En Banc: CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949.]
J. ANTONIO ARANETA , petitioner, vs . RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of

First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of
Manila , respondents.
[G.R. No. L-2756. August 26, 1949.]
J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR , petitioners, vs .

EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila , respondent.
[G.R. No. L-3054. Agosto 26, 1949.]
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido

Nacionalista , recurrente, contra EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS , recurrido.
[G.R. No. L-3055. Agosto 26, 1949.]
LEON MA. GUERRERO , petitioner, vs . THE COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY , respondents.
[G.R. No. L-3056. Agosto 26, 1949.]
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers

similarly situated , petitioner, vs . THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES , respondents.
L-2044
Paredes, Diaz & Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta &
Araneta for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto
Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for
respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos & Fernando as amici curiae.
L-2756
Araneta & Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amicus curiae.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr.
and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R.
Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo
also as amici curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique Fernando, Ramon Sunico and
Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon
Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as
amici curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENTION OF THE LAW, HOW

ASCERTAINED. — The intention of an act is to be sought for in its nature, the object to
be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The
consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as
additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
2. ID.; ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION INTERPRETED. — Article VI of the
Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited
period." "Limited" has been de ned to mean restricted; bounded; prescribed; con ned
within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope. The words "limited
period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
duration.
3. PRESIDENT; EMERGENCY POWERS; JUSTIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF.
— Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be
temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."
4. ID.; LEGISLATURE HAD RESTRICTED THE LIFE OF EMERGENCY POWERS.
— In the language of section 3 of Act No. 671, The National Assembly restricted the life
of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by war.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; AUTOMATICAL EXTINCTION OF ACT NO.
671; CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION. — Commonwealth Act No. 671 was only "for a
certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote
automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they
denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after
the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to
be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
6. ID.; CONTEMPLATED PERIOD FOR ACT NO. 671; CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION. — When it became evident that we were completely helpless against
air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next
regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can easily be discerned in
this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was
decided upon with speci c view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet.
Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers
so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The
enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic
institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete
disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government.
7. ID.; ID.; ID. — The period that best comports with the constitutional
requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we
believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period
coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the
convening of that body.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACT NO. 671 BECAME INOPERATIVE WHEN
CONGRESS MET IN REGULAR SESSION; EXECUTIVE ORDERS THEREAFTER ISSUED,
VALIDITY OF. — Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met
in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and
226 were issued without authority of law.
9. ID.; SYSTEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATION IS PRESERVED
FOR CONGRESS ALL THE TIME. — The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving
peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework
of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods
of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the speci c functions of
the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department —
unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to
prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was ghting a total war, or when
it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under
our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in
normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given
the ability to act, are called upon "to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."
10. JUDGES; DISQUALIFICATION; MEMBERS OF SUPREME COURT;
OBJECTION SHOULD BE MADE ON TIME. — A motion to disqualify a member of the
Supreme Court led after the said member had given his opinion on the merits of the
case cannot be considered because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon
the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been
rendered.
11. ID.; ID.; MEMBER OF SUPREME COURT FORMERLY AS SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE. — The fact that a member of the Supreme Court while Secretary of Justice
had advised the Chief Executive on the question involved in a certain case, does not
disqualify him to act when it is brought before the court, for he cannot be considered as
having acted previously in said case as counsel of any of the parties when the Chief
Executive is not a party thereto.
12. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHO MAY TAKE PART IN THE
ADJUDICATION; RULE 53, SECTION 1 WITH RULE 58, SECTION 1, INTERPRETED. — One
who is not a member of the court at the time an adjudication is made cannot take part
in that adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated
only by means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding
force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12,
of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of
Court). Promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for ling
and publication.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — One who is no longer a member of this Court at the time
a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision.
14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EACH OF THE GREAT BRANCHES OF THE
GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH ITS OWN DUTY. — Democracy is on trial in the
Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in this
country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own allocated
sphere, complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of
difficulties.
15. EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT LAWS. — Executive Orders, even if issued
within the powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may
have the force of law, in exactly the same manner as the judgments of the Supreme
Court, municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as
laws, even if they have the force of law.
16. ID. — Executive orders issued by the President in pursuance of the power
delegated to him under section 26, Article VI of the Constitution, may be considered
only as rules and regulations.
17. JUDGES; REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOTES TO ANNUL EXECUTIVE ORDERS.
— There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the votes of
eight justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the
President. Hence, a mere majority of six members of the Supreme Court is enough to
nullify them.
DECISION
TUASON , J : p

Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were
argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same
fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For
the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or su ciency of
interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the
question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical bene t
can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the
cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure
followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and de nitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino
vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821.)
The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly
issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-
2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order,
and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city scal.
Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from
the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel
the Administrator of the Sugar Quota O ce and the Commissioner of Customs to
permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both o cials refuse to issue the
required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive
Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and
for other purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the
Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing money under this Executive Order.
Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000
to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the holding of the national
elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen,
tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing,
spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionality of Act

