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NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)

DOCUMENT CODE NO. OF PAGES: 28


PLAN/PRJ/SUB UNIT PHASE DISCIPLANE DOCUMENT TYPE SERIAL NO. REV. NO. DATE
NIOEC 000 EG IN SP 7020 A0 DEC., 2006

NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL REFINING & DISTRIBUTION NIOEC


NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING
& CONSTRUCTION NIOEC

NIOEC SPECIFICATION
FOR

PIPELINE AUTOMATIC LEAK DETECTION


SYSTEM

FIRST EDITION

DECEMBER, 2006

THIS STANDARD IS THE PROPERTY OF NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION NIOEC. IT IS CONFIDENTIAL AND ALL RIGHTS
RESERVED TO THE OWNER. NEITHER WHOLE NOR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE DISCLOSED TO ANY THIRD PARTY, REPRODUCTED,
STORED IN ANY RETRIEVAL SYSTEM OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS WITHOUT THE PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION NIOEC
DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
REVISION INDEX
REV. REV. REV. REV.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE

1 26 51 76
2 27 52 77
3 28 53 78
4 29 54 79
5 30 55 80
6 31 56 81
7 32 57 82
8 33 58 83
9 34 59 84
10 35 60 85
11 36 61 86
12 37 62 87
13 38 63 88
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16 41 66 91
17 42 67 92
18 43 68 93
19 44 69 94
20 45 70 95
21 46 71 96
22 47 72 97
23 48 73 98
24 49 74 99
25 50 75 100

NOTES:
1) THIS SHEET IS A RECORD OF ALL REVISIONS TO THIS SPECIFICATION.
2) REMARKS RELATED TO EACH REVISION SHOW A BRIEF DESCRIPTION. THESE REMARKS SHALL BE
INTERPRETED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REVISED TEXT MARKED BY REVISION NUMBERS.
3) WHEN APPROVED EACH REVISION SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS A PART OF THE ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT.
4) NUMBER OF PAGES EXCLUDES THIS SHEET AND THE COVER SHEET.

1
0 DECEMBER, 2006 ORDOOBADI BEHRADFAR FARZAM SAJEDI.
REV. DATE PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED AUTHORIZED
DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)

CONTENTS: PAGE NO.

1. SCOPE.............................................................................................................................................2
2. REFERENCES................................................................................................................................2
3. UNITS ..............................................................................................................................................4
4. DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................4
5. ABBREVIATIONS .........................................................................................................................8
6. PRODUCT HISTORY...................................................................................................................8
7. CERTIFICATION AND APPROVALS ......................................................................................8
8. GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS...................................................................................8
9. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SYSTEMS..................................................................................9
10. REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................................................15
11. SCADA AND INSTRUMENTATION.......................................................................................19
12. NAMEPLATES...........................................................................................................................22
13. PAINTING AND RUST PREVENTION ..................................................................................22
14. DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................................................23
15. INSPECTIONS AND TESTING ..............................................................................................23
16. INSTALLATION, START UP AND COMMISSIONING ......................................................25
17. SPARES PARTS SUPPLY .........................................................................................................26
18. TRAINING .................................................................................................................................27
19. GUARANTEES ..........................................................................................................................27

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1. SCOPE

This specification defines NIOEC’S minimum requirements for the selection and engineering of
automatic pipeline leak detection systems (LDS).

Deviations from this specification will only be permitted on obtaining written approval from
NIOEC.

2. REFERENCES
Throughout this specification the following dated and undated standards and codes are referred to.
These referenced documents shall, to the extent specified herein, form a part of this specification.
For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any supplements
and amendments) applies. For dated references, the edition cited applies.
The applicability of changes in the dated references that occur after the cited date shall be mutually
agreed upon by NIOEC and the vendor /contractor.

ANSI (AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE)

API (AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE)

RP 500 A/B/C "Classification of Areas for Electrical Installation in


Refineries/Pipeline/Offshore Platforms"

RP 551 "Process Measurement Instrumentation"

RP 1113 "Developing a Pipeline Supervisory Control System"

RP 1119 "Training and Qualification of Liquid Pipeline Operators

RP 1120 "Training and Qualification of Liquid Pipeline Maintenance


Personnel"
PUBL 1130 "Computational Pipeline Monitoring for Liquids Pipelines""

PUBL 1149 "Pipeline Variable Uncertainties and Their Effects on Leak

Detectability"

PUBL 1155 "Evaluation Methodology for Software Based Leak Detection


Systems"

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BSI (BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION)

BS 5345 "Code of Practice for Selection, Installation and Maintenance of


Electrical Apparatus for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmosphere
(Other than Mining Applications or Explosive Processing and
Manufacturing)"

BS 4683 "Specification for Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Atmosphere"


(1971)

CENELEC (EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION OF


ELECTROTECHNIQUE)

EN 50.014 "General Requirements"

EN 50.018 "Flame-Proof Enclosure ’d’"

EN 50.020 "Intrinsic Safety ’i’"

IEC (INTERNATIONAL ELECTRO TECHNICAL COMMISSION)

60529 "Enclosure Protection Classification".

ISA (INSTRUMENT SOCIETY OF AMERICA)

S 5.1 "Instrumentation Symbols and Identification"

S 5.3 "Graphic Symbols for Distributed Control/Shared Display


Instrumentation, Logic and Computer Systems"

S 5.4 "Instrument Loop Diagrams"

RP 12.6 "Installation of Intrinsically Safe Instrument Systems in Class 1


Hazardous Locations"

NFPA (NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION)

NFC # 496 "Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment in


Hazardous Locations" (1982)

NFC # 497 A "Classification of Class 1 Hazardous (Classified) Locations for


Electrical Installation Area" (1986)

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NFC # 70 "National Electrical Code (NEC)"

NIOEC SP (NIOEC SPECIFICATIONS)


NIOEC-SP-70-01 “Specification for Instrumentation”
NIOEC-SP-00-10 “Specification for Units”

UL (UNDERWRITERS' LABORATORY)

UL-913 "Intrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus, for Use in


Class 1, 2 and 3, Division 1, Hazardous (Classified) Locations"
(1988)

