Republic vs Dela Rosa vested in both mining companies.
The claim of the
(160 SCRA 228, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988)
FACTS:
The case is about a parcel of land whose ownership
is disputed by four parties: the dela Rosas, Benguet
Consolidated Inc (BCI), Atok Corp, and the Bureau
of Forestry Development (BFD). In 1965, Jose de la
Rosa on his and on his three children’s behalf,
applied to register a parcel of land divided into 9
lots in Benguet. According to the children, they
acquired the land by virtue of prescription. As
evidence they produced tax declarations and
realty tax receipts.
Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI) opposed their
application, claiming that half the lots were
covered by mineral claim sold to it in 1934. Since
1934, BCI had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner. As evidence BCI presented geological
mappings, payment of taxes, and construction on
the land. Atok Corp’s claim is similar to BCI, that a
mineral claim covering the lots had been sold to it
in 1931. Their evidence is similar to BCI: construction
and tax payments.
The BFD also objected, saying that the land was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
(CCFR) under Proc. No. 217, dated 1929. As it was
forest land, it was not subject to alienation as stated
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
In the end, the CA affirmed the BFD’s rights on the
surface of the land, while reaffirming the rights to
the underground to both BCI and Atok. In other
words, the CA ruled that the surface was to be
agricultural on the surface, and mineral
underneath.
ISSUE: Who has the best claim over the land? BCI
and Atok Corp
WON land can be agricultural and mineral at the
same time. NO
HELD:
BCI and Atok have vested rights over the land. The
Court found that the mineral claims sold to both BCI
and Atok have been perfected prior to the
approval of the 1935 Constitution. The court had
earlier declared the legal effects of a valid mineral
claim: it segregates the area from the public
domain and confers to the locator the beneficial
ownership pf the claim. As of 1935, they were
removed from the public domain and had become
private properties of BCI and Atok. Even if the land
was included in the CCFR, it did not impair the rights
dela Rosas were utterly disregarded for weak
evidence, and even so, they could not have
acquired the land through prescription as the same
had already been converted to mineral land. Land
cannot be half agri and half mineral. The SC said
the classification of land must be categorical.
In this case, while the land was intiailly classified as
forest land, it ceased to be so and became
completely mineral when the mining claims were
perfected. Even if the surface was being tilled, it is
still to be considered mineral land. Jura regalia. The
SC discussed jura regalia in Sections 3-6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 137. The Regalian doctrine
is intended for the benefit of the State, and not of
private persons. Example, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land and minerals are discovered
underneath, his ownership pf the land does not give
him the right to extract or utilize the minerals without
the permission of the State, to which the minerals
belong. To further expound, once minerals are
discovered in the land, the State can discontinue
the surface tilling so as to not impede the mining
undertaken therein.
POLICY: The classification of land must be
categorical, it cannot be half and half. The
perfection of mining claims
convert land to mineral land even if they were
previously classified as forest land.
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corp. (2006)
Facts:
The case involves the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area”
(Diwalwal), a rich tract of mineral land located
inside the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in
Davao del Norte and Davao Oriental. Since the
early 1980s, Diwalwal has been stormed by conflicts
brought about by numerous mining claims over it.
On March 10, 1986, Marcopper Mining Corporation
(MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit (EP 133)
by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG). A
long battle ensued between Apex and MMC with
the latter seeking the cancellation of the mining
claims of Apex on the ground that such mining
claims were within a forest reservation (Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) and thus the
acquisition on mining rights should have been
through an application for a permit to prospect
with the BFD and not through registration of a DOL
with the BMG. When it reached the SC in 1991, the
Court ruled against Apex holding that the area is a
forest reserve and thus it should have applied for a
permit to prospect with the BFD.
On February 16 1994, MMC assigned all its rights to
EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is
alleged to be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC.
Subsequently, BMG registered SEM’s Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) application
and the Deed of Assignment. Several oppositions
were filed. The Panel of Arbitrators created
by the DENR upheld the validity of EP 133.
During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No.
2002-18 was issued declaring an
emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush
Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining
operations therein.
Issues:
1. W/N EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is
valid.
2. W/N the DENR Secretary has authority to issue
DAO 66 declaring 729 hectares of the areas
covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve as non-forest lands and open to smallscale
mining purposes.
3. Who (among petitioners Apex and Balite) has
priority right over Diwalwal?
Held/Ratio:
1. INVALID. One of the terms and conditions of EP
133 is: “That this permit shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his
duly authorized agents and shall be used for
mineral exploration purposes only and for no other
purpose.” While it may be true that SEM is a 100%
subsidiary corporation of MMC, there is no showing
that the former is the duly authorized agent of the
latter. As such, the assignment is null and void as it
directly contravenes the terms and conditions of
the grant of EP 133.
a. The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication
of MMC’s rights over the permit. It is not a mere
grant of authority to SEM as agent.
b. Reason for the stipulation. Exploration permits are
strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing
the resources and capability to undertake mining
operations. Without such a condition, non-qualified
entities or individuals could circumvent the strict
requirements under the law by the simple
expediency of acquiring the permit from the
original permittee.
c. Separate personality. The fact that SEM is a 100%
subsidiary of MMC does not automatically make it
an agent of MMC. A corporation is an artificial
being invested by law with a personality separate
and distinct from persons composing it as well as
from that of any other legal entity to which it may
be related. Absent any clear proof to the contrary,
SEM is a separate and distinct entity from MMC.
d. Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
inapplicable. Only in cases where the corporate
fiction was used as a shield for fraud, illegality or
inequity may the veil be pierced and removed. The
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot
therefore be used as a vehicle to commit
prohibited acts. The assignment of the permit in
favor of SEM is utilized to circumvent the condition
of non-transferability of the exploration permit. To
allow SEM to avail itself of this doctrine and to
approve the validity of the assignment is
tantamount to sanctioning an illegal act which is
what the doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.
e. PD 463 requires approval of Secretary of DENR.
