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ABSTRACT
Previous studies show that crude oil is negatively correlated with stocks
but has almost the same rate of return as stocks, and so adding crude oil
into a portfolio with equities can provide significant diversification
benefits for the portfolio. Given the diversification benefit of crude oil
mixed with equities, we examine the value effect of crude oil derivatives
transactions by oil and gas producers. Differing from traditional
corporate risk management literature, this study examines corporate
derivatives transactions from the shareholders’ diversification perspective.
The results show that crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas
producers do impact value. If oil and gas producing companies stop
shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, company stock prices increase
significantly. In contrast, if oil and gas producing companies initiate short
positions in crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices tend to drop (still
significant, but less so). Thus, hedging by producers is not necessarily
good. Transaction limitation is shown to be one of the possible sources of
the value effect of corporate derivatives transactions.
1. INTRODUCTION
To examine the value effect of crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and
gas producers, we select oil and gas producing firms that have changed their
derivatives policies during the period of 1996 through 2005. We calculate
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around derivatives policy changes
and investigate if there is a significant relationship between CARs and
derivatives position changes measured by hedge ratio changes.
We find that when oil and gas producing companies stop shorting crude
oil derivatives contracts, there is a very significant relationship between
CARs and hedge ratio changes. Removing short positions is associated with
higher CARs. So, shareholders do not like oil and gas producing companies
to hedge; they want these companies to stop hedging. When these companies
stop hedging, the value effect is reflected in a stock price increase and
shareholders’ wealth increase. This fact is consistent with our expectation
that removing short positions on crude oil derivatives contracts by oil and
gas producing companies has a value effect.
When oil and gas producing companies start shorting crude oil contracts,
we find negative and marginally significant market reactions. This result
shows that when oil and gas producing companies start shorting, share-
holders do not value this hedging policy. Hedging by oil and gas producers
has a negative value effect.
The Value Effect of Crude Oil Derivatives Transactions by Oil Producers 141
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
An earlier study published in the previous volume of this series (Xu, 2010),
provides evidence that crude oil and other energy commodities have zero or
142 HELEN XU ET AL.
negative correlation with equities (but do not have returns that are less than
risk free rate). Thus, adding these commodities into investors’ portfolios can
bring diversification benefits and improve the completeness of investors’
portfolios. Therefore, short transactions in oil producing industries are
expected to have negative effects on the diversification profiles of
shareholders’ portfolios, while reducing or removing short transactions are
anticipated to improve the diversification profiles of shareholders’ port-
folios. When crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers
improve the diversification of shareholders’ portfolios, transaction limita-
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tion makes shareholders unable to obtain the same risk and return profiles
as the companies provide. Consequently, shareholders have motivation to
value the derivatives transactions taken by companies.
For institutional investors, most of their investments still concentrate on
stocks and bonds. Because of the restrictive regulatory requirements,
insurance companies, mutual funds, and other institutional investors do not
venture much into commodities. It was not until recently that some pension
funds begin to add commodities in their portfolios. Doyle, Hill, and Jack
(2007) show that 75–80% of the funds invested into GSCI (Goldman
Sachs Commodity Index) are from pension funds and the rest are from
corporations. In March 2007, California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS), the biggest U.S. pension fund, started tracking the
GSCI index. Doyle et al. (2007) state that CalPERS current investment in
commodities accounts for only 3% of its portfolio, and that many pension
funds still do not invest in commodities at all. When pension funds invest
into the GSCI index, they need to rebalance their commodity portfolio
monthly, which incurs high transactions costs. High transaction costs
may be one of the reasons that pension funds are reluctant to invest into
commodities.
For individual investors, the exposure to commodities is also very limited.
