Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals 248 SCRA 590 G. R. No.
93833 September 25 1995 In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent
filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication,
and Other Purposes.” Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing
with petitioner. From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s
order null and void.
Issue: W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a
conversation.
Held: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private
communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent CA
correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator
under this provision of RA 4200. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
Facts:
A body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process
was conceived and called the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and its composition, term and
functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which also
indicates that the JBC shall be composed of seven (7) members.
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At
present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco I.
Chavez, (petitioner) questioned this practice in this petition.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter
and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ argument that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. To
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional is not limited to official nominees
for the post of Chief Justice.
The court recognizes the petitioner’s right to sue in this case and that he has the
legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy. According to petitioner, “since the JBC derives financial support for its
functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both
right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with illegality
and that its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution”.
The legality of the very process of the nominations to the positions in the judiciary is
the nucleus of the controversy which is considered by the court as a constitutional issue that
must be passed upon and that the allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore,
deserve an evaluation from the court.
(2) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its basic sense, and not pertaining to either House of Representatives or Senate is
referred to, but that, can only have one representative. The practical purpose of the seven-
member composition of the JBC is solution to stalemate voting.
Bicameralism of “Congress” refers to its legislative function in the government. The
Constitution is clear in the distinction of the role of each house in the process of lawmaking.
In the JBC, since there is no need for a liaison between the Senate and House of
Representatives when nominating judicial officers. “Congress” must therefore refer to the
entire Legislative department. It is clear that the Constitution orders that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.
Even though finding the current composition of the JBC as unconstitutional, all its
prior official actions are valid. Actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized under the doctrine of operative facts. These official actions are not
nullified.
Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-39419 12 April 1982
FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal
Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The
insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Subsequently, petitioner was charged
because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation, which is not
allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office
of the Insurance Commission. Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she
naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant
left a note on top of her husband’s desk. The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged.
On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding
petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section
189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of
the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a
person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is
within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation.
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is
intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the
aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that
the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself
or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is
also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by
the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid
section.
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is
essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is
well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime
must be alleged and proved.
The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
CHINA BANKING CORP VS ORTEGA
GR L-34964 January 31, 2973
FACTS:
Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest Development
Corporation. To satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank
deposit of the B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation
(CBC). Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial
court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to
inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the CBC of B & B Forest Development
Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the
disclosure of any information concerning to bank deposits.
ISSUES: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court
processes garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405.
RULING: NO. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B &
B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim
Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of the
garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against
examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case,
and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the
execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to
enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through
the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA v. CONGRESS OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 231671, 2017-07-25
Facts:
resolutions separately passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives, which
express support as well as the intent not to revoke President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216, injure their rights "to a proper [and] mandatory legislative review of the declaration of
martial law" and that the continuing failure of the Congress to convene in joint session
similarly causes a continuing injury to their rights.
Senator De Lima adds that she, together with the other senators who voted in favor of the
resolution to convene the Congress jointly, were even effectively denied the opportunity to
perform their constitutionally-mandated duty, under Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution, to deliberate on the said proclamation of the President in a joint session of the
Congress
Congress is required to convene in joint session to review Proclamation No. 216 and vote as
a single deliberative body.
may revoke such proclamation or suspension" under Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution allegedly pertain to the power of the Congress to revoke but not to its
obligation to jointly convene and vote which, they stress, is mandatory.
the convening of the Congress in joint session, whenever the President declares martial law
or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is a public right and duty mandated
by the Constitution.
Issues:
the issue of whether or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, it is
mandatory for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session in the event that the
President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof.
Ruling:
The Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the present petitions (i.e., that
the Congress be directed to convene in joint session and therein deliberate whether to
affirm or revoke Proclamation No. 216) may arguably have been rendered moot by: (a) the
lapse of the original sixty (60) days that the President's martial law declaration and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were effective under Proclamation
No. 216; (b) the subsequent extension by the Congress of the proclamation of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus over the whole of Mindanao
after convening in joint session on July 22, 2017; and (c) the Court's own decision in Lagman
v. Medialdea,[64] wherein we ruled on the sufficiency of the factual bases for Proclamation
No. 216 under the original period stated therein.
these cases involve a constitutional issue of transcendental significance and novelty... first
provision was complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours from the issuance on May 23,
2017 by President Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President
Duterte's Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the
Senate and the House of Representatives on May 25, 2017.
I quite realize that that is the practice and, precisely, in proposing this, I am consciously
proposing this as an exception to this practice because of the tremendous effect on the
nation when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended and then martial law is
imposed. Since we have allowed the President to impose martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus unilaterally, we should make it a little more easy for
Congress to reverse such actions for the sake of protecting the rights of the people.
Madam President, we need the wisdom of the Senators
Principles:
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote
jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.
. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants the Congress the power to revoke
the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session.
The use of the word "may" in the provision... is to be construed as permissive and operating
to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke,[71] but in order to
revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of
the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.
the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session."... he requirement that "[t]he
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
s the result of the foregoing, the 1987 Constitution does not provide at all for the manner of
determination and expression of concurrence (whether prior or subsequent) by the
Congress in the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
the underlying reason for the requirement that the two Houses of the Congress will vote
jointly is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and to facilitate the process of revocation of
the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus:
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, GR No. 212426, 2016-
07-26
Facts:
petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET -
ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant
consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of
America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection
to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with
the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on
foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments
on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed
in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that
the plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign
bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply
applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once
entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be
embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military
bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
Issues:
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)
Ruling:
we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been
authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15]
led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well
within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the
government's continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various
military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not
raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.
Principles:
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis
Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an
absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors.
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should
be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial
entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the
said constitutional provision.
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMRC), Petitioner
Vs.
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Imelda Salazar, Respondents
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992
Facts:
Private Respondent, "Imelda Salazar" was employed as general systems analyst of Globe-
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. (GMRC) While Delfin Saldivar, her close friend, was employed
as technical operations' support manager in May 1982.
Petitioner GMRC investigated Saldivar's activities due to the reports indicating that the
company equipment and spare parts were in custody of Saldivar. The internal audit report
also indicated that Saldivar entered into a partnership with Richard A. Yambao, owner and
manager of Eledon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier often recommended by Saldivar
to the petitioner. It also appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda
Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions with conflict of
interest with the company. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of
partnership between Yambao and Saldivar, and that she had full knowledge of the loss and
whereabouts of the missing air conditioner but she failed to inform her employer.
The Company placed Salazar under 1 month preventive suspension, allowing her 30 days
within which to explain her side. However, Salazar instead filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which was later modified to illegal dismissal.
The Labor arbiter ordered the company to reinstate Salazar to her former and equivalent
position and to pay her full back wages and benefits, plus moral damages. National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter's decision but limited back wages
for only two years and deleted the award of moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or Not the action of dismissal would constitute a violation of Art. 279 of the Labor
Code, which protects the security of tenure of an employee.
Held:
Positive. The Court did not agree on the petitioner's action of suspension and eventual
dismissal of Salazar due to lack of evidence to show that Salazar was involved with the
malicious activities of Saldivar.

The wordings of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous "An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and full back wages." Under the
principle of Statutory Construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The plain
meaning rule or Verba Legis derived from the maxim "Speech is the index of intention"
should be applied in this case.
Since there is no evidence to show an authorized or legal dismissal, and GMRC only relied to
an internal audit findings, Salazar, according to the Labor Code, is entitled to reinstatement
and full back wages allowed by the Court.
Basbacio vs. DOJ [G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994]
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law
were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had
been cancelled. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a
decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep.
Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to “any person
who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal.” The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of
Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner’s presence at the
scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet,
considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land
dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for
finding that he was “probably guilty.” Petitioner brought this petition for review
on certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
RATIO:
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
To say then that an accused has been “unjustly convicted” has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because
he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to
compensation for having been the victim of an “unjust conviction.” If his conviction was due
to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust.
That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the
law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
C. BOLOS vs. D. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
FACTS:
 On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaratio
n of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Art. 36 of the
Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
 On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig Cit
y, Branch 69 (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS an
d respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980as null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and r
espondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provi
ded by law.
 Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC on January 16, 2007 declaring as final
and executory
 On December 10, 2008, the Court of Appeals in an original action for certiorari unde
r rule 65 entitled “Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos
” reversedthe January 16, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
 The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for recon
sideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-
SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Mariages And Annulment Of Voi
dable Marriages) is not applicablein this case since the marriage of Cynthia and Dani
la was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.
 Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinacel
li stating that “coverage of A.M. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Famil
y Code which took effect on August 3, 1988”.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under the Famil
y Code” in A.M. 02-11-10-
SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

RULING: The Court of Appeals ruled that the categorical language in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is explicit in its scope.
RATIONALE: In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, it reads that: Section 1. Scope –
This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and ann
ulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Phillipines.
The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule extends onl
y to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which became eff
ective on August 3, 1988. The Court therefore cannot apply merit to the petitioner’s interpre
tation stating that “petitions” is being categorized in the phrase “under the Family Code” wh
en the Rule took effectivity.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when th
e law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or inte
rpretation, only application. It must therefore be given its literal meaning and applied witho
ut attempted interpretation in what is known as “plain-
meaning rule” or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is t
he index of intention”. Additionally, there is also the maxim verba legis non est recedendum,
or “from the words of a status there should be no departure.”
Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. Case No. 26 G.R. No. L-28329
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and
distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the
exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the
Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import
tax provided in RA 1394.
ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387
should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.
HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394
seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax'
is taken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of the legislature,
the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not betaken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will
make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. Antagonism between the Acts to be
interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention
of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other,
either expressly or by implication. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may
take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to
construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation.
The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394.
JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835.
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission
citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI,
Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed
recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule
II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash
bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has
placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with
Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, “to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.” The Solicitor
General sustained the appeal bond and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA
were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its
appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
RATIO: Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – that the
thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Under
the petitioner’s interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule
should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The
petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy.
On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES v. COA, GR No. 143596, 2003-12-11
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes... was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court... thereof.
As such, his salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn
from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance
of P944 from the local funds[2] of the Municipality of
Naujan starting 1984.
On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sought
the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any
budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner
judge.
the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner
judge's monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993.
In 1994, the Municipal
Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner judge's P1,600 monthly allowance in its
annual budget which was again approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of
Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.[5]
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal
Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the
P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the... immediate
refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter.
She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in
addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court. Her directive
was based on the... following:
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993
National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, of the Department of Budget
and Management
Funding Source:
No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source
Petitioner judge appealed to COA... who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor
Dalisay and who added that Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan failed to comply with Section 3 of Local
Budget Circular No. 53 dated September 1, 1993 outlining the conditions for the grant of
allowances to judges and other national officials or employees by the local government units
(LGUs). Section 3 of the said budget circular provides that
Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the
Commission on Audit. In the meantime, a disallowance of the payment of the P1,600
monthly allowance to petitioner was issued.
Issues:
whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its
Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
In sum, we hereby affirm the power of the Municipality of Naujan to grant the questioned
allowance to petitioner Judge Leynes in accordance with the constitutionally mandated
policy of local autonomy and the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. We also
sustain the... validity of Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan for being in accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September 14,
1999 of the Commission of Audit is hereby SET ASIDE and Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No.
53 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA VS IAC
Facts:
On March 4, 1980, Petitioner obtained a levy of attachment against the properties of
spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan for a collection of sum of money before the RTC of
Pasig. On July 2, 1950, Three creditors, herein respondents filed a petition for involuntary
insolvency of spouses Gatmaytan in Pampanga and Angeles City.
On December 10, 1980, Petitioner obtained a favorable judgment as the writ of execution
was issued in its favor. On September 21, 1981, the court ordered the consolidation of
ownership of petitioner over said properties. However, the Sheriff of Angeles City refused to
issue a final certificate of sale in favor of the petitioner in view of the insolvency proceedings
before the Pampanga and Angeles RTC.
Issue: Whether or Not the levy of attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the
insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses, commenced four months after said
attachment.
Held: The Provision of Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act. No. 1956) is very clear that
attachments dissolved are those levied within one month next proceeding the
commencement of insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside, are
judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the
debtor, where the action was filed within 30 days immediately prior to the commencement
of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut-off period - 1 month in attachment
cases and 30 days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to insolvency
proceedings. Section 79 relied upon by private respondent is not in conflict with that
provision invoked by petitioner.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute,
courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, it at all
possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, UT RES MAGIS VALEN QUAM PEREAT or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute. Its every word.
Hence, when a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation the court should adopt
such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative
and effective and harmonious with each other.
Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]
Ponente: BELLOSILLO J.
FACTS:
[C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is
“An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” Respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the
apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District
Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No.
2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No.
2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence
of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and
maintained that election of Sanggunian members be “at large” instead of “by district”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in
assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.
HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit
RATIO:
Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in
the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of
its legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must
therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has
oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact
the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and
the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-
districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to
continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they
shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A.
7166.
Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, Petitioners
Vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals and Hon. Raymundo Seva, Judge of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial
Court of Camarines Norte and William Guerra, Respondents
G.R. No. 78687, January 31, 1989
Facts:
Florencia H. De Enciso and Miguel Enciso owned a property which was formerly covered by
Original Certificate Title (OCT) No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No.
192765. The Original Certificate of Title was inscribed in the registration book for the
province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961.
On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold
the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses, Elena Salenillas and Bernardino
Salenillas for a consideration of P900. Petitioner Elena is a daughter of the Encisos.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was
issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling the OCT in the name of the Enciso.
On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc.
the petitioner was able to pay the loan for the amount of P1000. Later on, December 4,
1975, the petitioners mortgaged the property in PNB as a security for the loan of P2500.
However, petitioners failed to pay the loan. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the mortgage was
instituted by PNB and the property was sold at a public auction. Private respondent William
Guerra emerged as the highest bidder.
On August 17, 1983, PNB filed with RTC of Camarines Norte at Daet. A motion for writ of
attachment in favor of the private respondent. However, petitioners refused to vacate the
land and instead offered to repurchase the property by virtue of Section 119 of the Public
Land Act.