3. UNITS
International System of Units (SI) shall be used in accordance with NIOEC-SP-00-10, unless
otherwise specified.

4. DEFINITIONS
4.1 Purchaser
In cases where this specification is part of a direct order, Purchaser shall mean National Iranian Oil
Engineering and Construction (NIOEC). Where this specification forms part of contract documents,
Purchaser shall mean Contractor. In references to inspection by purchaser when this specification
forms part of contract documents this shall be construed to mean that NIOEC shall also have the
right of inspection.
4.2 Reliability
Reliability is defined as a measure of the ability of a leak detection system to render accurate
decisions about the possible existence of a leak on the pipeline, while operating within an envelope
established by the leak detection system design. It follows that reliability is directly related to the
probability of detecting a leak, given that a leak does in fact exist, and the probability of incorrectly
declaring a leak, given that no leak has occurred. A system is considered to be more reliable if it
consistently detects actual leaks without generating incorrect declarations. Conversely, a system
which tends to incorrectly declare leaks is often considered to be less reliable. This is particularly
true in cases where it is difficult for the pipeline operator to distinguish between actual leaks and
incorrect declarations. On the other hand, a high rate of incorrect leak declarations might be
considered less significant if the pipeline operators have access to additional information that can be
used to verify or disqualify a leak alarm.
Systems that limit or inhibit alarm generation in response to certain conditions of pipeline operation
are not necessarily less reliable. Reliability pertains only to the functionality of the leak detection

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software without regard to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA)
performance, availability of the pipeline instrumentation and communication equipment, or any
other factor beyond the control of the leak detection system vendor.
Such factors involve a separate category of performance, namely robustness.
The reliability of a leak detection system usually depends upon a number of parameter settings (e.g.
decision thresholds, filter characteristics, and so forth) as well as all of the suitable leak detection
techniques employed for the operational characteristics of the target pipeline system. In some cases,
a pipeline operator must decide whether to use settings that cause frequent alarms during normal
pipeline operations, or to use other settings that are less likely to cause alarms, but might delay or
even fail to alarm when a leak is present. Many systems also make automatic adjustments to
decision thresholds and other parameters in order to reduce the likelihood of generating alarms
during defined operating conditions. When such adjustments are made, a corresponding penalty is
normally incurred in some other aspect of performance. For example, decisions based on longer
observation intervals might make a particular system less susceptible to random instrumentation
errors or disturbances caused by normal pipeline operations, but this performance gain is achieved
at the expense of longer response time and the risk of greater fluid loss if a leak should occur.
Reliability can be managed through the use of operator response criteria and procedures. Such
procedural methods, unless embodied within the leak detection software itself and performed
automatically by the system, do not serve to discriminate between leak detection systems with
regard to performance. On the other hand, if additional information is available from the leak
detection, SCADA, or other systems, then reliability may be better managed.

4.3 Sensitivity
Sensitivity is defined as a composite measure of the size of leak that a system is capable of
detecting, and the time required for the system to issue an alarm in the event that a leak of that size
should occur. The relation between leak size and response time is dependent upon the nature of the
leak detection system.
In some cases there is a wide variation in response time as a function of leak size. In other cases the
response time is relatively independent of leak size.
However, there are no known systems that tend to detect small leaks more quickly than large leaks.
Frequently during the specification process, users attempt to define leak detection performance in
terms of detecting a particular leak flow rate within a specified minimum period of time. Although
sensitivity expressed in such terms certainly represents one aspect of performance, its importance
can vary depending on the nature of the leak detection system and the operating characteristics of
the target pipeline system. The correlation between leak size and response time can be highly

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dependent upon the leak detection techniques employed. It is also important to recognize that
adjustments made in the interest of improving sensitivity can have a corresponding and not
necessarily beneficial effect on other aspects of performance.
In practice, most systems can be set up to achieve various levels of sensitivity, provided the
minimum detectable leak size and minimum attainable response time are not violated. The leak
detection system vendor, and possibly the pipeline operator, can affect these characteristics by
adjusting leak detection thresholds, filter characteristics or other parameters. Appropriate settings
for these thresholds are usually dependent upon factors such as the SCADA system's scan time,
instrument placement, fluid types, and so forth.
Refer to Figures 2 and 3 of API Publication 1155 for illustrations of the variables affecting
minimum detectable leak size and minimum attainable response time for any given pipeline.

4.4 Accuracy
Accuracy is the validity of leak parameter estimates i.e., leakage rate, total volume lost, type of
fluid lost, and leak location within the pipeline network.
From a strictly mechanical point of view, leak rate depends upon the magnitude and shape of the
perforation, pipe environment, fluid characteristics and pressure at the leak site. If the location of a
leak is known, the leak flow rate can be used to determine resultant disturbances in pressure, flow
rate, and temperature at other points on the pipeline. Software based leak detection systems, on the
other hand, deal with quite the opposite situation. Although these systems approach their task in a
wide variety of ways, the one thing they all have in common is that they must operate with no prior
knowledge of the size or location of a leak, should one occur. Thus, a particular system might
calculate a leak flow rate to compensate for a difference between observed and expected values of
pressure or flow at certain points on the pipeline. This effective leak flow rate might then be used to
estimate the location of the leak and/or the volume loss related to the leak. Another system,
operating on the same pipeline, might estimate total fluid volume lost on the basis of metered
volumes and calculated changes in line pack, without ever attempting to directly estimate leak flow
rate or location.
4.5 Robustness
Robustness is defined herein as a measure of the leak detection system's ability to continue to
function and provide useful information, even under changing conditions of pipeline operation, or
in conditions where data is lost or suspect. A system is considered to be robust if it continues to
function under such less than ideal conditions. On the other hand, if the system disables certain
functions, it might then achieve better reliability, but would be considered less robust.

