined him. In Bonoan,13 the Court reversed the conviction of the accused,
holding that a person afflicted with dementia praecox and manic depressive
psychosis has "no control whatever of his acts. . . . There is in this disorder a
pathologic lessening [of] normal inhibitions and the case [in] which impulses
may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to
motor impulses (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and
Toxicology [2d, ed., 1926], vol. I, p. 617." There, the accused was treated at
the psychiatric department of San Lazaro Hospital and was released long
before the commission of the crime, but the reports of the alienists 14 who
examined the accused after the crime confirmed his mental disorders. The
Court held that the evidence that the accused appeared lucid when he stabbed
the victim did not necessarily prove his sanity, because it was "clear from what
Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of
Edinburgh, said in his work on Forensic Medicine, (3d. ed. [London], p. 382),
that in the type of dementia praecox, 'the crime is usually preceded by
much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attacks are
common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or
that their property is being taken.'"15
However, care must be taken to distinguish between lack of reason (insanity)
and failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger (passion).
". . . [I]t is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so
called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted
condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sane, does not
exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence."16
Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted as an exempting
circumstance, Philippine case law shows a common reliance on the test of
cognition, which requires a complete deprivation of intelligence — not only of
the will — in committing the criminal act.17 In the cited case of Rafanan, the
fact that appellant threatened the victim with death in case she reported her
ravishment indicated that he was aware of the reprehensible moral depravity
of that assault and that he was not deprived of intelligence. In Dungo, that the
accused knew the nature of what he had done negated his claim that he was
insane when he fatally stabbed his victim.18 In Aquino19, appellant, who took
120 cc of cough syrup and consumed three sticks of marijuana before raping
his victim and hitting her head with a stone, had some form of mental illness
which did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning
faculties, enabling him to exercise sound judgment and to satisfactorily
articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounted any intimation of
insanity when he committed the felony. It has been held that mere abnormality Q Who was ahead?
of the mental faculties does not exclude criminal culpability.
A Andres was ahead of me, sir.
In the present case, Dr. Adigue's testimony did not establish complete
deprivation of appellant's reason. Consequently, appellant cannot claim Q And you [were] following?
exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal A Yes, sir.
Code.
xxx xxx xxx
Alternatively, appellant argues that his condition should merit, at the very least,
the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par. 9 of the Q While walking together, can you tell the court what actually happened?
Code.20 In Formigones, the Court found the feeblemindedness of the accused
A Alberto waited for us on the way that were going pass, sir.
to be a mitigating circumstance, noting that his faculties were not fully
developed. After stabbing his wife, the accused in said case took her dead Q Why do you say that Alberto [was] waiting for you and Andres during that
body up their house, put her on the floor and lay beside her for hours, showing time?
remorse at having killed her. The accused was "suffering [from] some physical
defect which thus restrict[ed] his means of action, defense or communication A Perhaps he has a bad intentioned, (sic) sir.
with his fellow beings,' or such illness 'as would diminish the exercise of his
Q While walking on that path Andres was ahead of you what did you see if you
will power.'"21 In Rafanan, schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting
had see[n] anything?
because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of
his acts, was considered a mitigating circumstance which diminished the A Alberto stabbed Andres Dalisay, sir.
exercise of the offender's will power without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts.22 xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, however, the defense miserably failed to establish the Q What happen[ed] after Alberto had [stabbed] Andres Dalisay?
deprivation of the appellant's will when he stabbed his victim. Appellant
A They chased one another, sir.
testified that he thought the victim was going to pull out a weapon, thus he beat
him to the draw and stabbed him with his balisong.23 This statement shows xxx xxx xxx
that he did not suffer any deprivation of reason or discernment. While the victim
appeared to him as a "devil with horns," such perceptual distortion occurred Q What happen[ed] after that?
only after he had dealt the fatal blows on the victim. The Court cannot, A When the first stubbed (sic) hit Dalisay, Dalisay tried to hold the hand of
therefore, appreciate this mitigating circumstance in his favor. Alberto and when they were struggling Andres was able to push Alberto and
Second Issue: Proof of Treachery they both fell down and with Alberto on top of Andres, Andres was able to push
Alberto and he was able to get up and Andres ran away and Alberto chased
The treacherous nature of appellant's attack on the victim was established by him sir.
Andal who witnessed the incident. Testified the witness:24
FISCAL CARAAN:
FISCAL CARAAN:
Q Did Alberto [catch] up with Andres . . .?
Q What about you, where [were] you on that occasion?
A Yes sir, Andres Dalisay toppled down and Alberto stabbed him at the back,
A I was with Andres in going home sir.. sir.
Q Can you tell the court [if you were] walking together at that time? Q What happen[ed] next?
A Yes sir.
A After the stabbing of Andres at the back by Alberto, Andres was able to get
up and ran and while running he fell for the second time and Alberto stabbed
[him] again on the chest, sir.
Treachery can be gleaned from the fact that appellant waited behind a chico
tree and then, all of a sudden, jumped on the victim. Appellant's attack was not
only sudden and unexpected; it was also vicious and relentless. After
delivering the first stab, appellant chased his victim and stabbed him seven
more times. These seven additional stabs were inflicted when the victim was
helpless, as he fell down several times during the pursuit. Counterattack and
escape proved futile because of the injuries that the victim sustained. The
medico-legal officer reported that of the eight stab wounds on the victim, six
were fatal.25 Clearly, in killing his victim, appellant employed means which
ensured its execution without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the victim might make.26 Treachery which qualified the killing as murder was
properly appreciated by the trial court.
Third Issue: Absence of Evident Premeditation
The Court concurs with appellant and the solicitor general that the trial court
erred in appreciating evident premeditation. The solicitor general explains that
"only a few minutes had passed" from the time appellant left his sister's house
to the time he stabbed his victim. Thus, no sufficient lapse of time is
appreciable from the determination to commit the crime until its execution to
allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 27 Under such
circumstances, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.
Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited
in favor of the appellant.28The solicitor general concurs and notes that
appellant, after having earlier given himself up to a certain Col. Faltado,
surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, or about an hour after the stabbing
incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police
Station.29 Hence, the evidence sufficiently established the elements of
voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested;
(2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.30
The Proper Penalty
Voluntary surrender diminishes appellant's penalty. Since the crime committed
prior to the effectivity of Republic Act 7659, the imposable penalty for murder
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The proscription of the
death penalty by the 1987 Constitution did not amend the imposable penalty
under said article.31 Thus, Art. 64, which provides the rules for the application
of penalties containing three periods, governs the determination of the proper
penalty in this particular case.32 Contrary to the contention of the solicitor
general, Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply.33
Following Art. 64 (2) of the Code, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender entitles appellant to the imposition of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended), appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of prison mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, and reclusion temporal in
its maximum period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant is IMPOSED an indeterminate sentence of ten years and one day
of prison mayor maximum, as minimum, and seventeen years, four months
and one day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95029 March 24, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO NARVAS PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sanvicene, De Leon & Associates for accused-appellant.
NOCON, J.:
Accused-appellant Adolfo Pascual disclaims knowledge of raping Virginia de
Guzman on the feastday of the Sto. Niño (January 17, 1982) in Tondo because
he was, according to him, insane at that time. Virginia claims she was raped
five (5) times in as many hours.
As summarized by the trial court, the facts of the case are as follows:
[S]ometime in November, 1981, or roughly two (2) months before January 17,
1982, the Accused began courting Virginia de Guzman in earnest. . . . . His
persistency and tenacity and avowals of love bore fruit because after a month
of unrelenting courtship, Virginia de Guzman finally succumbed and she
accepted him as her boyfriend and agreed to be his girlfriend. . . . .
However, the feast of the Sto. Niño, the patron saint of the locality, which was
third Sunday of January of every year, was fast approaching. On January 15,
1982, . . . he invited Virginia de Guzman to attend and spend the day of the
feast on January 17, 1982, and have dinner in the house of his uncle "Tonying"
and his auntie at No. 1602 Velasquez Street, Tondo, Manila. She saw nothing
wrong with the invitation of the Accused and accepted the invitation readily.
. . . (they) started the day of January 17, 1982, by meeting in the house of
Virginia de Guzman at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning and attended mass
together.
xxx xxx xxx
When . . . (they) arrived (at the house of his uncle and auntie), . . . the Accused
told Virginia de Guzman that they will go to the old house (which was at the
back of the house) to have their dinner there because there were plenty of
people inside the house of his aunt. The Accused then took some food for
him(self) and Virginia de Guzman . . . (he) assured the latter that they will just
stay there for a while and get back to the house after their dinner. On that note,
Virginia de Guzman agreed.
They left the house of the aunt of the Accused, passing through the door near
the toilet (Exhibit "I-E") and proceeded to the old house nearby. Upon reaching
the old house, they passed through the door thereto. The old house is also a
two-storey edifice. There were no occupants at the time the Accused and
Virginia de Guzman entered the house. The lights were on.
The two proceeded to the second floor of the house. Virginia de Guzman was
then preparing the food brought for their dinner when the Accused suddenly
kissed her and tried to remove her blouse. She was caught off-guard and,
taken aback, instinctively she shouted. She resisted the advances of the
Accused. However, the accused persisted, assuring her that he will answer
and take full responsibility for what will happen. She refused. However, the
Accused, took out a "balisong" or single bladed knife from his waistline pointed
it to her neck, at the same time unzipping his pants. Virginia de Guzman,
thereupon managed to run to the ground floor of the house to seek help. The
door was closed, however. She pounded on the door, shouting: "Diyos ko,
tulungan po ninyo ako." However, the accused followed Virginia de Guzman
to the ground floor and prevented her from pounding on the door some more.
Nevertheless, the aunt of the Accused heard the noise and inquired: "Ano iyon,
Dolphy?" However, the Accused replied: "Wala iyon, Tiyang." Forthwith, the
Accused boxed Virginia de Guzman on the stomach and tried to stab her with
his balisong. Instinctively, Virginia de Guzman tried to wrest the knife from the
Accused and got hold of the knife. She, however, failed to wrest the knife from
the Accused. In the process, her palms and fingers were injured. The Accused
then held Virginia de Guzman by putting his right hand around her neck, with
the knife, held by the Accused with his right hand, pointed and pressed to her
neck. The Accused uttered invectives at Virginia de Guzman, saying "Putang
Ina mo, dito ka pa gagawa ng gulo." and warning her that something might
happen to both of them. The Accused then pulled her (kinaladkad) towards the
second floor as she continued to resist. Thereupon, the Accused, with the knife
still held by him, removed her blouse, cut off the front portion of her brassiere
with the tip of his knife and removed the strap of her brassiere with his left
hand. She did not know where the Accused put her brassiere after removing it
from her. She continued pleading with the Accused, at the same time kicking
him. Instead of relenting, the Accused pointed the knife at her and warned her
that if any vehicle was parked nearby, it might be a vehicle of a policeman and
he would have to cut her neck with the knife. The Accused then removed his
pants and clothes. Thereafter, he kicked the lower portion of her left leg and
this forced her to fall down on the floor, on a sitting position. The Accused then
removed her pants with his two hands, the knife still on his hand. The Accused
then ordered her to lie down on the floor and, when she did, the Accused
removed her panties with his left hand, while poking the knife at her neck.
Thereupon, the Accused went on top of her and inserted his private part into
her private parts and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. The
Accused, in the process, moved his buttock in an "up and down" direction. She
cried as she felt pains in her private parts. She had not experienced sexual
congress before. Her love for him completely evanesced because of what he
did.
The Accused was on top of her, having sexual intercourse with her for about
one-half hour. During that period of time, the Accused had his knife pointed at
her neck. After about half an hour, she felt something coming out of the private
part of the Accused and thereafter, he dismounted from her. Both of them sat
on the floor, naked, leaning against the wall. The knife, in the meanwhile, was
being held by the Accused. The Accused, assured her that he would take full
responsibility for what happened. It was then about 7:00 o'clock in the evening
of January 17, 1982. After an interval of ten (10) minutes, the Accused
succeeded in having a second sexual intercourse with her. Like during the first
intercourse, the Accused had with Virginia de Guzman, the knife was pointed
at her. Again, she felt something was coming out of his private parts. They sat
down again, on the floor, still naked for about thirty (30) minutes. Virginia de
Guzman then told the Accused that she wanted to go home already. However,
the Accused refused and merely kept silent. The Accused had sexual congress
with her for three (3) more times. It was then about 2:00 o'clock in the early
morning of January 18, 1982. By then she was extremely exhausted and dizzy.
She wanted to put on her clothes back but the Accused did not want her to. As
they laid down on the floor, Virginia de Guzman tried her best to keep awake.
However, the Accused was alert and was able to keep awake too. Unable to
keep herself from sleeping, Virginia de Guzman slept ahead of the Accused.
The Accused took a blanket from inside the aparador and used the said
blanket for both of them.1 (Sic not used to avoid cluttering of testimony).
Accused-appellant was thus charged in court with the rape of Virginia de
Guzman in an Information filed on February 3, 1982.2
In defense, accused-appellant pleads insanity and denial of the crime charged.
According to the trial court:
The Accused pleaded ignorance of the charge against him. The accused
denied recollection of his whereabouts on January 17, 1982. Although he
admitted knowing the Private Complainant as his neighbor, he alleged
ignorance of any relationship he had with her or having met her on January 17,
1982, or his whereabouts on January 29, 1982 or why he was brought to the
hospital although his mother, Felicitas Pascual used to visit him there. He
recalled his father's name, Elpidio Pascual, and his brothers' and sisters'
names, as Ernesto Pascual, Hermina Pascual, Arsenia Pascual and Jonel
Pascual. He studied with the Arellano University High School but finished only
the second year. He finished his elementary education at the Yangco
Elementary School.
The Accused adduced evidence, through the testimony of Dr. Eduardo Maaba
of the National Center for Mental Health, to prove that, at the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the Accused was insane within the context
of Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that the
Accused was first admitted to the National Mental Hospital (now the National
Center for Mental Health) on May 7, 1980 for "schizoprenia, undifferentiated
type" when the Accused was barely eighteen (18) years of age. Eventually,
the Accused was discharged from the hospital, on January 5, 1982 on an
overdue pass. The hospital found
that there was no more need for the further confinement of the Accused
although he had to go back to the hospital for periodic examination and
treatment. . . .3
On March 5, 1982, the trial court ordered the confinement of the accused at
the National Mental Hospital for examination and treatment.
It was only on July 3, 1987 that the accused was certified by the mental health
authorities to be fit to stand the rigors of a court trial.
Consequently, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment
against accused-appellant, on August 1, 1988, finding him guilty of the offense
charged, the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused ADOLFO
PASCUAL Y NARVAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape
defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and,
conformably with said provision, hereby sentences the said Accused, to the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties of the law
and the costs of suit.
The Accused is hereby ordered to pay to the Private Complainant, Virginia de
Guzman, the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, as moral damages.
The period during which the Accused has been confined at the City Jail after
his arrest in this case and the National Center for Mental Health from March 5,
1982 in connection with this case shall be credited to him in full provided that
he agreed, in writing, to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.4
Hence, this appeal, with accused-appellant raising as errors of the trial court:
I. In not finding that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of
rape;
II. In proceeding with the trial without first securing the conformity or approval
of the Director of Health as mandated by law that accused was already cured
of his mental illness and can stand trial, and
III. On the assumption that the accused was sane, in not acquitting him on
ground of reasonable doubt on the face of the inconsistent, contradictory and
incredible testimonies of prosecution witnesses.5
The principal submission of accused-appellant is that he was suffering from
"schizoprenia, undifferentiated type" on January 17, 1982 that is why he does
not remember having raped Virginia five (5) times.
Schizoprenia, as a defense, was discussed extensively in People vs. Rafanan,
Jr.,6 as follows:
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense,
it was only in People vs. Formigones that the Court elaborated on the required
standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of
Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, . . :
xxx xxx xxx
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent
cases. A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that
Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition
— "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal act]," and
(b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather
than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has
failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the
sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom and will," i.e., without an
accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is "perhaps to be
expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that
which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence
be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show
complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most
a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the
Revised Penal Code:" Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts.
Schizoprenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental
disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality,
and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly
called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis
and usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. A standard textbook in
psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of schizoprenia in the following
manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizoprenia:
a disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of
activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizoprenic — that
is, his detachment from reality and his consequent autism and the ambivalence
that expresses itself in his uncertain effectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's
system of schizoprenia is often referred to as the four A's: association, affect,
autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizoprenia that
he considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value
