PROFESSIONAL TRAFFIC OPERATIONS ENGINEERS

CERTIFICATION PROGRAM REFRESHER COURSE

MODULE 6

TRAFFIC SAFETY

July, 2016

Prepared by

Martin E. Lipinski, PhD, PE, PTOE

Department of Civil Engineering
University of Memphis

and

Robert K. Seyfried, PE, PTOE

President
R.K. Seyfried and Associates, Inc.
Evanston, IL
 TRAFFIC SAFETY

INTRODUCTION

It is the goal of the traffic engineering

profession to provide a transportation system
that maximizes safety for all users –
motorists, pedestrians, bicyclists, and others.
While it is well documented that geometric
design and traffic operations improvements
can make road safer, reducing crashes and
their severity is more than an engineering
problem. It is said that “human error” is a
contributing cause of 80 to 90 percent of all
crashes. An effective safety program involves
consideration of the human element, the
vehicle, the roadway, and the environment. A
comprehensive approach requires the use of
all of the safety E’s: Engineering, Education,
Enforcement, Emergency Medical Services,
Environment, Economics, Evaluation, and
Everyone.

Safety, in itself, is a somewhat abstract term.

What is more to the point is that we, as traffic
professionals, strive to make our roadway
systems and their elements safer.

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It is not sufficient to categorize a roadway as
safe just because it meets all engineering
standards. By satisfying all applicable
standards one provides nominal safety.
This concept does not consider the actual
crash history or potential at a site. We are
more concerned with substantive safety –
what is the actual safety performance of a
site. We should focus on providing
substantive safety and consider all factors
that are contributing to the safety record at
the location being reviewed.

The concept of nominal safety is a consideration of whether a roadway, design alternative, or

design element meets minimum design criteria. According to this concept, a highway or
proposed design is considered to have nominal safety if its design features (such as lane width,
shoulder width, alignment, sight distance, etc.) meet the minimum values or ranges. The
measure of nominal safety is simply a comparison of design element dimensions to the
adopted design criteria.

As an example, the criterion for Interstate lane width is 12 feet. A design alternative that
proposes 12-foot lane widths suggests a nominally safe design, whereas an alternative that
proposes 11-foot lane widths would not.

In actuality, the safety effects of incremental differences in a given design dimension can be
expected to produce an incremental, not absolute, change in safety. The nominal safety
concept is limited in that it does not examine or express the actual or expected safety
performance of a highway. This second dimension of safety is critical to making good
decisions regarding design exceptions.

Substantive safety is defined as the actual long term or expected safety performance of a
roadway. This would be determined by its crash experience measured over a long enough time
period to provide a high level of confidence that the observed crash experience is a true
representation of the expected safety characteristics of that location or highway. Quantitative
measures of substantive safety include:
 Crash frequency (number of crashes per mile (km) or location over a specified time
period).
 Crash type (run-off-road, intersection, pedestrian, etc.).
 Crash severity (fatality, injury, property damage).
Expected safety performance will vary based on inherent differences among highway types
and contexts. For example, the frequency and other characteristics of crashes differ for a two-
lane road in rolling rural terrain versus a multi-lane urban arterial versus a freeway
interchange.

Understanding a location’s substantive safety and making judgments about whether it meets
expectations should involve formal comparison of its crash profile with aggregate data for
facilities with similar characteristics—traffic volume, location (urban, rural, suburban),

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functional classification, facility type (two-lane, multi-lane divided, etc.), and terrain. There are
well–established methods for characterizing a location’s substantive safety. This generally
includes applying statistical models of crash experience from broader data bases (safety
performance functions and crash modification factor analysis). It should be based on models
and data from the same jurisdiction of the site being studied.

CRASH CHARACTERISTICS

Each year, there have been more than

6,000,000 motor vehicle crashes in the U.S.
costing society over $230.6 billion and
resulting in more than 30,000 deaths and
more than 1,500,000 injuries. Traffic crashes
are the leading cause of death for people of
ages 3 to 33. This excessively high toll is
considered to be one of the nation’s primary
public health issues.

While the number of fatalities and injuries

resulting from crashes has remained relatively
constant over the past twenty years, the
fatality rate has shown significant
improvement from 2.3 per 100 million
vehicle miles of travel in 1988 to 1.1 currently
(3.7 per 100 million vehicle km of travel to
1.7). The reasons for this decrease include:
 Increases in the number of vehicle
miles of travel
 Improvements in highway design and
operations
 Targeted safety programs, including
those designed to increase seatbelt
usage and to address alcohol-related crashes
 Improved vehicle design to reduce crash involvement and reduce crash severity.

ROADWAY SAFETY CONCEPTS

Safety is not an automatic byproduct of the application of established design and traffic
operations standards and practices. Rather, safety must be “designed into” the roadway,
explicitly considering the safety implications of design and operational decisions.

Highway features affect safety by:

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  Influencing the ability of the driver to
maintain vehicle control and identify
hazards. Significant features include
lane width, alignment, sight distance,
superelevation, and pavement
surface characteristics.
 Influencing the number and types of
opportunities that exist for conflicts
with other vehicles, pedestrians,
bicycles, and other road users.
Significant features include access
control, intersection design, railroad
grade crossings, traffic control devices, number of lanes, and medians.
 Affecting the consequences of an out-of-control vehicle leaving the traveled way.
Significant features include shoulder width and condition, roadside slopes, fixed
objects, and hazards, roadside barriers, and appurtenances.
 Affecting the behavior and attentiveness of the driver, particularly the choice of travel
speed and path. Driver behavior is affected by virtually all elements of the roadway
environment.

In many cases, safety and/or operational problems can be traced to a historical tendency to
base highway designs on minimum standards, rather than adopt an optimum design. The
acceptance of minimum standards as the criteria for design too often has occurred for reasons
of economy. Frequently, a more liberal design would have cost little more over the life of the
project, and would have increased safety and efficiency substantially.

