PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)

Right Of Accession
 Concept
 General Principles
 Kinds of Accession
• Accession Discreta
 Concept:
Art. 440 – The ownership of property gives the right by
• Accession Continua accession to everything which is produced thereby or
attached and incorporated thereto, either naturally or
• Over Immovables artificially

• Artificial or Industrial  Right of the owner to extend ownership over whatever

• Natural
• Over Movables
• Conjuncti on and Adjunction
• Commixtion and Confusion
• Specification
is incorporated to his property ei ther naturally or
artificially
 Not a mode of acqui ring ownershi p but an incident of
ownership
 Consequence of owners hip
 Accessory loses i ts indiv iduality when uni ted with the
principal
 It does not depend on new title

 Two Kinds
a. Accession Discreta (fruits)
b. Accession Continua

 General Principles
 Applicable to both acces sion continua and disc reta
 Accessory foll ows the principal
 No one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of
another

 Applicable to Accession Discreta:

 Owner of Principal owns the fruits (Art. 441)
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 Obligation of the owner to pay for the production,
gathering and preserv ati on (Art. 443)
 Applicable to Discreta al one: to the owner belongs the
fruits
 Applicable to Accession Continua
 Art. 445 and Art. 446 (BPS )
Bad faith = liability for damages and other consequences
Bad fai th of one party neutralizes bad faith of the
other
 Applicable to Accession continua alone:
1. Whatever is BPS belongs to the owner and he is
presumed to have been the BPS
 Accession Discreta
 Fruits are all periodical additions to the principal
produced by forc es inherent to the thing
- Increases or adds to the original thing
- At repeated intervals
- By inherent forces
 Kinds
1. Natural: spontaneous products of the soil; young of
animals; products of ani mals. Young of animals belong
to the owner of the Female
2. Industrial: produced by the land through labor or
cultivation
- Note: Natural and industrial fruits – only
from separation
3. Civil: rents of buildings, leases of land and amount from
annuities and similar inc ome (accrue from day to day)
4. Expenses for productio n, gathering and
preservation: to be pai d by receiver of frui ts
 Reimbursement for expenses
• Made even if the c ost>v alue of fruits , regardless of
good or bad faith. However, owner may choose to not
pay provided the fruits are given to the PG P
• Applies only to fruits whi ch have been gathered
(received)
• Basis: no unjust enrichment
• Costs must be commens urate to the normal needs of
annual production (not only for mere enhancement or
improvement of the estate, or luxury) and mus t not be
superflous.
 Cases:
1) Bachrach v Siefert : Upon a closer scrutiny of the record
however, not only of this case (G. R. No. L -1592) but also of G.
R. No. L -1379 of which we take judicial notice, for whic h
reason, said last case was cited and referred to for purposes of
background so as to giv e a clea r understanding of the facts in
this case, we find that the allowanc e being paid to the hei rs are
really not paid from the personal funds of the administratrix but
from the cash corresponding to the ½ of the estate adjudicated
to the heirs, which cash, is deposited in the bank. According to
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the decision of the Supreme Court in the mandamus case (G. R.
No. L -1379) promulgated on December 19, 1947, the
administratrix had in her possession the sum of P351,116.91
which has already been adjudicated to and belong s,
although pro indiviso, to the hei rs of the deceased E. M.
Bachrach and that furthermore, the monthly allowances being
paid to the hei rs or due them should be paid from this sum and
not from the personal funds of the administratrix Mary
McDonald Bachrach . Furthermore, the very order of the lower
court of October 2, 1940, authorizing the administratrix to pay
to the heirs the monthly allowances already mentioned,
stipulated in its fourth paragraph that said allowances should
be taken from the properties to be turned over to the heirs of the
deceased E. M. Bachrac h and shall be deducted from the share
of said heirs upon the death of the widow..
In the opinion of this Court, the cash in the possession of the
administratrix corresponding to the ½ of the estate adjudicated
to the heirs is sufficient for the monthly allowances being paid
to the heirs and that there is no necessity for the sale of the ½
of the estate corresponding to them. The main objection to the
heirs to the sale of ½ of the es tate adjudicated to them, which
½ besides the cash al ready mentioned, consist mostly of
shares of stock, is that s aid shares i f sold now may not
command a goo d price and that furthermore said heirs prefer to
keep said shares intact as long as there is no real necessity for
their sale. Of course, once said cash in the hands of the
administratrix, corresponding to the heirs is exhausted
because of the payment of the allowances made to the heirs,
some other arrangements might be necessary. The
administratrix would then have a right and reason to refuse the
payment of said allowances from her said personal funds or
from the fruits of the estate, which as a usufructu ary, belong to
her during her lifetime. But, until that point is reached, we see
no valid reason for ordering the sal e of the ½ of the estate
belonging to the heirs over thei r objecti on.
2. Bachrach v. Talisay Silay : The appellant bank bases
its preferential ri ght upon the contenti on that the bonus
in question is civil fruits of the l ands which the owners
had mortgaged for the benefit of the central givi ng the
bonus, and that, as civil fruits of said land, said bonus
was assigned by Mariano Lacson Ledesma on M arch 7,
1930, by virtue of the document Exhi bit 9 of said
intervening instituti on, which admitted in i ts brief that "if
the bonus in ques tion is not civil fruits or rent which
became subject to the mortgage in favor of the
Philippine National Bank when Mar iano Lacson
Ledesma's pers onal obli gation fell due, the assignment
of March 7, 1930 (Exhibit 9, P.N.B.), is null and voi d, not
because it is fraudulent, for there was no i ntent of fraud
in executing the deed, but that the cause or
consideration of the assi gnment was erroneous , for it
was based upon the proposition that the bonus was civil
fruits of the land mortgaged to the Philippine National
Bank." (P. 31.)
The fundamental question, then, submitted to our consideration
is whether or not the bonus in quest i on is civil fruits.
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This is how the bonus c ame to be granted: On December 22,
1923, the Talisay -Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the
Philippine National Bank . To secure the payment of its debt, it
succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano
Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the creditor bank.
And in order to compens ate those planters for the risk they
were running wi th their property under the mortgage, the
aforesaid central , by a resolution passed on that same date,
i.e., December 22, 1923, undertook to credit the owners of the
plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two
per centum of the debt secured according to yearly balance, the
payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from time
to time, as so on as the c entral became free of its obligations to
the aforesaid bank, and of those c ontracted by virtue of the
contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so used,
or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such
payment. (Exhibi ts 5, 6; P.N.B.)
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil
fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second, the proceeds from
leases of lands; and, thi rd, the income from perpetual or life
annuities, or other similar sources of revenue. I t may be noted
that according to the context of the law, the phrase "u otras
analogas" refers only to rent or income, for the
adjectives "otras" and "analogas" agree with the
noun "rentas," as do als o the other
adjectives "perpetuas" and "vitalicias." That is why we say that
by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only
three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and
certain kinds of inc ome.
As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the
only meani ng of "civil fruits" left to be examined is that of
"income."
Assuming that in broad j uridical sense of the word "income" it
might be said that the bonus in ques tion is "i ncome" under
article 355 of the Civil Code, i t is obvious to inquire whether it
is derived from the land mortgaged by Mari ano Lacson
Ledesma to the appell ant bank for the benefi t of the central; for
it is not obtained from that land but from somethi ng else, i t is
not civil fruits of that land, and the bank 's contention is
untenable.
It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but
only a remote accidental relation to the land menti oned, having
been granted as compensation for the risk of havi ng subjected
one's land to a lien in favor of the bank , for the benefit of the
entity g ranting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil frui ts
of anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one
chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing
the danger for the protection of the central, but certainly it is
not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which,
as far as this case is concerned, has nothing to do with it.
Hence, the amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of
the central granting i t, is not based upon the value, importance
or any other circumstanc e of the mortgaged property, but upon
the total value of the debt thereby secured, according to the
