SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 168578-79. September 30, 2008.]

NIETO A. RACHO , petitioner, vs . HON. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity

as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, HON. VIRGINIA PALANCA-
SANTIAGO, in her capacity as Ombudsman Director, and HON.
ANTONIO T. ECHAVEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court — Cebu City, Branch 8 , respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING , J : p

This petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks the annulment of the Joint Order 1 dated April 1, 2005 of the O ce of the
Ombudsman (OMB) in the Visayas. The OMB had denied reconsideration of its
Reinvestigation Report 2 in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E and its Resolution in OMB-C-C-03-
0729-L, both dated January 10, 2005. Petitioner herein also assails both issuances of
the OMB. SDTaHc

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows.

On November 9, 2001, DYHP Balita Action Team (DYHP) of the Radio Mindanao
Network, Inc. addressed a letter 3 on behalf of an anonymous complainant to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro. The letter accused Nieto A. Racho, an
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)-Cebu, of having accumulated wealth
disproportionate to his income. Photocopied bank certi cations disclosed that Racho
had a total deposit of P5,793,881.39 with three banks.
Pio R. Dargantes, the Graft Investigation O cer I (GIO) assigned to investigate
the complaint, directed DYHP to submit a sworn statement of its witnesses. Instead,
the latter led a Manifestation 4 dated October 16, 2002 withdrawing its complaint for
lack of witnesses. Consequently, GIO Dargantes dismissed the case. He ruled that the
photocopied bank certi cations did not constitute substantial evidence required in
administrative proceedings. 5
Then, in two separate Memoranda dated May 30, 2003, 6 Ombudsman Director
Virginia Palanca-Santiago disapproved GIO Dargantes's Resolution. In OMB-V-A-02-
0214-E, Director Palanca-Santiago held Racho administratively liable for falsi cation
and dishonesty, and meted on him the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture
of all bene ts and perpetual disquali cation to hold o ce. 7 In OMB-V-C-02-0240-E,
Director Palanca-Santiago found probable cause to charge Racho with falsi cation of
public document under Article 171 (4) 8 of the Revised Penal Code. 9 The latter moved
for reconsideration but it was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman.
On May 30, 2003, Racho was charged with falsi cation of public document,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-66458 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 8. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 2000, and for sometime
subsequent thereto, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
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 Honorable Court, above-named accused NIETO A. RACHO, a public o cer, being
the Chief, Special Investigation Division, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
Regional O ce No. 13, Cebu City, in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to [his] o ce, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting
of his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Disclosure of Business
Interest and Financial Connections; and Identi cation of Relatives In The
Government Service, as of December 31, 1999, by stating therein that his cash
in bank is only FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency
and that his assets minus his liabilities amounted only to TWO HUNDRED
THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT PESOS (P203,758.00),
Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact, said accused has BANK
DEPOSITS or cash in banks amounting to FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED ONE PESOS and 39/100
(P5,793,801.39), 1 0 Philippine Currency, as herein shown: TaISDA

1) Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company — Cebu, Tabunok Branch:

Unisa No. Amount

3-172-941-10 P1,983,554.45
3-172-941-11 949,341.82
——————
Total - P2,932,896.27
===========

2) Philippine Commercial International Bank — Magallanes Branch, Cebu City:

Account No. Amount

Equalizer — 29449-29456 P1,000,000.00

PCC Fund — 99-0095-0-0020-clf.b 200,000.00
Optimum Savings — 00-8953-06860-9 28,702.53
——————
Total - P1,228,702.53
===========

3) Bank of the Philippine Islands — Cebu (Mango) Branch, Gen. Maxilom

Avenue, Cebu City:

Account No. Amount

Gold Savings — 1023-2036-49 P1,632,282.59

thus deliberately failed to disclose an important fact of which he has the

legal obligation to do so as speci cally mandated under Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6713 (The Norms of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public O cials
and Employees) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, As Amended (The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), thereby making untruthful statement in a
narration of facts.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 1
Racho appealed the administrative case and led a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals to question the ruling in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E. In a
Decision 1 2 dated January 26, 2004, the appellate court annulled both Memoranda and
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 ordered a reinvestigation of the cases against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner led a
Motion to Dismiss 1 3 dated July 21, 2004. The same was denied for lack of merit in an
Order 1 4 dated August 24, 2004.
On reinvestigation, petitioner submitted a Comment 1 5 dated January 4, 2005
along with supporting documents. On January 10, 2005, the OMB issued the assailed
Reinvestigation Report, the dispositive portion of which states:
With all the foregoing, undersigned nds no basis to change, modify nor
reverse her previous ndings that there is probable cause for the crime of
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, de ned and penalized under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code, against respondent Nieto A. Racho for making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts in his SALN. As there are additional
facts established during the reinvestigation, re: failure of Mr. Racho to re ect his
business connections, then the Information led against him should be
amended to include the same. Let this Amended Information be returned to the
court for further proceedings. EHcaAI

SO RESOLVED. 1 6

Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied by the OMB in the Joint Order
dated April 1, 2005. It decreed:
The Motion for Reconsideration of respondent did not adduce any new
evidence, which would warrant a reversal of our ndings; neither did it present
proof of errors of law or irregularities being committed.

