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From Thome, H., 2015. Values, Sociology of. In: James D. Wright (editor-in-chief),
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol
25. Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 47–53.
ISBN: 9780080970868
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved.
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 Author's personal copy

Values, Sociology of
Helmut Thome, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle-Wittenberg, Germany
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
This article is a revision of the previous edition article by R. Rezsohazy, volume 24, pp. 16153–16158, Ó 2001, Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract

The first section of this article presents core elements in the object- or concept-focused definition of values, including some of
the functions ascribed to them: guiding and coordinating actions, marking personal and collective identities. The next section
introduces some additional analytical dimensions: the substantive, temporal, and social generalization of values; their
position in means–ends relationships; conceptual distinctions with regard to needs, attitudes, and norms. The third section
addresses some issues regarding the development of values on the personal and macrosocial level, concentrating on the
cognitive developmental approach. The final section presents a brief outline of two prominent approaches (initiated by
Inglehart and Schwartz) in studying the development and spread of values on the basis of data collected in a long-term series
of cross-national surveys conducted in an increasing number of countries worldwide.

Values are generally considered to play a crucial role in moti-
vating and guiding human action and to be constitutive
elements in the construction of personal and collective iden-
tities; they serve as a potent source of social integration but also
of conflict and division. Values are conceptualized quite
differently in various sociological theories. This article focuses
on those analytical distinctions and fundamental assumptions
that are widely shared among sociologists and other social
scientists, but some of the issues on which theoretical per-
spectives diverge will also be mentioned.
What Are ‘Values,’ How to Define Them?
There are numerous definitions – or rather explications of
meaning – available in the sociological literature. Most of them
can be classified into two groups: (1) ‘values’ as something
directly attached or ascribed to preferred objects and (2)
‘values’ as (enduring) beliefs or conceptions that construe
something as preferable or desirable. The first approach is
exemplified by Thomas and Znaniecki (1958: p. 21) who write:
“By a social value we understand any datum having an
empirical content accessible to the members of some social
group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an
object of activity. Thus, a foodstuff, an instrument, a coin,
a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are
social values.” In a similar vain, R.H. Turner (1968: p. 100)
states: “A value is a category of objects..” The second
approach, which has become the dominant one within soci-
ology (in contrast to economic theory), is represented by C.
Kluckhohn (1951: p. 395) who, drawing upon Dewey, writes:
“A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an
individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which
influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends
of action.” And he emphasizes, “that affective (‘desirable’),
cognitive (‘conception’), and conative (‘selection’) elements are
all essential to this notion of value” (ibid.).
The crucial point here is the distinction between something
simply desired (matter-of-factly) and something conceived to
be desirable, based on some reasoned judgment. An object may
be desired directly as such for whatever qualities it innately has
(or is assumed to have). But in order to ‘value’ an object –
according to Kluckhohn’s conception – it must fulfill certain
criteria that transcend it. This transfer of meaning, however,
may advance into something like a transformation of the
object: it may take on a symbolic quality, which makes it
appear and then be treated as a value in itself, while its
connection to some ‘conception’ of desirability might recede in
the background; patriots, for example, may endow the national
flag with such a quality. Thus, the object-focused and the
concept-focused definitions are commensurate to some extent:
a value may be instantiated in or symbolically represented by
some object or behavior, which in turn becomes indicative of
the value construct.
There is an element of circularity in Kluckhohn’s defini-
tion: how can desirability be stated without referring to pre-
conceived values? This circularity can be mitigated by
interpreting values as ‘second-order’ desires (H.G. Frankfurt)
and explicating the experiences and processes by which values
are generated or arrived at. A first-order desire can be
conceived as some want (drive, urge, impulse), directed
toward some object that is given independently from any
judgment regarding its appropriateness. We may act upon this
want spontaneously. But since we experience different sorts of
such first-order desires, some of them competing with each
other and with those of other people, we are led into reflec-
tions seeking or constructing criteria that enable us to evaluate
and rank order our desires, abstracting and transforming them
into second-order desires and, in an additional step, into
a second-order volition. Of course, there is always the possi-
bility of getting overwhelmed by our spontaneous urges and
desires.