No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum.
They rest their case chie y on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic
question we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently address
ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the
constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any dictum or statement
herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be understood as having
been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in full is as follows:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF
WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1.The existence of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary
to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency.
"SEC. 2.Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the
Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the
emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary
to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is,
among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any
of its subdivisions, branches, departments, o ces, agencies or instrumentalities;
(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive
Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, o ces,
agencies or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already
existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to
increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f ) to raise funds through
the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the
proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal
governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to
declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i)
to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to ful ll its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the
authority.
"SEC. 3.The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon
the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
"SEC. 4.This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and
regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress
of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy."
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness.
The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be
accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The
consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as
additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof
should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been de ned to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; con ned within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or
scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.,
1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question
intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."
(First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937,
938.)
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this
limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the
Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation
is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a
new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the
delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, inde nite, negative
and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become
permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the
repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the approval of the
President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this
would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it
would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: O ce and Powers,
1948 ed., p. 160, says:
"It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate
its powers signi es at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its
powers. Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays,
is the line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by
rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . .
."
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671.
Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in
full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The
silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express
provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity
to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the
Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to make a
provision for its termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the
effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or
annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to
remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and
regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive when
Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be
two legislative bodies operating over the same eld, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers
of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be
revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a
two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during
congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner,
between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic
apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by
the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an
executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject
enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on
export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No.
671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding
sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3
provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted."
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at
which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say
each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the
National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned in section 3 was to be the
rst and last and did not think that upon the convening of the rst Congress Act No.
671 would lapse, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and
clear terms for the ling of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was
expected to continue making laws in the form of rules, regulations and executive
orders, were as important, or as unimportant, as the initial one.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the
duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his
part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the
National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the
Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President
to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that
Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless
reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the
conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They
signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be
prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same
paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call
for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942."
(Italics ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of
enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with speci c view to the
inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability
could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication
by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so
destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been
conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of
the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality
of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it xed a
de nite, limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best comports with the
constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with
what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a
period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the
convening of that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671
became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the rst regular session of Congress instead of the rst special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think we are giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
"consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate."
(Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power of Congress to
legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the
question as to which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the
contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another
department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we
have endeavored to nd the will of the National Assembly — call that will, an exercise of
the police power or the war power — and, once ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the
function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts
as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief
Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war has not ended, and may act on the
strength of his opinion and ndings in contravention of the law as the courts have
construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no
pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive
orders as those under review. We take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity
of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former
Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in
this connection is purely statutory, in no sense political or directly derived from the
Constitution.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of
the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain
stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express
provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos.
600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be
good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of
the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The
logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the minds of the lawmakers
the idea was xed that the Acts themselves would lapse not later than the rules and
regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and
regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best
simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the
curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or
repealing rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to
keep or return them into force and to issue new ones independently of the National
Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted
inde nite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600
and 620.
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether
war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to assume that actual hostilities
between the original belligerents are still raging, the conclusion would not be altered.
After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation
of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions
surrounding the approval of the Emergency Powers Act, we are of the opinion that the
"state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the
impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent
total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National
Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and
with which the National Assembly would not be able to cope. The war itself and its
attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the
National Assembly been in a position to operate.
After all the criticisms that have been made against the e ciency of the system
of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form
of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling
of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving
peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework
of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods
of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the speci c functions of
the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department —
unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to
prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was ghting a total war, or when
it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under
our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in
normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given
the ability to act, are called upon "to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may,
we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the
President should retain his extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and other ills
directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid
any possible disruption and interruption in the normal operation of the Government, we
have deemed it best to depart in these cases from the ordinary rule relative to the
period for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this
decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in
section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No costs
will be charged.
Moran, C.J., concurs in part.
Ozaeta, J., concurs.
Paras, J., concurs and also in separate opinion.
Feria, J., concurs in so far as the decision is not in con ict with his separate
opinion.
Separate Opinions
MORAN , C.J., concurring in part:
I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the points
hereunder discussed.
I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency powers of the President had
ceased not in May 1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as Mr. Justice
Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria maintain, but on June 9, 1945, when Congress convened in
a special session to consider general legislation. The emergency contemplated in
Commonwealth Act No. 671, is "total emergency" which means the state of actual war
involving the Philippines, with the impending invasion and occupation of our country by
the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and paralyzation of the
Government, principally, the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. This was the
only reason and justi cation for the total relinquishment of legislative power by
Congress in favor of the Chief Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such
relinquishment was total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the
inability of Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such inability
ceased, the total emergency also ceased and the law likewise ceased to validly exist.
On June 9, 1945, the Congress of the Philippines convened in a special session "to
adopt such measures as may be necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "for
the purpose of considering general legislation." I hold that from that date, June 9, 1945,
Congress was able and ready to act on all matters, and the emergency powers
delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671, naturally ceased to exist.
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in
June 1945, I am not prepared to hold that all executive orders issued thereafter under
Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and void. It must be borne in mind that
these executive orders had been issued in good faith and with the best of intentions by
three successive Presidents, and some of them may have already produced extensive
effects in the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order No. 73, issued on
November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of P6,750,000 for public works; Executive
Order No. 86, issued on January 7, 1946, amending a previous order regarding the
organization of the Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1, 1946,
reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184, issued on November
19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other executive orders
appropriating funds for other purposes. The consequences of a blanket nulli cation of
all these executive orders will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that
before nullifying them, other important circumstances should be inquired into, as for
instance, whether or not they have been rati ed by Congress expressly or impliedly,
whether their purposes have already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in the
last instance, to what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de facto o cers; acts and
contracts of parties acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive order
must be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances, and, if necessary and
possible, before nullifying it, precautionary measures should be taken to avoid harm to
public interest and innocent parties.
To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of speci c
cases, I shall go into a brief discussion of the executive orders involved in the cases
now before this Court. With regard to the Executive Order No. 225 on general
appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it null and void till Congress may
have an opportunity to provide a substitute measure for the sustenance of government.
This view is predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till Congress may
pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without the executive
order in question. It would be absurd for this court to declare the cessation of an
emergency, and by that same declaration permit, if not abet, the formation of another
emergency which would be inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government
shall cease to function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws and
Constitution seem inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than the very Magna
Carta itself and nd solution in the basic principles of preservation of government and
of national survival, which in the last analysis, are the very reasons for the existence of a
Constitution. In such extreme cases, as can come from the present situation, it would
be the height of judicial imprevision to preserve the form of the constitution, and at the
same time permit the disruption and cessation of the government which that same
constitution so intricately designed and rmly established. Thus, in the remedy of an
evil, we shall cause a far greater one.
It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon fear, fear
that Congress will again fail to act on the matter of appropriations, and it may be
asserted that the members of Congress are presumed to be as patriotic as the
members of this Court, if not more, and that, therefore, we may rest assured that they
will not fail to ful ll their duty. I admit this to be true, and accordingly, I ask what is then
the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on appropriations which we are
sure will soon be substituted by a valid appropriations act? Why not defer judgment
and wait until the special session of Congress so that it may ful ll its duty as it clearly
sees it? I can nd no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert
judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more necessary.
It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide funds for
the operation of the government is a remote possibility. But there is no harm in
providing for all possibilities, both near and remote. If that remote possibility never
comes, well and good, nothing is lost and the situation is saved. However, if the remote
possibility does come, and it is not impossible, and we had already nulli ed the
executive order on appropriations, how will the government function and survive? On
the other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of such executive order, and that
remote possibility does come, we still have the saving lifeline of that executive order
which may, perhaps, be tolerated to save the country from chaos, until a more proper
and adequate remedy can be secured.
With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct of the
coming elections, I uphold the same view as in the foregoing, namely, not in abdicating
the power of this court to pass upon the validity of an executive order, but to defer
judgment upon such an order until the legislature may provide a substitute measure.
The reason for this is, likewise, absolute necessity. Without such Executive Order we
may not have elections in November. Elections are the very essence of popular
government for the establishment and preservation of which, our Constitution has been
consecrated. To permit the unwarranted abolition or even suspension of elections, will
surely result either in the denial of popular representation or in the perpetuation in
power of those already in o ce. Either result is revolting to our system of government.
Brie y stated, I hold that this court should neither ratify nor nullify this executive order,
but should defer judgment in the same manner and for the same reasons stated above
in connection with the executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is
confronted not only with bare issues of law, but with actual anomalous situations
pregnant with possible dangers to the nation, and it is the duty of the Court, as a
dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both legal and realistic.
With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses, and
Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines, I agree
that they must be held null and void upon the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and