The ideal highway is one with uniformly

high quality design applied consistently over
a section. It avoids discontinuities in the
highway environment such as abrupt major
changes in design speeds, transitions in
roadway cross section, the introduction of a
sharp curve in a series of flatter curves,
change from full to partial control of access,
constrictions in roadway width by narrow
bridges or other structures, intersections
without adequate sight distances, or other
failures to maintain consistency in the
roadway design and operational characteristics.
 Alignment and cross-section design have significant safety effects, especially on rural two-
lane highways. Safety issues tend to focus on sharp horizontal curves, crest vertical
curves that limit sight distance to major hazards, and narrow lanes and shoulders.
 Sight distance is a fundamental need of drivers to safely travel along the highway,
including sight distance ahead, across intersections, at railroad grade crossings, and
within passing zones. Because sight obstructions are a pervasive condition on streets
and highways, careful attention is needed to clear obstructions, to place compensating
traffic control devices, or to use other countermeasures. A greater sensitivity to not

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 only the traffic safety consequences
of sight obstructions, but also the
long-term safety benefits of relatively
simple, inexpensive countermeasures
could have a significant impact on
traffic safety.
 Intersection safety is a function of
location, adjacent land use, and
functional classification of the
intersecting streets. Improvements to
enhance safety include the categories
of geometric design, traffic control
devices, and signal operations as well
as enforcement and education of drivers and pedestrians.
 Roadsides that are flat and unobstructed provide drivers the best opportunity to recover
control of their vehicle after they leave the traveled way. Desirably, roadside slopes
should be 1V:4H or flatter, and fixed objects and other hazards should be removed
from within the clear zone.
 Traffic signing and pavement marking improvements have one of the highest benefit/cost
ratios of any highway safety treatment. In particular, larger signs, larger sign legends,
and improved retroreflectivity of signs for nighttime visibility aid all drivers, but
especially older drivers.
 Traffic signals are effective in reducing certain types of intersection crashes. Appropriate
timing of phase change intervals and pedestrian clearance intervals, and appropriate
placement of detectors to provide decision zone protection are critical to improved
safety.
 Pavement surface conditions, including slippery pavements, rutting, inadequate drainage,
and inadequate cross-slope, can lead to crashes, especially in wet weather.

The highway should offer no surprises to the driver in terms of either geometrics or traffic
controls. The violation of driver expectancies, the result of such a discontinuity of the highway
environment, is undoubtedly a large factor in the chain of events that leads to many crashes,
and thus a situation to be avoided.

ROAD SAFETY MANAGEMENT

PROCESS

An effective road safety management

process consists of the following elements:

 Collect and maintain crash database

 Network screening
 Diagnosis of sites and situations
 Select countermeasures
 Economic appraisal

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  Prioritize safety improvement projects
 Safety effectiveness evaluate of
treatments

Crash Database
Data used in safety studies, to a large extent,
is recorded by police officers on report
forms or electronic devices soon after a crash
has occurred. Important information
includes crash location, type, severity,
environmental conditions, and driver
actions. It must be recognized that this data
collection is subject to a number of potential
weaknesses that must be considered when
using the data:
 Not all crashes are reported to the
police, especially those that involve
only property damage
 Different jurisdictions may have significantly different reporting thresholds, and such
thresholds may change over time making comparisons difficult
 There can be inaccuracies in reported data due to simple typographical errors, location
estimates, and incomplete reporting.

There are also inherent limitations to crash data due to natural variations in crash occurrence
from year to year. If not considered and accounted for, these limitations may introduce bias
into safety analyses. Because crashes are random events, crash frequencies naturally fluctuate
over time at any given site. This randomness means that short-term crash frequencies alone
are not a reliable estimator of long-term crash frequency. Short-term crash frequency may vary
considerably from the long-term average crash frequency. It is difficult to know whether
changes in observed crash frequency are due to changes in site conditions or are due to natural
fluctuations. When a period with comparatively high crash frequency is observed, it is
statistically probable that the following period will have a comparatively low crash frequency.
This tendency is known as regression-to-the-mean. If not accounted for, regression-to-the-mean
bias can result in the over-estimation (or under-estimation) of the effectiveness of a safety
treatment. The effect of regression-to-the-mean can be overcome by using long-term average
crash frequency in selecting sites for improvement and in evaluating effectiveness of
improvements. However, this can only be done if there are no changes at the site (e.g.,
geometrics, traffic control, traffic volumes, roadside development) during the long-term
period. This is often not the case.

Finally, it must be recognized that relying on data about past crashes, as a method of
identifying sites for safety improvements, is an inherently reactive approach. Because of the
limitations in the use of crash data, increasingly, agencies are using a more proactive approach
to road safety, using the analytic tools of the Highway Safety Manual.

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Network Screening
Various techniques are available for
identifying spot locations or roadway
segments that have experienced a higher-
than-expected frequency, rate, or severity of
crash occurrence. A preliminary listing of
problem locations may be based on actual
crash experience or on the potential for
crashes. For each location that has been
identified as having an existing or potential
safety problem, the severity of that problem
must be quantified. In this manner, locations
can be compared in terms of relative hazard,
and efforts to identify causes and candidate
solutions concentrated on the more serious problems. The identification of hazardous
locations and features is an important process. These may include spot locations (such as a
railroad grade crossing or a narrow bridge); intersections; roadway sections (perhaps of
considerable length); or a street system (such as a neighborhood street system where crashes
at individual intersections may be infrequent, but on an aggregated basis, a safety problem
emerges).

In some cases, it is desirable to give more emphasis to locations that have experienced greater
than expected crash severity. However, fatal crashes should not be over-emphasized in the
process of identifying high-hazard locations. In most cases, the difference between a fatal or
an injury or a property-damage-only crash is simply a matter of chance.

Hazardous highway locations may or may not be high-crash locations. Many locations with
narrow bridges, slick pavements, numerous rigid roadside obstacles, etc., have a high crash
potential but may not yet have a history of high-crash occurrence. Early warning analysis should
be conducted routinely to identify locations that have a sudden increase in crashes or crash
potential. Sudden increases in crash potential may be noticed by observing a rash of skid marks,
erratic maneuvers, dents in guardrail, or other such indicators at a location.

Various techniques are available to identify spot locations or roadway sections that have
experienced a higher than expected
frequency or rate of crash occurrence. The
appropriate technique depends on availability
of data (e.g., traffic volumes), size and
complexity of roadway system, and technical
sophistication of the analyst and decision-
maker. The goal of any technique used is to
select those locations most in need of safety
improvements.

 Crash frequency is the simplest

technique for identifying high hazard
locations. Intersections or roadway

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 segments of uniform lengths are simply ranked in order of the number of crashes that
occurred during a given time period. This technique requires data from crash reports.
Although simple to perform, reliance on crash frequency tends to bias the
identification process in favor of higher volume roadway sections and intersections.
As a result, it may ignore severe safety problems on low-volume roads or intersections.
The identification process may be improved by categorizing roadway segments and
intersections according to functional classification (e.g., freeway, arterial, collector,
local), and developing separate rankings for each category.