The evaluative standards applied in such processes comprise
different elements; Parsons, for example, distinguishes cogni-
tive, appreciative, and moral standards (Parsons and Shils,
1951: pp. 162ff.), and Kluckhohn (1951: p. 397) emphasizes
that “the consistent connection between values and notions of
approval and disapproval implies the potentiality for rational
justification”; he also sees a “union of reason and feeling
inherent in the word value (ibid., 400).” The meaning of such

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International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 47–53
 Author's personal copy
48 Values, Sociology of
evaluative standards is revealed in binary (or bipolar) codes in
terms of which judgments are being made – like ‘good’ vs ‘evil/
bad’ (in the case of moral standards), or ‘true’ vs ‘false’
(cognitive standards), ‘beautiful’ vs ‘ugly’ (aesthetic standards).
Some of these codes may be applied reflexively. For example,
one may judge it as good or bad (right or wrong) to deliver or
not deliver a moral judgment (in terms of good or bad) in
a specific situation; moralizing, however, might be considered
inappropriate with regard to certain issues in certain social
contexts. We thus move from second- to higher-order desires.
The ‘moral matrix,’ i.e., the set of issues or dimensions
requiring or allowing for moral judgment varies between
cultures and among social groups (Haidt, 2012).
Any culture offers to the person a repertoire of evaluative
standards, social values; they are conveyed and inculcated, over
various stages of development, via socialization processes and
supported by social practices and interaction rituals (Dur-
kheim, Collins), but they also need to be interpreted individ-
ually and variedly depending on the specifics of the situational
context in which they are employed. A single act normally
touches upon various (and often competing) values (like
honesty and politeness); on the other hand, a single value may
be related to a larger set of actions. Values thus come into play
not singularly but as a plurality, which means they must
somehow be harmonized, arranged into a value ‘system’ or
comprehensive sets of value orientations in which they are
hierarchically ordered, to some extent at least. Such an
arrangement, however, must also allow for a considerable
degree of flexibility, it must remain open for context-specific
interpretations and modifications over time. In this sense,
values are enduring but not static.
As cited above, Kluckhohn defines values as “distinctive of
an individual or characteristic of a group”; as such they may
serve as markers of personal and collective identity. On what-
ever level of social generalization values are analytically
located, for most sociologists the concept contains an element
of normativeness. Desirability implies a notion of shared
beliefs and commitments, including a commitment to one’s
true self, which incorporates the perspective of a ‘generalized
other’ (Mead). The striving to realize some value is thus con-
nected with a sense of oughtness, something requested from
oneself and from others, a request that, if not met, may elicit
guilt and shame feelings (imposed upon oneself) or indigna-
tion and despise (at someone else), or, if met, pride and
respect. The reach and intensity of the ought component varies;
there are values considered to be (more or less) ‘private,’ at
one’s personal disposal, others (particularly moral values) are
more or less obligatory, and placed under public control.
Kluckhohn includes, as we have seen, a functional des-
cription in his definition of values by stating that “[a] value
influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends
of action.” Some additional functions can be added here (for
a longer list see Rokeach, 1973: pp. 12–16): (1) Values not only
guide actions (though they are, by far, not the sole determi-
nant), they also influence perceptions and feeling states. (2)
They provide a ‘vocabulary of motives’ (Gerth and Mills, 1953),
which helps to make sense of and to interpret, explain, justify,
or criticize one’s own as well as other people’s behavior,
prospectively and retrospectively. (3) Shared (social) values
provide a base for commonalities and trustful communication;
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 47–53
they stabilize expectations needed to coordinate interaction
over the long run. They perform these functions to the extent
that they are uncontested. “They can be taken for granted and
this taken-for-grantedness can also be taken for granted”
(Luhmann, 1996: p. 31). In other situations, however, values
can also be disputed among persons and groups and thus
instigate conflicts.
