Malahacan v.

Ignacio certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the

settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs
Extrajudicial Settlement by Agreement and Two-Year lien
are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why
Facts: the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an
administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the
This action is an appeal from the judgment of CFI in favor of absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no
Malahacan, the administrator of Guillerma Martinez. The action is
right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate
brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels,
and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the only heirs at among the heirs.
law of the said deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of
which the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate
the defendants had been occupying for some years before the
commencement of this action.Issue:

Whether the administrator can institute the said action.

Held:

No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real
estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death.
Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this
suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that
said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the
immediate possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor
does it appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there
were debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her
death. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of
the heirs at law possession of the real estate of which his intestate
died seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the
debts of the deceased

When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly
no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement
and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of
lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate
should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator.
The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of
existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the
heirs."When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is
Arcillas v. Montejo
Facts:
Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased sought the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and
prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the
heirs. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act),
Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's
participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new
certificate of title. But before any other material pleading could be filed
with respect to this petition, five (5) other children of the deceased
filed a petition and prayed for the issuance of letters of administration
in favor of herein petitioner preparatory to the final settlement of the
deceased's estate. They also filed an opposition to Geronimo’s
petition. Geronimo on the other hand opposed the petition for letter of
administration arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only
property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the
petition for administration was improper.
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing the
administration proceedings upon averments that the estate left no
debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age.
Held:
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to
an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to
an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do -so if
they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said
section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the
use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the
framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in
other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word
may is used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an
intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs
(Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273). Having decided to
institute administration proceedings (as in the case at bar) instead of
resorting to the less expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e.
extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may
not be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under
section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that
the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may
deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary
expenses incurred thereafter are consequences which must be
deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so
that they may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters.
Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the "cadastral"
motion, supposedly brought under the authority of section 112 of Act
496, cannot be sustained. While this section authorizes, among
others, a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration.
or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that
registeredinterests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate have terminated and ceased," and apparently
the November 12 petition comes within its scope, such relief can only
be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.
In the instant case the obvious lack of unanimity among the parties in
interest, manifestly demonstrated by petitioners' express objection to
the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244, sufficiently removes the
November 12 petition from the scope of section 112 of Act 496.
Pereira v. CA
Facts:
Andes Pereira passed away without a will and was survived by his
sister and his wife of ten months. The sister filed a petition for the
issuance of letter of administration which was opposed by the wife
contending that there exist no estate of the deceased as she is the
sole beneficiary of the benefits received by the deceased from
different agencies and that the only real property of the deceased has
already been extra judicially settled between them as the only
surviving heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary
where there are no debts left by the decedent
Held:
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not preclude
the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate
has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different
course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the
heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a
person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings.” Now, what constitutes “good reason” to warrant a
judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are
all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.
There are only two surviving heirs in this case, a wife of ten months
and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of
the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent that these two
heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private
respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain
possession of the alleged properties” of the deceased for her own
purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of
petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of
the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate
a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased.
To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left
has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no
useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, the
claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors,
should there be any, are protected in any event. We, therefore, hold
that the court below before which the administration proceedings are
pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there
being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding.
Pada-Kilario v. CA
Facts:
Respondent Silverio Pada filed an ejectment case against sps. Kilario.
The latter occupies a portion of the intestate estate of Jacinto Pada,
Grandfather of Silverio. The Kilario’s have been living therein since
1960 by sheer tolerance. When Jacinto Pada dies, his heirs entered
into extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1951. As a result thereof, lot
5581 was allocated to Ananias and Marciano who became co-owners
of said lot.
Ananias died and his daughter succeeded in his right as co-owner.
Eventually, Juanita sold her right in the co-ownership to Engr.
Paderes. Mariaon the other hand, heir of Marciano, sold her share to
her cousin respondent Silverio Pada. The latter demanded sps. Kilario
to vacate but the sps. refused.On June 1995, a complaint for
ejectment was filed against sps. Kilario. On July1995 a deed of
donation in their favor was executed by heirs of Amador Pada.
ISSUE: Whether or not the partition was valid
Held:
The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his
heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private
document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and
be registered in order to be valid. The object of registration is to serve
as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity
of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take
into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first
place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property
need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as
regards the heirs that participated therein. The extrajudicial partition
which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they
discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it
is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests.
As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that
there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid.
No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against
the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs
should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the
heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners
after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the
1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to
Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. The donation made
by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they
were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the
heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951
extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set
in.Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their
Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960
without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and
tolerance of the Pada family. Their admissions are evidence of a high
order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the
subject property is concerned.
McMicking v. Sy
Facts:
One Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator of the estate of
Margarita Jose. Mariano Ocampo became one of the sureties of
Engracio Palanca. After the execution of the bond, said Palanca took
possession of all the property of Margarita Jose. Later on, Mariano
Ocampo died, testate. Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator
of the estate of Mariano Ocampo while Pio de la Guardia Barretto
(defendant) qualified as one of the sureties of said Doroteo Velasco.
Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete
report and inventory of the property of the deceased, together with a
statement of all his debts and liabilities. The Court of First Instance
affirmed and approved the partition. Pursuant to such agreement and
order of the court approving the same, Doroteo Velasco, delivered to
the devisees and legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of
said decedent leaving in the hands of said administrator no property
or thing of value whatever belonging to said estate.
Meanwhile, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as
administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, and Jose McMicking
(plaintiff) was appointed in his stead. Said Palanca was removed from
office by reason of the fact that he failed and refused to render an
account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita
Jose. At the time of his removal he was indebted to the estate in the
sum of P41,960.15.
For the default of Engracio Palanca, Mcmicking filed a claim in the
amount of 30,000 to the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto as the
surety of Doroteo Velasco who is the administrator of the estate of
Mariano Ocampo who in turn is the surety of said Engracio Palanca.
The lower court dismissed the case and rendered judgment in favour
of defendant.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff may claim against the defendant as the surety of
Doroteo Velasco.
Ruling: No.
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court based their decision
upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de
la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself
had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not
liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.
At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stand
sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as
follows:
"SEC. 596.Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings,
in certain cases. — Whenever all the heirs of a deceased person are
of lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the
intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs
may, by a family council as known under Spanish law, or by
agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion
and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.
"SEC. 597.In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall
appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and
distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the
estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter
provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the
administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the
estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying
the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain
charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years
after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may
have been made."
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property
of the decedent without proceedings in court. The provisions which
they contain are extremely important. The wisdom which underlies
them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of every people which
maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who
owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for
the most urgent and imperative reasons and then only so long as is
necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons effective.
It is a principle of universal acceptance which declares that one has
the instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it is only
in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature
that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which
underlies it. The force which gave birth to this stern and imperious
principle is the same force which destroyed the feudal despotism and
created the democracy of private owners.
expense; and a system which consumes any considerable portion of
the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure. It being
undoubted that the removal of property from the possession of its
owner and its deposit in the hands of another for administration is a
suspension of some of his most important rights of property and is
attended with an expense sometimes entirely useless and
unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided whenever and
wherever possible.
As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on
an administrator's bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The
liability of the principal precedes that of the surety. If Velasco incurred
no liability, then his surety incurred none.