It is impractical for investors to buy and store crude oil. Because of high
transaction costs and risk, few individual investors hold crude oil derivatives
contracts by themselves. Hedge funds and commodity funds provide
opportunities for investors to gain exposure to commodities. Nonetheless,
because of high entrance requirements and fees, most of these funds are
only available to high net worth investors rather than common individual
investors. Edwards and Ma (1988), Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1990),
Irwin, Krukemyer, and Zulauf (1993), and Fung and Hsieh (2000) showed
that for publicly offered commodity funds, fees are substantially higher than
those charged by hedge funds. Fung and Hsieh (2000) state that high fees
and transactions cost make commodity funds unpopular.
The Value Effect of Crude Oil Derivatives Transactions by Oil Producers 143
date, and thus there may be information leakage before or after companies
disclose their hedging policies publicly.
To examine whether there is information leakage, this study examines the
relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes around the effective
date of derivatives position changes. The hypotheses are as follows:
H3. There is a significantly positive relationship between CARs and hedge
ratio changes if companies initiate crude oil derivatives short transactions.
which firms show changes in derivatives positions because they are new
or because they cease to exist due to mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy,
or other reasons. This study drops these firms.
3. For each sample firm, this study specifies the announcement date of
policy change and the effective date of policy change. Announcement
date is the disclosure date of correspondent accounting report to SEC.
The effective date is the effective date when derivatives contracts are
initiated or removed.
4. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions
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Table 1 (and the accompanying Fig. 1) show basic information about the
energy-producing firms that were active during the 10-year period 1996
through 2005. Panel A of Fig. 1 illustrates how the total of 887 energy firms
divides between those that ever used derivatives during that period (201
hedgers, less than one-quarter of all the firms) and those that never used
derivatives (686, more than three-quarters of all the firms). So, the total
population of energy producing firms showed a strong preference for not
hedging.
Panel B of Fig. 1 shows the breakdown for the subset of energy firms
that are listed in the CRSP Database (344 firms listed). Of these, 20 firms
regularly hedged, whereas 157 regularly did not hedge. Slightly less than
half of the publicly traded firms shifted strategies (sometimes more than
once) during the 10-year period spanned by the study. These are the ones
we focus on during the remainder of the analysis – because this is the
group for which we can study the stock market reaction to a change in
strategy.
The Value Effect of Crude Oil Derivatives Transactions by Oil Producers 147
No. of new hedgers that do not change derivatives policy 310 trading 46
days before and 60 days after event day and have hedge ratios data
No. of new nonhedgers 145
No. of new nonhedgers that do not change derivatives policy 310 trading 31
days before and 60 days after event day and have hedge ratios data
Notes: This table shows the profile of 344 sample firms examined for the value effect. All oil and
gas producing firms that have stock returns data in CRSP are collected. The examination period
is from 1996 to 2005. Corporations with derivatives transactions are chosen in terms of 10-K
forms, 10-Q forms, and footnotes to annual reports. All the forms are collected from the
EDGAR database. Firms that keep using commodity derivatives transactions and firms that
keep not using commodity derivatives transactions are taken as hedgers and nonhedgers. All
other firms are those that have changed their crude oil derivatives transaction policies during
the period from 1996 to 2005, either initiating use (new hedgers) or removing use (new
nonhedgers). For firms that have changed their derivatives transactions policies more than once,
we count them as both new hedgers and new nonhedgers. There are also some cases in which
firms show changes in derivatives positions because they are new or because they cease to exist
due to mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, or other reasons. This study cannot find the annual
reports for them from the EDGAR database, and drops these firms.
Table 2 and the accompanying Fig. 2 show a profile of the publicly traded
firms that changed hedging policies across the time-span of our study. There
were a total of 145 shifts from hedging to not hedging, and a total of
120 shifts into hedging.
Looking closely at the year-by-year activity is revealing. For 7 of the
10 years, the number of new nonhedgers exceeded the number of new
hedgers. Indeed, in three of those years, the number of new nonhedgers was
more than twice as many as the number of new hedgers (1997, 2003, and
2004). Of the total of 10 years, there were only 3 that saw the number of new
hedgers exceed the number of new nonhedgers (1996, 1999, and 2002).
