Chapter IV.

Construction and Interpretation of Words and Phrases

The legislative intent can be ascertained from the statue itself. When the statue is
unambiguous and clear then it should be interpreted literally.

1. When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150
SCRA 520, No. L-72005 May 29, 1987

Doctrine:
1. When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. ( Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos)
A. This rule requires that a general term or phrased should not be reduced into
parts and one part distinguished from the other to justify its exclusion from law.
B. The courts should administer the law as it is and not as what they ought to be
but as they find it and without regard to consequences.
C. A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason apparent in the law to justify it.

sine qua non - an essential condition; a thing that is absolutely necessary.

Writ of Certiorari-petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth to the Supreme Court.

Facts:

Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. Filed a complaint for collection against Varian
Industrial Corporation before the RTC of Quezon City. During the pendency of the
case the Varian Industrial Corporation was able to attach some properties upon
posting of Supersedes Bond, in turn the latter posted a counterbond in the sum of
1.4M through the surety Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.
On December 28, 1984, rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, which reads
as:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
GRANTED, and judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Varian Industrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:
 1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation
with 12% interest per annum from the date of default until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as li-quidated damages;
3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and
for attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.

Varian Industrial Corporation filed an appeal to the decision to the respondent

court. Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. Filed a Petition for Execution Pending Appeal,
Varian Industrial Corporation is required to file its comment but none has been filed.
An Order of Execution has been issued but not satisfied as the Varian Industrial
Corporation failed to deliver herein attached personal property so the plaintiff could
collect.
Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. filed a motion that the surety be ordered to pay the
value of its bond. On September 12, 1985 the court decided in favor of Sycwin
Coating & Wires, Inc..
Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. In its prayer it claims that since the respondent on
this case failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration which is considered a sine qua
non, or absolutely necessary, for a Writ of Certiorarito be granted. But this rule does
not apply under special circumstances that warrants an immediate or more direct
action, such as cases where an Order of Execution had been granted which makes the
relief extremely urgent, then a Temporary Restraining Order was granted in favor of
the defendant and surety or Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.

***Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:
SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property.

The Plaintiff on this case issued a resolution, as a response to the petition of the
Plaintiff, for counterbond with condition, using the basis of Section 5, Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court under the condition that in case the Plaintiff recovers
judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver the attached
property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be applied to the
payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and Surety will, on
demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the property released.
 Section 12: the appellant may attach property or file a counterbond executed to
the attaching party;

Section 17: once the decision became executory, the surety or sureties in the
counter bond are bound to pay the judgement;

Issue:

The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a
judgment maybe enforced on the counter-bond.

Ruling:

Yes, the Court of Appeals may enforce the fulfillment of the judgement through
the counter-bond.

Section 5 and 12 of Rule 57, are intended to secure the payment of any
judgement, while in Section 17, once the execution be returned unsatisfied such as on
this case, it is only then that the counter-bond shall be used to fulfill the execution of
the judgement. It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish.

Neither the rules nor the provision of the counter-bond stipulates the limits on
counter-bond being applied only for final and executory judgement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
restraining order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against
petitioner.

Relationship to the topic:

The Supreme court on this case, using the doctrine of When the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish has decided that the use of counterbond on
cases with pending appeals is allowed, since the Rules of Court’s provision that the
intention on claiming awards, and payment duly decided in court is to secure
payment, thus there are no rules that limits the counter-bond to be release only on
final and executory judgement, it can be released when the order of the court was not
fulfilled even when the other party is on pending appeal.

Juanito C. Pilar vs. Commission on Elections, 245 SCRA 759, G.R. No. 115245
July 11, 1995

Doctrine:
The term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who
pursued his campaign but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.—In the case at
bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be
deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one
who withdrew his candidacy.
Facts:
1. Plaintiff on this case is a candidate that later withdraw his candidacy, and did
not submit his statement of obligation and expenditure.
2. Election Law; Section 14 of RA No. 7166 states that every candidate has the
obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.—Section 14 of R.A.
No. 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.