Some Further Analytical Dimensions and Distinctions
Dimensions of Generalization
As concepts, values are symbolically (re-)presented by words,
behavior (e.g., gestures and rituals), and visible objects (e.g.,
badges or monuments). As symbols, they “involve ‘inter-
personalizing’ the kind of ‘abstraction’ or ‘generalization’
which characterizes all stable systems of orientation” (Parsons
and Shils, 1951: p. 161). Luhmann (1998: pp. 340f.)
conceives of values as ‘symbolically generalized media of
communication,’ and he distinguishes three interdependent
dimensions of generalization: the substantive, the temporal,
and the social.
The first dimension refers to the delimitation of semantic
meaning, the substantive content, and thematic unity of the
concept, which is specified by some contrast or difference: what
pertains to it and what is excluded, e.g., equality vs inequality,
respect vs disrespect, granted to whom and whom not. The
semantic meaning of a value concept can be abstracted to lower
or higher levels and specified across many or not so many
situations and institutional contexts.
The temporal generalization is brought about by various
forms of custom building and habit forming or by explicit
norm setting. Particularly, the norms connected with or in-
herent in values lend certainty and stability to expectations
derived from them: In case of disappointment it is not the
expectation that needs to be corrected, rather the perpetrator is
in the wrong (on the distinction between norms and values see
below). Value surveys often fail to adequately capture the
element of normativity tight up with values.
Social generalization seems to be an obvious ingredient of
values. They are shared among different persons – but shared to
what extent? On the lower end of the scale we have ‘personal’ or
‘privatized’ values, shared by only a few people; or they may be
held in common by many people but unknowingly so and/or
without any normative request. ‘Social’ generalization is thus
intimately linked with temporal or normative generalization,
and there are at least two subdimensions that need to be
distinguished here. One is the factual range of agreement
(consensus) or disagreement (dissent), the other is the
assumed or perceived range of consensus or dissent. Perceived
and factual agreement may fall apart in both directions. People
not only act on their own attitudes and personal values, but
also on what they perceive to be other people’s beliefs and
values. Unfortunately, empirical value surveys usually limit
themselves to registering only the degree of factual consensus
(by aggregating individual data, calculating means and vari-
ances); they regularly fail to ascertain at least the first level of
reciprocity, i.e., their respondents’ perceptions of what other
people think and value (more on this and normativity in
Thome, 2003).
 Author's personal copy
Values, Sociology of 49

Instrumental and Terminal Values, Empirical concerning the interconnectedness of needs and values. They
and Transcendental Ends can be conceived as the input, the raw material from which
values are abstracted. Ball-Rokeach and Loges (1992: pp.
In his famous book on The Nature of Human Values, Rokeach
2222f.) contend that “(v)alues are cognitive representations of
(1973: pp. 7f.) distinguishes between ‘instrumental’ and
human needs . [they] unite individual’s needs with the
‘terminal’ values; in the same sense he also speaks of ‘means
broader needs of society.” Kluckhohn (1951: pp. 428f.) states:
and ends values.’ The former refers to ‘modes of conduct’ (e.g.,
“Values both rise from and create needs”, but he also notes that
being ‘ambitious,’ ‘self-controlled,’ ‘independent’), which are
“some choices do not involve value elements but solely need
thought to be instrumental in attaining the latter, also referred
elements.” The (relative) urgency of needs (depending on their
to as ‘end-states of existence,’ like ‘happiness,’ ‘freedom,’
respective level of satisfaction) changes with changing natural
‘salvation,’ or ‘self-respect’ (ibid., 12). When Rokeach considers
environments, technologies, and social conditions; needs may
all ‘moral’ values (like ‘honesty’) to form a subgroup within the
thus serve as a mediating factor in the development of values.
category of instrumental values, his conception runs counter to
what many other scholars construe as moral values. He
Attitudes
acknowledges the possibility “that one terminal value, so
Thomas and Znaniecki (1958: p. 22) define attitude as “indi-
defined, is instrumental to another terminal value or that an
vidual consciousness which determines real or possible activity
instrumental value is instrumental to another instrumental
of the individual.. The attitude is thus the individual coun-
value” (ibid.), but his focus lies on the assumption that there is
terpart of the social value.” Kluckhohn (1951: p. 423), too,
a certain type, a fixed set of values, which are all instrumental to
emphasizes the ‘exclusive referability to the individual’ as a core
a second type of values, the ‘terminal’ ones, which in turn
definitional element in the concept of ‘attitude,’ but he adds
cannot (by definition) be employed as means to attain an
a second ‘principal difference from value’ namely “absence of
‘instrumental’ value.