annual balance, which is something quite dis tinct from and
independent of the property referred to.
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 Accession Continua over Immovables
 Artificial or Industrial (BPS)
 Natural
 Accretion Alluvium
 Avulsion
 Change of Course of the River
 Formation of Islands
Notes: * Planti ng – giv es rise to permanent trunks which
produces the fruits; sowi ng – one single crop per deposit of
seed
 Principle that accessory follows the principal
 Owner Builds Plants and Sows (LEGEND: LO=LAND
OWNER, OM=OWNER O F MATERIALS, GF=GOOD
FAITH, BF=BAD FAITH , BPS=BUILDS, PLANTS AND
SOWS)
 Article sources:
a. Art. 447: The owner of the land who makes thereon,
personally or through another, plantings, constructions
or works with the materi als of another, shall pay their
value; and if he acted i n bad faith, he shall also be
obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the
materials shall have the right to remove them only in
case he can do so without injury to the work
constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or
work without being destroyed. However, if the
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the m aterials
may remove them in any event, with a right to be
indemnified for damages .
b. Art. 449: He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is buil t, planted or sown
without right to indemnity.
c. Art. 453: If there was bad faith, not only on the part of
the person who buil t, planted or sowed on the land of
another, but also on the part of the owner of such land,
the rights of one and the other s hall be the same as
though both had acted in good faith. It is unders tood
that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and
without opposi tion on hi s part.
* BASED ON THE GRAPH:
1) LO IS IN GOOD FAITH, OM IS IN GOO D FAITH: LO acqui res
the BPS after paying indemnity f or val ue of materials , OM may
(1) remove BPS if no inj ury to work cons tructed or (2) receive
indemnity for value (Art. 447)
2) LO IS IN GOOD FAITH, OM IS IN BAD FAITH: LO may
acquire without paying i ndemnity , OM loses the mats without
indemnity. Analogous application of Art. 449
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3) LO IS IN BAD FAITH, OM IS IN GOOD FAITH: LO acquires
the BPS after paying indemnity for damages subject to OM’s
right to remove. OM may remove the materials in any event and
be indemnifi ed for damages (Art. 447)
4) LO IS IN BA D FAITH, OM IS IN BAD FAITH: Similar to LO
and OM in GF (Art. 453)
 Notes:
a. LO is in GF if he believes that the materials belong to
him and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
Howev er, negligence may subject him to liability for
damages
b. LO is in BF if he knows of his lack of title and absence
of permission of the owner of the materials
c. OM is in GF if he is ignorant of the acts of the LO
d. OM is in BF if he all ows LO to use his materials without
protest
 3rd party BPS and OM
*Article sou rces:
*Article sources:
Art. 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay
the expenses made by a third person in thei r production,
gathering, and preservation. (356)
Art. . 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally
or through a nother, plantings, constructions or works with the
materials of another, shall pay thei r value; and, if he acted in
bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages.
The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them
only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed,
or without the plantings, constructions or works being
destroyed. However, if the landowner acted i n bad faith, the
owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a
right to be indemnified f or damages . (360a)
Art. 448. The owner of the land on whic h anythi ng has been
built, sown or planted in good fai th, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articl es 546 a nd 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who s owed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the buildi ng or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the buil ding or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties s hall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof. (361a)
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land
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of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity. (362)
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, planted or s own in bad faith may demand the demolition
of the work, or that the pl anting or sowing be removed, in order
to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, pl anted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the
proper rent.(363a)
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the
landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or
sower. (n)
Art. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to
reimbursement for the necessary expenses of preservation of
the land. (n)
Art. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the
person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but
also on the part of the owner of s uch land, the rights of one and
the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good
faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the
landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and
without opposi tion on hi s part. (354a)
Art. 454. When the land owner acted in bad faith and the builder,
planter or sower proceeded in good fai th, the provisions of
article 447 shall apply. (n)
Art. 455. If the materials , plants or seeds belong to a third
person who has not acted in bad faith, the owner of the land
shall answer subsidi arily for their val ue and only in the event
that the one who made use of them has no property with which
to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner makes use of the
right granted by article 450. If the owner of the materials, p l ants
or seeds has been paid by the buil der, planter or sower, the
latter may demand from the landowner the value of the
materials and labor. (365a)
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is t he subjec t matter of the
action. He need not be i n possession of said property.
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in
good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the ex penses or of paying the i ncrease in value
which the thing may hav e acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be
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refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the
ornaments with whic h he has embellished the principal thing if
it suffers no inj ury th ereby, and if his successor in the
possession does not prefer to refund the amount
expended. (454)
*BASED ON THE GRAPH S:
 > GRAPH #1: ((LEGEND: LO=LAND OWNER,
OM=OWNER OF MATERIALS, GF=GOOD FAITH,
BF=BAD FAITH, BPS=BUILDS, PLANTS AND SOWS)
1) LO IS IN GOOD FAITH, BPS IN GOOD FAITH: LO has the
option to: a) Sell the land (unl ess value of land >BP rent) or
b) Acquire the BPS after payment of indemnity ( orig cost or
BPS or inc. in v alue) (Art. 546, 548). If LO chooses b, BPS may
retain until indemnity is paid
2) LO IS IN GOOD FAITH, BPS IN BAD FAITH: LO: 1. Option to
(a) get improv ements w/o paying indemnity + damages or (b)
sell land to BP/rent to S + damages or (c) order demolition of
work + damages & 2. Pay necessary expenses for preservation
(Arts. 449-451). BPS (1) Loses BPS w/o right to indemnity (2)
Recover necessary expenses for preservation of the land & (3)
pay damages to the LO Art (449 -452)
3) LO IS IN BAD FAITH, BPS IN GOOD FAITH: LO must
indemnify BPS + Damages and can’t compel B to buy land . BPS
may remove imp in any event and/or be indemnified for
damages
4) LO IS IN BAD FAITH, BPS IN BAD FAITH : Simi lar to LO and
BPS in GF (Art. 453)
NOTES:
1) GF of BPS lies in his beli ef that the land belongs to him,
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his ti tl e; BF
lies in his knowledge of his lack of title and absence of
permission of the LO
2) GF of LO lies in his ignorance of the acts of the BPS or
the belief the BPS has the right to build, etc.
3) Title to the accessory does not pass until there i s
payment for indemni ty
4) Failure of the builder to pay for the land destroy s the
right of retention (Bernardo v. Bataclan)
5) BPS may record right to i ndemnity as a lien and in case
of successive alienations of the land, recov ery may be
against present owner who acquires in BF
6) Does not apply
a. Usufruc t
b. Lease (Gemiano v. CA, Nicolas)
c. Owner who builds, sells land but not
improvements
d. Co-owners
7) BPS with permission of LO both in GF actually, both in
BF (Bernardo v . Bataclan, de Guzman v. Fuente and
Felices )
 Cases:
a. Bernardo v. Bataclan: The Civil Code c onfirms
certain time-honored pri nciples of the law of
property. One of thes e i s the pri nciple of
accession where by the owner of property
acquires not only that which it produces but that
which is united to it either naturally or
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artificially. (Art. 353.) Whatever is built, planted
or sown on the land of another, and the
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong
to the owner of the l and (art. 358). Where,
however, the planter, builder, or sower has
acted in good fai th, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners and it becomes necessary
to protect the owner of the improvements
without causing i njustice to the ow ner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating
what Manresa calls a state of "forced
coowners hip" (vol . 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law
has provided a just and equitable solution by
giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvem ents after payment of the proper
indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to
pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper
rent (art. 361). It is the owner of the land who is
allowed to exercise the option because his right
is older and becaus e, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing (3 Manresa, 4th ed., p. 213). In
the case before us, the plaintiff, as owner of the
land, chose to require the defendant, as owner
of the improvements, to pay for the land.
The defendant s tates that he is a possessor in
good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is
entitled has not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he
says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance with
the provisions of articl e 453 of the C ivil Code. We do not
doubt the validity of the premises stated. " Considera la
ley tan saarada y legitima la deuda, que, hasta que sea
pagada, no consiente que la cosa se restituya all
vencedor." (4 Manresa, 4th ed, p., 304.) We find,
however, that the defendant has l ost his right of
retention. In obedience to the decision of this court in
G.R. No. 37319, the pl ai ntiff expressed his desire to
require the defendant to pay for the v alue of the land.
The said defendant coul d have become owner of both
land and improvements and continued in posses sion
thereof. But he said he c ould not pay and the land was
sold at public auc tion to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we
have already said, requi res no more than that the owner
of the land shoul d choos e between indemnifying the
owner of the improvements or requiring the l atter to pay
for the land. When he failed to pay for the l and, the
defendant herein lost his right of retention.
The sale at public auction having been asked by the
plaintiff himself (p. 22, bill of exceptions) and the
purchase price of P8,000 received by him from Toribio
Teodoro, we find no reason to justi fy a rapture of the
situation thus created between them, the
defendant-appell ant not being enti tled, after all, to
recover from the plaintiff the s um of
P2,212. lawphi1.net
b. Ignacio v. Hilario: The Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan between the herein respondents
Elias Hil ario and his wife Dionisia Dres as
plaintiffs, and the herein petitioners Damian,
Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as
defendants, concerning the ownership of a
parcel of land, partly ric e -land and partly
residential . After the trial of the case, the lower
court, presided over by Hon. Alfonso Felix,
rendered judgment holdi ng plaintiffs as the l egal
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owners of the whole prope rty but conceding to
defendants the ownershi p of the houses and
granaries built by them on the residential portion
with the ri ghts of a possessor in good faith, in
accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.
c. Sarmiento v. Agana: The Municipal Court found
The plaintiffs prayed for an order of execu tion
alleging that since they chose neither to pay
defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them
the residential l ot, said defendants should be
ordered to remove the structure at their own
expense and to restore plaintiffs in the
possession of sai d lot.
The owner of the buildi ng erected in good faith on
a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value
of his buildi ng, under article 453. The owner of
the land, upon the other hand, has the option,
under article 361, either to pay for the building or
to sell his l and to the owner of the building. But
he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both
to pay for the building and to sell the land and
compel the owner of the building to remove it
from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to
such remotion only when, after having chosen to
sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the
same. But this is not the case before us.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge
Natividad compelling defendant s-petitioners to
remove their buildings from the land belonging to
plaintiffs -respondents only because the latter
chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell
the land, is null and void, for it amends
substantially the judgment sought to be executed
and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and
453 of the Civil Code.
that private respondents had built the
RESIDENTIAL HO USE i n good faith, and,
disregardi ng the testimony of ERNESTO, that it
had a val ue of P20,000.00. It then ordered
ERNESTO and wife to v acate the LAND after
SARMIENTO has paid them the mentioned sum
of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of
First Ins tance of Pas ay where, after the
submission of memoranda, said Cour t rendered
a modifying Decision under Article 448 of the
Civil Code. SARMIENTO was required, within 60
days, to exercise the option to reimburse
ERNESTO and wife the s um of 40,000.00 as the
value of the RESIDENTIAL HO USE, or the
option to allow them to pur chase the LAND for
P25,000.00. SARMIENTO did not exercise any
of the two options within the indicated period,
and ERNESTO was then allowed to deposit the
sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the
purchase price for the LAND. This is the hub of
the controvers y. SARMIENTO then instituted the
instant certiorari proceedings.
We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders
in good faith in view of the peculiar
circumstances under whi ch they had
constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far
as they knew, the LAND was owne d by
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ERNESTO's mother -in-law who, having stated
they could build on the property, could
reasonably be expected to later on give them the
LAND.
SC: The provision for the exercise by petitioner
SARMIENTO of either the option to indemnify
private respondents in the amount of
P40,000.00, or the option to allow private
respondents to purchase the LAND at
P25,000.00, i n our opinion, was a correct
decision.
d. Depra v. Dumlao: Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco
Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered
under T ransfer Certi ficate of Title No. T3087,
known as Lot No. 685, situated in the
municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of
approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin
Dumlao, defendant -appellant, owns an
adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with a n
approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed
his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had
encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square
meters of DEPRA's property, After the
encroachment was discovered in a relocation
survey of DEPRA's lot made on November
2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a
demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back
from his encroachment, filed an action for
Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973 against
DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of of Duman gas,
docketed as Civil Case No 1, Said complaint was
later amended to include DEPRA as a party
plain. plaintiff.
After trial , the Municipal Court found that
DUMLAO was a buil der i n good faith, and
applying Article 448 of the Civil Code said that
their was lease. No forc ed lease.
Reversed by the SC: apply the provisions.
Choose whether to pay for the improv ements or
to sell the 34 sqm land.
e. Technogas Phils v CA: Technogas bought land
and building. Building encroaches area of
another property. TC hel d that Technogas was B
in GF, CA reversed on the basis that as owner of
the property, technogas must know the bounds
of its property, thus in BF.
SC: GF builder. AS buyer, technogas inherited
its predecessor’s GF. LO must exercise option
to either sell the land or buy the building.
The private respondent's insistence on the
removal of the encroachi ng structures as the
proper remedy, whic h respondent Court
sustained in its assailed Decisions, is thus
legally flawed. This is not one of the remedi es
bestowed upon him by law. It would be av ailable
only if and when he c hooses to compel the
petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable pric e
but the latter fai ls to pay such price. 3 3 This has
not taken place. Hence, his options are limi ted
to: (1) appropri ating the encroaching porti on of
petitioner's building after payment of proper
indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot
occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a
remedy of his own liking.
Prepared by Team Bessy  11
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
f . Ortiz v. Kayanan, 92 SCRA 146: Possessor,
Ward, awarded to ward’s heirs. Possession in
GF. Possession in GF of Ortiz ended when he
was summoned to Court. We hold, therefore,
that the disputed tolls , after deducting
petitioner's expenses for administration, belong
to Quirino Comintan, owner of the land through
which the toll road passed, further considering
that the same was on portions of the property on
which petitioner had not introduced any
improvement. The trial court itself clarified this
matter when it placed the toll road under
receivership. The omission of any mention of the
tolls in the decision itself may be attributed to
the fact that the tolls appear to have been
collected after the rendition of the judgment of
the tri al court.
g. Geminiano v. CA, 259 SCRA 10: ISSUES: (1)
Whether or not the private respondents are
builders in good faith or mere lessees? (2)
Whether or not the alleged promise to sell of the
petitioners is valid? (3) Which provision of the
law governs the case at bench: Art. 448 or Art.
1678? SC HELD: (1) Being mere lessees , the
private respondents knew that their occupation
of the premises would continue only for the life
of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be consider ed
as possessors nor builders in good faith. It has