Issue:
Whether Juanito C. Pilar is still liable for the violation of the Section 14 of R.A
7166 even if he already withdraw his candidacy.

Ruling:
Yes, Juanito C. Pilar is still liable for the violation of the Section 14 of RA No.
7166 even after he withdraw his candidacy.

The said Electoral Law provision states that, “ every candidate has the obligation
to file his statement of contributions and expenditures” it did not specify the status of
the candidate. While Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines states that, “ [t]he
filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.”
On this case although Juanito C. Pilar already manifested his change of heart, his
initial action of filing a candidacy makes him also responsible to file the necessary
statements and submit required forms, The rule is well recognized that where the law
does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. As the obligations are not only for
active candidates, but to all who filed their certificate of candidacy even after the
withdrawal.
Wherefore, due to lack of diligence to follow the obligations attached to filing of
candidacy, the petitioner on this case is guilty for the violation of Section 14, of R.A
7166.
Relationship to the topic:
On this case the the issue of whether a candidate that already withdrawn
candidacy are still liable to submit their statement of contribution and expenditure.
Section 14 of R.A No. 7166 states that “ every candidate has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures”, applying well distinguished rule that
where the law does not distinguish, court should not distinguish the plaintiff is still in
obligation to submit the necessary reports as withdrawal of candidacy does not negate
the candidate of the necessary compliance.

People vs. Evangelista, 253 SCRA 714, G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996
Doctrine:
If the law makes no distinction, neither should the Court.—Private respondent argues,
however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious appeals (like his
appeal notwithstanding the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction) and
unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so neither
should the Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free
and not only given probation.
Facts:
1. Grilo S. Tugonon was found guilty of Frustrated Homicide by the RTC of Misamis
Oriental and sentenced with one year of prision correccional in its minimum period
and ordered to pay to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical expense, without
subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. |The sentence was lower due to two
mitigating circumstance incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender.
2. The defendant then appealed the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals, which
modified his sentence to 2 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
3. On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probation under the
provision of P.D. No. 968. Which the chief probation and parole officers
recommended to be declined on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial
court, when he could have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the
right to make his application.
4. The RTC set aside the recommendation of the Probation officer and granted the
probation of the respondent.
5. The law being referred to, P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1990, Section 4
of the new statutes reads, “Grant of Probation.—Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.”
6. Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between
meritorious appeals (like his appeal notwithstanding the appellate court’s affirmance
of his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. The RTC on the other hand

Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for granting the probation of the private
respondent Grilo S. Tugonon.

Ruling:
Yes, the RTC’s decision is not guided by the correct application of statutory
construction on P.D. No. 1990.
The amendment of the law provides that, “xxxx That no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.” Thus the argument that a distinction should be made
between a meritorious and unmeritorious appeal can not apply. If the law makes no
distinction, neither should the Court, the provision of the law is clear, the intention of
the amendment was to not let the felons in cases to simply take their changes on
which application of law would provide a lesser sentence, as the probation's intends to
be the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated.
In this case the RTC failed to properly interpret the law. The perfection of the
appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of conviction by
the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an application
for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same “after it shall
have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal.”
Wherefore, the decision granting the parole of Grilo S. Tugonon by the RTC is
set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
Relationship to the Case:
The contention on this case is whether the Probation Law applies to appealed
cases as the RTC have decided construed, the law intends that a convicted felon to
take Probation Law as an opportunity to be reformed and rehabilitated, and not just an
option to lessen the penalty, thus the law does not make a distinction on the kind of
appeal, the moment an accused make an appeal then the Probation Law can not be
applied.

