Frederick W.

Taylor's 1899 Pig Iron Observations: Examining Fact, Fiction, and Lessons for
the New Millennium
Author(s): Charles D. Wrege and Richard M. Hodgetts
Source: The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 6 (Dec., 2000), pp. 1283-1291
Published by: Academy of Management
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1556350
Accessed: 30-01-2017 16:16 UTC

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? Academy of Management Journal
2000, Vol. 43, No. 6, 1283-1291.

FREDERICK W. TAYLOR'S 1899 PIG IRON OBSERVATIONS:

EXAMINING FACT, FICTION, AND LESSONS
FOR THE NEW MTILLENNIUM

CHARLES D. WREGE
Cornell University

RICHARD M. HODGETTS
Florida International University

Taylor's pig iron observations at Bethlehem Iron in 1899 are often cited as an example
of how scientific management helped increase industrial efficiency. The current re-
search, relying almost exclusively on primary sources, reveals that Taylor's famous pig
iron anecdote was erroneous. Additionally, this article offers lessons and guidelines
for managers in the new millennium.

Although Frederick W. Taylor's impact on man- Unfortunately, for the majority of the readers of
agement cannot be denied, whether his work al- management publications, the printed word has an
ways represented the use of science to solve man- aura of authenticity that is seldom questioned, and
agement problems is questionable. George has said original documents are neglected.
that Taylor believed "to maximize output with a This study draws on original documents and pre-
given level of effort. . . the scientific method had to sents an analysis of what really happened during
be applied to worker selection, job determina- the famous pig iron observations of 1899. It also
tion, creation of a proper environment, and so on, presents lessons to be learned by researchers in
to determine properly the task for each man" general and management scholars in particular.
(1972: 93).
This concept of a scientific, research-based ap-
proach in management practice was not new (Hoag- BACKGROUND
land, 1955). For example, in Poland in the late
Management history is replete with anecdotes
1890s Karol Adamiecki was developing work flow
regarding the work of prominent people. Yet per-
network diagrams to solve production problems in
haps no story is more famous that that of Frederick
local factories (Marsh, 1975). However, Taylor did
Taylor's pig iron observations, which were con-
impress his audiences by describing the apparent
use of scientific methods to reduce costs and to
ducted at the Bethlehem Iron Company of South
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in March-May 1899.
create prosperity for the workforce. More impor-
Taylor had come to Bethlehem at the behest of
tantly, his claims were readily accepted by practi-
Robert Linderman, president of the company, to
tioners and scholars until almost 75 years later,
reduce costs by introducing a piece rate system
when they were challenged by Wrege and Perroni
(South Bethlehem Globe, 1898; Taylor, 1898).
(1974). These authors focused on how Taylor's ac-
When Taylor arrived at Bethlehem, pig iron was
count of his study of pig iron loading at the Beth-
selling at $11.50 per long ton (2,240 pounds) (Hob-
lehem Iron Company continually changed in the son, 1899), and the company had 10,000 tons on
years from 1901 to 1911. However, they did not hand. However, it was waiting for a better price
attempt to study the details of pig iron loading or before selling. By March 1899, the price had risen
whether the company or the workers actually pros-to $13.50 per long ton (Iron Age, 1899), and the
pered from the piece rate system that Taylor rec- company quickly sold its inventory and began
ommended. The current research focuses on these
preparations for loading the iron onto gondola cars
latter three aspects of Taylor's work. for shipment. At this point Taylor decided to take
The reason for the continued acceptance of Tay- advantage of the opportunity to study pig iron load-
lor's observations largely lies in the persistent reli- ing for the purpose of lowering loading costs, as
ance of management scholars on published sources well as to secure data for a book he was preparing
(usually those appearing in management publica- on time and performing work. He assigned two of
tions) rather than on original documents prepared his assistants, James Gillespie and Hartley C.
at the time of the actual events Taylor described. Wolle, to study the loading process. They reported
1283