Also, PD 463 (Mineral Resources Development
Decree), which is the governing law when the
assignment was executed, explicitly requires that
the transfer or assignment of mining rights, including
the right to explore a mining area, must be with the
prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not
present in this case.
f. EP 133 expired by non-renewal. Although EP 133
was extended for 12 months until July 6, 1994, MMC
never renewed its permit prior and after its
expiration.
With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994, MMC
lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. SEM,
on the other hand, has not acquired any right to
the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its
favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have
not acquired any vested right over the area
covered by EP 133.
2. NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert
forest reserves into non-forest reserves. Such power
is vested with the President. The DENR Secretary
may only recommend to the President which forest
reservations are to be withdrawn from the
coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No. 66 is null and void
for having been issued in excess of the DENR
Secretary’s authority.
3. (Since it’s been held that neither MMC nor SEM
has any right over Diwalwal, it is thus necessary to
make a determination of the existing right of the
remaining claimants, petitioners
Apex and Balite, in the dispute.) The issue on who
has priority right over Diwalwal is deemed
overtaken by the issuance of Proclamation 297 and
DAO No. 2002-18, both being constitutionally-
sanctioned acts of the Executive Branch. Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are
now, therefore, within the full control of the State
through the executive branch. Pursuant to Sec. 5 of
RA 7942, the State can either: (1) directly undertake
the exploration, development and utilization of the
area or (2) opt to award mining operations in the
mineral reservation to private entities including
petitioners Apex and Balite, if it wishes. The exercise
of this prerogative lies with the Executive
Department over which courts will not interfere.
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran,
Case Digest
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
Facts :
Former President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of
her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the
interim procedures in the processing and approval
of applications for the exploration, development
and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279
authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint-venture, co-production, or
production- sharing agreements for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding
implementation by the DENR of Administrative
Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining
leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be
converted into production-sharing agreements
within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which
provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2
years from the effectivity of the Department
Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and
gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates
compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines,
Inc., an organization composed of mining
prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to
file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.
Issue: Are the two Department Administrative
Orders valid?
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application
of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of
declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, pertains to the old system of
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources through "license, concession or lease"
which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the
said constitutional mandate and its implementing
law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on
"license, concession or lease" of mineral resources
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
and other existing mining laws are deemed
repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of
administration and management of mineral lands,
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and other existing mining laws, still
govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279
provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws,
and their implementing rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in
force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of
the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this
petition, are subject to alterations through a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the
State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police
power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of
contract from altering, modifying and amending
the mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant
to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital
public needs. The passage of Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry
into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
 DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
together with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40)
and of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by
the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining
Corporation (AMC), a corporation established
under the laws of Australia and owned by its
nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax
Mining Limited to form a single company that now
goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining
Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of
stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an
FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000
hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya
and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay
Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right
of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the
full right of ingress and egress and the right to
occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right
not to be prevented from entry into private lands by
surface owners or occupants thereof when
prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals
therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc.,
an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples
organized under Philippine laws, representing a
community actually affected by the mining
activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of
areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
I or the Mines Adjudication Board is final and
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE
CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE
UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the
ways and means by which the foreign-owned
contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to
the government the specific surface areas within
the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure. The government then acquires
ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of
the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in
order to enable the latter to proceed to fully
implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet
called for at this stage since there are still various
avenues by which surface rights can be acquired
other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under
attack merely facilitates the implementation of the
FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating
the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining
Law and its implementing rules and regulations do
not provide for just compensation in expropriating
private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942
and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the
payment of just compensation.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION.
NO.
there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law
and its implementing rules and regulations that
exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to
determine just compensation in expropriation
proceedings involving mining operations.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of
Arbitrators the authority to decide cases where
surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse
permit holders entry, thus, necessitating involuntary
taking, this does not mean that the determination
of the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators
conclusive. The determination is only preliminary
unless accepted by all parties concerned. There is
nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction
by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary
matter the reasonable compensation due the
affected landowners or occupants. The original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide
determination of just compensation remains intact
despite the preliminary determination made by the
administrative agency.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and
supervision over mining operations. The following
provisions thereof establish the mechanism of
inspection and visitorial rights over mining
operations and institute reportorial requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly
relegates the State to the role of a “passive
regulator” dependent on submitted plans and
reports. On the contrary, the government agencies
concerned are empowered to approve or
disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and
change -- the various work programs and the
corresponding minimum expenditure commitments
for each of the exploration, development and
utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS'
INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY FOREIGN
AND FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THEIR
INVOLVEMENT IN MINING ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES
PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
the use of the word “involving” signifies the
possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise
related to or compatible with financial or technical
assistance.
Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that
there was a conscious and deliberate decision to
avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks
an intent not to use the expression “agreements x x
x involving either technical or financial assistance”
in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
V the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS
SERVICE CONTRACTS
NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts
found in the 1973 Constitution was not carried over
to the present constitution, sans any categorical
statement banning service contracts in mining
activities, does not mean that service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated
in the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of
service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who would invest in and operate and
manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State; this time,
however, safety measures were put in place to
prevent abuses of the past regime.
the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are
in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the
1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign
corporations acting as contractors on the one
hand; and on the other, the government as
principal or “owner” of the works. In the new
service contracts, the foreign contractors provide
capital, technology and technical know-how, and
managerial expertise in the creation and operation
of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and
the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB),
actively exercises control and supervision over the
entire operation.
OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests which may be
resolved by a court of law through the application
of a law. ! to exercise the power of judicial review,
the following must be extant (1) there must be an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
power; - involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy
involving a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942
has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved
and an FTAAs have been entered into. The FTAA
holders have already been operating in various
provinces of the country.