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The distinction between reliability and robustness is significant. Reliability is a measure of
performance within a specified operational envelope. Robustness is a measure of the effective size
of the operational envelope. For example, consider the following hypothetical leak detection
systems:
System I: This system employs a sensitive leak detection algorithm. The system is normally very
reliable, but will frequently generate alarms during certain normal pipeline operations.
System II: This system employs an alternative algorithm which is somewhat less sensitive than that
of System I, but generates only a fraction of the alarms.
System III: This system employs the same sensitive leak detection algorithm as System I, but
inhibits leak detection during pipeline operations that can cause it to generate alarms.
System IV: This system normally employs the same sensitive leak detection algorithm as System I,
but switches to the less sensitive algorithm of System II when it senses conditions that generate
alarms.
In this example, the designers of System I have sacrificed a degree of reliability in order to maintain
a high level of sensitivity, whereas the designers of System II have chosen to sacrifice a degree of
sensitivity in order to achieve a high level of reliability. By simply disabling the leak detection
function under certain conditions, the designers of System III have sacrificed a degree of robustness
in order to achieve higher levels of reliability and sensitivity. The example of System IV represents
an attempt to selectively trade sensitivity and/or reliability in order to achieve a more robust system.
Although techniques vary between different software based leak detection methodologies, most
attempt to achieve an acceptable tradeoff between reliability, sensitivity, accuracy, and robustness
by sensing conditions of pipeline operation that cause alarms and making temporary parameter
adjustments or disabling certain functions as required. Prior to the selection of a methodology for a
given pipeline system, it is important that the pipeline company understand the way all operating
conditions are handled by that methodology. This understanding will help the pipeline company to
determine if a particular solution is consistent with the target pipeline's operational characteristics,
as well as the company's expectations.
The reliability of a pipeline's communication, SCADA, and instrumentation systems can also have a
dramatic effect on the utility of a software based leak detection system. A more robust system is one
that is less likely to exhibit loss of functionality during periods of partial data outages caused by
instrument failures, communication anomalies, routine maintenance, and so forth. Systems that
continue to operate during outage periods or transient conditions on the pipeline might employ
different settings for thresholds, filter characteristics, and other parameters. This usually results in
some degradation of the system's sensitivity, accuracy, and/or reliability. In such cases, robustness
is enhanced at the expense of other aspects of performance.

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5. ABBREVIATIONS
Throughout of this specification the following abbreviations will be used:
CPM: COMPUTATIONAL PIPELINE MONITORING
LDS: LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM
SCADA: SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
RTU: REMOTE TERMINAL UNIT

6. PRODUCT HISTORY
The Leak Detection System shall be of the same model and design as used in similar oil and gas
pipeline services and operating/ambient conditions with at least three (3) years of satisfactory
operational history.

7. CERTIFICATION AND APPROVALS


CE marking shall be required in accordance with EMC- Directive 89/336/EEC, and the conformity
certificates shall be provided.
The VENDOR shall also submit certificates/records of type test approval of the system, based on
recognized national or international standards, which for CENLEC regulations shall be LCIE, TUV,
PTB, BASEEFA and for NEC regulations shall be FM or UL.

8. GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS


8.1 Electrical Power
Electrical power supply will be specified in the project specifications. Should the equipment be
installed in remote areas with no electrical supply, vendor shall design and supply reliable solar
panel based power supplies with adequate battery back-up.
8.2 Environmental Data
Environmental data shall be supplied with the specific project specification.
Shipping and storage conditions will be considered as -20 °C to 85 °C and 0% to 100%.
However, as a minimum the following operating conditions shall not degrade the continuous
operation of the system:
Min/max temperature: -25°C to 80 °C
Min/max humidity: 20% to 90% RH non-condensing
Suspended Solids are dust and sand.
Allowable indoor noise level shall be 55 dBA, measured at one meter from equipment in question.

8.3 Ingress Protection and Hazardous Area Classification

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Indoor stations and system cabinets shall conform to IEC-60529, IP 42, as a minimum.
Electrical accessories, cabling and junction boxes in hazardous areas shall be suitable for NEC
Class I, Division I, and Group C (IEC Zone I, Group II B) locations.
8.4 Electromagnetic Interference
Equipment shall meet all electromagnetic compatibility requirements of the IEC 61000-4-2, 61000-
4-3, and 61000-4-4 standards.
Each element of the LDS must function without introducing intolerable electromagnetic
disturbances to other items or being susceptible to electromagnetic influences from other systems.
Emission limits generally comply with the relevant requirements of BS-6527 for Class B
equipment, and Susceptibility performance shall generally comply with the relevant requirements of
IEC 1000-4. All equipment shall be designed in such a way as to ensure immunity to interference
from VHF and UHF hand portable transceivers operating in the range 150 MHz to 470 MHz with a
power output of 1 Watt (RMS) held at 300 mm from any equipment forming part of the LDS
system

9. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SYSTEMS


Pipeline Leak detection systems are in general divided into two categories; externally based (direct)
or internally based (inferential).
9.1-EXTERNALLY BASED SYSTEMS
Externally based methods detect leaking product outside the pipeline and include traditional
procedures such as right-of-way inspection by line patrols, as well as technologies outlined as
follows:
• Acoustic Devices: Leak detection in pipelines using acoustic emissions technology is based
on the principle that escaping liquid creates an acoustic signal as it passes through a perforation in
the pipe. Acoustic sensors affixed to the outside of the pipe monitor internal pipeline noise levels
and locations. These data are used to create a baseline “acoustic map” of the line. When a leak
occurs, the resulting low frequency acoustic signal is detected and analyzed by system processors.
Deviations from the baseline acoustic profile would signal an alarm. The received signal is stronger
near the leak site thus enabling leak location.
Acoustic sensing can be applied externally to buried pipelines by using steel rods driven into the
ground to conduct the sound to a sensor mounted on the rod. The rods are inserted at intervals along
the pipeline.

• Cable Sensors: Polymer based cable sensors which swell in the presence of leaked
hydrocarbons, thus changing their electrical properties to facilitate signaling and alarming.

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Liquid sensing cables are buried beneath or adjacent to a pipeline and are specifically designed to
reflect changes in transmitted energy pulses as a result of impedance differentials induced by
contact with hydrocarbon liquids. Safe energy pulses are continuously sent by a microprocessor
through the cable. The pulses are reflected and returned to the microprocessor. Based on the
specific installation of the cable, a baseline reflection map is stored in the memory of the
microprocessor. When a leak occurs, the cable is saturated with fluid. The fluid alters the
impedance of the sensing cable, which in turn alters the reflection pattern returning to the
microprocessor. The change in signal pattern causes the microprocessor to register a leak alarm at
the location of the altered impedance. Controller interface software is available to provide real-time
information on leak detection and record keeping. Specific cable types are chosen for each
application based on the specific fluid being monitored.
Liquid sensing leak detection is typically marketed as a self-contained leak detection and location
system, including all hardware and software. Advantages include relatively high accuracy in
determining leak location, no modifications to existing pipeline, and easy software configuration
and maintenance. Disadvantages include very high installation costs and extensive power and signal
wiring requirements.
• Fiber Optic Sensors: Changes occurred in the optical property of the cable as a result of the
presence of leaks, or change in temperature occurred in the immediate surroundings is utilized in
detection and alarming. With this technology, fiber optic sensing probes are driven into the soil
beneath or adjacent to the pipeline. In the presence of hydrocarbons, the patented covering of the
sensor changes its refractive index. This change is registered optically by the sensor and converted
to a parts-per-million reading of hydrocarbons.

