ESTRADA, Rochelle Ann

G06

MAPALAD AISPORNA , petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-39419. April 12, 1982.] De Castro, J.

Recit-ready Synopsis:

[TOPIC: CONTEXT OF WHOLE TEXT]

Petitioner, wife of a duly licensed insurance agent, was charged by the trial court for violation of the first paragraph of Section
189 of the Insurance Act having acted as agent in the solicitation for insurance in favor of Eugenio Isidro for and in behalf of
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. without having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of
the Insurance Commission. The evidence disclosed at the trial was that petitioner merely left a note on top of her husband's
desk informing the latter of Isidro's intention to renew his policy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals construing the first
paragraph of Section 189 independent from the two succeeding paragraphs, affirmed the judgment of conviction and held
that the receipt of compensation for the issuance of an insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. The main issue resolved is whether or not the agent mentioned in the first
paragraph of Section 189 is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph. The Supreme
Court reversed the earlier decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence — "Any person who for compensation . . . shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, . . .." Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an
essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the Section 189. The petitioner-accused did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Thus, she can't be held liable for violating Section
189 because she is not technically an insurance agent within the purview of said section.

Principles: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses
and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law, it must be borne in
mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences
but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. More importantly, the doctrine of associated
words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is
found or with which it is associated.

Facts:

 Petitioner, wife of a duly licensed insurance agent, was charged for violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act having acted as agent in the solicitation for insurance in favor Eugenio Isidro for and in behalf of
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. without having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the
office of the Insurance Commission.

 In the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that aforementioned policy was issued with active
participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife
of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was
issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so
she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew.
  The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed by the respondent
CA. Petitioner challenges the CA decision before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
without reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether or not
the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found
on its second paragraph.

Ruling:

NO. The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the
first paragraph; to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of the Section 189. The petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance
policy of Eugenio Isidro.

The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:

"No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other
compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first procured from the
Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall
act as agent, subagent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in
obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine
Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which
must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the
Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved
and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance
Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue
or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the
first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of
the company.

"Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a person
other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to
all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.

"Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the
conviction of any person acting as agent, subagent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business
of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such
certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person."

A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent,
subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the
intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.

The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 of the
aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word
"agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is
explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence — "Any person who for
compensation . . . shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, . . .." Patently, the definition of an insurance
agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said
section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent''
mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the
second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A
statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law,
it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases,
clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. More
importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

JOSE ESCRIBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID P. AVILA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato (First Branch) and SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, respondents.

G.R. No. L-30375. September 12, 1978. Aquino, J.

Recit Ready:

[TOPIC: PURPOSE OF LAW OR MISCHIEF TO BE SUPPRESSED]

This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to conduct the preliminary investigation of a complaint for
written defamation. Congressman Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of
North Cotabato a complaint for libel against Mayor Escribano of Sultan Kudarat). Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense arguing that city fiscal of Cotabato is the only functionary empowered
conduct the preliminary investigation of the libel charge pursuant to Republic Act No. 2364 and article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. The issued resolved by the Supreme Court is whether the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by
means of radio at Cotabato City. The SC ruled that CFI has the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
purpose of the amendment (Republic Act No. 4363) is to prevent the complainants in written defamation cases
from harassing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts. The rule is that in construing a statute the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which
induced the enactment of a law are important factors to be considered in its construction. It can be stated that the lawmaking
body, by means of that amendment, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to
conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely sought to strip ordinary municipal court of its
power to hold a preliminary investigation of written defamations.

Facts:
 On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato, filed directly with the
Court of First Instance of that province (now North Cotabato) a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of
Tacurong, Cotabato (now the province of Sultan Kudarat).
 Escribano was charged with having said in a speech, which was broadcasted on August 26, 1968 by a radio station at
Cotabato City, that "Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live (lived) in this province" (Criminal Case No. 5283).
 Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. Judge Avila in
his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the power to conduct the preliminary investigation.
 Petitioner Escribano, in support of his contention that city fiscal of Cotabato is the only functionary empowered
conduct the preliminary investigation of the libel charge, invokes the provisions of Republic Act No. 2364 and article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, approved on June 19, 1965, and
which do not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct's preliminary investigation of written defamations (see
additional notes below).

Issue: Whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city
attorney of that city.