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and -
A question is considered ripe for adjudication when
effect on the individual challenging it. (3) the
person challenging must have the “standing" -
personal or substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized
grievance.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or
the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty.
! “taking” under the concept of eminent domain as
entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color
of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private
property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color
of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public
use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from
Regulation in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right
of the state (and of those entities to which the
power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn
private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation.On the other hand, police power is
the power of the state to promote public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
Although both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for their
object, and recent trends show a mingling of the
two with the latter being used as an implement of
the former, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence,
no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the
exercise of police power, property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance
prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of
their seating capacity (which would result in the
diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was
upheld valid as this would promote the comfort,
convenience and safety of the customers.
where a property interest is merely restricted
because the continued use thereof would be
injurious to public welfare, or where property is
destroyed because its continued existence would
be injurious to public interest, there is no
compensable taking. However, when a property
interest is appropriated and applied to some public
purpose, there is compensable taking.
! On different roles and responsibilities:
* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts of agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President
may execute with the foreign proponent.
(Executive Order No. 279, 1987)
! in re: easements and taking
In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that
the imposition of burden over a private property
through easement was considered taking; hence,
payment of just compensation is required. The
Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be
established, whatever may be the object thereof, is
not merely a real right that will encumber the
property, but is one tending to prevent the
exclusive use of one portion of the same, by
expropriating it for public use which, be it what it
may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of
the property condemned or seized be previously
and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the
appellant by means of the remedy employed in
such cases, as it is only adequate remedy when no
other legal action can be resorted to, against an
intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary
restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the
coercive power with which the same is invested.
! in order that one law may operate to repeal
another law, the two laws must be inconsistent.The
former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconciliable with the latter act.
DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006
FACTS: In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c
empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies when it comes to either technical or
financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995,
Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA
with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The
FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore
37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya
including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law,
DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio
petitioned to have the law and the RR to be
annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes
unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep.
Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40
as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of
DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and
unjust “taking” of private property for private
purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public use
and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit
entry into a private property and allow taking of
land without payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents
argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a
valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of
which, the state may prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. This government regulation involves the
adjustment of rights for the public good and that
this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or
economic exploitation of private property. Public
respondents concluded that “to require
compensation in all such circumstances would
compel the government to regulate by purchase.”
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs
are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted
the requisites of eminent domain. They are;
(1) the expropriator must enter a private
property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color
of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public
use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the
law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is
not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942
provides for just compensation as well as section
107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the
property of the surface owner, occupant, or
concessionaire as a consequence of such
operations shall be properly compensated as may
be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner
and Occupant- Any damage done to the property
of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire
thereof as a consequence of the mining operations
or as a result of the construction or installation of the
infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be
properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the
government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
Minors of the Philippines/Oposa vs. DENR/Factoran
(224 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
Petitioners are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio Factoran,
Jr., then Secretary of the DENR. He is substituted in
this petition by the new Secretary, Angel Alcala.
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit and alleges that the they "are all citizens of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn.”
They pray that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to (among other
things)—
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
(3) Grant them such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises.
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. Respondent
Judge Rosario issued an order granting the motion
to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental
law of the land.
ISSUES: 1. WON Petitioners have locus standi to file
the present action. YES
2. WON the relief prayed would result in the
impairment of contracts. NO
3. WON the complaint stated a cause of
action - YES
HELD:
1. This case has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Needless to say, every generation has
a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology.
2. Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
However, it is worth noting that a timber license is
an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads: “Sec. 10. No law
impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.” cannot be invoked. Even granting
arguendo that it is a contract, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the state.
3. After careful examination of the petitioners'
complaint, SC finds the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE
OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, the civil case be said to
raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is
no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the
instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge dismissing
the class suit is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.
La Bugal-b’laan v. Ramos
(445 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004)
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued EO 2796 on July
25, 1987, authorizing DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-
owned corporations.
President Fidel V. Ramos approved RA 7942
(Philippine Mining Act of 1995) on March 3, 1995.
This law “shall govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all
mineral resources (sec 15).” It contained provisions
regarding FTAAs, as well as the different modes of
mineral agreements for mining:
(1) The State may directly undertake such
activities.
(2) The State may enter into co-production,
joint venture or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens.
(4) For the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils, the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving technical or financial assistance.
ISSUE: Is RA 7942 unconstitutional? NO.
HELD: (At first Yes, for being violative of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. – Jan 204 decision)…
ie all other natural resources shall not be alienated,
preserved for the Filipinos, etc…
Ultimately, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
RA 7942 – Dec 2004 decision. The Constitution
should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should
not be used to strangulate economic growth. It
should be construed to grant the President and
Congress sufficient discretion to attract foreign
investments and expertise, as well as secure for our
people blessings of prosperity and peace.
As per Section 2, Art XII: … “The President may enter
into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.”
Note: (based from dissenting opinions) Limitations
under Sec 2 Article XII
1. State retains legal ownership of all natural
resources
2. State shall have full control and supervision
over the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources.
Specific limitations / restrictions in fourth paragraph
of Sec 2 (power of president to enter into
agreements with foreign corporations):
First, the natural resources that may be subject of
the agreement are a limited class, particularly
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. Among
the natural resources which are excluded from
these agreements are lands of the public domain,
waters, coal, fisheries, forests or timbers, wildlife,
flora and fauna. Most notable of the exclusions are
forests and timbers which are in all respects
expressly limited to Filipinos.
Second, these agreements with foreign-owned
corporations can only be entered into for only
large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils.
Third, it is only the President who may enter into
these agreements. This is another pronounced
change from the 1973 Constitution, which allowed
private persons to enter into service contracts with
foreign corporations.