• Vapor Monitoring System: In highly volatile pipeline product services, this system sucks
the vapors in a low-density polyethylene sensor tube. This gas stream runs past specialized
sensors that can detect trace concentrations of specific hydrocarbon compounds.
Hydrocarbon gas sensing systems are more frequently used in storage tank systems but can also be
applicable to pipelines. Leak detection using vapor-monitoring techniques is a fairly straightforward
concept. When a liquid seeps into the soil, vapors migrate from into the surrounding soil pore
spaces. Probes are arranged in the soil so that a vacuum may be applied to them. The soil vapors are
collected for laboratory or field analysis. Tracers or chemical markers may be added to the product
being monitored so that it may be identified from naturally occurring background vapors. When the
tracers or markers are encountered during analysis of the vapors, it can be surmised that a leak has
occurred.

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The vapor sensing tube leak detection method involves the installation of a secondary conduit along
the entire length of the pipeline. The conduit may be a small-diameter perforated tube attached to
the pipeline or it may completely encompass the pipeline, allowing the annular headspace to be
tested. Air gas samples are drawn into the tube and analyzed by hydrocarbon vapor sensors to
determine the presence of a leak. Because of the logistical problems associated with any system
installed along the entire length of a pipeline, vapor-sensing tubes are usually only employed on
short lines.
While hardware based systems can provide an accurate detection of leaks in a comparably short
time period, the volume of the components required to be installed along the pipeline, thus requiring
numerous sources of local power supply, long connections to upstream/downstream stations,
guarding and maintenance, preclude their wide usage and indeed not many references could be
found in the Oil and Gas pipeline sector for their application on major pipeline projects.

9.2- INTERNALLY BASED SYSTEMS


Internally based methods, also known as computational pipeline monitoring (CPM), use instruments
to monitor internal pipeline parameters (i.e., pressure, flow, temperature, etc.), which are inputs for
inferring a product release by manual or electronic computation.
The main category of inferential leak detection in pipelines is known as computational pipeline
monitoring (CPM). CPM refers to algorithmic monitoring tools that are used to enhance the abilities
of a pipeline controller to recognize anomalies which may be indicative of a product release. CPM
operates by providing an alarm and displaying other related data to the controller who, in turn,
would investigate the reason for the alarm and initiate a response if the anomaly represents a
product release. CPM does not include externally based detection systems which operate on the
non-algorithmic principle of physical detection of a product leak.
CPM mainly relies on the data collected from the field instruments, which are continuously input
into a computer program that mathematically or statistically analyzes the information. Analysis
results are produced in the form of parameter estimates, which in turn are subjected to some
probability law or decision criteria to determine if a leak is present. The degree of complexity in
analyzing field data ranges from the comparison of a single element (i.e., pressure) relative to a
threshold limit to extensive analyses of multiple elements with dynamic thresholds. Without the
computer program and associated algorithms, the data would be difficult if not impossible to
interpret in a timely manner. Consequently, the heart of any CPM system is the computer program.
The classes of CPM are differentiated by the types of instruments and programs (or algorithms)
used. There are three basic types of CPM: volume (or mass) balance, pressure analysis (rarefaction
wave monitoring), and real time transient modeling (RTTM). Note that some of the leak detection

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systems offered by vendors include more than one type of leak detection method (i.e., both volume
balance and pressure analysis). Additionally, most of the volume balance and RTTM leak detection
systems use some sort of pressure analysis to locate leaks.

In general these systems are based on proprietary field mounted sensors, such as pressure, flow and
temperature transmitters which continuously measure the appropriate parameters and transmit them
to a centralized computing system, where the measurements can be checked against proprietary
software based profiles in order to identify the irregularities in the pipeline parameters and hence
detect and alarm the leakages.
These profiles are usually developed from a database established from past years of experimental
and field leak tests. This technique can drastically reduces the false alarm rate (one alarm a year or
less) and improve the sensitivity and leak location accuracy.

The systems are generally divided into the following categories:


z Volume Balance
The volume balance method of leak detection, also known as line balance, compensated volume
balance, or mass balance, is based on measuring the discrepancy between the incoming (receipt)
and outgoing (delivery) product volumes of a particular pipeline segment. During a unit time
interval, the volume of product that enters a pipe may not be equal to the measured volume exiting
the pipe. The difference is accounted for by uncertainties in line pack and flow measurement. The
principal differences among the various volume balance methods are outlined below.
Basic line balance does not compensate for changes in line pack due to pressure, temperature, or
product composition.
Volume balance is an enhanced, automated technique, which does account for line pack correction
by assessing changes in volume due to temperature and/or pressure variations. A representative bulk
modulus is used for line pack calculations.
Compensated volume balance is an enhanced volume balance technique which accounts for volume
change using a dynamic bulk modulus to assess line pack correction.
Mass balance accounts directly for product density (i.e., with online densitometers).
Ultrasonic systems detect leaks via transient-compensated volume or mass balance; therefore, they
are included under this heading. These systems typically operate through accurate tracking of flow
rate, computation of pressure, temperature, and product characteristics and determination of sonic
profiles using external clamp-on instruments configured with data processing equipment.
Compared to other leak detection methods, volume balance is particularly useful in identifying
small leaks. However, leaks are generally detected more slowly and flow metering at each end of

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the line or pipeline segment will not identify the location of the leak. Most of the software-based
volume-balance systems incorporate additional algorithms for leak location based on pressure
analysis.
z Pressure Analysis (Rarefaction Wave Monitoring)