Ruling: CFI has authority. Escribano's contention that in chartered cities the city fiscal has the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigations is not correct. While section 23(f) of the Charter of Cotabato City (Republic Act No, 2364)
empowers its city attorney to "investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances and
prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused", that power is not
exclusive.

The purpose of the amendment (Republic Act No. 4363) is to prevent the complainants in written defamation cases from
harassing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts. The rule is
that in construing a statute the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment
of a law are important factors to be considered in its construction.

Congress did not confine the amendatory law to laying down the guidelines for the venue of criminal and civil actions. Since,
as already noted, its purpose is to minimize the filing in municipal courts of out-of-town libel suits, the lawmaking body, in
order to attain that objective, deprived the ordinary municipal courts of the power to
conduct the preliminary investigation of a criminal action for written defamation.

It can be stated that the lawmaking body, by means of that amendment, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the
proper Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely sought to strip
ordinary municipal court (not the municipal court of the provincial capital or the city court) of its power to hold a preliminary
investigation of written defamations.

The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary
investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that
in construing a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or
the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose
rather than one which will defeat it.

Additional Notes:

Charter of Cotabato (Republic Act No. 2364, as amended by Republic Act No. 3332):

"SEC. 23. The city attorney — His compensation, powers and duties. —

The provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered hundred nine to the contrary notwithstanding, the city shall have an attorney
who shall be the chief legal adviser of the city . . .

The city attorney shall have the following powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

"(f) He shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances and prepare the
informations or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused. . . .

"(g) He shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances triable in
the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, and the municipal court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to
criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals."

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, approved on June 19, 1965:

Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the
provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such
actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article."

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ , petitioner, v s . HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S.

GARCIA, respondent.

G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995. Kapunan, J.

Recit-read: [TOPIC: DICTIONARIES]

Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a complaint in RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. Private respondent filed a criminal case for violation of Republic Act 4200
(Anti-wiretapping Act) alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. The trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner Ramirez. Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court's earlier ruling. Petitioner elevated the case
to SC vigorously arguing that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation and that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication,"
not a "private conversation". The Supreme Court said the provision of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The petitioner's contention that the phrase
"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)." These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange,
on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish. cd

Principles: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where
a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Facts:

 A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
 Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
 As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes."
 The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner Ramirez agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute
an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication
by a person other than a participant to the communication.
 Respondent appealed to the CA. CA reversed the earlier ruling.
 Petitioner elevated the case to SC vigorously arguing that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication and petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a
"private conversation".

Issue: Whether or not petitioner's act of recording the conversation violated the provisions of R.A. 4200.

Ruling: YES. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in
the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any." Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)." These definitions are
broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are
likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. cd

NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, Acting Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, petitioner, vs .
HONORABLE FRED RUIZ CASTRO, Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines,
HONORABLE WENCESLAO PASCUAL, Provincial Governor of Rizal, and DOCTOR BRAULIO STO.
DOMINGO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-9669. January 31, 1956.

Montemayor, J.

Recit-ready: [TOPIC: Change in phraseology by amendments]

Santos, mayor of San Juan Del Monte, was under suspension from his office due to administrative charges filed against him
and so petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of
temporary disability of the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor. While acting as
Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. The Office of the President of the Philippines
interpreted said action of Salaysay in running for the office of Mayor as an automatic resignation from his office of Vice-Mayor
under the provisions of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, as a consequence of which he no longer had authority to
continue acting as Mayor. Petitioner refused to turn over the office of Mayor. Petitioner contends that his case does not come
under section 27 of the Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) for the reason that when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the office of Mayor, he was actually holding said office. The respondents, however, maintain that the office petitioner was
actually holding when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor was that of Vice-Mayor. The issue resolved by
the Supreme Court is whether a Vice- Mayor acting as Mayor may be regarded as actually holding the office of Mayor. The
Court said a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not "actually hold the office" of Mayor within the meaning of section 27 of the
Election Code; that a Vice-Mayor who files his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, even while acting as Mayor, is
considered resigned from the office of Vice-Mayor for the reason that is the only office that he "actually holds" within the
contemplation of section 27 of the Revised Election Code and the office he is running for (Mayor) is naturally other than the
one he is actually holding (Vice-Mayor); and that having ceased to be a Vice- Mayor, he automatically lost all right to act as
Mayor.