Fourth, these agreements must be in accord with
the general terms and conditions provided by law.
This proviso by itself, and more so when taken
together, as it should, with another provision, entails
legislative intervention and affirmance in the
exercise of this executive power. While it is the
President who enters into these contracts, he/she
must act within such terms and conditions as may
be prescribed by Congress through legislation. The
value of legislative input as a means of influencing
policy should not be discounted. Policy initiatives
grounded on particular economic ideologies may
find enactment through legislation when approved
by the necessary majorities in Congress. Legislative
work includes consultative processes with persons of
diverse interests, assuring that economic decisions
need not be made solely from an ivory tower. There
is also the possible sanction of repudiation by the
voters of legislators who prove insensate to the
economic concerns of their constituents.
Fifth, the President is mandated to base the
decision of entering into these agreements on "real
contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country." In terms of real limitations,
this condition has admittedly little effect. The
discretion as to whether or not to enter into these
agreements is vested solely by the Constitution in
the President, and such exercise of discretion,
pertaining as it does to the political wisdom of a co-
equal branch, generally deserves respect from the
courts.
IPRA (R.A. No. 8371)
Cruz vs Secretary
(347 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000)
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,respondents.
FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity
of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral
domains which may include natural resources. Cruz
et al contend that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of “ancestral domains”
and “ancestral lands” which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private
landowners.
ISSUE: WON IPRA law is unconstitutional. NO
HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After
deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote.
They deliberated again and the same result
transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s
petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
public domain – somehow against the regalian
doctrine.
NOTES: ( just in case sir will ask about ani :)
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on
the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
“(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and
coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which
provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources found within ancestral domains
are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
“(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b)
which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
“(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates
the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
“(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates
the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral
lands;
“(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of
the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals
and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the
right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of
natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than
25 years; and
“(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples
the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.”
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of “ancestral domains”
and “ancestral lands” which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the
IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
These provisions are:
“(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the
process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon
certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of
Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
“(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall
be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or
ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples; “(4)
Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
“(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples.”
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part
II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that “the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office
of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination.” They contend that said
Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control
over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.
[G.R. No. L-37312. July 15, 1975.]
MARCOS B. COMILANG, Petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division),
ABDON DELENELA, GUILLERMO PEREZ, DOMINGA
COMILANG and ESTEBAN COMILANG, Respondents.
Bienvenido J. Garcia for Petitioner.
Daniel Zarate & Associates for Private Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In Civil Case No. 848, the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City and Benguet rendered a decision for
partition of the mineral claim known as the Bua
Fraction Lode Mineral Claim, the identical mineral
claim involved in two Supreme Court decisions
(Comilang v. Buendia, Et Al., G.R. No. L-24757, Oct.
25, 1967 and Comilang v. Delenela, Et Al., G.R. No.
L-18897, March 31, 1964). Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration of the decision and petition for
relief from judgment having been denied, the case
was elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals
which thereafter set aside the decision of the lower
court on the ground that the previous decisions of
the Supreme Court constituted res adjudicata in so
far as the action was concerned. Hence, this
petition for review by certiorari putting in issue the
question of whether or not the lower court in Civil
Case No. 848 had the authority to adjudicate to the
petitioner one-half of the ground surface of the Bua
Mineral Claim, notwithstanding the final judgment
in the previous cases recognizing the absolute
ownership over one and one-half hectares of the
surface rights of Abdon Delenela and his co-heirs.
The Supreme Court ruled that the principles of res
adjudicata applies and, hence, the case cannot
be relitigated. Considering, however, that petitioner
has still a legal right over the mineral claim and to
have his definite portion thereof segregated, the
trial court may proceed with the partition of the
mineral claim, excluding therefrom the one and
one-half hectares of the ground surfaces, the
ownership of which belongs exclusively to Delenela
and Perez.
Petition denied.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; JUDGMENTS; RES
JUDICATA. — The fundamental principle upon
which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the
same issue more than once; that, when a right or
fact has been juridically tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION WHERE THERE IS
DIFFERENCE IN AREAS OF LANDS SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE ACTIONS. — The fact that the land involved
in the later case covers a greater area than that
involved in the earlier case does not preclude the
application of the principle of res judicata. Where it
is shown that there is the same identity of the parties
in both cases and that the land involved in the first
case is included in the bigger land which is the
subject matter of the second case, and the
plaintiff’s right to contest defendant’s title or interest
in the land involved in the first case had already
been in issue and adversely decided in that case,
the principle of res judicata applies.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT AND
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT, DISTINGUISHED. —
Section 49 (b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
enunciates that concept of res judicata known as
"bar by prior judgment" while Section 49 (c) of the
same rule refers to "conclusiveness of judgment."
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, between the
first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case which sought to be barred, there
is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as
to the claim or demand in controversy, including
the parties and those in privity with them, not only
as to every matter which was offered and received
to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to
but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose and of all
matters that could have been adjudged in that
case. But where between the first and second
cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of
cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in
the second case, only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and not
as to matters merely involved therein.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM "LAW OF THE
CASE." — The doctrine of law of the case is akin to
that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its
application. It relates entirely to questions of law,
and is confirmed in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case. The doctrine of res
judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to
the conclusive determination of issues of fact,
although it may include questions of law, and
although it may apply to collateral proceedings in
the same action or general proceeding, it is
generally concerned with the effect of an
adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for review by way of certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
June 20, 1973.
In the aforesaid decision, the Court of Appeals set
aside the decision of the lower court in Civil Case
No. 848 (Marcos Comilang v. Abdon Delenela, Et.