This method detects a leak by comparing the current pressure signal


with the trend taken over a period of time. The patented software then applies statistical analysis to
determine if there is a significant difference between the two signals, thereby indicating a leak.
The rarefaction wave (also called an acoustic, negative pressure or expansion wave) method of leak
detection is based on the analysis of pipeline pressure variations. When product breaches the
pipeline wall there is a sudden drop in pressure at the location of the leak followed by rapid line re-
pressurization a few milliseconds later. The resulting low-pressure expansion wave travels at the
speed of sound through the liquid away from the leak in both directions. Instruments placed at
intervals along the pipeline respond as the wave passes. If a leak occurs in the middle of a line
segment with uniform construction, the rarefaction wave should be seen at opposite ends of the line
simultaneously. If the leak is closer to one end, it should be seen first at the close end and later at
the far end. The time evidence recorded at each end of the monitored line or segment is used to
calculate the location of the leak. Most volume balance and RTTM leak detection systems use
pressure analysis to locate leaks. Models also use pressure measurements as boundary conditions.
Since the rarefaction wave travels at significant speeds, on the order of one mile per second, this
method of leak detection is particularly useful in identifying large leaks rapidly. Smaller leaks
typically take longer to detect and very small, pinhole leaks may go undetected. The success of a
rarefaction wave LDS largely depends on the frequency and sensitivity of instrument
measurements. Because of the sensitivity of this type of technology to operational changes that
result in large transient pressure waves, leak detection performance generally falls off under highly
transient, slack-line, and multi-phase flow conditions.
The principal difference among the various rarefaction wave technologies is how the wave is
identified and monitored. Some sensors or transducers monitor for the leading edge of the wave
while others evaluate the shape of the wave.

• Real Time Transient Modeling: This method provides a mathematical model of the fluid
flow within the pipeline. The equations used to model the flow are conservation of mass,
conservation of momentum, and equation of state for the fluid.
The most sensitive, but also the most complex and costly leak detection method in use is real time
transient modeling (RTTM). RTTM involves the computer simulation of pipeline conditions using
advanced fluid mechanics and hydraulic modeling. Conservation of momentum calculations,

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conservation of energy calculations, and numerous flow equations are typically used by the RTTM
system.
RTTM software can predict the size and location of leaks by comparing the measured data for a
segment of pipeline with the predicted modeled conditions. This analysis is done in a three-step
process. First, the pressure-flow profile of the pipeline is calculated based on measurements at the
pipeline or segment inlet. Next, the pressure-flow profile is calculated based on measurements at the
outlet. Third, the two profiles are overlapped and the location of the leak is identified as the point
where these two profiles intersect. If the measured characteristics deviate from the computer
prediction, the RTTM system sends an alarm to the pipeline controller. The more instruments that
are accurately transmitting data into the model, the higher the accuracy of and confidence in the
model. Note that models rely on properly operating and calibrated instruments for optimum
performance. Calibration errors can result in false alarms or missed leaks, and the loss of a critical
instrument could require system shutdown.
The advantage RTTM provides over other methods is its ability to model all of the dynamic fluid
characteristics (flow, pressure, temperature) and take into account the extensive configuration of
physical pipeline characteristics (length, diameter, thickness, etc.), as well as product characteristics
(density, viscosity, etc.) Additionally, the model can be tuned to distinguish between instrument
errors, normal transients, and leaks. The distinct disadvantages of this detection system are the costs
associated with implementing RTTM and the complexity of the system, which requires numerous
instruments and extensive controller training and system maintenance.

z Statistical Pipeline Integrity Management System


This patented system applies advanced statistical techniques to flow, pressure and temperature
measurements of a pipeline. Variations generated by operational changes are registered and thus
reliable system performance can be achieved through tuning of statistical parameters.
As the system monitors a pipeline continuously it learns about continual changes in the line and in
the flow, pressure instruments. As long as the instruments continue to function correctly, variations
in fluid properties e.g. composition change, is not supposed to present a problem to the system.
Typical instrument malfunctions e.g. outliers, frozen points, can be detected automatically and thus
operators are informed of such malfunctions as they occur.
Statistical techniques are applied to detect changes in the overall behavior of flow and pressure at
the inlet and outlet points. Although the control and operation may vary from one pipeline to
another, the relationship between the pipeline pressure and flow will always change after a leak
develops in a pipeline. For example, a leak could cause the pipeline pressure to decrease and
introduce a discrepancy between the ingress and egress flow-rate. The leak detection system is

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
designed to detect such changes i.e. pattern recognition. Leak determination is based on probability
calculations at regular sample intervals. The basic principle used for the probability calculations is
mass conservation and hypothesis testing: leak against no-leak. Although the flow and pressure in a
pipeline fluctuate due to operational changes, statistically the total mass entering and leaving a
network must be balanced by the inventory variation inside the network. Such a balance cannot be
maintained if a leak occurs in a network. The deviation from the established balance is detected by a
statistical test method. The combination of the probability calculations and pattern recognition is
claimed to provide the system with a high level of system reliability i.e. minimum spurious alarm.
Under leak-free operations, the mass balance principle determines that the difference between the
ingress and egress flow-rate should be equal to the inventory variation in a pipeline.
The system has learning capability, e.g. operational changes introduced after the installation will be
used to further tune the system and gradual instrument drift is incorporated for eliminating false
alarms. The reliability of the system will improve after it has the opportunity to experience different
operational changes: start up, shut down, valve opening.

10. REQUIREMENTS
The method of leak detection selected for a pipeline is dependent on a variety of factors including
pipeline characteristics, product characteristics, instrumentation and communications capabilities,
and economics. Pipeline systems vary widely in their physical characteristics and operational
functions, and no one external or internal method is universally applicable or possesses all the
features and functionality required for perfect leak detection performance. However, the chosen
system should include as many of the following desirable leak detection utilities as possible
10.1. CHARACTERISTICS
The pipeline leak detection should be capable of promptly detecting a leak, including:
• The continuous capability to detect a discharge of 1% of the flow meter range
• To satisfy the following requirements as determined by Contractor in accordance with a
particular pipeline characteristics and requirements and approved by NIOEC:

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
LEAK DETECTION REQUIREMENTS
LEAK SIZE % OF FLOW LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME
FULL PIPE RUPTURE 100 LESS THAN *** MINUTES
LARGE LEAK 50 LESS THAN *** MINUTES
MEDIUM LEAK 25 LESS THAN *** MINUTES
SMALL TO MEDIUM LEAK 10 LESS THAN *** MINUTES
SMALL LEAK 5 LESS THAN *** MINUTES
VERY SMALL LEAK 1 LESS THAN *** MINUTES

ESTIMATION OF LEAK DETECTION LOCATION


LEAK SIZE % OF FLOW LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME
LARGE LEAK 50 WITHIN ± ****METERS
VERY SMALL LEAK 1 WITHIN ± ****METERS
FALSE ALARMS
THE SYSTEM SHALL OPERATE WITH LESS THAN ******FALSE ALARMS PER YEAR

• Flow verification through an accounting method, at least once every 24 hours.