Principles:
The chief function of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the lawmaker and, that intention has been ascertained, to give
effect thereto.

Facts:

 Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, and the petitioner Nicanor G.
Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of September, 1955 and for some time prior thereto, Santos
was under suspension from his office due to administrative charges filed against him and so petitioner Salaysay acted
as Mayor under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary disability of the
Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor.
 On September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
 The Office of the President of the Philippines on September 12, 1955 designated Braulio Sto. Domingo acting
Municipal Vice-Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the office of
Mayor as an automatic resignation from his office of Vice-Mayor under the provisions of section 27 of the Revised
Election Code, as a consequence of which he no longer had authority to continue acting as Mayor.
 Salaysay was advised by Provincial Governor Wenceslao Pascual to turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo, in
view of Salaysay's automatic cessation as Vice-Mayor, and in view of the appointment of Sto. Domingo, as acting
Vice-Mayor by the President of the Philippines, and because Pascual had directed Sto. Domingo to assume the office
of Mayor during the suspension of Mayor Santos.
 Petitioner refused to turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo.
 Petitioner contends that his case does not come under section 27 of the Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) for the
reason that when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, he was actually holding said office. The
respondents, however, maintain that the office petitioner was actually holding when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Mayor was that of Vice-Mayor, the one to which he had been duly elected; that he was
not actually holding the office of Mayor but merely discharging the duties thereof and was merely acting as Mayor
during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent.

Issue: Whether a Vice- Mayor acting as Mayor may be regarded as actually holding the office of Mayor.

Ruling: NO. A Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not "actually hold the office" of Mayor within the meaning of section 27 of the
Election Code; that a Vice-Mayor who files his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, even while acting as Mayor, is
considered resigned from the office of Vice-Mayor for the reason that is the only office that he "actually holds" within the
contemplation of section 27 of the Revised Election Code and the office he is running for (Mayor) is naturally other than the
one he is actually holding (Vice-Mayor); and that having ceased to be a Vice- Mayor, he automatically lost all right to act as
Mayor.

Before the enactment of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, the law in force covering the point or question in
controversy was section, Commonwealth Act No. 666 which provides:

"Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office other than the one for which he has been lastly
elected, shall be considered resigned from his once from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

The legislative intention as we see it was to favor re- election of the incumbent by allowing him to continue in his office and
use the prerogatives and influence thereof in his campaign for re- election and to avoid a break in or interruption of his
incumbency during his current term and provide for continuity thereof with the next term of office if re-elected. But section 2,
Commonwealth Act No. 666 had reference only to provincial and municipal officials duly elected to their offices and who were
occupying the same by reason of said election at the time that they filed their certificates of candidacy for the same position.
It did not include officials who hold or occupy elective provincial and municipal offices not by election but by appointment.

President Roxas amended said section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 by substituting the phrase "which he is actually holding",
for the phrase "for which he has been lastly elected" found in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666. The amendment is
now found in section 27 of the Revised Election Code which we quote below:

"SEC. 27.Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy."
The purpose of the Legislature in making the amendment was to allow an official to continue occupying an elective provincial,
municipal or city office to which he had been appointed or elected, while campaigning for his election as long as he runs for
the same office. He may keep said office continuously without any break, through the elections and up to the expiration of
the term of the office. By continuing in office, the office holder was allowed and expected to use the prerogatives, authority
and influence of his office in his campaign for his election or re-election to the office he was holding. Another intention of the
Legislature as we have hitherto adverted to was to provide for continuity of his incumbency so that there would be no
interruption or break, which would happen if he were required to resign because of his filing his certificate of candidacy.
Bearing this intention of the Legislature in this regard in mind, can it be said that a Vice-Mayor like the petitioner herein,
merely acting as Mayor because of the temporary disability of the regular incumbent, comes under the provision and
exception of section 27 of the Election Code? The answer must necessarily be in the negative. A Vice Mayor acts as Mayor
only in a temporary, provisional capacity. This tenure is indefinite, uncertain and precarious. He may act for a few days, for a
week or a month or even longer. But surely there, ordinarily, is no assurance or expectation that he could continue acting as
Mayor, long, indefinitely, through the elections and up to the end of the term of the office because the temporary disability of
the regular, incumbent Mayor may end any time and he may resume his duties.