imputation of the ‘desirable.’” Though ‘attitude’ implies
Parsons’ conception of ‘means–ends chains’ is more flexible
a positive, negative, or indifferent stance taken toward some
on this: “concrete action does not take place in terms of isolated
object, for whatever reason, the concept as such implies no
ends with only one set of means, but rather in terms of very
element of oughtness. Attitudes may engage values, but values
long and complex ‘chains’ of means-end relationships, so
may also become the object of an attitude.
constituted that the ‘end’ of one sector of the chain is a means
to some further end (or more than one)” (Parsons, 1990: p.
Norms
322). The ultimate ends (Parsons also speaks of ‘ultimate ends
Norms are generally defined as (formally or informally given)
or values,’ p. 323) envisioned or gradually emerging (in the
rules about what persons – in most cases a specified set of
course of action) can be ‘empirical’ or ‘transcendental.’ Whether
persons – ought to do or not to do in given circumstances,
or not an empirical end is reached (by causally adequate
enforced by the threat of sanctions in the case of transgression.
means) can be checked by the actor and by an outside observer.
In contrast, values inspire and guide behavior, but they are
Whether or not a transcendental end has been attained is not
quite independent of specific situations, and they do not
arguable by an external observer in terms of scientific criteria. In
directly prescribe or proscribe a specific behavior. Norms are
this case, the means–ends relationship becomes ‘symbolic,’ e.g.,
restrictive in their sheer oughtness; values instead are
when people perform religious rituals. The ‘symbolic appro-
enhancing, they inspire a striving for something ‘greater than
priateness’ attributable to this relationship can be interpreted
oneself’ (see the concluding paragraph in the third section
by an external observer, it does not need to be explicitly
below).
conscious to the actor himself (Parsons, 1968: p. 258).
Values are regularly employed to justify and legitimate
Means–ends relationships are often looked at in only one
norms, but it can be misleading to say of norms (making it
direction: what has been attained as an end can, in the next
a part of their definition) that they ‘specify’ values, or that they
step, be employed as a means to reach another end. But Simmel
are ‘derived’ from them. Norms are needed to coordinate action
already pointed out that originally trivial means can be turned
and maintain social order particularly in circumstances where
into (ultimate) ends, referring to money as a striking example.
the actors involved hold different or conflicting values. To
perform this function (especially in highly differentiated soci-
eties), there must be available a repertoire of (mainly legal)
Related Concepts: Needs, Attitudes, and Norms
norms that are neutral with regard to any set of potentially
Needs conflictive particularistic values (see the long-standing discus-
Needs are generally conceived as more or less urgent wants or sions about the nature of ‘positive’ law and the relationship
desires, which are registered or make themselves felt as such by between legitimacy and legality). The construal of more highly
the actor herself/himself or by an observer. They can be given abstracted values that transcend the apparent discrepancies
independently from any evaluation (i.e., they are ‘first-order between more concretely specified values may also help to
desires’), though the way they are shaped and perceived (e.g., as prevent or mitigate conflict. Individuals who are in disagree-
necessities that assure survival in a natural and social envi- ment with norms that are imposed upon them might still
ronment) is likely to be influenced by some evaluative reflec- decide to obey them, not only for fear of sanctions but also
tions or other external considerations. Often they are seen as because they have made their compliance to legitimately
rooted in the organic system (physiological processes) or in established common or legal norms, a higher-order norm
‘human nature’ (including its social embeddedness), inde- (a principle) that they are willing to adhere to in order to serve
pendent from one’s volition. There are different conceptions the (universally) valued goal of peaceful coordination of

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 47–53
 Author's personal copy
50 Values, Sociology of
action, whatever conflicts might arise on the level of lower-
order values. When norms are highly abstracted and formu-
lated as principles, the analytical difference to values might get
blurred. These constellations have also triggered much theo-
retical debate among philosophers and social scientists seeking
to clarify the priority relationship between the ‘right’ and the
‘good.’