Mr. Justice Feria and also upon those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr.
Justice Alex Reyes.
My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs. Dinglasan,
G. R. No. L-2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G.R. No. L-2756 and Guerrero vs. Commissioner
of Customs, G.R. No. L-3055, and that judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El
Tesorero de Filipinas, G.R. No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. L-3056.
PARAS , J., concurring :
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however, the
following observations: Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the legislative
intent is to make Commonwealth Act No. 671 effective during the existence of the
emergency contemplated therein and that it is within the exclusive province of the
political departments to determine whether said emergency continues or has ceased to
exist, I am of the conviction that, in view of the formal and unmistakable declarations of
both the Congress and the President, said Act No. 671 should be held as having lost its
force and effect.
It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly spoken of in
the Act is a total emergency resulting from war and that the Act was passed at a time
(December 16, 1941) when there was factually a state of war involving the Philippines.
In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was
categorically declared by the Congress that "since liberation conditions have gradually
returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of
war and who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction resulting
therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last war as regards these war
sufferers being still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the
debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modi ed form." The President, in
turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies
it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing pains arti cially created by seasonal
partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that
follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year."
We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the
emergency created by the last war exists as regards only those debtors whose war
damage claims have not been settled by the United States Philippine War Damage
Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342), patently meaning that said emergency
is, at most, a partial emergency. It is needless to point out that only a small portion of
the Philippine population are debtors and not all of those who are debtors are war
damage claimants.
We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the
emergencies faced by the Republic are incidental emergencies arti cially created by
seasonal partisanship, clearly meaning that such emergencies not only are not total but
are not the result of war.
If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as admitted by
the President, not the result of the war, Commonwealth Act No. 671 has lost its basis
and cannot legally give rise to the executive orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not
pretended that said orders are intended to meet any emergency growing out of the last
war. Lack of a budget, an appropriation for the elections, or an import control law, has
been brought about by the inaction of the Congress unaffected by the last war, and
such emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind contemplated in
Commonwealth Act No. 671.
The government has for four years since liberation been normally functioning;
elections had been regularly held; a national census had been taken; Congress had held
regular and special sessions; "people travel freely most everywhere and more quickly,
by land, sea and air, to an extent that was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more
brisk than ever, goods are plentiful, our people even in the remotest communities and
barrios of the country are better dressed, their diet has been immensely improved, and
they look more healthy than they ever did" (President's fth monthly radio chat, March
15, 1949); and the sporadic depredations of the outlaws in isolated areas of the
country are but the last paroxysms of a dying movement (President's State-of- the-
Nation Message, January 24, 1949), - all these certainly negative the existence of any
real (much less total) emergency.
That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the emergency is
conclusively established by the fact that it had assumed the task of directly enacting,
during its past sessions, measures dealing with all the matters covered by the speci c
legislative powers conceded to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in
line with the fundamental reason for the approval of said Act, as may be gathered from
the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942,
the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which rea rmed the
abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The
assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers
that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." (The
Good Fight, pp. 204-205.) When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly
meant factual war, a situation that existed at the time of the passage of
Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised by the
principal is considered withdrawn from the agent. A cursory examination of
Commonwealth Act No. 671 will show that the legislative functions therein speci ed
had been discharged by the Congress. The following illustrates the powers delegated in
the Act and the measures enacted by the Congress itself covering each:
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 —
(a)to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches,
departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities:
Republic Act No. 333 —
"An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the permanent seat
of the National Government, to create a capital city planning commission, to
appropriate funds for the acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits
of said city, and to authorize the issuance of bonds of the National Government
for the acquisition of private estates, for the subdivision thereof, and for the
construction of streets, bridges, waterworks, sewerage and other municipal
improvements in the capital City." (Approved, July 17, 1948.)
(b )to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Departments:
"An Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within
one year the different Executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and their
instrumentalities of the government, including the corporations owned or
controlled by it." (Approved, October 4, 1946.)
(c)to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, o ces, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing:
Commonwealth Act No. 732 —
"An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to authorize the
President of the Philippines to organize said department as well as the foreign
service of the Republic of the Philippines." (Approved, July 3, 1946.)
(d)to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of
an administrative character:
"An Act appropriating the sum of ve million pesos to enable the national
housing commission to resume its functions." (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
"An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of Retirement
gratuities or pensions under existing laws." (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
(e)to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in
existence:
"An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered eighty-one
providing a new time limit for the waiver of, and/or extension of the period, within
which to perform, accomplish or comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation
required of locators, holders, lessees, operators of mining claims or concessions,
end of water rights and timber concessions connected with the mining industry
and the condonation of mining, speci c and real estate taxes, under certain terms
and conditions." (Approved, June 1, 1948.)
Ley No 321 de la Republica —
"Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor,
enmendado al efecto el articulo quinientos veintiocho del Codigo Administrativo
Revisado." (Aprobada, Junio 9, 1948.)
(f)to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the
expenditure of the proceeds thereof:
"An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . ." (Section 87 [e]
No. 7.) Approved, June 15, 1948.)
"An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be released by
the Central Bank representing excess monetary reserves, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to issue bonds, certi cates or other evidence of
indebtedness covering such amounts." (Approved, June 15, 1948.)
"An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation." (Section 2 [f].)
(Approved, Oct. 29, 1946.)
(g )to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in
overdrafts for purposes that he may approve:
Various Appropriation Acts.
(h)to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts:
Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948.
(i)to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by hundreds of
other acts approved by the Congress which, it cannot be denied, all tend to "enable the
Government to ful ll its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority."
Moreover, the withdrawal of the greater and more important powers may be presumed
to have carried the accessory and less important powers.
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted
by virtue of the war powers of the Congress. As the Act itself expressly states, its basis
is section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution which merely authorizes delegation of
legislative powers to the President in times of war or other national emergency. The
phrase "in times of war or other national emergency" is solely indicative or descriptive
of the occasions during which the delegation may be extended and does not classify
the act of delegating legislative functions as a war power. It must be borne in mind that
said section 26 is peculiar to our Constitution, with the result that the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States cited on behalf of the respondents, expounding the
theory that the exercise by the President of his war powers granted by the Congress
cannot be interfered with by the courts, are not controlling. Particularly, the case of
Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883, in which the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason that it
merely involved the power of deportation which, even in our jurisdiction, is recognized, it
being the rule here that the courts cannot control the right of the Chief Executive to
determine the existence or su ciency of the facts justifying an order of deportation.
Upon the other hand, the war power of the President is separately covered by section
10, paragraph (2), of Article VII, and that of the Congress by section 25, Article VI, of the
Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
MONTEMAYOR , J., concurring and dissenting :
The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, 1947;
Executive Order No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive Orders Nos. 225 and
226 both dated June 15, 1949 were issued without authority of law and therefore illegal
and of no legal force and effect. I concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence
without comment or explanation would be su cient and satisfactory. However, in view
of the radical difference between the reasons had and given by the majority in arriving
at the result and those entertained by me, and considering the transcendental
importance of these cases, not only because of the vast amounts of public funds and
the rights of citizens affected but also of the principles of law involved, and the fact that
not only the force and effect of a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality
and the force and effect of numerous executive orders issued by several Presidents
during a period of about three years, affecting as they do not only citizens, their
interests and their properties but also the different departments and o ces of the
Government, I deem it my duty to set forth my views and the reasons in support of the
same.
There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-
petitioners particularly, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056. Much could be
said for and against that claim, but I am willing to brush aside all the defenses and
technicalities on this point in order to be able to consider and decide the more
important question of the legality of the executive orders involved and whether or not
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force.
The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the strength of and by
virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that Commonwealth Act No.
671 ceased to have any force and effect on May 25, 1946 when Congress rst
convened in regular session after liberation. In this, I disagree for I believe and hold that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and in effect. But despite this view, I am of
the opinion that the executive orders under consideration were issued without
authority.
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we nd that it deals with and regulates
house and lot rentals. If the legislature had not already acted and legislated on this
matter since the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, this would be a proper
eld for Presidential action. However, the legislature had already promulgated
Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as
late as the month of May, 1947, Congress passed House Bill No. 978 further amending
Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in thus acting, the Legislature had already
shown its readiness and ability to legislate on this matter, and had withdrawn it from
the realm of presidential legislation or regulation under the powers delegated by
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and regulations in the
form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief Executive merely acts
as an agent of the legislature, his principal which made the delegation. As such agent,
he cannot go against the policy and expressed desire of his principal.
There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689, Republic Act
No. 66, and House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive Order No. 62 on the other.
That was the reason why President Roxas vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good
faith that it would not solve and remedy the problem of house rentals as explained by
him in his communication to the House of Representatives of June 21, 1947, setting
forth his views on the bill. The President may not and could not substitute his opinion
however excellent or superior for that of the legislature on matters of legislation when
Congress has already acted and expressed its opinion and desire on the matter.
With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that Congress
passed Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, authorizing the
President to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the exportation of certain products,
merchandise and materials. Under said authority the President issued Executive Order
No. 3 dated July 10, 1946, later amending section 2 of said Executive Order by issuing
Executive Order No. 23 dated November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation of certain
products, materials and merchandise. The important thing to consider is that section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that the authority it granted to the President
shall terminate on December 31, 1948, that is to say, that after said date the Executive
could no longer validly regulate exports under said law. The President, however,
overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency powers under
Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive Order No. 192 regulating exports,
to take effect on January 1, 1949. What was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62
is applicable to the lack of authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No.
192, namely, that on this matter of export control, the legislature had already withdrawn
it from the jurisdiction of the Executive under his emergency powers after the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any Presidential power or authority on the
subject of export control was derived from said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority given the
President to regulate and control exports on December 31, 1948 and failed or refused
to renew said authority, the inference or conclusion is that after said date Congress
deemed any presidential regulation on exports unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore,
in promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief Executive acted not only without
legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy of Congress. This he may
not validly do.
With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations made
with regard to Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally applicable. By previously
enacting necessary legislation on the yearly Government appropriation and on the
appropriation of funds for the expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has
shown its readiness and ability to cope with the nancial problems of the Government
on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved October 22, 1946, appropriating funds for
the operation of the National Government from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic
Act No. 156 appropriating funds for the scal year 1947-48 and Republic Act No. 320,
the appropriation law for the scal year 1948-49 show that Congress was in a position
and able to provide for the yearly expenditures of the Government. And Republic Act
No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray election expenses on March 11, 1947;
Republic Act No. 147 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of
provincial, city and municipal o cials and eight senators held on November 11, 1947,
and Republic Act No. 235 appropriating P100,000 for the special elections held on
March 23, 1948, to ll vacancies in Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of
Leyte, demonstrated the ability of the Congress to appropriate money for election
purposes. By so doing Congress had tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this portion of the
eld where the President may under his emergency power legislate or promulgate rules
and regulations.
In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory underlying the
delegation of emergency powers to the President under Commonwealth Act No. 671
and similar laws is that the legislature because of the emergency resulting from the
war, would be unable to meet in order to legislate or although able to meet, because of
the emergency, the ordinary process of legislation would be too slow and inadequate
and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the power and authority of
legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of one man, the Chief Executive. But as
regards Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the legislature has demonstrated that not
only it could meet but also that it could legislate on this point of appropriations by
approving general appropriation laws for the different scal years since liberation as
well as appropriations for the necessary funds for the different national and provincial
elections. Consequently, there no longer was any necessity for Presidential legislation
in this regard. Moreover, and this is not unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to
pass an appropriation law for the scal year 1949-50 and a law appropriating funds for
the elections in November, 1949 was not due to any emergency resulting from the war,
contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather and possibly due to lack of
time and because of the rather abrupt ending and adjourning of the last session of the
Legislature last May.
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have force and
effect on May 25, 1946. The other view is that it is still in force. To me this is the main
and the more important issue involved in these cases. In fact the argument of the
parties centered on this point. The importance of this issue may readily be appreciated
when it is realized that on its determination is based, not only the validity or nullity
(according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the four Executive Orders now
under consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders promulgated under authority of
Commonwealth Act No. 671 after May 25, 1946, up to the present time. Its
determination will also decide whether or not the President may still exercise his
emergency powers in the future on matters and subjects not heretofore withdrawn by
the Legislature. Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point, I deem it
necessary to explain and elaborate on my reasons for my disagreement.
For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing

Commonwealth Act No. 671 in full as well as section 26, Article VI of the Constitution
on which said Act is based:
"AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF
"Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
"SECTION 1.The existence of war between the United States and other
emergency.
to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is,
(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, o ces,
agencies or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already
application of those of an administrative character; (c) to impose new taxes or to
increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f ) to raise funds through
proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal
Government to ful ll its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the
authority.
SEC. 3.The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon
SEC. 4.This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and
of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."
"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." (Section 26, Article VI, Constitution.)
I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:
"Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term x the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object
to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the
constitution." (Page 5, majority opinion.)
The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation of legislative
powers to the Chief Executive under the Constitution, such as was done under
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was because due to the emergency resulting from the war,
the Legislature could not meet to enact legislation; that the moment the Legislature
could convene there would no longer be any reason for the exercise by the President of
emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the Legislature could meet and
actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his delegated legislative
powers, there would be the serious anomaly of two legislative bodies acting at the
same time, namely, the Legislature and the Executive, "mutually nullifying each other's
actions"; that the limited period xed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and
effectiveness as required by the Constitution is the interval from the passage of said
Act and the moment that Congress could convene, not in special session where its
power of legislation is limited by the Chief Executive in his call for special session, but
in regular session where it could be free to enact general legislation; and that unless
this automatic ending or cessation of Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need of
another Act or legislation by Congress to repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the Chief
Executive may by his veto power effectively block any effort in this direction.
I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had occasion
to state though incidentally, the real reason for the delegation of legislative powers to
the Chief Executive is not only because the Legislature is unable to meet due to a
national emergency but also because although it could and does actually meet, whether
in regular or special session, it is not in a position and able to cope with the problems
brought about by and arising from the emergency, problems which require urgent and
immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more quickly and expeditiously than about
one hundred members of the Legislature, especially when they are divided into
legislative chambers. That is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic
countries dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel
dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where the functions
which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a legislative body, are entrusted
under certain limitations to one single official or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is in
session, the legislators woke up one morning to nd that there was extreme scarcity of
imported foods, fuel, building materials, equipment required in agriculture and industry,
etc., because of a monopoly, hoarding, injurious speculations, manipulations, private
controls and pro teering, or that there were wide-spread lockouts and strikes
paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant espionage or sabotage
endangering the very life and security of the nation. How much time would it take the
legislature to enact the necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and
pass the necessary emergency measures?
We are all familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is
introduced in the Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding committee, it is studied
by said committee, which in some cases holds public hearings; the committee
discusses the bill and sometimes introduces amendments; if the bill is not killed in the
committee or shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion and
possible amendment by all the members; it is nally voted and if approved, it is sent to
the other house where it undergoes the same process; and if it is nally approved by
both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief Executive for his study and
approval or veto. All this may consume weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily,
many bills nally approved by Congress could be sent to the President for approval or
veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not overlook the
fact that in some cases for lack of time or due to disagreement among the legislators
or between the two houses of Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual
appropriation law for the scal year 1949-50, appropriation of funds for the elections
to be held in November, 1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226,
involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the Election Code etc.
have not been passed by Congress in its last session ending last May, 1949, which
session lasted one hundred days. If we were to rely on the ordinary process of
legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is
passed, the situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may
have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislations or any
remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable door after the horse had
been stolen.
Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated its
legislative powers because of the existence of a state of national emergency as early
as the year 1939. During its second special session of that year, it promulgated the
following laws:
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the
Philippines to suspend until the time of the adjournment of the next regular
session of the National Assembly, either wholly or partially and under such
conditions as he may deem proper, the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444,
commonly known as the Eight Hour Labor Law;
(b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to take over,
for use or operation by the Government, any public service or enterprise and to
pay just compensation in the manner to be determined by him and to prescribe
and promulgate regulations he may deem essential to carry out the purposes of
the Act;
(c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national
emergency due to a state of war among several nations and as a measure to
prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculations, pro teering,
etc. affecting the supply, distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel,
building materials, agricultural equipments etc. authorized the President to
purchase any of the articles or commodities available for storage, for re-sale or
distribution, to x the maximum selling price of said articles or commodities and
to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary; and.
(d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in view of
the existence of a state of national emergency to reduce the expenditures of the
executive departments of the Government by the suspension or abandonment of
service, activities, or operations of no immediate importance.
At that time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe, quite far
from the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines
being involved in the war. In fact, the Philippines did not get involved in the war until
more than two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then free to
meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In
fact, it met in regular session in January, 1940 lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for
another regular session of 100 days, excluding the several special sessions held during
those two years. And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President
under section 26, Article II of the Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to the
theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the
President even when it could meet and it actually met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the
President, the Assembly in its fourth special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and
reiterated this practice and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating
additional and more extensive legislative powers to the President in spite of the fact
that the war was still far away in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of
involving the Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met
again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session begun that month
and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative powers delegated to the
President, because according to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature was
able to meet, the Assembly allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act
No. 620 which merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that
all this, far from supporting the view of the majority that the Legislature delegated
legislative powers to the President only because it could not meet, fairly and squarely
refutes said view.
Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great anomaly
to have two legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President to be acting at the
same time, each nullifying the acts of the other. I fail to see the suggested anomaly. In
fact, under the view and interpretation given by the majority of the delegation of
legislative powers, the very laws making such delegation contemplated the
simultaneous functioning of the Legislature and the President, both exercising
legislative powers. And it is a fact that there were several instances of the legislature
and the President both validly and simultaneously exercising legislative powers.
Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to, approved on
September 30, 1939, the power delegated to the President to prescribe rules and
regulations he may deem essential to carry out the purposes of the Act, namely, the
taking over of and operation by the Government of any public service or enterprise and
to pay for the same, was to last until the date of the adjournment of the next regular
session of the National Assembly. This means that, during the regular session of the
Assembly which began in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the President could
exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again, under Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and indeed he exercised his emergency powers
during the regular session of the Assembly which began in January, 1941, when
President Quezon issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337,
339, 340, 342, 344 and 345.
The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671 Since under the view of
the majority the emergency powers of the President granted him by Commonwealth
Act No. 671 ended only on May 25, 1946, then the extensive legislative powers
delegated to the President under that Act could be exercised and in fact they were
exercised during the ve special sessions of Congress in the year 1945, which lasted a
total of 84 days. During those special sessions of 1945, President Osmeña issued
several Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers.
Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared anomaly
and impropriety of the Legislature and the Executive both exercising legislative
functions simultaneously, is more fancied than real? The situation was contemplated
and expressly intended by the Legislature itself, evidently believing that said condition
or state of affairs was neither anomalous nor improper. There is to my mind really no
incompatibility. At such a time and during the period of their simultaneous functioning,
the Legislature may perform its ordinary legislative duties taking its time to study,
consider, amend and pass bills, reserving to the President matters requiring and
demanding immediate action.
After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to exercise
his emergency powers at the same time that it is in session. It may validly and properly
stipulate in its grant of emergency powers that they be exercised when the Legislature
is not in session. In fact, in one instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the
National Assembly expressly provided "that the authority herein given shall be exercised
only when the National Assembly is not in session." When in its other acts of delegation,
like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature not only fails to stipulate this condition,
but on the contrary, contemplates Presidential exercise of legislative powers
simultaneously with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended it
and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not for the Courts to pass upon
the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully nullifying the
acts of the Legislature, to me that is quite remote, if not impossible. As already stated
at the beginning of this opinion, the Chief Executive acting as an agent of the
Legislature under his emergency powers, may not go against the wishes and policies of
his principal. He can only carry out its wishes and policies, and where his acts and
orders run counter to those of the Legislature, or operate on a eld already withdrawn
because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts or Executive Orders must
give way and will be declared void and of no effect, by the Courts, as we are doing with
the Executive Orders involved in these cases.
With respect to the claim in the majority opinion that unless the emergency
powers were made to end at the time the President made his report to Congress when
it convened, it would be necessary to enact new legislation to repeal the act of
delegation, in which case the period for the delegation would be unlimited, inde nite,
and uncertain, contrary to the constitutional provisions, I may say that the President
was authorized by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during the existence of the
emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in contemplation of the
Constitution. There would be no need for a new law to repeal the Act of delegation, for
said Act is self-liquidating. The moment the emergency ceases, the law itself
automatically ceases to have force and effect, and the Presidential emergency powers
also end with it.
Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, which
we feared and expected in December, 1941 failed to materialize either because the
invasion was repelled or because the Japanese high command at the last moment
decided to by-pass the Philippines and divert his forces further south to invade, say
Australia, or if the Paci c war had ended as we all or most of us then expected it to end
sooner within weeks or months after its commencement and that the emergency
resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter, Commonwealth Act No. 671
would have automatically ceased to have force and effect right in the year 1942 without
any a rmative act or law of the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the
President to continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any
emergency. But under the view of the majority, emergency or no emergency even if
Congress could meet in special session to enact general legislation, the country must
continue to be ruled by Presidential decree until the next regular session of Congress
which may not come till many months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me the
real and only reason and test for the continuance of the exercise of emergency powers
is the continued existence of the emergency, not the inability of Congress to meet in
regular session.
The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court fear that
the President may promulgate rules and regulations contrary in purpose and effect to
legislation enacted by the Legislature; that he may reenact his rules and regulations
after being repealed by the legislature, and that he may even veto a bill passed by
Congress repealing the Act of delegation and ending his emergency powers. It is a fear
not well founded. It runs counter to the presumption that the Chief Executive like any
other public o cial would perform his functions and conduct himself in every respect
for the good and welfare of the people and in accordance with the Constitution. It is
fear based on the presumption that the Legislature and the Chief Executive are at
loggerheads, working at cross purposes and that the President though acting as a
mere agent of his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal and
even challenge its authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much in love with his
emergency powers that he would perpetuate them by going as far as vetoing an act of
Congress ending said emergency powers. Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to
the different Chief Executives who have wielded these emergency powers, Presidents
Quezon, Osmeña, Roxas and the present incumbent President Quirino, that no accusing
nger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even insinuating that they had abused
their emergency powers or exercised them for any purpose other than the welfare of
the country, or that they had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes of the Legislature.
Even after liberation there has been no claim not even from the Legislature itself, to the
knowledge of this Court, at least to that of the undersigned, that any Chief Executive
exercised his delegated powers, knowing that they had ended or had abused the same.
There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which we are
now holding to be invalid were issued from ulterior motives or to further and favor the
political interests of the President issuing them. It is admitted in the majority opinion
that Executive Order No. 62, seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in
good faith by President Roxas. Executive Order No. 192 was issued to regulate exports,
President Quirino presumably believing that exports at this time still needed regulation
and control as was formerly provided by Congress in its Act No. 728, and that the
matter was still within the eld of his emergency powers as was also mistakenly
believed by President Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive Order
No. 226, it merely appropriated funds to defray the expenses in connection with the
holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which, said elections could
not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225, it merely continues in force
Republic Act 320 which appropriated funds for the last scal year inasmuch as
Congress had failed to pass a General Appropriation Act for the operation of the
National Government for the period beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is
no insinuation that any political motives or purposes are involved in these Executive
Orders.
I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the delegation
of legislative powers by the Legislature should be done for a limited period, it is to be
presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. I
even agree to its de nition of the word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act
No. 671 itself, limited its operation and effectiveness to and made it coextensive with
the duration of the emergency resulting from the war and that furthermore, that
duration is a limited period within the meaning and contemplation of the Constitution.
Surely the emergency resulting from the war contemplated by the National Assembly
when it enacted Act No. 671 is not permanent or inde nite It is of limited duration. It
may be long or it may be short; but it cannot be for always. It has an end. Presumably
the members of the National Assembly thought that the emergency would not last as
long as it did. The belief entertained at the time by not a few, in fact by a great portion
of the people here not excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be
of short duration, a question of months at the longest; that American reinforcements
would come at the beginning of the year 1942 and drive away the invading Japanese
armies if they ever were able to occupy the Philippines and that, consequently, the war
as far as these islands were concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass
away. The wisdom or lack of wisdom of the National Assembly in limiting or rather
making the life and effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671 coextensive with the
resulting emergency, viewed in the light of what had actually happened, cannot be
passed upon by this Court. So, as I see it, so long as the emergency resulting from the
War continues, Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists and so long the Chief Executive
retains his emergency powers.
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force only until
Congress could meet and resume its legislative functions. Naturally, this view is based
on the theory that legislative functions in times of emergency are delegated only
because of the inability of the Legislative Department to meet and exercise its
functions. I believe I have successfully demonstrated the aw in this theory, not only by
showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of legislative powers is not the
inability of the Legislature to meet but rather its inability to consider and pass
legislation in time to meet an emergency which requires as it does urgent and
immediate action and can be solved only by the exercise of legislative functions by one
single responsible individual, unhampered by study and prolonged discussion by many
members of the legislative body, but also by the fact that although since 1939 when the
second world war broke out in Europe and for a period of more than two years
thereafter, when the National Assembly could still meet and in fact convened on several
occasions and for hundreds of days in regular and special sessions, nevertheless, it had
been delegating legislative powers to the President.
The majority view nds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution does not impose this condition or requirement. The only important
conditions imposed by the Constitution are that there be a national emergency and
delegation be for a limited period. The same thing is true with Act No. 671 which makes
the delegation. The only condition imposed by section 2 of said Act is that the
delegated powers be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the Constitution nor in
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less express mention
about the inability of the Legislature to meet. When every consideration for clearness
and for Executive and Judicial guidance loudly called for and demanded an unequivocal
and clear expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source and
basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this point. The only
conclusion is that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the members of the
National Assembly had thought of much less intended to impose this condition. To
sustain the majority view would require reading into the law what is not there.
In further support of its view that emergency powers may be exercised by the
President only until the Legislature could meet, the majority nds comfort in and cites
section 3 of Act 671 which reads as follows:
I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon ling his report
with Congress, about the rules and regulations promulgated by him under his
emergency powers under Commonwealth Act 671, his emergency powers
automatically ceased. I could well imagine that under an act of delegation of legislative