Moreover, the total number of shifts was fairly volatile from year to year.
There were just fourteen shifts in 1996 (suggesting low levels of tension
concerning the direction of energy prices), while there were 46 shifts in the
148 HELEN XU ET AL.
201
Use derivatives
686
Do not hedge
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Firms in CRSP
20
167 157
1996 9 5
1997 11 23
1998 9 11
1999 24 13
2000 22 24
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2001 8 13
2002 17 14
2003 5 12
2004 7 19
2005 8 11
Total 120 145
Notes: This table shows the profile of firms that have changed derivatives policy across time.
This study lists the time periods during which the firm has transactions over the period from
1996 to 2005. By doing this, this chapter can identify the time when companies start or stop
commodity derivatives use. Firms that keep using commodity derivatives transactions and firms
that keep not using commodity derivatives transactions from 1996 to 2005 will be separated
from other firms. All other firms are those that have changed their crude oil derivatives
transactions policies during the period from 1996 to 2005, either initiating use (new hedgers) or
removing use (new nonhedgers). New hedgers are those firms that have initiated derivative use
during the period from 1996 to 2005. New non-hedgers are those firms that have removed
derivatives transactions during the period from 1996 to 2005.
So, the next logical step is to treat the policy shifts as events, and examine
the stock price movements around the event.
During the sample time period, there are 120 firm/dates that start using
crude oil and gas related derivatives contracts, and each firm/date is counted
as one new hedger. Among these 120 sample new hedgers, there are some
cases in which firms change their derivatives policy again during the
estimation window (310,61) or during 60 days around the event dates.
For example, firm A announced its intention to remove its entire commodity
derivatives contract effectively on 07/01/1999 but later announced its
intention to initiate using commodity derivatives contracts on 04/01/2000.
To control the contaminating effect of the announcement of quitting on
07/01/1999, we exclude the announcement of firm A on 04/01/2000 from our
sample of new hedgers. Also, we make sure that the selected new hedgers
have hedge ratio data. Thus the final sample of new hedgers includes
46 firm/dates. Using the same method, of the 344 sample firms we obtain
150 HELEN XU ET AL.
30
25 24 24
23
22
20 19
17
15 14
13 13
12
11 11 11
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10 9 9
8 8
7
5 5
5
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
145 sample new nonhedgers, which are firm/dates that announce to stop
using crude oil and gas related derivatives contracts. After clearing the
contaminating transactions and checking the availability of hedge ratios
data, we get 31 new nonhedgers for oil and gas producing industry.
4. METHODOLOGY
firms’ risk exposure. Allayannis and Weston (2001) also contend that we
should examine the effect of hedging policy changes on firm value changes.
This investigation applies standard event study methodology to examine
the effect of derivatives position changes on firm value changes. We test
whether there is a significant relationship between CARs around derivatives
transactions policy change and hedge ratio changes. This study divides
sample firms as new hedgers and new nonhedgers, and then test whether the
decision to initiate crude oil derivatives transactions or to quit crude oil
derivatives transactions causes significant CARs. Based on Gregory (2001)
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where, Rjt is the return to stock j at day t; aj the intercept; bj the slope
coefficient; Rmt the return to the value-weighted CRSP market index on day
t; and ejt the error term of firm j on day t.
The derivative transaction announcement date or effective date is the
event date, day 0, for each stock j. The estimation period is defined as a 250-
day non-event window starting on day 310 through day 61. Equation (1)
is estimated with ordinary least squares, and the predicted residual for each
day in the prediction interval is defined as follows:
where a^ j and b^ j are the estimated OLS parameters from the estimation
window, Rjt the return of stock j at time t, Rmt the market return at time t,
and t from the event window. The market return is the CRSP value-
weighted market index return.