in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of
one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the
patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's
thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to others, delusions, and
the experience of having one's actions controlled or influenced from the
outside.
Schizoprenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on
the basis of second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical
appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination,
perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
xxx xxx xxx
In previous cases where schizoprenia was interposed as an exempting
circumstance, it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases,
the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the
mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the
accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.7
The following actions on the part of the accused-appellant, which are findings
of fact of the trial court, negate complete destruction of intelligence at the time
the rape was committed:
1. the fact that he pointed a "balisong" at the neck of Virginia when she initially
resisted his advances;8
2. the fact that he told his Auntie that Virginia's pounding at the door of the
house, where accused brought her to be raped, was nothing to worry about; 9
3. the fact that he threatened her with death if any police vehicle will park near
that home; 10
4. the fact that when complainant first resisted accused's advances and after
he had consummated the sexual assault, he assured Virginia that he would
answer and take full responsibility for what will happen; 11
5. the fact that he raped her five (5) times in as many hours; 12
6. the fact that accused took a blanket from the aparador and used it to cover
both himself and the complainant, who having been raped five times,
eventually fell asleep as she was tired, exhausted and emotionally drained; 13
7. the fact that the accused insisted on going with Virginia when her mother
rescued her from accused's auntie's old house. 14
All these indicate to the court that accused-appellant was very much aware of
what he had done, contrary to the requirement of complete deprivation of
intelligence for the exempting circumstance of insanity to be appreciated in
accused-appellant's favor. 15
We find, therefore, no exempting circumstance of insanity in accused-
appellant's case. With this finding, the resolution of appellant's second
assignment of error would be irrelevant and immaterial.
II
However, appellant contends that, on the assumption that he was sane, he
could not be convicted on the basis of the inconsistent, contradictory and
incredible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as follows:
1. Accused-appellant threatened Virginia with a knife either when she was
boxed by the accused at the first floor of the house where she was
raped16 or when he kissed her while they were eating; 17
2. Either Virginia told her mother she was raped when she and her mother
were going home from accused's auntie's house on the morning of January 18,
198218 or she never informed her mother of the rape committed on her 19; and
that
3. Virginia just slept the whole day of the 18th of January when she arrived at
her house.20
These alleged inconsistencies represent minor lapses on the complaining
witness' part and are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a
humiliating experience, which are painful to recall, in open court and in the
presence of strangers on an extremely intimate matter not normally talked
about in public, and do not detract from the credibility of the complaining
witness.21 What is sufficient is that Virginia's parents did talk things over
between themselves lest the entire family be involved in any untoward
incident. 22 After the decision to seek vindication on the wrong done to her was
reached, the family lost no time in reporting the incident to the police and
having Virginia medically examined. 23
The fact that Virginia slept the whole day of January 18, 1981 in the safety of
her own house has no effect on the credibility of her testimony that she was
raped the previous night by the accused and up to the early morning of January
18th. Tired and exhausted from her harrowing experience, it is but natural for
her to fall asleep.
III
A rule deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that when a woman testifies
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is to be said to constitute
the commission of said crime.24 No young Filipina of decent repute would
publicly admit that she has been ravished and abused unless it is the truth.25
The law presumes every person to be sane. A person accused of a crime has
the burden of proving his affirmative allegations of insanity.26 This appellant
has failed to prove — that he was insane at the time he raped Virginia — and
offered no evidence of his total deprivation of intelligence while he was raping
Virginia five (5) times. On the contrary, accused-appellant's own witness
testified as follows:
FISCAL CADELINA:
When you were examining him on March 9, 1982, he was relating to you the
incident of intercourse, did the Accused show any sign of remorse about the
intercourse or rape?
WITNESS:
The most important thing that I do here is to jot down the acts of the patient,
but there were times when the patient described emotional tunes. In this
particular case I failed to reflect it in the chart of the patient, sir.
FISCAL CADELINA:
But when the patient was answering your questions he answered them
responsively and coherently, is that right?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.27
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the indemnity is hereby
INCREASED to P40,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.28
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO AGACER,* EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN
AGACER and ERIC*** AGACER,Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For resolution is appellants' Motion for Reconsideration 1 of our December 14,
2011 Decision2 affirming their conviction for the murder of Cesario Agacer, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7,
2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding
appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the following
modifications:
(1) actual damages is DELETED;
(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer ₱25,000.0
as temperate damages; and
(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer h interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of damages
awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.3
Appellants assert that their mere presence at the scene of the crime is not
evidence of conspiracy;4 that there was no treachery since a heated argument
preceded the killing of the victim;5 and that even assuming that their guilt was
duly established, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should
have been appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin Agacer (Franklin) who
was only 16 years and 106 days old at the time of the incident, having been
born on December 21, 1981.6
In our February 13, 2012 Resolution,7 we required the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration particularly on
the issue of Franklin’s minority.
Meanwhile, in a letter8 dated June 8, 2012, the Officer-in-Charge of the New
Bilibid Prison, informed us that appellant Florencio Agacer (Florencio) died on
February 17, 2007, as evidenced by the attached Certificate of Death
indicating cardio pulmonary arrest secondary to status asthmaticus as the
cause of death.9
The OSG, in its Comment,10 asserts that there exists no cogent reason to
disturb our findings and conclusions as to the guilt of the appellants since the
facts and evidence clearly established conspiracy and treachery. However, it
did not oppose and even agreed with appellants’ argument that minority should
have been appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance in favor of
Franklin, the same being duly supported by a copy of Franklin’s Certificate of
Live Birth secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO) Document
Management Division.11
Issues
Hence, the following issues for our resolution:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the existence of conspiracy and
treachery in the commission of the crime charged?
2. Should the mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor of
appellant Franklin?
3. Does the death of appellant Florencio extinguish his criminal and civil
liabilities?
Our Ruling
There is partial merit in appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Reiterated Arguments in a Motion for Reconsideration Do Not Need a New
Judicial Determination.
Appellants’ contention that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove
conspiracy and treachery is a mere rehash of their argument set forth in their
brief, "which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we
rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered."12 It is not a new issue that
needs further judicial determination.13There is therefore no necessity to
discuss and rule again on this ground since "this would be a useless formality
of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth
in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
movant."14
As a Minor, Franklin is Entitled to the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of
Minority.
Nevertheless, we agree with appellants that Franklin is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Franklin’s Certificate of Live
Birth shows that he was born on December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16
years old at the time of the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He is
therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the
offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in the
proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and
compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted
with less discernment.15 This is regardless of the fact that his minority was not
proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for
our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights
of the state, the victim and his heirs.
Penalty to be Imposed Upon Franklin.
Pursuant to the above discussion, the penalty imposed upon Franklin must be (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen
accordingly modified. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. A (17) years and four ( 4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
degree lower is reclusion temporal.16 There being no aggravating and ordinary maximum, and (b) the criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto of appellant
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on Franklin should be Florencio Agacer are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, which ranges from judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET ASIDE.
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months.17 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty SO ORDERED.
next lower in degree is prision mayor, the medium period of which ranges from
G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015
eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Due to the seriousness of
the crime and the manner it was committed, the penalty must be imposed at PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERGEL ANCAJAS
its most severe range. AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, Accused-Appellants.
The Death of Florencio Prior to Our Final Judgment Extinguishes His Criminal DECISION
Liability and Civil Liability Ex Delicto.
PERALTA, J.:
On the effect of the death of appellant Florencio on his criminal liability, Article
89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that: Appellants Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas are before us seeking a review
of the Decision1 dated April 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Cebu City,
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally issued in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00857.
extinguished.
On October 19, 1998, appellants were charged before the Regional Trial Court
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
(RTC), Branch 61, Bogo, Cebu City with the crime of Rape under the following
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
Information,2 the accusatory portion of which
occurs before final judgment;
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
That on the 16th day of July 1998, between the hours of 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock
It is also settled that "upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his in the evening, at the house of the victim at Taytayan, Municipality of Bogo,
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for Court, the said accused, confederating and conspiring with one another, with
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is deliberate intent, by means of force and violence by boxing her on the stomach
on the criminal."18 thereby rendering her unconscious, with intimidation and lewd design, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with
While Florencio died way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was AAA,3 while she was in a state of unconsciousness.
not timely relayed to the Court, such that we were unaware of the same when
we rendered our December 14, 2011 Decision. It was only later that we were CONTRARY TO LAW.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
informed of Florencio’s death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the Officer-in-
Charge of the New Bilibid Prison. Due to this development, it therefore On their arraignment on February 23, 1999, appellants pleaded NOT
becomes necessary for us to declare Florencio 's criminal liability as well as GUILTY5 to the crime charged.
his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final
judgment. The judgment or conviction is thus set aside insofar as Florencio is Trial thereafter ensued.
concerned.
AAA, nineteen (19) years old, is a household help of the spouses Constantino
WHEREFORE, appellants' Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY and Elvira Cueva. At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1998, she
GRANTED.1âwphi1 Our Decision dated December 14, 2011 is MODIFIED as asked permission from her employers to go to her parents' house. 6 AAA's
follows: (a) appellant Franklin Agacer is sentenced to suffer the penalty often house is located in Barangay Taytayan, Bogo, Cebu,7 the same barangay
where her employers' house is situated. On her way to her parents' house, she
met appellants Vergel and Allain who wanted to go with her but she
refused.8 They suddenly held her hands but she was able to get free from their
hold. She then decided to return to her employers' house 9 but when she
thought about her parents' need for the money,10 she just stayed and waited
at the side of the road hoping that the appellants would go away. 11
Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her parents'
house but appellants reappeared and held her hands again. 12 She shouted for
help and struggled to be freed from their hold but appellant Allain covered her
mouth with a handkerchief13 and appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach
which caused her to lose consciousness.14
At about 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, AAA regained her
consciousness and she noticed that she was only wearing her t-shirt as her
bra, panty and maong pants were on her side.15 She felt'pain all over her
body.16 Her vagina hurt17 and it was covered with blood. Her panty and maong
pants were also stained with blood.18 She went back to her employers' house
and told them that she was raped by appellants. 19
At around 9 o'clock in the morning of the same day, AAA was accompanied by
the Spouses Cuevas to the police station in Bogo, Cebu to report the rape
incident.20 The rape incident was contained in a police blotter and AAA was
later instructed to undergo a physical examination which she did. 21
Dr. Mary Ann Jabat (Dr. Jabat) of the Severo Verallo Memorial District Hospital,
Bogo, Cebu, conducted an examination on AAA and issued a Medical
Certificate22 dated July 17, 1998. The medical findings and testimony of Dr.
Jabat revealed that AAA had lacerations in the perineum and hymen (at 3
o'clock and 10 o'clock positions); her labia majora had erythema and slight
edema; and the vaginal swab indicated the presence of spermatozoa. She
said that the lacerations in the perineum and the hymen were due to the
insertion of a foreign object or the male organ23 and that the presence of
spermatozoa signifies recent sexual intercourse.24
On the other hand, appellants strongly denied the accusation and interposed
the defense of alibi. They both claimed that they were not at the crime scene
where AAA's alleged rape happened as they were somewhere else. Appellant
Allain claimed that at around 7:00 p.m., he went to fetch her sister Lucille
Reichards who was talking with friends at Kit Prisilla's house; and that he and
his sister went home at around 9:00 p.m. and never went out again.25 While
appellant Vergel claimed that at around 8:00 p.m., he bought barbeque and
passed by Kit's house where he saw co-appellant Allain and their sister Lucille
talking;26 that when he went back home a little later, he already saw appellant
Allain in their house. Appellant Vergel left their house again at 9:00 p.m. as he
was called by Kit to tally the,collection of the masiao tips; and that he went
home at around 10:00 p.m.27 They both testified that Kit's house is 100 meters
from their house28 and that AAA's house is also 100 meters from their
house.29 Appellants' sister Lucille and their mother Amparo Ancajas
corroborated their alibis.
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, a medico legal expert, who gave
a different explanation on Dr. Jabat's medical findings, 30 and Doroteo Booc,
appellants' brother-in-law, to show that he saw AAA walking with a male
companion on that fateful night.31 Appellant Allain's birth certificate was
presented to show that he was still seventeen (17) years old at the time the
alleged rape of AAA was committed.32Also presented was the police
blotter.which contained four (4) names as suspects on AAA's rape but
the.same police blotter also contained in the progress report that AAA only
suspected accused-appellants as her rapists arid refused to acknowledge the
other two.
On March 28, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,33 the dispositive portion of
which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vergel Ancajas and Allain
Ancajas are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Further, each accused is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92, as amended by Circular No. 63-97 of the Court
Administrator, the Jail Warden of the Cebu Provincial Detention and
Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC), Cebu City, is hereby directed to immediately
transfer the two (2) accused to the custody of the National Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Jail Warden, CPDRC for his
information, guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC ratiocinated that the elements of the crime of rape were duly proven
by the prosecution and the fact of rape had been corroborated in its material
details by the medical findings of Dr. Jabat. It found that AAA had positively
identified appellants whom she was familiar with being her neighbors and
childhood friends.
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its unconscious;cralawlawlibrary
Resolution35 dated July 25, 2007. The RTC ruled on the issue of appellant
Aliain's minority by saying that the penalty imposed upon the two accused c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the said penalty should be applied and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of minority. even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
The RTC further said that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply present.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
to appellant Allain because he is convicted of an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, citing Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. complainant; and, (2) that the same was accomplished under any of the above-
enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal which the CA gave due course. The committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who
parties were required to submit their respective briefs and upon their can testily with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.39 Therefore,
compliance, the case was submitted for decision. in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single
and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victim's testimony meets the
On April 27, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision. test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this
testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime. 40
Dissatisfied, appellants filed this appeal for a final review of their conviction. In
our Resolution36 dated January 18, 2012, we notified the parties that they may Appellants' claim that rape was not was established as AAA had been
file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire within thirty (30) days unconscious during its alleged commission is not persuasive.
from notice. Both parties manifested37 that they are adopting the briefs they
filed before the CA. While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that appellants
had carnal knowledge of AAA as the latter was unconscious, however, proof
Appellants claim that based on AAA's testimony, the element of carnal of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for
knowledge was not established since she claimed to be unconscious, hence, circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the
she would not know the act allegedly done to her; that she only believed that crime beyond reasonable doubt.41 Indeed, the Court had affirmed convictions
they had carnal knowledge of her because she felt pain on her vagina. They for rape based on circumstantial evidence.42
claim that there were inconsistencies in her testimony and that her conduct
after the alleged rape negate the commission thereof. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
The issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond (3) and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
reasonable doubt appellants' guilt for the crime of rape. conviction beyond reasonable doubt.43 A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved
Article 266-A38 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements of the form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
crime of rape as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.44