powers where the President is authorized to perform one single act such as the
suspension of the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the
reduction of the expenditures of the executive departments of the National Government
by the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of no
immediate necessity under Commonwealth Act No. 500, when the President has
exercised his delegated authority and made his report to the Assembly as required by
said laws, the latter, as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased,
for the simple reason that nothing remains to be performed or done. However, treating
of the grant of extensive emergency powers as was done under Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said laws contemplated many different acts, rules and
regulations of varied categories and objectives and to be performed not at one time or
instance but at different times during the existence of the emergency, as the need or
occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or the holding that upon submitting a
partial report of his acts up to the time he made the report, the whole law making the
delegation including his powers under it automatically ended. The legislature during the
emergency might be able to convene and naturally, the President will immediately make
his report to it of the rules and regulations promulgated by him up to that time; but if
the emergency continued or even became more serious, would it be reasonable to hold
that his emergency powers ended right then and there? Would it not be more logical
and reasonable to believe that inasmuch as the grant and the exercise of his emergency
powers were motivated by and based upon the existence of the emergency and since
the emergency continued his work and responsibility were not ended and that his
partial report could not possibly affect the continuance of his emergency powers?
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the ling of a report with
Congress by the President as soon as that body convened. According to the majority
opinion on that date the whole Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect. Under that
theory, as soon as Congress convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that
President Osmeña, complying with his duty, must have made his report of all the
numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far, perhaps including those issued by his
predecessor President Quezon who because of his premature death was unable to
report his acts to Congress, the President automatically lost his emergency powers.
But the majority opinion quali es this convening of Congress, for it says that it must be
a regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the life of
Commonwealth Act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when Congress held its rst
regular session after liberation. I do not quite see the necessity or the reason for the
distinction made between the special and regular sessions, for at both sessions
Congress could well receive the report of the President. The reason given is that "in a
special session Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate." But as a matter of fact, the rst two special sessions
called by President Osmeña in 1945, after liberation, each for a period of thirty days
were both to consider general legislation. So, actually there is no reason for the
distinction.
Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to x the time at which
Commonwealth Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as of the date when the
President could le his report before Congress when it rst convened not in special
session but in regular session, it would have expressly and unequivocally said so. In its
other acts of delegation of powers when the legislature wanted to have the report of
the President at its regular session, it expressly and explicitly said so. In section 3 of
Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act 496, in section 6 of
Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 500 and in section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly provided that the President shall
report to the National Assembly within ten days after the opening of the next regular
session of the said Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under the
authority of those Acts. The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or speculation. In
section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, however, the same Assembly has not speci ed
the kind of session before which the President should make his report. It merely said
that upon the convening of the Congress the President shall report thereto all the rules
and regulations promulgated by him. We should make no distinction where the law
makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority opinion would require
reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671, something that is not there.
In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or not
Commonwealth Act No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (of the majority) being
that it automatically ceased to have any force and effect on May 25, 1946, the other
view being that the law operated as long as the emergency resulting from the war
existed, the opinion of and the obvious interpretation given by the legislature which
enacted the law and made the delegation of powers and the President to whom the
delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much if not decisive
weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing upon the validity or
constitutionality of a law enacted by the Legislature, in which case, the Court may nd
the act invalid and unconstitutional if it is in violation of the basic law, regardless of the
opinion or interpretation given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive
Department which may be trying to enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid and
constitutional. Here, we are merely trying to ascertain the intention of the National
Assembly as to the life and period of effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to
Commonwealth Act 671, favor the view of the majority? The answer in my opinion is
clearly and decidedly in the negative. The majority cites Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600
and 620 to support the theory that Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to
operate when Congress met at its next regular session. But the logical inference or
conclusion to be drawn from these two acts is, in my opinion, just the reverse. It is even
fatal to the view of the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us consider
Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers to the President,
approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is silent as to any express provision
regarding its life or period of effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers
granted the President by it will last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like
section 3 of Act 671 provides that "the President shall within the rst ten days from the
date of the opening of the Assembly's next regular session report to said Assembly
whatever action he had taken under the authority therein granted." Said section 4 of Act
600 is clearer and more speci c than section 3 of Act 671 in that it clearly speci es the
next regular session whereas the latter refers merely to the convening of Congress. But
let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that "the convening of the
Congress" mentioned in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, referred to regular
session. According to the majority opinion, under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
600, as soon as the President made the report to the National Assembly at its "next
regular session" which was to be and was actually held in January, 1941,
Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the President
automatically lost his delegated legislative powers. But this is contrary to the very view
of the National Assembly which passed said Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 of
the National Assembly passed during that "next regular session" and approved on June
6, 1941 merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the
powers delegated to the Chief Executive. It left the rest of the provisions and sections
of Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section 4 (which was left intact) of Act
600, the President was still required to report to the National Assembly within the rst
10 days from the date of the opening of its next regular session which should have
begun in January, 1942, despite the fact that he had already made a report to the
Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answers and refutes the contention of the
majority that the law of delegation of powers contemplated only one meeting of
Congress at which the President was to report his acts of emergency, and that said
report was to be the first and the last.
Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only of
Commonwealth Act No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The logical conclusion is
that in promulgating Commonwealth Act 620 on June 6, 1941, the National Assembly
all along regarded Commonwealth Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to
the President as still in force and effect despite the report led with the Assembly by
the President at the beginning of its regular session in January, 1941. When the
Legislature merely amends a section of a law, leaving the rest of said law intact and
unchanged, the logical inference and conclusion is that the amended law was still in
force because you cannot amend a law which is no longer in force. The only thing that
could be done with a law that has ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in passing
Commonwealth Act 620 in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenact Commonwealth
Act No. 600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as June
1941, considered said Act 600 as still effective and in operation and consequently, the
emergency powers of the President continued and subsisted despite his previously
having made a report of his actions in January 1941. This squarely refutes the theory
that as soon as the President led his report on the exercise of his emergency powers
with the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to operate and the President
lost his emergency powers.
As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with another
phase of this case from January to June, 1941, President Quezon had issued at least
eight Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers, by authority of
Commonwealth Act 600. From this it is evident that he did not share the majority view,
because despite his having made his report to the Assembly in January, 1941, and even
before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620, he believed and considered
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in force after that date and that he still retained his
emergency powers.
Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executives and of
Congress after May 25, 1946, when according to the majority opinion Commonwealth
Act No. 671 ceased to operate. After May 25, 1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino
had issued numerous Executive Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act
No. 671. Like President Quezon, they also evidently were of the opinion that despite the
meeting of the Legislature in regular session the act delegating legislative powers to
them (in the case of Roxas and Quirino - Commonwealth Act No. 671) was still in force,
that they still retained their emergency powers and so proceeded to exercise them in
good faith.
Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in
force and effect after said date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the several legislative
sessions, regular and special since then and up to and including the year 1949,
Congress has not by law or resolution said anything questioning or doubting the validity
of said Executive Orders on the score of having been promulgated after
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only this, but at
least in one instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one of those
supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May 25, 1946, to be valid. I refer
to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, 1948, creating the National Airport
Corporation which considered and treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated
October 21, 1947, by providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the
abolishment of the O ce of the Administrator of the Manila International Airport
established under the provisions of said Executive Order No. 100 and the transfer of
the personnel and funds created under the same Executive Order to the National Airport
Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 which appropriated public funds and
therefore, was of a legislative nature must have been issued under Commonwealth Act
No. 671. It cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by authority of
Republic Act No. 51, for said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the President only
one year within which to reorganize the different executive departments, o ces,
agencies, etc. and Executive Order No. 100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947,
after the expiration of the one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common
knowledge that during the last session of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there
was talk if not a movement in the Congress to end the emergency powers of the
President. Nothing concrete in the form of legislation or resolution was done, for if we
are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the members of Congress or at least a
majority of them were willing and satis ed to have the Chief Executive continue in the
exercise of his emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads to no other
conclusion but that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still
in force and effect.
If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question arises: how
long and for what period will said Act continue to operate? As I have already stated, I
believe that the delegation of emergency powers was made coextensive with the
emergency resulting from the war, and as long as that emergency continues and unless
the Legislature provides otherwise, Act 671 will continue to operate and the President
may continue exercising his emergency powers.
The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency
resulting from the war passed or does it still exist? This is a fair and decisive question
inasmuch as the existence of the emergency is, in my opinion, the test and the only
basis of the operation or cessation of Act 671. The existence or non-existence of the
emergency resulting from the war is a question of fact. It is based on conditions
obtaining among the people and in the country and perhaps even near and around it. It
is a highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ. There are those
who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions have returned to normal; that the
people have now enough to eat, sometimes even more than they had before the war;
that people nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and
transported and better compensated for their labor, and that the President himself in
his speeches, chats and messages had assured the public that normal times have
returned, that the problem of peace and order had been solved, that the nances of the
Government and the national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food
supply. It is, therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the
war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that
conditions are still far from normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerful
and reassuring colors is based on over optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to
show in bold relief the achievements of the administration, and so should be
considered with some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than before the
war for the reason that many rice farms are idle because of the farmers' fear of or
interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order is far from solved as
shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnappings, lootings and killings and organized
banditry not only in Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before
the war, the Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 o cers and men could
provide complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all respects to
enforce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men,
provided with modern weapons and equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilian
guards and of the Philippine Army and Air force cannot solve the peace and order
problem; that the dissidents who are well organized, armed and disciplined even attack
and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and engage the armed Government forces;
that as long as more than 100,000 rearms are loose and in the hands of irresponsible
parties, not excluding the seemingly regular mysterious supply to them of additional
rearms and ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folk in
central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon whose parents and
relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose women folk had been outraged by the
same elements, whose homes had been looted and burned and whose very lives had
been subjected to constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and
their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the poblaciones to live there in utter
discomfort and privation, it is said that it would be di cult to convince these
unfortunate people that normalcy has returned and that there is no longer any
emergency resulting from the war. To further support the claim of the existence of an
emergency, the menace of communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon
but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all this is a result of
the war.
I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a controversial
one, the decision on which must be based on the ascertainment of facts,
circumstances and conditions and the situation obtaining in the country. This Court is
not in a position to decide that controversy. It does not have the facilities to obtain and
acquire the necessary facts and data on which to base a valid and just decision. Neither
did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as in a hearing or trial at
which evidence, oral or documentary, is introduced. We cannot invoke and resort to
judicial notice because this refers to things of public knowledge, and not controverted,
whereas things, facts and conditions necessary for the determination of whether or not
there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but require investigation,
accurate reporting and close contact with the people to be able to ascertain their living
conditions, their needs, their fears, etc.
To me, the departments of the Government equipped and in a position to decide
this question of emergency are the Chief Executive and the Legislature. The rst has at
his command and beck and call all the executive o cials and departments. He has the
Army, the Constabulary, Naval Patrol, the Police of the cities and towns and the barrio
lieutenants to inform him of the state of peace and order and the security of the state.
He has the Secretary of Education and all the subordinate o cers and school o cials
under him to inform him as to whether or not there is a school crisis or emergency as a
result of the war. He has the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his
men to advise him as to the agricultural needs and the food supply of the country. He
has the Secretary of Finance and all the officials under him to inform him of the finances
of the Government and the economy of the country as well as the officials to advise him
of the land shipping transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a
position to determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the war.
As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the rst called upon to
decide as to the existence or non-existence of an emergency. According to the
Constitution, section 24, Article VI, either House of Congress may call upon the head of
any department of the Government on any matter pertaining to his department. The
members of Congress come from all parts and the far-corners of the country. They are
supposed to be in close contact with their constituents and know at rst hand their
needs, the way they live, etc. Congress, therefore should know. Moreover, it is the
legislature that must rst determine as to whether or not there is a national emergency
as a condition precedent to the delegation of its legislative powers. Naturally, it is the
one that is called upon to say when that emergency ceases.
Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does it
believe that it still exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said about the acts,
conduct and attitude of the legislature as to its belief that Commonwealth Act No. 671
is still in force, are all applicable and may be repeated to show that the Congress
believes that the emergency resulting from the war still exist. Under the theory that I
maintain, Congress must be of the opinion that the emergency still exists for the reason
that as I have shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force
and the life and operation of said Act depends upon and is coextensive with the
existence of the emergency. To this may be added the attitude and the belief of the
President as to the continued existence of the emergency. It must be borne in mind that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his emergency
powers only during the existence of the emergency. The inference is that before
exercising his emergency powers by promulgating an Executive Order he must First
determine and decide that the state of emergency still exists, for that is the condition
precedent to the exercise of his delegated power. In other words, the two departments
of the Government, the Legislative and Executive Departments, best quali ed and called
upon to determine whether or not the emergency resulting from the war still exist have
made manifest in their acts and attitude that they believe that such emergency still
exists. I may here state that on this question of emergency, I entertain no personal
opinion either way lacking as I do the means of deciding fairly and justly. Neither has
the Court. If the decisions of the courts on questions of fact involved in a controversy
are given due respect and weight and are binding, it is because such decisions are
based on evidence adduced and received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for
the purpose and no evidence has been received. In other words, we have nothing on
which to decide a question of fact which is the existence or non-existence of
emergency.
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, nding these Executive Orders to be
void and of no effect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 with the evident
result that no funds are appropriated for the operation of the Government for the scal
year beginning July of this year and for the expenses in the coming national elections
next November, one may inquire as to what will happen or what is to be done. The
answer or answers to this question lie with the Chief Executive. Congress will not meet
in regular session until next year. It is not for the court, not even the undersigned to
suggest the calling of a special legislative session to cope with the perilous situation
thus created, altho one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the President
call a special session and Congress for one reason or another fails to meet, or though it
meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an appropriation law, then a real crisis
will have ensued. I am con dent that the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility
as the Chief of the ration would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know what to do and
he would do something according to his sound discretion and in accordance with law,
statutory or otherwise and in the discharge of his high executive powers, express or
implied.
TORRES , J.:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the existence of