been said that while the right to let property is an
incident of title and poss ession, a person may be
a lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to
the tenant although he i s not the owner of the
premises let. After al l, ownership of the property
is not being transferred, only the temporary use
and enjoyment thereof. In this case, both parties
admit that the land in question was origi nally
owned by the peti tioners ' mother. The l and was
allegedly acqui r ed later by one Mari a Lee by
virtue of an ex trajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of
possession in order that she gain possession of
the property i n questi on. That’s why the
petitioners' mother therefore remained i n
possession of the lot. It is undisputed that the
private respondents came into possessi on of a
126 square-meter portion of the said lot by virtue
of a contract of lease ex ecuted by the
petitioners' mother in their favor. The juri dical
relation between the petitio ners ' mother as
lessor, and the priv ate respondents as lessees,
is therefore well -establis hed, and carries with it
a recogni tion of the l essor's title. The private
respondents, as lessees who had undis turbed
possession for the entire term under the lease,
are then estopped to deny their l andlord's title,
or to assert a better ti tle not only in themselv es,
but also in some third person while they remain
Prepared by Team Bessy  12
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
in possession of the leased premises and until
they surrender possession to the landlord. This
estoppel ap plies even though the lessor had no
title at the time the rel ation of lessor and lessee
was created, and may be asserted not only by
the origi nal lessor, but also by those who
succeed to his title. (2) NO. The alleged
promise of the petitioners to sell the lot
occupied by the private respondents' house
was not substantiated by convincing
evidence. Neither the deed of sale over the
house nor the contrac t of lease contained an
option in favour of the respondent spouses to
purchase the said lot. And even if th e petitioners
indeed promised to sell, it would not make the
private respondents possessors or builders in
good faith s o as to be covered by the provisions
of Articl e 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot
raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the
aforementioned lot because the alleged promise
to sell was not fulfill ed nor its existence even
proven. The fi rst thing that the private
h. Pleasantville Dev’t Corp v. CA, 253 SCRA 10:
respondents should have done was to reduce
the alleged promise into writing, because under
Article 1403 of the Civil Code , an agreement for
the sale of real property or an interest therein is
unenforceable, unless some note or
memorandum thereof be produced. Not having
taken any steps i n order that the alleged promise
to sell may be enforc ed, the private respondents
cannot bank on that promise and profess any
claim nor colour of title over the lot in question.
(3) ART. 1678 applies. The rights of the priv ate
respondents as lessees are governed by Article
1678 of the Civil Code which allows
reimbursement to the extent of one-half of
the value of the useful improvements . It must
be stressed, however, that the right to
indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil
Code arises only if the lessor opts to
appropriate the improvements . Since the
petitioners refused to ex ercise that option, the
private respondents cannot compel them to
reimburse the one -hal f v alue of the house and
improvements. Nei ther c an they retain the
premises until reimbursement is made. The
private respondents' sol e right then is to remov e
the improvements witho ut causing any more
impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
ISSUES:(1) Whether or not Keewas a builder in
good faith? SC HELD:Yes, Kee was a builder in
good faith. Good faith consists in the beli ef
of the builder that the land he is building on
is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw
in his title. And as good faith is presumed,
petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith
Prepared by Team Bessy  13
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
on the part of Kee. At the time he built
improvements on Lot 8, Ke e believed that
said lot was w hat he bought from petitioner.
He was not aware that the lot delivered to him
was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith.
Petitioner failed to prove otherwise. We agree
with the foll owing observation of the Court of
Appeals:"The roots of the controversy can be
traced di rectly to the errors committed by
CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong property to
Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly
improbable that a purchaser of a lot would
knowingly and willingly build his residence
on a lot ow ne d by another, deliberately
exposing himself and his family to the risk of
being ejected from the land and losing all
improvements thereon, not to mention the
social humiliation that would follow . "Under
the circ umstances, Kee had acted in the manner
of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of
his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer
Certi ficate of Titl e No. T -69561, while Lot 9 is
identified in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-106367. Hence, under the Torrens system of
land regis tration, Kee is pr esumed to have
knowledge of the metes and bounds of the
property with which he is dealing. . . ."But as Kee
is a layman not versed in the technical
description of his property, hehad to find a way
to ascertain that what was described in TCT No.
69561matche d Lot 8. Thus, he went to the
subdivision developer's agent and applied and
paid for the relocati on of the lot, as well as for
the production of a lot pl an by CTTEI's geodetic
engineer. Upon Kee's receipt of the map, his
wife went to the subdivision site a ccompanied by
CTTEI's employee, Octaviano, who
authoritatively decl ared that the land s he was
pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith
and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI,
and because of the company's positive
identification of the property, K ee saw no
reason to suspect that there had been a
misdelivery. The s teps Kee had taken to protect
his interes ts were reasonable. There was no
need for him to have acted ex -abundantia
cautela, such as being present during the
geodetic engineer's relocation survey or hi ring
an independent geodetic engineer to
countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of
subdivision lots to their owners is part of the
regular course of everyday businessof CTTEI.
Because of CTTEI's blunder, what Kee had
hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kee's
efforts all went to naught." To demonstrate
Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's
violation of paragraphs22 and 26 of the
Contract of Sale on Installment.We
disagree.Such violations have no bearing
whatsoever on whether Kee was abuilder in
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the
time he built the improvements onLot 9.
These alleged violati ons may give rise to
petitioner's cause of action against Kee under
the said contract (contractual breach), but may
not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee
was a builder in good faith. Petitioner also
points out that, as found by the trial court,
the Contract of Sale on Installment covering
Lot 8 between it and Kee was rescinded long
before the present action was institu ted. This
has no relevance on the liability of petitioner,
as such fact does not negate the negligence
of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot to
Kee. Such ci rcumstance is relevant only as it
gives Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful
detainer again st Kee. Petitioner next contends
that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was
erroneously pointed out to him" because the
i.
latter agreed to the following provision in the
Contract of Sale on Installment , to wit: "13.
The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the
execution of his contract he/she has personally
examined or inspected the property made
subject-matter hereof, as to its location,
contours, as well as the natural condition of the
lots and from the date hereof whatever
consequential change therein ma de due to
erosion, the said Vendee shall bear the
expenses of the necessary fillings, when the
same is so desi red by hi m/her." The subjec t
matter of this provision of the contrac t is the
change of the l ocation, c ontour and condition of
the lot due to erosi on. It merely provides that the
vendee, havi ng examined the property pri or to
the execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder
the expenses resul ting from such change. We do
not agree w ith the interpretation of petitioner
that Kee contracted aw ay his righ t to recover
damages resulting from petitioner's
negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to
public policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights
may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudi ci al to a thi rd person with a
right recognized by law."
Felices v. Iriole, GR No. 115814 May 26, 1995:
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent may
recover or be reimbursed the value of his
improvements on the land in questi on, on the
theory that as both he a nd petitioner knew that
their sale was illegal and void, they were both i n
bad faith? SC HELD: NO . Consequently, Art.
453 of the Civil Code applies in that "the rights
of one and the other shall be the same as though
both had acted i n good faith". The rule of Art.
453 of the Civil Code invoked by defendant
cannot be applied to the instant case for the
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
reason that the lower court found, and
