COMMON INTENTION

In Parichhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, it was said that to attract the application of Section
34, the following three conditions must exist:-
i. A criminal act must be done by several persons
ii. There must be a common intention of all to commit that criminal act
iii. There must be participation of all in the commission of the offence in furtherance of
that common intention.
Looking in the present case, there was no participation of A and B in commission of the offence
in furtherance of the common intention. There was participation on their part to attack and
cause simple hurt to X but not to grievously hurt him. Also, there was a common intention on
their part to attack and hit X but not to shoot X, which was merely intended by C.
Also, the aim of the act needs to be taken into account while determining the aspect of common
intention. The aim of the common act must have been intended by all the accused in order to
hold them guilty under section 34, IPC. In Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamil Nadu2, it
was held that it is essential for the application of section 34 that the person who instigates or
aids in the commission of the crime, must be physically present at the actual scene of the crime
for the purposes of facilitating or promoting the offence, the commission of which is the aim
of the joint criminal venture.
Here, it is very evident that the aim of the common act was generated in the spur of the
movement and was to hit X in a normal ordinary course. However, C took this act to an extreme
stage by taking his pistol out and shooting X above the knee causing him grievous hurt. So, we
can say that the act of A and B cannot be combined with the act of C, as it was of complete
different nature and its aim also differed from that of A and B.
According to Section 34, IPC, the participation of all the members of the group in the execution
of the plan is an essential ingredient that needs to be fulfilled. However, there was no
participation on the part of A and B in the act of shooting X. They were merely participants in
the act of attacking X and causing minor bruises in his body, which cannot amount to grievous
hurt. In Pandurang Tukia and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad3, it was said that the word
“common intention” implies a prior concert, that is, a prior meeting of minds and participation
of all the members of the group in the execution of that plan. The acts done by each of the
participants may differ and may vary in character, but they must be actuated by the same
common intention.
Relying on the authorities on the Indian Penal Code, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal on IPC provides us
with an illustration which says that – Where X, Y and Z, with an intention of assaulting A, give
him a beating during the course of which X, who had previous enmity with A stabs him in the
abdomen resulting in A’s death, the act of stabbing is not done in furtherance of the common
intention of the group. The common intention in this case was merely to inflict simple hurt.
Hence, Y and Z would be liable for causing simple hurt(section 323, IPC) only.

1
Parichhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 535.
2
Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1976 AIR 2027.
3
Pandurang Tukia and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad, 1955 AIR 216.
Our present case have similar facts as this illustration, where two accused were not involved in
the commission of the crime, but they were merely involved in the heated argument and they
were guilty only of simple hurt under Section 323, IPC.
In Kripal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh4, A, B and C went on to attack X in his field because
of a long-standing dispute over a land. First B and C attacked him on his leg and he fell down,
then A stabbed X in the head with his spear. He then put his leg on X’s chest to extract the
spear blade which had stuck in X’s jaw. The blow had gone through the skull and injured the
brain, so that X died on the spot. The only common intention that could be attributed to them
was the intention to beat X to produce injuries. Therefore, they were not guilty under sections
302/34, but under section 323 of IPC.
This case clearly lays out the situation where the accused can have the common intention in
one act but not for an act committed by one accused all of a sudden to which the co-accused
did not intend.
The case of Girija Shankar v. State of Uttar Pradesh5 re-affirms the principle that if the co-
accused did not have the common intention, they cannot be held guilty under Section 34, IPC.
In this case, the material on record confirmed that co-accused person did not share the common
intention to kill the deceased. There was no evidence to show that co-accused persons were
aware that main accused was carrying a gun or that he intended to use it. So, they were not
convicted in terms of section 302 read with section 34, IPC.
In the present case also, through the facts available in front of the court, it can no where be
proved that A and B had knowledge that C was carrying a gun with himself and that he intended
to use it. They were a party to the attack but not to the shooting. Also, we have in front of us
that they were not even aware of the prior medical history of the deceased, that a gunshot in
the knee might have caused the death of X.
So, it is humbly contented before the court that the accused A and B, though had the common
intention to cause simple hurt but it was no where carried forward to cause grievous hurt. Also,
the Counsel admits that the common intention may develop suddenly during the course of an
occurrence, but still unless there is reasonable evidence and clear proof of such common
intention, an accused cannot be held guilty under Section 34, IPC.

4
Kripal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 706.
5
Girija Shankar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2618