Art. 266-A- Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a Here, AAA was on her way to her parents' house when appellants, her
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following neighbors since childhood, appeared and held her hands. She struggled and
circumstances: shouted but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief to prevent
her from shouting, while appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach which
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;cralawlawlibrary caused her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she
felt pain all over her body and her vagina. She found her bra, bloodied parity
and maong pants beside her. She went back to her employers' house and told
them that appellants raped her. AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Jabat's declaration that the lacerations in AAA's perineum and hymen were
due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male organ and the presence of
spermatozoa signified recent sexual intercourse. It is well settled that when
the victim's testimony is corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration,
there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential
requisites of carnal knowledge.45The lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are
the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. 46
We find no error committed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in giving
credence to AAA's testimony. In fact, it was put down in record that AAA was
crying while she was testifying before the trial court. 47 It has been held in
several cases that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of
the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain
the victim feels when she recounts the detail of her traumatic experience. 48
We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants. Under
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to
reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. 49
The prosecution had established that appellants held AAA's hands, and when
she tried to shout, appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and
appellant Vergel punched her in the abdomen which caused her to lose
consciousness. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be
unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective which were
present in this case.50
We find that the RTC correctly rejected appellants' defense of denial and alibi.
AAA positively identified appellants as the persons who raped her. She knew
them as they were neighbors since childhood. Denial fails in the light of AAA's
positive declaration.
Appellants' alibi is also unavailing. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to
prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed,
but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility for him to have
been at the scene of the crime.51 Physical impossibility refers to the distance
between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the
place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the
two places.52 Appellant Allain testified that at around 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of
July 16, 1998, he was at Kit's house, which was located around 100 meters
away from their own house. On the other hand, appellant Vergel testified that
he passed by Kit's house at past 8:00 p.m. and saw Allain thereat. Notably,
appellant Allain testified that AAA's house is also 100 meters away from their
house. Thus, it would show that Kit's house is also in the same vicinity where
the crime was committed. Hence, it was not physically impossible for the
appellants to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
Appellants' argument that AAA's conduct after the alleged sexual assault, i.e.,
washing her bloodied panty and maong pants, and washing her private part,
are not the normal behavior of a woman who had just been raped deserves
scant consideration.
It is not accurate to say that there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior
among rape victims.53 On the contrary, people react differently to emotional
stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim
following her defilement.54 What is notable in the records was the fact that after
she had regained consciousness at 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998,
she immediately went back to her employers' house and narrated to them what
appellants had done to her, later reported the rape incident to the police and
underwent a physical examination of her private parts. Her actions indeed
showed her desire to obtain justice for what appellants did to her.
Appellants' contention that if AAA was positive as to their identification as the
perpetrators of the crime charged, why were there two other names included
in the police blotter, is also unmeritorious.
The same police blotter stated a notation that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Progress Report on Rape Alarm (Entry Nr. 98-257). As per sworn statement
of offended party AAA that the alleged suspects were Allain Ancajas and
Vergel Ancajas and she refused (sic) the other
suspects.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn statement
of AAA and her categorical declaration56 in open, court that appellants were
the perpetrators of the crime charged and no other. It is well entrenched that
entries in a police blotter, although regularly done in the course of the
performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries,
for these are often incomplete and inaccurate. These, therefore, should not be
given undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein. 57
Appellants' claim that a DNA test on the spermatozoa found on AAA's vagina
should have been submitted for DNA testing to know whether the sperm
indeed came from both appellants or from AAA's boyfriend.
It has already been established that appellants were the ones who raped AAA.
The DNA test is not essential, while there exists other evidence pinning down
appellants as the perpetrators.58 Moreover, if the prosecution had not
conducted such DNA test, appellants should have moved for such test during
the trial to prove their innocence.
All told, we find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the
guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Under Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when
rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. The RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both appellants
notwithstanding that appellant Allain was only 17 years old, a minor, at the
time of the commission of the crime on July 16, 1998. His birth
certificate59 showed that he was born on December 19, 1980. The RTC did not
consider such minority saying that the penalty imposed upon the two accused
is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the said penalty should be applied and
imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of minority.
We beg to differ.
To begin with; on May 20, 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise known
as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, took effect, RA No. 9344
provides for its retroactive application, as held in People v. Sarcia,60 which
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344] allows the retroactive application of the Act
to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time
of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to
this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable
penalty on appellant Allain even if the crime was committed seven years earlier.
Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Madali, et al. v. People,61 we held that discernment is that mental capacity
of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
In this case, it was established that appellant Allain acted with discernment as
shown by his act of covering AAA's mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her
from shouting and conspired with appellant Vergel in raping AAA.
As the crime of rape was committed by two persons, the penalty imposable
under Article 266 (B) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Pursuant to Article 6362 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed
by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the
commission of the crime. Since no aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable.
Appellant Allain was only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is,
therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under
Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty to be
imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.
Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e.,
from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.63 To determine the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one
degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the
crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its
medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken
from the full range of prision mayor.64
Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of age
who committed a crime and was found guilty, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if such child has reached
18 years or more at the time of judgment. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various circumstances
of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the benefits of a
suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because he is
convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetuamaking reference to
Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,65 Rule, on Juveniles in Conflict with the law.
We do not agree.
In People v. Sarcia,66 we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No. 8344
even if the minor therein was convicted of reclusion perpetua and we
ratiocinated as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no distinction
as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law,
unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetuaor life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by
the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and
another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child
in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from
the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted
below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,
accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted
with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the
Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare
and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. x x x67ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In fact, the Court En Bane promulgated on November 24, 2009, the Revised
Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such legislative
intent.68
Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with
the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment of
conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the minor
reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No. 9344,
to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section find that exemplary damages should also be awarded to set a public example
38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no and to protect hapless individuals, from sexual molestation. 71 We, therefore,
longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the application of RA No. award the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in accordance with
9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent prevailing jurisprudence.72
of the said law.
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
In People v. Jacinto,69 we ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.73
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended
sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 27, 2011 of the
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty- Court of Appeals Cebu City, issued in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00857
one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule are clear on is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Vergel Ancajas is imposed the
the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old. penalty of reclusion perpetua. In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance
appreciated in favor of appellant Allain Ancajas, and the absence of other
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, he is sentenced to suffer the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even penalty often (10) years and one day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporalmedium, as
he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall maximum. Both appellants are each ORDERED to pay P30,000.00 exemplary
be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in damages. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages, both in the amount
accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a of P50,000.00 to be paid by each appellant, are maintained. The award of
normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age. The case against appellant Allain Ancajas shall be REMANDED to the trial
court for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training No. 9344.
facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and vs.
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD. HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the
court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other PEREZ, J.:
training facility.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of
Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the accused as
facility pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344. the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be convinced
that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been
The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 ordered at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.2
by the RTC to be paid by each appellant are hereby affirmed. We, however,
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has
become final and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the
benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the
age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice
and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under
the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto
seeks before this Court the reversal of the judgment of his conviction. 4
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the
crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the
evening more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd
design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of
minority, the victim being only five years old.7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 8 During pre-trial,9 the
defense admitted the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate
of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter
entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon presentation of the
original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to
prove their respective versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki
[Julito]12 may be summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF’s house is
along the road. That of appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from
FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by FFF’s house, the frequency
of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also,
appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge
against appellant prior to the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him
all the time – playing at the basketball court near her house, fetching water,
and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and appellant used to
be friends until the incident.14
At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-
year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA
followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He
thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay
[Rita].15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of
Tanduay Rum.16 At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was
wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left the store at
the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television,
while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the
"lower area or place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short
pants21 when he held her hand while on the road near the store.22 They walked
towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho
[the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed
her panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from waist
down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his
penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and
cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in
turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. 30 She was
without slippers.31 He found her face greasy.32 There was mud on her head
and blood was oozing from the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury
and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black. 34 She had
no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina. 35 AAA
told him that appellant brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at the
back of the house of the Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers,
removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast;38 and that he proceeded
thereafter to the Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos. 40 He asked
the appellant what he did to AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy
rum at the store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to check on his
daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again,44 and boxed
him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching
television at the house of Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was
crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to
which she replied that appellant raped her.49 Julito left and found appellant at
the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the
daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.51Appellant’s aunt,
Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the appellant
responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and
my knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have
the incident blottered.54 FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the
municipal health center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health
Physician, issued a medical certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like
material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another
examination at the provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth
B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital, attended to her and
issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,58 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No.
6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic) 59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story.
To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria
took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the
commission of the crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she actually
saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. 61 In addition, Antonia
Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the
behavior of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house
stands at the back of FFF’s house.64He denied that there was a need to pass
by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch water. 65 He,
however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF,66 and whenever he
was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him.67
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the
Perochos to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors,
including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were
gathered together in a drinking session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the store
to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house,
he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time
because he had a watch .68
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her
house attending the birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and
7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that
appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that
appellant’s white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at
the kitchen having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the
visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road
next to the house of the Perochos.72 From where she was, she saw Julito, who
was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s face was
covered and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought
it was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she
returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white
T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following
behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito embraced
AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching
incident and testified that appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her,
FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came
in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed
at appellant. Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another
Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF. 83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening, she was
watching the television along with other people at the house of Rita. Around
7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt
on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA
came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened.
AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia’s advice, Julito released her and went out
of the house.84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening, FFF arrived,
pointed a finger at him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA.
FFF left but returned at around 8 o’clock in the evening. This time, he boxed
appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, 86 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to
death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence
stating that appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was
only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed on 28 January
2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the
accused is amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused,
therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its
disposition in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial
court with the following MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the
appellant’s Notice of Appeal.92 This Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs. 93 Both parties
manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the
principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass
the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we
consider the three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.97
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may
be sufficient to convict the accused.98More so, when the testimony is
supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive
identification of the perpetrator of the crime,100except when it is established
that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus Q Where did he push his penis?
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101
A To my vagina.
I
Q Was it painful?
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12)
years of age even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) A Yes.
through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of Q What was painful?
reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority. 102 A My vagina.

