TANADA V TUVERA to be given substance and reality.
The law itself makes a list of
FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is
thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.
ISSUE: WN publication in the official gazette is required before
any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable
RULING: In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar
as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by
said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine
from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect,
or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The object of sec 1 off CA 638, is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance
that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the
diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much
less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638
reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The
word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is
what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing
leaves respondents with no discretion as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances
"of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether
the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
enforced or implemented prior to their publication. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
c l a i m e d t o h ave b e c o m e ve s t e d , o f s t a t u s , o f p r i o r
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Rutter vs. Esteban: court sustained the right of a party under
the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
Here, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither
the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained
since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject
matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
Pesigan vs. Angeles - "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency
of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication,
even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
DEC. 29, 1986
FACTS: A MFR of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985
was filed. Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1.WN a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not as to their publication;
2.WN a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation
RULING:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speacking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
A law w/o any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
All statutes, including those of local application nand private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin 15 days agter publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
FUENTES V TARCIANO ROCA
FACTS: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled lot in Zamboanga City and
sold it to her son on October 11, 1982 , Tarciano T. Roca
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale.Tarciano did not for the
meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano sold the lot to petitioners
Fuentes spouses. Atty. Plagata prepared an agreement to sell
dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it
was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a
down payment of ₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to
him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of
structures and occupants and secure the consent of his
estranged wife, Rosario, to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance
with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take
possession of the lot and pay him an additional ₱140,000.00 or
₱160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to
comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become
owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
The lawyer went to see Rosario and had her sign an affidavit of
consent.3 As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty.
Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On
January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale.
They then paid him the additional ₱140,000.00. A new title was
issued in the name of the spouses.
Eight years after the death of tarciano and rosario, the children
of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the
RTC. They claimed that the sale was void since Rosario, did not
give her consent to it and her signature had been forged.
spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations and argued that the four-
year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud
had already lapsed.
RTC: ruled that the action had already prescribed since the
ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud,
already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years
after its discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to
have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was
issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine
years after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on
January 18, 1989.9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing
evidence of the fraud. Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario
was not conclusive proof of forgery.
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization
of the affidavit of consent did not invalidate the sale. The law
does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be
valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She
personally signed the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12
CA reversed the RTC decision. Since Tarciano and Rosario were
married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property relations
were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may
be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from
the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her
heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11,
1989 sale.
Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for review.14
ISSUES: Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of
nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and
RULING: Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the law that applies to
this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although
Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the
conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a
few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the
system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property
relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited
him from selling commonly owned real property without his
wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s
consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173
gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in
that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the
marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail
to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly
superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property
Relations Between Husband and Wife.18 Further, the Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal
partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes
spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal
of that lot was already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the
Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real
property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s
written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same
would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void
or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very
beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared
void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A
void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in
civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription.21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no
action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to
allow restitution of what has been given under it.22 This action,
according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in
1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real
property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s)
written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to
bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to
the transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife
may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack
of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the
transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs,
brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the
sale to them based on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable
prescriptive period should be that which applies to fraudulent
transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice
of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when it was
registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of
action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be
the Fuentes spouses in that they appeared to have agreed to buy
the property upon an honest belief that Rosario’s written consent
to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time
they learned that her signature had been forged within which to
file an action to annul the sale and get back their money plus
damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document
of consent upon a false representation that the property would
go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned out that this
was not the case, then she would have four years from the time
she discovered the fraud within which to file an action to declare
the sale void. But that is not the case here. Rosario was not a
victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not
obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her
written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for
annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their
mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of
consent.
COMMISSIONER V HYPERMIX
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the
Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-20034
on the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs.
FACTS: On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of
Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff
purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge. 5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding
tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for
protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC)
cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were
the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond
to cover the tariff differential.6
Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief7 with the RTC. It
anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported
and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.8
Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration
with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
RTC issued a TRO
Petitioners: filed a MTD and alleged that: (3) CMO 27-2003 was
an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and
(4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature,
because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine
respondent’s products.
RTC rendered its Decision11 without having to resolve the
application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss
and ruled in favor of respondent
-With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found
that petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of
hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003.
petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in
defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court, however,
dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected
substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners
should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and
publication.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WN
RULING: The Petition has no merit.
Declaratory Relief
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as
follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must
be ripe for judicial determination.15 We find that the Petition filed
by respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of
CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
 Smart Communications v. NTC: The determination of whether
a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v.
Department of Finance Secretary:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand,
interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to
make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated
authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is
reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as
to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body,
by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed
those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial
judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is
not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the
rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule;
(ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or
(iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have
adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff
rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial
determination, because litigation is inevitable19 for the simple and
uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the
enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat
importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a
protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be
subjected to the 7% tariff. Therefore, a petition for declaratory
relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the
substantive rights of respondent as explained above, it therefore
follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent
provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University
of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date
shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any
party of persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by
law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any
rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before
the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it
gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the
law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected
a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.20
Tañada v. Tuvera:The clear object of the above-quoted
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance
that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the
diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records – no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much
less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated
by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must
be struck down.
In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due
process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to
observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative
Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal
protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the regulation. Finally,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of
delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of
the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ACAAC V AZCUNA
FACTS: Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood
Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization,
founded by petitioner Acaac, which is engaged in the protection
and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects
within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built
some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island
(a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage
in 20016 which it rented out to the public and became the source
of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners
Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued
separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its
failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of
its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096,8
otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the
Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on
Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the
requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and
Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents
against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still the same remained
unheeded.
On July 8, 2002, Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB)
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject
ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any
entity, association, corporation or organization inside the
sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized
by the local government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved
the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in
turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices
were posted declaring the premises as government property and
prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served
upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on
Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the
subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against
individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and
damages15 against respondents alleging that they have prior
vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL
claimed that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping,
tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the
subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were
deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity
of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was
adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by
Republic Act No.7160, 16 otherwise known as "The Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by
the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17
RTC Ruling: declared the ordinance as invalid/void based on the
following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and
that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b)
the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island
is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish
sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands
belong to the national government, through the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the
foregoing, respondents were ordered, among others, to desist
from closing Capayas Island to the public.21 However, the
petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built
thereon without valid building permits22 since they were found to
have no title over the disputed property.23
CA: granted respondents’ appeal. it held that the subject
ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to
declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in
accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to
Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and
published in conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the
bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted
with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed.27
The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was
vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the
subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of
the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create
and administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject
ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that
the subject ordinance is valid.30
CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary
rights over the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for
injunction improper.31
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners.34
RULING: The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or
Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three
(3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved
ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development
plans and public investment programs formulated by the local
development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such
ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall
examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for
prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of
the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing
his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance
or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it
shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in
part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the
minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal
authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or
resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and
therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance
cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time
considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to
note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time
the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the
SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to
Section 56 (d) above.
As properly observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to
arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, "action." It is clear,
based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be
entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the
declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance
is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of
statutory construction that the parts of a statute must be read
together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and
that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each
other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that
apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given
effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving
spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37
It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a
public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the
subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations,
petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no
publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In
contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the
publication and posting requirements.40 While it is true that he
likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure
prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise,
petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which
they, however, failed to do.
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA
in upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the
property in dispute to be entitled to its possession. Besides, the
RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by
petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was not
appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and
conclusive upon them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
KASILAG V RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio and the petitioner
executed a public deed. One year after the execution of the deed,
Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as
well as the tax on the land and its improvements. She and the
petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she
conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition
that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would
attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits
of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By
virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner entered upon the
possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not
collect the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon
the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934
the tax declaration was transferred in his name and on March 6,
1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from P1,020
to P2,180.
CA held that the contract entered into by and between the
parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute
purchase and sale of the land and its improvements and
rendered null and void and without legal effect the entire Exhibit
1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between
the parties.
Petitioner contends that the CA violated the law in holding that
Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its
improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.
ISSUE: wn the petitioner should be deemed the possesor of the
land in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated.
RULING: YES
cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts: the intention
of the contracting parties should always prevail because their will
has the force of law between them.
Article 1281 of the Civil Code: if the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and
if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the
contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.
The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly
show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of
loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per
annum and entered into a contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure the
payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated
interest thereon.
There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it
is not against the law. The second, or the mortgage of the
improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No.
2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties
agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the
mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by
paying the loan together with interest, she would execute in
favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for
P1,000, including the interest stipulated and owing. The
stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the
expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take
possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on
condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon
the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated
to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting
the latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil
Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance
burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and
valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the
first assignment of error is well-founded and that error was
committed in holding that the contract entered into between the
parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its
improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. .
It may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad
faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
WN the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good
faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated.
It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the
rule.
From the facts found established by the CA we can neither
deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in
his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the
prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the
question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance
of the laws.
Manresa: gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be
the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be
such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with
the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of
the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that
he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of
the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that
the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to
the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the
change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the
petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act
may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession
and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we
have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible
and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in
good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning
of article 433 of the Civil Code and having introduced the
improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article
361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents
are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon
indemnifying the petitioner the value thereof which we fix at
P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents may
elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its
market value to be fixed by the court of origin.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is
reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract of
mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and
binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally
by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and,
as such, is a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a
possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to
have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying
the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner
to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are
found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the court of
origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a
right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged
improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the
mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within
three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that
stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged
improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof
the petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements
for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment
of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs
in all instances. So ordered.
ELEGADO V CA
FACTS: Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly
resident in the Philippines, died in U.S.A. 1 As he left certain
shares of stock in the Philippines, his son, Ward Graham, filed an
estate tax return with the Philippine Revenue Representative in
San Francisco, U.S.A. 2
Respondent Commissioner assessed an estate tax of P96,509.35
on February 9, 1978 which was protested. The protest was
denied by the Commissioner.5 No further action was taken by the
estate in pursuit of that protest.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been
admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon. 6 Ward
Graham, the designated executor, appointed Elegado as his
ancillary administrator.7
Elegado commenced probate proceedings in the Philippines. 8
The will was allowed on December 18, 1978. A second estate tax
return was filed. BIR assessed an amount of P72,948.87 and
such assessment was protested.
While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the
probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic
estate tax of P96,509.35. He said that this liability had not yet
been paid although the assessment had long become final and
executory.
The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the
protest filed on August 13, 1980, against the second assessment
of P72,948.87.14 On this understanding, he filed on September
15, 1981, a petition for review with the CTA challenging the said
assessment. 15
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the
petitioner stressed, no answer was filed during a delay of 195
days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment
in a letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982.16 This
cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and
academic.17
The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25,
1984.18 The petitioner then came to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES: (1) whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent
should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property;
(2) whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of
the owner's death or six months thereafter; and (3) whether the
appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot
and academic.
RULING:
We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.
In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, it is
obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment
for P72,948.87 that the petitioner had been deprived of a cause
of action as it was precisely from this assessment that he was
appealing.
Court of Tax Appeals: the petition questioning the assessment
of July 3, 1980, was "premature" since the protest to the
assessment had not yet been resolved.
SC: the said assessment had been cancelled thru the
letter. The respondent court was on surer ground,
however, when it followed with the finding that the said
cancellation had rendered the petition moot and
academic. There was really no more assessment to
review.
Petitioner: argues that the issuance of the second assessment
on July 3, 1980, had the effect of canceling the first assessment
of February 9, 1978, and that the subsequent cancellation of the
second assessment did not have the effect of automatically
reviving the first. Moreover, the first assessment is not binding
on him because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers
who had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of
Tax Appeals.
It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the
second assessment of P72,948.87, the Commissioner
made it clear that "the aforesaid amount is considered
provisional only based on the estate tax return filed
subject to investigation by this Office for final
determination of the correct estate tax due from the
estate. Any amount that may be found due after said
investigation will be assessed and collected later." 21 It is
illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can
supersede an earlier assessment which had clearly
become final and executory.
The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner
cannot be serious when he argues that the first
assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who
filed the return on which it was based were not familiar
with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner
suggesting that they are excused from compliance
therewith because of their ignorance?
-If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar
preference because they are not allowed to claim a like
ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and
shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is
indeed difficult to find.
But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that
the first assessment is already final and executory and can no
longer be questioned at this late hour. The assessment was made
on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978. The
protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was
taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question that
the assessment has become final and executory.
In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner
cannot now raise the question of its validity before this Court any
more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax
Appeals. .
2..whether or not the shares of stock left by the decedent
should be considered conjugal property or belonging to
him alone is immaterial in these proceedings. These
questions were not resolved by the Court of Tax Appeals because
it had no jurisdiction to act on the petitioner's appeal from an
assessment that had already been cancelled. The assessment
being no longer controversial or reviewable, there was no
justification for the respondent court to rule on the petition
except to dismiss it.
If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an
error in the computation of the estate tax, as the petitioner
insists, that error can no longer be rectified because the original
assessment has long become final and executory. If that
assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance with
the prescribed procedure, that error — for error it was — was
committed not by the respondents but by the decedent's estate
itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he now
complain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered,
Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
DAVID V AGBAY
FACTS: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. In 2000, they
purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Oriental
Mindoro and constructed a residential house. However, in 2004,
they were informed that the said lot is public land and part of the
salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) with the DENR and indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen.Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She
also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents.
On October 11, 2007, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner: averred that at the time he filed his application, he
had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had
been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as
a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from
the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property
was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey
the same.
Provincial Prosecutor: found probable cause to indict petitioner
for violation of Article 172 of the RPC
CENRO: rejected petitioner’s MLA and ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure
the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed
before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the
petitioner. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination
of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the
law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion,
holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who
became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost
their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the
governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since
the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and
admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he
had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded
that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.
Petitioner before the RTC asserted that first, jurisdiction over
the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-
determination of probable cause by the court that issues a
warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order
disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino
citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires
his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already
consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his
criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of
allegiance.
RTC denied the petition for certiorari
Petitioner before the SC:
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification,
the lower court has disregarded the undisputed fact that
petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-
acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal
fiction "deemed not to have lost" it at the time of his
naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said
to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence
in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under
a warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the
lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his
wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of
arrest against him before the same is implemented, which is
tantamount to a denial of due process.18
ISSUES:(1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly
denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (petitioner).
RULING:
! R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003," was signed
into law by President Arroyo on August 29, 2003
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of
the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of
oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born
Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group,
and "retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law
intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to
describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they
shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship
may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by
doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring
and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall
retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the
new law.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention
of Philippine citizenship
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen
prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required
oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the
time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in
Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having
already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the
policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together
with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such
policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A.
9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the particular
application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal
law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in
relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a
private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not
take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or
commercial documents.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of
said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized
as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his
Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October
8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF SIMON V CHAN
FACTS: In December 1996 Simon issued a check in the amount
of ₱336,000.00 chan with the assurance that the check is duly
funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank
of the Philippines. However, when said check was presented for
payment the same was dishonored.
On July 11, 1997, the late Simon was charged with a criminal
case for violation of BP 22. More than 3 years later, Chan
commenced in the MeTC a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for
a writ of preliminary attachment.
METC: granted the writ of preliminary attachment
Heirs of Simon filed a MTD. Chan opposed to it.
METC: granted the dimissal and cited the grounds of litis
pendentia and that the case for sum of money is one based on
fraud and hence falling under Art 33 of the NCC where prior
reservation is required. RTC upheld the dismissal.
CA overturned the RTC and rule that the chandes in the Revised
rules on criminal procedure pertaining to independent civil
actions are applicable to this case. The case was remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. Simon appealed
ISSUE:
1.whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the
unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent
civil action.
2.WN the changes in the RR on CP may be given retroactive
effect
Ruling:
1.NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil
liability arising from the issuancec of an unfunded check
prohibited and punished under BP 22.
RULE 111 of The Rules of Court: “the criminal action for
violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed.”
SC circular 57-97: “the criminal action for violation of BP 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed or recognized.”
2 YES, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not
yet in effect when Chan commenced the civil case on Aug. 3,
2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionaly abjectionable. Any new rules may validly be made
to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation,
considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the
rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do
not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum
of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.
Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and,
accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated
by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the
decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO V CA
FACTS: Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent
Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private respondents
Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are
children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962,
she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari
store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, all
situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly
Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro,
Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties
were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on
account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby,
rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims
that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to
sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita
Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the
apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for
annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby
enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared
as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course,
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents.
It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said
properties were acquired during the existence of the second
conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the
petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that those properties belong
exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer
them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: "whether or not Article 116 of the Family Code applies to
this case because Article 253 of the same Code [which] expressly
repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code"
RULING: Indeed, Articles 1585 and 1606 of the New Civil Code
have been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines which
took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall under
Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was expressly
repealed by Article 2547 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner
in her petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we
cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior
vested rights pursuant to Article 2568 in relation to Article 1059
(second paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of
Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or
accrued while the said provisions were in force. 10 Hence, the
rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect
survive their repeal.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO
ORDERED.
PESCA V PESCA
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a
union that begot four children. She contends that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of
being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband
became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
drinker. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his
drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time,
he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill
her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were
not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode and went to
her sister. Two months later, she returned home to give him a
chance to change. But, respondent assaulted petitioner in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He
was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sought for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their
marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.


Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the CA,
which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the
marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.
ISSUES: (2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina should be taken to be
merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
HELD: (2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of
the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law.
The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute
a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon
Law, was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in
the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to assist the
courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial
decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law.
Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in
nature. The petition was denied.
NERWIN V PNOC
FACTS: In 1999, the National Electrification Administration
("NEA") published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a
contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and
delivery of about 60,000 pieces of woodpoles and 20,000 pieces
of crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project.
Nerwin emerged as the lowest bidder. In the Recommendation of
Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the]
Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October
4, 2000, NEA administrator recommended to NEA’s Board of
Directors the approval of award to Nerwin of all schedules for IBP
No. 80
NEA’s Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by
50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 "given the time
limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the
loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching". In turn, it
resolved to award the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a
reduced number to Nerwin. Nerwin protested the said 50%
reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a
losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing bidders filed a complaint, citing
alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-
qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project
to Nerwin.
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding,
NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate
Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and
qualification of Nerwin. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted
to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government
Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal
impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to Nerwin.
Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other
bidders, Nerwin filed a complaint for specific performance and
was granted by RTC.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation
purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and
to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification
Project ("O-ILAW project").
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for
the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC alleging
that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a
portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case, stating that the
complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that
government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to
TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum
shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign
and file the complaint.3
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to
respondents’ reply, the RTC granted a TRO. Respondents moved
for the reconsideration but was denied.
A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the respondents,
alleging that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin
had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from
the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the
Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring
respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents’ counsel
from representing them.7
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion.
ISSUES:
I. WN the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep.
Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme
Court, on government projects.
II. WN the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case
on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only
of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
III. WN the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is
also one for damages.
RULING: The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it
annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on
July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether
dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the
propriety of respondent Judge’s issuance of a preliminary
injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining
an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in
issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order
enjoining petitioners’ sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The
same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on
November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent
Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20 and December
29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. –
No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the government’s direction, to restrain,
prohibit or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases
filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not
apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
xxx
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely
supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to
courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions
in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources
Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a
mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative
case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the
Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative
Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO
or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in
cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects.
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even
from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent Judge’s
blatant disregard of a "simple, comprehensible and unequivocal
mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs
relative to government infrastructure projects." Respondent
Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that
the instant case falls under the single exception where the said
proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in
default because, in the first place, he should not have given due
course to private respondent’s complaint for injunction.
Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other
grounds proffered by petitioners.10
The CA’s decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely
abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of
Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was
thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the
bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly,
when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue
any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any
of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether
public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way
and/or site or location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases
filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not
apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the
court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to
the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract
is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning
bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is
void and of no force and effect.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and
unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to
enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The
RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under
Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself
instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through
Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect
the prohibition against the issuance of TROs
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under Section
8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief
ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs
or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or
before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of
that tendency is judicially impermissible,22 for it is never the
function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the
merits of a case,23 or to decide controverted facts.24 It is but a
preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened
wrong,25 further injury,26 and irreparable harm27 or injustice28
until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus
look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their
courts to render a meaningful decision.29 Foremost in their minds
should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will
hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on
the merits.30 It is well worth remembering that the writ of
preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the
threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant
before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.31
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
DM CONSUNJI V CA
FACTS: An accident occured at around 1:30 p.m., wherein Jose
Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Juego’s
widow, Maria, filed in the RTC a complaint for damages against
the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
A.M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the
following grounds:
ISSUE: WN APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.
RULING: When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an
election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and
bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected
remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act
of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of
election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness
to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to
hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the
doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a
waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant
cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code
and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code.
The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have
waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must
be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the
person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s
rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that
person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge
upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of
the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a
waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on
the record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a
remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address
petitioner’s contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private
respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had
availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for
petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an
issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead
waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise,
the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to
now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue
when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before
the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the
facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights pertaining to
a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge
or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a
basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only
after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be
civil liability.
In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and
its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only
the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one
until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the
principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has
been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that
her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15,
1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC.
The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10
days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the
application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was
filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was
not aware of her rights.
Petitioner: argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling
in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited
to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from
the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws.
The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of
remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her
ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed
by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC,
payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the
Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
DELA CRUZ V DELA CRUZ
FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz (Isabelo) and his sister,
respondent Lucila C. Dela Cruz and (Lucila) and Cornelia C. Dela
Cruz (Cornelia), bought on installment a 240-square meter land .
Isabelo and Cornelia paid the down payment and religiously paid
the monthly amortizations.1 On the following year, Isabelo
constructed a residential house on the subject lot.2
Lucila and Isabelo agreed to have the said lot be used as
collateral for the loan that Corazon planned to secure from a
Bank. To make this posible, Lucila paid the ₱8,000.00 that they
still owed Gatchalian Realty, Inc. On January 18, 1979 the
Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title in Lucila’s
name3 and this was mortgaged for Corazon’s benefit. But, since
Corazon failed to pay her loan, the bank foreclosed the property.
Lucila redeemed it.
On October 7, 2002 Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver5
relinquishing all her share, interest, and participation to half of
the lot to Isabelo and the other half to her niece, Emelinda.
Isabelo and Emelinda executed a Kasunduan6 acknowledging
their respective rights in the property. Claiming ownership of half
of the subject property by virtue of Lucila’s affidavit of waiver, on
August 22, 2005 Isabelo filed an action for partition before RTC,
seeking the segregation of his portion of the land and the
issuance of title in his name. But Lucila countered that the
property, including the house built on it, belonged to her since
she paid for the same out of her income as pawnshop general
manager and from selling jewelry.7
She claimed that her affidavit of waiver did not cede ownership
of half of the property to Isabelo since the affidavit made clear
that her waiver would take effect only if the problems that beset
their family were resolved. Since this condition had not been
met, she had every right to revoke that waiver as in fact she did
so on September 24, 2004 in the Kasulatan ng Pagpawalang Bisa
ng "Affidavit Waiver."8
ISSUE: WN Lucila’s affidavit of waiver ceding to Isabelo half of
the subject property conveys to him a right of ownership over
that half
RULING: CA agreed with the RTC that Lucila’s affidavit of waiver
did not vest any property right to Isabelo since the condition she
set in that affidavit had not been fulfilled. This then gave Lucila
the right in the meantime to rescind the waiver, something that
she eventually did. But, contrary to the position that the CA and
the RTC had taken, Lucila’s waiver was absolute and contained no
precondition.
Evidently, Lucila would not have used the terms "to put
everything in proper order, I hereby waive…" if her intent was to
set a precondition to her waiver covering the property, half to
Isabelo and half to Emelinda. If that were her intention, she
could have stated, "subject to the condition that everything is put
in proper order, I hereby waive..." or something to that effect.
When she instead said, "That to put everything in proper order, I
hereby waive my share, interest and participation" in the two
halves of the subject property in favor of Isabelo and Emelinda,
Lucila merely disclosed what motivated her in ceding the
property to them. She wanted to put everything in proper order,
thus she was driven to make the waiver in their favor. Lucila did
not say, "to put everything in proper order, I promise to waive
my right" to the property, which is a future undertaking, one that
is demandable only when everything is put in proper order. But
she instead said, "to put everything in proper order, I hereby
waive" etc. The phrase "hereby waive" means that Lucila was, by
executing the affidavit, already waiving her right to the property,
irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to the same.
After he and his co-owner Emelinda accepted the donation,
Isabelo became the owner of half of the subject property having
the right to demand its partition.
WHEREFORE, THE Court:
1. GRANTS the petition; 2. SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
December 18, 2009 and resolution dates May 25, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 90797 as well as the Decision
dated February 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas in
SCA 05-0008; 3. ORDERS the partition of the subject property
between petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz and Emelinda C. Dela
Cruz; 4. ORDERS the remand of the records of SCA 05-0008 to
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas; and 5. DIRECTS the latter
court to proceed with the partition proceedings in the case in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
DONA ADELA V TIDCORP
FACTS: On August 23, 2006, Doña Adela Export International,
Inc., filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. RTC issued an order
declaring petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings
against petitioner.
Thereafter, Atty. Gonzales was appointed as receiver. Atty.
Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement 6 incorporating therein her proposed terms of
compromise.
Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the
Proposed Compromise Agreement12 of TIDCORP and BPI wherein
he stated that petitioner has a personality separate and distinct
from its stockholders and officers. He argued that he cannot be
held liable for the expenses and taxes as a consequence of the
auction or distribution/payment of said machineries to the
creditors; hence, his name should be deleted as a party to the
Compromise Agreement.
RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En
Pagoby Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration17 and claimed
that TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement imposes on it several
obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and waiver of
confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is not a party and
signatory to the said agreement. Bur RTC denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that express and written waiver from the
depositor concerned is required by law before any third person or
entity is allowed to examine bank deposits or bank records.
According to petitioner, it is not a party to the compromise
agreement between BPI and TIDCORP and its silence or
acquiescence is not tantamount to an admission that binds it to
the compromise agreement of the creditors especially the waiver
of confidentiality of bank deposits. Petitioner cites the rule on
relativity of contracts which states that contracts can only bind
the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a
third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has
knowledge thereof. Petitioner also maintains that waivers are not
presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly shown, either by
express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable
explanation.
Respondent BPI counters that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement because
petitioner and its counsel participated in all the proceedings
involving the subject compromise agreement and did not object
when the compromise agreement was considered by the RTC.
Respondent TIDCORP contends that the waiver of confidentiality
under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 1405 and 8791 does not require
the express or written consent of the depositor. It is TIDCORP’s
position that upon declaration of insolvency, the insolvency court
obtains complete jurisdiction over the insolvent’s property which
includes the authority to issue orders to look into the insolvent’s
bank deposits. Since bank deposits are considered debts owed by
the banks to the petitioner, the receiver is empowered to recover
them even without petitioner’s express or written consent, said
TIDCORP.
TIDCORP further avers that the BPI-TIDCORP compromise
agreement approved by the RTC is binding on petitioner and its
Board of Directors by reason of estoppel. The compromise
agreement is not an ordinary contract. Since it was approved by
the insolvency court, the compromise agreement has the force
and effect of judgment; it is immediately executory and not
appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery, TIDCORP
concluded.
ISSUE: WN the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-
TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall
waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank deposits under R.A.
No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy
of Bank Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The
General Banking Law of 2000.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement
between the parties in a civil case is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory.20
However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was
obtained through fraud, mistake, or duress, he must file a motion
with the trial court that approved the compromise agreement to
reconsider the judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on
any of the said grounds for annulment of contract within 15 days
from notice of judgment. Under Rule 37, said party can either file
a motion for new trial or reconsideration. A party can file a
motion for new trial based on fraud, accident or mistake,
excusable negligence, or newly discovered evidence. On the
other hand, a party may decide to seek the recall or modification
of the judgment by means of a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that "the decision or final order is contrary to law" if the
consent was procured through fraud, mistake, or duress. Thus,
the motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration is the
readily available remedy for a party to challenge a judgment if
the 15-day period from receipt of judgment for taking an appeal
has not yet expired.21
In this case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the
decision based on compromise agreement assailing the waiver of
confidentiality provision in the Agreement between its two
creditors, TIDCORP and BPI, in which petitioner was not a party.
After the trial court denied the motion on the ground of estoppel,
petitioner sought a direct recourse to this Court.
We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions,
final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only
questions of law are raised or involved. Petitioner submits the
lone question of law on whether the waiver of confidentiality
provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI is valid
despite petitioner not being a party and signatory to the same.
R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits
may be disclosed. These are under any of the following
instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in
cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in
the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d)
when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Council may inquire
into a bank account upon order of any competent court.23
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was
executed by BPI and TIDCORP only. There was no written
consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos,
Jr., that petitioner is waiving the confidentiality of its bank
deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of
petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the agreement.
It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said
provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner
who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by
failure to interpose its objection during the proceedings.1âwphi1
It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be
positively demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not
normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not only
be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly, intelligently,
and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show
an actual intention to relinquish the right. Mere silence on the
part of the holder of the right should not be construed as a
surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against the existence and validity of such waiver.24
In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared
insolvent by the RTC, all its property, assets and belongings were
ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in
the order of the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver,
petitioner was directed to assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all
its real and personal property, monies, estate and effects with all
the deeds, books and papers relating thereto,25 pursuant to
Section 3226 of the Insolvency Law.27 Such assignment shall
operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent
debtor not exempt by law from execution.28 Corollarily, the
stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise
Agreement that petitioner waives its right to confidentiality of its
bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty.
Gonzales as receiver since all the property, money, estate and
effects of petitioner have been assigned and conveyed to her29
and she has the right to recover all the estate, assets, debts and
claims belonging to or due to the insolvent debtor.30
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to
Enter Into Compromise Agreement, she did not sign or approve
the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted by TIDCORP
and BPI. In her Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago
by Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) there is no showing that Atty.
Gonzales signified her conformity to the waiver of confidentiality
of petitioner’s bank deposits.
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits
lacks the required written consent of petitioner and conformity of
the receiver. We, thus, hold that petitioner is not bound by the
said provision.
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is
binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon
non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.32 The
rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides
that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs x x x."33 The sound reason for the exclusion of non-
parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical
tie which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an
obligation.34 Consistent with this principle, a judgment based
entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the
parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the
parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and
in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the
court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the
basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the
compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take
part in the compromise agreement.35
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
AUJERO V PHILCOMSAT
FACTS: It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for
respondent Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latter's Finance
Department. After thirty-four (34) years of service, the petitioner
applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was
approved, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate
equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year
of service. At that time, the petitioner was Philcomsat's Senior
Vice-President with a monthly salary of Two Hundred Seventy-
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Five Pesos (P274,805.00). 



Petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaimin
Philcomsats favor.



Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint
for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the actual amount
of his retirement pay is Fourteen Million Fifteen Thousand and
Fifty-Five Pesos (P14,015,055.00) and the P9,439,327.91 he
received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his
claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to
declare his quitclaim as null and void.



Labor Arbiter issued a Decisionin the petitioners favor, directing
Philcomsat to pay him the amount of P4,575,727.09 and
P274,805.00, representing the balance of his retirement benefits
and salary for the period from August 15 to September 15, 2001,
respectively.



NLRC granted Philcomsats appeal and reversed and set aside LAs
Decision. The NLRC dismissed the petitioners complaint for
unpaid retirement benefits and salary in consideration of the
Deed of Release and Quitclaim he executed following his receipt
from Philcomsat of the amount of P9,439,327.91, which
constitutes the full settlement of all his claims against
Philcomsat.



By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the
petitioners claims, holding that the NLRC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondents
appeal. The CA further ruled that the NLRC was correct in
upholding the validity of the petitioners quitclaim.



ISSUE: Whether or not the quitclaim executed by the petitioner
in Philcomsats favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right to
institute any claim against Philcomsat?
 contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.


HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
 the authority of this Court – or any court for that matter


LABOR LAW
 within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When


While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by
employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by
unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal
responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary
settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the
courts as the law between the parties.[29]Considering the
petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be
unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be
legitimate waiver.
 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,


The petitioner's educational background and employment stature
render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or
inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot
permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of
his act, when his knowledge and understanding thereof is
expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to
lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency
in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the
reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere
afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
 construed any other way.


DENIED
THORNTON V THORNTON
FACTS: Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were
married on August 28, 1998 in Manila. A year later, respondent
gave birth to a baby girl. Respondent after 3 years returned to
her old job in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her
friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her
daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but
she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001,
respondent left the family home with her daughter without
notifying her husband. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the FC in Makati City but this was dismissed,
presumably because of the allegation that the child was in
Basilan. But they were not in Basilan.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s
cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as
Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the
Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country.
CA; denied the petition on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed
RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980)
ISSUE: WN the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of
the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
RULING:
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA
7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of
habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned?
yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the
word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as
the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other
than the Family Court also possesses the same
competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not
exclusive but concurrent – and such an interpretation is
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within
– to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is
there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not
to be sought form the courts but only from the
legislature.
Solicitor General: that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has
rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,4
the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA
7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it
to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To
the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied
repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,
every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord
with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to
have known the existing laws on the subject and not have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved
against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in
order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to
issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA
7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does
not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody
of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled
with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody
of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the
minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
(Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family
courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for
habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED
and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
KIDA V SENATE
FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic
Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first
regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for
the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections
should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme
Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No.
10153.
ISSUES:
1. WN the 1987 Constitution mandate the
synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. WN the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-
readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. WN the grant [to the President] of the power to
appoint OICs constitutional?
RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and
UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly
state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to
the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections. The
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following
elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although
called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
“local” election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the
1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT
violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by
either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate
days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the
President’s certification of necessity in the following
manner:
The presidential
certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two
stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has
passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed
in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that
the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House
and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power
to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court
identified the three options open to Congress in
order to resolve the problem on who should sit as
ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow
the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
(2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected
in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office;
or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs,
[their respective terms to last also until those
elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume
office.]
3.1. 1st o p t i o n : H o l d o v e r i s
unconstitutional since it would
extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option
since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of
office of elective local
officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be
three years and no such
official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local
officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term
through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover
period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant
for the new term. This view – like the extension
of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly,
then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot
also create a new term and effectively appoint
the occupant of the position for the new term.
This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it
is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option
that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is
constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,
Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have
to remember that the rule of holdover can only
apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153,
made it explicitly clear that it had the intention
of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing
this provision. The deletion is a policy decision
that is wholly within the discretion of Congress
to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, except where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections
is unconstitutional since COMELEC,
on its own, has no authority to order
special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections
is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the
positions of President, Vice President, Members
of Congress and local officials, except when so
provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress
may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the
ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date
– May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so
doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom
that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither
the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at
the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests
on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to
supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done
in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term
of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier
than the three (3) years that the Constitution
itself commands. This is what will happen – a
term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the
cost of a violation of an express provision of
the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of
the power to appoint ARMM OICs in
the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only
Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of
OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-
synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3,
4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself,
however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise
of this power should be strictly construed;
these limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The
President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the
Commission on
Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose
appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government
whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank
in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies,
commi ssi ons, or boards.
[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four
groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the
executive departments;
ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, from the
rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers
whose appointments are
vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other
officers of the government
whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by
law;
Third, those whom the
President may be authorized
by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower
in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to
appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed
by the petitions to the authority to appoint
OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the
assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials to be
“elective and representative of the constituent
political units.” This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the
assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we
hold that this alleged constitutional problem is
more apparent than real and becomes very real
only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly
read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM
positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in
any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153
in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.” This power is far different
from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read
– in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments PD No. 463, otherwise known as the Mineral
that the synchronization requires. Resources Development Decree, prescribed
BICOL V TRANS-ASIA requirements for the registration of all mining
“rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursusant to the patents with the Director of Mines within a
Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior to the 1935 constritution certain period, among others. The existence of
are vested rights that cannot be impaired” the mining claims were in fact registered in the
FACTS: In 1976, the Gold Mining Development Project Team,
Office of the Register of Deeds prior to the
Mining Technology Division, The Mining Group of the Bureau of
issuance of PD 463, as found in the 4 TCT’s
Mines prepared a so-called Technical Feasibility Study on the
Possible Re-Opening of the CPMI Project of PIM (Mining Aspect) issued to PIMI that were foreclosed by MBC,
and the Exploration Program (Uranium Project) in Camarines and eventually purchased by appellee through
Norte. The Government opened the area for exploration. In an Absolute Deed of Sale. The existence of the
November 1978, the Benguet Corporation-Getty Oil Consortium mining patents, therefore, subsists. Under the
began exploration for uranium under an Exploration Permit of the Philippine Constitution, there is an absolute
area, but withdrew in 1982 after four years of sustained and prohibition against alienation of natural
earnest exploration. Trans-Asia then explored the area from 1986 resources. Mining locations may only be subject
onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with to concession or lease. The only exception is
PIMI over the area, their agreement being duly registered by the where a location of a mining claim was
Mining Recorder Section of the DENR. In 1997, Trans-Asia filed perfected prior to 1935 Constitution.. The right
an application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing
of the locator to the mining patent is a vested
Agreement (MPSA)3 over the area and was granted on July 28,
right, and the Constitution recognizes such
2007, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive right to
right as an exception to the prohibition against
explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the portion of
the mineral lands. alienation of natural resources. The right of the
appellee as the beneficial owner of the subject

 mining patents in this case, therefore, is
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) superior to the claims of appellant.
informed the DENR that it had acquired the mining patents of
RoblesvirtualLawlibrary

PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale, stating


that the areas covered by its mining patents were within the
CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the DENR Secretary and
areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA. 

the OP.21 It agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP that


Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed mining areas, but
Trans-Asia informed Yinlu that it would commence exploration
ruled that Yinlu was required to register the patents under PD
works. Yinlu opposed to it. MGB Regional Office V in resolving the
No. 463 in order for the patents to be recognized in its favor. It
issues between the parties, learned that the registration of its
found that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest did not register
MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlu’s request to register
the patents pursuant to PD No. 463; hence, the patents lapsed
the deed of absolute sale in its favor and informed the the DENR
and had no more effect.
Secretary that there was no record on file showing the existence
of the mining patents of Yinlu.
ISSUE: wn petitioner yinlus mining patents are valid, existing
and impervious to the mineral production sharing agreement
DENR Secretary: Favored Yinlu’s, finding that the mining
subsequently granted to the respondent trans-
patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930 as evidenced by and
asiartuallawlibrlawred
indicated in PIMI’s certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and
that the patents were validly transferred to and were now owned
by Yinlu.11 He rejected Trans-Asia’s argument that Yinlu’s patents
had no effect and were deemed abandoned because Yinlu had
RULING:
failed to register them pursuant to Section 101 of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended. He declared that the DENR did not The petition is meritorious.
issue any specific order cancelling such patents. He refuted
Trans-Asia’s contention that there was a continuing requirement
The finality and immutability of the decision of the OP are not the
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining patent holder to
only reasons for turning down Trans-Asia’s appeal. Trans-Asia’s
undertake improvements in order to have the patents subsist,
cause also failed the tests of substance and validity 

and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to


undertake the improvement, observing that the requirement was
The decision of the OP was actually unassailable in point of law
not an absolute imposition. He noted that the suspension of
and history.

PIMI’s operation in 1974 due to financial losses and the


foreclosure of its mortgaged properties by the creditor banks
During the period of Spanish colonization, the disposition and
(MBC/PCIB) constituted force majeure that justified PIMI’s failure
exploration of mineral lands in the Philippines were governed by
in 1974 to comply with the registration requirement under P.D.
the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867,40 otherwise known as The
No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was the basis for
Spanish Mining Law.41 The Regalian doctrine was observed, to
issuing the patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals,
the effect that minerals belonged to the State wherever they
rendering the minerals covered by the patents to be segregated
could be found, whether in public or private lands. During the
from the public domain and be considered private property; and
American occupation, the fundamental law on mining was
that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all
incorporated in the Philippine Bill of 1902. Pursuant to the
natural resources, was adopted only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, once a mining claim was made
Constitutions.12chan
or a mining patent was issued over a parcel of land in accordance
with the relative provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such
Office of the President: Affirmed the assailed order and land was considered private property and no longer part of the
resolution of the DENR Secretary,16 to wit: public domain. The claimant or patent holder was the owner of
both the surface of the land and of the minerals found
underneath.


 them of the cancellation of their mining patents. In the absence
A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the government for of any showing that the DENR had provided the written notice
the said mining claim.
 and opportunity to Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest to that

 effect, it would really be inequitable to consider them to have
Under the 1935 Constitution, the alienation of natural resources, abandoned their patents, or to consider the patents as having
with the exception of public agricultural land, was expressly lapsed. 

prohibited. The natural resources being referred therein included Nonetheless, we deem it significant to remind that Yinlu has been
mineral lands of public domain, but not mineral lands that at the directed by the DENR to henceforth conduct its mining operations
time the 1935 Constitution took effect no longer formed part of in accordance with Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act
the public domain.
 of 1995) and its implementing rules and regulations. 