 Crash rates are normally considered better indicators of risk than crash frequencies
alone, because they account for differences in traffic volumes, and hence exposure.
Crash rates for roadway segments are normally expressed in terms of crashes per 100
million vehicle-miles (100 million
vehicle-kilometers) of travel
(100MVM or 100MVK), using the
following equation:

C  100,000,000
R SEC 
365  T  V  L

where Rsec = crash rate for the

roadway section
C = number of reported
crashes
T = time period of the
analysis (years)
V = annual average daily traffic volume (veh/day)
L = length of the segment (mi or km)

Crash rates for spots (such as

intersections) are normally expressed
in terms of crashes per million
entering vehicles (MEV), using the
following equation:

C  1,000,000
R SPOT 
365  T  V

where Rspot = crash rate for the spot

C = number of reported
crashes
T = time period of the analysis (years)
V = annual average daily traffic volume entering the spot (veh/day)

Ranking locations by crash rates requires traffic volume data for all roadway segments
or spots. Because it accounts for exposure to potential crashes, it is generally superior
to crash frequency as a means of identifying high hazard locations. However, it may

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 result in a bias in favor of low-volume locations that have relatively few crashes, but a
high crash rate. Although such a location may be of concern, it may offer less overall
benefit in terms of crashes reduced when compared with a higher volume location
with more numbers of crashes (and hence more crashes that could be reduced.

 Number-rate methods of ranking high

hazard locations attempt to correct
the biases of the crash frequency and
crash rate methods. First, all spot
locations or roadway segments are
ranked by crash frequency, and those
with less than a certain number of
crashes removed from further
consideration. The minimum crash
frequency criteria may be established
at a level that reduces the group of
remaining locations to a workable
size. Then the remaining locations
are re-ranked using the crash rate. Finally, locations with less than a certain crash rate
are removed from further consideration. The remaining locations are assured of
having a minimum crash frequency and crash rate.

 Equivalent property damage only (EPDO)

rates adjust the high hazard
identification process to give greater
weight to injury and fatal crashes.
This technique compares the relative
importance of crashes that result in
only property damage with that of
injury and fatal crashes. Weighting
factors must be developed which
reflect the relative importance to
society of crashes of different
severities. For example, one agency
uses a weighting factor of 12 for fatal
crashes and five for injury crashes. The number of fatal and injury crashes are
multiplied by the weighting factors, and these “equivalent property damage only”
crashes added to the actual number of property damage crashes. Then an EPDO rate
can be calculated similar to normal crash rates for intersections or roadway segments.

Establishing weighting factors is difficult. Care should be taken so that fatal and/or
injury crashes are not weighted too heavily, which can lead to biases in the ranking of
high hazard locations by over-emphasizing or locations with a few severe crashes.

 Rate quality control method applies statistical concepts to avoid pitfalls associated with
random variation in crash frequency. Because crashes are relatively rare events, the
actual number of crashes at a given location may vary considerably from year to year.

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 The rate quality control method
determines whether the actual crash
rate varies from the average of
similar locations more than could be
attributed to pure chance. The
critical crash rate is calculated for
each location as follows:

Ra 1
Rc  Ra  K 
V 2V

where: Rc = critical crash rate per

100 MVM (or 100MVK) or per MEV
Ra = average crash rate for locations with characteristics similar to the subject
location
K = constant corresponding to the level of confidence in the findings of the
analysis
V = volume of traffic at subject location (same units as used for crash rates)

If the actual crash rate for a location is greater than the critical rate, then the location
is considered hazardous. In other words, the crash rate is significantly higher than the
average rate for similar locations. K values of 1.282, 1.645, and 2.327 correspond to
levels of confidence of 90, 95, and 99 percent, respectively. The lower the value of K,
the greater the chance that a location will be identified as hazardous when it really is
not.

 Empirical Bayes methods use the

concept of a conditional probability,
which is the probability that
something is true given the
knowledge that something else has
occurred. In dealing with crashes,
analysts want to know the probability
that a location is truly hazardous
given the crash history, traffic
volumes, and physical characteristics
of the location. The Bayesian
procedure provides a method to
combine the crash frequency
predicted by a crash prediction model (NP) with the crash frequency from site-specific
crash history data (NA). The expected crash frequency considering both the predicted
and observed crash frequencies is computed as:

EP = w(NP) + (1-w)NA

Where EP = Expected crash frequency

NP = Number of crashes predicted by a crash prediction model for

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 a specified period of time
NA = Number of crashes observed during a specified period of time
w = Weighting factor which determines the weight to be placed on
the crash frequency predicted by the crash prediction model

At railroad grade crossings, past crash history is often a poor indicator of the true
hazardousness of a given location because crashes tend to be very rare and random.
The use of a crash prediction model, along with actual crash data, can improve the
ability to correctly identify high-hazard locations. The expected crash frequency (EP)
calculated using Bayesian methods can be used directly to rank locations for safety
investigation.

 Potential for safety improvement (PSI) is

another method that can be used as
a criteria for identifying high-hazard
locations. PSI is the difference
between a location’s actual crash
frequency and the expected crash
frequency for all locations with
similar classification (NP). The
locations with the largest potential
safety improvement (crash
reduction) would be ranked highest.
The expected crash frequency for
similar locations can be estimated
using Bayesian methods.

 Expected value analysis is intended to

identify abnormal crash patterns. The
method uses a statistical test to
determine whether a crash pattern at
a location is significantly higher than
the same crash pattern at similar
locations within the jurisdiction. For
example, this method may be used to
identify intersections where the
frequency of left turn crashes is
significantly greater than the number
of left turn crashes at similar
intersections. Patterns to be analyzed
may be based on vehicle maneuvers (e.g., left turn, rear-end, run-off-the-road, etc.),
time-related conditions (e.g., day vs. night, weekday vs. weekend, seasonal, etc.),
weather conditions (e.g., wet vs. dry pavement), or severity (PDO, injury, or fatal).

 Highway Safety Manual (HSM) Predictive Method has been developed due to the
recognition of the need for standardized, quantitative methods for crash estimation
and crash evaluations that address the limitations of use of data on past crashes. The

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HSM provides quantitative methods
to reliably estimate expected average
crash frequencies and severities at a
site, facility, or roadway network. The
predictive method allows for crash
estimation in situations where no
crash data are available. Where crash
data are available, the Empirical Bayes
method is used to apply a weighting
factor is to combine the estimation
from the HSM model with observed
crash frequency.

The HSM predictive models vary by

facility type, but all have the same
basic elements:
 Safety Performance
Functions (SPFs)--statistical
“base” models are used to
estimate the average crash
frequency for a facility type
(e.g., two-lane rural highway,
urban and suburban arterials)
with specified base conditions
 Crash Modification Factors
(CMFs)--CMFs are the ratio
of the effectiveness of one
condition in comparison to
another condition (e.g., 12-ft
[3.6 m] lane width compared
to 10-ft [3.0 m] lane width).
CMFs are multiplied with the
crash frequency predicted by
the SPF to account for the
difference between site
conditions and specified base
conditions
 Calibration Factor C--multiplied with the crash frequency predicted by the SPF
to account for the differences between jurisdiction and time period for which
the predictive models were developed and the jurisdiction and time period to
which they are applied.