respondent admits, that the improvements in
question were made on the premises only
after petitioner had tried to recov er the land
in question from respondent, and even
during the pendency of this action in the
court below. After respondent had refused to
restore the land to the petitioner, to the extent
that the latte r even had to resort to the present
action to recover h is property, petitioner could
no longer be regarded as having impliedly
j.
assented or conformed to the improvements
thereafter made by respondent on the premises .
Upon the other hand, respondent, recognizing
as he does petitioner's right to get back his
property, continued to act in bad faith when
he made improvements on the land in
question after he had already been asked
extra -judicially and judicially, to surrender
and return its possession to petitioner ; and
as a penalty for such bad faith, he must
forfeit his improvements without any right to
reimbursement therefor . At the outset, it must
be made clear that as the sale in question was
executed by the parties within the five -year
prohibitive period under section 118 of the
Public Land Law , the same is abso lutely null
and void and ineffective from its inception .
Consequently, petitioner never lost his title or
ownership over the land in question , and
there was no need either for him to
repurchase the same from respondent, or for
the latter to execute a deed of reconveyance
in his favor. The case is actually for mutual
restitution, incident to the nullity ab initio of
the conveyance.
"He who buil ds, plants or sows i n bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is buil t, planted,
or sown wi thout right to indemnity" (Art. 449,
New Civil Code).
Spouses Nuguid v. CA, GR No. 105360, May
25, 1993 and GR No. 151815, January 23,
2005: MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the
petitioners are entitl ed to the lot’s
improvement? MAIN SC HELD: NO, the
petitioners should not b enefit from the lot’s
improvement, until they reimbursed the
improver in full, based on the current market
value of the property. As we earlier held, since
petitioners opted to appropriate the
improvement for themsel ves as early as June
1993, when they appli ed for a writ of execution
despite knowledge that the auction sale did not
include the apartment building . Despite the
Court's recognition of Pecson's right of
ownership over the apartment building, the
petitioners still insisted on dispossessing
Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to
cover both the lot and the building . Clearly,
this resulted in a violation of respondent's
Prepared by Team Bessy  16
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
right of retention . Worse, petitioners took
advantage of the situation to benefit from the
highly valued, income -yielding, four -unit
apartment building by collecting rentals
thereon, before they paid for the cost of the
apartment building . It was only four years later
that they finally paid its full value to the
respondent. It is not disputed that the
construction of the four -door two-storey
apartment, subject of this dispute, was
undertaken at the time when Pecson was still
the owner of the lot . When the Nuguids
became the uncontested owner of the lot on
June 23, 1993, by virtue of entry of judgment
of the Court's decision, dated May 25, 1993, in
G.R. No. 105360, the apartment building was
already in existence and occupied by
tenants. In its decisi on dated May 26, 1995 in
G.R. No. 115814, the Court declared the rights
and obligations of the litigants in accordance
with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code .
These provisions of the Code are directly
applicable to the instant case. Under Article
448, the landowner is given the option, either to
appropri ate the improvement as his own upon
payment of the proper amount of indemnity or t o
sell the land to the possessor in good faith .
Relatedly , Article 546 provides that a builder in
good fai th is entitled to full reimbursement for all
the necessary and us eful expenses incurred; it
also gives him right of retention until full
reimbursement is made. While the law aims to
concentrate in one pers on the owners hip of the
land and the improvements thereon in view of
the impracticabili ty of creating a state of forced
co-ownership, it guards against unjus t
enrichment i nsofar as the good -faith builde r's
improvements are conc erned. The ri ght of
retention is considered as one of the measures
devised by the law for the protection of builders
in good fai th. Its object i s to guarantee full and
prompt reimbursement as it permi ts the actual
possessor to rema in in possession while he has
not been reimbursed (by the person who
defeated him in the case for possession of the
property) for those necessary expenses and
useful improv ements made by him on the thing
possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good fai th
cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the
period of retention nor be disturbed in his
possession by ordering him to vacate. In
addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is
prohibited from offsetting or compensating the
necessary and useful ex penses wi th the frui ts
received by the builder -possessor in good faith.
Otherwise, the security provided by law woul d
be impaired. This is so because the right to the
expenses and the ri ght to the frui ts both pertai n
to the possessor, making compensation
juridically impossibl e; and one cannot be used
Prepared by Team Bessy  17
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
to reduce the other. Petitioners' interpretation of
our holdi ng in G.R. No. 115814 has neither
factual nor legal basis. The decision of May 26,
1995, shoul d be construed in connection with
the legal principles which f orm the basis of the
decision, guided by the precept that judgments
are to have a reasonable intendment to do
justice and avoid wrong. The text of the decision
in G.R. No. 115814 expressly exempted Pecson
from liabil ity to pay rentals, for we found that th e
Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the
trial court's determination of the indemnity, but
also in ordering him to account for the rentals of
the apartment building from June 23, 1993 to
September 23, 1993, the period from entry of
judgment until Pecson's dispossession. As
pointed out by Pecson, the dispositive portion of
our decision in G.R. No. 115814 need not
specifically include the income derived from the
improvement in order to entitle him, as a builder
in good faith, to such income. The rig ht of
retention, which entitles the builder in good faith
to the possession as well as the income derived
therefrom, is already provided for under Article
546 of the Civil Code. Given the circumstances
of the instant c ase where the buil der in good
faith has been clearly denied his right of
retention for almost half a decade, we find that
the increased award of rentals by the RTC was
reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had
reaped al l the benefi ts from the improvement
introduced by the respondent during said period,
without paying any amount to the latter as
reimbursement for his c onstruction costs and
expenses. They s hould account and pay for such
benefits. We need not belabor now the appellate
court's recognition of herein respondent's
entitlement to r entals from the date of the
determination of the c urrent market value until
its full payment. Respondent is clearly enti tled
to payment by virtue of hi s right of retention over
the said improvement.
 > GRAPH 2: ((LEGEND: LO=LAND OWNER,
OM=OWNER OF MATERIALS, GF=GOOD FAITH,
BF=BAD FAITH, BPS=BUILDS, PLANTS AND SOWS)
1. LO in GF (Arts. 448, 546, 455)
a) Get improvements and pay indemni ty to BPS; subsidiary
liability to OM
b) SELL to BP or rent to S (unless value of land>imp rent to BP)
c) Get improvements and pay indemni ty to BPS;
Prepared by Team Bessy  18
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
d) SELL to BP or rent to S (unless value of land>imp rent to BP)
e) No subs. Liab for mats
2. BPS in GF (546, 449)
a) Right to retention for necessary and useful expenses
b) Pay value of mats to OM (546, 45 5)
c) Right to retention for necessary and useful expenses
d) Keep BPS w/o indemnity to OM & collect damages from OM
3. OM in GF
a) Collect value of mats from BPS or subs from LO
b) Remove only i f wi thout injury (455, 447)
4. OM in BF
>GRAPH 3: ((LEGEND: LO=LAND OWNER, OM=OWNER OF
a) Lose materia ls w/o ri ght to i ndemnity (449)
b) Pay damages
Notes:
• Check – necessary, useful and expenses for mere
luxury
preservation of land (Art. 452);
• Rights of LO and BPS must first be decided before that
of the OM
3) OM in BF: Recover v alue from BPS as if both in GF; If BPS
• OM in GF collects from BPS and subs from the LO, if OM
in BF, loses mats unle ss others are in BF
• BF party pays damages to the GF party/s
• BF of one neutraliz es that of the other
• First Line: (1) Ri ghts of the land owner against the BPS
from Art. 448 and s ubsidiary liability from Art. 455; (2)
Obligation of the BPS to pay OM impli ed from 455, “only
if the one who used cannot pay”
• Second Line: (1) The LO has no subsi diary liabili ty
because Art. 455 only i mposes the subsi diary li ability
on those OM who did not act in BF; (2) Consequence to
the OM comes from the genera l rule that BF = loss of
things
MATERIALS, GF=GOOD FAITH, BF=BAD FAITH,
BPS=BUILDS, PLANTS AND SOWS)
1) LO in GF: LO 1. Option to (a) get improvements w/o paying
indemnity + damages or (b) sell land to BP/rent to S + damages
or (c) order demolition of work + damages & 2. Pay necessary
expenses for preservation (Arts. 449 -452)
2) BPS in BF: Recover necessary expenses for the
Loses improvements wi thout right to i ndemnity from LO unless
LO sells the land
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 PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)