2. Words construed in their ordinary sense.

3. Exceptions in the Statue

Doctrine:
Foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
payable outside thereof, are within the coverage of the Bouncing Checks Law.—
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar
account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22). But it will be noted that the law does not
distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its
order dated July 5, 1988: “Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign
checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable
outside thereof x x x are within the coverage of said law.” De Villa vs. Court of
Appeals, 195 SCRA 722, G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991

G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B.
MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES
Tickler: EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATUTE

DOCTRINE :
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling
reasons exist to justify it.
FACTS:
Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court (Makati, Branch)
with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The accused, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ, to apply on account with an amount of U.S. $2,500.00. The check was
issued at the time the accused had no sufficient funds and later on it was dishonored
and failed to pay Lorayez.
The petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds:
a. Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
 b. No offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars,
hence the obligation created is null and void
ISSUE:
W/N a foreign check drawn against a foreign account is covered by BP22

RULING:
Yes, because under the BP22, foreign checks, provided they are drawn and issued
in the Philippines through payabale outside are within the coverage of the law.

Statcon relation:
The contention on this case is whether a foreign check issued in the Philippines is
exempted from the B.P Blg. 22. Applying the well established doctrine where the law
does not distinguish the court should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that
where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it. Since the check on this case was issued in the
Philippines and the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case foreign
check issued in the country then has no exception.

4. General Terms Following Special Terms ( Ejusdem Generis)

MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR

TRADE BOARD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK
MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK
COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979

DE CASTRO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
FACTS:

Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are engaged in the
manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines.
The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and
sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk
Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent,
Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of
Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized
for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of
local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.

Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition
for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their
respective rights and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the
Tax Code against their filled milk products.

The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal

Revenue now petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw
from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription
required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to comply
with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any
violation of the aforesaid order. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in
skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form,
from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all
the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated February 16, 1963
restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from requiring plaintiffs' private
respondents to print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words, "This milk is
not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words of similar
import, ".
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition
and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction. Petitioners therein pray that
the respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding from the action filed
by the Philippine association of Nutrition for misleading advertisement, misleading
and/or misbranding. That the petitioners’ milk was not labelled as an imitation of
cow’s milk.
The Office of the Solicitor General brought an appeal from the said order by
way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case
52276 and Special Civil Action 52383 were heard jointly being intimately related
with each other.
ISSUE: Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of Tax
Code.
RULING:

No, Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the
specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed
skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general
clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally
or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term
"skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute. The
difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the
fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but
is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or
safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also it
has been found out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private
respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all
ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with
filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having
been fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).

5. Express Mention and Implied Exclusion ( Expression Unius Est Exclusivo

Alterius)

PARAYNO V. JOVELLANOS

DOCTRINE: When the law specifically made distinctions between one from another,
the legal maxim ejusdem generis will not be used, it cannot be construed that the
former falls under the general definition of the latter. In such cases the doctrine
expressio unius est exclusio alterious will be applied.
FACTS:
Parayno, herein petitioner, is the owner of a gasoline filling station that is being
petitioned by some residents in Calasiao, It being a violation of the Official Zoning
Code of said municipality by its positon less than 100 meters from the nearest school
and it is situated in a thickly populated area which endangers the citizen on fire and
hazardous smell. The Sangguniang Bayan recommended the closure or transfer of
said gasoline station which caused the petitioner to elevate the matter in the RTC. The
petitioners argument is anchored on the fact that the ordinance prohibits “Gasoline
filling station” and that her business is a “Gasoline service station.RTC denied the
special civil action, applying the doctrine of esjudem generis stating that petitioners
business falls under the ambit of the ordinance’s prohibition. Petitioner then filed an
appeal through the Court Of Appeals which was denied hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline service station violates the Official Zoning
Code of Calasiao?
HELD:
No, it does not. The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao clearly made distinctions on
gasoline service station from gasoline filling station in its provisions and prohibited
the gasoline filling station specifically. Applying the legal maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterious it cannot be construed that the term “gasoline service station” falls
under the prohibition for “gasoline filling station it being defined, by the ordinance
itself, a completely different term.
Thus, we can conclude that the gasoline service station of the petitioner does not
violate the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao.
Relationship to the topic:
One of the principles used in statutory construction is expressio unius est exclusio
alterious which means that the express mention of one thing imples the exclusion of
others. In the instant case the Official Zoning Code made distinctions between
“gasoline service station” and “gasoline filling station” then expressly mentioned the
latter in the prohibitions. It can be deduced, using this doctrine, that they impliedly
excluded “gasoline service station” from the prohibition.