These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal

construction so that the intent of the framers may be fully carried out.
They should not be straitened or narrowed but should rather be given
that wideness and fullness of application without which they cannot
produce their most beneficial effects.

Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of administration of

these Islands, they are the first provisions to which our attention is
directed in seeking a legal method for the division and distribution of
the property of deceased persons. They are thus made prominent.
And justly so. The purpose which underlies them, as we have already
intimated, is to put into one's hands the property which belongs to him
not only at the earliest possible moment but also with the least
possible expense. By permitting the partition and division without
proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially all expense and
waste are saved. This is as it should be. The State fails wretchedly in
its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the division
and distribution of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome,
unwieldy and expensive that a considerable portion of the estate is
absorbed in the process of such division. Where administration is
necessary, it ought to be accomplished quickly and at very small
Gerona v. de Guzman
Facts:
The petitioners in this case are the grandchildren of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman in his first marriage while the respondents are
the children in the second marriage. The said respondents allegedely
succeeded in partitioning and acquiring titles on the 7 parcels of land
of Marcelo after his death through fraud and so the petitioners were
deprived of their share. In their action for the cancellation of the said
certificate of title, the court found that although the petitioners are the
legitimate grandchildren of Marcelo, their action has already
prescribed.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of
the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of
the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations, of action;
that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein
prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud
perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or
1957; and. that accordingly, said period, had not expired when the
present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner’s action has prescribed.
Held:
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an
action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only
as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under
an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases,
from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of
the property. When respondents executed the aforementioned deed
of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs
of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates
of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from
the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse
to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the
annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with
fraud.
It is .already settled in this -jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance
of real property based upon a constructive or impIied trust, resulting
from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Inasmuch as
petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial
settlement" upon the-ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of
the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case
at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the
name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of
extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole
world.
Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed. until 4 November 1958,
or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of
age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have discovered defendants'
fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the said
date within which to file this action, Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona
became of age on 8 December 1949 or after the registration of the
deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the remainder of
the period of 4 years from December 1949 within which to commence
her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9
January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge
(even if only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on
25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona became of legal age
on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the time he
gained knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement on 25 June
1948. Francisco Gerona and Delfin Gerona had, therefore, two years
after the removal of their disability within which to commence their
action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190),
that is, January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August
1954, with respect to Delfin.
PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated
proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of
herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted the
petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Private
respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before
the CFI of Ozamiz City. CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity
of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said
decision to the Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, the
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent
Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption
of petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn,
to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter
refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they
were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to
annul the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amended on March
25, 1987 to include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants,
but the same failed. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2)
whether or not said deed is valid
HELD:
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is
not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is
four (4) years. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was
filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the
questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the
basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on
publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof. Under said provision, without the participation of all persons
involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be
binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must
be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is
agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which
was when publication was done in the instant case.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed
of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of
fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including
some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same,
is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together
with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of
Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of
the Civil Code. The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that
they were not aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even filed an
action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that
their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still
being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The
complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26)
years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response
to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The
decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it
is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in
bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in

