PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC.
and JENS PETER It was then that the rift between the contending parties soon emerged.
HENRICHSEN, Petitioners, v. KLAUS K. SCHONFELD,
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2)
venue was improperly laid. It averred that respondent was a Canadian
citizen, a transient expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was employed
and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign corporation with principal office in Tokyo,
Japan. Since respondent's cause of action was based on his letter of
employment executed in Tokyo, Japan dated January 7, 1998, under the
principle of lex loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed in
Tokyo, Japan. Petitioners claimed that respondent did not offer any
justification for filing his complaint against PPI before the NLRC in the
Philippines. Moreover, under Section 12 of the General Conditions of
Employment appended to the letter of employment dated January 7, 1998,
complainant and PCIJ had agreed that any employment-related dispute
should be brought before the London Court of Arbitration. Since even the
Supreme Court had already ruled that such an agreement on venue is valid,
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction.13
Issue: Whether the case can be filed before the Philippine courts regardless
of a stipulation in the contract that in case the dispute the case shall be filed
before Japan ; London.
Held: The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court
in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan,31 is that
while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a
contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are
not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to
restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them
be litigated only at the place named by them.32
In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in
this court," "in no other court save '," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except
'," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.33 It cannot be said
that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any
complaint arising out of the employment contract.
Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his Complaint in his
place of permanent residence, or where the PCIJ holds its principal office, at
the place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated
in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent could
have filed his complaint, however, petitioners themselves admitted that the
provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely
permissive.
CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE
CASTRO, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO
ARTIGO,
Appellants[5 were co-owners of four (4) lots located at EDSA corner New
York and Denver Streets in Cubao, Quezon City. In a letter dated January
24, 1984 (Exhibit A-1, p. 144, Records), appellee[6 was authorized by
appellants to act as real estate broker in the sale of these properties for the
amount of P23,000,000.00, five percent (5%) of which will be given to the
agent as commission. It was appellee who first found Times Transit
Corporation, represented by its president Mr. Rondaris, as prospective buyer
which desired to buy two (2) lots only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually,
sometime in May of 1985, the sale of lots 14 and 15 was consummated.
Appellee received from appellants P48,893.76 as commission.
Appellee apparently felt short changed because according to him, his total
commission should be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%) of the agreed
price of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to appellants for
the two (2) lots, and that it was he who introduced the buyer to appellants
and unceasingly facilitated the negotiation which ultimately led to the
consummation of the sale. Hence, he sued below to collect the balance
of P303,606.24 after having received P48,893.76 in advance.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Artigos complaint is not dismissible for failure
to implead as indispensable parties the other co-owners of the two lots. The
Court of Appeals explained that it is not necessary to implead the other co-
owners since the action is exclusively based on a contract of agency
between Artigo and Constante.
Issue: Whether the complaint merits dismissal for failure to implead other co-
owners as indispensable parties
Held:No. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the
case can be had.[7 The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and
courts cannot proceed without their presence.[8 Whenever it appears to the
court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been
joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of
such party.[9 However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable
parties is not applicable to the instant case.
A contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and Artigo.
Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constantes individual or
representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of
the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties.
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the
liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be
compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent may recover the whole
compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in this case.
G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002
VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
Issue: Whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against
petitioners;
Held: No. Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in
good faith and for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they
were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued
in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so
would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith
and for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not
impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in
connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so
would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.