the emergency powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity of Executive Orders Nos.
225 and 226.
REYES , J., concurring and dissenting :
The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on December 16,
1941 prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating extraordinary
powers to the President, still existed at the time the Chief Executive exercised those
powers by promulgating the executive orders whose validity is now challenged.
On issues similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of opinions. While
some courts would rather leave the determination of such issues to the political
department of the Government, others are for making the determination subject to
judicial review. But the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court on the point
accords with the rst view and declares that "these are matters of political judgment
for which judges have either technical competence nor o cial responsibility." (Ludecke
vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
In any event, the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a question of fact
which may not always be determined without evidence by mere reference to facts
within judicial notice. In the present cases, there has been no trial for the reception of
proof, and I am not aware that enough facts have been shown to justify the conclusion
that the emergency in question has already ceased. On the other hand, since the
exercise of the emergency powers by the President presupposes a determination of
the existence of the emergency, the President must be presumed to have satis ed
himself in some appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued his
executive orders. Under the theory of separation of powers and in accord with the
latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not for the judiciary to review the
nding of the Executive in this regard. Judicial review would in such case amount to
control of executive discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal
department of the Government. Only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of
powers by a political branch of the Government is judicial interference allowable in
order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. But with the cold war still going on
though the shooting war has already ended; with the world still in turmoil so much so
that the American Secretary of State has declared that "the world has never before in
peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most of the
industries of the country still unrehabilitated, so that a large proportion of our food and
other necessaries have to be imported; with a great portion of the population still living
in temporary quarters; with most of the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace
and order conditions in the country far from normal, it would be presumptuous for this
Court, without proof of the actual conditions obtaining in all parts of the Archipelago, to
declare that the President clearly abused his discretion when he considered the
emergency not ended at the time he promulgated the executive orders now questioned.
The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the question of the
existence or continuance of the emergency is one for the political department of the
Government to determine by restricting "the life of the emergency powers of the
President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding session due to enemy
action or other causes brought on by the war." I cannot subscribe to this narrow
interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for in my opinion it is contrary to both the
plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment. That law invests the President
with extraordinary powers in order to meet the emergency resulting from the war and it
expressly says that the President is to exercise those powers "during the existence of
the emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise the powers only
when the Legislature is not in session. Much less does it say that the emergency
powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has convened in regular session. An
emergency resulting from a global war cannot end with the mere meeting of the
Legislature. Neither may it be legislated out of existence. The Legislature, once it has
convened, may, if it so desire, revoke the emergency powers of the President, but it
cannot by any form of legislative action put an immediate end to the emergency itself.
Well known is the fact that a deliberative body, such as the Legislature, because of the
time consumed in the study and discussion of a measure, may not always act with the
promptness which the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need for
the concentration of power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act No. 671 in
express terms authorizes the President to exercise the emergency powers "during the
existence of the emergency" and not merely during the time that the Legislature could
be in session. For one thing, to make the life of the emergency powers depend upon the
inability of the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those emergency powers
automatically ended the moment they were conferred, for at that very moment the
Legislature that conferred them was in session.
The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were made to
cease the moment Congress convened in regular session, we would be having two
legislatures which could mutually annul each other, will not stand analysis. In supposing
that the President, in the exercise of the emergency powers could "repeal or modify a
bill passed by the Legislature," the argument overlooks the fact that the emergency
powers delegated to the President under Article VI, section 26 of the Constitution could
only authorize him "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy." Only the Legislature (with the concurrence of the President of course) may
declare a national policy, and once that policy is declared the President may not, under
the Constitution, depart from it. Moreover, unless the Presidential veto could be
overridden, no bill approved by Congress could become a law if the President did not
want it. And if the President approves a bill and allows it to become a law, surely he can
have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other hand, if the bill becomes a law
because his veto has been overridden, there is no point in his repealing that bill,
because if there are enough votes to override his veto there must also be enough votes
to repeal his emergency powers.
The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction upon section
3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that —
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has to report only
once, that is, the rst time Congress is convened, and never again. But the majority
opinion wants to read that thought into the law in order to bolster up the theory that the
emergency powers of the President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a
regular session.
Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion makes
reference to a passage in President Quezon's book, "The Good Fight," to the effect that,
according to the author, Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become
invalid unless reenacted." But I see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that
the emergency powers of the President were to end the moment Congress was
convened in regular session regardless of the continuance of the emergency which
gave birth to those powers. A more valid application of the rule of contemporary
construction may, I think, be made by citing the executive orders promulgated by
President Roxas in his time in the exercise of the emergency powers conferred by
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Many of those executive orders were issued after May 25,
1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event which, according to the
majority opinion, automatically put an end to the emergency powers.
While we have adopted the republican form of government with its three co-equal
departments, each acting within its separate sphere, it would be well to remember that
we have not accepted the American theory of separation of powers to its full extent.
For, pro ting from the experience of America when her Supreme Court, by the
application of the doctrine of separation of powers, frustrated many a New Deal
measure which her Congress had approve to meet a national crisis, our Constitutional
Convention in 1935, despite the warning of those who feared a dictatorship in this
country, decided to depart from the strict theory of separation of powers by
embodying a provision in our Constitution, authorizing the delegation of legislative
powers to the President "in times of war or other national emergency." It is my surmise
that this provision was intended to guard not only against the inability of Congress to
meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We have proof of this last in the
last regular session of Congress, when this body failed to pass measures of pressing
necessity, especially the annual appropriation law and the appropriation for the
expenses of the coming elections.
It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the scal year 1949-1950 as
well as for the coming elections is not an emergency resulting from the war. But I say
that if the emergency resulting from the war as contemplated in Commonwealth Act
No. 671 still exists, as the President believes it exists or he would not have issued the
executive orders in question (and it is not for the Court to change that belief in the
absence of proof that the President was clearly wrong) would it not be a dereliction of
duty on his part to fail to provide, during the emergency, for the continuance of the
functions of government, which is only possible with an appropriation law? What would
be gained by issuing rules and regulations to meet the emergency if there is no
Government to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a special session is no
guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be passed before the
thousands of o cials and employees who work for the Government have starved. It is,
probably, because of these considerations that the National Assembly, in approving
Commonwealth Act No. 671, speci cally empowered the President, during the
existence of the emergency, "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would
lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act has also authorized the President
during the existence of the same emergency "to exercise such other powers as he may
deem necessary to enable the government to ful ll its responsibilities and to maintain
in force this authority." Under this speci c provision, the appropriation for the expenses
of the coming elections would, naturally, come, for, without doubt, it is a measure to
enable the Government "to fulfill its responsibilities."
Consistently with the views above expressed, I am of the opinion that Executive
Order No. 225, appropriating funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic
for the scal year 1949-1950, and Executive Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the
expenses of the coming national elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the
petition in G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of the Philippines, and
the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio Barredo, et al., vs. Commissioner on Elections,
et al., in which the said two executive orders are respectively challenged, should be
denied.
But Executive Order No. 62 (Regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 192
(controlling exports) stand on a different footing. The validity of Executive Order No. 62
can no longer be maintained because of the approval by the Legislature of
Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, which regulate the same subject
matter and which, as an expression of the national policy, can not be deviated from by
the President in the exercise of the emergency powers delegated to him by
Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to Executive Order No. 192
(controlling exports) in view of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating
the same subject matter, especially because section 4 of said Act terminates the
power of the President thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner. Consequently,
since the validity of these executive orders (Nos. 62 and 192) can no longer be upheld,
the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756 and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their
enforcement, should be granted.
PADILLA , J.:
I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with Mr.
Justice Bengzon that petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 have no personality to
institute the proceedings.
BENGZON , J., dissenting :
The majority feels it has to decide the question whether the President still has
emergency powers; but unable to determine in which of the above ve cases the issue
may properly be decided, it grouped them together. When the eye or the hand is unsure,
it is best to shoot at ve birds in a group: ring at one after another may mean as many
misses.
It does not matter that the rst two cases had been submitted and voted before
the submission of the last three. Neither does it matter that, of these last, two should
be thrown out in accordance with our previous rulings. The target must be large.
These cases could be, and should be, decided separately. If they are, they may be
disposed of without ruling on the general question whether the President still has
emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 761. How? This way, which is my
vote.
1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The President
has presently no power to regulate rents, because his power to do so is granted by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 which have lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act
No. 671 he has no power to regulate rents.
2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has
no personality to sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et al., 42 Off.
Gaz., 1243, a citizen and taxpayer, as such, has no legal standing to institute
proceedings for the annulment of a statute.
3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The
private rights of petitioner and of his partymen are affected only as taxpayers.
4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the
President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that they
include regulation of exportation, inasmuch as the Congress has chosen to legislate on
exports (Commonwealth Act No. 728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power
delegated to the President along that field.
It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those questions which
are necessary to decide a case.
Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by Mr. Justice
Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence of emergency powers, I prefer to
vote as herein indicated.
I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.
For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However,
after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by resolution of September 16,
1949, which follows.
RESOLUTION
September 16, 1949
MORAN , C.J.:
Petitioners led motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be disquali ed to act
in these cases; (2) that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perfecto before his death
be counted in their favor; and (3) that the opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a
vote for the nullity of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 276.
I
As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the opinion
that it must not be considered, it having been presented after Mr. Justice Padilla had
given his opinion on the merits of these cases. As we have once said "a litigant . . .
cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and raise an objection of
this sort after decision has been rendered." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., 374.)
Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised
the President on the question of emergency powers, does not disqualify him to act in
these cases, for he cannot be considered as having acted previously in these actions as
counsel of any of the parties. The President is not here a party.
All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to disqualify Mr.
Justice Padilla, with the exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta and Mr. Justice Feria who
reserve their vote.
II
With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr. Justice
Perfecto in the decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice Perfecto died and
ceased to be a member of this Court on August 17, 1949, and our decision in these
cases was released for publication on August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in
connection with Rule 58, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is as follows:
"SECTION 1.Judges: who may take part. — All matters submitted to the
court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for
consideration and adjudication by any and all of the justices who are members of
the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and
adjudication, whether such justices were or were not members of the court and
whether they were or were not present at the date of submission; . . ."
Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time an
adjudication is made cannot take part in that adjudication. The word "adjudication"
means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by means of a decision. And a decision
of this Court, to be of value and binding force, must be in writing duly signed and
promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296,
section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court). Promulgation means the delivery
of the decision to the Clerk of Court for ling and publication. Accordingly, one who is
no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed and promulgated,
cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true decision of the
Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision
is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote
cast by a member of the Court after deliberation is always understood to be subject to
con rmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That
vote is of no value if it is not thus con rmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of
this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes,
wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the
decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best
fruit of their most mature re ection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice,
before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated
during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices,
binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve
for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a
member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding
unless and until duly signed and promulgated.
And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against Abelardo
Subido, 1 promulgated on September 28, 1948:
"que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se
considera decidido una vez registrada, promulgada y publicada la sentencia en la
escribania, y que hasta entonces el resultado de la votacion se estima como una
materia absolutamente reservada y con dencial, perteneciente exclusivamente a
las camaras interiores de la Corte."
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the date of
promulgation of judgment. In that case a judge rendered his decision on January 14;
quali ed himself as Secretary of Finance on January 16; and his decision was
promulgated on January 17. We held that the decision was void because at the time of
its promulgation the judge who prepared it was no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs.
Rodriguez, 37 Phil., 186.)
Another reason why the vote and opinion of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto can not
be considered in these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been
allowed by this Court to take part in the decision on the question of emergency powers
because of lack of majority on that question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to
follow any opinion previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is no
law or rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of his predecessor's will. On
the contrary, the successor must act according to his own opinion for the simple
reason that the responsibility for his action is his and of no one else. Of course, where a
valid and recorded act has been executed by the predecessor and only a ministerial
duty remains to be performed for its completion, the act must be completed
accordingly. For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly
led and promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a ministerial duty, may be
ordered by the successor as a matter of course. But even in that case, if the successor
is moved to reconsider the decision, and he still may do so within the period provided
by the rules, he is not bound to follow the opinion of his predecessor, which he may set
aside according to what he may believe to be for the best interests of justice.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and opinion
of the late Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be denied.
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice
Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in this denial. Mr.
Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason dissent.
III
In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief Justice as a
vote in favor of petitioners, the writer has the following to say:
In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the emergency
powers vested in Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in June 1945, but I voted for
a deferment of judgment in these two cases because of two circumstances then
present, namely, (1) the need of sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations
as the lifeline of government and (2) the fact that a special session of Congress was to
be held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not defer judgment and wait until the special
session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it?"
It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government into
imminent disruption by allowing the nullity of the executive orders to follow its
reglementary consequences when Congress was soon to be convened for the very
purpose of passing, among other urgent measures, a valid appropriations act.
Considering the facility with which Congress could remedy the existing anomaly, I
deemed it a slavish submission to a constitutional formula for this Court to seize upon
its power under the fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in question. A
deferment of judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial statesmanship,