Al.) for partition on the ground that "the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Marcos Comilang
v. Generoso A. Buendia, Et Al., G. R. No. L-24757,
promulgated on October 25, 1967, constitutes res
adjudicata insofar as the present case is
concerned . . ." Respondent Court of Appeals
made the observation that the lower court in its
decision also totally ignored the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Maxima Nieto de
Comilang v. Abdon Delenela, Et Al., 1 which was
reiterated and re-affirmed in the later case. It
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the Supreme Court has finally settled the issue in
that the appellants Delenela and Perez are the
absolute owners of the surface ground of the
property in question.
‘The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of all legal
questions properly brought before it, and its
decision in any given case constitutes the law of
that particular case.’ (Kabigting v. Acting Director
of Prisons, L-15548, October 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 281;
Macasantos v. Guinoo, L-19973, April 30, 1965, 13
SCRA 685; People v. Olarte, L-22455, Feb. 28, 1967,
19 SCRA 494).’ Once the judgment of the Supreme
Court has become final, it is binding on all inferior
courts, and hence, beyond their power and
authority to alter or modify it.’ (Macasantos v.
Fernan, L-13726, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 277;
Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, Oct. 30, 1962,
7 SCRA 281; Jocson v. Glorioso, L-22686, Jan. 30,
1968, 22 SCRA 316)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The antecedent facts prior to this appeal are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"About the year 1908, Nicolas Comilang staked a
mining claim known as the ‘ Bua Fraction Mineral
Claim’ over a parcel of land in Tuding, Benguet,
Mountain Province, with an area of 76,809 square
meters, more or less. His exploration works in the
mining claim did not last for long, for he
abandoned it, and stopped the exploration, but he
continued to live in the house he built on a portion
of the land with his wife, brothers and sisters.
"In the year 1918, Macario Comilang also settled on
a portion of the land with an area of about one (1)
hectare, for residential and agricultural purposes.
After his death, his daughter, Fabiana Comilang
Perez remained to live in the house built by her
father on the land. Still later, other relatives of the
old Nicolas Comilang settled and built their own
houses over other portions of the land, one of which
houses was acquired by Abdon Delenela who now
resides on the land width the other Comilang heirs.
"Surface rights over the area embraced in the
original Bua Fraction Mineral Claim of Nicolas
Comilang soon became the subject of litigation in
the Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Case
No. 250 — Action to Quiet Title), instituted by the
heirs of Guillerma, Marcelina, Jolian, Timoteo,
Melecio and Macario, all surnamed Comilang,
against appellant herein Marcos Comilang who
claimed to have bought the rights and interest of
Nicolas Comilang in the old mining claim. In a
decision rendered in said case No. 250, dated
November 26, 1952, the court dismissed both claims
of ownership of the plaintiffs and the defendant
and declared the area public land. The court,
however, recognized the possession of the parties
over certain specified portions of the area, among
which was an area of about one and one-half (1-
1/2) hectares in possession of Marcos Comilang,
which has been declared for taxation purposes in
his name. This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11157-R on October 29,
1955.
"In the same year, the 1-1/2 hectares of land
occupied by Marcos Comilang, then declared
under Tax Declaration No. 4771 in his name, was
levied upon and sold at public auction by the
sheriff of Mountain Province to satisfy a judgment
for a sum of money obtained by the spouses Jose
Coloma and Eugenia Rumbaoa against Marcos
Comilang in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in
Civil Case No. 1433. The judgment creditors were
the purchasers at the auction sale, and a
certificate of sale was executed in their favor by the
sheriff on June 1, 1957.
"In the meantime, an application for lode patent
covering the Bua Fraction Mineral Claim was filed
with the Bureau of Mines. Abdon Delenela and his
co-heirs filed their opposition to the application.
Pending the controversy before the Bureau of
Mines, Delenela and his co-heirs; instituted an
action for determination of their rights on the land in
the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 735. The parties submitted an
amicable settlement recognizing co-ownership
among themselves of the Bua Mineral Claim. In a
decision rendered in said Case No. 735, dated
March 3, 1958 the court awarded one-half in
undivided share in the mineral claim in favor of
Marcos Comilang, and the other half also in
undivided share in favor of Abdon Delenela and
co-heirs.
"Later, in the exercise of their right as co-owners,
Abdon Delenela and Guillermo Perez, with the
knowledge and conformity of Marcos Comilang,
redeemed and bought from the Coloma spouses,
the latter’s lights, title, interest and claim to the 1-1/2
hectares of land acquired under the certificate of
sale thereof executed in the latter’s favor by the
sheriff on June 1, 1957. This redemption sale took
place on June 11, 1958.
"On February 9, 1959, the Director of Mines
recommended the issuance of a lode patent over
the Bua Mineral Claim in favor of Marcos Comilang
Delenela, and the other claimants in the proportion
of one-half (1/2) in undivided share in favor of
Marcos Comilang, and the other one-half (1/2) also
in undivided share in favor of Delenela and the
other heirs pursuant to the decision of March 3,
1958, aforementioned, in Civil Case No. 735.
"On August 12, 1959, upon motion of Abdon
Delenela and Perez, who have thus acquired and
succeeded to the rights of the Coloma spouses on
the 1-1/2 hectares, the Municipal Court of Baguio
City issued a writ of possession in their favor
directing the sheriff of Mountain Province to evict
Marcos Comilang and his wife from the 1-1/2
hectares of land sold in the execution sale." 2
As an aftermath of the foregoing events, three (3)
cases were brought on appeal to this Court. The first
case was the appeal of Maxima Nieto de
Comilang, wife of Marcos Comilang, from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City
in Civil Case No. 897, directing the Sheriff to place
Guillermo Perez and Abdon Delenela in possession
of the 1-1/2 hectares of land sold in the Sheriff’s
execution sale. The second is the appeal of Marcos
Comilang from the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1440,
denying the petition of Marcos Comilang to annul
the Order of the Municipal Court of Baguio City in
Civil Case No. 1433, dated August 11, 1967,
directing the Sheriff to place Abdon Delenela and
Guillermo Perez in possession of the aforestated 1-
1/2 hectares of land. The third is the case at bar.