TICKLER: When “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius” is not applicable

TITLE: Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc., vs Torres
CASE NUMBER: G.R. No. 132527
DATE: July 29, 2005
PONENTE: Azcuna, J.

DOCTRINE: While it is well-established that opinions expressed in the debates and

proceedings of the Legislature, steps taken in the enactment of a law, or the history of
the passage of the law through the Legislature, may be resorted to as aids in the
interpretation of a statute with a doubtful meaning, a Committee Report which came
into being well after the enactment of the law cannot be said to form part of such
statute’s legislative history

FACTS:

RA 7227 was enacted by Congress to maximize former U.S. military bases in

Clark and Subic by converting them into special economic zones in order to promote
the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country
in general.

Specifically, the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was designed to have a
free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic
Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free
importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or
removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the
Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines. Similar
incentives can also be extended to the Clark Freeport Special Economic Zone (CSEZ)
as far as RA 7227 allows but this is to be determined by the inhabitants and local
government units affected within the limits of the laws governing this context.

However, the President issued Executive Order 80 which puts to the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) the authority to determine the policies
and tax incentives to govern CSEZ and that it would also have the same laws and
policies that SSEZ has. The BCDA promulgated Board Resolution No. 93-05-034
authorized the bringing of duty-free goods, within a certain limit, out of the CSEZ
while maintaining their tax exemptions. Executive Order No. 97-A was released by
the President and paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of that E.O. say that residents can purchase
and bring out of the Secured Area to other parts of the Philippine territory consumer
items worth not exceeding US$100 per month or to Filipino non-residents of items
worth not exceeding US$200 a year.

Also, petitioners argue that the those covered by tax incentives are the
importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only under the statutory
construction principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius or on the principle
governing expression mentions and implied exclusions.

ISSUES RELATED TO OUR SUBJECT:

1. Whether or not Executive Order 80 is an invalid executive legislation, contravening

the limits imposed by RA 7227
2. Whether or not BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 is valid, since it is based
on E.O. 80

3. Whether the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applicable in

limiting the tax incentives only to importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment.

RULING:

The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and

Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 are hereby declared NULL and
VOID and are accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Respondents are
hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provisions. All portions of
Executive Order No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the second sentences in
paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which are hereby declared INVALID.

In the absence of any express grant of tax and duty-free privileges to the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ) in R.A. No. 7227, there would be no legal basis to uphold
Section 5 of Executive Order (EO) No. 80 and Section 4 of Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA), Board Resolution No. 93-05-034—tax and duty-
free incentives being in the nature of tax exemptions, the basis thereof should be
categorically and unmistakably expressed from the language of the statute.

The second sentences of par. 1.2 and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax
and duty-free removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, from
the Secured Area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), are null and void for
being contrary to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227.