The prediction model to estimate the expected average crash frequency generally takes
the form:

𝑁𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐹 × (𝐶𝑀𝐹1 × 𝐶𝑀𝐹2 × … 𝐶𝑀𝐹𝑛 ) × 𝐶

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Where: Npredicted = predictive model estimate of crash frequency for a specific year on
the site type (crashes/year)
NSPF = predicted average crash frequency determined for base conditions for
the site type (crashes/year)
CMFn = Crash Modification Factor for local conditions for site type.
C = Calibration Factor to adjust for local conditions for site type

Safety Performance Functions are

regression equations that estimate
the average crash frequency for a
specific site type, with specified base
conditions, as a function of annual
average daily traffic and segment
length. Base conditions typically
include conditions such as lane and
shoulder width, presence of lighting,
presence of turn lanes, etc. For
example, the SPF for rural two-lane
highways is:

𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑠 = (𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇 × 𝐿) × (365) × 10−6 × 𝑒 −0.4865

Where: NSPFrs = estimate of predicted

average crash frequency for SPF base
conditions for a rural two-lane
highway segment (crashes/year)
AADT = average annual daily traffic
volume on highway segment
(veh/day)
L = length of highway segment (mi
or km)

Crash Modification Factors

represent the relative change in crash
frequency due to a change in one
specific condition (e.g., lane width,
shoulder width, curve radius). A
CMF of 1.00 indicates that no change
in crash frequency is expected. A
CMF less than 1.00 indicates that the
proposed change will result in a
reduced crash frequency. A CMF
greater than 1.00 indicates that the
change will result in increased crash
frequency. Sometimes Crash
Modification Factors are confused
with Crash Reduction Factors.

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When several types of
improvements are included in a
project, the CMFs for the various
improvements must be combined by
multiplying them together.

Crash frequencies, even for

nominally similar roadway segments
or intersections, may vary widely
from one jurisdiction to another.
Such differences may result from
differences in weather or terrain,
crash reporting practices, and driver
population. The Calibration factor
adjusts the SPF to reflect the
differing crash frequencies from one
state to another or one geographic
region to another within a state.

Estimation of expected average

crash frequency using only observed
crash frequency or only using the
HSM statistical predictive models
may result in a reasonable estimate of
crash frequency. However, the
statistical reliability (probability that
the estimate is correct) is improved
by combining observed crash
frequency with the estimate from the
predictive model. The HSM uses an
Empirical Bayes method to combine
the two estimates together. A
weighting factor is calculated that is
dependent on the variance of the
SPF and is not dependent on the
validity of the observed data. The
Empirical Bayes method is only
applicable when both predicted and
observed crash frequencies are available, as follows:

𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑤 × 𝑁𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + (1 − 𝑤) × 𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑

Where: Nexpected = expected average crash frequency for study period

w = weighting factor
Npredicted = predicted average crash frequency using an SPF
Nobserved = observed average crash frequency

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  Other non-crash indicators of high
hazard locations may be used to
identify safety problems in the
highway system, including:
o Pavement skid testing
o Evidence of frequent evasive
actions or unreported
crashes (e.g., skid marks,
marks on longitudinal
barriers, scars on roadside
trees or poles, etc.
o Capacity deficiencies
o Number of access points
o Traffic conflicts analysis

Diagnosis of Sites and Situations

When a manageable number of locations
have been identified by a network screening
method, the next step is an analysis of crash
patterns. If a repeated pattern (or patterns) of
crash occurrence can be identified, this may
indicate a causal relationship between a
design or traffic operational characteristic of
the site and the crashes which are occurring.

The more crashes that can be included in this

analysis, generally the easier it is to identify a
pattern, if one exists. At least three years of
crash data are desirable, especially if there are
relatively few crashes each year. If there are a significant number of crashes at a location, a
shorter data collection period may be used. If data are available, additional years of data should
be analyzed as long as no significant design or traffic operational changes have occurred at the
site.

One of the most useful crash analyses is a

crash summary by type. This serves as a
major indicator of possible design or traffic
operational factors that are contributing to
crashes. Crash types are typically categorized
as:
 Left-turn, head-on
 Right-angle
 Rear-end
 Sideswipe
 Pedestrian
 Bicycle

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  Run-off-the-road
 Fixed object
 Head-on
 Parked vehicle
 Animal
 Other

Crashes may also be summarized by contributing environmental conditions, such as:

 Rain
 Snow/ice
 Fog
 Darkness
 Construction

The crash types are often summarized on a

collision diagram. A collision diagram is a
schematic drawing that uses symbols to
represent each crash type. The collision
diagram should show:
 Direction of movement and
intended maneuvers prior to impact
for each vehicle or pedestrian
involved in the crash
 Non-contact vehicles that were
involved in the chain of events that
led to the crash, but were not
contacted by any other vehicle
 Date, day of week, and time of day of
crash
 Unusual conditions such as adverse
weather, construction, pavement
conditions, etc.

All crashes related to the site (but only

crashes related to the site) should be included
in the crash summary and/or collision
diagram. In some cases, a crash that occurred
at a distance remote from the site may be
site-related (e.g., a rear-end collision that occurred several hundred feet upstream of a
congested intersection). In other cases, a collision that occurred near the site might not be site-
related because it was a random event unrelated to site design or operational conditions (e.g.,
an animal collision at an intersection).

In many cases, the only source of information on intended maneuvers and non-contact
vehicles is in the narrative or diagram portion of a police crash report form. Unless a copy of
the original report form can be accessed during the preparation of the collision diagram, this

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information may be lost, and the pattern shown on the collision diagram may provide
misleading information.

Additional summaries of crash characteristics may also be useful in identifying site deficiencies
and selecting appropriate countermeasures. These include:
 Crash severity
 Contributing circumstances
 Environmental conditions
 Time period

It is also important to understand the physical

characteristics at the site. The condition diagram
is a scale drawing, as-built plan, or aerial
photograph of the location showing all
roadway features, including roadway
dimensions, abutting land uses, traffic control
devices and their location, geometric features
such as sight distance restrictions, and other
pertinent information.

Select Countermeasures
After one or more patterns of crashes have
been identified at a study location, the next
step is the generation of a list of potential
countermeasures.