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1284 Academy of Management Journal December

their observations to Taylor, who made decisions. Layout and Loading

The two men began by first selecting ten of the very
Pigs and piles. In 1899 at Bethlehem, a pig of
best workers and having them work as fast as they
iron (or ingot; 92 pounds) was 32 inches long, 41/2
could loading pig iron for a full day. Commenting
inches high, and 4 inches wide. These pigs were
on the results, Wren (1994) reported:
organized for loading by first putting them into
"basic piles." Each pile consisted of 390 pigs and
During the first day, the workers loaded 75 tons
each, filling one car. Since the average tons per day
was approximately 2 feet high, 2 feet deep, and 35
had previously been about 121/2 tons per worker, the feet long. Then the workers added the basic piles
workers were exhausted. Gillespie and Wolle then together to create a pile of full pigs 10 feet tall. As
deducted 40 percent for time to be allotted to rest seen in Figure la, the final result was 12 rows with
and delays, establishing the new standard at 45 tons 5 basic piles per row and then a shorter row in front
per worker per day. (1994: 117) that consisted of just over 2.5 basic piles. The rea-
son for the shorter row was to make it possible to
On the basis of these results, Taylor then set a erect planks supported by wooden blocks from the
piece rate of $0.0375 per ton. So a worker who met pile of full pigs to the gondola car, located directly
the standard of 45 tons would earn $1.69 for the in front of the short pile. The men could then pick
day, a substantial increase over the $1.15 day rate up the pigs, walk on the plank, and put them into
that the average pig iron loader was then earning. the car.
On countless occasions, Taylor used the story he Gangs and gondolas. In the period March-May
had fashioned about the pig iron observations to 1899, two types of standard gauge, wood gondola
explain how productivity increases at Bethlehem railway cars were being used at Bethlehem. Ac-
Iron were achieved and how the workers earned cording to John O'Connor, a freight car historian,
more money. The "win-win" aspect of the anecdote the older of the two types was the 1869 gondola,
was extremely attractive to Taylor's listeners. How-which was 30 feet long and made to hold 25,000
ever, was his story accurate, or was it contrived pounds; the newer was the 1880 gondola, which
through the use of omissions and generalizationswas 33 feet long and made to hold 36,000 pounds
regarding what really happened a century ago at(J. O'Connor, personal interview, September 2,
Bethlehem? 1997). In either case, it was possible to line up ten
cars in front of a full pile and begin loading.
As already noted, planks would be placed from
the top of the gondola car to the front portion of the
METHODS
pile, which was five feet high (again, see Figure la)
In an effort to clarify the work of Wrege and andthree feet from the car. Two people in the gang
Perroni (1974) on Taylor's pig iron observations would remain in the car, and the rest would bring
through use of greater detail and to evaluate the
the pig iron to them to be stacked neatly in the
accuracy of Taylor's reports of his observations, gondola
we so that the car would not tilt in transit and
took four approaches. First, the report writtenderail. by The gang would start with level 1 of the pile
Gillespie and Wolle regarding the results ofand thethen move on to level 2. As the pig iron loading
observations in 1899 was studied in detail to deter- continued, the top of the pile would be reduced
mine the amount of work that the pig iron loaders and the elevation of the planks would be increased,
did and their rates of pay. Second, an analysis was so that the men could load levels 3, 4, and 5.
made of the weather conditions at Bethlehem dur- This explanation fits well with Taylor's descrip-
ing this time period. Third, the personal diary of tion and gives the impression that the loading was
Robert Sayre, second largest stockholder at Bethle- both simple and routine. In fact, it was not so
hem, was studied. Fourth, from these new findings, simple, for four reasons we discovered after careful
lessons were derived for management scholars for analysis of the original documents but that Taylor
the new millennium. failed to include when he told his pig iron story.
A number of important considerations are criti- First, considerable time was required to adjust the
cal in examining Taylor's pig iron story. One of the wooden blocks that were needed to support the
most significant is the nature of the product and theplanks (Gillespie & Wolle, 1899). Second, during
layout of the shipping area at Bethlehem Iron. A bad weather the workers had to walk very carefully
second is the process that was used in loading the on the ingots and the planks, thus reducing their
iron for shipment. A third is the performance of the output-and weather in this geographic region dur-
workers and the costs associated with the work. ing the winter and spring was sometimes brutal
The following sections examine each of these. (Allentown Daily Call, 1899). Third, controlled ex-

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2000 Wrege and Hodgetts 1285

FIGURE 1
Configurations of Iron to Be Loaded

(la) A Full Pile of Pigs

10'