The CAR (Eq. 3 below) is generated by calculating the cumulative pre-
diction residual for each security j as a sum of the prediction errors over the
event window examined. The event windows include (30, 0), (0, 30), and
(30, 30). Window (30, 0) is used to detect the market reaction before
announcement of derivatives policy change or before the effective derivatives
policy change. Window (0, 30) is used to detect the market reaction after
announcement of derivatives policy change or after the effective derivatives
policy change. Window (30, 30) is used to detect the market reaction
152 HELEN XU ET AL.
X
t2
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After obtaining the CAR for each sample firm, this study applies the
Weighted Least Square (WLS) method to test if there is a relationship
between CARs and hedge ratio changes. Karafiath (1994) also mentions the
cross-correlation of error terms and the possible change of variance of error
terms. WLS is applied to solve this problem. CAR over the event windows
(30, 0), (0, 30), and (30, 30) is taken as dependent variable, respectively,
and the hedge ratio change is taken as independent variable. The regression
model is as follows:
where CARj is the cumulative abnormal return for security j; a the intercept;
b1 the coefficient of hedge ratio change; x1j the hedge ratio change around
event day; and ejt the error term.
This study continues to investigate the effect of transaction limitation by
conducting another WLS regression. CARs are used to represent the value
effect of derivatives policy changes. The identified transaction limitation
proxy variable is the firm size represented by the market capitalization,
collected from the CRSP database. Hedge ratio change is used as a control
variable. The regression model is as follows:
where b2 the coefficient of firm size; and x2j the firm size before
event day.
The Value Effect of Crude Oil Derivatives Transactions by Oil Producers 153
5. RESULTS
For oil and gas producing companies that start shorting energy commodities
derivatives, Table 3 shows negative and significant market reactions, which
is consistent with our forecast. The coefficients of hedge ratio change are
0.17, 0.12, and 0.29 for different event windows. For the event window
(30, 0) and (30, 30), the coefficients are significant at the 10% level.
The market reactions are not as significant as the market reactions when
companies stop shorting derivatives contract. This result means that when
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oil and gas producing companies start shorting, market reactions are
marginally significant and negative. Shareholders do not want oil and gas
producers to short.
Sample size 46 46 46
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.002 0.02
F value 1.87 0.91 1.92
p-value (0.18) (0.34) (0.17)
Explanatory variables
Intercept 0.08 0.06 0.13
p-value (0.08) (0.16) (0.09)
D hedge ratio 0.17 0.12 0.29
p-value (0.09) (0.17) (0.09)
Notes: This table shows the market reactions to the derivatives policy change announcements
by new hedgers. Announcement date is the disclosure date of correspondent accounting report
to SEC. For the CARs around the announcement of derivatives positions changes, we use
announcement dates as event dates. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives
positions changes. We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity
derivatives transactions and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from
10-Q and 10-K forms. We take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as
the expected quarterly production. The ratio of future quarterly underlying positions covered
by crude oil and gas derivatives contracts to the expected quarterly production is taken as the
hedge ratio of new hedgers. Since oil and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and
gas derivatives contracts, all hedge ratios we obtain are negative. CARs are generated by the
standard event study methodology, and the event windows include (30,0), (0,30),
and(30,30).We conduct the Weighted Least Square (WLS) regression between CARs and
derivatives positions changes to examine whether there is a significant relationship between
CARs and derivatives position changes.
Statistically significant at 10% level (one-tailed test).