Desirably, a range of alternative

countermeasures should be considered for
any study location. This may include relatively
high-cost to relatively low-cost treatments.
These alternative countermeasures could
potentially be implemented individually or in
combination with one another. In any such
analysis, the do-nothing alternative should
always be considered.

Potential countermeasures may be identified

through:
 Detailed investigations of crashes to
identify causal factors
 Reviews of site plans and condition
diagrams
 Site inspections
 Other traffic studies, such as spot
speeds, conflicts analysis, and
intersection sight distance studies

18
  The practices and previous experiences of the agency

Following is a list of crash patterns, their probable causes, and possible countermeasures:

Right-angle crashes at a two-way, STOP-controlled intersection:

Potential Causal Factor Possible Countermeasure

Restricted sight distance
Excessive speed
Inadequate roadway lighting
Inadequate advance warning signs
Large traffic volume
Inadequate traffic control devices
Remove sight obstruction
Restrict parking near intersection
Provide all-way stop of signal
Install/improve warning sign
Install stop line closer to cross road
Install/improve warning sign
Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Install rumble strips
Improve lighting
Install or improve warning sign
Provide traffic signal
Reroute traffic
Upgrade traffic control devices
Increase enforcement

Left-turn crashes at a two-way, stop-controlled intersection:

Potential Causal Factor Possible Countermeasure

Large turn volume Create one-way street
Add left-turn lane
Prohibit left turn
Reroute left-turn traffic
Provide traffic signal with left-turn phase
Restricted sight distance Remove sight obstruction
Provide left-turn lane
Prohibit left-turn
Provide traffic signal with protected only left
turn phase
Excessive speed Reduce speed limit
Improve enforcement

19
Right-angle crashes at signalized intersection:
Potential Causal Factor
Restricted sight distance
Excessive speed
Inadequate roadway lighting
Poor visibility of traffic signal
Inadequate signal timing
Inadequate advance warning signs
Large traffic volume
Possible Countermeasure
Remove sight obstruction
Install/improve warning sign
Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Adjust phase change interval
Install rumble strips
Improve lighting
Install or improve warning sign
Install overhead signal heads
Install 12” signal lenses
Install visors
Install back plates
Relocate/add signal heads
Retime signal
Adjust phase change interval
Provide red clearance interval
Provide progression
Provide signal actuation with dilemma zone
protection
Install/improve warning sign
Add lane(s)
Retime signal
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Rear-end crashes at signalized intersection:

Potential Causal Factor Possible Countermeasure

Large turning volume Provide left-turn phase
Prohibit turns
Provide turn lane
Increase corner radius for right turns
Slippery pavement Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Overlay pavement
Provide adequate drainage
Groove pavement
Provide “Slippery When Wet” sign
Inadequate roadway lighting Improve lighting
Crossing pedestrians Install/improve crosswalk devices
Provide pedestrian signal indications
Poor visibility of traffic signal Install or improve warning sign
Install overhead signal heads
Install 12” signal lenses
Install visors
Install back plates
Relocate/add signal heads
Inadequate signal timing Adjust phase-change interval
Provide red-clearance interval
Provide progression
Provide signal actuation with dilemma zone
protection
Unwarranted signal Remove signal

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Run-off-the-road crashes on a section of two-lane, rural highway:

Potential Causal Factor Possible Countermeasure

Excessive speed Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Slippery pavement Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Overlay pavement
Provide adequate drainage
Groove pavement
Provide “Slippery When Wet” sign
Inadequate roadway lighting Improve lighting
Poor visibility of curve warning sign Increase sign size
Inadequate roadway design Widen lane(s)
Realign curve
Install guardrail
Inadequate delineation Install/improve warning sign
Install/improve pavement markings
Install/improve delineation
Inadequate shoulder Upgrade shoulder
Inadequate pavement maintenance Repair road surface

Head-on crashes on a section of two-lane, rural highway:

Potential Causal Factor Possible Countermeasure

Excessive speed Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Install median barrier
Inadequate/improper pavement markings Install/improve pavement markings
Inadequate roadway design Widen lane(s)
Inadequate shoulder Upgrade shoulder
Inadequate pavement maintenance Repair road surface

Motor vehicle striking side of train at a highway-railroad grade crossing:

Potential Causal Factor Possible Countermeasure

Restricted sight distance
Excessive speed
Slippery pavement
Poor visibility of traffic control devices
Inadequate pavement markings
Remove sight obstruction
Install/improve warning sign
Provide STOP sign
Reduce grade on approach
Install gate and/or flashers
Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Improve skid resistance
Increase sign size
Install roadway lighting
Install/improve pavement markings

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Motor vehicle struck by train at a highway-railroad grade crossing:

Potential Causal Factor Possible Countermeasure

Restricted sight distance
Excessive speed
Slippery pavement
Poor visibility of traffic control devices
Inadequate pavement markings
Improper traffic signal preemption timing
Improper railroad signal or gate warning time Retime railroad warning time
Rough crossing surface
Sharp crossing angle
Remove sight obstruction
Install/improve warning sign
Provide STOP sign
Install gate and/or flashers
Reduce speed limit with enforcement
Improve skid resistance
Increase sign size
Install/improve pavement markings
Retime signal
Improve crossing surface
Realign roadway at crossing

Economic Appraisal
The next step in the Road Safety
Management Process involves consideration
of the cost-effectiveness of alternative
improvements, comparing relevant costs of
implementation with benefits in terms of a
reduction in crash frequency and/or severity.

Quantifying the impacts of each alternative

countermeasure in monetary terms can be
quite difficult. This requires an estimate of
the effectiveness of various improvements in
reducing crashes. Crash reduction factors are
contained in the Highway Safety Manual, the
FHWA Crash Modification Clearinghouse and
other publications. These crash reduction
factors estimate the percentage of crashes
that can be reduced or avoided by
implementing various improvements. Such
data must be used cautiously, because
countermeasure applications vary greatly and
published data usually apply to only
“average” conditions. In addition, when two
or more countermeasures are implemented
together, the expected crash reduction
cannot be taken as the sum of the reduction
for each countermeasure taken individually.

Another issue that is not always clearly addressed when developing and using crash reduction
factors is: “What would have happened to crash frequency or severity if no improvement had

23
been made?” Locations identified as high-
hazard usually have crash rates that may be
two or three times the average crash rate for
similar locations. Some of this high crash
record may be due, in part, to chance. For
example, an intersection having four crashes
three years ago, three crashes two years ago,
and 11 crashes last year may tend to have
fewer than 11 crashes next year, regardless of
whether there was a countermeasure applied.
This tendency is called regression-to-the-mean as
previously discussed. The use of two or three
years of “before” data in identifying and
analyzing high-hazard locations can assist in avoiding problems with regression to the mean.
However, it remains unknown to what extent some of the compiled crash reduction factors
in published tables may be inflated by this effect.