(lb) Types of Pocket Casts

Type 1 cast, hemmed Type 2 cast, hemmed Type 3 cast, hemmed

in on all sides. in on two sides. in front and rear.
Average loading time = Average loading time = Average loading time =
.576 minutes .548 minutes .552 minutes

periments conducted by Gillespie and Wolle in the yard and containing special pig iron orders of 25
middle of March 1899 revealed that the work done tons each, as shown in Figure lb. The average time
by each of the work teams varied sharply-as did it took a man to load a pig from a pile when walking
the labor cost per ton (see Table 1). So from the very 1 to 15 feet in good weather was .271 minutes; in
beginning there were different amounts being contrast, loading from pocketed casts could re-
loaded by different work teams, and Taylor and his quire, as can be seen in Figure lb, as much as .576
associates were having trouble determining both minutes per pig because of the configuration of the
standard work levels and incentive rates. Fourth, casts (Gillespie & Wolle, 1899). Therefore, Taylor
much of the loading was actually done from what had to raise the pay rate for loading from pocketed
were called "pocketed casts." These were piles of casts, in some cases to as much as $0.0700 per long
pigs located in various configurations around the ton, and this significantly influenced overall costs.

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1286 Academy of Management Journal December

TABLE 1
Controlled Observations of Pig Iron Loadinga

Factors Friday, March 10 Saturday, March 11 Monday, March 13

Storage conditions Pile of 17.9 long tons (pocketed) Pile of 25.7 long tons (pocketed) Pile of 16.6 long tons (pocketed)
Type of pig Half: 46 pounds Full: 92 pounds Full: 92 pounds
Total pounds loaded 40,096 (17.9 x 2,240) 57,568 (25.7 X 2,240) 37,184 (16.6 X 2,240)
Pigs loaded 872 (40,096/46) 626 (57,568/92) 404 (37,184/92)
Tons loaded 17.9 (40,096/2,240) 25.7 (57,568/2,240) 16.6 (37,184/2,240)
Walk on level 5 feet 5 feet 7 feet
Walk on plank 12'3" rise 10'6" rise 2'9" rise
Top of car 2'6" above the plank 2'6" above the plank 2'6" above the plank
Size of
gang 4 men 12 men 10 men
(2 in the car, 2 loading) (2 in the car, 10 loading) (2 in the car, 8 loading)
Time spent loading 52.5 minutes 54.0 minutes 14.0 minutes
Weather conditions Cloudy, 50?, Cloudy, 55?, Fair, 60?,
clear, milder clear, milder cloudy, threatening
Tons per man 4.48 (17.9/4) 2.14 (25.7/12) 1.66 (16.6/10)
Tons loaded per man per minute 0.08533 (4.48/52.5) 0.03963 (2.14/54.0) 0.1660 (1.66/10)
Tons loaded per man in 1 hour 5.12 (0.08533 X 60) 2.38 (0.039630 X 60) 9.96 (0.1660 x 60)
Tons loaded per man in 10 hours 51.2 (5.12 X 10) 23.8 (2.38 X 10) 99.6 (9.96 X 10)
Tons loaded by gang 204.8 (51.2 X 4) 285.6 (23.8 x 12) 996 (99.6 X 10)
Cost to load $4.60 ($1.15 X 4) $13.80 ($1.15 X 12) $11.50 ($1.15 x 10)
(4 men) (12 men) (10 men)
Cost per ton $0.022461 ($4.60/204.8) $0.048319 ($13.80/285.6) $0.011546 ($11.50/996)

a Source: Gillespie and Wolle (1899: 23-28).