This being so, this Motion for Reconsideration of respondent is hereby

DENIED. The ndings of this O ce as contained in the two (2)
REINVESTIGATION REPORTS (in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E and OMB-V-A-02-0214-E)
and RESOLUTION (in OMB-C-C-03-0729-L) stand.

SO ORDERED. 1 7

In the instant petition, Racho cites the following issues:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN DIRECTOR, AS WELL AS
RESPONDENT DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS WHO SANCTIONED
HER DEED, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION EQUIVALENT TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN SHE REFUSED OR FAILED TO INHIBIT
HERSELF FROM CONDUCTING THE SUPPOSED "REINVESTIGATION";
II.

WHETHER OR NOT HEREIN PETITION[ER] WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW

IN THE SUPPOSED "REINVESTIGATION";

III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN DIRECTOR, AS WELL AS
RESPONDENT DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS WHO SANCTIONED
HER DEED, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION EQUIVALENT TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN SHE HELD THAT PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT ADDUCE PROOF OF ANY
IRREGULARITY IN THE "REINVESTIGATION"; AND

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 IV.
WHETHER OR NOT BY REASON OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S INHERENT
POWER TO DO ALL THINGS REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, EVEN IF NOT PRAYED FOR IN THE INSTANT
PETITION, THE SUBJECT OMBUDSMAN CASES OMB-V-C-02-0240-E AND OMB-
C-C-03-0729-L CAN BE DISMISSED. 1 8
CDTHSI

Stated simply, the issues now for determination are as follows: (1) Whether
Ombudsman Director Palanca-Santiago gravely abused her discretion when she did not
inhibit herself in the reinvestigation; (2) Whether petitioner was denied due process of
law on reinvestigation; and (3) Whether there was probable cause to hold petitioner
liable for falsification under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of Ombudsman Director
Palanca-Santiago since she did not inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. He claims a
denial of due process because of the fact that Director Palanca-Santiago handled the
preliminary investigation as well as the reinvestigation of the cases. In both instances,
the latter found probable cause to indict petitioner for falsi cation. For this reason,
petitioner believes that Director Palanca-Santiago has turned hostile to him. He insists
that respondent director had lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge when she
found probable cause against him on preliminary investigation. Petitioner penultimately
questions the haste with which the reinvestigation was concluded and the lack of
hearing thereon. In essence, he insists on the dismissal of his cases before the OMB.
On November 6, 2006, the OMB thru the O ce of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
led a Memorandum 1 9 dated October 23, 2006 for respondents. The OSP avers that
the instant petition stated no cause of action since it did not implead the Hon.
Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo as a respondent. That Director Palanca-Santiago
resolved the investigation adverse to petitioner, the OSP contends, did not necessarily
indicate partiality. The OSP explains that the Reinvestigation Report was merely
recommendatory and the finding of probable cause was done in line with official duty. It
points out further that petitioner failed to cite speci c acts by which Director Palanca-
Santiago showed hostility towards him. Finally, the OSP charges petitioner with forum
shopping since he had already raised the issue of respondent director's impartiality in
his petition assailing the Memorandum dated May 30, 2003, before the Court of
Appeals.
After considering the contentions and submissions of the parties, we are in
agreement that the instant petition lacks merit.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public o cers is vested primarily in
the OMB. For this purpose, the OMB has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 2 0 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989). Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention to ensure that the OMB is insulated from any outside pressure and
improper in uence. 2 1 Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so,
the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman's powers,
and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to
no one, acts as the champion of the people and the guardian of the integrity of the
public service. 2 2
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to le the corresponding information with the appropriate
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 courts. 2 3 Such nding of probable cause is a nding of fact which is generally not
reviewable by this Court. 2 4 The only ground upon which a plea for review of the OMB's
resolution may be entertained is an alleged grave abuse of discretion. By that phrase is
meant the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an excess or
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty; or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law; or to act at all in contemplation of law, as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 2 5
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we nd no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents. As already well-stated, as long as substantial
evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, his decision will not be overturned. 2 6 Here,
the nding of the Ombudsman that there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable
for falsi cation by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts rests on
substantial evidence.
The OMB evaluated petitioner's Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) for the year 1999 2 7 against certi ed true copies of his bank deposits during
the same year. In his SALN, petitioner declared P15,000 cash in bank as of December
31, 1999. The bank certi cations of petitioner's deposits, however, con rmed that he
had an aggregate balance of P5,793,881.39 in his accounts with three banks. Original
certi cations dated June 17, 1999 issued by the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) 2 8
and Equitable PCI Bank (Equitable PCIB) 2 9 revealed accounts for P1,632,282.59 and
P1,228,702.53, respectively. A photocopied certi cation dated June 16, 1999 from
Metrobank 3 0 indicated a deposit of P2,932,896.27.
The OMB did not accord weight to the Joint A davit 3 1 submitted by petitioner.
In said A davit, Vieto and Dean Racho, petitioner's brothers, stated that they entrusted
to petitioner P1,390,000 and P1,950,000 respectively. On the other hand, petitioner's
nephew, Henry Racho, claimed that he delivered the amount of P1,400,000 to petitioner.
These sums were purportedly their contribution as stockholders of Angelsons Lending
and Investors, Inc. (Angelsons) and Nal Pay Phone Services (NPPS) — businesses
managed by the spouses Racho. Ironically, Dean Racho was not listed as a stockholder
of the lending company. Moreover, the Articles of Incorporation 3 2 of Angelsons
re ected that Vieto, Henry and the spouses Racho individually paid only P12,500 of the
subscribed shares of P50,000 each. Petitioner did not present proofs of succeeding
contributions made and their amounts. Curiously, a ants allegedly tendered their
additional contributions during family reunions. 3 3 Neither did the a ants describe the
extent of their interest in NPPS. Petitioner merely presented NPPS' Certi cate of
Registration of Business Name 3 4 secured by his wife Lourdes B. Racho. Yet, said
certi cate did not operate as a license to engage in any kind of business, much more a
proof of its establishment and operation. Even assuming that said businesses exist,
petitioner should have similarly reported his interests therein in his SALN.cCaDSA