question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the
present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who
were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the
rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition
was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not
correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the
partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941. To
say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning
is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at
the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests
and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a
sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal
shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguels
estate but only Pilars estate.

Petition is GRANTED.
ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS. CARREON
FACTS:
Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal
summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M. Francisco.
Alleging that they had three minor children who were his legal heirs,
and that the deceased left a parcel of land with house thereon, and no
creditors, she asked for declaration that the persons entitled to share
in his estate are the said three minor children, with herself as
usufructuary. She requested for appointment as guardian ad item of
her three minor children, and her request was granted in due course.
Petition was approved and was registered.
Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the
sisters Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon and was duly registered.
Afterwards, she conveyed by absolute deed of sale, to the aforesaid
creditors, her interest and participation in the land. This sale was
likewise inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds.
However, in a motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, mother of
the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in representation of the
minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, averred that this minor was a
recognized natural son of the deceased, with legal right to participate
in his estate, that the previous proceedings were void because Rosa
Aldana Francisco had concealed such fact, and because she had
interests in conflict with those of her three sons, the truth being that
the land was private property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could
not have been awarded a portion in fee simple.
When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria
Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal, without prejudice, of
Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition. Her request
was granted.
Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration,
contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter became
a closed incident. Thereafter, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, as
guardian ad item of the three legitimate, submitted an "amended
motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations of her
previous motion and prayed for identical remedies — except those
touching the recognition of Jose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling
objections, the court admitted the amended motion, heard it granting
the interested parties opportunity to present their evidence and
arguments, and rendered judgment holding the realty was private
property of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four
years before his marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it held that the
whole property passed to the ownership of the three legitimate
children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of the widow;
it annulled the mortgage and the sale executed by Rosa Aldana in
favor of the Carreon sisters, and then issued other appropriate
instructions to the Register of Deeds.
ISSUES:
WON the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for
reopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn from the
litigation and (2) in taking cognizance of the annulment of the
mortgage and sale, which it could validly consider as a probate court.
HELD:
Supposing the original motion did not afford legal standing to the three
legitimate children, and that it could not be "amended", as contended
by appellants, we perceive no reason to prevent the court below from
considering such amended motion as a new and independent petition
in the expediente, filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children.
The matter of time might conceivably be material in regard in
considering the "amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this
case it happens to be immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74
such motion may be lodged with the court within one year after the
minors have reached majority; and they are still minors now.
Incidentally this section 5 fully answers appellants' contention that
Tiburcia's moves should have been initiated within two years after
November 8, 1947.
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for
readjustment or reopening could take place only within two years as
prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate
of title; because they are conclusively presumed to know the
existence and provisions of section 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge
correctly observed:
But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with the
encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74, Section 4,
and did not specifically mention section 5, the fact that section 4, Rule
74 was therein noted should have been sufficient warning to them that
the title was subject to the interest of persons unduly prejudiced
hereby. We take judicial notice of the fact that in the adjudication in
summary settlements more often that not, the order merely says that
the sale shall be subject to the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This is
the case because the Court can not foresee whether the movant
would be affected; but section 5 being an imposition of the law, and
being a mere sequence to the provisions of Section 4; we hold that
where the title on its face shows that it was subject to the provisions of
Rule 74, section 4, a third person who accepts it must take notice that
he is running the risk of interferring with the rights of minors as
provided under section 5, Rule 74.
The resolution under review apportions property admittedly belonging
to the decedent among his legal heirs. It is no objection that it affects
the herein appellants. They knew or ought to know the rule permitting
such to reapportionment even after two years, and they have been
given every chance to be heard, having been by their own petition,
regarded as parties to the entire proceedings. And section 4, Rule 74
(which must be deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5,
Rule 74) expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful
participation in the real estate "notwithstanding any transfers of such
real estate" and to "issue execution" thereon. All this implies that,
when within the amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the
court in re-dividing it among the heirs has authority to direct
cancellation of such alienation in the same estate proceedings,
whenever it becomes necessary to do so. To require the institution of
a separate action for such annulment would run counter to the letter of
the above rule and the spirit of these summary settlements.
From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial error
was committed by the lower court, whose order is, consequently,
affirmed with costs.

Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be directed

against the bond which, according to appellants, should have been
demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because that section applies
where personal property is distributed — not where, as here, realty is
the subject of partition.

Several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding some
of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the decedent, some
parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue which must be decided in a separate suit". But here there is no
question that the realty belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit
was unnecessary, specially remembering that in these summary
settlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and
"without delay" "to determine who are the persons legally entitled to
participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them."
SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondents.
Facts:
• Teodoro Tolete died, leaving his wife and nephews and nieces
who are children of his deceased brothers and sisters.
• His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating saying that
Teodoro had no children or dependents, neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces..
• Then, his wife sold the property to Sampilo, then Sampilo sold
it to Salacup.
• Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of
administration. She alleged that Teodoro’s wife, Leonicia de Leon has
no right to execute the affidavit of self adjudication for there are other
heirs aside from her.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Sinopera. The CA modified the
ruling stating that the affidavit of Leonicia is null and void, but the
subsequent sales are valid insofar as it is not above Leonicia’s share
from Teodoro’s estate.
Issues:
The petitioners now argue that Sinopera’s cause of action has already
prescribed because according to the rules of court, person’s deprived
of their right due to the partition or self adjudication must bring their
action within two years from the date of partition or self-adjudication.
Is their contention correct?
Held:
No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in the said
proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have the
chance to participate.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. in
Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all
of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This
requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act
No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title
of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are Indicated was the
persons to answer for right violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On
the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly
of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not
take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot
be any doubt that those who took part or bad knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear
that if they claim to have been in any manner ,deprived of their lawful
right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may
demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both
"the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or
interest. Evidently, they are the persons who, in accordance with the
provision, may seek to remedy the prejudice to their rights within, the
two-year Period. But as to those who did not take part in the
settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the
setlement, there is no direct or express provision, and it is
unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their
claims within the period extend the effects of the settlement to the
two years. To to them, to those who did no t take part or had no
knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect,
would be violative of the fundamental right to due Process law.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of exrajudicial
settlement or by affidavit, is ail ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution
would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death
of the decedent or of the extrajudicialy settlement or affidavit,
especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by
implication. We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and
there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on which the
ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.

The two year rule is applicable only:

(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition,

(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly

complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians.

The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all
the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement,
the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left, aside from
his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
RULE 75 Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary
US VS. CHIU GUIMCO
FACTS:
Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the
municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting
China. Before his departure from the Philippines he had executed a
will before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Guimco
and Co-Iden were named as executors. Chiu Guimco is Joaquin
Cruz’s brother.
Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his
deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his brother’s
Filipina wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to the estate for a
consideration. He also entered into an agreement with Uy Cuan, his
brother’s Chinese wife, for the distribution of the estate and for the
payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate. No payments
have, however, been made by Guimco.
Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to
Guimco urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the
institution of lawful proceedings in accordance therewith. Guimco
replied that the will in question had never been in his possession and
that he had never seen it.
A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil
Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the will within
the time required by law. The court found the accused guilty and
imposed upon him a fine of P1800. Subsequently, the court, believing
that the will was in his possession, ordered him to produce it but
Guimco still failed to do so. The court ordered the confinement of
Guimco in the provincial jail.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered the
commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?
RULING:
No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of Rule
75), which allows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver a
will after the death of the testator without reasonable cause, can only
be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over
the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where
administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before
taking action under this section, should require that there be before it
some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make
action by the court under this section appropriate.
The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is
clearly a totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided
in section 628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a
prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine
therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed
under Sec. 629.
To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under
Sec. 628 would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere
production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had
possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would
constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in a
criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against
himself.
GUEVARRA VS. GUEVARRA

Facts:

1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various

bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a
legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he
acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for
probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared
that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to
invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her

legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the
acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption
that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated.
She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be
disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's

theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and

considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the
decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is
mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy. Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for
without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
may be rendered nugatory - See more at:
http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2013/02/guevara-v-guevara-
digest.html#sthash.L4WNF9fM.dpuf
PALACIOS VS. CATIMBANG-PALACIOS
FACTS:
June 25, 1946 - Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament.
Availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed on
May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition
for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural
children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios.
June 21, 1956 - an opposition was filed by Maria Catimbang to the
probate of the will. Ground: she is the acknowledged natural daughter
of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus
impairing here legitime. She objects to its intrinsic validity or to the
legality of the provisions of the will.
July 6, 1956 – court issued an order ADMITTING the will to probate.
After proper hearing concerning the intrinsic validity of the will, the
court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child
of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime,
with costs against petitioner.
Petitioner appealed in order to secure the probate of his will availing
himself of the provisions of Article 838 (2) NCC, which permit a
testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the
allowance of his will.
ISSUE:
WON the opposition can be entertained/heard.
RULING:
NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if
the purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an
acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will
for issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is
especially so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive
and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the
effects thereof after his death.
In Montañano vs. Suesa, court said: "The authentication of the will
decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these
points remain entirely un-affected, and may be raised even after the
will has been authenticated."
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime
of a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before he has had a chance to present such petition,
the ordinary probate proceedings after the testator's death would be in
order".The reason for this is that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article
777, new Civil Code.).
Trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the
portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor
on the ground that, as it has found, she is an extraneous matter which
should be treshed out in a separate action.
FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA
FACTS:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned
for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in a Special Proceeding,
admitting to probate the alleged last will and testament of the
deceased, and overruling the opposition to the probate.
On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent), submitted to
the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22,
1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of
the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time,
Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month
later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all
claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the
probate asked. Grounds: forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix,
estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two
deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the
testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but conveyances
were finally set aside by this Supreme Court.
CFI: will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution
on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we
shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or
when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely
presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration,
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation
be considered and resolved.
Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for
the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise
the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
1960, the CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole
purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on
February 9, 1960.
On the question of whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of
sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary
heir, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked
the latter, the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by
the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate
had become final for lack of appeal.
(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin overruling the
estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final.
(c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been
impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of
the proponent.
RULING:
(a) It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles
all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As
such, the probate order is final and appealable; Section 1 of Rule 109
specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order
or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue: they were entitled to await the trial Court's
resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an
appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the
higher Courts. This contention is without weight.
The probate decree of the Court was not appealed on time, the same
had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no
longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is
made to rest.
The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express
one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not
affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked
testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
(b) The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public
policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed
wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the
decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver
the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for
its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow
public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
(c) Article 957(2) of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of
1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter
case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to
the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again
belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract,
the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the
reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the
right of repurchase.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such
change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed
in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that
the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor
of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. As found by the Court of
Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances, "no
consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on
account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful
whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely
intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her
testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.
Revocation being an exception, we believe, that in the circumstances
of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
does not apply to the case at bar.
If the annulment was due to undue influence, then the transferor was