Developmental Perspectives: Adopting, Generating,
and Changing Values
The adoption and reconstruction of values on the personal
level and in different stages of life have mainly been concep-
tualized and studied as a major element in processes of
socialization shaped by the given and further evolving (sub-)
cultural systems and by their respective location within the
differentiated structure of social systems. These processes have
been theorized in widely differing ways by psychologists and
social scientists. In this section, I will concentrate on core
concepts of the cognitive developmental approach, which
focuses on moral norms and values and has its major roots in
the work of Kohlberg. This approach is particularly interesting
because it offers hypotheses and empirical insights not only on
personal development, but also relates these processes to
certain features of large-scale societal structures that have been
evolving in recent history. At the end of this section, I will
briefly point out a rather different approach, which conceives of
identity-constitutive values as arising out of emotion-laden
‘experiences of self-transcendence.’
Kohlberg (1981, 1984) describes individual moral devel-
opment as a sequence of three major (and further subdivided)
stages characterized by rising levels of (cognitive) under-
standing and different types of conformity motives. At the
‘preconventional level,’ norms are taken to be valid because
they are (re-)presented by authorities; they are followed in
order to avoid punishment or receive rewards. At the
‘conventional level,’ moral values and the norms associated
with them are deemed valid because they are propagated in
one’s group or society; they are primarily accepted and obeyed
in order to gain social acceptance and to avert guilt feelings. At
the ‘postconventional level,’ reached by a smaller portion of
people, individuals ascribe superior validity to universal moral
principles (centered around the concepts of justice and fairness
and equal basic worth of all human beings), which they respect
and voluntarily submit to on the basis of reasoned insight in
their legitimacy. The major factor propelling forward this
movement from one stage to the next, Kohlberg (taking the
lead from Piaget) saw in the developmental ‘logic’ inherent in
the ontogenetic advancement of cognitive capacities from early
childhood into adolescence. He also assumed a gradually
increasing consistency between the cognitive and the motiva-
tional dimension of moral development, between judgments
(concerning the rightness of moral norms and the validity of
moral values) and the willingness (motivation) to act in
accordance with them.
More recent research has led to several modifications and
additional analytic distinctions. A major correction achieved
herein was to differentiate and disentangle the cognitive and
the motivational dimension – moral understanding and moral
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 47–53
motivation are now seen as independent dimensions (Colby
and Damon, 1995; Nunner-Winkler, 2004: pp. 306f.). Each
level of cognitive moral understanding can be associated with
different types and varied strength of moral motivation,
though some (correlational) affinity between these
dimensions seems to persist. A high level of moral
understanding might be tied up with a high level of moral
motivation: acting morally may become a central part of
a person’s self-identity; but it can also be associated with
a low level of motivation or with an inclination to make use
of ‘neutralization techniques’ and cognitive distortions, which
pave the way to moral disengagement (Bandura et al., 1996).
There is also some debate on whether or not or in which way
such a ‘minimalized’ set of highly abstracted and universally
valid moral principles (most essentially: not to inflict harm
on other people) can be or in fact are supplemented with
more concretely prescribed moral rules associated with
broader sets of values concerning the ‘good life’ as perceived
and construed within particular communities of varied size
and social location (see, e.g., Joas, 2000).