plan based on how far the workers had to carry the

In all likelihood, Taylor overlooked these problems
because the work approach was eventually ironrevised
was introduced. The piece rate per ton was
and the new one was easier to explain. increased to $0.0438 for those who were loading
pig iron piled no more than 15 feet from the side of
the car and not more than 5 feet below the top edge
Performance and Pay
of the car. For those who had to walk greater dis-
tances
Gillespie and Wolle's ongoing analysis led them or faced obstacles in carrying the iron, the
to conclude that the initial method of loading the as high as $0.0700 per ton (Gillespie &
rate went
pigs was inefficient. Too much time was lost
Wolle, in
1899).
Under
placing the planks in their proper position andthe revised incentive plan, a few workers
continued
supporting them with blocks of wood. So they de-to load the cars, but the others had be-
signed metal hangers that hooked over thecomesidetoo
offatigued
a to remain on the incentive plan.
gondola car, hanging two feet below the topSo Gillespie
of the and Wolle again changed the system.
car. The hangers made it possible for one Each man to
man was now assigned to a gondola, and he
would simply
place one end of a plank on a pile and the other end throw the pigs into the car. With this
arrangement,
in the hangers, thus eliminating the need to arrange some workers were able to make more
the wooden blocks on the railway tracks. money by loading the pig iron under the incentive
system
Gillespie and Wolle also met with Taylor than by accepting the $1.15 day rate. Of
to de-
course, had
termine the piece rate incentive plan. Taylor the actual wages earned depended on the
set a rate of $0.0375 per long ton but found distance the iron had to be carried, the elevation of
that the
men would not load pig iron at this rate.the planks, and the difficulty of the loading. More-
There
were two reasons for this reluctance. One was that over, most workers were unable to make more than
the day rate was $1.15, and a worker would have to $0.90 a day on the piece rate system, and so they
load 31 long tons in order to make more than this chose to go back to the day rate of $1.15. However,
amount ($0.0375 x 31 = $1.16). The second reason two workers, Henry Noll and Simon Conrad, did
was that the work of loading the increased tonnage profit from the incentive system because they were
was extremely fatiguing, as will be seen shortly, loading from distant pocketed casts and were thus
and many loaders found that after a day or two of paid as much as $0.070 per long ton. Yet not even
loading they had to be reassigned to other work on they worked on the piece rate system every day.
a day rate basis because they could not continue They needed time to rest and recover their energy.
their loading efforts. As a result, a revised incentive As seen in Table 2, in March 1899 Noll was on

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2000 Wrege and Hodgetts 1287

TABLE 2
Henry Noll and Simon Conrad's Work Recordsa

Date Day Type of Pay Days

Noll
March 30-31 Thursday and Friday Incentive 2 days
April 1, 3, 4 Saturday, Monday, and Tuesday Incentive 3 days
April 5-14 Wednesday-Friday Daywork 9 days
April 15 Saturday Incentive 1 day
April 17-18 Monday and Tuesday Daywork 2 days
April 19 Wednesday Incentive 1 day
April 20 Thursday Daywork 1 day
April 21, 22, 24-27 Friday-Thursday Incentive 6 days
April 28-29 Friday and Saturday Daywork 2 days
May 1-6, 8 Monday-Saturday and Monday Daywork 7 days
May 9 Tuesday Incentive 1 day
May 10-11 Wednesday and Thursday Daywork 2 days
May 12-13 Friday and Saturday Incentive 2 days
May 15-16 Monday and Tuesday Daywork 2 days
May 17-18 Wednesday and Thursday Incentive 2 days
May 19-20 Friday and Saturday Daywork 2 days
May 22-25 Monday-Thursday Incentive 4 days
May 26 Friday Daywork 1 day
May 27-29 Saturday and Monday Incentive 2 days

Conrad
May 1-5 Monday-Friday Daywork 5 days
May 6 Saturday Incentive I1 day
May 8 Monday Daywork 1 day
May 9-10 Tuesday and Wednesday Incentive 2 days
May 11 Thursday Daywork 1 day
May 12 Friday Incentive 1 day
May 13 Saturday Daywork 1 day
May 15-16 Monday and Tuesday Incentive 2 days
May 17 Wednesday Daywork 1 day
May 18-19 Thursday and Friday Incentive 2 days
May 20, 22-24 Saturday and Monday-Wednesday Daywork 4 days
May 25-27, 29 Thursday-Saturday and Monday Incentive 4 days

a Source: Wrege and Greenwood (1899).