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of Q Did you cry?
the acts culminating in the insertion of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-
A Yes.103
year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved
such fact. The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were
phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA well understood the
AAA testified:
information elicited from her, said it all – she had been raped. When a woman,
PROS. OMANDAM: more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that
rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally
xxxx badges of truth and honesty.105
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo 106 revealed
you, what else did he do to you? that the hymenal lacerations at 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have
A He mounted me. been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus
could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you? such object could have been an erect male organ.107

A Yes. The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of

Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
penetration conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge.108
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the
time of the commission of the crime are now in dispute.

Q Who pushed them apart? The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and
that appellant was elsewhere when the crime was committed.109
A Hermie.
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily
Q Did Hermie push anything at you? identify her assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering
that she could have a good look at him during the commission of the
A Yes.
crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA
Q What was that? even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that
it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand
A His penis. and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering
testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was
accused, whom she called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch
water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at
the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted
to impute the crime to someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal,
was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is
younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination
by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and
respect considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the witnesses’
manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full
realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and
circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the
crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private
complainant’s positive identification of accused and other corroborative
circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki,
the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus
corroborating the latter’s testimony that he confronted accused after hearing
of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred
in finding his denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their
respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s
very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to
store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had
already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle
Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed that her husband was not
around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at
work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the
second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her
husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay. 118 Further, the drinking
session started only after the appellant’s errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session.
This is contrary to Gloria’s statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness
Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This
belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of
Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito,
and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that
appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection differ in that Julito wore
a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved
shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s
house three (3) minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the
evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this
respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying,
to tell her father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house
of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla
Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen at the house
of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she
had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take
a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible,
the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The
defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being
related or were one way or another linked to each other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations
on his whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between
the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity
when the crime was committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of
the commission of the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach
in less than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused
not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the
testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep
when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She
could have merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout. 126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating
that of the appellant that he was in their company at the time of the commission
of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the
appellant’s sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s
physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however,
an established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape occurred,
was a stone’s throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the
appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is
unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the
appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much
occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested.
Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond,
could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is,
therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed,
and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and
ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never
left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant
never left their sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to
ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where
the crime was committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would
take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store
next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed
the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his
uncle’s house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses
even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene
of the crime.130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for
appellant to have been at the time and place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly
considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was
enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated
in People v. Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the
Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of
the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the
time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should
apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but
below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found
to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings"
in accordance with the Act shall be observed.134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such capacity may be known and should
be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case.136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the
gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an
isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2)
boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen
(17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences
of his unlawful action.139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997.
Considering that she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on
28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is
committed against a child below seven (7) years old141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition
against the imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act
No. 9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than
that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. 143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the
graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree
from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor
under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous
character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition
of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is
reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed
the crime has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the
victim and her family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority which effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the
damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be
increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the
Lapse of the Period of Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of
majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August
2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the aforestated provision does not apply to
one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision
in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense
committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the
benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the
law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A.
No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction
that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A.
No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the
Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension
of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on Senate Bill No.
1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further
strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the
application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child
in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,
accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted
with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the
Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s]
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial
proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should
still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on
Children in Conflict with the Law,which reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended
sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule are
clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even
to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as
he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall
be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training
facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the
court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other
training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant is
reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of
origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act
No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision 1 dated 28 June 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed
with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao
y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula,
Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding,
Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and
Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged
under the criminal information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No. 118 FB
Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named-accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together, did then and there by force and
intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty
against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for
ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice
of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected
fish deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces.
Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was
identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence at FB
Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have
been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to
locate said passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with
another companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan
but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan
informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to
accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing
the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be
back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large,
returned to Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in
and Chan met them by the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of
Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house
companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy
tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen
pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s
feet.8 Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report
the incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two
hours, the group stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin
Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at
her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women,11 later identified in court
by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). 12 Chan
was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by
Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol). 13 Ronas and
Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million
Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board
the "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped
and the group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the
house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as
Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman,
later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00
o’clock in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao
(Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo
nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as
Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan
that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has.18 Chan
was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions
to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19 The group then
talked to Chan’s son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his
mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver ₱400,000.00 at
the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao
(Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the
investigation regarding the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors
called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s release. 21 During
their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed
a Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s residence.
The inspectors observed that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at
the second floor of the house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab
until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort and
stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the
cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received
information that the abductors acceded to a ₱400,000.00 ransom money to be
delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am.
Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and strategically
positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am,
a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took
the ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The
surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men,
later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was
also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team
assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the
apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen,
Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim
manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The
presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea, stating:
"It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and
enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it
has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence
you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the
presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the
consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering
a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification,
the other appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier
conferred with them and explained to each of them the consequences of a
change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court
separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the
consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the
affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea and
assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such change
of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they
pleaded guilty,28 the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence,
which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim,
Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and
Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with
modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants
HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y
HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and
imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the
victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only
17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No.
00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly
ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants
in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs and manifestations will be
discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that
the witness, Chan, was not able to positively identify them because of her
failing eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA
found Chan’s testimony credible and straightforward. During her testimony,
she positively identified the accused-appellants. If she had not met them
before, she could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact, the
participation of these accused-appellants was further established through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of
witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its
observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless,
through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
been considered.31 In People v. Tañedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate
the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed that the briefs
submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting
in relevant particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to
the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient.
We also find her argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven
people apprehended when they conducted the rescue operation at around
5:00 o’clock in the morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the positive identification
of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate evidence working against her
defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants
proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail
over the witnesses’ positive identification of the accused-appellants, more so
where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant
testimonies of witnesses and the absence of evidence other than mere denial
proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of
the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the
records36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew
their plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered
pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This
Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care
where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the
reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial
purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where
grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the
meaning, significance and consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review
in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of
guilt was based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on
the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences
of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines
provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must
conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines
should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of
physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judge’s intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not
infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or
upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of
the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully
explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment.
Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental
right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a
denial of his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the
crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully
complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to
ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their
plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records 43 that Karim had the
mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty
and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea
of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code. Karim was not warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the
penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly
annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below,
is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For
accused Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this court that he be allowed to
be re-arraigned Your Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as
charged but the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You
plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no
condition attached. We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the
penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made,
this Court will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial
court judge’s shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-
appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set
aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the
sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and
credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea
but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.45 The manner
by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence
proving the commission of the crime by the accused. 46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial
court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial
court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants
and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs
that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly
established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of
those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of
Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument
on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the
ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at
the cottage during the rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector
Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people
apprehended when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols
Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently
established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during
the rescue operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. 51 Once conspiracy is shown,
the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality
of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-appellants
and placed all of them at the crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to
commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the
conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from
the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of
the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the
common purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in
its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1)
before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the
victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts
in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present
when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was
conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond
reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act
of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s attention to the
manifestation made by the prosecution regarding their disinterest in
prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned.55 However, pursuant to the ruling
of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused
rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts;
more so in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers
and lied several times under oath during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about
substantial details such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she
saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several times,
Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the other
accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people
whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew,
therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while
she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of
the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient
evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence
the prosecution had was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13
August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was detained and
conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping,
this Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal,
but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered
an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal
liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking
it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the
criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the
room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and
would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose
to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It
has been held before that being present and giving moral support when a
crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in
the crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an
accomplice.62Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v.
Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation
of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of
a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
considering the evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-
appellants’ participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their
guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom and
imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the
penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion
Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian.
Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she
acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian
acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an
exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant
to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from
the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344, 67 the
suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the
law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This leaves the Court
with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of
penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is
Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what the principals
would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that
as to Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that
prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower
than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision
Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of
Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance and there being one
mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other
training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in
People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time
of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that
Perpenian’s actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty
for her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from
detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the
documentary evidence offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the
real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved
of all personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his
death72 having occurred before rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the
commission of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim
or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons
convicted were held liable for ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages,
where, as in this case, the penalty for the crime committed is death which,
however, cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346: 75
1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have
suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is
the penalty warranted by the facts but is not imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros 76 is instructive on the
apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire
amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their
liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each
principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only
an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of
them shall be liable for the total amount of ₱300,000.00 divided among the
principals who shall be liable for ₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each) and
Perpenian who shall be liable for ₱12,000.00. This is broken down into
₱10,666.67 civil indemnity, ₱10,666.67 moral damages and ₱10,666.67
exemplary damages for each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil indemnity,
₱4,000.00 moral damages and ₱4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone
accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-
appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in the amounts of ₱100,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the
crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of ₱288,000.00
while the accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of
the Revised Penal Code on several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release
THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully
served the penalty imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted
for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the
Director of the Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The
Director of the Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this Court,
within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the action he has
taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014
ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with
the law through measures that will ensure the observance of international
standards of child protection,1 and to apply the principles of restorative justice
in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the
law.2 The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to
impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict
with the law.
Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the
petitioner with homicide under the following information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga
City, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay
Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and without any
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife , inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly causing his death, per Death
Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and made an integral part hereof,
to the damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs in such amount as may
be proven in court.
Acts Contrary to Law.3
The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense
as follows: Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so
of March 30, 2000, he, together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of
Dalupaon Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony if the high
school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim,
arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter.
When asked to demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed the victim,
this witness demonstrated that with the appellant’s left arm around the neck of
the victim, appellant stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.
He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later
brought him to the hospital.
Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito’s companion at the time of the incident,
corroborated the testimony of Dequito on all material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was
stabbed in front of the [elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol
Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for more than a month in the
hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later, however, when her son
went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her son’s stab
wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to another operation, but
died the day after. She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported
to the police authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the
wake and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the
victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ failure
overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that the underlined cause of death
was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:
He testified that around seven inthe evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was
at the Dalupaon High School campus watching the high school graduation rites.
At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon High School
on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell
to the ground. He was not able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so
he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met
somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who ganged up on him.
He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why
he was in possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for
his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that day. He went home
after the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to
the barangay hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town
proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He
felt sad after hearing it.4
Judgment of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of
homicide as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the
heirs of the victim ₱81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral
expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.5
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but
modified the penalty and the civil liability through the decision promulgated on
July 19, 2006,6 disposing thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case
Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six years of
prision correccionalas minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of
prision mayor as maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual
damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical
and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the
amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason
Espinola. Weaffirm in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its
amended decision on December 7, 2006, decreeing as follows:7
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Our decision promulgated on July 16, 2006, which is the subject
of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED such that the judgment shall now
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding
appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide
is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual
damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical
and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the
amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason
Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch
20, for appropriate action on the application for probation of, herein, appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not
correctly imposing the penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a
juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No.
9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the lower courts as
well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1)
whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking
into consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the
Revised Penal Codeand Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2)
whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of
sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the
penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344
and other international agreements.
Ruling of the Court
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporalfor homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the
time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days
old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,8 such minority was
a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor. 9
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty,
which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six
years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its
medium period – eight years and one day to 10 years – was proper because
there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly,
the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and
one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate
sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to
only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal
Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support
or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.
To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would
cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides
certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in
conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction
with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child
shall be limited to the minimum.11Consistent with this principle, the amended
decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate
penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part,
Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the
discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling
the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies
from probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for
probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case
to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the
sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the
suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age,
pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.– If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his
conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension
of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation
of his rights as a child inconflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No.
9344 and international agreements.1avvphi1 A review of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in
conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic
Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the rightnot to be
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper
disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the
imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a
disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the
shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did
not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the
penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was
imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation
and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment
was for the shortestduration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action
taken herein. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), 14 the United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and
the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of
disposition, provided it is imposed asa last resort and for the minimum
necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although
he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other
training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by
the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child’s
best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular
penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the
trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to
commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or
other training facilities under its control, supervision and management, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008
MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 and
Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Padua’s petition for certiorari
and denied his motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004 3 and July 28,
20044 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had
denied his petition for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were
charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,5 Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs. 7 The Information
reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar
Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a.
"Mike", with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in
relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael
Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1
Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing
4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the
tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.8
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of not guilty.9
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s
counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty
and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders
under Section 7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no
objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order12 stating that the
former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-
arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision13 dated February 6, 2004,
the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty
of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec.
5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused
fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation15 dated February 10, 2004
alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the
benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 96816 (P.D. No. 968),
otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act
No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer
of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report
and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City
Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within
five days from receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana
submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending
that Padua be placed on probation.18
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-
Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that
under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court
ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on
minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer
Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that
minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his
recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of
sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not
find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application
for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his
sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals
with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents.
Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to
violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was
[v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70
thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor
Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that
minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in
view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act,
regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended."
(underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by
Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.20
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied
on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court
of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated
April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but
it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED
PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
[02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED
UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE
LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
OTHER PURPOSES.22
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent,
opted to adopt its Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG
countered that
I.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section
24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
II.
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law" has no application to the instant case.24
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s
petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s order denying his petition for
probation? (2) Was Padua’s right under Rep. Act No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 3226 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law" have application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Padua’s petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.
There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and
such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.28
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows
that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of
statutory construction in denying Padua’s petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep.
Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep.
Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under
this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of
the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No.
968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail
of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary
rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute
are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30 Furthermore,
there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.31
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the
legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher
punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while
extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11 32 and 1533 of the
Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims
while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing
the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike,
are given the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly
stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the
application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and
first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.35
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug
pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for
using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months
rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under
Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of
selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under
Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated.
Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as
the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application in this case.
Section 6836 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both
pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep. Act No. 9344
could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of
Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found
guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides
that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age
or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child 39 for purposes of
applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears
moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19,
2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183563 December 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 8,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53,
finding the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against
the private complainant AAA.3
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged4 with eight (8)
counts of rape in separate informations, the accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by lust, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without
her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.5
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.6
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province
of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party,
actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.7
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.8
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.9
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.10
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.11
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree.12 (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he
entered a plea of not guilty.13 On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of
the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity of the
accused-appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that
the accused appellant is the uncle of the victim.14
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the
accused and his counsel. The cases were then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges
against the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she was born on November
1, 1987.15 In one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she stated that
the accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember,
though, the exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant
stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her. He had his
clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put
it in her vagina and did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know
if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not
see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.16
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for
five times on different nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol
with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAA’s neighbor. He came to
AAA’s house, took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see
what he was wearing as it was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he
left. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in
July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top
of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every
time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said that she recognized the
accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night and their
window was only covered by cloth. He entered through the kitchen as the door
therein was detached.17
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August
1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of
her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was
heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that
the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA
said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-
appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint
when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.18
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary
evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal Report,19 which
contained the results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr.
Rommel Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and
(2) Exhibit B - the Social Case Study Report20 pertaining to AAA’s case, which
was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office of the
Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so many times. last
act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia – grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 o’clock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE21
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness
stand to deny the informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of
AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in
1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995,
he worked in Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria
Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996. He stated that he was working in
Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX.
When he would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a
certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house of AAA as the latter’s parents
were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAA’s parents because
he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that in July
1999, he was also living in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher
at a restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to September 1999. The
accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at
the same restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go home
to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he would have drinking
sprees with AAA’s stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.22
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA
was his sister and they were close to each other. He said that his parents were
still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then resided at Calaasan,
Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents’ house was about two
kilometers away from the house of AAA. While he was working at the
restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every month,
mainly on Sundays.23
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a
Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape
Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found
accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE
COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged
under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty
of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape and pay moral damages in the
amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos and pay the
cost.24 (Emphases in the original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that AAA
was in tears when she testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of
her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If there were inconsistencies
in AAA’s testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable
considering that AAA was pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The
delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an indication that the
charges were fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the
medico-legal officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-
appellant’s defense of alibi was likewise disregarded by the trial court,
declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at
any time of the day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban City.
The trial court stated that the accused-appellant was positively identified by
AAA as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against
him. The trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less
than 18 years old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the
accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third
civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 of the RTC
Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a
privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the
accused-appellant claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that
he was only 13 and 17 years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred
in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In a Resolution26 dated November 6, 2002, the
trial court denied the accused-appellant’s motion, holding that the latter failed
to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed
as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.27 The parties then filed their respective briefs.28 On
February 7, 2006, we resolved29 to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.30 The cases were docketed in the
appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-
53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to [AAA] in
the amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos for each count of
rape and clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00)
Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of rape. The death
penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No.
9346.31
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the
accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to discredit her.
The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents of rape
occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More
significant was her "straightforward, categorical and candid testimony" that she
was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals also
agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAA’s charges of rape conformed with
the physical evidence and the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated defense of
alibi could not stand against the positive identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged in the
informations and admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate court,
however, differed in appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying
circumstance of AAA’s minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said
circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating
circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown
that the same was purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it
facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded
exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal32 of the above decision and the
same was given due course by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 33 dated
May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required
the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within
30 days from notice.34 Thereafter, in a Manifestation and Motion35 filed on
December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, prayed that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On
February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.36
The Issues
In the accused-appellant’s brief, the following issues were invoked:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH.37
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give
weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state
with consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well
as her age at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not
remember the dates of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were
allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies
cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the
qualifying circumstances of AAA’s minority and her relationship to the
accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-
appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to
deny the appeal, but with a modification of the penalties and the amount of
indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty
of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of
rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years
old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed to
substantiate the said fact as AAA’s testimony thereon was too inconsistent and
incredible to be worthy of any belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that
she was raped for the first time when she was eight years old. Nonetheless,
during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999,
she said that the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was
only seven years old. On her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she
was first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape
by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
In particular, "Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of
statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented."38
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No.
8353,39 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22,
1997.40 Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code,41 which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In People v. Macafe,42 we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs
from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.
Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry
is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The
law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on
account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.43 (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions
of law are essentially the same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape
charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of
carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the commission of the
rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, "the date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman." 44 "Inconsistencies
and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?
are not grounds for acquittal."45
A: Yes, sir in our house.
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the
substance of AAA’s testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?
v. Condes46 that: A: My younger brother and I.
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the Q: About your mother and step father where were they?
credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's
observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded A: In the ricefield.
finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment
PROS. SABARRE:
and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full May we make it of record that the witness is crying.
realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine COURT:
if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
Have it on record.
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must PROS. SABARRE:
be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
A: In the afternoon.
[Court of Appeals].47
xxxx
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and
we found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused- Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did he do to
appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape charged. AAA positively you next if any?
identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes.
With tears in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said A: He went on top of me.
incident of rape as follows: Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE] A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled down
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were still 8 the zipper.
years old? Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what did he do
[AAA] next if any?

A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and date. A: He was pumping on me.

Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old? Q: Did he pull out his organ?

A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry. A: Yes, sir.

Q: How did he rape you? Q: And where did he place his organ?

A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts. A: In my vagina.

Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

A: Pain.48 A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.