not expressing her own free will and intent in making the
conveyances. Hence, it cannot be concluded, either, that such
conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.
The recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the
nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy. An alienation
through undue influence in no way differs from one made through
violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing
his real intent, and it cannot be held that there was in fact an
alienation that could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.
Appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
PASCUAL VS COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Canuto together with other people including his two siblings Catalina
and Victorino were co-owners of a parcel of land. Canuto had the said
subdivided and had 2,670 sq mts of the said lot under his name. After
which he executed a deed of absolute sale supported by the joint
affidavit of his children in favor of Consolacion for his share on the
said lot, However Consolacion was able to register in her name the
title of all the 2,670 sq mts lot in 1968.
In 1988, Remedios niece of Canuto sought to annul the title obtained
by Consolacion alleging that Catalina devised the said property to her
in her last will and testament.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners claimed that the basis of the action is fraud,
and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within lour years from
the registration of CONSOLACION’s title on 28 October 1968 and not
some 19 years later on 4 February 1988. REMEDIOS opposed the
motion, claiming that she became aware of CONSOLACION’s
adverse title only in February 1987. CONSOLACION maintained that
she had timely filed her complaint within the four-year prescriptive on
4 February 1988.
Issue:
(1) whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS, and
(2) whether REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest.
Held:
What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but
the same is already barred by prescription. Prescriptive Period is 10
Years Counted From Registration of Adverse Title The four-year
prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the
fraud does not give rise to an implied trust, and the action is to annul a
voidable contract under Article 139012 of the Civil Code. In such a
case, the four-year prescriptive period under Article 139113 begins to
run from the time of discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud. In the present case, REMEDIOS does not
seek to annul the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS does not assail the
KASULATAN as a voidable contract. In fact, REMEDIOS admits the
validity of the sale of 1,335 square meters of land under the
KASULATAN. However, REMEDIOS alleges that the excess area of
1,335 meters is not part of the sale under the KASULATAN.
REMEDIOS seeks the removal of this excess area from TCT No.
(232252) 1321 that was issued to CONSOLACION. Consequently,
REMEDIOS’ action is for “Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate [of Title] and Damages.” REMEDIOS’ action is based on an
implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of
the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was
without basis. In effect, REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION
acquired the additional 1,335 square meters through mistake or fraud
and thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property.
Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten years under Article
1144 and not four years under Articles 1389 and 1391. It is now
well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained
by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article
145615 of the Civil Code, is ten years pursuant to Article 1144.16 This
ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse
party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when
the adverse party registers the land. REMEDIOS filed her complaint
on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after CONSOLACION
registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October 1968.
Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS’ complaint. REMEDIOS is
also not a real party-in-interest who can filethe complaint, as the trial
court correctly ruled. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or suffer from
the judgment in the suit.25 If one who is not a real party-in-interest
brings the action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of action.26
REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its
one­half portion) on the devise of these lots to her under CATALINA’s
LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the probate court did
not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS
does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS
admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C208 is still pending.27
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that “[N]o will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.” This Court has interpreted this provision to
mean, “until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and
no right can be claimed thereunder.”28 REMEDIOS anchors her right
in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINA’s LAST WILL.
However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINA’s LAST
WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL.
REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust
over these lots.
IN RE JOHNSON
Espino, Carla
FACTS:
Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States. He died in the city of Manila leaving a will. The will is
an holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead
of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. A petition, however, was presented in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground
that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in
accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be
probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three
weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin."
Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court.
However, after the will had been probated, her daughter from first
marriage, Ebba Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree of
probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing
the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole
legitimate heir of her father. She contended, among others, that the
order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to her. In
the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the
court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she
was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore,
insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of
the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner to be
present either in person or by representation; and it is said that the
failure of the court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes
an infringement of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared
that property shall not be taken without due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order admitting the will to probate was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and void because it was made without notice
to the petitioner;
RULING:
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
In the case of In re Davis, the Court ruled that "the proceeding as to
the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of
things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character
of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding
where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an
exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as
depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the
proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the
ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was
unreasonably short."
Further, section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
“Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a
reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.” The use of the word
"judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section indicates an
intention on the part of the Legislature to give wide latitude to the
remedy here provided, and is not to be restricted to judgments or
orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation. In other words the
utility of the provision is not limited to actions proper but extends to all
sorts of judicial proceedings. The word "party," used in this section,
means any person having an interest in the subject matter of the
proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by the judgment,
order, to other proceeding taken.