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, does not apply when words are
mentioned by way of example. The provision in question made use of the phrase
“such as” before enumerating a list of items that would be covered by the tax
incentives. This means that the Legislature intended that to be just a way of example.
To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located inside the special
economic zone only to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to
the intention of the Legislature to create a free port where the “free flow of goods or
capital within, into, and out of the zones” is insured.
6. Associated Words ( Noscitur A Sociis)
BUENASEDA VS. FLAVIER G.R. NO. 106719 SEPTEMBER 21, 1993
Quiason, J.
TICKLER: Ombudsman power to recommend or suspend
DOCTRINE: Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word “suspension” should be
given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a
particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with
which it is associated.
FACTS: The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeks to nullify the
order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr.
Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al.
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed
with the Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondents argue that the power of
preventive suspension given to the Ombudsman under Section 24 of RA No 6770:
“Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under
his authority pending an investigation,” was contemplated by Section 13(8) of Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, that the Ombudsman shall “exercise such other power or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.”
Petitioners claim that under the Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to
the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials
and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Thus,
Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension himself. Further, petitioners and
the Solicitor General invoke Sec 13(3) Article XI of the Constitution, which limits the
power of Ombudsman to: “Direct officer concerned to take appropriate action against
a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure or prosecution and ensure compliance therewith.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and
employees.
RULING:
Yes. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
The Solicitor General cannot invoke Section 13(3) Article XI of Constitution for the
suspension indicated herein are those punitive in character. When the Constitution
vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public
official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure.
All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the
rule of Noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the
other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
The Ombudsman power to preventively suspend petitioners is clearly provided in the
Sec 24 of RA No 6770. Section 24 of RA No 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the
power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative
charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is
imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.
The Ombudsman merely ordered for a preventive suspension which may be necessary
due to several causes and such office should be given the discretion to decide when
the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended. In order
to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the
Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for the office to conduct
such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, it may need to suspend the
respondent.

Relationship to the topic:

Under the doctrine of Noscitur a sociis, associated words explain and limit each other.
It is an ancient and fundamental rule in the construction of statutes that the meaning
of a doubtful word or phrase may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other
words or phrases with which it is associated and that, where several things are
referred to, they are presumed to be of the same class when connected by a copulative
conjunction, unless a contrary intent plainly appears.

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO,

Petitioners
vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PAGCOR, Respondents.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 111097
July 20, 1994
CRUZ, J.:

DOCTRINE: NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

“When a particular word used in a statute is susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated.”
FACTS: PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
However it was opposed by civic organizations, the religious elements, the women's
groups and the youth led by Mayor Magtajas and the city legislators. Since the
casino succeeded in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., renovated, equipped and prepared the same for its casino there
during the Christmas season.
Therefore Cagayan De Oro City enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the
issuance of business permit and to cancel existing business permit to any
establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for
the operation of CASINO. It also adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefor.
Petitioners contend that under the Local Government Code, LGUs are authorized and
mandated to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited
games of chance."
The Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid. Petitioner’s Motion of
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance 3353 and Ordinance 3375 are valid

RULING: NO. The aforementioned 2 ordinances are invalid.

The contention of the petitioners is untenable because under the principle noscitur a
sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted or be given the same meaning of the
words it is associated. Since under the Local Government Code, the word "gambling"
is associated with "and other PROHIBITED games of chance," the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of
chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
Further, for an ordinance to be valid, the 1st requisite is that it should not violate the
Constitution or any other statute.
In the case before us, the 2 ordinances violate PD 1869 insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino. PD 1869
allows the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in
general. It allows PAGCOR to regulate gambling not prohibited by law (casino,
lottery, horse-racing etc.) since PAGCOR is the 3rd largest source of income next to
BIR and BOC.
On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is
not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them
if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem
at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units
must prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only
those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be
read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and
mutually complementary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE TOPIC: Under the doctrine of NOSCITUR A

SOCIIS, when a particular word used in a statute is susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated.
As applied in the case, since the word "gambling" is associated with "and
other PROHIBITED games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only
illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented
or suppressed. It therefore excludes casino which is permitted by law.

7. Use of Technical Terms

8. Use of Negative Words

FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

No. L-79094
June 22, 1988
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. The use of
the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced and more importantly,
penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated
rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of respondent
Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena
City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of
Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial
conference in the Trial Court. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the
offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely
on the stipulation of facts made during the pretrial on August 8, 1985, which was not
signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence.
RULING:
Yes, because according to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, SEC. 4. “No
agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used
in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his
counsel.” Hence, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the
Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the
accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. By its very language, the
Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and
phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory. The use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced and
more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are,
by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in
favor of the accused.