 

Consequently, such prohibition against the alienation of natural WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
resources did not apply to a mining claim or patent existing prior promulgated on October 30, 2012 by the Court of Appeals;
to November 15, 1935. 
 REINSTATE the decision issued on May 4, 2010 and resolutions

 dated June 29, 2010 and March 31, 2011 by the Office of the
The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are President in O.P. Case No. 09-L-638; and DIRECT the
private properties. The Government, whether through the DENR respondents to pay the costs of suit.

or the MGB, could not alienate or dispose of the lands or mineral 

through the MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or SO ORDERED.
entity. Yinlu had the exclusive right to explore, develop and
utilize the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or assign Yao Kee v Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)
such exclusive right. We uphold the rulings of the DENR
Secretary and the OP to exclude the disputed areas that had DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE:
been established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered To establish a valid foreign marriage, it must be proven
owner to be taken out of the coverage of Trans-Asia’s MPSA.
 that:

 1. An existing foreign law exist; and
Still, Trans-Asia insists that Yinlu’s mining patents should no 2. The alleged foreign marriage is proven by
longer be recognized because they were not registered pursuant convincing evidences.
to Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463.hTrans-Asia
submits that because MBC/BDO did not comply with the FACTS:
requirement for the registration of the patents, Yinlu’s mining 1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan
rights should now be deemed abandoned because no title or right where he left behind real and personal properties
was passed to it. In that sense, Trans-Asia maintains that Yinlu in the Philippines amounting to 300K.
had no vested right.
 2. Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel et, al, file a petition to

 grant letters of administration for Sy Kiat’s
We disagree with Trans-Asia.
 properties. In the petition they alleged that they

 were the children of a certain Asuncion Gillego a
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require Filipina.
registration and annual work obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 3. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et, al and
463 nevertheless expressly provides that the provisions of PD alleged that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat
No. 463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested and the other oppositors are the legitimate
rights under other mining laws. children of Yao Kee.
4. The Court found out that:

 a. Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee;
Republic v. Court of Appeals: we stated that mining rights b. Aida Sy-Gonzales et, al are acknowledge
acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the illegitimate children of Sy Kiat and
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could Asuncion Gillego.
not be impaired even by the Government. Indeed, the mining 5. The Court held in favor of Yao Kee et, al.
patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 6. Sy-Gonzales made an appeal which led for the CA
1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 to modify the decision of the probate court.
Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest 7. Both respondent moved for partial
had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that reconsiderations which the court denied.
could not and should not be impaired even in light of their past
failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual ISSUE: W-O-N the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid in
work obligations.
 the Philippine jurisdiction?