The chosen system should include as many of the following desirable leak detection utilities as
possible:
• Possesses high sensitivity to product release and possesses accurate product release alarming;
• Allows for timely detection of product release;
• Offers efficient field and control centre support;
• Requires minimum software configuration and tuning;
• Requires minimum impact from communication outages;
• Accommodates complex operating conditions;
• Is available during transients;
• Is configurable to a complex pipeline network;
• Performs accurate imbalance calculations on flow meters;
• Is redundant;
• Is false alarm proof; For example, some leak detection systems give false alarms when a
pump start causes a temporary increase in the flow difference. However, if a leak occurs
during a pump start, which is the most likely time, a real leak will be dismissed as just
another false alarm caused by the pump start.
• Detects leaks with shut-in flow (zero flow rate in the pipeline).
• Possesses dynamic alarm thresholds;
• Possesses dynamic line pack constant;

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
• Accommodates product blending;
• Accounts for heat transfer;
• Provides the pipeline system’s real time pressure profile;
• Accommodates slack-line and multiphase flow conditions;
• Accommodates all types of liquids;
• Identifies leak location;
• Identifies leak rate;
• Accommodates product measurement and inventory compensation for various corrections
(i.e., temperature, pressure, and density).

10.2. METHODS
Different methods of leak detection systems are outlined in section 5 of this document. Based on the
references in major oil and gas pipelines, it appears that the application of internal systems is
prevalent. As such, considering the factors including Pipeline characteristics, Product
characteristics, Instrumentation and communications capabilities and the Economics, such internal
leak detection systems will be specified in NIOEC pipeline projects.

10.3. EVALUATION
Within the framework of the proposed leak detection system evaluation methodology, each
performance metric shall be evaluated in terms of a system's ability to satisfy a set of related
criteria. Contractor shall establish specific criteria for a particular pipeline and in so doing, the
Contractor must first define the leak detection goals for the pipeline and then specify corresponding
criteria relative to the performance metrics of reliability, sensitivity, accuracy and robustness. These
performance criteria constitute one set of information that the Contractor would then provide to a
potential vendor in order to determine if that vendor's system is an acceptable leak detection
solution.
There are three steps involved in determining the appropriate leak detection performance criteria for
a particular pipeline. The Contractor must first identify any legal, contractual or regulatory
requirements relating to leak detection. A minimum set of performance criteria must be established
to meet these obligations.
The next step is to characterize the pipeline in terms of its possible leak mechanisms and the
likelihood that one of these will result in a leak. A number of diverse factors are involved in this
characterization.
• These include, but are not necessarily limited to:

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
• Length and volume of the pipeline,
• Pressure, temperature, and flow rate envelope,
• Terrain over which the pipeline travels,
• Type of fluids transported,
• The installed pipe,
• Pipeline operating procedures,
• Pipeline maintenance procedures, and
• External factors such as nearby roadwork, construction, or land development activity.
The final step in developing performance criteria is to perform an assessment of definite and
potential
costs associated with incorrectly declared leak alarms, missed alarms, late alarms, and any other
deviation from ideal leak detection system performance. This assessment, when considered
alongside
the regulatory requirements and the leak potential characterization of the pipeline, should provide a
basis from which the pipeline company can establish a set of leak detection objectives. The task of
defining the appropriate leak detection performance criteria can then be reduced to a process of
prioritizing each performance metric in terms of its level of importance, and further defining a set of
specific performance criteria which illustrate the desired objectives.
Each alternative technology must then be evaluated and summarized below as per specific
requirements outlined in the table.
• Availability on the market,
• Performance,
• Suitability criteria,
• Transferability,
• Effectiveness,
• Cost,
• Low Cost Of Ownership
• Feasibility,
• Environmental Impacts.

To perform the evaluation, the following functions must also be performed on a pipeline-specific
basis:
• Identify any legal requirements relating to leak detection;

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
• Characterize the pipeline in terms of its possible leak mechanisms and the likelihood that one
of them will result in a leak Factors include, but are not limited to, length and volume of the
pipeline; pressure, temperature, and flow rate envelope; terrain; product characteristics; and
pipeline operating and maintenance procedures;
• Determine the leak detection potential of the pipeline;
• Perform an assessment of definite and potential costs associated with incorrectly declaring
leak alarms, missed alarms, late alarms, and any other deviation from ideal leak detection
system performance.

Once this evaluation has been completed, a written justification shall be provided for each
applicable technology determined to be the best available for the applicant’s operation.

11. SCADA AND INSTRUMENTATION


LDS system Vendor shall, taking into account full system specifications based on NIOEC project

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
specification, design and specify the SCADA and the instrumentation involved in the LDS in proper
data sheets based on NIOEC specifications. The SCADA and the instruments may be supplied by
LDS Vendor or purchased by NIOEC and free-issued to the Vendor depending on NIOEC decision.

11.1 Presentation of LDS Information on SCADA


Results from the LDS shall be stored and displayed on SCADA monitors. All output from the LDS
shall be treated by the SCADA system as normal process variables. LDS Vendor shall provide
adequate data such that SCADA Vendor can create his own mimic displays as required by the
NIOEC. These displays shall be developed during the detailed functional definition stage.

The minimum requirements for the displays shall include:


• Calculated flow, temperature, pressure, density and head profiles for the complete pipeline,
together with pipeline profile and user-definable trending displays.
• Combination displays for e.g. calculated parameters (as a line plot), combined with bar plots
of measured parameters (such as pressure).
• Alarm displays (segregated from other SCADA system alarms where possible).
• Data/communication faults
• System summaries, reports and diagnostics.
• Help mimics;
• The leak detection time
Leak size and location displays. The detected leak point will be located on the whole pipeline
system map, represented on a graphical display (pointed at by a special mark defined for such
purposes). Near the pointer, the magnitude and confidence level of the leak and the distance to the
reference point will also be displayed;
• Pig tracking information;
• Trends;
• Historical data.
The results from the LDS shall be made available through a standard Applications Programming
Interface to facilitate easy selection of data to be transferred to the SCADA system.

11.2 FIELD INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS


LDS Vendor shall ensure accurate and timely data reception from the instruments to be installed on
the pipeline. If the data transmission frequency is low, field data will be saved in the local RTU’s to
be sent to the SCADA system in batches.