Another significant difficulty in economic evaluation of proposed improvements is in valuing

crashes that can be avoided by the countermeasure(s). Various agencies have valued crashes
avoided at significantly different levels. Analysts should carefully consider the underlying
assumptions behind crash values before using them. It should be recognized that higher values
placed on avoided crashes would tend to justify more expensive countermeasures.

In evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a

proposed improvement, it may be necessary
to compare the value of the initial costs of
construction or right-of-way acquisition
against the future value of benefits of crash
reduction that may accrue over a period of
many years into the future. There may also
be future ongoing costs of operation and
maintenance of the improvement that need
to be considered in the evaluation. Future
costs and benefits do not have the same
value as current costs and benefits, and must
be discounted based on the time value of
money. The present worth of some future cost or benefit is:

F
P
(1  i)n

The present worth of a series of future amounts is:

(1  i)n  1
P  A
i(1  i)n

24
Where P = Present worth of future costs or benefits

F = A single future cost or benefit

A = Annual amount of a series of future costs or benefits
n = Number of years into the future
i = Annual interest rate representing time value of money

Alternative safety improvement projects that have a benefit/cost ratio (lifetime benefits
divided by lifetime costs) greater than 1.0 or a positive net present worth (lifetime benefits
minus lifetime costs) may be considered economically worth implementing. In performing
such economic analyses, it should always be remembered that some projects may involve
significant costs that cannot be readily measured in dollar value, such as environmental and
social impacts. Such impacts must be carried through the evaluation process and explicitly
considered in deciding which projects to go forward with.

Prioritize Projects
The next question that must be addressed is
which projects should be implemented in
order to use limited safety resources as
efficiently as possible, and in what order of
priority? A simple ranking of alternative
projects according to any of the following
may sometimes be appropriate:
 Net present worth
 Project costs
 Monetary value of project benefits
 Total number of crashes avoided

Incremental benefit/cost analysis is more sophisticated, and generally will result in more
efficient allocation of resources.

Once safety improvement projects have been selected for implementation, the projects should
move forward as quickly as feasible. Any delay in implementation will potentially cost
additional crashes. Locations that are not chosen for implementation of safety improvement
projects, or where the implementation of the desired improvement projects must be delayed,
should be examined to determine if interim
improvements are appropriate to improve
safety pending the implementation of the
desired improvement.

Safety Effectiveness Evaluation of

Implemented Improvements
A program of countermeasure evaluation is
essential for intelligent future
countermeasure selection. Such an
evaluation determines the actual
effectiveness of any improvements after they

25
have been put into place. The evaluation results, whether positive, negative, or neutral, should
be documented to improve the knowledge base to improve future decisions.

Such evaluations are typically “before-and-after” evaluations. In order to conduct such a study,
it is essential that the study be designed prior to implementing the improvement so that
adequate “before” data can be collected.

As currently conducted by many practitioners, before and after studies often suffer from two
serious flaws and provide incorrect or misleading results. These flaws are:
 Failure to control for the effects of changing conditions during the lengthy time
periods required to amass before and after crash statistics. For example, changes in
vehicle design, driver education or enforcement campaigns, etc. may result in changes
in crash frequency even if no improvements were made in the roadway.
 Failure to correct for regression-to-the-mean. Regression to the mean occurs when
locations with high crash frequencies during one time period experience more normal
frequencies during the next time period even if no causative factor changes.

The best way control for changing conditions is to use randomly selected control sites where
crash data are collected, but no changes are made. The Empirical Bayes method can be used
to control for regression-to-the-mean bias. Instead of a set of control sites, the SPF developed
for the treatment site(s) is used to predict crash frequency at the treatment site(s) in the after
period had the treatment not been applied.

ROAD SAFETY AUDITS

The Road Safety Audit (RSA) is a proactive

approach that can be applied before a crash
history indicates a problem exists. A road
safety audit is defined as “a formal safety
performance examination of an existing or
future road or intersection by an
independent audit team.” The key elements
of this definition are:
 It is a formal examination with a
structured process and not a cursory
review;
 It is conducted independently by
professionals who are not currently involved in the planning, design, construction, or
operation of the project;
 It is completed by a team of qualified professionals representing appropriate
disciplines; and
 It focuses solely on safety issues.

The RSA is not:

 a means to rate or rank a project.

26
  a check of compliance with standards.
 a redesign of a project.
 a part of the crash investigation process.

Stages of a Road Safety Audit

RSA’s can be performed at one or more
stages of a roadway project:
 Planning or feasibility
 Preliminary design
 Final design
 Pre-opening or during construction
 On an existing roadway

RSA’s can have the greatest impact when

they are early in the design process when the
range of redesign options is the greatest. The
best advice is to conduct an audit as early as possible to be integrated with the agencies existing
safety program.

Steps in conducting a Road Safety Audit

The following are the steps in the formal
process of performing a road safety audit.
 Select the team. The road safety audit
team should be composed of people
who are independent of the project
and bring expertise from diverse
backgrounds, experiences, and
knowledge. There is no set number
of people on the team, but teams of
3 to 5 people seem to be ideal. Core
skills include geometric design,
traffic engineering, and safety. Other
disciplines may include
enforcement, planning, human factors, and pedestrian/bicycle specialists.
 Provide the background information. The project designer or client (the
person/organization who is commissioning the audit) provides information to the
team. This may include plans, design reports, traffic volume data, and crash histories
if available.
 Hold a commencement meeting. At this meeting the audit team and the designer/client meet
to discuss the purpose of the audit and any other issues or concerns from both sides.
 Assessing the documents. The audit team meets to review all the documents and
information provided. At this meeting they review the checklist or prompt lists they
will take to the field when doing a site inspection.
 Inspecting the Site. The team makes a site visit to inspect the site and identify all potential
safety issues. The inspection should consider all potential users: not just motorists but
also pedestrians, bicyclists, and others. A daytime visit is essential but a subsequent

27
 nighttime visit should be part of the field inspection process. The team should use
checklists or prompt lists to make sure all safety issues are addressed. However, these
lists should only be used to help identify issues. The primary value of the audit is the
collected expert evaluations of the personal on the audit team.
 Write the audit report. The report should be a short, concise summary of the findings of
the audit team. It needn’t be any longer than 2 to 3 pages, except for large-scale
projects. The report should contain the following: purpose of the audit, names of the
audit team, resources used by the audit team, and identification of safety issues. Safety
issues may be listed as findings or recommendations, depending on the desires of the
designer/client. It is becoming common practice in the U.S. to hold a meeting with
the designer/client prior to writing the report. The purpose of this meeting is not to
discuss what is in the report, but to establish an atmosphere of cooperation and to
assure that the audit is addressing pertinent issues.
 Hold a completion meeting. The audit
team presents its report at a formal
meeting to the designer/client. This
should be viewed as an opportunity
to disagree with the findings of the
audit.
 Write a response to the audit. It is the
responsibility of the designer/client
to write a formal response to the
audit report. This response should
address each and every audit
finding/recommendation and
should identify which
recommendations are fully accepted, which are partially accepted, and which are
rejected. Reasons for rejection should be given. Solutions or changes that will be
implemented should also be listed.
 Implement of solutions. The designer/client is responsible for implementing the changes
agreed upon in their report responding to the audit findings.
 Close the loop. The designer/client should use the results of the audit process to guide
future projects. The experiences of the audit and the safety findings should be shared
with others in the organization to improve future designs.