acquires improvements, remove mats if feasible w/o injury (Art. 3) BPS in BF

447); May be liabl e to LO for damages a. Right to retention for necessary exp
b. Pay value of material s to OM + damages (Art. 546, 447)
**If all are in BF same as if all are in G F (Art. 453)**
4) OM in GF
* Notes: Options for LO i n GF in case of BF of BPS is under 450, a. Collect value of mats from BPS or subs from LO
damages under 451 and the right of the BPS in BF for expenses b. Remove only if without injury (Art. 447, 455)
for preservati on is under 452. Loss of thing for BF is under c. Collect value of mats from BPS or subs from LO
449. d. Remove only if without injury (Art. 447, 455)

• Rights of OM is only agai nst the BPS and in the event that the
BPS acquires what is BPS, the relation bet ween BPS and OM
is similar to rights of OM vs. LO in the first slide.
• Art. 453 is i n consonance with the principle of in pari delicto
 >GRAPH 4: ((LEGEND: LO=LAND OWNER,
OM=OWNER OF MATERIALS, GF=GOOD FAITH,
BF=BAD FAITH, BPS=BUILDS, PLANTS AND SOWS)
Notes:
LO BF, BPS GF, OM GF
• Art. 454 relationship between LO BF and BPS GF is
same as 447.
• Art. 447 speaks of relati onship between OM and LO.
This article gives the BPS to remove imp in any event,
and entitl es him to damages.
• Since OM is still in GF, then, LO is still subsidiary liable

 Graph 5:
1) LO in BF (Arts. 453, 448, 546, 548, 455)
a. Acquire imp after payi ng indemni ty to BPS unless BPS chooses 1) LO in GF (Art. 449, 450, 451)
to remove
b. Pay BPS damages a. Options (a) get property (b) sell to BPS or (c) demolish
c. Subsidiarily liabl e to OM (Art. 454, 447, 455)
d. Acquire imp after payi ng indemni ty to BPS (subs liable to OM) b. Pay necessary ex penses to BPS
or
e. SELL to BP or rent to S (unl ess value of land>imp rent to BP) c. Subsidiary Liable to O M

2 ) BPS in GF 2) LO in BF
a. May remove improv ements in any
b. May be indemnified for damages i n any event (Art. 454, 447) a. Get improvements and pay indemnity + damages to BPS (Art.
454, 477) unless BPS removes