In the first case, this Court had occasion to pass
upon the question of whether or not the sale on
execution of residential land containing an area of
1-1/2 hectares to the spouses Jose Coloma and
Eugenia Rumbaoa and which was redeemed and
bought from said spouses by Abdon Delenela and
Guillermo Perez, with the conformity of the
judgment debtor Marcos Comilang, included the
mineral claim under it. Resolving this issue in the
negative, this Court stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We find the above ruling objectionable on two
grounds: (1) that the certificate of sale on
execution, as well as the order of the court for a writ
of possession, expressly included a residential land
alone and not the mineral claim known as the Bua
Mineral Claim of nine hectares covered in part by
the 1-1/2 hectares residential lot; and (2) there is no
express or implied taking away of the said mineral
rights or the mineral claim by virtue of the
execution, nor is there any express act of Marcos
Comilang supposedly consenting to the
redemption by Delenela and Perez of the
ownership of the mineral claim.
". . . the only property actually sold at public
auction . . . is the residential land containing an
area of 1-1/2 hectares, together with the
improvements existing thereon, without including
the Bua Mineral Claim or the undivided one-half
right thereto of Marcos Comilang . . .
x x x sale. Consequently, We have to declare that the
"Aside from the fact that the mineral claim was not
sold in execution, the provisions of the Mining Law
expressly declare that the ownership of land for
other purposes does not include the minerals, and
that mineral rights are not included in agricultural
land patents." 3
This Court, however, affirmed the Order of the
Baguio Court in so far as it sanctioned the
ownership and possession of Guillermo Perez and
Abdon Delenela over the 1-1/2-hectare residential
lot.
In the subsequent case of Comilang v. Buendia, et.
al., 4 the same question in relation to the identical
1-1/2-hectare parcel of residential land subject
matter of the earlier case was raised by Marcos
Comilang. He claimed that the issuance of the
mineral lode patent covering the mineral claim
over the land which included the said 1-1/2
hectares, conveyed full ownership, not only of the
mineral rights, but also of title over the surface of
the ground. He insisted that there could be no
severance of the surface rights over a mineral claim
located under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and,
therefore, the Sheriff could not have validly sold the
surface rights in the execution sale of June 1, 1957.
He therefore challenged the final certificate of sale
conveying the 1-1/2-hectare portion of Abdon
Delenela and Guillermo Perez as an invalid
disposition thereof. In its decision dated October 25,
1967, this Court, reiterating its earlier ruling, made
the following observations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The validity of that sale was questioned when
the Municipal Court ordered the eviction of
appellant from the land sold on execution, and the
Supreme Court declared in L-18897 that the sale
was valid. The sale operated to divest appellant of
his rights to the land which vested in the purchasers
at the auction sale. The parties herein subsequently
litigated their rights to the mineral claim in Civil
Case No. 735 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City, and on the basis of their amicable agreement
(appellant was a party in the case), the court
declared the Bua Mineral Claim co-ownership
property of the parties thereto ‘ except the
improvements existing thereon’ (p. 9, appellant’s
petition). There is no room for doubt, therefore, that
the right to possess or own the surface ground is
separate and distinct from the mineral rights over
the same land. And when the application for lode
patent was prosecuted in the Bureau of Mines, the
said application could not have legally included
the surface ground sold to another in the execution
patent procured thereunder, at least with respect
to the 1-1/2 hectares sold in execution, pertains
only to the mineral right and does not include the
surface ground of the land in question." (pp. 493-
494.)
On December 15, 1968, the Court of First Instance
of Baguio City and Benguet, presided over by
Judge Pio R. Marcos, rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. 848, an action for partition brought by
Marcos Comilang against Abdon Delenela,
Guillermo Perez, Dominga Comilang and Esteban
Comilang, co-owners, of the mineral claims known
as the Bua Fraction Lode Mineral Claim, the
identical mineral claim involved in the two Supreme
Court decisions above mentioned. Contrary to the
rulings enunciated by the Supreme Court in the two
aforementioned cases, said court declared in
part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The defendants claim that the partition of the Bua
Fraction Mineral Claim should be limited only to the
mineral rights and does not include the surface
rights which belongs to them exclusively by virtue of
the sale by the Colomas to them. Plaintiffs,
however, maintain that the issuance of Lode Patent
No. V-24 and the corresponding Original Certificate
of Title No. P-404 of the Bua Fraction Mineral Claim
in favor of plaintiff and defendants, include not only
the minerals but also the surface.
"There is merit in the claim of plaintiffs in this case.
Under the provisions of the Old Mining Law, (Act No.
624 of the Philippine Commission), under which the
Bua Fraction was perfected, the locator is the
owner, not only of the minerals but also all the
surface ground. The Bua Fraction Lode Claim is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-404
and any claim adverse or otherwise not annotated
in the said title is not recognized. The claim of
defendants that they purchased the surface rights
of Marcos Comilang is erroneous as said claim does
not appear in the certificate of title. The alleged
acquisition of the surface rights by defendants was
on June 11, 1958, and the issuance of the patent of
the Bua Lode Mineral was on November 7, 1966, yet
defendants failed to file their claim with the Director
of Mines or with the Mining Recorder of Baguio.