not judicial supremacy, was needed.
However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose
of remedying the nullity of the executive orders in question appears remote and
uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give my unquali ed concurrence in the
decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason declaring that these two executive orders were
issued without authority of law.
While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved by the
belief that positive compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the
Government, which is our prime concern in all these cases, would be effected, and
inde nite deferment will produce the opposite result because it would legitimize a
prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our
opinion, repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening the way
to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure.
The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion,
would come to pass should the said executive orders be immediately declared null and
void, are still real. They have not disappeared by reason of the fact that a special
session of Congress is not now forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the
hands of the Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former
the power to call a special session should the need for one arise, and in the latter, the
power to pass a valid appropriations act.
That Congress may again fail to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote
possibility, for under the circumstances it fully realizes its great responsibility of saving
the nation from breaking down; and furthermore, the President in the exercise of his
constitutional powers may, if he so desires, compel Congress to remain in special
session till it approves the legislative measures most needed by the country.
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a
permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great branches of the Government,
within its own allocated sphere, complies with its own constitutional duty,
uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principles underlying its organic structure
should be maintained rm and strong, hard as the best of steel, so as to insure its
growth and development along solid lines of a stable and vigorous democracy.
With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null and void,
and with the vote to the same effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr.
Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Montemayor, there is a su cient
majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that matter.
It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight Justices
are necessary to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the executive orders in
question, under section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 and Article VIII, section 10 of the
Constitution. This theory is made to rest on the ground that said executive orders must
be considered as laws, they having been issued by the Chief Executive in the exercise of
the legislative powers delegated to him.
It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even if issued
within the powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may
have the force of law, in exactly the same manner as the judgments of this Court,
municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even
if they have the force of law.
Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in times of
war or other national emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is the
power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
Consequently, the executive orders issued by the President in pursuance of the power
delegated to him under that provision of the Constitution, may be considered only as
rules and regulations. There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act
requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order
issued by the President. It is very signi cant that in the previous drafts of section 10,
Article VIII of the Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were included among
those that required for their nulli cation the vote of two thirds of all the members of the
Court. But "executive order" and "regulation" were later deleted from the nal draft
(Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a
mere majority of six members of this Court is enough to nullify them.
All the members of the Court concur in this view.
For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla,
and the motion to include the vote of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of
these cases. And it is the judgment of this Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225
and 226, null and void, with the dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and
Mr. Justice Reyes, upon the grounds already stated in their respective opinions, and
with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining.
But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in the normal operation
of the Government, it is decreed, by the majority, of course, that this judgment take
effect upon the expiration of fteen days from the date of its entry. No costs to be
charged.
Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ.,
concur.
Feria, J., concurs plus his concurring opinion.
FERIA , J., concurring :
The respondents in the cases G.R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that the
petitioners in said cases can not institute an action to invalidate the Executive Orders
Nos. 225 and 226 promulgated by the President, because they have no interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation, and can not therefore
question the validity of said executive orders requiring expenditures of public money.
Although this Supreme Court, in the case of Custodio vs. President of the Senate,
G.R. No. L-117 (42 Off. Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution "That the constitutionality
of a legislative act is open to attack only by a person whose rights are affected thereby,
that one who invokes the power of the court to declare an Act of Congress to be
unconstitutional must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he
has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of
its enforcement," that ruling was laid down without a careful consideration and is
contrary to the ruling laid down in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States that
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers, have su cient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11,
p. 761.) All the members of this Court, except two, in taking cognizance of those cases,
rejected the respondents' contention, reversed the ruling in said case and adopted the
general rule above mentioned; and we believe the latter is better than the one adopted
in said case of Custodio, which was based on a doctrine adhered to only in few
jurisdictions in the United States; because if a taxpayer can not attack the validity of the
executive orders in question or a laws requiring the expenditure of public moneys, no
one under our laws could question the validity of such laws or executive orders.
After laying down the fundamental principles involved in the case at bar, we shall
discuss and show that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no longer in force at the time
the Executive Orders under consideration were promulgated, because even the
respondents in the cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L-2756, in sustaining the validity of the
Executive Order No. 62 rely not only on Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on Commonwealth Act No. 671; and afterwards we
shall refute the arguments in support of the contrary proposition that said
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and, therefore, the President may exercise
now the legislative powers therein delegated to him.
PRELIMINARY
The Constitution of the Philippines, drafted by the duly elected representatives of
the Filipino people, provides in its section 1, Article II, that "The Philippines is a
republican state, sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." The people have delegated the government authority to three
different and separate Departments: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1,
Article VI, the legislative power to make laws is conferred upon Congress; the executive
power to faithfully execute the laws is vested by sections 1 and 10 of Article VII, in the
President; and the judicial power is vested by section 1, Article VII, in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. the Supreme Court
having the supremacy to pass upon "the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulations."
The distribution by the Constitution of the powers of government to the
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments operates, by implication, as an
inhibition against the exercise by one department of the powers which belong to
another, and imposes upon each of the three departments the duty of exercising its
own peculiar powers by itself, and prohibits the delegation of any of those powers
except in cases expressly permitted by the Constitution. The principle of the separation
of the powers of government is fundamental to the very existence of a constitutional
government as established in the Philippines patterned after that of the United States
of America. The division of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial
represents the most important principle of government that guarantees the liberties of
the people, for it prevents a concentration of powers in the hands of one person or
class of persons.
Under the doctrine of separation of the powers of government, the law-making
function is assigned exclusively to the legislative, and the legislative branch cannot
delegate the power to make laws to any other authority. But it must be borne in mind
that what cannot be delegated is that which is purely legislative in nature, not
administrative. There are powers so far legislative that may properly be exercised by
the legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated because they may be
advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the other
departments of the government, such as the authority to make rules and regulations of
administrative character to carry out an express legislative purpose or to effect the
operation and enforcement of a law. As illustrations of the proper exercise of the power
of Congress to delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the
necessary details to carry into effect a law, are Act No. 3155 empowering the Governor
General then, now the President, to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of
the importation of foreign cattle (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Act No. 3106
authorizing the Commissioner of the Public Service Commission to regulate those
engaged in various occupations or business affected with a public interest, and to
prescribe what the charges shall be for services rendered in the conduct of such
business (Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National Industrial
Recovery Act enacted by the Congress of the United States authorizing the President to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations to carry out the emergency measure
enacted by Congress, though a part thereof was declared unconstitutional for
producing a delegation of legislative authority which is uncon ned, "and not canalized
within banks to keep it from overflowing."
Although, in principle, the power of the Legislature to make laws or perform acts
purely legislative in nature may only be delegated by Congress to another authority or
o cer of either the executive or judicial department when expressly permitted by the
Constitution, no such delegation is authorized by the State constitution or Federal
Constitution of the United States. It is a fact admitted by the attorneys and amici curiae
for the petitioners and respondents in these cases that section 26, Article VI, of our
Constitution is unique and has no counterpart in said constitutions, and for that reason
not a single case involving a question similar to the one herein involved has ever been
submitted to and passed upon by the courts of last resort in the United States. The
provision of our Constitution reads as follows:
"Sec. 26.In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by
law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy."
It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional provision
empowers Congress to delegate to the President, is not the power to promulgate rules
and regulations of administrative nature, for this may also be delegated at any time
without necessity of an express authority by the Constitution, but the power to
promulgate rules and regulations purely legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion of
the President the determination of what rules or regulations shall be or what acts are
necessary to effectuate the so-called declared national policy, for otherwise it would
not have been necessary for the Constitution to authorize Congress to make such
delegation.
DEMONSTRATION
The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President of the Philippines
to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature only (1) in times of war or (2)
other national emergency, such as rebellion, ood, earthquake, pestilence, economic
depression, famine or any other emergency different from war itself affecting the
nation.
It is obvious that it is for Congress and not for the President to determine when
there is such a particular emergency and to authorize the President to promulgate rules
and regulations to cope with it. Therefore, if Congress declares that there exists a war
as a national emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to tide over the emergency, the latter could not, because he believes that
there is an economic emergency or depression or any emergency other than war itself,
exercise the legislative power delegated to meet such economic or other emergency.
The Constitution requires also that the delegation be for a limited period or the
authority so delegated shall cease ipso facto at the expiration of the period, because to
require an express legislation to repeal or terminate the delegated legislative authority
of the President might be subversive to the constitutional separation of powers in our
democratic form of government, for the President may prevent inde nitely the repeal of
his delegated authority by the exercise of his veto power, since the veto could be
overridden only by a two-thirds vote and it would be extremely di cult to repeal it in a
subservient Congress dominated by the Chief Executive. Besides, to provide that the
delegated legislative powers shall continue to exist until repealed by the Congress,
would be a delegation not for a limited, but for an unlimited period or rather without any
limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subject to repeal by the Congress,
without necessity to providing so.
No question is raised as to the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 671
under which Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were promulgated by the
President of the Philippines according to the contention of the respondents. The
question involved is the validity (not constitutionality) of said executive orders, that is,
whether or not the President had authority to promulgate them under Commonwealth
Act No. 671; and therefore the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of this
Court required by section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution to declare a treaty or law
unconstitutional is not required for adjudging the executive orders in question invalid or
not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 671, which read as follows:
"COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671
"AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF
"Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
"SECTION 1.The existence of war between the United States and other
emergency.
to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly he is,
(b) to reorganize the government of the Commonwealth including the
Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, o ces,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government and to abolish any of those already
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to
increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f ) to raise funds through
proceeds thereof (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
"SEC. 4.This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and the rules and
of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
"Approved, December 16, 1941."
Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was familiar with the
well-known limits of its powers under section 26, Article VI, of the Constitution and did
not intend to exceed said powers in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express
provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 as amended by
620 and 671, and those of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by Republic Act
No. 66 and Republic Acts Nos. 51 and 728, we are of the opinion, and therefore so hold,
that the actual war in Philippine territory and not any other national emergency is
contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that the period of time during which
the President was empowered by said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to promulgate rules
and regulations was limited to the existence of such war or invasion of the Philippines
by the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular session. Such
emergency having ceased to exist upon the complete liberation of the Philippines from
the enemy's occupation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased to be in force and
effect at the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress in
1946, before the promulgation of said executive orders, and hence they are null and
void.
In view of the existence of a state of national emergency caused by the last world
war among several nations of the world, the second National Assembly during its
second special session passed the following acts: (a) Commonwealth Act No. 494
authorizing the President until the adjournment of the next regular session of the
National Assembly, to suspend the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444,
commonly known as the "Eight-Hour Labor Law," when in his judgment the public
interest so requires, in order to prevent a dislocation of the productive forces of the
country (b ) Commonwealth Act No. 496 delegating to the President the power
expressly granted by section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution to the State "until the
date of adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to take over
solely for use or operation by the Government during the existence of the emergency,
any public service or enterprise and to operate the same," upon payment of just
compensation; (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498, authorizing the President, among
others, to x the maximum selling prices of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals,
building materials, implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and
industry, and other articles or commodities of prime necessity, and to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public interests, which rules and
regulations shall have the force and effect of law until the date of the adjournment of
the next regular session of the National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No. 499
providing that until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
National Assembly, any sale, mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transfer of vessels
owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the Philippines or by a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines, to any person not a citizen of the United States or of
the Philippines, shall be null and void, without the approval of the President of the
Philippines; and Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President to reduce the
expenditure of the Executive Department of the National Government by the suspension
or abandonment of services, activities or operations of no immediate necessity, which
authority shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session. All these
Commonwealth Acts took effect upon their approval on September 30, 1939, a short
time after the invasion of Poland by Germany.
During the fourth special session of the second National Assembly,
Commonwealth Act No. 600, which superseded the above-mentioned emergency
power acts, was passed and took effect on its approval on August 19, 1940. This Act
No. 600 expressly declared that the existence of war in many parts of the world had
created a national emergency which made it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure
the tranquillity of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all
subversive activities, by preventing or relieving unemployment, by insuring to the people
adequate shelter and clothing and su cient food supply, etc. To carry out this policy
the President was "authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the
force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the
National Assembly," which rules and regulations may embrace the objects therein
enumerated. And the National Assembly in its regular session commencing in January,
1941, in view of the fact that the delegated authority granted to the President by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, and 600 was to terminate at the
date of the adjournment of that regular session of the National Assembly, passed Act
No. 620 which took effect upon its approval on June 6, 1941, amending section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 600 by extending the delegated legislative authority of the
President until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress
of the Philippines, instead of the National Assembly, the Constitution having been
amended by substituting the Congress of the Philippines for the National Assembly.
Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
620, provides that "the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
which shall have the force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next
regular session of the Congress of the Philippines," it is evident that this limitation was
intended to apply, not only to the effectivity of the rules and regulations already
promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the President to promulgate
them, for the following reasons: First, because Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496,
498, 499, and 500 had expressly limited the authority of the President to exercise the
delegated power while the Assembly was not in session until the date of the
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, and there was
absolutely no reason whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended, which superseded said Act, would not