154 HELEN XU ET AL.
For oil and gas producing companies that stop shorting crude oil and
gas derivatives contracts, Table 4 shows that there is a very significant and
negative relationship between CARs and hedge ratio changes, which is
also consistent with our expectation. The coefficients of hedge ratio
change are 0.02, 0.18, and 0.2 for different event windows. For the
event window (0, 30) and (30, 30), the coefficients are significant at 1%
and 5% level, respectively. Since hedge ratio of short position is negative,
this result implies that if more short positions are removed, there will
be more significant positive market reactions. Shareholders value these
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transactions very significantly. The F test also shows the whole regression
Sample size 31 31 31
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.24 0.1
F value 0.15 10.52 4.42
p-value (0.7) (0.003) (0.04)
Explanatory variables
Intercept 0.009 0.04 0.06
p-value (0.21) (0.06) (0.09)
D hedge ratio 0.02 0.18 0.2
p-value (0.35) (0.0015) (0.02)
Notes: This table shows the market reactions to the derivatives policy change announcements by
new non-hedgers. Announcement date is the disclosure date of correspondent accounting report
to SEC. For the CARs around the announcement of derivatives positions changes, we use
announcement dates as event dates. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives
positions changes. We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity
derivatives transactions and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-
Q and 10-K forms. We take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as
the expected quarterly production. The ratio of quarterly underlying positions covered by crude
oil and gas derivatives contracts to the quarterly crude oil and gas production before companies
stop using crude oil and gas derivatives is taken as the hedge ratio of new nonhedgers. Since oil
and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, all hedge
ratios we obtain are negative. CARs are generated by the standard event study methodology,
and the event windows include (30,0), (0,30), and (30,30). We conduct the Weighted Least
Square (WLS) regression between CARs and derivatives positions changes to examine whether
there is a significant relationship between CARs and derivatives position changes.
Statistically significant at 10% level (one-tailed test), Statistically significant at 5% level
(one-tailed test), Statistically significant at 1% level (one-tailed test).
The Value Effect of Crude Oil Derivatives Transactions by Oil Producers 155
Sample size 46 46 46
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.02
F value 0.07 0.06 0.11
p-value (0.80) (0.80) (0.74)
Explanatory variables
Intercept 0.03 0.01 0.04
p-value (0.34) (0.43) (0.36)
D hedge ratio 0.04 0.03 0.07
p-value (0.40) (0.40) (0.37)
Notes: This table shows the market reactions to the derivatives policy effective changes by new
hedgers. The effective date is the effective date when derivatives contracts are initiated or
removed. For the CARs around the actual derivatives positions changes, we take effective dates
as event dates. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions changes.
We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity derivatives transactions
and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-Q and 10-K forms. We
take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as the expected quarterly
production. The ratio of future quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas
derivatives contracts to the expected quarterly production is taken as the hedge ratio of new
hedgers. Since oil and gas producers take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives
contracts, all hedge ratios we obtain are negative. CARs are generated by the standard event
study methodology, and the event windows include (30,0), (0,30), and (30,30). We conduct
the Weighted Least Square (WLS) regression between CARs and derivatives positions changes
to examine whether there is a significant relationship between CARs and derivatives position
changes.
156 HELEN XU ET AL.
Sample size 31 31 31
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
F value 0.01 0.15 0.18
p-value (0.93) (0.70) (0.68)
Explanatory variables
Intercept 0.01 0.06 0.07
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Notes: This table shows the market reactions to the derivatives policy effective changes by new
nonhedgers. The effective date is the effective date when derivatives contracts are initiated or
removed. For the CARs around the actual derivatives positions changes, we take effective dates
as event dates. This study uses hedge ratio changes to represent derivatives positions changes.
We collect the information on the underlying positions of commodity derivatives transactions
and the information on crude oil and gas production positions from 10-Q and 10-K forms. We
take the commodity production in the quarter before event quarter as the expected quarterly
production. The ratio of quarterly underlying positions covered by crude oil and gas derivatives
contracts to the quarterly crude oil and gas production before companies stop using crude oil
and gas derivatives is taken as the hedge ratio of new nonhedgers. Since oil and gas producers
take short positions on crude oil and gas derivatives contracts, all hedge ratios we obtain are
negative. CARs are generated by the standard event study methodology, and the event windows
include (30,0), (0,30), and (30,30). We conduct the Weighted Least Square (WLS) regression
between CARs and derivatives positions changes to examine whether there is a significant
relationship between CARs and derivatives position changes.