Petitioner argues that his culpability should not be ascertained on the basis of
photocopied bank certi cations. Apparent from the records, however, is the Order 3 5
dated August 27, 2004 of the OMB which required petitioner to comment on the
certi ed true copies of bank certi cations issued by BPI and Equitable PCIB. All the
same, even if we exclude his deposit in Metrobank, a signi cant disparity between his
declared cash on hand of P15,000 and cash in bank of P2,860,985.12 subsists when
compared to his total bank deposits duly certified for the same year.
Indeed, the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
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 36 It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 3 7 A nding of probable cause
merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. 3 8
Moreover, we are unable to agree with petitioner's contention that he was denied
due process when no hearing was conducted on his motion for reinvestigation. In De
Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 3 9 we ruled that a clari catory hearing is not required
during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clari catory hearing is
optional on the part of the investigating o cer as evidenced by the use of the term
"may" in Section 3 (e) of Rule 112, thus:
(e) If the investigating o cer believes that there are matters to be
clari ed, he may set a hearing to propound clari catory questions to the parties
or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to
be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. 4 0
This rule applies equally to a motion for reinvestigation. As stated, the O ce of
the Ombudsman has been granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the
Constitution and by law. As a rule, the O ce of the Ombudsman may, for every
particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its own initiative,
decide how best to pursue such investigation. 4 1 In the present case, the OMB found it
unnecessary to hold additional clari catory hearings. Notably, we note that a hearing
was conducted during preliminary investigation where petitioner invoked his right to
remain silent and confront witnesses who may be presented against him, although
there was none presented.
Besides, under the Rules of Procedure of the O ce of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 07), particularly Rule II, Section 7 (a), 4 2 in relation to Section
4 (f), 4 3 a complainant's active participation is no longer a matter of right during
reinvestigation. Admittedly, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied in administrative proceedings. Thus, it is settled that administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 4 4 DHSACT