Therefore, also in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis

case, the petitionerin this case could have applied at any time within
six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had been
precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions
over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will to
probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon
a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have
been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is
no doubt true that six months was, under the circumstances, a very
short period of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and
be prepared to contest the probate with the proof which she might
have desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although
the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently
short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in
this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here
appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order
admitting the will to probate.It follows that the order of March 16,
1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate cannot be
declared null and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably
prevented from appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of
the probate of the will in question.
MANAHAN VS. MANAHAN
FACTS:
The petitioner, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No.
4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan.
The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice
required by law was accordingly published. It, later on, entered the
decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was
probated on September 22, 1930 and appointed the herein petitioner
as the executrix. On May 11, 1932, the appellant herein, Engracia
Manahan, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying
that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the
authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. She claimed that
she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as
such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of
the will.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to and should have
been notified of the probate of the will: and
(2) No. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceedings. Also, inasmuch as the
proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial
court's decree admitting the will to probate was effective and
conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section
306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
SEC. 306.EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect
to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; . . . .

(2) Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the ground
that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure
have not been complied with in the execution thereof.

RULING:

(1) The appellant's contention is obviously unfounded and untenable.

She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and
neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an
interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the
probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir,
being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be
notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the
appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced
heir, she did not acquire any successional right.
ALABAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the
Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado a.
ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of
her will. b. RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of the will and
directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent
Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the
probate proceedings a. CLAIMs: 1) they are the intestate heirs of the
decedent. 2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to
non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and
lack of notice to the other heirs.
will could not have been probated because: a) the signature of the
decedent was forged; b) the will was not executed in accordance with
law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause;
c) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish
a will; d) the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure; e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at
the time of affixing of her signature; and f)she did not know the
properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties
which no longer belonged to her. b. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion 1)
petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and
that the deficiencyin the payment of docket fees is not a ground for
the outright dismissal of the petition. 2) RTC’s Decision was already
final and executory even before petitioners’ filing of the motion to
reopen 3. Petitioners filed a petition to annule RTC’s decision
a.CLAIM: there was a compromise agreement between petitioners
and respondents and they learnt the probate proceeding only in July
2001 b.CA’s RULING: petition dismissed 1) no showing that
petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of
newtrial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of their own.
ISSUE:
W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure
to mention the petitioners asparties
RULING:
No 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem a. Under the Rules
of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other personinterested in the estate may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must
bepublished for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator b. Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the
notice of hearing 2.The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion
for new triala.The ruling became final and executor because the
motion was filed out of time. Given that they knew of the decision 4
months after they could have filed a petition for relief from judgment
after the denial of their motion to reopen. 3. Petition for annulment of
judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive
requisites, a. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
was rendered. PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment
set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. 4. Notice is
required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator a. the will states that the respondent was
instituted as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate or
personally notify them.
RULE 76 Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Santos v. Castillo
FACTS:
Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian of the minor
acknowledge natural children of the deceased, filed a petition for
probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. She also filed a motion for the
appointment of a special administrator. At the hearing, respondents
Jose, Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores, legitimate children of the
deceased filed their opposition, on the ground that the court had not
acquired jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner's allegations being
insufficient to confer jurisdiction because she did not allege that she
had the custody of the will, and therefore, was not entitled to present it
for probate and furtherance because the will that should be probated
is the original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the
petitioner. Petitioner filed an amended petition prayingthat
respondents be required to present the copies of the will and the
codicil in their possession. Court issued an order denying the petition
for the appointment of a special administrator by petitioner and
ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the last will and testament
and all other documents in relation thereto, to deliver said papers to
the court within the date from notice. Consequently, petitioner filed a
motion praying that her amended petition be admitted. However,
before this motion was decided, respondents, after their father's
death, presented the original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that
they be admitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing the
petition filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court acquired
jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will shall
pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed.
For this purpose, section 626 provides that the person who has the
custody of he will shall, within 4 days after he knows of the death of
the testator, deliver the will to the court which has jurisdiction, or to the
executor named in the will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive
means to compel a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to
the court which has jrisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceased
designated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directed his
nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to keep one in
his possession, and to turn over the other two copies to his son Jose
Azores, with instructions to the effect that if petitioner or his son failed
to present said will for probate, Manuel should take charge of
presenting it to the court. +aking everything into account therefore, it
is of the court's vieww that Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had
the custody of the will because the original thereof was turned over to
him. For the sake of argument, however, admitting that the testator
had designated nobody as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied
that his act of subsequentl$ making a codicil and entrusting the
custody thereof to his legitimate children, clearly modified his last will.
In this sense, the custody of both is entrusted to his legitimate children
and not to Manuel Azores or to petitioner. Hence, as the legitimate
children of the deceased had custody of the originals of the will and of
the codicil, they alone could, had the right and where bound by law to
apply for the probate of their father' last will. In order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for
the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the
application must allege, in addition to the residence of the deceased
and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant is
the executor in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to
be probated. The original of said document must be presented or
sufficient reasons given to justify the nonrepresentation of said
original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof.
Inasmuch as these requisites had not been complied with in the
application filed by the petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed
in jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.
PEREZ VS. PEREZ
FACTS:
On May 25, 1973, the plaintiffs-appellants executed a deed of real
estate mortgage in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines
over the property located in Bataan as security for an agricultural loan
of P6,500.00. The mortgage contract was registered in the Registry of