Nunner-Winkler (2004) registers a large-scale historical
trend in societal development that has strengthened the
advancement toward higher levels of moral reasoning reached
by a growing number of individual persons. Her starting point
is Elias’ claim that there is a coevolution of societal and
personality structure (Elias, 1994). In these processes, chains
of interdependence among increasing numbers of interacting
persons, institutions, and administrative units were elongated,
thus calling for ever more individual insight and
considerateness, i.e., self-control. Consequently, ‘outside
constraints’ (level 1 in Kohlberg’s developmental theory) were
more and more replaced by internalized ‘self-constraints’
(level 2). Many other theoretical models for analyzing long-
term societal developments could be introduced at this point,
e.g., Durkheim’s ideas on the erosion of collectivism; Weber’s
propositions concerning the increasing and multifaceted
import of processes of rationalization; Riesman’s theses on
the shifting weights of tradition-, inner-, and outer-directed
orientations as characteristic features of evolving cultures and
personality structures; more recent work by Wouters (1986)
has emphasized the increasing importance of processes of
‘informalization.’ Most theorists are agreed upon assuming
that societies in the long run have become less hierarchically
organized and more differentiated into interdependent
subsystems performing specialized functions more or less
autonomously and reaching out beyond national boundaries.
These processes – including the dismantling of hierarchical
structures within the family – have made individuals become
increasingly more autonomous: free, but also forced, to make
their own choices, free to enter cooperative relationships but
also pushed to develop their competitive capacities. According
to Nunner-Winkler (and others), the sociohistorical changes
in societal structure and in socialization styles have, on the
level of individual personalities, promoted the transition from
the second to the third level of Kohlberg’s scheme of moral
development: “a change from super-ego controls and
habitualized conformity dispositions towards more ego-
syntonic types of conformity motivations” (Nunner-Winkler,
2004: pp. 309f.). But she also warns that “there might be
a rising risk that the increasing availability of ego-syntonic
 Author's personal copy
conformity motivation might go along with the dismantling of
previously reliable barriers against amorality” (Nunner-
Winkler, 2000: p. 239). The structurally induced release from
moral bind has been a central topic in theories of anomie,
with a broad range of empirical evidence particularly
produced in studies of crime development (see, e.g., Messner
et al., 2008).
As indicated above, cognitive developmental theories assume
that on the highest level of personal moral development high-
conformity motives, i.e., the willingness to act in accordance
with moral values and norms considered universally valid,
emanates directly from one’s reasoned insight into what is
‘right.’ Other scholars have argued that rational reflections as
such cannot produce motivation, that there is no motivation
without the press of emotions. Joas (2000), drawing on Ch.
Taylor and others, expounds the idea that motivating
conceptions of the desirable are anchored in and ultimately
emerge from emotion-laden experiences of self-transcendence,
in which a person is captivated by something that carries her
beyond her personal self, without losing it. Such (elevating, but
in other cases dejecting) experiences are evoked when
smoothly proceeding routine activities of everyday life get
interrupted or turned into a new and unexpected direction,
thus calling into question previous paths of behavior and
hitherto held beliefs and interpretations. Examples are religious
revelations, falling in love, loosing one’s job, getting intensely
praised or humiliated, having a friend dying in an accident,
being suddenly confronted with the misery of other people.
The elevating or disturbing feelings elicited in such situations
call for articulation and narration in order to find new
interpretations that clarify, partially revise and partially
confirm, one’s own standing on what is good or bad (values)
and how this is related to what is right or wrong (in terms of
norms). In this perspective, the adequacy of norms can be
judged rationally (with regard to their efficiency in
coordinating social action), the validity of values, however, is
comprehended in the interplay of reflections and emotions
arising from elevating or disturbing experiences that press for
articulation and interpretation (for a challenging view on the
role of emotions in grounding moral values see De Sousa, 2008).
Empirical Research on Values and Value Change
There is a long tradition of empirical studies on values and
value change, in which a large array of strategies and tech-
niques has been used to collect information and interpret data
from all sorts of written text, from participant and nonpartic-
ipant observation, from face-to-face interviews or
questionnaire responses. A brief overview of empirical value
studies of various types produced till the early 1980s is
offered by Spates (1983). To study values in national and
cross-national perspective, large-scale survey studies based
on representative samples of whole populations (or of
specific subpopulations like highly qualified employees of
large corporations, school teachers, or university students)
and repeated overtime have become the prime research
instrument. Since the 1970s, sociological discussions on
value change have been increasingly dominated by the work
of Inglehart (e.g., 1977, 1997) and the European and World
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 47–53
Values, Sociology of 51
Values Surveys he has initiated. Since the mid-1990s, another
approach on cross-cultural value research developed by S.H.
