31. People vs.

Que Po Lay

G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954

Justice Montemayor

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by
Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said
circular had no force and effect.

Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said
circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The
Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not
require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in
order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law.

HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the
law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this,
on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is
clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951.

32. People vs. Zapata

A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against his wife Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio
Bondoc, for cohabiting and having sexual intercourse during the period from 1946 – March 1947.
Dalmacio knows that his co-defendant is a married woman.

The defendant wife entered a plea of guilty. In September 1948, Andres filed another complaint for
adultery committed from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948.

Defendants filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue:

Whether or not there was double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. Adultery is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the
moment of the carnal union.

33. PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965

Facts:

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as
the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement
gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of
Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and
officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to
one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re
election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at
least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary
for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and
sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is
another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under
Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in
question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave
benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each
retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
Issue:

whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads as
follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and
other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of
residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:

Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members
of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso
which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such
increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National
Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration
of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether
the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other
emoluments.”

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees

and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision
clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore
unconstitutional.
34. Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera

TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic
of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an
action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23,
1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

35. QUIAO V. QUIAO

G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC
rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor
children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after
more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to
Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision
under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership– NO.

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default
rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and
such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that
the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code)
form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And
since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to
the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142
of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property
and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts.
The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.
Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
36. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

G.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010

FACTS:

Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine
passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia”
as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied
for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her
request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of
Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has
not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of
Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her
maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling. The CA also
affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA
8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the
Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the
case of Yasin v Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to
the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

RULING:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin v Honorable Judge Shari’a
District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s
surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when
a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with
this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married
woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her
maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport,
the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.
Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA
8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage
to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage.

Yasin case not in point

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, this involved a Muslim divorcee whose
former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin
did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to
resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special
law prevails over a general law.

Implied repeals are disfavored

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as
possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.
This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her
present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the
use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one’s name and identity in a passport, which
is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s
constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity
and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains
at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as
it is valid.

38. And 39. Republic vs CA and Molina

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a
year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for
aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple
had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child.
Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological
incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each
other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital
obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

40. Rosete vs. Sheriff of Zambales