Deeds of Bataan. The plaintiffs failed to pay their obligation which
prompted DBP in extrajudicially foreclosing the property. the
application was filed And the necessary notice of Sheriffs sale was
issued and posted by the deputy sheriff at three (3) public places in
Morong, Bataan, where the mortgaged property is located and duly
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Olongapo News. On
December 19, 1978, the public auction sale was conducted at the
municipal building in Morong, Bataan, wherein Democrito Perez
emerged as the winning bidder for P11,000.00. Certificate of sale in
favor of Democrito Perez was issued and registered in the Registry of
Deeds. Since plaintiffs-appellants failed to exercise their right to
redeem the foreclosed property, original defendant Democrito Perez
executed an affidavit of consolidation which resulted in the issuance
of a new TCT. On 1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public Auction
Sale with Damages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against the
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga, Bataan.
The case was dismissed. Petitioners filed an appeal alleging that the
RTC erred in holding that the public auction sale of the subject
mortgaged property was valid despite the lack of notice to them, thus,
depriving them of their right to property without due process of law.
They further alleged that the notice of public auction sale was not
validly published in a newspaper of general circulation, as required by
law. But CA affirmed RTC's decision. Motion for reconsideration was
filed but the same was denied.
ISSUE/s:
WHETHER THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS ON POSTINGS. WHETHER THERE WAS NO
PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
WHERE THE REAL PROPERTY IS SITUATED.
RULING:
No. The requirement on the posting of notices is found in Section 3 of
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, viz: Sec. 3. Notice shall
be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in
at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four
hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city. Their position that the puericulture center and
the municipal building should be considered one and the same place
because they were located in one place is pure fallacy and totally
unacceptable for being contrary to the actual state of things. The
petitioners further contend that even after the sheriff had posted the
notice, he may not have posted it anymore for the remaining nineteen
(19) days, as required by Act No. 3135. It could also be, according to
petitioners, that after the notice was posted, the same may have been
removed from where it was posted either by an act of man or by an
act of nature. But such contention was not supported with evidence.
As correctly held by the trial court and the appellate court, the deputy
sheriff has in his favor the presumption that his official duty was
regularly performed. The petitioners herein were unable to topple this
presumption in the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now in this
Court. -No. To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that
it is published for the dissemination of local news and general
information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers; and that it is published at regular intervals. The
newspaper must not also be devoted to the interests or published for
the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race
or religious denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest
circulation so long as it is of general circulation. Based from the
testimonies of the witnesses, it was proven that Olongapo News was
indeed a newspaper of general circulation. That although in 1978, it
was not published in Morong, Bataan, under P.D. No. 1079, it is
categorical that in the event there is no newspaper or periodical
published in the locality, the same may be published in the newspaper
or periodical published, edited and circulated in the nearest city or
province. Since no newspaper of general circulation was being
published in Morong, Bataan, in the year 1978, then the respondents
were right in availing themselves of the services of the Olongapo
News, which, as found by the trial court, was the nearest publication
in Bataan.
DE ARANZ VS. GALING
FACTS:
On 3 March 1986, private respondent Joaquin R-Infante filed RTC
Pasig a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and
testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition
specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees
and devisees. The probate court issued an order setting the petition
for hearing. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor
appeared. The hearing was then reset and private respondent
presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the
testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the
proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that, as named legatees, no
notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days
within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. This was
denied by the Court. Petition for certiorari was filed and referred to CA
which was also dismissed. Hence, present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the requirement of notice on
heirs, legatees, and devisees is merely a procedural convenience to
satisfy the requirements of due process?
RULING:
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads: SEC. 4. Heirs,
devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.
— The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in
the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post
office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days
before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of
the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as
executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-
executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known.
Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before
the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing. It is clear from the
aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their
places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no
question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and
devisees were known to the probate court. But despite such
knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be
sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the
will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for
three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Basa v. Mercado
Facts:
By virtue of an order, Judge Reyes allowed and probated the will of
Basa, wherein the administrator under the said will was declared as
the only heir of the deceased. After the administration proceeding was
closed, the petitioner-appellant in this case filed a motion for the
reopening of the said proceeding alleging that the court lacked
jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply
with requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing
prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The appellants claimed that the first publication was made on June 6
and the third on June 20 and that the hearing was conducted on the
27th of the same month, only 21 days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the
hearing. Hence, the “three weeks successively” required by the code
was not complied with.
bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at
regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be
made in said paper precisely because it was a "newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Pampanga", No attempt has been made
to prove that it was a newspaper devoted to the interests or published
for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling,
race or religious denomination.
The fact that there is another paper published in Pampanga that has a
few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies
also have a larger circulation in that province is unimportant.
The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in
the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with
the largest number of subscribers. No fixed number of subscribers is
necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.

Issue:

Whether the notice should be published for three full weeks before the
date set for the hearing on the will.

Whether Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published,

was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

Held:

It is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (taken from Code of Civil procedure of the State of
Vermont) does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be
published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on
the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be
made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing.

The record shows that the newspaper in question is a newspaper of

general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a
Maninang v. CA
Facts:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her
properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family
Clemencia had lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will also
provided that she does not consider her niece Bernardo as his
adopted son. Maninang filed a petition for probate of the said will,
while Bernardo instituted an intestate proceeding. The two cases were
consolidated and subsequently the testate case was dismissed on
motion of Bernardo alleging that the holographic will was null and void
because, as the adopted son and the only compulsory heir, he was
preterited and there intestacy should ensue.
probated, the court should meet the issue because the probate of a
will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. (Nuguid and Balanay Case)
Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is
insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of
the Will demanded. Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled
that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the
parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for
resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent’s Will, private
respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter,
whether it was a valid disinheritance.

In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Maninang

averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the
Court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution
on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by the decedent.

Issue:

Whether the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed

the testate case.

Held:

Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. “x
x x The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
wills. “Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of
the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only
purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law.”

The exception to the rule is “Where practical considerations demand

that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is