Relationship to the topic: Use of Negative Words

Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. The use of
the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced and more importantly,
penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated
rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused.

9. The use of the words “May” and “Shall” in the statute

REPUBLIC VS SERENO
TICKLER: May Vs Shall, quo warranto removal of impeachable officer
DOCTRINE: Use of word ”may” in the statute generally notes a permissible thing
while the word “shall” is imperative.”
The use of the word “may” clearly shows it is directory and not mandatory.
FACTS:
* Maria Lourdes Sereno is Incumbent chief justice
* Impeachable officials can only be removed from office by impeachment
* Lack of qualifications is not grounds for impeachment, but for quo warranto
* Quo warranto and impeachment are different. By definition quo warranto relieves
the ineligible official while impeachment removes said official
* The word MAY implies permissibility, while SHALL is mandatory

ISSUE:
*Is the removal of impeachable officers only by impeachment? Or are quo warranto
actions as sailing the eligibility of an impeachable officer the exemptions?
* Can quo warranto actions essentially "remove" from office an impeachable official
by relieving them from their current duties?

RULING:
* Yes, removal is only by impeachment because quo warranto does not remove. It
relieves and disqualifes. No, quo warranto cannot remove an impeachable official
* Yes, Where the law prescribes certain qualifications for a given office or position,
courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent
which, his right or title thereto MAY be declared void. Given that may was used, it is
implied that it is within judicial power to decide on this matter.

10. The use of the word “Must”

11. The use of the term “and” and the word “or”
12. The use of the word only

ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE
MARTILLOS, respondents.
TICKLER: THE USE OF THE WORD “ONLY”
DOCTRINE: The word “only” means exclusive.
FACTS:
A complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims was filed against Roos (for
brevity) before the NLRC. Jose Martillos (Martillos, for brevity) alledged that he had
been hired as a driver-mechanic in 1988 but was not made to sign any employmen
contract by Roos. Roos contended that Martillos had been hired on several occasions
as a project employee and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of
the projects.
The Labor artiber ruled in favor of Martillos finding that he had acquired the status of
a regular employee as he was hired as a driver with little interruption from one project
to another, a task which is necessary to the usual trade of his employer. The Labor
Arbiter ordered Roos to pay Martillos the aggregate sum of P224,647.17 representing
backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay and 13th monh pay.

Roos filed an appeal however instead of posting the required cash or surety bond
within the reglementary period, Roos filed a motion for extension of time to
submit/post surety bond.

The 2nd Division of the NLRC dismissed Roos’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction stating
that the bond is an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer and that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary perion and in
the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Roos elevated the dismissal to the CA but the resolution of the NLRC was affirmed.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the appeal bond is substantial compliance with
the NLRC rules.

RULING:
NO. The NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal within the ten
(10)-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal as the appeal bond was filed eight
(8) days after the last day thereof.

The appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. The Court reiterates the
settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary
award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten
(10) days from such decision. The appeal bond is not merely procedural but
jurisdictional. Without said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the
appeal. Indeed, non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. It must be stressed that there is
no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of
statute.

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal
may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The overpowering
legislative intent of Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of the appeal
bond requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a burden
imposed on the employer. The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an
indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored
by the provision that an appeal may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond.” The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS
intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive
means by which an employer’s appeal may be considered completed. The law
however does not require its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to
ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. What petitioners
have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of such bond. The
overpowering legislative intent of Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of
the appeal bond requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a
burden imposed on the employer (Borja Estate v Balad, G.R. No. 152550, June 8,
2005).