Costs and benefits

The costs of an audit are reasonable, ranging
from around $1,000 to $10,000 for large-
scale projects. The audit itself can be
completed in one day, with an additional
day’s time for each team member to review
materials and to prepare the final report.

The following benefits have been observed

as a result of using road safety audits:
 Safer new highways through crash

28
 prevention and severity reduction
 Reduction of life-cycle costs of road improvements
 Reduced need to modify newly constructed projects
 Better understanding and documentation of road safety engineering
 Eventual safety improvements to design standards and procedures
 More explicit consideration of the safety needs of vulnerable road user
 Encouragement of a “culture” of road safety

SAFETY EMPHASIS AREAS

Pedestrian Safety
In a recent year, there were an estimated
4,749 pedestrian fatalities representing
approximately 12% of all motor-vehicle fatal
crashes. Crash involvement rates (crashes
per 100,000 population) are highest for the
five- to fifteen-year-old age group. Fatality
rates (fatalities per 100,000 population) are
highest for the age group 70 and above.
Forty-six percent of the crashes resulting in
pedestrian fatalities involved either a driver
or a pedestrian with a BAC of 0.08 or greater.
Thirty-four percent of pedestrians killed had a BAC of 0.08 or greater. Approximately one-
half of all pedestrian fatalities occurred during hours of darkness.

An analysis of the types of pedestrian crashes

is important to selecting appropriate safety
countermeasures. The most frequent types
of crashes are:
 Dart-out first half, where the
pedestrian is struck in the first half of
the street that he or she is crossing
(24 percent)
 Intersection dash (13 percent)
 Dart-out second half (10 percent)
 Mid-block dart (8 percent)
 Turning vehicle crash (5 percent)

Effective pedestrian safety programs require a comprehensive approach that includes

engineering, enforcement, and education. A focus on human factors issues is critical, given the
statistics that show high crash rates for children and the elderly. The following
countermeasures have proven to be effective in reducing pedestrian crashes. The selection of

29
the specific countermeasure should be based
on an analysis of the type of pedestrian
crashes and observed pedestrian and vehicle
behavior.
 Sidewalks and walkways provide an area
for pedestrians to walk separated
from vehicle flows. Sidewalks and
walkways should be clear of
obstructions.
 ADA measures insure that provisions
are made for persons with
disabilities.
 Marked crosswalks serve as a warning
for motorists and indicate appropriate crossing locations to pedestrians.
 Roadway lighting can be used to illuminate a length of roadway or at specific crosswalk
locations
 Pedestrian underpasses/overpasses can be employed at locations with high pedestrian and
vehicle volumes.
 Transit stops should be located with consideration of pedestrian behavior and the
placement of crosswalks.
 Roadway design treatments that can be used to enhance pedestrian safety. These include:
modification of right-turn radii, provision of medians for pedestrian refuge, and the
use of islands.
 Traffic calming devices include bulbouts or chokers to narrow intersection widths, speed
humps, chicanes, and whole street narrowing.
 Traffic signal modifications include timing plans that provide adequate phasing to
accommodate pedestrian movements and the use of supplemental treatements, such
as countdown pedestrian signals, to improve safety.

Intersection Safety
Intersection crashes account for more than
45 percent of all reported crashes in the U.S.,
and 21 percent of fatalities. In a recent year,
9,213 Americans lost their lives as a result of
intersection-related crashes, a rate of more
than one every hour.

Selecting safety treatments at intersections

requires consideration of many factors
including roadway alignment, functional
classification, the type and amount of traffic
(motor vehicle, pedestrians, and bicycles),
geometric design elements, traffic control devices, and abutting land use.

The following have been identified as promising strategies at unsignalized intersections.

30
  Access management – close or relocate driveways or implement turn restrictions.
 Geometric design improvements – provide left or right turn lanes, offset left turn lanes,
restrict or eliminate turns by channelization, realign intersection legs, convert
intersections to roundabouts, or improve pedestrian and bicycle facilities.
 Improve intersection sight distance – provide clear sight triangles at corners and at medians,
eliminate parking.
 Use additional traffic control devices – provide larger signs, use advanced warning signs, use
supplemental STOP signs, provide additional pavement markings (such as turn path
markings), install flashing beacons.

The following have been identified as promising strategies at signalized intersections.

 Traffic signal improvements – improve signal visibility with additional signal faces or
relocation of signal heads, use multiphase signal operation, optimize phase change
intervals, coordinate signals along a route, or remove unwarranted signals.
 Access management – close or relocate driveways or implement turn restrictions, restrict
cross-median access near intersections.
 Geometric design improvements – provide left or right turn lanes, offset left turn lanes,
restrict or eliminate turns by channelization, realign intersection legs, convert
intersections to roundabouts, improve pedestrian and bicycle facilities.
 Use additional traffic control devices – provide advanced warning signs, provide additional
pavement markings such as turn path markings.
 Implement automated enforcement of red light running cameras.

Roadside Safety
Approximately thirty percent of all highway
fatalities are the result of single-vehicle run-
off-the road crashes. For two-lane rural
roads, about one-half of all fatalities are run-
off-the-road crashes. The three types of
fixed objects or roadside features most
frequently involved in fatal crashes are: trees
or shrubbery, culverts/ditches/curbs, and
utility poles. The forgiving roadside concept
allows for errant vehicles leaving the roadway
for whatever reason, and supports a roadside
designed such that the serious consequences
of the roadway departures are minimized.

Design options for treating roadside obstacles, in order of preference, are:

 Remove the obstacle.
 Redesign the obstacle so it can be safely traversed.
 Relocate the obstacle to a point where it is less likely to be struck.
 Reduce impact severity by using an appropriate breakaway device.

