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Imke Schröder is affiliated with University of California Center for Laboratory Safety, University of California-Los Angeles, 4th
floor Strathmore Building, 501 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA (Tel.: 310 794 5369; email: ischroeder@ehs.
ucla.edu).
Debbie Yan Qun Huang is affiliated with University of California-Los Angeles Jonathan and Karen Fielding School of Public
Health, Department of Biostatistics, USA.
Olivia Ellis is affiliated with University of California-Los Angeles Jonathan and Karen Fielding School of Public Health,
Department of Environmental Health Sciences, USA.
James H. Gibson is affiliated with University of Southern California, University Park Campus, 3434 S. Grand Avenue, CAL 120,
Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA.
Nancy L. Wayne is affiliated with University of California Center for Laboratory Safety, University of California-Los Angeles,
4th floor Strathmore Building, 501 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA and Office of the Vice Chancellor for
Research, University of California-Los Angeles, 2147 Murphy Hall, 410 Charles Young Drive East, Los Angeles, CA 90095,
USA.
12 ß Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society 1871-5532
Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2015.03.001
place a higher value on employees’ substances, and laboratory inspec- not developed to answer hypotheses,
safety relative to other priorities.3 tions by institutions’ health and safety but intended to inform about lab safety
However, near misses with potentially experts to ensure a safe working envi- knowledge and tools for safe experi-
dangerous consequences in govern- ronment; (4) personal protective mentation, researcher’s and organiza-
ment facilities have questioned safety equipment (PPE) such as a lab coat, tional risk safety atmosphere,
practices in government labs.4 Many eye protection and gloves that offers compliance behavior, and injury or
studies have demonstrated a positive a direct protective layer to research- incident experiences. Participants in-
impact of organizational safety climate ers.12,13 Dependent on the hazard ad- cluded laboratory researchers at vari-
and safety culture on safety out- ditional PPE is often required. PPE is ous professional levels from academia,
comes,5–9 however, little is known generally regarded as the last barrier to private industries, government labora-
how researchers in academic, govern- protect against harm from laboratory tories, and medical schools mainly in
mental and industry laboratories com- hazard if engineering and administra- the United States, but also in the Unit-
pare in their safety perception and tive controls fail or are ignored.13 ed Kingdom, Japan, China, and other
practices. Safety climate is described Wearing required PPE can be consid- countries. The initial analysis of the
as the perceptions of safety shared by ered a proxy for how well researchers survey was conducted by Nature Pub-
the workers and the management of a comply with safety policies.14 lishing Group, who highlighted that
facility or organization at a given time. Laboratory safety is generally regu- researchers generally have mixed atti-
It can be considered a temporal phe- lated by Occupational Safety and tudes toward lab safety standards, and
nomenon and subject to change. Safety Health Administration (OSHA) poli- that especially younger researchers
culture refers to an organization’s cies setting exposure limits to hazard- underestimate the risk in their labora-
commitment to safety, in which safety ous substances.15 Many states, tory.21
sets priority over other processes that including California, have developed The goal of this study is to examine
might be important to the organiza- their own job safety and health pro- the laboratory safety survey with focus
tion. Both safety climate and safety grams, which are approved and moni- on similarities and differences of per-
culture are placed in perspective in a tored by OSHA. Additional regulatory ceptions of safety climate and self-
review by Guldenmund10 and Wieg- policies exist for radiation and bioha- reported safety compliance behavior
mann et al.11 zards.16,17 However, safety practices between researchers working in aca-
Research scientists often include a differ extensively between institutions demic, government, and industry lab-
broad variety of hazardous substances as each facility generally develops its oratories. An optimal safety climate
or equipment in their experiments that own safety policies that are based on describes an organization’s safety per-
can place them at risk of injury if safety state and federal regulatory require- ception atmosphere, where employees
measures are not followed. It could be ments and best practices addressing and management place the same value
expected that laboratories in academic the specific hazards and risk levels in on safety at a particular moment in
institutions generally use smaller their workspaces. These site-specific time. Safety climate is recognized as
volumes of hazardous substances as policies often vary between academic, a robust leading indicator or predictor
compared to laboratories in industrial government, and industry research fa- of safety outcomes.22 To reduce het-
facilities, which often manipulate larg- cilities, and even between labs of the erogeneity based on cultural and coun-
er amounts of hazardous material for same facility.18 However, despite reg- try-dependent regulatory differences,
the development of scaled-up ulatory oversight, sometimes cata- only participants from the United
manufacturing processes. Laboratories strophic accidents happen.19 Incited States were included in this analysis.