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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
3) BPS in BF
a. Recover necessary ex penses ( Art. 452, 443)
b. Loses improvements without ri ght of indemnity from LO (Art.
452) unless LO sells the land
4) BPS in GF
a. Indemni ty for damages
b. Remove imp in any ev ent. (Art. 454, 447)
5) OM in GF
a. Collect value of mats from BPS
b. Remove in any event if BPS acquires imp.(Art. 447)
6) OM in BF
a. No indemnity and los es materials (Art. 449)
Note: LO no longer has subsidiary liability in the event that
he compels BPS to buy the land.
 Natural Accession over immovables
> Alluvium
 Art. 457: To the ow ners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters. (366)
• Elements ( Republic v . CA) + water mus t be fres h water +
original identity of the deposit is lost
• Registration still necess ary ( Grande v. CA)
• If deposit is by sea water, it belongs to the state
• Rivers include creeks, and lakes but not esteros and
canals
 Cases:
1) Republic v. CA: ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the two lots are
an accretion? (2) Whether or not the the private respondents?
can validly register Lots 1 & 2 in their names ? SC HELD: (1) NO,
the lands are not an accretion, but really an encroachment of a
portion of the Meycauay an river by reclamation. In the instant
case, there is no evidence w hats oever to prove that the
addition to the said property was made gradually through the
effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers .
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides : "To the owners of
lands adjoining the bank s of rivers belong th e ac cretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters." The above -quoted article requires the c oncurrence of
three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular
provision is said to have taken place. They are (1 ) that the
deposit be gradual and i mperceptible; (2) that it be made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the
land where accretion tak es place is adj acent to the banks of
rivers. The requirement that the deposi t should be due to th e
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes
from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposi ts caused by
human intervention. All uvion must be the exclusi ve work of
nature. Also, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
deposits were artifici al and man -made and not the exclusive
result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The
alleged alluvial deposi ts came into being not because of the
sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the
transfer of the di ke towards the river and encroaching upon it.
The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast
imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the
fishpond adj oining i t. It i s under two meters of water.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is
preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land
came into being because of the effec ts of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who
happens to be their ov erseer and whose hu sband was first
cousin of their father noticed the four hectare accretion to the
twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim
that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If
so, their witness was inc ompetent to testify to a gradual and
imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed
an increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now the
land in ques tion. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was
sudden. However, the private respondents' own evidence
shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the
side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep
on the side of the pilapil facing the river.The reason behi nd the
law giving the ripari an owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss
that he suffers because of the l ocation of his land. If estates
bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evil s
produced by the des tructive force of the waters and if by virtue
of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to encumbrances
and various kinds of eas ements, it is proper that the risk or
danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not
acquire the additions to his land caused by speci al works
expressly intended or designed to bring about ac cretion. When
the private respondents tran sferred their dikes towards the
river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and
not to protect their property from the destructive force of the
waters of the river.We agree with the submission of the
Solicitor General that the testimony of the private respondents'
lone witness to the effec t that as early as 1939 there al ready
existed such alleged all uvial deposits, deserves no merit. It
should be noted that the lots in question were not included i n
the survey of their adjac ent property c onducte d on May 10,
1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of
Meycauayan conduc ted between the years 1958 to 1960. The
alleged accretion was declared for tax ation purposes only in
1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently formed.
The only valid conclusion therefore is that the sai d areas could
not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private
respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the
Meycauayan river in 1951. (2) NO, the adjudication of the
lands in question as priv ate property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void. The lower court cannot validly
order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were porti ons of the bed of the
Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of
the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article
502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippi nes. They are
not open to registration under the Land Registration Act
2) GRANDE vs CA: Issue: Whether the acc retion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which
receives it is covered by a Torrens ti tle thereby making the
alluvial property impresc riptible? Held: No. An accretion does
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such acc retion is c overed by a Torrens title.
Ownership of a piece of l and is one thing; registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over
the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed
by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registrati on law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to
the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of thi rd parti es. But to obtain this protection, the
land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws
wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The
fact remains, however, that peti tioners never sought
registration of said all uv ial property (which was formed
sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original
Certificate of Titl e No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up
to the time they institu ted the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Isabel a in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not
entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torr ens system.
Consequently, it was subject to ac quisition through
prescription by third persons.
 Art 458: The owners of estates adjoining ponds or
lagoons do not acqui re the land left dry by the natural
decrease of the waters , or lose that inundated by them
in extraordinary floods . (367)
 Not really alluvi um since no deposi t of sediments
 Natural Accession over immovables
> Avulsion
 Art. 459: Whenever the current of a river, creek or
torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a k nown
portion of land and trans fers it to another estate, the
owner of the land to whi ch the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he
removes the same within two y ears. (368a)
• Identification of the l and is necessary and must be a
compact mass.
• Original owner of the land mass will remain to be the owner
of the land unless there is (a) abandonment or (b)
expiration of 2 years
 Art 460: Trees uprooted and carried away by the
current of the waters bel ong to the owner of the l and
upon which they may be c ast, if the owners do not claim
them within six months. If such owners claim them, they
shall pay the expenses i ncurred i n gathering them or
putting them in a safe pl ace. (369a)
 Applies only to uprooted trees. If tree is carri ed away
with land, then Art. 459 applies
 Recovery of expenses for preservation
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
 Change of Course of a River
A. Art. 461 : River beds whi ch are abandoned through the
natural c hange in the c ourse of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners
of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to
acquire the same by payi ng the value thereof, which value
shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new
bed. (370a)
(Abandonment of a River Bed)
Requisites
 Change must be sudden so that the old bed can be
identified, otherwise, all uvium
 Change must be permanent
 There mus t be abandonment by the owner of the bed.
 Change must be natural
If a river dries up still public dominion
 Cases:
1) Baes v. CA: Issue: Whether the RIPARIAN OWNER is
entitled to compens ation for the damage to or loss of his
property due to artificial means? Held: Yes. They are
entitled. If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation
for the damage to or los s of his property due to natural
causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him
when the change in the course of the river is effected
through artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the
land covered by the canal was the result of a
deliberate act on the part of the government when it
sought to improve the fl ow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It
was therefore obligated to compensate the Baes es for thei r
loss. In this case, Petiti oners having been compensated,
cannot claim additional compensation. Felix Baes was
given Lot 3271 -A in exc hange for the affected Lot 2958 -B
through the Deed of Exc hange of Real Property dated
June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange becaus e the two
lots were of the s ame area and value and the agreement
was freely entered into by the parties. The petiti oners
cannot now claim additional compensati on because, as
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, . . . to allow
petitioners to acquire owne rship of the dried -up
portion of the creek would be a clear case of double
compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the
state. The exchange of l ots between the petitioners and
the Republic was the res ult of vol untary negoti ati ons. If
these had failed, the gov ernment could s till hav e taken Lot
2958-B under the power of eminent domain, upon
payment of just compens ation, as the land was needed for
a public purpose.
2) Binalay v. Manalo: Issue No. 1: WoN Lot 821 shall be
considered as a natural/river bed? Held: Yes. Law of
Waters "Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek
or river is the ****** ground covered by its waters during
the highest floods ". ******
The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
their onward course cover the entire depressed portion.
Though the eas tern bed substantially dries up for the most part
of the year (from January to August), we cannot ignore the
periodical swelling of the waters (from September to
December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with
flowing river waters. depressed portion is a river bed rests
upon evidence of record. Firstly , respo ndent Manalo admitted
in open court that the entire area he bought from Taguba was
included in Lot 307. If the 1.80 hectares purchased from
Taguba was included i n Lot 307, then the Cagayan River
referred to as the wes tern boundary in the Deed of Sale
transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent
Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad,
must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the
eastern branch of the ri ver (duri ng the rainy months). In the
Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is
separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a
large tract of land which i ncludes not only Lot 821 but also what
this Court characterizes as the eas tern branch of the Cagayan
River. Secondly, the pictu res identified by respondent
Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed
portion as a river bed . A huge vol ume of water passes through
the eastern bed regularl y during the rainy season. In addition,
petitioner Gannaban testified that one had to go down
(cliff) from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent
Manalo to the depressed portion.
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to
carve its eastern channel on the surface of the earth. However,
the Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of
Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already
existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo . The
words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses — perhaps written to
make legitimate the cl aim of private owners hip over the
submerged portion — is an implied admission of the
existence of the river bed . In the Declaration of Real Property
made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed
the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike -like
slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been
formed only after a prolonged period of time .
Issue No. 2: WoN respondent Manalo is the rightful ow ner
of the eastern branch/bed of the river? No. [MAIN ISSUE]
PUBLIC DOMINION respondent Manalo did not acquire