Another
the piece rate system for only 2 days. factor that
During was never explained by Tay-
April
and May of that year, he was onlorthe
is how the pigrate
piece iron handlers could have saved
system only 11 days each month and the company
was paidmoney, on givenathat there were so many
day work basis for the remaining 14 work days inefforts. Taylor reported
costs associated with their
each month. A close analysis of Table that his2 goal
shows was to load a long ton at a cost of
that,
in early April 1899, Noll worked under the incen- $0.0500 (Taylor, 1901). In fact, this goal was impos-
tive payment plan for 3 days and then returned to could earn more than
sible, given that workers
day work for 9 days. Later in the $0.0500 month, by loading from the pocketed casts, where
he worked
6 days on incentive (a day off, Sunday, fell inasthe the rates were as high $0.0700 per long ton. How
middle of this work period) and then much, then,
went did onTaylor
day save the company with his
rate for 9 days. Only at the end of new
Maymethod didof he
loading
workthe iron?
steadily on the incentive system. Of In analyzing
course, thesome
costs forof the 7,490 long tons that
the occasions on which he was paid were actually
a day loaded
rate from March 30 through May
were
a result of the weather-but many 31, 1899, not.
were it is important
This isto realize that only 27
evident (see Table 2) from the records percent of(2,015/7,490)
the other of this work was done under
loader, Simon Conrad, who had 12 incentive days the incentive plan. The bulk of the tonnage was
during May. Six of these days were ones on which loaded by day gangs paid $0.0940 per ton. Exhibit 1
Noll was on day rate! So it is highly likely that Noll (next page) provides an analysis of these data.
could also have worked on incentive these days. So Taylor's story about loading the pigs at
Why did he not? Fatigue was a key reason. $0.0500 per ton was not true, although he did man-

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1288 Academy of Management Journal December

EXHIBIT 1 pies of Scientific Management, or from current text-

Costs for Loading Pig Iron at Bethlehem Iron books. In Taylor's case, he simplified the observa-
Company, March 30-May 31, 1899: The Old tions by presenting only some of the information.
Method versus Taylor's Modified Approach As a result, the story is fluid and consistent, but it
omits many significant facts, as reported here. In
Old method:
Total cost of loading 7,490 long tons $677.10
retrospect, it is evident that Taylor took some of the
under day rate of $0.0904/ton facts associated with the observations and wove
them together into a coherent and logical story that
Modified approach:
intrigued his audience.
Amount Loaded under Piece Rate
In fairness, Taylor is not the only person to have
Worker Long Tons Amount Earned presented erroneous anecdotal data. Many manage-
ment textbook authors have drawn on secondary
Noll 745 $ 41.58
sources in presenting Taylor's studies. In the pro-
Conrad 457 23.01
All others 813 24.32 cess, they have embellished the data and added
"facts" that are simply not true. As a result, Taylor's
Total 2,015 $ 88.91
anecdotes have now taken on mythical propor-
Cost of Loading tions. For example, the data from
Remaining Gillespie and
Amount
Wolle show that, after they had conducted one day
7,490 long tons
-2,015 long tons loaded under
of walking experiments with a group of seven
piece rate workers, Gillespie and Wolle assigned the pig iron
5,475 long tons left to be loaded
handlers to their tasks. In contrast to what some
under day rate ($0.904/ton) basic textbooks report, Taylor and his assistants
$494.94 conducted no training of workers and made no
refined adjustments to the loading routines. The
Total cost of loading 7,490 long tons $ 88.91
under modified approach, only changes that were made were in the amount of
March 30-May 31,1899 money paid per long ton (up to $0.0700 for some
494.94
pocketed casts) and the way the workers loaded the
$ 583.85 cars (initially in teams and then individually).
Savings based on use of modified $ 677.10
approach
-583.85
Primary Sources Must Be Consulted
$ 93.25
The second lesson to be learned for management
historians is that original sources must be exam-
ined because they offer a more complete, more
age to reduce the overall cost of loading the 7,490
detailed picture. The data provided by Gillespie
long tons by a total of $93.25 (see Table 3). On and
theWolle clearly show that the pig iron loading
other hand, he omitted a significant additional cost:
techniques had to be continually changed because
Because the pig iron handlers were now throwing
the work was too demanding and the money was
the iron into the car, there would be damage to the
not sufficiently motivational.
gondolas, and these costs would be billed back to
Additionally, original documents reveal that
Bethlehem.
Taylor's primary interest in conducting these ob-
servations was probably to convince Joseph Whar-
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED ton, Bethlehem's primary stockholder, to let him
The pig iron observations offer some very buyuseful
stock at a reduced price (Taylor, 1899). Tay-
lessons to management researchers, especially lor's observations may well have been influenced
those in the management history area. The follow- by his attempts to ingratiate himself with the major
ing is a discussion of five of the most useful. stockholders, who knew little about what he was
doing and were likely to believe his reports of great
success. In fact, Robert Sayre, who was at Bethle-
Anecdotal Data Are Often Erroneous
hem when Taylor was supposedly saving the com-
Most of what management scholars know about pany money, wrote in his diary for April 8, 1899,
the pig iron observations has been learned from that Taylor was "causing a great deal of money to be
secondary sources, such as Taylor's (1911) Princi- spent unnecessarily" (Robert Sayre Diary, 1899).