The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?
Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who found "old, healed, incomplete"
hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. "[W]hen the testimony of a A: No, sir.
rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to Q: What did he do with his penis?
conclude that there has been carnal knowledge."49
A: He made me hold it.
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in
July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?
counts were proven with moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the said
A: He left.
incidents is as follows:
xxxx
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July 1999?
ATTY. SABARRE:
A: Five times.
Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did he
Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?
rape you?
A: Night time.
A: (witness did not answer)
Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?
PROS. SABARRE:
A: Different nights.
Make it of record that the witness is crying again.
Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?
Q: Why are you crying?
A: My Kuya and other siblings.
A: I am angry and hurt.
Q: You have companions why were you raped?
PROS. SABARRE:
A: Because they were sleeping.
Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding considering
Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you please narrate that the witness is psychologically incapable of further proceeding.
to the court?
xxxx
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out my
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please narrate the
panty and went on top of me.
whole incident to this honorable court?
Q: With whom was he drinking?
A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.
A: With my step father.
Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?
Q: Where did they drink?
A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.
A: In our neighbor.
Q: When he pump what did you feel?
Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused wearing at
A: Pain.
that time?
COURT:
Why did you feel pain?
A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.
ATTY. SABARRE;
How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night time?
A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by cloth as
cover.50
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape.
She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that
were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in
August 1999. AAA narrated only one incident of rape in this manner:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month of
August 1999?
A: Two times.
Q: Was it during day time or night time?
A: Nighttime.
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?
A: He kissed me.
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?
A: He took off his shirts.
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?
A: He went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his name
answered Henry Arpon).51
"It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime
that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's
evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands
to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of
innocence."52 Thus, including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA
was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described
the incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our
mind, AAA’s narration of the sexual abuses committed by the accused-
appellant contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the
crime of rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in her private part.53 "Etched in our
jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage crime cannot be
expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every
lurid detail of a frightening experience — a verity born[e] out of human nature
and experience."54
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi
deserves scant consideration. "Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it
is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused
must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than
the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it
was committed."55 "[S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated,
it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification
by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime."56
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court
that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be
negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not
impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after
working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day
off every Sunday, which according to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually
molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in
the coming years up to August 1999. She can not be mistaken on the identity
of the accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during the
daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her
mother.57
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that
AAA may have been prompted to falsely testify against him (accused-appellant)
in view of the latter’s quarrel with AAA’s parents when he refused to work with
them in the rice fields.58 Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same
specious and implausible. "Where the charges against the appellant involve a
heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a
sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public
scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its wake."591avvphi1
As to the accused-appellant’s objection that there was no proof of the age of
the victim, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the prosecution sufficiently
established the age of AAA when the incidents of rape were committed. The
testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987, 60 the voluntary
stipulation of the accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority
of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony regarding his recollection of the
age of the victim,61 his own niece, all militate against accused-appellant’s
theory. In People v. Pruna,62 the Court established the guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such
as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the
victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible,
of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the
complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the
witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and
facial features, was indeed a minor.63
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or
intimidation need no longer be belabored upon. "[I]n rape committed by close
kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse
of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.
Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation." 64
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion
perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent
of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly
recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent
of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the
three (3) counts of rape committed by the accused-appellant. "As a special
qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s
minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven
beyond reasonable doubt."65 In the instant case, the informations alleged that
AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when the incidents of rape
occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree. The said circumstances were also admitted by the
accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference of the case and again
admitted by him during his testimony.66
In People v. Pepito,67 the Court explained that "[t]he purpose of entering into a
stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties
and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed
on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These
admissions during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being
mandatory in nature, the admissions made by appellant therein must be given
weight." Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty is
warranted. For the second and third counts of rape, the imposable penalty is
also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-
appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Although this
matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, we still take
cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule that "[i]n a criminal
case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in
the appealed judgment."68
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," provides
for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict with the law, 69 viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. — The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy
the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in
conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or
older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be
resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,70 we clarified that, in the past, the Court
deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of
the accused provided the following conditions concur, namely: "(1) the
absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of
the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on
the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident
without any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any
contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies
are untrue."71
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on
February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of
rape allegedly happened in 1995.72 Other than his testimony, no other
evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records
of this case show neither any objection to the said testimony on the part of the
prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC
and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellant’s
minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No.
9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that
Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. —
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at
the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of
this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this
Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable
law.
People v. Sarcia73 further stressed that "[w]ith more reason, the Act should
apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years
of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age
limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended,74 "i.e., from ‘under nine years of age’ and ‘above nine
years of age and under fifteen’ (who acted without discernment) - to ‘fifteen
years old or under’ and ‘above fifteen but below 18’ (who acted without
discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability."75
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal
Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the
accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that
time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year
of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998
as previously discussed, any doubt therein "should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter."76 The Court, thus, exempts the
accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to
the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-
appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999,
the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the
said instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In Madali v.
People,77 the Court had the occasion to reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that
mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case." In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment
was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had already
found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell anybody
about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant
because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the
accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly
acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he
was aware of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is
a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, "the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However,
for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to
be reckoned with." Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper
penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each
count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the
circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a
suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section
38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances
of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the
Law.1awphi1
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the
instant case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age
and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a
suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21.
The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the [Department
of Social Welfare and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third
incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above disposition and the same
shall be enforced in accordance with law and the pronouncements in the
prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.78 that "[c]ivil indemnity is
mandatory when rape is found to have been committed. Based on prevailing
jurisprudence, we affirm the award of ₱75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil
indemnity for each count." We also explained in Sarcia that "[t]he litmus test x
x x in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death
penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua."79 The trial court’s award of civil indemnity of
₱50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore increased to ₱75,000.00 for
each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified "without need of proof
other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered
moral injuries [from the experience she underwent]."80 We also increase the
trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts
of rape herein established in keeping with the recent case law.81
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of exemplary damages. As held
in People v. Llanas, Jr.,82 "[t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper
not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the aggravating
circumstances of minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the
offense, both of which were alleged in the information and proved during the
trial." The appellate court’s award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is
raised to ₱30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with
the current jurisprudence on the matter.83
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry
Arpon y Juntilla is hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED
RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for
each of the three (3) counts of rape ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest
on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this
Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate
action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as
Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil
liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity
created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as
between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the
death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship
by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed
administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita
Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against
her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit
read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single,
and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,]
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving
daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto
attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties
of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to
recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but
are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of
the children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our
mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my
mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about
November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my
mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell
and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special
Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of
Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because
William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved
her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind
almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the
presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon,
and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my
sister’s widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document
in the belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since
she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell
her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found
buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3)
deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book
No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc.
No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente
B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II,
Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing
on the deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations
received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her grandmother’s
properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid ₱7,000,000.00 for the
property covered by TCT No. 3148 and ₱7,034,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to
William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my
mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid
₱8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735,
and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy
Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers,
as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-
in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to
oppose or to refuse her father’s orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the
power of attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total
₱22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never
delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter
died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to
deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate,
but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister
Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney
allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in
favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice
reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation
of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following
Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under
Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said
Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79
years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated
November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said
accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes,
accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any
person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more
or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T.
No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T.
No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once
in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds
of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for
₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for ₱250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-
0735 for ₱650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of
the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in
1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information
so as to increase the amount of damages from ₱1,150,000, the total amount
stated in the deeds of sale, to ₱22,034,000, the actual amount received by
Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded,
the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting
circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and
ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused
severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law.
Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the relationship
is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense.
While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished
the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and
Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law
and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of
Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso.
"No criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the
crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually
by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code,
preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft
and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather against
his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his
mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente
Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious,
the same is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated
June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita,
represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it.
It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not
extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent
Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the
exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in
favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the
argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and
thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida,
private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a
brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG,
the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already
created havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as
private respondent’s daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt
[Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private
respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the
provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain
language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the
crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being
"relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code.
We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991,
private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to
exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article
332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts
should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law
where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are
facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or
qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the
lawgiver’s intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and
apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law
what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws
are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case,
the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple
language is most favorable to Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders
of the trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book
on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law
recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the
offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa
case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato
(Sato’s wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-
owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could
have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since
Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about
and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no
longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may
not be invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was
allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her
marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law
relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the
exemption from criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law
and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved
the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal
case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and
Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s
provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious
mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect
only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following:
(1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a
surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the
extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or
swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to
civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to
the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been
held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and
adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the
stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;18 by the
stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;19 by the stepfather who
steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson who steals from his
grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with
him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other
spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction
created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family
relations.
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of
one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse
dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that
confronts us in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts
acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the
matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the
subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are
conflicting views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is
not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs.
Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most
judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living
issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is
dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the
dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659,
56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued
despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or
children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are
commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the
medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331,
333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which
gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this view,
the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the
marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily
determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as
the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the
relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood
relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues
even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. 27 The
rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the
marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether
the marriage produced children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by
affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as
a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view
considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives
or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-
marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the
married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views,
we hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit
of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury
disqualification and incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has
been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives
or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant
to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said
provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in
the same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make
no distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving
spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with
respect to his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and
that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the
family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts
shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of
Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 35The view that
relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the
marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws
is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt,
rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee
that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is
established beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The
rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient
to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the
lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve
family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article
332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or
interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that
interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that
the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised
Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code
and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article
20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the
said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State
waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the
private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not
by the designation of the offense.40 What controls is not the title of the
Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the
offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being
charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say
what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by the prosecutor
who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which
is not binding on the court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato,
by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time)
and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with
her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his
minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds,
to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed
by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document)
statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of signing the
SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression
of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature
and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she
only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have
read) because of Sato’s representation that the document pertained to her
taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she
believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document
was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark,
therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she execute a
document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita
granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of
selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the
document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed,
the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely
attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3)
Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties,
said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor
of the falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author
thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the
amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from
₱1,150,000 to ₱22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended
Information would now state that, while the total amount of consideration
stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only ₱1,150,000, Sato actually
received the total amount of ₱22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s
properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public
documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the
amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that
was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents
(particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato
cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For
The Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable
for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public document is required for a proper conviction for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the
ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish
that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a
necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate
exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held
criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article
332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes
against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected
by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component
crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that
complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to
apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple
crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly
consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public
document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold
the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter
and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the
violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed
authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is
involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.47 Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns
the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil
aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is
committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter
acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective
rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when
the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of
public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member,
he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article
332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the
component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two
component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are
animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there
is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other
words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a
single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is
violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the
right to property),49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical
rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in
itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however,
the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the
complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality
of crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more component
crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal
liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document
falls under this category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of
crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each
of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered
neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes
(concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal
liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is
only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more
crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component
crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
—∞——∞——∞—
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of
the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the
offender is only one.54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public
document requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it
does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and
considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component
crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public
documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability
for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of
public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex
crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and
material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material
plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished
individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for
Committing Estafa Even Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does
not require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does
not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a
necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if
it did, then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be
an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In
People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one
crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. 57 In
this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out
more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he
used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third
persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means
to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form
a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a
public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public,
official or commercial document.59 In other words, the crime of falsification was
committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually utilizing
the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is
estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not
by the falsification of the document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information
show that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato
presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement
of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was
consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa
occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he
had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale.
Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA
(as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time
she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said
document. That is why the falsification of the public document was used to
facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the
estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement,
had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or
in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by,
and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior
thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple
crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if
Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to
her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her
signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of
falsification.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 131856-57 July 9, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM MONTINOLA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The core issue in this case is whether the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
killing perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery may be treated
as a separate offense or as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Accused-appellant William Muyco Montinola (hereafter WILLIAM) was
charged before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City with robbery with
homicide in Criminal Case No. 47168 and illegal possession of firearm in
Criminal Case No. 47269. The accusatory portions of the two informations
read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 47168:
That on or about the 18th day of November 1996, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above
named accused, armed with unlicensed Cal. 380 Pistol "Llama" with Serial No.
170257 did then and there deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence
against or intimidation of persons, with intent of gain, take and carry away cash
amount of P67,500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion, and by reason
and on occasion thereof, the said accused shot to death the said Jose Eduardo
Reteracion; that cash amount of P48,200.00 was recovered from the herein
accused.
Contrary to Law.1
Criminal Case No. 47169 reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of November 1996, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused,
with deliberate intent and without any justifiable motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, custody and control
one (1) Pistol Llama, caliber .380 with Serial No. 170257 with two (2) cal. .380
live ammunition without having obtained the proper license or permit to carry,
to hold and possess the same, which firearm was used by the said accused
William Muyco Montinola in shooting to death the victim Jose Eduardo
Reteracion.
Contrary to Law.2
Upon his arraignment on 6 January 1997,3 WILLIAM entered a plea of not
guilty to both charges. Joint trial of the two cases was conducted. However, on
19 February 1997, after the prosecution had presented three witnesses,
WILLIAM moved to withdraw his previous plea of "not guilty"; and when
rearraigned, he pleaded "guilty" to both charges. Nevertheless, trial on the
merits continued.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General,
are as follows:
At noon of November 18, 1996, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven
by Jesus Hibinioda bound for Libertad Plaza, Iloilo City. Among the
passengers was Jose Eduardo Reteracion. All of a sudden, appellant drew his
gun, an unlicensed firearm, .380 caliber pistol Llama with Serial No. 170257
and directed Reteracion to hand over his money or else he would be killed (p.
19, TSN, January 13, 1997). Appellant aimed the firearm at the neck of
Reteracion and fired successive shots at the latter. As a result Reteracion
slumped dead (pp. 22-23, TSN, January 13, 1997).
Police Officer Garcia, who heard the shot, approached the jeep and met
appellant carrying a gun. He chased appellant who ran away with his jacket
bloodstained as he threw bundles of money. Garcia and the bystanders picked
up the money strewn on the way by appellant. Police Officer Hollero finally
caught up with appellant, who was brought to the police station with his gun
(pp. 5-10, TSN, January 13, 1997).
The gun used by appellant while robbing and killing Reteracion was
determined by Senior Police Officer Ely Superio of the PNP Firearms Unit as
not licensed. Appellant had no permit to possess and/or carry the same (p. 4,
TSN, February 18, 1997). The paraffin test made on the hands of appellant
yielded positive for gun powder nitrate indicating that he had recently fired a
gun (p. 7, TSN, February 19, 1997). The gun confiscated from appellant [was]
the same gun used to shoot and kill the victim as shown by the comparison of
the slugs from the tested bullets with the slugs recovered from the body of the
victim (pp. 7-8 TSN, February 26, 1997).
The wife of the victim spent for the burial and wake of her husband an amount
of P191,835.00 and failed to recover P39,500.00 which was a part of the
money taken from her husband. She became depressed, sleepless and not in
the mood to eat because of utter sadness resulting from the death of her
husband (pp. 6-14, TSN, January 14, 1997).4
On 24 April 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment 5 finding WILLIAM
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against him. It sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua for the robbery with homicide and to the penalty of
death for illegal possession of firearm. It also ordered him to pay the family of
the victim the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P191,835 for the burial
and wake expenses; and P39,000 for the unrecovered part of the money taken
from the victim and to pay the victim’s wife P100,000 as moral damages.
On 19 May 1997, WILLIAM filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal6 stating
that he was appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. In an order dated
15 May 1997, the trial court directed the transmission of the records to this
Court.
In his appellant’s Brief, WILLIAM imputes this lone error to the trial court:
IT WOULD BE AN ERROR TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE
CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM BECAUSE OF THE
ENACTMENT OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294 WHICH AMENDED
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866.
WILLIAM contends that the use of an unlicensed firearm in the crime of murder
or homicide should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and not as
a separate offense pursuant to R.A. No. 8294,7 specifically Section 1 thereof,
amending for that purpose P.D. No. 1866.8 The new law, R.A. No. 8294, may
be retroactively applied, since it is favorable to him in that it effectively "reduced
the penalties for simple and aggravated forms of illegal possession." For this
reason, he prays that the Court reconsider the challenged decision of the trial
court and order the dismissal of the case for illegal possession of firearm.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the
invocation by WILLIAM of the benefits of the third paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294, is misplaced. The use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the
crime of murder or homicide only, which are classified as crimes against
persons, and not to robbery with homicide, which is classified as a crime
against property under Title X of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, to
apply to the present case the provisions of R.A. No. 8279 and treat the use of
an unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance would
contravene Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 22, Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the "ex post facto application of law." Under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery with homicide is
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. Should the Court appreciate the
use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance, the higher
penalty of death shall be meted on the accused. Essentially, therefore,
WILLIAM shall be made to suffer a greater and harsher punishment than that
which the law imposed when the act was committed. Upon the other hand,
there is no legal obstacle on the conviction of WILLIAM of the separate crimes
of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm because such is
supported by our ruling in People v. Cerveto.9
The OSG then sought for the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling adjudging the
accused guilty of two separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal
possession of firearm. It recommends, however, that in the charge of illegal
possession of firearm the accused be given the benefit of the lighter penalty
provided in R.A. No. 8294, i.e., a penalty ranging from four years (4) and two
(2) months, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum, of prision correccional.
Furthermore, the accused should be ordered to return the amount of P19,300
representing the "difference between the amount taken away and the amount
recovered as alleged in the information."
A few words on procedure and jurisdiction.
WILLIAM’s notice of appeal has not escaped our attention. He therein stated
that he was appealing the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals. It must
be noted that it is the Supreme Court, and not the Court of Appeals, that has
appellate jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.10 As to judgments in which death penalty is
imposed, such as the judgment in Criminal Case No. 47169, no notice of
appeal is necessary, as the same is subject to automatic review11 pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. But as
to judgments imposing reclusion perpetua, such as that in Criminal Case No.
47168, the appeal to this Court shall be by filing a notice of appeal with the trial
court.12
WILLIAM’s notice of appeal from the judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 47168-
69, albeit erroneous since it was directed to the Court of Appeals, may
nevertheless be given due course. For even without that or even if he did not
appeal from said judgment, we would nevertheless review the same
conformably with our ruling in People vs.Alitagtag,13 as affirmed in People vs.
Contreras.14 We ruled therein that where cases have been consolidated and
jointly tried, and only one decision is rendered sentencing the accused to death
in one and to reclusion perpetua in the others, he would be deemed to have
appealed from the judgment in the latter cases.
Now on the merits of the case.
We find that the prosecution has duly established by evidence independent
from WILLIAM’s plea of guilty and confession of guilt that he killed the victim
after having succeeded in divesting the latter of his money. The gun he used
in shooting the victim, which was thereafter seized from him and offered in
evidence, was unlicensed. And per the testimony of SPO3 Ely Superio of the
PNP Firearms and Explosive Unit, WILLIAM had no license or permit to
possess or carry the same.
The lone issue thus obtaining in this case is whether in light of the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866 he could be prosecuted for, and
convicted of, the separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal
possession of firearms.
On 18 November 1996, when the crime was committed, the pertinent law, P.D.
No. 1866, provided in Section 1 thereof as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms
or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of a
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearms or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
In People v. Alolod,15 the accused therein grabbed from a passenger of a
jeepney a bag containing money. When the latter resisted and grappled for the
possession of the bag, accused shot him twice with a .38 caliber paltikrevolver.
In our decision of 7 January 1997, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment
convicting the accused-appellant therein of two separate crimes of robbery
with homicide and illegal possession of firearm and sentencing him to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case. As to the charge of illegal
possession of firearm, we held:
Sec. 1 of P.D. [No.] 1866 provides that "[i]f homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."
Since the incident took place on 13 December 1991 when the death penalty
was proscribed and before it was reimposed under R.A. [No.] 7659, which took
effect [on] 31 December 1993, the sentence is automatically commuted
to reclusion perpetua.
The present case has similar set of facts; the only difference is that the crimes
were committed on 18 November 1996 when R.A. No. 7659 restoring the
death penalty was already in effect. Thus, in line with the ruling in Alolod and
applying P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 7659, WILLIAM could be held guilty of
two separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm,
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the first crime and to death for the
second.
Fortunately for WILLIAM, on 6 July 1997 while his case was still pending, R.A.
No. 8294 amending P.D. No. 1866 took effect. The third paragraph of Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
In recent cases,16 we ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal
possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. Hence,
insofar as the new law will be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him
from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, it shall be given
retroactive effect.17
We cannot apply to the instant case People v. Cervito,18 which is relied upon
by the OSG. Unlike in the instant case, that case did not call for the application
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 or the third paragraph
of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, since the
unlicensed firearm which was recovered from the scene of the crime was not
the one used in the homicide committed on the occasion of the robbery. The
prosecution evidence itself disclosed that such gun had not been fired, as it
had no spent shells. The accused-appellant therein, Freneto Cervito, was,
however, seen pointing that gun at the passengers while the robbery was
going on. He was thus convicted of two crimes of robbery with homicide and
illegal possession of firearm. We affirmed his conviction for both crimes.
Although the crimes were committed on 10 July 1995 before the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8294, we applied the said law with respect to the penalty for the crime
of illegal possession of firearm for being more favorable to the accused in that
it provided a lighter penalty.
The next question that needs to be addressed is whether the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the killing perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the crime
of robbery with homicide.
It is undisputed that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a
special aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. But,
may the aggravating circumstances attending the killing be appreciated in
fixing the appropriate penalty for robbery with homicide? The rulings on this
matter are conflicting.
In People v. Galang19 and People v. Semañada,20 treachery and cruelty,
which attended the killing, were considered as aggravating circumstances in
determining the penalty for robbery with homicide. In People v. Nismal,21 the
circumstance of disregard of respect due the victim on account of his rank
aggravated the crime of robbery with homicide.
Likewise, in People v. Capillas,22 People v. Ang,23 and People v.
Punzalan,24 we held that when the killing is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, the qualifying circumstances attendant to the killing
would be considered as generic aggravating circumstances; thus, in all these
three cases the circumstance of abuse of superior strength25 served to
aggravate the crime. In the third case, evident premeditation was also
considered as aggravating. However, in these three cases, as well as
in People v. Ponciano,26 we said that disregard of age, sex or rank is not
aggravating in robbery with homicide, which is primarily a crime against
property, as the homicide is regarded as merely incidental to the robbery.
It is worthy to note, however, that in the more recent case of People v.
Salvatiera,27 reiterated in People v. Cando28and People v. Macabales,29 we
held that when treachery obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance, since robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. Having formed part
of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the crime,
such treachery would help determine the penalty to be imposed.
Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm mentioned in Article 296 30 of the
Revised Penal Code has been held to be applicable only to cases of robbery
in band under Article 295 of the same Code. It was not appreciated in fixing
the penalty for robbery with homicide under Article 294 even if committed by a
band with the use of unlicensed firearms (the element of band was considered
merely as an ordinary aggravating circumstance).31
At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstances present in the
commission of homicide or murder may be counted in the determination of the
penalty for robbery with homicide, we cannot appreciate in this case the
special aggravating circumstance of "use of an unlicensed firearm" mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294. Such law was not yet enacted when the crime was committed by
WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be given retroactive effect for being unfavorable
to him.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are
both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is
attended by one aggravating circumstance. If we would apply retroactively the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm under Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the imposable penalty
would be death. Conformably with our ruling in People v. Valdez,32 reiterated
in People v. Macoy,33 insofar as the new law would aggravate the crime of
robbery with homicide and increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to
death, it would not be given retroactive application, lest it would acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. Hence, we shall not appreciate that special
aggravating circumstance. There being no modifying circumstances, the
lesser penalty34 of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon accused-
appellant WILLIAM.
Parenthetically, the trial court was correct in not crediting in favor of WILLIAM
the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, since the change of his plea from
"not guilty" to "guilty" was made only after the presentation of some evidence
for the prosecution.35 To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the
accused must have voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.36 The following requirements
must therefore concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2)
the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before a competent
court trying the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.37 The third requisite is wanting in
the present case.1âwphi1.nêt
We shall modify the awards of damages. The award of P191,835 for burial and
wake expenses should be reduced to P117,672.26, since only the latter
amount was evidenced by receipts. Likewise, considering the allegation in the
information and the testimony38 of the victim’s wife that the amount of P48,200
was recovered from WILLIAM, the award of P39,000 representing the
unrecovered part of the money taken from the victim must also be reduced to
P19,300 (the difference between the sum of money taken from the victim
[P67,500] and that recovered from accused-appellant [P48,200]). We should
also reduce the award of moral damages from P100,000 to P50,000 in
accordance with current jurisprudence.39
WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 25, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47168 and 47269 is AFFIRMED with
MODICATIONS as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 47169, accused-appellant WILLIAM MONTINOLA is
ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and therefore spared
the penalty of death;
2. In Criminal Case No. 47168, where the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposed,
(a) The award of P191,835 for burial and wake expenses is REDUCED to
P117,672.26;
(b) The award of P39,000 representing the unrecovered part of the money
taken from the victim is REDUCED to P19,300; and
(c) The award for moral damages is REDUCED from P100,000 to P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. 172321 February 9, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RENATO DADULLA y CAPANAS, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A rapacious father who vented his lust on his own daughter without any qualms
is allowed to suffer the lesser penalty because of the failure of the criminal
information to aver his relationship with the victim. Even so, the Court
condemns his most despicable crime.
The father is now before the Court to assail the decision promulgated on
January 20, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01021, whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) pronounced him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape
in Criminal Case No. 98-2304, imposing reclusion perpetua, and of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 98-2305, thereby modifying the sentences
handed down by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272 (RTC), in Marikina City. 1
The Charges
On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with rape and
attempted rape through separate informations, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of threats, force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
AAA,2 against her will and consent.3
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt
to have carnal knowledge of herein complainant one AAA, thus commencing
the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not perform
all the acts of execution that could have produced the crime of rape by reason
of cause or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance.4
Evidence of the Prosecution
In the evening of January 15, 1998, AAA, then sleeping in the bedroom that
she and her five younger siblings shared with their father, was roused from
sleep by someone undressing her.5 It was her father. AAA resisted, but the
accused, wielding a bladed weapon,6 threatened to kill her if she
shouted.7 The accused then forcibly kissed her on the lips, mashed her breasts,
touched her private parts, and had carnal knowledge of her. After her ordeal,
she put on her garments and just cried.8 She recalled that her father had first
sexually abused her on February 14, 1992.9
On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused from sleep by her father touching
her body. Noticing that her shorts were already unzipped and unbuttoned, she
zipped and buttoned them up and covered herself with a blanket. But her father
pulled the blanket away and tried to unzip her shorts. However, she was able
to go under the wooden bed to evade him. She resisted his attempts to pull
her out from under the bed by firmly holding on to the bed. She told him that
she would not get out from under the bed because what he was doing to her
was bad.10 Upon hearing her, he stopped and withdrew, telling her to leave the
house. He then went to sleep.11 In the meanwhile, BBB, AAA’s younger sister,
was awakened by what she thought was an argument between her father and
AAA. She heard him tell AAA: Tumigil ka na nang kaiiyak, wala ka nang
pakinabang. AAA just cried under the bed and did not say anything. BBB soon
fell asleep,12 but AAA could not sleep and remained under the bed until
morning when the accused left to ply his jeepney route. 13
Upon waking up, BBB saw her father as he was about to leave the house. She
heard him telling AAA to leave the house.14 As soon as he had left, BBB
approached the crying AAA and asked what had happened to her. AAA related
her ordeal and pleaded with BBB to help her.15 Together, they went to their
uncle, CCC, to report the incident. CCC queried AAA whether she wanted her
father to be thrown in jail, and she replied in the affirmative. Thus, CCC
requested his wife to accompany AAA to the barangay to file a complaint. Later,
AAA and CCC’s wife went to Camp Crame for the physical and genital
examinations, which established that AAA had a deep healed hymenal
laceration at 5:00 o’clock position.16
Evidence of the Defense
The accused denied molesting AAA. He narrated that on January 15, 1998,
AAA and BBB left the house at around 6:30 p.m. to watch television elsewhere
and returned only at around 11:00 p.m.; that on January 22, 1998, he scolded
AAA for her failure to cook on time; that at around 4:00 a.m. of January 23,
1998, he struck AAA’s face with his fist (dinunggol sa mukha) and told her to
leave the house because he was slighted by AAA’s laughing instead of
answering his query of whether she had understood why he had scolded her
the previous night; and that AAA was no longer a virgin due to her having been
raped by Joel Cloma in 1992, and by another man in 1993.17
The RTC Decision
On March 24, 1999, the RTC found the accused guilty of rape in Criminal Case
No. 98-2304-MK, and imposed the death penalty, ordering him to pay to AAA
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages; and of
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, and imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to five years, four months, and twenty days, as
maximum, ordering him to pay to AAA ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-2304 DESPITE THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT
PROPERLY INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
ATTEMPTED RAPE DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-2305.
Nonetheless, the CA disposed in its decision promulgated on January 20,
2006:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATION:
In Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y
Capanas is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is
also ordered to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in
addition to civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y
Capanas, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK
was reclusion perpetua because the accused was liable only for simple rape
by virtue of the information not alleging any qualifying circumstances; and that
in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the accused was guilty only of acts of
lasciviousness, not attempted rape, because his act of opening the zipper and
buttons of AAA’s shorts, touching her, and pulling her from under the bed
constituted only acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling of the Court
We sustain the conviction but correct the award of civil liability.
I
Criminal Liabilities
The CA correctly determined the criminal liabilities in both cases.
To begin with, the finding and conclusion of the RTC that the totality of the
evidence presented by the State painted a convincing tale of AAA’s harrowing
experience at the hands of the accused are well founded and supported by the
records. Her unwavering testimonial account of the bestiality of her own father
towards her reflected her singular reliability. The CA’s holding that a woman
would think twice before concocting a story of rape unless she was motivated connection with the incident that transpired on January 22, 1998, Liza testified
by a desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her18 was apt and as follows:
valid. Indeed, her revelation of being sexually assaulted by her own father
several times could only proceed from innate sincerity, and was entitled to Pros. Dela Peña:
credence in the absence of strong showing by the accused of grounds to Q: While you were sleeping in the evening on January 22, 1998, do you recall
disbelieve her. Also, her immediate willingness to report to and face the police of any instance (sic) or incident which awakened you?
investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial was a
badge of trustworthiness. Witness:

Secondly, the failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the A: Yes, sir.
information in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified
Q: Again Miss Witness, tell us this incident that you are referring to?
rape against the accused. Section 8,19 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has
expressly required that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be A: While I was sleeping, I was awakened that my zipper was already opened
specifically alleged in the information. Due to such requirement being pro reo, and my buttons were already loosened.
the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those
charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of Q: And upon noticing that the zipper and the buttons of your short[s] are
the effectivity of the 2000 revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that already loosened or opened, what did you do?
embodied the requirement).20
A: I zipped it again and unbuttoned it.
The term "aggravating circumstance" is strictly construed when the
Q: Was your father there on that night?
appreciation of the modifying circumstance can lead to the imposition of the
maximum penalty of death.21 Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of A: Yes, sir.
relationship, even if established during trial, could not affect the criminal
penalty of the accused by virtue of its non-allegation in the information. The Q: What about your brother and sisters?
accused could not be convicted of the graver offense of qualified rape,
A: They were already asleep.
although proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily
included in the information.22 Accordingly, the accused was properly convicted Q: Like on January 15, 1998, you slept, on January 22, 1998, you slept side
by the CA for simple rape and justly punished with reclusion perpetua. by side with your brothers and sisters and your father?
Thirdly, it is notable that the RTC outrightly concluded that the crime committed A: Yes, sir.
on January 22, 1998 constituted attempted rape, after quoting the testimony
of AAA and BBB. It offered no analysis or discussion of why the accused was Q: Did you notice the presence of your father when you said you were
criminally liable for attempted rape. The omission contravened Section awakened on that night?
14,23 Article VIII of the Constitution, as reiterated in Section 1,24 Rule 120 of A: Yes, sir.
the Rules of Court, which enjoined that decisions should state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based.25 Q: What was he doing?