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. SUPERIOR GAS AND EQUIPMENT CO. and the COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents

G.R. No. L-14115. May 25, 1960

BENGZON, J p:

Recit-ready: [TOPIC: Conditions at time of enactment]

In August 1956, the steamship "Chi Chung" arrived in Manila, from Formosa, carrying 1,200 metric tons of industrial salt
consigned to Superior Gas & Equipment Co., (Sugeco for short). Before taking its cargo, Sugeco was required to pay and did
pay — upon demand of the customs authorities, the sum of P2,400.00 as wharfage fee. Sugeco petitioned for a refund of the
said amount contending that its importation should not pay wharfage fees because it made no use of the facilities of
government wharves or piers, the cargo having been discharged through the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf Co. The Court said
that articles imported into the Philippines and landed on private wharves are exempted from payment of fees. There are two
laws enacted at different times, under dissimilar circumstances. At the time the Tariff of Act of 1909 was approved, the
Government had no wharves of its own; therefore, the wharfage fee imposed by it could not have meant charges for the use
of Government wharves. At the time Republic Act 1371 was approved, the Government had wharves; and the discussions in
the Legislature showed the intention not to levy wharfage fees on merchandise unloaded at places other than Government
wharves or without making use of pier facilities. The proviso exempting from the wharfage fee all imported merchandise on
private wharves makes this intention all the more evident. Therefore, goods not landed via the Government wharves should
not pay wharfage. However, Republic Act 1937 approved on June 22, 1957, amended Republic Act 1371 by eliminating the
proviso which expressly exempted from the wharfage fee all imported articles "unloaded on private wharves." The Court still
upheld Sugeco's exemption from payment as the assessment and collection of the tax occurred before the passage of said
Republic Act 1937.

Principle

Facts:

 In August 1956, the steamship "Chi Chung" arrived in Manila, from Formosa, carrying 1,200 metric tons of industrial
salt consigned to Superior Gas & Equipment Co., (Sugeco for short).
 Before taking its cargo, Sugeco was required to pay and did pay — upon demand of the customs authorities, the sum
of P2,400.00 as wharfage fee on August 23, 1956.
 After protesting the payment in vain, Sugeco resorted to the Tax Court, contending that its importation should not
pay wharfage fees because it made no use of the facilities of government wharves or piers, the cargo having been
discharged through the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf Co.
 The Tax Court sustained Sugeco's contention. This appeal hinges on the interpretation of Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 1371 — the law in August, 1956 — levying a charge of two pesos per metric ton "as a fee for wharfage" upon all
articles imported into the Philippines; but with the proviso that no such fee shall be levied on articles imported "which
are unloaded on private wharves."
Issue: Whether or not SUGECO should pay the wharfage fees despite not using of the facilities of government wharves or
piers as the cargo having been discharged through the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf Co.

Ruling: No. Articles imported into the Philippines and landed on private wharves are exempted from payment of fees.

We have two laws enacted at different times, under dissimilar circumstances. At the time the Tariff of Act of 1909 was
approved — in the first years of American occupation — the Government had no wharves of its own; therefore, the wharfage
fee imposed by it could not have meant charges for the use of Government wharves, which was the generally accepted idea;
so this Court in view of the surrounding circumstances believed and held (in the Sugar Centrals case) that the charges were
payable even if no Government wharf be used, because they were meant to be used as a trust fund "for the purpose of
acquiring and constructing wharves by the Government of the Philippine Islands."

However, at the time Republic Act 1371 was approved, the Government had wharves; and the discussions in the Legislature
showed the intention not to levy wharfage fees on merchandise unloaded at places other than Government wharves or
without making use of pier facilities. The proviso exempting from the wharfage fee all imported merchandise on private
wharves makes this intention all the more evident. In other words, the Congress at last accepted the ordinary concept of
"wharfage charge" as the "charge for use of wharf by way of rent or compensation" or the "money paid for landing goods
upon, or loading them from a wharf" or the "fee or duty paid for the privilege of using a wharf"; and admitted that goods not
landed via the Government wharves should not pay wharfage.

Our attention is invited to the circumstance that Republic Act 1937 approved June 22, 1957, amended Republic Act 1371 by
eliminating the proviso which expressly exempted from the wharfage fee all imported articles "unloaded on private wharves."
Whatever the effect of such elimination may be, we do not regard it to be material in this case, inasmuch as Sugeco's
importation, and the assessment and collection of the tax occurred before the passage of said Republic Act 1937.

The refunding order should be, and is hereby affirmed.