13. Computation of Time

G.R. No. 98382
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents

DOCTRINE:
Week is a term interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven
consecutive days. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary)

FACTS:
Petitioner, Philippine National Bank, filed a complaint seeking for the decision of
the Court of Appeals to be reversed with the prayer for respondent, Epifanio De La
Cruz, to answer for damages and other equitable remedies.
Petitioner, consolidated ownership of the two parcels of land mortgaged to it by
the respondent who alleged that the former unlawfully foreclosed the said properties.
The two lots were mortgaged to guarantee three promissory notes with the date of
maturity on November 10, 1958. The third promissory note, however, contains a
clerical error regarding the date of issuance which the respondent claims that it should
have been on June 30 in year 1961 instead of 1958. Nevertheless, a fact cannot be
overlooked that the latter still failed to pay the first two promissory notes payable
within 69 and 49 days, which resulted to the foreclosure of the said lots.
Consequently, the foreclosure petition of the two mortgaged lots was granted by
Sheriff Leopoldo Palad of the Sheriff’s Office at Malolos, Bulacan. Afterwards, the
Notice of Sale of the said foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11
and April 12, 1969. Based on the aforementioned facts, the Court of First Instance
dismissed the complaint of the respondent against the petitioner bank.
As a result, respondent filed for an appeal in the appellant court, which resolved
to give course to the petition. The court opined that PNB (Philippine National Bank),
failed to comply with Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requiring the notice of auction sale to
be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks. It also quoted the rule
on the Jalandoni vs. Ledesma case that the rule on statutory provisions governing
publication of notice of mortgaged foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with
and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale
at least voidable. It also based its ruling on the case of Tambunting vs. Court of
Appeals which held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance
with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and
that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice
insufficient and vitiate the sale. For this reason, the Court of Appeals declared the
auction sale as absolutely void and that the Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of Sale
and Affidavit of Consolidation are likewise of no legal effect.
Under these circumstances, PNB, the petitioner, filed the present petition praying for
the decision of the Court of Appeals to be reversed. He claimed that there is no breach
of the aforementioned provision even if the third publication was made only a day
after the second publication since it is enough that the second publication be made on
any day within the second week and the third publication, on any day within the third
week. On the contrary, the respondent, believes that the period between each
publication must never be less than seven consecutive days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid compliance of the petitioner bank regarding the
required weekly publication of the notice of sale on extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage?

RULING:
No, petitioner bank did not comply with the requirement of weekly publication.
According to Moreno, in his Philippine Law Dictionary, the definition of “week” was
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days.
Applying this meaning, the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be
construed as sufficient advertisement for the second week because the period for the
first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the
second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear
that the second publication by the petitioner was both theoretically and physically
accomplished during the first day of the third week. Thus, the second publication
cannot be equated with compliance in law nor to the intention of the lawmakers when
Act No. 3135 was enacted. That being the case, the petition was dismissed and the
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Relationship to the topic:

 It is related to the topic on “Computation of Time” because the case highlighted
the importance of referring to the meaning of the word “week” itself when the law is
silent.
In the case, Article 13 of the New Civil Code is completely silent in regard to the
definition of “week”. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still rendered judgment, with
reference to the Philippine Law Dictionary of Moreno stating that “week” is
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven days. Because of this, the
term was used as a measure of duration. The Supreme Court on its ruling, expressed
this point by stating that it would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as
reckoning point, in line with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code,
for the purpose of counting the first week of publication as to make the last day
thereof on April 4, 1969 for the reason that this will have the effect of extending the
first week by another day.

FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees

vs.
JUAN CARPIO, defendant-appellant
DOCTRINE:
Section 13 of the Administrative Code provides as follows:
“In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act
required by law or contract to be done at a certain time or within a certain limit of
time, the day of date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and
the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided.”
FACTS:
The litigants compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if within
one month from the date the plaintiffs failed to repurchase the certain land, the
defendant would vest its ownership.
The court held in the affirmative, but the defendant appealed and contend that on
August 13 when the plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated period already elapsed. The
determination of the termination of the stipulated month depends upon the kind of
month agreed upon by the parties and on the day from it should be counted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land within the stipulated
period?
RULING:
Yes.
As to the kind of month, the ruling in the case of Guzman v. Lichauco, Article 7 of
the Civil Code had been modified by Section 13 of the Administrative Code,
according to which “month” now means the civil and calendar month and not the
regular thirty-day month.
The civil or solar month is defined as that which agrees with the Gregorian calendar;
and these months are known by the names of January, February, March, etc. They are
composed of unequal portions of time. And the calendar month is a month as
designated in the calendar, without regard to the number of days it may contain.
As to when the said month began, Section 13 of the Administrative Code provides:
“In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act
required by law or contract to be done at a certain time or within a certain limit of
time, the day of date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and
the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided.”
According to the phrase contained, “one month from this date” which was July 13,
1928 is exactly the date which must be excluded being the “day from which the time
is reckoned” according to the words of Section 13 of the Administrative Code.
The court ruled that the civil month of thirty-one days began on July 14 and
terminated with the end of the thirteenth day of the following August. It has been
proved without discussion that the plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land from the
defendant on August 13th, it follows that offer was made within the period stipulated.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE TOPIC
The case of Gutierrez v. Carpio is related to the topic of Computation in Time
because the Supreme Court ruled the case by applying the doctrine in Section 13 of
the Administrative Code which states that: “In computing any fixed period of time,
with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a
certain time or within a certain limit of time, the day of date, or day from which the
time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless
otherwise provided.” The issue at hand was resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. And the
repurchase of land from the defendant on August 13th was made within the period
stipulated.

14. Function of the Proviso

ALU-TUCP vs National Labor Relations Commission and National Steel

Corporation
GR No. 109902

TICKLER: Function of the proviso

DOCTRINE: The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with

reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached,
and not to other sections thereof, unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or
qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier
provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) declaring the petitioners as project employees of private respondent National
Steel Corporation (NSC). Petitioners were employed by NSC in connection with its
Five Year Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II) for varying lengths of time when they
were separated from NSC's service thus they filed complaints for unfair labor
practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC. After the hearing, the
Labor Arbiter declared the petitioners as “regular project employees” who shall
continue their employment as such for as long as the project exists and who shall be
entitled to the salary of a regular employee. Both parties appealed the decision, which
was later affirmed with modifications by the NLRC declaring that the petitioners were
“project employees” and set aside the award to the petitioners of the same benefits
enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis. The petitioners then
invoke Article 280 of the Labor Code arguing that they are “regular” employees
because their jobs are necessary, desirable and work-related to NSC's main business
and also because they have rendered service for six years or more to NSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were properly characterized as “project

employees” rather than “regular employees” of National Steel Corporation.

RULING: Yes, the petitioners were properly characterized as “project employees”.

The employment of each "project worker" is dependent and co-terminous with the
completion or termination of the specific activity or undertaking [for which] he was
hired which has been pre-determined at the time of engagement. Since, there is no
showing that they (13 complainants) were engaged to perform work-related activities
to the business of respondent which is steel-making, there is no logical and legal sense
of applying to them the proviso under the second paragraph of Article 280 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment — The provisions of the written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, and employment shall be deemed to be regular where
the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least
one year service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.

The present case therefore strictly falls under the definition of "project employees" on
paragraph one of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended. Moreover, it has been
held that the length of service of a project employee is not the controlling test of
employment tenure but whether or not "the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee".
The petitioners' claim that they should be qualified as regular employees because they
have rendered more that six years of service to NSC lacks legal basis. The proviso in
the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code which states that an employee
who has served for at least one year shall be considered a regular employee relates to
casual employees and not to project employees.
In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 11 this Court
ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 relates only to casual
employees and is not applicable to those who fall within the definition of said Article's
first paragraph, i.e., project employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso
is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to
which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof, unless the clear legislative
intent is to restrict or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso
but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such
intent is observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which has been quoted
earlier.Hence, petition dismissed.