operated by the federal government by recent accidents in academic labs,2 For the comparison of researchers
often conduct research on highly haz- the National Research Council of the from academic, government and in-
ardous materials such as explosives, National Academies recently released dustry laboratories understanding the
radioactive substances, and highly recommendations for an improved following questions were of particular
pathogenic organisms. safety culture at colleges and universi- interest:
Institutions operating research labs ties.18
generally protect their workers on four The focus of this study is to compare 1. What is researchers’ experience of
levels if hazards cannot be eliminated safety perception and practices of their lab safety training?
or substituted: (1) isolation by pre- researchers from academic govern- 2. How do researchers assess risks as-
venting access to personnel who do ment and industry labs, and the extent sociated with their work?
not work with the hazard; (2) engi- to which they adhere to safety mea- 3. How safe do researchers feel in lab-
neering controls to provide a safe, well sures required for their respective re- oratories?
ventilated work space that often in- search environments. Our results are 4. What are researchers’ attitudes to-
clude chemical fume hoods or based on the analysis of data of a re- ward compliance with PPE regula-
biosafety cabinets for working with cently performed comprehensive labo- tions?
hazardous chemicals and pathogens, ratory safety survey.20 The survey was 5. Does monitoring of safety activities
respectively; (3) administrative con- designed by the UC Center for Labora- by the PI or safety manager impact
trols to provide safety training, tory Safety, BioRAFT, and Nature Pub- PPE compliance and accidents in
access to information on hazardous lishing Group. Survey questions were the lab?
p = 0.038; Figure 1B). Thirty-five per- between the three institutions. The ma- safety. Less than half of all respondents
cent of all respondents received addi- jority of all respondents agreed that stated that their supervisor or PI regu-
tional lab safety training from their PI they were sufficiently trained to be larly monitors whether laboratory
or laboratory supervisor. Training by a compliant with lab safety regulations, duties are performed in a safe fashion
co-worker predominated for younger and also trained well enough to effec- using proper safety equipment (Figure
researchers and the lab environment tively minimize the risk of injury to 1C), suggesting that a number of PIs or
difference for co-worker training themselves and others in their lab (Fig- supervisors place little value on an ac-
shown in Figure 1B was no longer ure 1C). However, only 67% of tive involvement in lab safety.
significant when adjusted for age. Re- researchers stated that they were
search labs can vary greatly in the type trained in the safe use of the specific Risk Assessment and Perception
of hazards they house, and experi- hazards they included in their experi- Before analyzing participant’s risk per-
ments with hazards are highly individ- ments (Figure 1C). When asked wheth- ception, it was important to establish
ualized. Therefore, introducing a new er safety training in their organization whether or not respondents were ex-
student or research staff to laboratory focused on fulfilling compliance posed to hazardous materials or equip-
safety by an experienced fellow student requirements rather than on improving ment. All participants worked in labs
or staff is common practice in many laboratory safety, significantly fewer where hazards were used at least some
institutions. Other laboratory safety researchers from industry facilities of the time, and 76% of the respon-
training practices including training agreed as compared to researchers from dents stated that two or more hazards
provided by an outside company or academic and government labs were used frequently or very frequent-
when training on new, complex instru- (p < 0.001 for both; Figure 1C). This ly. Of all hazards listed, highly toxic or
mentation is required was reported suggests that industry researchers more mutagenic substances such as toxins
by 7% or fewer of all researchers (Fig- readily accept training as a benefit to and carcinogens were reported as most
ure 1B). their safety, or they are more compliant frequently used by 48% of researchers
Respondents’ perception of their lab with safety regulations regardless of across the three types of institutions
safety training was overall very similar its perceived usefulness in improving (Supplementary Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Laboratory safety training practices and perceptions in academic, government and industry laboratories. (A)
Respondents’ answers to the question ‘‘When do lab personnel receive new safety training?’’ Number of respondents is shown in
parentheses. (B) Respondents’ answers to the question ‘‘Who has provided you with lab safety training in your current lab?’’