Trial Court issued an alias writ of attachment. The petitioners moved for a motion of
consideration but were denied.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The respondent Trial Court Judge,
according to petitioner, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Court of Appeals dismissed the
case for lack of merit. According to Court of Appeals, the transfer of property from the
parent to the child for a nominal sum was not the conveyance contemplated by the law.
Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
Held:
Yes. The Petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under "Section 119 of the
Public Land Act. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent of homestead

provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs within a period of 5 years from the date of re conveyance."
It is clear that only three types of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase that is the
applicant, his widow and legal heirs. Elena Salenillas is a legal heir of the Enciso being their
daughter.
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by
respondent contravenes the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations,
that which better serves the purpose of the law shall prevail.
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991
FACTS:
 The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on
December 1 to 9, 1989.
 January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant
to Office Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.
 January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to
the petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At
the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a
Motion for Summary Dismissal.
 February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days
to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
 May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had
been discontinued under P.D. No.39.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.
HELD:
 Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory
challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
 November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the
Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.
 January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination of
martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created there under, the reason for
the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
 It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold
that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective
when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation
No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May 28, 1987)
Ponente: CRUZ
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of
absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue
of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to
two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently
enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint,
on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New
Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing
was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended
during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not
to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s
will.
Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from
the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed
qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia
Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an
application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied
the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month
basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in
four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service
Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA
project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1
of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular
employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act
No. 6683.
HELD: YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the
latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will
be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement
to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is
the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement
within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of
substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not
only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15)
years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
City of Manila and Treasurer vs. Judge Gomez [G.R. No. L-37251. August 31, 1981]
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June
18, 1949, fixed the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. On the other hand, Section
4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1,
1969, imposed “an annual additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real
property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws”
but “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centrum. That
maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three
percent. [B]y means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26,
1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional
one-half percent realty tax.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest and later filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the recovery of it. It contended that the additional one-half percent
tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No.
88827). After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city
treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer
appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court)
with the ruling of Judge Gomez brought about the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional one-half percent realty tax is legal and valid.
HELD:
YES. By necessary implication.
RATIO:
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction and
sustained the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax was
sanctioned by the provision in Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law. The doctrine of
implications means that “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed”. The obvious implication is that an additional
one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law (the
ordinance) fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.
Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code
(later), in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorized the
augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962] (Regala)
FACTS:
[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said
motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.
HELD: YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case
was remanded for trial on the merits.
RATIO:
The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case
is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for
reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a
substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that
justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To
accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the
legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule
of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the
peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had
intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears
no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion
alterius has been erroneously applied.
LAZATIN V. DESIERTO G.R. 147097
Facts: The Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Complaint Affidavit against petitioners CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES,
TEODORO L. DAVID, and ANGELITO A. PELYAO with Illegal Use of Public Funds. The complaint
alleged irregularities in the use of Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF). Main reason: He was both the proponent and implementer of the projects
funded by CDF, signed the vouchers and supporting documents pertinent to disbursement
and he also was the one who received such. It was alleged that petitioner, together with the
help of Morales, David, and Pelayo was able to convert his CDF into cash.After preliminary
investigation, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) recommended filing 14
counts of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section (e) of R.A.No. 3019. Said
resolution was approved by Ombudsman, thus 28 Informations were filed against
petitioners before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner submitted reconsideration, it was granted
by the Sandiganbayan who ordered reinvestigation. Office of the Special Prosecutor’s (OSP)
recommended dismissal for lack or insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman however
ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP resolution. OLA recommended
to proceed with the trial. Ombudsman adopted OLA’s resolution. Petitioner’s main allegation
is that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn OSP’s resolution because of lack of
authority to do so. They alleged that base on the constitution, the Ombudsmanand OSP are
separate entities and thus the prior does not have the power to overturn any decision made
the latter. Second, checks were issued to Lazatin as reimbursement for advances he made.
Decision of lower courts/CA:Directly filed with SC from Sandiganbayan/Ombudsman
.Issue:Whether Ombudsman has the authority to overturn the OSP
.Ratio : This Court held that giving the prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, 13, Article IX provides that the
Ombudsman shall “exercise with other functions or duties as may be provided by law.”
Thus, the Legislature passed R.A. No. 6770, which contains Section 3, placing the OSP under
the Ombudsman was upheld by this court. Section 7 of Article IX expressly provides that the
then existing Tanodbayan, to be enceforth known as the Office of the Special prosecutor,
“shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by
law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.” It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan’s/Special
Prosecutor’s power or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the
Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman. Perez v. Sandiganbayan: the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filinf of informations, which power had
not been delegated to the OSP.