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2000 Wrege and Hodgetts 1289

All Data Have Inconsistencies drive down their own loading costs. Yet such evi-
dence would be the best proof that the observations
One of the reasons why Taylor's pig tale has
did indeed produce the results that Taylor cited. In
survived for so long is that it has no inconsisten-
every science, replication is critical to theory vali-
cies. Everything in the story fits together neatly. In
dation.
fact, an analysis of the primary data associated with
One reason for the lack of replication is undoubt-
these observations shows that a number of things
edly that Taylor's approach was no more efficient
made it difficult to state definitively what was hap-
than the old method of loading iron. Any company
pening and to measure the full bottom-line impact
that carefully examined the costs and the savings
of the work. When there are no inconsistencies in
would have quickly concluded that the prize was
the data, one has to wonder what has been left out
not worth the pursuit.
of the calculations.
A second reason overlooked by most by research-
For example, before undertaking the studies, Tay-
ers is that Taylor's observations could not have
lor relied on data generated by Gillespie and Wolle
added much to the company's bottom line, even if
from company records in March 1899. They found
everything worked according to plan. His stated
that a total of 3,430 long tons had been loaded in
objective was to cut the cost of loading pig iron
2,697 hours at a cost of $310.10, or $0.1106 per ton
from $0.0904 per long ton to $0.0500, thus saving
(3,430/$310.10), and that the average person loaded
the company $0.0404 per long ton. Overlooking the
12.7 tons daily (Gillespie & Wolle, 1899). These
fact that his payment plan, with its incentives run-
records, however, were inadequate because they did
ning as high as $0.070 per long ton, made a $0.0404
not cover the number of men loading the iron, how
saving impossible, one must consider the fact that
the iron was stored (whether in unobstructed piles or
even if Taylor had been totally successful in his
pocketed casts), the distance the iron had to be car-
efforts, he would have saved Bethlehem Iron a total
ried, the height of the planks, the type of railway cars
of only $302.60 (7,490 long tons X .0404). So for the
being loaded, or the weather conditions from March 1
50 days that the observations lasted, the firm would
to March 15, 1899.
have been able to reduce expenses by a mere $6.05
Second, the cost of loading a pig varied consid-
a day! When other companies analyzed the value of
erably, as seen in Table 1. One of the determining
Taylor's approach, it is likely that they also realized
factors was how long the crews worked. The data in
that all of this effort would, at best, produce little (if
this table show that the crew loading iron on March
any) savings. This calculation was undoubtedly
13 did so at a cost of less than 2 cents per ton, but
why there were no large-scale replications of the
they worked for only 14 minutes. The other two
study. Taylor told a good tale, but he could not sell
crews worked for a little less than 1 hour. Given
it to senior-level managers who focused on facts
that the fatigue factor was critical in this work and and not anecdotes.
the typical workday was 10 hours, how valuable
were findings that were based on less than 60 min-
utes of work? Digital Archiving Is Now Critical
Third, when each worker was assigned his own
In 1994, two national groups, the Commission on
gondola to load and the pigs were thrown into the Preservation and Access and the Research Libraries
wooden car rather than stacked neatly in it, the useful
Group, created the Task Force on Digital Archives.
life of the car would have been reduced. The reason
Since then, this not-for-profit task force has been
the pigs had been stacked was to ensure that they did
extremely active in helping to develop guidelines
not slide about and cause excessive wear and tear on
for ensuring the successful transfer and protection
a gondola's bearings and undercarriage, injuries that
of digital material from one generation of computer
would cause derailment. Damage from this new load-
technology to another. In particular, the group is
ing method would have been costly, and the railroad
helping archivists organize, preserve, and protect
would have passed these costs on to Bethlehem.
access to a wide range of stored resources by: (1)
However, this fact was never explored by Gillespie
compiling and distributing guidelines, standards,
and Wolle, an omission that leaves one to ponder
and best practices for digital preservation, (2) de-
what the long-run cost of loading the pigs under this
veloping varied means to coordinate digital preser-
new arrangement would have been.
vation activities within institutions, and (3) help-
ing to formulate institutional policies for acquiring,
converting, storing, and maintaining digital mate-
Replication Is the Hallmark of Good Science
rials (Hedstrom & Montgomery, 1998). As these
There is no reported evidence of other compa- kinds of efforts continue to make headway, records
such as those used in the current research will be
nies' copying Taylor's approach and being able to