Petitioner complains of how quickly the reinvestigation proceedings were

terminated. The OMB issued the Reinvestigation Report on January 10, 2005, barely a
week after petitioner led his Comment dated January 4, 2005. Thus, the latter
surmises that no reinvestigation was actually made. However, a review of the facts
would reveal that after the Court of Appeals directed a reinvestigation of the case, the
OMB issued an Order dated August 27, 2004 requiring petitioner to submit a comment
within 10 days from receipt. The latter failed to comply. On December 1, 2004,
petitioner led a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment 4 5 of 30 days; the OMB
granted the same for 15 days. On December 17, 2004, petitioner asked for another
extension of 30 days reckoned from December 19, 2004 within which to submit a
comment; the OMB gave him up to December 28, 2004. On December 28, 2004,
petitioner moved for a third extension. Then, without waiting for the OMB's resolution of
his latest motion, petitioner led his Comment on January 4, 2005. But with his
repeated motions for extensions, he already contributed to palpable delay in the
completion of the reinvestigation.
Clearly, the requirements of due process have been substantially satis ed in the
instant case. 4 6 In its Order 4 7 dated December 22, 2004, the OMB warned petitioner
that no further extension will be given such that if he fails to le a comment on
December 28, 2004, the cases against him will be submitted for resolution. Even so, the
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 OMB considered petitioner's belatedly- led Comment and the documents attached
therewith in its Reinvestigation Report. In our view, petitioner cannot successfully
invoke deprivation of due process in this case, where as a party he was given the
chance to be heard, with ample opportunity to present his side. 4 8
Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of
Director Palanca-Santiago for her refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if
a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
cas e, 4 9 public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. 5 0 They are not considered judges,
by the nature of their functions, but merely quasi-judicial o cers. 5 1 Worth-stressing,
one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against a party
su cient to disqualify even a judge. 5 2 Hence, absent proven allegations of speci c
conduct showing prejudice and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of discretion
here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse themselves on
reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted delays
in the prosecution of actions. cTIESD

Finally, we note that petitioner failed to attach a certi ed true copy of the
assailed Resolution in OMB-C-C-03-0729-L in disregard of paragraph 2 5 3 of Section 1,
Rule 65 on certiorari. As previously ruled, the requirement of providing appellate courts
with certi ed true copies of the judgments or nal orders that are the subjects of
review is indispensable to aid them in resolving whether or not to give due course to
petitions. This necessary requirement cannot be perfunctorily ignored, much less
violated. 5 4 In view, however, of the serious matters dealt with in this case, we opted to
tackle the substantial merits hereof with least regard to technicalities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of
Criminal Case No. CBU-66458 against petitioner.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 32-37. HSCAIT

2. Id. at 55-71.
3. Records, p. 4.
4. Id. at 41.
5. Id. at 59-61.
6. Rollo, pp. 90-97 and 98-105.
7. Id. at 97.
8. ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. —
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
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 xxx xxx xxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

xxx xxx xxx

9. Rollo, pp. 104-105.
10. The total amount should be five million seven hundred ninety three thousand eight
hundred eighty one pesos (P5,793,881.39).
11. Records, pp. 71-72.
12. Rollo, pp. 73-79. Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate
Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring.
13. Records, pp. 82-83.
14. Id. at 94.
15. Id. at 110-112.
16. Rollo, p. 71.
17. Id. at 36-37.
18. Id. at 223-224.
19. Id. at 247-266.
20. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on
December 13, 1989.
21. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto, G.R. No. 139675,
July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 112, 121.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 166797, July 10, 2007, 527
SCRA 190, 205.

25. Peralta v. Desierto, G.R. No. 153152, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 322, 337. SDHCac

26. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto, supra note 21, at
122.
27. Records, p. 12.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 113-115.
32. Id. at 117-123.
33. Id. at 114.
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 34. Id. at 133.
35. Id. at 95.
36. Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), supra note 24, at 204.
37. Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000, 335 SCRA 581, 605.
38. Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), supra note 36.
39. G.R. No. 147932, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 71.
40. Id. at 80.
41. Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129099, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 461,
469. ADEHTS

42. Sec. 7. Motion for reconsideration. —

a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or

resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof
with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been
filed in court. (As amended by Administrative Order No. 15 entitled "Re: Amendment of
Section 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07", signed by Tanodbayan Aniano A.
Desierto on February 16, 2001.)
xxx xxx xxx
43. Sec. 4. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner
prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions:
xxx xxx xxx
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are
facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he
may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness
being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the
clarificatory questioning may be, conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to
be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served
on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under
oath.
xxx xxx xxx
44. Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 135775, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA
744, 753.
45. Records, pp. 96-98.
46. Filipino v. Macabuhay, G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50, 59.
47. Records, pp. 100-101.
48. Filipino v. Macabuhay, supra note 46, at 58.
49. Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA 293, 301.
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 50. Gallardo v. People, G.R. No. 142030, April 21, 2005, 456 SCRA 494, 507.
51. Sales v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 302.
52. Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 474, 543.
53. SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — . . .

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
54. Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163745, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 158, 166. TDCaSE

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