private owners hip of the bed of the eastern branch of the
river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale
executed by Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor .
These vendors could not have validly sold land that
constituted PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION .
Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
"The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
**rivers, torrents**, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, **banks**, shores, roads teads, and ot hers of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without bei ng for public
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national weal th." (Emphasis supplied).
*Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and ba nks, "rivers"
is a composite term whi ch includes: (1) the running waters,
(2) the bed, and (3) the banks .
[ STRESSED THE PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF RIVER BEDS ]
The claim of ownershi p of respondent Manalo over the
submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it w ere alleged and
proved that the Cagayan River forst began to encroach on his
property after the purchase from Taguba and Faustina Taccad.
Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by
operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over
the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudiced
respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since
estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other
evils produced b y the destructive force of the waters . That
loss is compens ated by, inter alia, the right of accretion
acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. It so happened
that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it .
Article 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural
causes, opens a new bed through a private estate, this BED
SHALL BECOME OF PUBLIC DOMINION.
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accreti on which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters.
Issue No. 3: WoN Lot 821 (accretion) is an increment to Lot
307? No.[ANOTHER MAIN ISSUE]
Re ACCRETION (L ot 821), no evidence to prove that Lot 821
is an increment/additi onal to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern
branch of the river.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of
the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites :
(a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible ; (b) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (c ) that the land where
accretion takes place is ADJACENT to the banks of rivers
(or the sea coast) .
The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent
Manalo border on the eas tern branch of the Cagay an River. Any
accretion formed by thi s eastern branch which respondent
Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot
307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank
of the river ********NO T ADJACENT to Lot 307 but DIRECTLY
OPPOSITE Lot 307 across the river. *******
it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91
hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of th e strip of land
having a total area of 22.72 hectares . We find it difficult to
suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from
slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size . The total
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hecta res
(8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from
Gregorio Taguba), *****i n fact even smaller than Lot 821 which
he claims by way of acc retion. ***** (mas Malaki pa ‘yung
Lot 821 11+ heckaysasanabiliniyang lot na 10.45 hec )
there are steep ve rtical dike-like slopes separating the
depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307 . This
topography of the land, among other things,
precludes/excludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an
increment to the depres sed porti on by reason of th e slow and
constant action of the waters of ei ther the western or the
eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
Issue No. 4: WoN respondent Manalo is the rightful owner
of Lot 821?
Re ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP of Lot 821, If respondent Manalo
had proved prior poss es sion, it was limited physically to Lot
307 and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed . The
testimony of DomingaMalana who was a tenant for Faustina
Taccad did not i ndicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In
fact, the complaints for forcibl e entry lodged before the MTC
pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed
and ***not to Lot 821.
tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of
respondent Manalo.
Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff i n an action
for quieting of title must at least have EQUITABLE TITLE TO
OR INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY which is the subject
matter of the action . The evidence of record on this point is
less than satisfactory and the Court feels compel led to refrain
from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821,
adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as
owner(s) thereof .
=> WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the CA are
hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307.
The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the
Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be ***property of
public dominion.***
The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an
appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested
parties.
B. Arts. 462 and 463 :
Art. 462. Whenever a riv er, changing its course by natural
causes, opens a new bed through a private estate, this bed
shall become of public dominion. (372a)
Art. 463. Whenever the c urrent of a river divides i tself into
branches, leaving a piec e of land or part thereof isolated,
the owner of the land retains his ownership. He als o retains
it if a portion of l and is s eparated from the estate by the
current. (374)
Prepared by Team Bessy  27
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
 Refer to ins tances wherein a new water system is
formed in a private es tate.
 Owner retains ownership of the property save for that
disturbed by the current.
 Formation of Islands (Arts. 464, 465 and 463 ):
 Art. 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas
within the juris diction of the Philippines, on lakes, and
on navigable or floatabl e rivers belong to the
State.(371a)
Art. 465. Islands which through successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in
non-navigabl e and non -floatable rivers, belong to the
owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of the m,
or to the owners of both margins if the island is in the
middle of the riv er, i n which case it shall be divided
longitudinally in halves . If a single island thus formed
be more dis tant from one margin than from the other, the
owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner
thereof. (373a
Requisite: Must be formed by deposits not identifiable
> Ownership
A. Formed by the Sea
1. Within the terri torial waters State
2. Outside terri torial waters first occupant (by international
law)
B. Formed in Lakes or navigable or floatable rivers State
 Gov’t decl ares which riv ers are navigable
 Rivers are navigable in l aw if navigabl e in act for some
purpose beneficial to trade and commerce
C. Formed in non -navigable or nonfloatable w aters
1. Equidistant from both banks ripari an owners by halves
2. Nearer one margin/bank nearer riparian owner
D. Formation of island by branching of a river same
owner; no accession
 Natural Accession over Movables
> Adjunction
Accession exists i f separation is not possible, otherwise,
separation may be demanded (Art. 469)
 Adjunction – union of materials of different owners
making up a new thing (separation = injury) and each
component retains i ts own nature.
Gen. Rule: Accessory follows the p rincipal
A. Determination of Principal: Intent, Value, Volume
B. Adjudication in GF by either owners : apply the general
rule
- Except: if value of accessory>value of the principal, the
owner of the accessory can demand separati on, even if the
principal suffers some damage (not destruction)
C. Union by the owner of the principal acting in BF : Owner
of accessory may (1) rec over value + damages or (2) demand
separation + damages
D. Union of the owner of the accessory acting in BF : Owner
Prepared by Team Bessy  28
PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
of accessory los es the accessory + liable for damages
 Application of the tests is ordinal
A. Intent: that to which another is united as ornament, or
for its use or perfection i s deemed the principal (engine
is the pri ncipal, all the other parts of the vehicle a re
mere accessori es)
B. Value: value which is greater is deemed the principal, if
value is equal , then of greater volume is the principal
 Case:
Siari Valley Estates v. Lacasan: ISSUE: whether the
commixtion was made in bad faith? Held: Yes. Lucasan
acted in bad faith. As the trial judge said "Filemon had been
actuated by bad faith in retaining i n his ranch, to multiply and
increased there for his own benefi t, the cattle belonging to the
Siari Valley Estate"
Art. 472 - If by the will of their owners two things of the same or
different kinds are mix ed, or if the mixture occurs by chance,
and in the l atter case the things are not separable without
injury, each owner shall acquire a right proportional to the part
belonging to him, bearing in mind the value o f the things mixed
or confused. (381)
Art. 473 New Civil Code:
"if the commingling of two things is made in BAD FAITH,
THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT WILL LOSE HIS SHARE”
cowboys and even his Lucasan’s sons Rafael and Vicente -
rounded up and drove pl aintiff's cattle into Lucas an’s pasture;
Lucasan knew he had plaintiff's cattle, but refused to
return them despite demands by plaintiff; he even
threatened plaintiff's men when the latter tried to retrieve
its animals; he harassed them with false prosecutions for
their attempts to get back the company's animals ; he
wouldn't allow plaintiff' s cowboys to get into his pasture
to identify its flock; he rebranded several Siari Valle y cattle
with his own brand; he sold cattle w ithout registering the
sales; after some cattl e impounded were entrusted to his
custody as trustee, he disposed of not less than 5 head of
cattle among those he received as such trustee ; lastly, he
disposed of much more cattle than he had a right to.
*No actual evidence exis ts that all these missing animals (323)
were taken by defendant or his men; but in vi ew of the proof that
his men on two occasions drove away more than 30 head of
cattle, it is not erroneous to believe that the others must have
also been driven away on subsequent or pri or occasions ,
applying, by analogy, the principle that one who stole a part of
the stolen money mus t have taken also the larger sum lost by
the offended party. (P. v. Fernandez, 58 Phil. 674; P. v. Buada,
60 Phil. 363.)
*offspring or the increase of domes tic animals belongs to the
owner of the dam by acc retion
P’s cattle – usually mestizos
R’s cattle – native lang. Syemprenagtakasi P kasi may lahing
mestizo na the cattle of R. hehe
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)
 Natural Accession over Movables
> Mixture
Mixture – Uni on of materials where the components lose their
identity.
Commixtion – soli ds
Confusion – liquids
A. By will of both owners or by accident
1. Each owner will ac quire an interest in proportion to the
value of his materi al
B. By one owner in GF and the other in BF
1. GF owner will acqui re an interest in proportion to the value
of his material + can col lect damages
2.BF owner shall lose hi s material + liable for damages
Note: A1 also appli es to sales from a mass of fungible goods
 Case: Santos v. Bernabe: ISSUE: Whether or not
Tiongson c an claim the 924 cavans of rice as his own?
HELD: No, both Tiongson and Santos MUST DIVIDE
the cavans and palay PROPORTIONATELY . The
cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed
with those belonging to Tiongson , the following rule
prescribed is. . .
Article 381 of the Civil Code: “If, by will of one of their owners,
two things of identic al or dissimilar nature are MIXED, or if the
mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things
CANNOT BE SEPARATED without injury, EACH OWNER
SHALL ACQUIR E A RIGHT IN THE MIXTURE
PROPORTIONATE TO THE PART BELONGING TO HIM,
according to the VALUE OF THE THINGS MIXED OR
COMINGLED.” The number of kilos in a cavan not having been
determined, the Court took the proportion only of the 924
cavans of palay which we re attached and sold, thereby
giving Santos , who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and
Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value
thereof at the rate of 3Php per cav an.
 Natural Accession over Movables
> Specification
Specification – Transformation of another’s material by the
application of labor; material becomes of di fferent kind.
Principal Labor
A. Owner of the principal is in GF
GR: Maker acquires the new thing and he must i ndemnify the
OM
Exception: if value of the materi al> resulting thi ng, OM may
(1) acqui re the work by paying for the labor or (2)
demand indemni ty for material
B. Owner of the Principal in BF OM has the opti on
1. Acquire the resul t w/o indemnity + damages
2. Demand indemnity for the material + dama ges
C. OM is in BF loses mats + damages
Notes: Indemnity
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PROPERTY NOTES (WED/THURS: 5:30-7:30PM)

1. Delivery of the same quantity, kind and quality or

2. Payment of the value as per expert appraisal

sentimental val ue shall be appreciated

Prepared by Team Bessy  31