They could not claim that they were not aware of
the pendency of the application for the patent of
said mineral claim as they even filed their
opposition. Therefore, they are forever barred for
their failure to file said claim by virtue of the
provisions of the same mining laws and
regulations."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court of First Instance, disregarding completely
defendants Abdon Delenela, et al’s claim for
surface rights over the oft-mentioned 1-1/2
hectares, accordingly ordered the partition of the
Bua Fraction Lode Mineral Claim among the
plaintiff Marcos Comilang and defendants in the
proportion agreed upon by them, namely, 1/2 to
the plaintiff and 1/2 to the defendants. On January
17, 1969, defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that the decision ordering
partition was in contravention of the ruling laid
down by the Supreme Court in the case of
Comilang v. Buendia, Et Al., supra, but said motion
was denied on March 11, 1969. A petition for relief
from judgment was likewise denied on September
8, 1969.
On October 6, 1969, defendants appealed to the
Court of Appeals from the final decision dated
December 15, 1968 and the Order dated
September 8, 1969, denying their petition for relief
from judgment. It is the decision of the Court of
Appeals herein that is the subject of the present
petition for review by certiorari.
The ultimate issue before this Court is whether or not
the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and
Benguet in Civil Case No. 848 had the authority to
adjudicate to the petitioner one-half (1/2) of the
ground surface of the Bua Mineral Claim,
notwithstanding the final judgment in the previous
cases recognizing the absolute ownership over the
one and one-half (1-1/2) hectares of the surface
rights of Abdon Delenela and his co-heirs.
There is no question that in the aforecited cases,
We have held that the public auction sale of 1-1/2
hectares of the surface of the Bua Fraction Mineral
Claim to the Coloma spouses and which was in turn
acquired by Abdon Delenela and his co-heirs,
operated to divest petitioner Marcos Comilang of
his rights thereon. We likewise declared that such
surface rights are severable from the mineral rights
so that ownership over each of them may be
lodged in two different persons. Consequently, the
grant of the lode patent in favor of Marcos
Comilang, Abdon Delenela and his co-heirs could
not have legally included the one and one-half (1-
1/2) hectares of the ground surface subject of the
auction sale. Having thus resolved the question of
ownership over the 1-1/2 hectares residential land
(one of the issues raised in Civil Case No. 848 for
partition of mineral rights in the two cases
abovementioned), it cannot again be relitigated
by the same parties in the subsequent action for
partition.
"The fundamental principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought
not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once; that, when a right or fact has been
juridically tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in
law or estate. . . ." 5 judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute
It is important to note that the parties in the two
cases (De Comilang v. Delenela, Et. Al. and
Comilang v. Buendia, Et Al., supra) decided by this
Court such as Marcos Comilang, Abdon Delenela
and Guillermo Perez, are the same ones involved in
the action for partition. It is true that the land
involved in the action for partition covers a wider
area because the Bua Fraction Lode Mineral Claim
involves an area of 6.5765 hectares, whereas the
area subject of previous litigation was only 1-1/2
hectares. However, this does not preclude the
application of the principle of res judicata. Where it
is shown that there is the same identity of the parties
in both cases and that the land involved in the first
case is included in the bigger land which is the
subject matter of the second case, and the
plaintiff’s right to contest defendant’s title or interest
to the land involved in the first case had already
been in issue and adversely decided in that case,
the principle of res judicata applies. 6
‘A judgment upon the merits bars a subsequent suit
upon the same cause, brought in a different form of
action and a party, therefore, cannot by varying
the form of action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated." 7 of res judicata in its second form, namely
This principle of res judicata is embodied in Rule 39,
Sec. 49[b] and [c] of the Rules of Court, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and for the
same title and in the same capacity.
"(c) In any other litigation between the same parties
or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged,
or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto:"
Sec. 49[b] enunciates that concept of res judicata
known as "bar by prior judgment" while Sec. 49[c]
refers to "conclusiveness of judgment." There is "bar
by prior judgment" when, between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second
case which is sought to be barred, there is identity
of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The
bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the
claim or demand in controversy, including the
parties and those in privity with them, not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to
any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose and of all matters
that could have been adjudged in that case. But
where between the first and second cases, there is
identity of parties but no identity of cause of action,
the first judgment is conclusive in the second case,
only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. 8
There is evidently identity of parties and subject
matter between the two aforecited cases and the
case at bar. Since, in the ultimate analysis, what
was involved in the two previous cases was the right
of ownership over the Found surface of the mining
claim consisting of 1-1/2 hectares acquired by
Abdon Delenela, Et. Al. in the Sheriff’s sale, there is
identity of cause of action of those two cases with
the case at bar, which involves specifically the right
of ownership over the Found surface of the Bua
Fraction Lode Mineral Claim. Even if there is no
identity of cause of action, provided there is
identity of parties and subject matter, the doctrine
"conclusiveness of judgment" would be applicable.
9 Having definitely resolved in the two aforecited
cases that the ownership over the 1-1/2 hectares of
surface rights were vested in Delenela and Perez,
such holding is conclusive upon the parties in this
case, and, therefore, that question can no longer
be relitigated between them. 10
Further distinction between the concepts of res
judicata and "law of the case" may be made,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .’The doctrine of law of the case’ is akin to that
of former adjudication, but is more limited in its
application. It relates entirely to questions of law,
and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case. The doctrine of res
judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to
the conclusive determination of issues of fact,
although it may include questions of law, and
although it may apply to collateral proceedings in
the same action or general proceeding, it is
generally concerned with the effect of an
adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding."
(30 Am. Jur. 913-914.)
The Court of First Instance, therefore, had neither
power nor authority to adjudicate anew the rights
of ownership of the parties over the ground surface
to the extent of 1-1/2 hectares of the Bua Fraction
Lode Mineral Claim.
It is claimed by petitioner, however, that private
respondents "never filed any pleading alleging that
the instant action is barred by reason of res judicata
arising from the decision rendered in G. R. No. L-
24757." But said party ignores the fact that private
respondents have already interposed the defense
of res judicata when they alleged as one of their
affirmative defenses in their Supplemental Answer
on September 7, 1964 that the cause of action is
barred by prior judgments by reason of the decision
of the Supreme Court in Comilang v. Delenela, Et.
