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I was Deputy Commissioner Peshawar in 1959 when I first met Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He
was a Minister in the Ayub cabinet and was on a visit to Peshawar as a chief guest at a
function organized by the Rural academy. After the speeches were over, Bhutto was
visibly bored and wanted to get away but did not know how to handle the situation. I
rescued him and together we went to the Peshawar Club where we spent a very pleasant
evening. Bhutto was young, witty, well-read, well-dressed, more at ease in the company
of young civil servants than his cabinet colleagues.
His next visit to Peshawar was as Acting Foreign Minister. On arrival, he told me that he
would like to visit BadaBer, the American Base close to Peshawar, and before leaving for
Warsak, made it clear that he would like to see all the facilities at the Base. I got in touch
with the American Base Commander and requested him to receive the minister and make
necessary arrangements for his visit to the Base. The Commander said the minister would
be welcome to visit the cafeteria where he would be served coffee and sandwiches. He
politely turned down Bhutto's request to visit the operational and other sensitive areas of
the Base. However, in deference to my wishes, he promised to refer the matter to
Washington. Half an hour later, the Commander called back to inform me that, except the
cafeteria, no other facility would be shown to the Minister. Bhutto was visibly upset and
asked me if the American knew that he was Pakistan's acting Foreign Minister. I said they
did. Bhutto kept quite and the matter ended there. I was still in Peshawar when the U2
incident took place, which provoked Khruschev into the dramatic gesture of drawing on
the map, a red ring around Peshawar. The spy plane, as we learnt later, had taken off from
Peshawar.
Bhutto took up the matter with President Ayub who decided to terminate the 1959
Communication Agreement which governed the Base and publicly announced his
government's position on the Peshawar facility. President Johnson's reaction was quite
sharp. He asked his ambassador to deliver the following letter to President Ayub.
Dear Mr. President:
In the spirit of honesty and frankness that has always been at the heart of our
relationship, I feel I must tell you of my deep concern over the reports I have received
during the past several weeks from Ambassador Oehlert about your Government's
attitude toward our Communications facility at Peshawar. I have delayed writing to you
personally until now because I hope that some mutually acceptable solution could have
been worked out by this time.
I was surprised and disturbed that your Government saw fit publicly to announce its
position on the Peshawar facility before any real discussion between our two
Governments was possible. And it was particularly distressing to learn that your
Government's action may have been taken because of threats and demands by another
power.
I had thought you and I shared a convection that our own security-- as well as the security
of many other nations-- was well served by our cooperation in maintaining the Peshawar
facility. Accurate technical and scientific information on the intentions and capabilities of
others, can, as you know, be a stabilizing element in the present uncertain state of the
world.
In all frankness, the actions of your Governments do not seem to me to be appropriate to
the close relationship that has existed for so many years between our two countries and
which has been manifested in our contribution of more than $3 1/2 billion in aid to
Pakistan.
I accept of course, your right to terminate the 1959 Communications Agreement,
although I would hope that even now you could reconsider that decision. I do want you to
know, simply and unequivocally, that closing down of the Peshawar facility in July 1969
will give us real problems.
In this connection, I must point out that this facility is a complex one. Some of its
elements can be moved relatively easily. Others will take more time. Their hasty removal
could result in significant gaps in our understanding of the intentions of others and
thereby diminish the sense of security we both seek.
If, however, your decision is firm, I would hope and expect that you might allow our
representatives to discuss an arrangement whereby the various elements of the facility
can be phased down and closed but in an orderly way during a period beyond the formal
termination date of July 17, 19 69. I have asked Ambassador Oehlert to convey these
views to you and to be prepared to enter into full discussion of them at an early date.
I cannot hide from you the fact that the loss of Peshawar facility will be a real blow to
what I believe to be our mutual interests. But I do think that if we can agree to
arrangements that will permit a reasonable withdrawal period it will lessen the impact.
Such arrangements, if arrived at through imagination and good will on both sides, would
make the transition easier to accomplish. I do not think, old friend, this is too much to
ask.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Ayub stuck to his position and did not oblige. The Base was closed down.