impose the same limitation on the authority delegated in Commonwealth Act No. 600
as amended in compliance with the requirement of the Constitution; secondly, because
it would have been useless to give the rules and regulations the effect and force of law
only until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress, if the
President might, after said adjournment, continue exercising his delegated legislative
powers to promulgate again the same and other rules and regulations; and lastly,
because to construe Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620,
otherwise would be to make the delegation not for a limited but for an inde nite period
of time, in violation of the express provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution.
All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 before its
amendment show that it was the intention or policy of the National Assembly, in
delegating legislative functions to the President, to limit the exercise of the latter's
authority to the interregnum while the National Assembly or Congress of the Philippines
was not in session until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session thereof,
which interregnum might have extended over a long period of time had the war in
Europe involved and made the Philippines a battle ground before the next regular
session of the Congress had convened. And the authority granted to the President of
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had to be extended over a long period of
time during the occupation because, before the meeting of the next regular session of
the Congress, the Philippines was involved in the war of the United States and invaded
and occupied by the Japanese forces. And the President was authorized to exercise his
delegated powers until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
Congress, for the reason that although during the next regular session a bill may be
passed by the Congress, it would not become a law until it was approved, expressly or
impliedly, by the President during the period of twenty days after it shall have been
presented to him.
The reason of the limitation is that if Congress were in position to act it would
not be necessary for it to make such legislative delegation to the President, for
Congress may in all cases act, declare its will and, after xing a primary standard or
yardstick, authorize the President to ll up the details by prescribing administrative
rules and regulations to cope with the actual conditions of any emergency; and it is
inconceivable that there may arise an emergency of such a nature that would require
immediate action and can not wait, without irreparable or great injury to the public
interest, and action of the legislature in regular or special session called by the Chief
Executive for the purpose of meeting it. If in the United States they could withstand and
have withstood all kinds of emergency without resorting to the delegation by the
legislative body of legislative power to the Executive except those of administrative
nature, because no such delegation is permitted by the States and Federal
constitutions, as above stated, there is no reason why the same can not be done in the
Philippines. The framers of our Constitution and the National Assembly that enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be aware of the inconveniences and
chaotical consequences of having two legislative bodies acting at one and the same
time.
It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the
President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations until the date of the
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly or Congress, as the
above-quoted Commonwealth Acts; but it is also true that it clearly provides that
"pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared"; and
that the de nite and speci c emergency therein referred to is no other than the "state
of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines", declared in the title of
said Act No. 671, that was the reason for which the President was "authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is obvious that what
Act No. 671 calls "total emergency" was the invasion and occupation of the Philippines
by the enemy or Japanese forces which, at the time of the passage and approval of
said Act, had already landed in Philippine soil and was expected to paralyze the
functioning of the Congress during the invasion and enemy occupation of the
Philippines.
The mere existence of the last world war in many parts of the world which had
created a national emergency and made it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers was not called total emergency by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600
and 620, because it had not yet actually involved and engulfed the Philippines in the
maelstrom of war. It does not stand to reason that the authority given to the President
to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature by Commonwealth Acts Nos.
494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to terminate at the date of the adjournment
of the next regular session of the Congress of the Philippines in 1946, but those
granted to the President by Commonwealth Act No. 671 under the same war
emergency should continue to exist inde nitely even after the Congress of the
Philippines had regularly convened, acted, and adjourned in the year 1946 and
subsequent years. Besides to give such construction to Act No. 671 would make it
violative of the express provision of section 26, Article VIII, of the Constitution, under
which said Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted, as expressly stated in said Act,
and which permits the Congress to authorize the President, only for a limited period
during a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into effect a
declared national policy.
By the special session of the rst Congress of the Philippines commencing on
the 9th day of June, 1945, called by the President for the purpose of considering
general legislation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 did not cease to operate. As we have
already said, the emergency which prompted the second National Assembly to enact
Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating legislative powers to the President, was the
inability of Congress to convene in regular session in January of every year during the
invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial forces. The National Assembly
could not have in mind any special session which might have been called by the
President immediately after liberation, because the calling of a special session as well
as the matters which may be submitted by the President to Congress for consideration
is a contingent event which depend upon the possibility of convening it and the
discretion of the President to call it, and the matters he will submit to it for
consideration; because it is to be presumed, in order to comply with the provision of
section 26, Article VI of the Constitution, that it was the intention of the National
Assembly to x a limited period, independent of the President's will, during which he is
authorized to exercise his delegated legislative power.
The object of section 3 of Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report "as
soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines all rules and
regulations promulgated by him under the powers therein granted" is to inform the
Congress of the contents of said rules and regulations so that the latter may modify or
repeal them if it sees t to do so, inasmuch as, according to section 4 of the same Act,
"the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the
Congress shall otherwise provide." And although said section 3 does not specify
whether in regular or special session, it is evident that it refers to the next regular and
not to the special session of the Congress, because as a rule a special session is called
to consider only speci c matters submitted by the President to Congress for
consideration, and it would be useless to submit such report to the Congress in special
session if the latter can not either modify or repeal such rules and regulations; and
besides, it is to be presumed that it was the intention of the National Assembly in
enacting section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 to require the submission of a report
to the next regular session of the Assembly or Congress, as provided in section 4
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, which
required a similar report, for there was absolutely no plausible reason to provide
otherwise.
Our conclusion is corroborated by the fact that section 3 of Act No. 671 only
requires the President to submit the report, "as soon as practicable upon the convening
of the Congress" and not to submit a report to the Congress every time it convenes, in
order to inform the Congress thereof so that the latter may modify or repeal any or all
of them, for under section 4 of the same Act "such rules and regulations shall continue
in force and effect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." It is obvious that the
convening of the Congress referred to in said section 3 is the next regular session of
the Congress after the passage of Act No. 671, and not any other subsequent sessions;
because, otherwise, it would not have required that it shall be submitted to the
Congress as soon as practicable and the purpose of the law already stated in requiring
the submission of the report would be defeated; and if it were the intention of said
Commonwealth Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue promulgating rules
and regulations after the next regular session of the Congress, it would have required
the President to submit to the Congress each and every time it convenes a report of the
rules and regulations promulgated after his previous reports had been submitted.
Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative interpretation given to
Commonwealth Act No. 671 by the same Congress in enacting Commonwealth Act No.
728 which took effect on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, control,
curtail, and prohibit the exploration of agricultural or industrial products, merchandise,
articles, materials and supplies without the permit of the President until December 31,
1948 as expressly provided in section 4 thereof, because it would not have been
necessary for the Congress to promulgate said Act No. 728 if the President had
authority to promulgate Executive Order No. 62 in question on January 1, 1949, under
Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contented by the respondents; and Republic Act No. 51,
approved on October 4, 1946, authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize
within one year the different executive departments, bureaus, o ces, agencies and
other instrumentalities of the government, including corporations controlled by it,
would not have been passed by the Congress if Commonwealth Act No. 671 under
consideration was then still in force, for section 2 (b) and (c) of said Act No. 671
authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to create new subdivisions,
branches, department o ces, agencies or instrumentalities of government, and to
abolish any of those already existing.
REFUTATION
There is no force in the argument that the executive orders in question are not
valid, not because the promulgation of the acts above mentioned and of
Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by the Republic Act No. 66 on rentals, the
appropriation acts or Republic Acts Nos. 1, 156, and 320 for the years 1946-47, 1947-
48 and 1948-49, and of the Republic Acts Nos. 73, 147, and 235 appropriating public
funds to defray the expenses for the elections held in 1947 and 1948, shows that the
emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to
exist, but because Congress "has shown by their enactment its readiness and ability to
legislate on those matters, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential
legislation or regulations under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671."
If the Congress was ready and able to legislate on those matters since 1946 and for
that reason the executive orders herein involved are null and void, there is no valid
reason for not concluding that the emergency powers of the President has ceased to
exist in 1946, because since then the Congress could, although it did not, legislate on all
matters on which the President was granted and delegated power to legislate by the
Commonwealth Act No. 671. And if Commonwealth Act No. 671 continues to be in
force and effect in so far as it grants delegated legislative powers to the President and
declares the national policy to be carried out by the rules and regulations the President
is authorized to promulgate, the mere promulgation of the acts above described can
not be considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal of the authority of the President
to promulgate rules and regulations only on those matters, and the adoption of a
contrary policy by the Congress, because implied repeal is not favored in statutory
construction, and the national policy referred to in section 26, Article VIII of the
Constitution is to be declared by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to
the President, in order to establish the standard to be carried out by him in exercising
his delegated functions, and not in repealing said powers.
As we have already said, section 26, Article VI of the Constitution expressly
empowers Congress, in times of war and other national emergency, to authorize the
President to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy,
and therefore it is for the National Assembly to determine the existence of a particular
emergency, declare the national policy, and authorize the President to promulgate rules
and regulations of legislative nature to carry out that policy. As the National Assembly
has determined and speci ed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 that the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia which involves the
Philippines is the emergency which made it necessary for the National Assembly to
invest the President with extraordinary powers to promulgate rules and regulations to
meet the resulting emergency from the actual existence of that war which involved the
Philippines, the President cannot, under said Act No. 671, determine the existence of
any other emergency, such as the state of cold war, the continued military occupation
of the enemy country, the disorder in central Luzon, the current in ation, and the
economic and political instability throughout the world, cited by the respondents, and
promulgate rules and regulations to meet the emergency; because obviously it is not
for the delegate but for the delegant to say when and under what circumstances the
former may act in behalf of the latter, and not vice-versa.
The theory of those who are of the opinion that the President may determine
"whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941, prompted the approval of
Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still
existed at the time the Chief Executive exercised those powers," is predicated upon the
erroneous assumption that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 contemplated any other
emergency not expressly mentioned in said Commonwealth Act. This assumption or
premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 of said Act No. 671 expressly states that "the
existence of the war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia
which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary power in order to meet the resulting emergency." That is the war
emergency. And it is evident, and therefore no evidence is required to prove, that the
existence of the war which involved the Philippines had already ceased before the
promulgation of the executive orders in question, or at least, if the last war has not yet
technically terminated in so far as the United States is concerned, it did no longer
involve the Republic of the Philippines since the inauguration of our Republic or
independence from the sovereignty of the United States.
It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency from the
existence of the war" as used in section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 should be
construed to mean any emergency resulting from or that is the effect of the last war,
and not the war emergency itself, and that therefore it is for the President to determine
whether at the time of the promulgation of the executive orders under consideration
such emergency still existed, because such contention would make Act No. 671
unconstitutional or violative of the provisions of section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution. This constitutional precept distinguishes war emergency from any other
national emergency, such as an economic depression and others which may be the
effect of a war, and empowers the Congress in times of war and other national
emergency, to be determined by Congress itself as we have already said and shown, to
authorize the President, for a limited period that may be shorter or of the same duration
but not longer than that of the emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out the policy declared by the Congress in order to meet the emergency. To construe
Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended would be to leave the determination of the
existence of the emergency to the discretion of the President, because the effects of
the war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not determined or stated in
said Act and could not have been foreseen by the Assembly in enacting said Act; and
because it would make the delegation of powers for an inde nite period, since such an
emergency may or may not become a reality and it may arise a short or long time after
the last war. It is of judicial notice that the economic depression, effect of the rst
world war, took place in the year 1929, or about ten years after the cessation of
hostilities in the year 1919; and by no stretch of imagination or intellectual gymnastics
may the failure of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of the
Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and to defray the
expenses in connection with the holding of the national election on the second Tuesday
of November, 1949, be considered as an emergency resulting from the last war.
"In the enactment of emergency police measures, the question as to whether an
emergency exists is primarily for the legislature to determine. Such determination,
although entitled to great respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases,
possess the nal authority to determine whether an emergency in fact exists."
(American Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.)
No case decided by the courts of last resort in the United States may be cited in
support of the proportion that it is for the President to determine whether there exists
an emergency in order to exercise his emergency powers, and "it is not for the judiciary
to review the nding of the Executive in this regard." There is none and there cannot be
any. Because, as we have already stated at the beginning of this opinion, and we are
supported by the above quotation from American Jurisprudence, the power to pass
emergency police legislation in the United States may be exercised only by the
legislature in the exercise of the police power of the State, and it can not be delegated
to the Executive because there is no provision in the State and Federal constitutions
authorizing such delegation as we have in section 26, Article VI, of our Constitution. As
we have already said before, the only legislative power which may be delegated to the
Executive and other administrative bodies or o cers in the United States is the power
to promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature, which does not include
the exercise of the police power of the State.
The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Ludecke
vs. Watkins, 92 Law. ed., 1883, quoted by the respondents and dissenters in support of
the proposition that "only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a
political branch of the government is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain
the supremacy of the Constitution," has no application to the present case; because the
question involved in the present case is not a political but a justiciable question, while
the question in issue in said Ludecke case was the power of the court to review "the
determination of the President in the postwar period that an alien enemy should be
deported, even though active hostilities have ceased," and it was held that it was a
political question and, therefore, was not subject to judicial review.
CONCLUSION
In view of all the foregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the executive
orders promulgated by the President under Commonwealth Act 671 before the date of
the adjournment of the regular session of the Congress of the Philippines in 1946 are
valid, because said Commonwealth Act was then still in force; but the executive orders
promulgated after the said date are null and void, because Commonwealth Act No. 671
had already ceased to be in force in so far as the delegation of powers was concerned.
Therefore, are null and void the Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, 1947, regulating
rentals for houses and lots for residential purposes; the Executive Order No. 192
promulgated on December 24, 1948, on the control of exports from the Philippines; the
Executive Order No. 225 dated June 15, 1949, appropriating funds for the operation of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949
to June 30, 1950; and the Executive Order No. 226 promulgated on June 15, 1949,
appropriating the sum of six million pesos to defray the expenses in connection with,
and incidental to, the holding of the national election to be held on the second Tuesday
of November, 1949.
Footnotes
1.81 Phil., 517.

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[G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949.]

J. ANTONIO ARANETA , petitioner, vs . RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of

[G.R. No. L-2756. August 26, 1949.]

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR , petitioners, vs .

[G.R. No. L-3054. Agosto 26, 1949.]

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido

[G.R. No. L-3055. Agosto 26, 1949.]

LEON MA. GUERRERO , petitioner, vs . THE COMMISSIONER OF

[G.R. No. L-3056. Agosto 26, 1949.]

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENTION OF THE LAW, HOW

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Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionality of Act

PARAS , J., concurring :

MONTEMAYOR , J., concurring and dissenting :

For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing

I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the existence of

REYES , J., concurring and dissenting :

BENGZON , J., dissenting :

FERIA , J., concurring :

1.81 Phil., 517.

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