Al. in G. R No L-18897 promulgated on March 31,
1964, together with the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Civil Case No. 250 in the City Court of
Baguio, in Civil Case No 1433 It must be noted that
in the aforecited case of Comilang v. Delenela, Et
Al., this Court had occasion to pass upon the
validity of the sale on execution of the 1-1/2
hectares, by sustaining the rights of ownership of
Delenela and Perez therein, which rights of
ownership did not include that of the mineral claim.
The case of Comilang v. Buendia, Et Al., which was
promulgated on October 25, 1967 after the offer of
evidence was made by private respondents an
March 14, 1967 in Civil Case No 848, reiterated the
ruling in the earlier case of Comilang v. Delenela,
Et. Al. that the auction sale operated to divest
Marcos Comilang of his rights to the 1-1/2 hectares
of land which vested in the purchasers Considering,
however, that petitioner has still a legal right over
the mineral claim and to have his definite portion
thereof segregated, the trial court, in the case at
bar, may proceed with the partition of the mineral
claim, excluding therefrom the one and one-half (1-
1/2) hectares of the ground surface, the ownership
of which belongs exclusively to Delenela and Perez.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition, the
same is hereby denied, without prejudice to the
court a quo rendering its judgment in Civil Case No.
848 in accordance with this opinion Costs against
petitioner.
Fernando, Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion
Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-55132 August 30, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal Lagawe Ifugao,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Ifugao, Lagawe, Ifugao, JULIUS
ROBLES, EDUARDO BANDAO, MARCOS OYAGON,
DAGYO UYANG, UDULON LATTOD, BUCCAHAN
MUNDIGUING, JUNIOR MUNDIGUING, PIWIT
TUNDAGUI, GUINOMON CHONGA-AP, FERNANDO
TID-ONG, JULIO BALLOGAN, FERNAN GAGGO,
CARMEN GAGGO AND BALBINA POCYA,
respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts:
Prior to 27 March 1978, the Director of Mines issued
a commercial lease permit to one Felix de Castro
granting him the exclusive right to quarry, extract
and carry away sand and gravel from the Sumigar
Quarry located at Banawe, Ifugao.
On complaint by Felix de Castro, an Information
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ifugao,
presided over by respondent Judge, charging
private respondents with the crime of "Theft of
Minerals" defined and penalized under Section 78
of Presidential Decree No. 483, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1385.
Respondents-accused filed a Motion to Quash on
the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense inasmuch as they had paid
"sand and gravel tax," to the Municipal Treasurer of
Banawe, Ifugao, for the quarrying of sand and
gravel. The taking, therefore, according to private
respondents, was with the consent of the
government. They also invoked LOI No. 243, which
allows persons to extract sand and gravel even
within the leased area for use in government
infrastructures.
Petitioner opposed the quashal arguing that it is
error to imply that consent was given by the
Government through the Municipal Treasurer
inasmuch as the taxes paid to the Municipal
Government are not the fees required by the
Bureau of Mines.
On 28 January 1980, respondent Judge issued the
assailed Order quashing the Information on the
ground that violation of P.D. No. 463 is limited to an
administrative violation and that the crime of Theft
under the Revised Penal Code (Article 308) has not
been committed since malice, which is an essential
element in the commission of a crime, is lacking.
The reconsideration prayed for by petitioner was
denied by respondent on 18 July 1980. Hence, this
certiorari Petition alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the facts charged in the Information
constitute an offense?
Ruling: participation of the Government since private
Section 78. Theft of Minerals. Any person who, respondents had paid taxes on the sand and
without a mining lease or a temporary permit or, gravel extracted is not well-taken. In crimes
any other permit granted by the Secretary or the punished by special laws, the act alone,
Director under existing mining decrees, laws and irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense.
regulations to mine, shall extract, remove and/or WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted.
dispose of minerals belonging to the Government
or from a mining claim or claims leased, held or
owned by other persons, shall be deemed to have
stolen the ores or the products thereof from the
mines or mills….
The elements of the offense, therefore, are that :
(1) the accused extracted, removed and/or
disposed of minerals;
(2) these minerals belong to the Government or
have been taken from a mining claim or claims
leased, held or owned by other persons; and
(3) the accused did not possess a mining lease or a
temporary permit or any other permit to mine
granted by the Secretary or the Director under
existing mining decrees, laws and regulations.

Evidently, the Information filed in the Court below

includes all the foregoing elements. Thus, it alleged
(1) that the accused, conspiring and mutually
helping one another, wilfully and feloniously
extracted, removed and/or disposed of minerals or
material aggregates like sand and gravel; (2) the
minerals were taken from the Sumigar Quarry,
Banawe, Ifugao, which is covered by a commercial
permit issued by the Bureau of Mines, Baguio City, in
favor of complaining witness Felix de Castro; and
(3) the extracting was done without any mining
lease or permit of their own pursuant to law.

It will have to be held, therefore, that based upon

the facts alleged in the Information, the essential
requisites of the Offense of "Theft of Minerals," as
specified by substantive law, are present. Thus,
respondent Judge, in considering as evidence the
three receipts of tax payments issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of Banawe, Ifugao, exceeded
his jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of
discretion when he considered matters of defense
extrinsic to the allegations in the Information and
which should be substantiated during the trial.
Moreover, said receipts merely show payment of
taxes pursuant to Provincial Ordinance No. 14 and
not the authority to extract, remove, and/or dispose
of minerals from the Sumigar Quarry as required by
P.D. No. 463. Those receipts are insufficient
evidence to prove that the proper Government
office had, in effect, granted the required permit to
extract minerals from said quarry.

The rationalization by respondent Judge that the

taking away of sand and gravel was without malice
because it was done with the knowledge and