Relevantly, we advert to the DENR’s finding that PIMI’s failure to RULING:
register the patents in 1974 pursuant to PD No. 463 was No. It is a well-established rule that the Philippine courts
excusable because of its suffering financial losses at that time, cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. It must be alleged and
which eventually led to the foreclosure of the mortgages on its proved as any other fact. To establish a valid foreign marriage, it
assets by the MBC and PCIB as its creditors.60 The failure of must be proven that:
Yinlu’s predecessors-in-interest to register and perform annual 3. An existing foreign law exist; and
work obligations did not automatically mean that they had 4. The alleged foreign marriage is proven by
already abandoned their mining rights, and that such rights had convincing evidences.
already lapsed. For one, the DENR itself declared that it had not
issued any specific order cancelling the mining patents.61 Also, Here, Yao Kee did not present any competent evidence
the tenets of due process required that Yinlu and its relative to the law and customs of China. For the failure to prove
predecessors-in-interest be given written notice of their non- the foreign law or customs, and consequently the validity of the
compliance with PD No. 463 and the ample opportunity to marriage, the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
comply. If they still failed to comply despite such notice and recognized in the Philippine jurisdiction.
opportunity, then written notice must further be given informing
 ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11,
2010
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE:
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or,
even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours.
FACTS:
1. Echin was hired by ATCI as medical technologist under
a 2-year contract.
2. Under the MOA all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of 1 year.
3. Echin was deployed on Feb. 17 2000 but was later
terminated on Feb 11 2001, she not having allegedly
passed the probationary period.
4. The Ministry of Kuwait denied Echins request for
reconsideration, thus she returned to the Philippines.
5. Echin filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal against ATCI.
6. LA found out that ATCI never showed just cause to
warrant the dismissal of Echin and held that Echin was
illegally dismissed.
7. ATCI appealed the LA’s decision, which the NLRC
affirmed the LA’s decision.
8. ATCI appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the
NLRC’s decision.
9. ATCI filed MR but was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: W-O-N the employment contract is governed by the Civil
Service law and Regulations of Kuwait?
RULING:
No. It is not governed by the Civil Service law and
Regulations of Kuwait. Generally, a contract freely entered into is
considered the law between the parties who can establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their
respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. It is
hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question
of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor
arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
Aznar vs Garcia 7 Scra 95
DOCTRINE/PRINICPLE:
“The intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions is
governed by the national law of the decedent”
FACTS:
1. Edward Christensen an American Citizen from
California is domiciled in the Philippines.
2. He left a will executed in the Philippines in which he
bequeathed 3,600 Pesos to Maria Helen Christensen
and the remainder of his estate shall belong to Maria
Lucy Christensen.
3. Under the laws of California, the testator may dispose
his estate in any manner he pleases. However, it also
provides that in matters relating to personal property
it shall be governed by the laws of his domicile.
4. Aznar drew a project of partition in conformity to E.
Christensen’s will.
5. H. Christensen opposed the partition arguing that the
Philippine laws govern the distribution of the estate.
ISSUE: W-O-N the succession is governed by the Philippine
laws?
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 16 of the Civil Code it provides that
the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions is governed by
the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The
provision in the laws of California giving a testator absolute
freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which
applies only to persons domiciled within the said estate.
On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California
stating that personal property is governed by the laws of the
domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies to
persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of
the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled governs the
succession and the regime of legitimes must be respected.
Amos v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358 (1967)
DOCTRINE/PRINICIPLE:
“A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.”
FACTS:
1. Amos is a citizen of Texas USA. He had 5 legitimate
children from his first wife (Divorced).
2. Amos had a second wife, Violet Kenedy who survived
him and they had 3 legitimate children.
3. August 5 1952 Amos executed a will in the Philippines,
in his will he stated the following:
a. $240K to his first wife
b. P120K to his 3 illegitimate children
c. The remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children of his first and second wife in equal
shares.
4. Amos died as a resident of Texas.
5. His will was admitted to probate.
6. Bellis filed their oppositions to the project partition.
Alleging that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children.
7. The lower court overruled the opposition by applying
article 16 of the Civil Code.
8. MR’s were denied.
ISSUE: Which law must apply, Texas law or the Philippine law?
RULING:
The laws of Texas shall apply. The Renvoi is usually
pertinent to where the decedent is a national of one country, and
a domicile of another. Here, it is not disputed that the decedent
was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. Moreover, in the
case of Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Tayag v Benguet Consolidated, GR L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968
DOCTRINE/PRINICPLE:
“An administrator appointed in one state has no power
over property matters in another state.”
FACTS:
1. Perkins died domiciled in New York.
2. Perkins have properties both in the Philippines and
New York, hence, a domiciliary administrator was in
New York by the New York Courts and an ancillary
administrator was appointed by the Philippine Courts.
3. To Satisfy the claims of local creditors the Philippine
ancillary administrator asked the New York
administrator to surrender the former 2 stock
certificate owned by Perkins in Benguet Consolidated.
4. The New York administrator refused to surrender the
certificates. Prompting the Philippine courts to consider
the stock certificates as lost.
5. The court then ordered Benguet Consolidated to cancel
the said certificates and issue a new one to be
delivered to the ancillary administrator.
6. Benguet Consolidated refused on the grounds that the
old certificate still exists and in the future the company
might be held liable for damages because of the
presence of conflicting certificates.
ISSUES: W-O-N Benguet Consolidated should issue the new
certificate?
RULING:
Yes, Benguet Consolidated should issue the new
certificate. While the old certificate still exists, the same may by
judicial fiction may be considered lost. Since there is a refusal by
the New York administrator, to deny the remedy would be
derogatory to the dignity of the Philippine judiciary. The ancillary
Philippine administrator is entitled to the possession of said
certificates so that he can perform his duty. An administrator
appointed in one state has no power over property matters in
another state.
Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, GR 193707, Dec. 10, 2014
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE:
“If the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same
as our local or domestic or internal law.”
FACTS:
1. Socorro and Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25 1990
2. They had a son named Rodrigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
3. They had a divorce in Holland.
4. Del Socorro contends that Wilsem promised to provide
child support monthly but was never fulfilled.
5. Del Soccorro through her counsel sent letters
demanding support but Wilsem refused to receive the
letter.
6. This led to Del Socorro to file a complaint against
Wilsem for its refusal to give child support.
ISSUE: W-O-N Wilsem a foreign national has the obligation to
support his child under the Philippine laws?
RULING:
Yes. Generally, Under the New Civil Code it stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy,
the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties. However, in international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.
In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws
on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child. True, foreign laws do
not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved
in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001; LORNA GUILLEN
PESCA, petitioner vs. ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
FACTS: Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No.
52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the
trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the
basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and
ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Respondent
appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending
that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was
legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying
his motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid
and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That
the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so
provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity
is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his
incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the
incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has
been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent
and incurable in nature.
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of
the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14
January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption
that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the
guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory
and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and
not its dismissal.
Respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its
assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has
been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the
term has been so defined in Santos.
ISSUE:
(1) Is the principle of Stare Decisis applicable in this case,
following the precedent set by the Santos and Molina
cases, respectively?
(2) Did the appellate court erred in reversing the decision
of the trial court?
RULING:
(1) YES. The- "DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS,"
ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The interpretation or construction
placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part
of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is
only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit."
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of
the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an
inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family that the State cherishes and protects. While the
Court commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating
that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not
quite given up, neither should we. WOW.
(2) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for
there was absolutely no evidence showed and proved by
petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as
laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further
explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010 ARTURO M. DE
CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO,
Respondents.
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the
controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days
after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the
JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process
for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced
immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be
vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent
Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose
its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
Philippine Star.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed
to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint,
written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22,
2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the
position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the
JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list
of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case
being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of
intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the
shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the
act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight
appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re
Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively,
shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which
the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to
judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE:
(1) Is the principle of stare decisis controlling, and
accordingly can insist that the Court has erred in
disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela case?
(2) Whether the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Art. VII, Sec. 15 (Midnight
Appointment Ban), does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.
RULING:
1. NO. The contention has no basis. Stare decisis derives
its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non
quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to
unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a
principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed
of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like
cases in the same court and in lower courts within the
same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in
question is reversed or overruled by a court of
competent authority. The decisions relied upon as
precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be
appealed to higher courts and for that reason are
probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid
down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself
and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the
actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but
also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the
higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-
ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest
court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate
authority to rule according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is
not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a
new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a
common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges
make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always
strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an
earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent
case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and
the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and
justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the
precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be
disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom
should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore,
devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently
forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority
of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle
of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
2. No, the Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not
apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and
defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme
Court, among others. Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9 of this Article are the
provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices. In particular, Sec. 9 states that the appointment
of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President
upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the
JBC; Sec. 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had
the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art.
VII, Sec. 15 to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Taken into consideration also that the appointment of the next
Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having
the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under
the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive
Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and
proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective
Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the
office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary,
because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The
Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life
of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman
of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of
the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the
incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May
17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of
Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.
G.R. No. 187451 August 29, 2012, JESUS
VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,
vs. JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent. PERALTA, J., Acting
Chairperson,*VILLARAMA, JR.,**PEREZ,***
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
seeks to reverse and set aside the February 25, 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 72613, reversing
and setting aside the February 19, 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1, Isabela, Basi Ian (RTC), in Civil Case No.
685-627, an action for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership
with Preliminary Injunction."
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring
Virtucio. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the merit of this case, this court finds for the
plaintiff and against the defendant by:
1. Ordering the defendant and all those acting in his behalf to
vacate Lot No. 140, Pls-19, located at Lower Bañas, Lantawan,
Basilan and surrender the possession and ownership thereof to
plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱ 15,000.00) as attorney's fees and
another Ten Thousand Pesos (₱ 10,000.00) as expenses for
litigation; and
3. To pay the cost of the suit in the amount of Five Hundred
Pesos (₱500.00).
Not in conformity, Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 25, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision declaring
Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140, Pls-19, thereby reversing
and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that
Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore,
entitled to retain possession of it. Consequently, the awards of
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit were
deleted.
In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to
approve Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had
become final, Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by
acquisitive prescription. The decisions on the issues of the
approval of Virtucio's homestead application and its validity were
impertinent as Alegarbes had earlier put in issue the matter of
ownership of Lot 140 which he claimed by virtue of adverse
possession.
The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in
disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the
decisions of the administrative bodies, none of which touched
upon the issue of Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive
possession of over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. The CA