‘‘Other’’ refers to additional, not specified training practices. Number of respondents is shown in parentheses. (C) Respondents’
perception of laboratory safety training; (Total number of respondents from academic labs are from left to right: 988, 987, 975,
987, and 500; total number of respondents from government labs are from left to right: 133, 132, 133, 133, and 64; total
number of respondents from industry labs are from left to right: 120, 120, 119, 120, and 43). All groups were compared to
each other. ‘‘a’’ indicates significant age bias of the data; when adjusted for age, group differences between lab environments
were no longer significant. ‘‘b’’ indicates significant age bias of the data; however, the significant difference between groups
remains even when adjusted for age (p < 0.01); ‘‘c’’ indicates significant group differences of responses that are not age biased
(p < 0.01).
When performing experiments with process and, thus, less prone to under- gauged their risk informally and 12%
hazardous substances or instrumenta- estimation of potential dangers that reported not to perform any type of
tion, a risk assessment should be con- could lead to accidents. About 52% risk assessment at all (x2 = 25.07,
ducted to inform of potential dangers and 43% of the researchers in govern- df = 2, p < 0.001 and x2 = 12.19,
and offer procedures for risk mitiga- ment and industry laboratories, re- df = 2, p = 0.002, respectively). Few
tion. Researchers’ risk perception to- spectively, stated that they used their researchers used their own format for
ward working with hazards is generally organization’s approved forms for risk risk assessment. Risk assessment tools
based on two factors that could influ- assessment (Figure 2). Informal risk offered by outside companies were not
ence risk taking behavior, i.e., an ob- assessment was performed by 36% commonly used, possibly because they
jective, formal risk assessment to government and 43% industry were not offered at most institutions.
quantitate risk exposure, and a subjec- researchers. In contrast, only 18% of Researchers’ personal risk percep-
tive awareness of potential dangers researchers in academic labs assessed tion is an important factor influencing
posed by the hazard.25,26 The more their risk with a university approved their risk taking behavior.25 The survey
formalized the risk of a hazard form (x2 = 93.34, df = 2, p < 0.001) was analyzed to compare how
is assessed the less subjective is the (Figure 2). Instead, 57% of them researchers perceive their own risk
Table 2. Analysis of Individual’s Risk Perception Versus Organization’s Risk Level (Own Risk – Org Risk) by ANOVA with
Responses Following a Five-Point Likert scale.
Organizationa n Mean Std Dev Std Err Min Max df t-Value p-value
Academia 831 0.26 0.73 0.03 4.0 3.0 830 10.25 <0.001
Government 124 0.38 0.79 0.07 4.0 1.0 123 5.33 <0.001
Industry 113 0.15 0.78 0.07 2.0 4.0 112 2.05 0.043
a
Researchers responding with ‘‘I don’t know’’ were not included in the analysis.
Table 3. Lab Safety Perceptions and Attitudes. p-Values were Calculated by Pearson’s Chi-Square.
Survey question Answer option Academic Government Industry p-value
labs labs labs
# # #
Feel safe in laboratory Strongly agree/agree 889 90% 125 95% 115 95% 0.226
Neither agree nor disagree 35 3% 7 5% 4 3%
Strongly disagree/disagree 67 7% 0 0% 2 2%
Characterization Takes precedent over all 691 67% 103 78% 92 77% 0.463
of safety in other lab duties/very
laboratory important
Equally important as 197 20% 24 18% 19 16%
experiment
Less important than 103 10% 6 4% 9 8%
experiment/low priority
Safety rules Strongly agree/agree 160 16% 39 30% 17 14% 0.004
negatively impact Neither agree nor disagree 194 20% 24 18% 22 19%
productivity Strongly disagree/disagree 636 64% 69 52% 80 67%
Safety rules interfere Strongly agree/agree 252 26% 49 37% 24 20% 0.017
with scientific Neither agree nor disagree 213 21% 22 16% 22 18%
discovery process Strongly disagree/disagree 519 53% 62 47% 74 62%