Nonetheless, the omission did not invalidate or render ineffectual the A: He was sitting and touching me, sir.
conviction, for the CA in due course reformed the RTC’s error. In its disquisition
on why the accused should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness, instead of Q: How far was he from you?
attempted rape, the CA explained the true nature of the crime of the accused A: He was near me.
thus:
Q: And upon seeing your father near you and the button and zipper of
We likewise agree with accused-appellant that the court a quo erred in your short[s] was open, what did you do?
convicting him of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK. In
A: I zipped and unbuttoned my short[s] and covered myself with blanket.
Q: Why did you cover yourself with blanket?
A: Because I do not want to see him beside me.
Q: Did you not ask your father to leave because you do not want to see
him?
A: I told him.
Q: Did your father leave?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why don’t you like your father beside you?
A: Because of these things he was doing to me.
Q: And after covering yourself with blanket, what transpired next?
A: He removed the blanket from me, sir.
Q: And after that, what happened?
A: He was forcibly opening my short[s].
Q: What did you do when your father was forcibly opening your short[s]?
A: I covered myself under the wooden bed.
Q: How wide is this wooden bed?
A: From that wall up to the rostrum.
Pros. Dela Peña:
About a distance of two meters in width. Why did you hide yourself under the
wooden bed?
A: In order not to repeat what he was doing to me.
Q: After you hi[d] yourself under the wooden bed, what did your father
did [sic] to you?
A: He held me on my hands and tried to pull me out under the wooden
bed.
Q: And was your father able to pull you out under the wooden bed?
A: No sir.
The act of accused-appellant in opening the zipper and buttons of the
shorts of Liza, touching her and pulling her when she hid under the bed
showed that he employed force on Liza and was motivated by lewd
designs. The word "lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and
lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried in a wanton manner. Thus, the crime
committed by accused-appellant is merely acts of lasciviousness, which
is included in rape. The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are:
(1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it
is done: (a) by using force and intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party
is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of
either sex.26
According to People v. Collado,27 the difference between attempted rape and
acts of lasciviousness lies in the intent of the perpetrator as deduced from his
external acts. The intent referred to is the intent to lie with a
woman.28Attempted rape is committed when the "touching" of the vagina by
the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be
acts of lasciviousness.29 Thus, the accused’s act of opening the zipper and
buttons of AAA’s shorts, touching her, and trying to pull her from under the bed
manifested lewd designs, not intent to lie with her. The evidence to prove that
a definite intent to lie with AAA motivated the accused was plainly wanting,
therefore, rendering him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. 98-2305-MK.
And, fourthly, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous
for not being in accord with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This impelled the
CA to revise the indeterminate penalty, rationalizing:
Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of
lasciviousness is prision correccional. We impose the penalty in its medium
period, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance alleged and
proved. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty
imposable is from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and
two months of prision correccional, as maximum.30
We uphold the revision by the CA. The RTC fixed the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty from within prision correccional, when Section 131 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law expressly required that the minimum "shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense." The penalty next lower is arresto mayor.
II
Civil liability must be modified
Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,32 the attendance of any aggravating
circumstance (generic, qualifying, or attendant) entitles the offended party to
recover exemplary damages. Here, relationship was the aggravating
circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to award ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in rape and of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts
of lasciviousness.
of that legal provision. The retroactivity of the ruling vis-à-vis the accused could
not be challenged or be barred by virtue of its being civil, not penal, in effect.
WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01021 is affirmed in all respects, subject to the modification that
the civil liabilities include ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for the rape
(Criminal Case No. 98-2034-MK), and ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages for
the acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 98-2035-MK).

Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically SO ORDERED.

alleged in the information (albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to
increase the criminal liability of the accused, the established presence of one
or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature

entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the
Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in the information affected
only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. The Court has
well explained this in People v. Catubig:33

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as
it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.lavvphil

That People v. Catubig was subsequent to the dates of the commission of the
crimes charged did not matter. Like any other judicial interpretation of an
existing law, the ruling in People v. Catubig settled the circumstances when
Article 2230 of the Civil Code applied, thereby reflecting the meaning and state