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
Instrumentation requirements should be reviewed with each leak detection system vendor under
consideration. While it is generally true that instruments of great accuracy, precision, and
repeatability will improve performance over instruments of lesser characteristics, it is also true that
some leak detection techniques are much less dependent upon instrument characteristics than
others. Furthermore, estimates of an instrument's actual field operation, along with descriptions of
the pipeline company's calibration guidelines and SCADA data processing techniques, will be more
useful to a vendor of software based leak detection systems than the instrument manufacturer's
published specifications.
Consistent and reliable SCADA system performance is of critical importance to a software based
leak detection system, regardless of the methodology employed. If the quality of the data is bad, or
if the data acquisition frequency is inadequate, the ability of the software to recognize a potential or
actual leak condition is compromised. In addition to the physical description of the pipeline system,
definition of the pipeline company's SCADA system, and its performance characteristics, are of
critical importance to the leak detection vendor. This definition provides the vendor with
background information necessary to determine if an existing SCADA system will be adequate to
support the needs of their software. SCADA performance characteristics that can have a negative
affect on leak detection include slow or irregular update rates, time skew in acquired data from
opposite ends of the pipeline, and communication system reliability. These, like many of the other
factors, have different effects depending on the leak detection method under consideration, and
therefore, must be discussed with each vendor to determine their impact on that method's
functionality.
Instrumentation specifications shall generally meet the requirements of NIOEC-SP-70-1; however
the instrumentation accuracy and repeatability shall be better than the following figures:
• Flow: Better than 0.2 % of Span, Better than 0.1 % of Span;
• Pressure: Better than 0.2 % of Span , Better than 0.1 % of Span;
• Temperature: Better than 1 ºC, Better than 0.5 °C.
NOTES:
Instrument resolution determines the minimum leak detectable by any system based on field
measurements. If the resolution of flow and pressure meters is 0.1%, for example, it is impossible to
use these meters to detect a leak smaller than 0.1%.
Instrument repeatability is critical in determining leak detection reliability. If it is required to detect
a leak of a magnitude equal to or smaller than the instrument repeatability, then false alarms will be
generated. To avoid false alarms, the minimum leak to be detected should be greater than the
combined repeatability of the flow and pressure instruments.

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
Hysteresis can affect leak detection performance only when different nonlinear characteristics exist
between the flow meters at the ingress and egress points. An example of such cases is when
different makes of flow transmitters are used at the inlet and outlet of a pipeline.
Note that SCADA and telecommunication system can reduce measurement resolutions if the
Analogue to Digital (AD) converters are not selected properly. To maintain a high resolution level,
it is recommended to use 12 bit or higher AD converters.

11.3 COMMUNICATION
Fiber optics will be used along the pipeline as the means of communication among the system
equipment. The type and construction shall comply with the specifications as provided by the
National Iranian Pipeline and Telecommunication Company.

11.4 REMOTE TERMINAL UNITS


Where the system equipment are to be installed in remote areas the Vendor shall design and supply
proper Remote Terminal Units, which shall be suitable for the intended area and the environmental
conditions.

12. NAMEPLATES
Each cabinet, module, station, peripheral included in Vendor’s scope of supply shall have
its individual nameplate as follows:
• Nameplates shall be plastic type with a glossy black laminated surface and opaque white base
• Nameplates for outdoor equipment shall be stainless steel
• Nameplates shall be securely fixed at both ends with stainless steel screws
• Nameplate size, characters and character format shall be submitted for Purchaser’s review and
approval
• English lettering shall be used
Vendor’s mark and nameplate shall also be required for each station, cabinet and rack containing
manufacturer’s name, manufacturing date and production number. Material and format shall be the
same as other nameplates discussed above.
Each station and cabinet shall have both front and rear side nameplates.

13. PAINTING AND RUST PREVENTION


13.1 Paint Specification

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
The VENDOR shall paint each item in accordance with the paint specification agreed with the
PURCHASER prior to hardware manufacturing commencing.
13.2 Paint Colour
The paint colour shall be approved by the PURCHASER at the commencement of manufacture.
13.3 Special Requirements
If the Vendor’s paint specification and colours are not acceptable to the PURCHASER then the
PURCHASER will advise the VENDOR of the required paint specification and colours.
13.4 Surface Treatment
Surfaces to be painted shall be dry and free from burrs, weld spatter, flux dirt, dust, oil and any other
foreign matter before any paint is applied.
All parts of the equipment shall be rust proofed adequately.

14. DOCUMENTATION
14.1 General
The documentation to be supplied with the equipment shall be sufficient to operate, maintain, repair
and re configure the hardware and software throughout the operational lifetime of the system.
14.2 Design Documents
The VENDOR shall produce a Functional Design Specification as his first activity prior to any
construction commencing unless agreed by the PURCHASER. The Functional Design Specification
shall detail fully the equipment offered, hardware details, and software configuration and programs
and test procedures and shall be approved by the PURCHASER.
The VENDOR shall produce unique drawings and documents for his supplied equipment and
software, which are identified as for PURCHASER approval.
14.3 On line Documentation
It is recommended that a copy of vendor documentation related to the system maintenance and
configuration reside within the engineering station.

15. INSPECTIONS AND TESTING


15.1 General
The system shall be fully tested and inspected at Vendor’s shop to ensure satisfactory operation
before packing and shipping. A schedule for inspection and testing shall be detailed in the
manufacturing quality Plan. The Purchaser’s inspectors will witness the tests.
15.2 Factory Acceptance Test (FAT)
a) General
The VENDOR shall submit test procedures for Purchaser’s approval prior to the FAT.
The VENDOR shall satisfactorily test the Equipment prior to the Factory Acceptance Tests, and
submit test procedures to Purchaser prior to the FAT.