Statistically significant at 5% level (one-tailed test).
and significant at 5% level. When larger oil and gas producers stop using
oil and gas derivatives contracts, market reactions are more significantly
positive.
6. LITERATURE REVIEW
Modigliani and Miller (1958) conclude that hedging does not matter in an
efficient market because shareholders can enter the same transactions to
create their desired risk and return profiles. Based on their theory, corporate
risk management can only create firm value by changing investment decisions
or by reducing the costs of market imperfections, such as tax, transaction
The Value Effect of Crude Oil Derivatives Transactions by Oil Producers 157
Sample size 31 31 31
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.23 0.16
F value 2.76 5.44 3.93
p-value (0.08) (0.01) (0.03)
Explanatory variables
Intercept 0.07 0.06 0.13
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Notes: This table shows the magnitude of the value effect caused by transaction limitation. WLS
regression is used to detect the value effect caused by transaction limitation. We conduct a WLS
regression between CARs and firm sizes using hedge ratio changes as the control variable, and
find a significant and positive relationship between CARs and firm sizes. The firm size is
represented by the market capitalization, which is collected from the CRSP database.
Statistically significant at 10% lLevel (one-tailed test), Statistically significant at 5% level
(one-tailed test), Statistically significant at 1% level (one-tailed test).
between foreign currency hedging policy change and firm value change and
conclude that foreign currency hedging is associated with higher firm value.
Graham and Rogers (2002) document a positive relation between derivative
use and debt capacity and argue that the tax benefits resulting from hedging
increases firm value by 1.1%. Carter et al. (2006) show that jet fuel hedging
is positively related to airline firm value. Guay and Kothari (2003) find that
derivatives are a small piece of risk management for large U.S. firms, and
that firm value changes only slightly compared to firm value change for
large moves in the underlying prices and rates. Lookman (2004) contends
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that when commodity risk is a primary risk, hedging is associated with lower
firm value; when commodity risk is not a primary risk, hedging is associated
with higher firm value.
When the factors of management quality are taken into consideration, the
hedging effect becomes insignificant. Taken together, the effect of hedging
on firm value, if any, is marginal. Jin and Jorion (2006) find that hedging
does not seem to affect firm value. Adam and Fernando (2006) find that the
derivatives transactions of gold mining firms have consistently realized
positive cash flows without changing firms’ systematic risk. They conclude
that derivatives transactions can increase shareholder value. Mackay and
Moeller (2007) find that hedging can add firm value when financial risks are
hedged while destroying firm value when operating risks or both operating
risks and financial risks are hedged. Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009)
present positive valuation effects primarily for firms using interest rate
derivatives.
7. CONCLUSION
Crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers can change the
market value of shareholders’ portfolios. If oil and gas producers stop
shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices of these companies rise,
and thus shareholders’ wealth increases. If oil and gas producers start
shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices of these companies
drop, and thus shareholders’ wealth decreases. Transaction limitation is
identified as one possible source of the value effect.
The ideas introduced in this study have implications for future studies on
corporate risk management activities. Further studies can examine the
effectiveness of other types of derivative transactions, such as interest rate
and foreign exchange rate derivatives contracts.
The Value Effect of Crude Oil Derivatives Transactions by Oil Producers 161
NOTES
1. See Mayers and Smith (1982, 1987), Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985),
DeMarzo and Duffie (1991), Froot et al. (1993), Nance et al.(1993), Ross (1996),
Stulz (1996), Mian (1996), Tufano (1996), Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997),
Leland (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), Graham and Smith (1999), and Haushalter
(2000).
2. See Helen Xu (2010). Also see Froot (1995), Kolb (1996), De Roon, Nijman,
and Veld (2000), Becker and Finnerty (2000), Greer (2000), Georgiev (2001), Georgi
(2004), Rzepczynski, Belentepe, Wei, and Lipsky (2004).
3. www.marketwatch.com – as at February 3, 2006.
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