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BATACLAN VS MEDINA

 The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of
the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.
 The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns
and flashlights were not available.
 In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
 Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver
and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus
was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area
in and around the bus.
 The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
 In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because
the Medina Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City.
There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the
driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding and that the driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as instructed by
Mariano Medina.
 The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions
to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in
front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding,
the blow out would not have occurred.

Ratio:

 Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,


unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.
 Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

LA MALLORCA VS CA

ISSUE: WON as to the child Raquel, who was already led by the father to a place about
5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract
of carriage also persisted

HELD: Yes. The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point
of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or
a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES VS CA
Issue:
Is PAL liable for the breach of contract of carriage?

Held:
YES. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous
event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers.
Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is
deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case
once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until
the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's
premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in
safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they
have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then
ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the
fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place. While we find PAL remiss in
its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being stranded in Cotabato
City, there is no sufficient basis to conclude that PAL failed to inform him about his non-
accommodation on Flight 560, or that it was inattentive to his queries relative thereto.

ABOITIZ SHIPPING VS CA
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had
already disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises.
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is
a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for
his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact
that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify
the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. We believe there exists such
a justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading
his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a
carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also
to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still
deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.

PAL VS BUNCIO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is correct that it should not pay moral damages.

RULING:

No. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on
a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect
that he be transported on that flight and on that date, and it becomes the airline’s
obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination without delay.
If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of transporting, he dies or is
injured, the carrier may be held liable for a breach of contract of carriage.

In breach of contract of air carriage, moral damages may be recovered where (1) the
mishap results in the death of a passenger; or (2) where the carrier is guilty of fraud or
bad faith; or (3) where the negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to
virtually amount to bad faith.

It was established in the instant case that since Deanna and Nikolai would travel as
unaccompanied minors, petitioner required private respondents to accomplish, sign and
submit to it an indemnity bond. Evidently, petitioner was fully aware that Deanna and
Nikolai would travel as unaccompanied minors and, therefore, should be specially taken
care of considering their tender age and delicate situation.

The foregoing circumstances reflect petitioner’s utter lack of care for and inattention to
the welfare of Deanna and Nikolai as unaccompanied minor passengers. They also
indicate petitioner’s failure to exercise even slight care and diligence in handling the
indemnity bond. Clearly, the negligence of petitioner was so gross and reckless that it
amounted to bad faith.

It is worth emphasizing that petitioner, as a common carrier, is bound by law to exercise


extraordinary diligence and utmost care in ensuring for the safety and welfare of its
passengers with due regard for all the circumstances. The negligent acts of petitioner
signified more than inadvertence or inattention and thus constituted a radical departure
from the extraordinary standard of care required of common carriers.

As we have earlier found, petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private
respondents, and it acted recklessly and malevolently in transporting Deanna and Nikolai
as unaccompanied minors and in handling their indemnity bond. We have also
ascertained that private respondents are entitled to moral damages because they have
sufficiently established petitioner’s gross negligence which amounted to bad faith. This
being the case, the award of exemplary damages is warranted. The records show that
Mrs. Regalado died in 1995 at the age of 74, while Deanna passed away in 2003 at the
age of 32. This being the case, the foregoing award of damages plus interests in their
favor should be given to their respective heirs.

TIU VS ARRIESGADO
The court found that indeed, the petitioner, was liable for being negligent while being
engaged in the business of common carriage. The SC could no longer change the facts
that were sustained in the trial court and court of appeals hence, since it was deemed
that the bus was moving in a very fast speed which was the cause of the accident, the
SC will have to sustain that ruling and hold that indeed, there was negligence on the part
of the petitioner.
Also, the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is inapplicable to the case because it
could only apply to a controversy between two colliding vehicles. In this case, it was the
passenger and not another driver who was injured and thus, the said doctrine could not
be applied.
However, the respondents Pedrano and Condor was found by the court to be
negligent as well. The court found that there was merit in the contention of the petitioner
that the said truck violated Section 34 or RA 4136, wherein they did not have proper
warning devices in accordance with the said law.
Lastly, with regard to PPSI, the court held that since it admitted to being bound
by a contract with the petitioner, it would be liable as well. However, the said liability
would only fall within the amount settled in the said contract.
Hence, the petition was partially granted.
ESTACIO VS BERNARDO
From the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it can be shown
that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 ft. as
shown in the sketch of the police. There was also only one tire mark which meant that
the brakes of the truck were not aligned properly, otherwise, there would have been 2
tire marks. It is the negligent act of the petitioner’s driver of driving the cargo truck at a
fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of the respondent
Bernardo’s injury. As employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solitarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. He is presumed to be negligent in the selection
of his employee which petitioner failed to overcome. He failed to show that he examined
driver Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience and records.

Bernardo is guilty of contributory negligence by standing at the rear portion of the


jeep. Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as
a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. Bernardo’s act of standing on the left rear
portion showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm
or put his life in danger. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning
or signs of an impending danger to health and body. Quinquillera (jeepney driver) was
also negligent because there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and
regulations. He also allowed Bernardo to stand on the left rear of his jeep. There is also
a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner of the jeep, Bandoquillo, to which
she did not rebut.

CANCO VS MANILA RAILDROAD COMPANY


In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act – that is
to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and physical
condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and
off the train at the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of
the platform where he was alighting. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way
was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.

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