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
The VENDOR shall notify the PURCHASER a minimum of 30 days in advance of his intention to
carry out tests so that arrangements can be made to witness the event.
For FAT, the VENDOR shall make available time, space and assistance to ensure the
PURCHASER is given all possible assistance.
VENDOR shall provide all goods, materials and services for all the tests and shall provide all test
equipment required to test out the equipment and to simulate all field inputs, outputs and serial links
and monitor all output operations.
FAT shall be as complete as practicable with all interfacing equipment available from other
systems, and shall be a detailed function test covering all stages of the equipment's operation.
a) Unit Tests
The system shall be checked during the test for correct operations and a full functional test shall be
carried out to confirm compliance with the specification.
All faults discovered shall be rectified at the Vendor’s cost and the affected system offered for re-
test.
The tests shall comprise the following tests as a minimum:
• Visual, mechanical and electrical inspection of all equipment for conformance to drawing and
specification.
• Hardware testing.
• Power supply testing for load and switching.
• RFI and EMI tests.
• Database checking.
• Functional loop checks. The system final database shall be used for these tests.
• CPU and memory maximum loading capacity checks.
• Factory as-built documentation shall also be checked.
b) System Software Tests
The software tests shall comprise the following tests as a minimum:
• Functional tests of the operating system.
• Configuration tests of the standard system i.e. alarm limit changes etc.
• Functional tests of all utility programs.
• Functional tests of all VENDORS supplied application software.
• Functional tests of communication with all third party equipment.
c) Performance Tests
The performance tests shall comprise the following tests as a minimum.
System response tests to confirm that the performance requirements of specification are met

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
System integration tests to confirm all functions are operational and dependency between functions
is present.
d) Testing Method
CPM systems shall be tested with actual or simulated commodity releases. Possible methods of
testing include:
• Removal of test quantities of commodity from the line.
• Editing of CPM configuration parameters to simulate commodity loss (software
simulations).
• Altering an instrument output, for example a meter factor, to simulate a volume imbalance,
or a pressure output to simulate a hydraulic anomaly.
The method used will be specific to the particular CPM application and pipeline system. CPM tests
may be "announced" or "unannounced." An unannounced test is started without the knowledge of
the Pipeline Controller and tests the CPM system as well as the response of the Pipeline Controller.
Generally, unannounced tests are preceded by successful announced tests. An announced test is
started with the awareness of the Pipeline Controller and tests only the CPM system.
Throughout the startup procedure, there will likely be a variety of tests. Consideration should be
given to testing by actual removal of commodity from the pipeline.
e) Retesting
CPM applications should be tested on a 5-year interval to demonstrate their continued effectiveness.
Consideration should be given to testing by actual removal of commodity from the pipeline.

15.3 Test Completion


On completion of satisfactory PURCHASER witnessed factory acceptance tests the VENDOR shall
collate all test results for signature and approval and issue the necessary certificates.

16. INSTALLATION, START UP AND COMMISSIONING


16.1 Installation
Purchaser will install the equipment at site under the supervision of VENDOR specialists.
16.2 Checks
VENDOR specialists shall be responsible to check that the following minimum requirements have
been fulfilled:
• Correct installation of cabinets and stations.
• Replacement of equipment in cabinets and station removed for transportation.
• Connection and installation of all system cables and internal cable connections.
• Connection of all power and earthing cables and resistance checks.

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
16.3 Power up
Vendor specialists shall power up the system and check that following requirements have been
completed:
All Vendors standard hardware, software and diagnostics checks have been completed, including all
processor failure mode, redundancy, security access and restart procedures.
Communication checks have run with data transmission corruption being acceptable within the
Vendor’s published specification.
16.4 SAT
The VENDOR shall submit SAT Test Procedures for Purchaser’s approval prior to the Test. Vendor
specialists shall then perform Site Acceptance Test (SAT) for Purchaser’s approval. Full functional
test shall be carried out at this stage.
The VENDOR shall specify the need for any special test equipment and site support
required for installation and commissioning.
16.5 Commissioning
Vendor may be required to provide a site-based specialist to assist the Purchaser with the following
activities during commissioning:
• Operator guidance.
• Loop tuning.
• Control loop configuration amendments.
• Resolve system faults.
• Vendor shall confirm in his quotation, his commitments to render the above-mentioned.
16.6 Test Equipment
The VENDOR shall specify the need for any special test equipment and site support
required for installation and commissioning.
16.7 Documents
The VENDOR shall provide agreed as-built documents and drawings following site
commissioning.

17. SPARES PARTS SUPPLY


17.1 Construction, Pre-commissioning and Commissioning Spare Parts
VENDOR shall recommend the spares for construction, pre-commissioning,
commissioning and construction allowance, which will be purchased together with the
equipment, and include the cost of spares in the quotation.

17.2 Spare Parts for One Year of Operation

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
VENDOR shall recommend the spares required for one year of operation and provide a price list.
PURCHASER may purchase the spares listed in Vendor’s recommended spare part list after review.
Validity of spare parts proposal shall be 12 months.

17.3 Maintenance Tools


If the supplied equipment requires special maintenance tools, the VENDOR shall include in his
proposal a price list for one complete set of such special tools. PURCHASER may purchase the tools in
a similar manner to spares as indicated in Section 17.2.

18. TRAINING
Vendor shall train NIOEC/end user personnel both at Vendor's offices and at site to gain full
command of the system, including maintenance and system configuration. Classroom training
courses will be provided for different personnel including operators, engineers and system manager
and site installation will review the previous course on an “on-the-job” approach, relating theory
with the day to day tasks and potential leak events.

19. GUARANTEES
Vendors shall guarantee that he is able to support and supply spare parts for the supplied hardware,
software and firmware for at least 10 years from the date of shipment.
Completion of commissioning does not end Vendor's involvement: Vendor shall be able to provide
support either by telephone or site attendance, and where appropriate, modems shall be provided,
with client authorization, to permit remote connection to the equipment or the operator interface to
diagnose problems and make adjustments. Vendor shall be in a position to offer system
maintenance contract services to:

• Debug and trouble-shoot the software.


• Install software upgrades.
• Periodically back-up the database and graphics screens.
• Check and clean the hardware.
• Make adjustments identified by the operations staff to further optimize the system.
• Provide advice and assistance.

If the VENDOR believes that parts of the system will be withdrawn from sale after 10 years, he
shall provide a statement detailing the equipment to be withdrawn, the timing and how updated
parts can replace the withdrawn parts.

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DECEMBER, 2006 NIOEC-SP-70-20(1)
The Vendor shall also guarantee that the equipment supplied is free from fault in design,
workmanship and material, and is of adequate design and proper material to fulfill satisfactorily
the specified operating conditions.
Should any failure or defect in design, material, workmanship or operating characteristics develop
under the start-up and commissioning periods or during the first 12 months of operation, but not
later than 24 months from the date of shipment, the Vendor shall make all required repairs,
alterations or replacements of the defective equipment, free of charge, and shall pay transportation
fees involved to and from NIOEC’s site.

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