held that the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the OP did not determine whether
Alegarbes' possession of the subject property had ipso jure
segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and, thus, was
beyond their jurisdiction. Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Is the Doctrine of Stare Decisis controlling in this case,
alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
disregarding the decision in CA-G.R. CV-26286 for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Custodio vs.
Alegarbes which contains same factual circumstances
as in this case and ruled against JOSE ALEGARBES?
RULING: NO, because that the subject property in the said case
was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a
party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits
said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved
similar factual circumstances. The Court also found from the
records that the period of acquisitive prescription in that case
was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint,
which is wanting in this case.
Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish
judicial precedent. "The principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument.”
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's
insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier
decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court
to adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle,
which is not legally possible because only final decisions of this
Court are considered precedents.
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not dwell on the
complaint of Virtucio with regard to the deletion of the award of
attorney's fees in his favor. It is ludicrous for the CA to order
Alegarbes to pay attorney's fees, as a measure of damages, and
costs, after finding him to have acquired ownership over the
property by acquisitive prescription. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199310 February 19, 2014, REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. REMMAN ENTERPRISES,
INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc.
(respondent), filed an application with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's
application for registration. Thereafter, following the required
publication and posting, a scheduled hearing was set. However,
on May 30, 2002, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of
general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit
its comment/opposition to the respondent's application for
registration.
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the
respondent's application for registration, asserting that the lots
are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its
Opposition,alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land
long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella
Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties
were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime),
who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said
lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943.
Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to
Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until
the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are
within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as
evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's
application for registration should be denied since the subject
parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section
41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands,
surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying
for the oppositor LLDA, he found out that the elevations of Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area
verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002,
Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject
properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who
claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the
subject properties he conducted upon the request of the
respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to
LLDA's claim, are above 12.50 m.
The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of
title to the subject properties. The RTC found that the respondent
was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are
very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m
and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was
able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that
the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the
petitioner. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Is the Stare Decisis Principle applicable, considering that
CA affirmed the trial court's decision using the ratio in the Roche
case?
RULING: No, because in the Roche case, failed to produce the
requirements set by the court. Roche did not present evidence
that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the
survey map and technical description of the land which
bears no information regarding the land’s classification.
She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any
certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it
cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for
registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. When
Remman opposed by stating the TAN Properties will not suffice in
establishing the status of the land in question.
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that
the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two
certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as
per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are
insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued
by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of public domain as alienable
and disposable. They must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal custodian of the records.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which
affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No.
N-11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application
for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration
Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204039, January 10, 2018, UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner vs. SPOUSES WALTER UY AND
LILY UY, Respondents
FACTS: Spouses Walter and Lily Uy (respondents) entered into a
Contract to Sell with Prime Town Property Group, Inc.(PPGI) for a
unit in Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium Project. The total
contract price amounted to ₱1, 151,718. 7 5 payable according
to the following terms: (a) ₱l00,000.00 as down payment; and
(b) the balance paid in 40 monthly installments at ₱26,297.97
from 16 January 1997 to 16 April 2000.
PPGI transferred the right to collect the receivables of the
buyers, which included respondents, of units in Kiener Hills to
UCPB as PPGI’s partial settlement of its loan with UCPB.
Respondents filed a complaint before the the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board Regional Office (HLURB Regional Office) for
sum of money and damages against PPGI and UCPB. They
claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price,
PPGI failed to complete the construction of their units in Kiener
Hills.
The HLURB Regional Office found that respondents were entitled
to a refund in view of PPGI’ s failure to complete the construction
of their units. Nonetheless, it found that UCPB cannot be
solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts receivables
were conveyed to UCPB and not the entire condominium project.
Respondents appealed before the HLURB-Board of
Commissioners.
The HLURB Board reversed and set aside the HLURB Regional
Office decision. It agreed that the proceedings against PPGI
should be suspended on account of its corporate rehabilitation.
Nevertheless, the HLURB Board found UCPB solidarily liable with
PPGI because it stepped into the latter’s shoes insofar as Kiener
Hills is concerned pursuant to the MOA between them. It noted
that UCPB was PPGI’s successor-in-interest, such that the delay
in the completion of the condominium project could be
attributable to it and subject it to liability. The HLURB Board ruled
that as PPGI’s assignee, UCPB was bound to refund the payments
made, without prejudice to its right of action against PPGI. On
appeal, the OP affirmed the decision of the HLURB Board. UCPB
appealed before the CA, which affirmed with modification the OP
decision. While the appellate court agreed that respondents are
entitled to a full refund of the payments they may have made, it
ruled that UCPB is not solidarily liable with PPGI, and as such
cannot be held liable for the full satisfaction of respondents’
payments. It limited UCPB’s liability to the amount respondents
have paid upon the former’s assumption as the party entitled to
receive payments. UCPB moved for reconsideration but it was
denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Does Stare Decisis apply only to cases decided by the
Supreme Court.
RULING: Yes, Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by the
Supreme Court. As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the
reliance of the CA on 0 ‘Halloran arguing that it was not a binding
precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In De Mesa v.
Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. Inc., the Court explained that the
doctrine of stare decisis deems decisions of this Court binding on
the lower courts, to wit:
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched
in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit: The principle of stare decisis
et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts
to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the
Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument.
In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative
only when judicial precedents are set by pronouncements of this
Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is true regardless
whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally
sound as only decisions issued by this Court become part of the
legal system. At the most, decisions of lower courts only have a
persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in contesting the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis when the CA relied on
decisions it had issued.
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.HEINRICH S. RITTER,
accused-appellant,The Solicitor General for plaintiff-
appellee. Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie
Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter
masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted
a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning,
Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that
Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the
following day, Rosario said that the object has already been
removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw
Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and
confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to
remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed
because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She
was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a
Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was
made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape
with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable of rape with homicide.
RULING: No, Ritter was not liable of rape with homicide.
ON ROSARIO’S AGE: The prosecution didn’t satisfy the
evidence for age. It is of doubtful value. Unfortunately, in the
instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more
reliable document as to Rosario’s birth which could serve as
sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973.
Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the
alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
NO RAPE WAS COMMITTED. The evidence shows that Rosario
submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In
fact, she appears to have consented to the action as she was
paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie
Ramirez was paid P200.00. The environmental circumstances
coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court
clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street
child, was a prostitute in spite of her tender age.
Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex at
such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the
purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape. “Was
the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside
Rosario’s vagina which led to her death?
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert
something inside Rosario’s vagina, the evidence is still not
adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant’s
alleged act. If the device inserted by the appellant caused the
pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the
pain and discomfort until May 1987, seven (7) months after the
alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.
It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a
foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort,
and serious infection only after seven months inside a young
girl’s vaginal canal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages
to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him
thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the country. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987, CARLOS ALONZO and
CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners. Luis R. Reyes for
private respondent.
FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso
shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their deceased
parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of
absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con
Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the
petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding
to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to
them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a
fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to
petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking
the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court
dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice
of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision
of the Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the
requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.
RULING: YES. The petition before us appears to be an
illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad
laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact
that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to
their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can
lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to
run, much less expired in 1977.
we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice. We interpret and apply the
law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the
power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of
the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose
that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it
the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the
letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect
to the law maker's will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the
date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were
made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua
in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years
after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners
extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there
was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of
redemption.
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in
the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should
have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if
the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and
the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon
inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable
with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is
reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Quimiguing v Icao G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
Facts: Carmen Quimiging, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the
defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with the plaintiff under
force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, she
became pregnant and had to pay for hospitalization and stopped
studying. The latter claimed damages of Php 120 a month. Duly
summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of
action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been
born. The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed
the complaint.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result
of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl; but
the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred
no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support?
Held: Yes. Petition granted.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it,
as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support
from its progenitors.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of
the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides
imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article
291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it"
adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the fetus be alive at
the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb).
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that
for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his
lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same
Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts
Hence, the girl has a cause of action.
De Jesus v Syquia
FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age
was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother
in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years
of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He
got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship.
As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was
born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a
constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a
rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his
name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country,
he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on
time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend
Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at
St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a
House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for
about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,
defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another
woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the
defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the
ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of
Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other
letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy
proves acknowledgement of paternity?
2. Whether the defendant is liable for damages for the breach to
marry?
HELD:
1.Yes. The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as
admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to
connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The
mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the
period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status”.
2.No. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in
refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed
breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing
in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize
the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the
amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount
of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only
the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.
Continental Steel v. Montaño
Doctrines: Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life.
Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for
Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child.
Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the
38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due
to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity
leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other
death benefits.
It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that
the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death
could be covered by the CBA death benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the
entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as
legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality
could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
which provides:
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it,
provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is
alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s
womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than
seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four
hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect
of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
determined by law, by contract and by will.
Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died
because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from
the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus
that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at
all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus
that never acquired juridical personality.
Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be
supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she
could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the
power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.
Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
resolution. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not Montano is entitled to bereavement leave
Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42
of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced.
Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not
relevant in this case.
The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it
does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn
from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s
wife, for sustenance.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent,
such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn
fetus in the mother’s womb.
3.Yes. Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted
to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief
of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one.
It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising
from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any
less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
Limjoco vs Estate of Fragrante
FACTS: Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a certificate
of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San
Juan, Rizal.
Fragrante dies while his application was still pending. At the time
of his death, his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to the intestate estate of the deceased through
authorizing the said intestate estate with its special or judicial
administrator, appointed by the Court, to maintain and operate
the plant.
Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate of Fragrante
cannot be substituted as the applicant for the deceased and is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
1) Whether the estate of Fragante is a person.
2) Whether the estate of Fragante may be considered as
a citizen
HELD:
1). YES.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself,
under the Bill of Rights, it seems clear that while the civil rights
guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural
persons, the term “person” must be deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons.
It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or juridical,
no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities
and in other of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical
persons fare estates of deceased persons.
Hence, the Court held that within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Fragante should be considered an
artificial or juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which include the exercise during the
judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment
of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
Fragante has rights and obligation which survived after his death.
One of those rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the PSC.
Under the present legal system, rights and obligations which
survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the
estate of the deceased.
3. YES.
The fiction of such extension of Fragante’s citizenship is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors
and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the loss of the
investment which he had already made in the ice plant, not
counting
Heirs of Favis vs Gonzales
Facts: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to
Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven children.
When Capitolina died in March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana
Gonzalez (Juana), his common-law wife with whom he sired one
child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano), he executed an affidavit
acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano
is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four
children.
Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994,
prior his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation
transferring and conveying properties in favor of his
grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the said donation prejudiced
their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners
herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before
the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their
grandchildren as respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr.
Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have
had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed
of Donation.
The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners
nullification case. The CA motu proprioproprio ordered the
dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an
averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Court.
Issue: WON respondenfs failed to appreciate Mariano's
advanced age thus making the donation invalid due to vitiated
consent
Held: Unfortunately for respondents, they relied completely on
the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals even when
petitioners came to us for review not just on the basis of such
defective motu propio action but also on the proposition that the
trial court correctly found that the donation in question is flawed
because of vitiated consent.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. during the execution of the Deed of
Donation was already 92 years old; living with the defendants
and those years from 1993 to 1995 were the critical years when
he was sick most of the time. In short, he’s dependent on the
care of his housemates particularly the members of his family. It
is the contention of the defendants though that Dr. Mariano
Favis, Sr. had full control of his mind during the execution of the
Deed of Donation because at that time, he could go on with the
regular way of life or could perform his daily routine without the
aid of anybody like taking a bath, eating his meals, reading the
newspaper, watching television, go to the church on Sundays,
walking down the plaza to exercise and most importantly go to
the cockpit arena and bet. Dr. Ofelia Adapon, a neurology expert
however, testified that a person suffering from Parkinson’s
disease when he goes to the cockpit does not necessarily mean
that such person has in full control of his mental faculties
because anyone, even a retarded person, a person who has not
studied and have no intellect can go to the cockpit and bet. One
can do everything but do not have control of his mind. x x x That
Hiatal Hernia creeps in very insidiously, one is not sure especially
if the person has not complained and no examination was done.
It could be there for the last time and no one will know. x x x.
The Deed of Donation in favor of the defendants Ma. Theresa,
Joana D. Favis, Maria Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and
Maria Thea D. Favis, all of whom are the children of Mariano G.
Favis, Jr. was executed on [16 October] 1994, seven (7) months
after Dra. Mercedes Favis left the house of Dr. Favis, Sr. at
Bonifacio St., Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, where she resided with the
latter and the defendants.
Putting together the circumstances mentioned, that at the time
of the execution of the Deed of Donation, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.
was already at an advanced age of 92, afflicted with different
illnesses like Hiatal hernia, Parkinsons’ disease and pneumonia,
to name few, which illnesses had the effects of impairing his
brain or mental faculties and the deed being executed only when
Dra. Mercedes Favis had already left his father’s residence when
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. could have done so earlier or even in the
presence of Dra. Mercedes Favis, at the time he executed the
Deed of Donation was not in full control of his mental faculties.
That although age of senility varies from one person to another,
to reach the age of 92 with all those medications and treatment
one have received for those illnesses, yet claim that his mind
remains unimpaired, would be unusual. The fact that the Deed of
Donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes Favis left his
father's house necessarily indicates that they don't want the
same to be known by the first family, which is an indicia of bad
faith on the part of the defendant, who at that time had influence
over the donor.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied
and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938
to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St.
Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos
was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos
won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months
under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she
became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the
First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the
district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became
Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of
all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile
because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country
clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin,
as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.
UMALE vs. ASB REALTY CORPORATION
FACTS:
1. This case involves a parcel of land located in
Amethyst Street, Ortigas Center, Pasig City which
was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl
Corporation (Amethyst Pearl), a company that is,
in turn, wholly-owned by respondent ASB Realty
Corporation (ASB Realty).
2. Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment
in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of
ASB Realty in consideration of the full
redemption of Amethyst Pearl's outstanding
capital stock from ASB Realty. making ASB
Realty the owner of the subject premises
3. Sometime in 2003, ASB Realty commenced an
action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against
petitioner Leonardo S. Umale.
4. ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease
contract with Umale for the period June 1,
1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was for
Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the
property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720.00.
5. Upon the contract's expiration on continued
occupying the premises and paying rentals.
6. On June 2003, ASB Realty served on Umale a
Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to
Vacate and Pay. ASB Realty stated that it was
terminating the lease effective midnight of June
30, 2003.
7. Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's
demands and continued in possession of the
subject premises, even constructing
commercial establishments thereon.
8. Umale admitted occupying the property since
1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract but
vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his
lessor. He was adamant that his lessor was the
original owner, Amethyst Pearl. Since there was
no contract between himself and ASB Realty.
9. In asserting his right to remain on the property
based on the oral lease contract with Amethyst
Pearl, Umale interposed that the lease period
agreed upon was "for a long period of time."
Umale further claimed that when his oral lease
contract with Amethyst Pearl ended, they both
agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed
that Umale did not have to pay rentals until the
sale over the subject property had been perfected
between them.
10. Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality
to recover the subject premises considering
that ASB Realty had been placed under
receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation
receiver had been duly appointed. Under the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), it is the
rehabilitation receiver that has the power to
"take possession, control and custody of the
debtor's assets." Since ASB Realty claims that it
owns the subject premises, it is its duly-
appointed receiver that should sue to recover
possession of the same.
11. ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for Umale
to have entered into a Contract of Lease with
Amethyst Pearl in 1999 because Amethyst Pearl
had been liquidated in 1996.
12. MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against
Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty
had no cause to seek Umale's ouster from the
subject property because it was not Umale's lessor.
MTC agreed with Umale that only the rehabilitation
receiver could file suit to recover ASB Realty's
property. Having been placed under receivership,
ASB Realty had no more personality to file the
complaint for unlawful detainer.
13. RTC reversed decision of the MTC. It found
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it
was indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease
contract with Umale. With respect to ASB Realty's
personality to file the unlawful detainer suit, the
RTC ruled that ASB Realty retained all its corporate
powers, including the power to sue, despite the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the
Interim Rules, the RTC noted that the rehabilitation
receiver was not granted therein the power to file
complaints on behalf of the corporation. Moreover,
the retention of its corporate powers by the
corporation under rehabilitation will advance the
objective of corporate rehabilitation, which is to
conserve and administer the assets of the
corporation in the hope that it may eventually be
able to go from financial distress to solvency.
14. Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC denied
reconsideration of its Decision and granted ASB
Realty's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
 Execution.
15. Umale then filed his appeal with the CA insisting
that the parties did not enter into a lease contract.
16. Pending the resolution thereof, Umale died and was
substituted by his widow and legal heirs. CA
affirmed RTC decision in toto.
Issue: Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly
authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to recover
an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the
fact that the corporation had already been placed under
rehabilitation?
HELD: The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its
officers.There is no denying that ASB Realty, as the owner of the
leased premises, is the real party-in-interest in the unlawful
detainer suit. Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB
Realty is incapacitated to file this suit to recover a corporate
property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed
rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is
the only one that can file the instant suit.
Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist
by operation of law. As a creature of law, the powers and
attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or
impliedly, in the law. Among the general powers granted by law
to a corporation is the power to sue in its own name. This
power is granted to a duly-organized corporation, unless
specifically revoked by another law. The question becomes: Do
the laws on corporate rehabilitation — particularly PD 902-A, as
amended and its corresponding rules of procedure — forfeit the
power to sue from the corporate officers and Board of
Directors?
Corporate rehabilitation is defined as "the restoration of the
debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is
shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible
and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation
continues as a going concern than if it is immediately
liquidated." This concept of preserving the corporation's
business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation
is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. This means
that the debtor corporation (the corporation undergoing
rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and corporate
officers, remains in control of its business and properties,
subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation
receiver. The concept of debtor-in-possession, is carried out
more particularly in the SEC Rules, the rule that is relevant to
the instant case. It states therein that the interim rehabilitation
receiver of the debtor corporation "does not take over the
control and management of the debtor corporation." Likewise,
the rehabilitation receiver that will replace the interim receiver
is tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the
rehabilitation plan. There is nothing in the concept of corporate
rehabilitation that would ipso facto deprive the Board of
Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation, such as
ASB Realty, of control such that it can no longer enforce its
right to recover its property from an errant lessee.
To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several
restrictions on the debtor corporation. The rules enumerate the
prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of
which involve some kind of disposition or encumbrance of the
corporation's assets) during the pendency of the rehabilitation
proceedings but none of which touch on the debtor
corporation's right to sue.
While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers
retain their power to sue to recover its property and the back
rentals from Umale, the necessity of keeping the receiver
apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this
Court. Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty, the
rehabilitation receiver has to be notified of the developments
in the case, so that these assets would be managed in
accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan.
Dumlao vs Quality PlasticsGR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on
February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria,
Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics
the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November
1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is
hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to
pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area
of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the
sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has
given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13,
1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria’s death. The
summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June
24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter
acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-
defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and
all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality
Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the
judgment against Oria and the execution against his land
(T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of
Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against
his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just
learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed.
The Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality
Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good
faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the

judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower court’s judgment
against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil
personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations was lost through death.

The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul
the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled
to claim attorney’s fees against the corporation.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set

aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is
declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's
land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M.

VELEZ, respondent.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990.

Facts:

On Sept. 27, 1988, respondent-brothers Vargas(es) filed a

petition for habeas corpus against Eugenio for forcibly taking
Vitaliana (respondents’ sister)from her residence in 1987 and
confined by the former in his palacial residence in Misamis
Oriental. The respondent-brothers, however, were not
knowledgeable of Vitaliana’s death on August 28, 1988 due to
heart failure, prior to their filing of the writ of habeas corpus.
Hence, Eugenio did not release the body of Vitaliana claiming
that the writ of habeas corpus is invalid because it was filed after
the death of Vitaliana. the respondent-brothers claimed that
there was no existing marital relationship between Eugenio and
Vitaliana and therefore they have the custody over the body of
the latter. The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse
or children of Vitaliana and that petitioner was merely a common
law spouse , her brothers and sisters have the custody. Also, it
was held that Eugenio was legally married to another woman.

Issue:

Whether the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to

her full blood brothers and sisters or her common law spouse.

Ruling:

The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. And

even if it was recognized, the co-ownership requires that the
man and the woman must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In this case, Eugenio was legally married to
another woman, which bars him from being legally capacitated to
contract marriages. Thye Civil Code of the Philippines defines
“spouse” as a lawfully wedded spouse not including common law
spouses. Hence, the custody of Vitaliana’s body is given to her
brothers and sisters.

VALINO vs ADRIANO et al.

 G.R. No. 182894; April 22, 2014; Mendoza, En Banc
DOCTRINE:
• The law confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner.
• Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in
the Philippines.
• It is generally recognized that the corpse of an
individual is outside the commerce of man. However,
the law recognizes that a certain right of possession
over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent
burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third
persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This
quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes
them to take possession of the dead body for purposes
of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or
to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory
of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This
is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario
Adriano in 1955. The couple had 5 children and 1 adopted child,
also impleaded herein as respondents. The marriage did turn
sour and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano continued
to support his wife and children.
Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted.
Atty. Adriano died and since his immediate family, including
respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself
to bury Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the
meantime, Respondents heard about the death and requested
Valino to delay the burial so they can pay their final respects, but
Valino still buried the body.
Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be
indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.
Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at
Valino's family's mausoleum and that the respondent's knew that
Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded to
the US on vacation. And that as far as the public was concerned,
Valino had been introducing her as his wife for the past 20 years.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit
as well as the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have
not been sufficiently proven.
CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was
entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband.
Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199
of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate
court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty
but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her
husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on
the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the
time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year
separation in fact.]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased
Atty. Adriano) are entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
HELD:
YES. The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the
burial with the respondents, to wit:
The duty and the right to make arrangements
for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for
support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In
case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a
better right. (New Civil Code Art. 305)
…
Whenever two or more persons are obliged to
give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art.
199)
…
No human remains shall be retained, interred,
disposed of or exhumed without the consent of
the persons mentioned in Articles [199 of the
Family Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art.
308)
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States when
he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had,
in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right
and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless.
It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of
man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent
burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who
have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising
out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also
authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for
purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or
to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the
dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right.
There can be no doubt that persons having this right may
recover the corpse from third persons.
JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO93 Phil 257
Facts: This was a summary proceeding to resolve the order of
the deaths of Joaquin Navarro Jr and his Angela. While the battle
for the liberation of Manila was raging, the whole familysought
refuge at the German Club. While staying there, it was set on fire
and the Japs wereshooting at the fleeing refugees. 3 daughters
were shot dead, Angela refused to leave the placewhile JN Jr,
wife, FL & JN Sr fled. JN jr was shot while coming out. Moments
later, theGerman Club collapsed. CA said that the mother died
before the son on the basis that she couldhave died immediately
after for a variety of causes.
Issue: Whether the mother died before JN Jr.
Held:
In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference
can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The
presumption that AJ died before her son was based on
speculations, notevidence. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by which civil cases aredecided, this
inference should prevail.
Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2)
indirect(3) circumstantial or (4)
inferential.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more
persons are called to succeed each other asto which of them died
first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed
that theydied at the same time, and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to another. In theRules of Court,
in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS
This case is about the Marcos family’s MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION to allow them to return to their home
country after the exile in response to the dismissal of the original
petition.
F A C T S :
On Sep 15, 1989, the Marcos family’s first petition to
allow them to return to their country was dismissed by a vote of
8 against 7, after the Court declared that President Aquino did
not act with grave abuse of discretion in barring the Marcoses
from returning as the same will pose a threat to national interest
and welfare. On Sep 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
In light of this, President Aquino proclaimed that for the order of
society, the remains of the former president will not be allowed
to return to the country until such time as the government shall
otherwise decide. The Marcoses filed a motion for reconsideration
on Oct 2, 1989 raising the following arguments against the
respondents:
1.To bar the Marcoses is to deny them the inherent right of
citizens to return to their country and protection of the rights
guaranteed to them as Filipinos under the Constitution
2. President Aquino has no power to bar a Filipino from his own
country, if she has, she exercised it arbitrarily
3. Imelda reinforced that President Aquino is not the “legal”
president of the Philippines
The Solicitor-General prays for the motion to be denied for lack
of merit as it is already moot and academic as to the deceased
former President Marcos.
I S S U E :
Does President Aquino have the power and legal basis to bar the
return of the Marcos family to their home country?
With the former president’s death, will barring the Marcos Family,
who claim to have inherent rights, from returning to the country
constitute a grave abuse of discretion?
H E L D :
The Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit.
1.There were no compelling reasons established by the
petitioners to allow a reconsideration
2. The death of Ferdinand Marcos did not change the factual
scenario as threats to the government, to which the return of the
Marcoses may provide catalytic effect, have not shown to be
ceased.
3.
a. The President has unstated residual powers from the grant of
executive power; she can exercise power from sources not
enumerated so long as not explicitly forbidden by the
constitutional text, which are needed for her to comply with her
duties under the current Constitution.
b. The present (1987) Constitution’s residual powers are distinct
from that of 1973’s pursuant to
Amendment 6, which allowed Marcos to stage the Martial Law in
that the latter allowed the President an “express” grant of power
as well as a “specific power of legislation” (Meaning he himself
can pass/amend/revise laws of any kind at any time
immediately)
4. President Aquino in barring the Marcoses is acting within her
jurisdiction to protect and promote the interest and welfare of
the people as latter’s “right” as a Filipino to return, incites a
“right” to destabilize the country and also a “right” to hide their
incessant orchestrated efforts at destabilization.
Dissenting Opinions
CRUZ: The security threat already died with Marcos, as he has
been reduced to a non-person.
PARAS: Though dead, the former president is still entitled to
some rights and the human rights of his widow and family
members still subsist. Alleged threats to national security
remained unproved. Our AFP can easily control any possible
uprising or military destabilization. In fact, if we do not allow the
remains to return, more trouble may be expected.o To grant the
petition may soften the hearts of the oppositionists, making way
for a united citizenry.
PADILLA: Constitution applies to all Filipinos, thus it is irrelevant
to say that the Constitution and human right to be buried in this
country would apply to all Filipinos except Mr. Marcos, because
he was a dictator and plunderer. Marcos’ supporters pose a
greater threat to peace and order with Marcos deprived of his
right to burial in the country.
SARMIENTO: President Aquino’s “residual” power to forbid
citizens from entering their country can’t be found in the
Constitution. President gives assurances to foreign investors of
the stability of the nation and the government’s capacity to quell
forces
Mercado and Mercado VS. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215
FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of
Jose Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs of his sister Margarita
Mercado; Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who pretended to be of
legal age to give their consent into the contract of sale of the
land they inherited from their deceased mother Margarita
Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on
sought for the annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and sold to her children is legally in possession of the latter
Josepha were minors during the perfection of contract.
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?

Ruling:
ISSUE:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors court and the Court of Appeals and denied the petition.
presented themselves that they were of legal age.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is
HELD:
essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following
The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of
were made and entered into by minors, who pretended to be of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it
legal age. The court stated that they will not be permitted to should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders
contracted by them, or to have them annulled. the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia
does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose
The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on his property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia,
estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6 paragraph A which states that petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the
“whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission, donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control
intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a of his mental facilities.
particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, cannot be Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of
permitted to falsify it. sound mind at that time and this condition continued to exist
until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was
valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever
FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA, she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove
respondents
 the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was
G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007. tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question
belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the
Facts: issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note
from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the that even if it prospered, the deed of donation was still a
Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it
military service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.
September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June
16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-
half of the real property through the execution of a document,
titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On December 11,

1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings
to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the
trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for
Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of
Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is
formerly the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to
be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes
sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her
children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as
Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as
damages against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed
of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano
never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred
that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to
her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound
mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On
August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court
and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient
evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time
he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.

Issue:

Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the

donation