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1290 Academy of Management Journal December

better protected, and the ability to review and an- tics of the workers that results in some people
alyze original documentation will be significantly doing more work than others? Even more impor-
increased. tantly, if these work crews continued working for
the entire ten-hour day, what conclusions could
have been drawn regarding how to organize the
THE VALUE OF THE OBSERVATIONS FOR THE
crews for maximum efficiency?
NEW MTTT.ENNIUM
A fourth important point is that anecdotal data
In retrospect, the 1899 pig iron observations areare no substitute for quantitative analysis. Modern
important because they show that one of the pri- organizations pursuing higher-quality outputs have
mary goals of management has not changed in over now realized that record keeping, charting, feed-
a century: to reduce costs. At the same time, how-back, and objective analysis are far more important
ever, the observations point out the importance ofthan anecdotes. After studying some of America's
researchers being more systematic and sophisti-most successful corporations, Hodgetts (1998)
cated in their approach to reaching their goals. found that all of them used quantitative and ongo-
Taylor and his associates made copious mistakes, ing measures to determine their quality and perfor-
the most important being that they simplified the mance. Anecdotes typically smooth out inconsis-
results of their study and glossed over the incon- tencies and lead to misinterpretation of data-and
sistencies. In the new millennium, where hyper- these actions result in erroneous conclusions. In
competition will rule the day, firms that repeat the new millennium, managers and scholars will
Taylor's mistakes will find themselves unable to need to pay far less attention to story telling and far
compete effectively. more to data collection and analysis.
A second and complementary conclusion that In conclusion, the major reason for examining
emerges from the reanalysis of Taylor's observa- the pig iron observations is to reemphasize that
tions is that "benchmarking" is going to be a critical reduced cost has long been and remains a major
activity in the new millennium. In fact, this ap- goal of management. However, the tools and tech-
proach, and related strategies, are proving ex- niques contemporary organizations must use to
tremely important in helping organizations main- pursue this objective will have to be different from
tain a competitive stance. If Taylor and his those of the past. What Taylor did was standard
associates had gone farther in studying all the ele-practice for his day-and the results show that he
ments influencing pig iron handling, they might really did not accomplish much more than generate
have realized quite clearly that their cost figures a story that has been retold and refashioned in so
were erroneous. Additionally, they did not get themany ways that what the typical management
workers involved in the process via feedback re- reader "knows" about what happened at Bethlehem
garding how the work could be done more effi- Iron a century ago is more fiction than fact. In the
ciently. Today many enterprises are sidestepping new millennium, managers will have to increas-
this problem by creating empowerment programs. ingly focus on data collection and analysis and
Admittedly, empowerment was not a concept that fight the tendency to accept anecdotes and hearsay
would have been accepted in 1899, but that obser- as accurate. In an emerging world of hypercompe-
vation helps reinforce our point: new methods tition, this lesson could spell the difference be-
must be continually introduced if organizations' tween success and failure.
managements hope to increase their productivity
levels.
REFERENCES
A third useful point to be derived from the Taylor
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focus must be given to the scientific collection of weather conditions. March-April.
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Gillespie, G., & Wolle, H. 1899. Report on the establish-
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the conditions under which each team worked South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (compiled June
were significantly different, thus making it impos-17). Hoboken, NJ: Frederick W. Taylor Collection,
sible to answer key questions like these: What is the Stevens Institute.

ideal work crew size? How do the working condi- Hedstrom, M., & Montgomery, S. 1998. Digital preserva-
tions correlate with the amount of output per day? tion needs and requirements in RLG member insti-
Is there any difference in the physical characteris- tutions. http://www.rlg.org/preserv/digpres.html.

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2000 Wrege and Hodgetts 1291

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Charles D. Wrege received his Ph.D. from New York
University. He is the Academy of Management historian
and archivist and the curator of the History of Manage-
search focus is in management history, with particular
emphasis on Frederick W. Taylor.
sity of Oklahoma. He is a professor of strategic manage-
ment at Florida International University. His current re-
search focuses on strategy in multinational enterprises
and the use of high-performance work groups in the
international arena.

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