31
  Shield the obstacle with a
longitudinal traffic barrier designed
for redirection or use a crash
cushion.
 Delineate the obstacle if the above
alternatives are not appropriate.

The clear roadside concept, as described in

the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide is applied
to improve safety by providing an
unencumbered roadside recovery area that is
as wide as practical on a specific highway
section. When first introduced, a value of 30
feet (9m) from the edge of the traveled way
was assumed for all roadways, regardless of
roadway volume or speed. Within this clear
zone, objects are treated in accordance with
the design options stated above. However,
it became apparent that this distance
couldn’t be justified on low-volume, low-
speed roadways. Current procedures for
determining clear zone use a design process
that includes the following: backslope or
foreslope, design speed, horizontal
curvature, and roadway AADT.

Foreslopes of 1V:4H or flatter are considered recoverable. Foreslopes steeper than 1V:3H are
considered critical where a vehicle is likely to turn over.

For low-speed rural collector and local roads, a minimum clear zone width of 10 feet (3.0m)
should be provided.

LEGAL LIABILITY

The number of lawsuits filed and increasing

sizes of awards to plaintiffs are a source of
great concern among many personnel of
transportation agencies. If public officials
over-react to a fear of litigation, the result
may paralyze decision-making or cause
resources intended for safety improvements
to be diverted to inappropriate or ineffective
expenditures.

Most lawsuits arising out of highway crashes

allege “negligence” on the part of one or

32
more parties. Negligence consists of a failure to do what an ordinary, reasonably prudent
person would do under similar circumstances; a failure to use reasonable care in dealing with
others. The courts do not expect transportation officials to be perfect nor to make the best
possible decisions. It is simply asked that the decisions made and actions taken be reasonable
under the circumstances. In most cases, when a transportation agency is found negligent and
the plaintiff receives a large award, it is because someone in that agency has simply failed to
exercise ordinary, reasonable care.

When negligence is claimed, there are usually six principle issues which must be resolved in
court:
 Did damages occur? That damages have
occurred to an individual is often
obvious. Damaged property and
medical expenses are clearly
established. However, many other
types of damages, and their value, are
not necessarily as obvious. Loss of
future earnings, future medical care,
pain and suffering, etc. may also be
losses whose value is decided by the
court based on evidence presented in
trial.
 Did a potentially dangerous defect exist? The road is not guaranteed to be absolutely safe.
However, drivers should be able to expect that a highway is safe for usual and ordinary
traffic and road users who are exercising reasonable and prudent care, both in the
daytime and at night. Drivers are not required to anticipate extraordinary dangers,
impediments, or obstructions which they have not been warned of. Public highways
must be designed and maintained in a way that is reasonably safe for travel.
 Was the defect a “proximate” cause of the damages? The fact that a defective condition existed
does not necessarily mean that the transportation agency was negligent. The defect
must be found to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. Proximate cause is
defined as that which, in a natural, probable and continuous sequence, unbroken by
an intervening cause, results in the damages. The same result would not have occurred
without the proximate cause. There may be several proximate causes for any crash.
The “but for” test is used to determine proximate causes. If it can be said that but for
the presence of the condition or action the injuries would not have occurred, then the
condition or action is a proximate cause.
 Did the agency have knowledge of the defect? Negligence is predicated upon knowledge. A
reasonable person could not have corrected the defect unless its existence was known.
Once a transportation agency has received notice of a defect, a duty may arise to repair
the defect or at least to warn drivers until it can be repaired. The notice of a defect can
take place in two ways. First, it can be “actual” notice, such as a complaint call or
observation by agency personnel. Second, it can be “constructive” notice. That is, a
defect could exist long enough that a reasonable person should have found it.
 Was the transportation agency acting in a “discretionary” or “ministerial” role? Discretion means
the power and duty to make a choice among alternatives, requiring independent
judgment of available resources, impacts, and priorities. Planning, design, policy, and

33
 legislative actions are typically considered discretionary. In the absence of obvious
defects, some courts may provide rather broad protection for discretionary decisions.
The concept is that judges and juries should not substitute their judgment for those of
professionals in technical matters. Ministerial actions generally involve clearly defined
tasks performed with minimal leeway for personal judgment. These are typically
implementation actions such as maintenance or construction at the operational level.
Exposure to liability is often far greater for ministerial functions than it is for
discretionary functions.
 Did the plaintiff contribute to the crash through negligent behavior? Contributory negligence is
considered conduct which falls below the standard of care which individuals must
exercise for their own safety and which contributed to the injuries. This may include
behavior such as high speed, inattentiveness, use of alcohol or drugs, or failure to use
seat belts. In most states, the relative negligence of all parties is compared, and any
award to the plaintiff is reduced proportional to the plaintiff's relative contribution to
the crash. The concept of “joint and several liability” means that all defendants have a
joint responsibility to the plaintiff. If one defendant cannot afford to pay their share
of the award to the plaintiff, then the other defendants must increase their payments
to fully compensate the plaintiff.

Although transportation agencies may not be able to totally avoid lawsuits, the risk of such
legal actions can be managed. The heart of any risk management process should be an effective,
aggressive program of identifying hazardous highway locations and features, and treating those
locations with appropriate safety countermeasures.

SUMMARY

In summary, a traffic safety program should include the following elements:

 Ensure that local law enforcement personnel understand why crash data are needed,
that crash reports are correctly and completely filled out, and that the crash reports are
filed in a manner that facilitates cross classification and retrieval.
 Use objective criteria to identify conditions and locations that would benefit from
safety improvements.
 Identify patterns of crash types and causal relationships with roadway design and
operational characteristics.
 Develop alternative countermeasures for each site, and determine the most cost-
effective treatment.
 Develop a priority list among competing sites and use it to program corrective actions.
 Place warning devices at sites where more extensive corrective actions cannot be
immediately implemented, and/or take routine maintenance actions to improve safety
at the sites.
 Review projects after implementation.
 Periodically reassess and update the priority list and the need for the warning or minor
improvements at sites not yet completed.
 Keep good records of all portions of the program.

34
 REFERENCES

1. Traffic Engineering Handbook, Institute of Transportation Engineers, Washington, DC,

2016.

2. http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811659.pdf

3. Roadside Design Guide, American Association of State Highway and Transportation

Officials, Washington, DC, 2011.

4. Manual of Transportation Engineering Studies, Institute of Transportation Engineers,

Washington, DC, 2010.

5. Highway Safety Manual, Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC, 2010.

6. Homburger, W.S., et.al., Fundamentals of Traffic Engineering, 15th Edition, Institute of

Transportation Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2001.

7. Crash Modification Factor Clearinghouse, Federal Highway Administration,

cmfclearing-house.org

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