Schwartz, has received increasing attention as well. What
follows here is a brief outline of the major concepts and
empirical findings advanced in both of these research groups
(with respect to Inglehart, I draw upon a more
comprehensive review in Thome, 2008). I also want at least
to mention the cross-cultural studies by Hofstede (1980,
2001) and by Triandis (1995) as well as the values research
based on experimental gaming strategies applied in
a laboratory setting (see, e.g., Wilke et al., 1986), which I
cannot review here due to space limitations (for an overview
on these approaches see Karp, 2000).
Inglehart is best known for his interpretation of value
change (since the late 1960s) as a shift in preferences away
from ‘materialist’ to ‘postmaterialist’ values. His initial
hypotheses were derived from Maslow’s theses on need hier-
archies (Maslow, 1954) stating that “people act to fulfill
a number of different needs, which are pursued in hierarchical
order, according to their relative urgency for survival”
(Inglehart, 1997: p. 22). On this view, the physical need for
sustenance and freedom from bodily harm takes precedence
over all else. Only to the extent that these are satisfied do we,
according to these assumptions, turn our attention to the
social need to belong and to be respected, and finally to the
personal need for self-actualization. With respect to political
objectives (Inglehart’s primary value indicators), basic needs
find expression, for example, in the pursuit of economic
stability and continuous growth; the need for security
requires public order and protection from criminality and
(seemingly) hostile countries; the need to belong and to be
given respect motivates calls for participation in the
workplace and in politics; self-actualization requires legally
enshrined freedoms and opportunities to arrange our lives as
we see fit. Inglehart’s idea was to ask people how urgent they
considered political goals he presented to them via
questionnaire items classified in this way as indicating
a stronger or weaker leaning toward the materialist or
postmaterialist pole of such value orientations. The item
batteries that Inglehart had designed to measure value
orientations via a rank ordering of political goals were
included in the Eurobarometer Surveys (EBS) conducted on
behalf of the European Commission since 1973 twice a year
(the data are available as an online trend file, see references
below, which also includes data from three earlier European
surveys as well). In addition to the EBS, Inglehart et al.
initiated more comprehensive European Values Studies and
World Values Surveys starting in 1981, now in its sixth wave
scheduled to be concluded in March 2014. These surveys
have by now covered about hundred countries in all
continents.
The European data till (roughly) 1990 confirmed, by and
large, Inglehart’s prognoses concerning the shift toward post-
materialism in central European countries. Since then the trends
diverged cross nationally, and despite further economic growth
postmaterialism declined in several countries. There was (and still
is) considerable debate not only on Inglehart’s way of theorizing,
but also on the adequacy of his instruments of measurement (see,
e.g., Clarke, 2000; Flanagan, 1987; Vinken, 2006), which have
become increasingly questionable as the surveys were expanded
 Author's personal copy
52 Values, Sociology of
to include non-European countries as well. Inglehart himself has
extended his system for categorizing relevant value orientations.
The dimension of materialism vs postmaterialism has been
embedded in the more broadly conceived dimension of
‘survival vs self-expression,’ which includes additional
measurements of subjective well-being, trust in other people,
political engagement, and tolerance for nonconformist
lifestyles. The ensuing research has made increasingly clear that
there has not been a departure from materialist values but
rather an increasing emphasis on combining economic
prosperity with libertarian, antiauthoritarian value orientations
(Welzel, 2009). Inglehart has also constructed a second
analytical dimension, which contrasts ‘traditional’ and ‘secular-
rational’ orientations (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and
Welzel, 2010). Key points here are belief in God and religious
commitments, respect for authorities, regard for one’s own
nation and the family. Inglehart acknowledges in principle that
these two dimensions may be combined in different ways in
different countries. While a continuous increase in economic
prosperity promotes both secularization and self-expression
values, this development is ‘path dependent,’ considerably
determined by cultural traditions. Nevertheless, for the long run
he sees both dimensions converge into a two-stage process of
‘modernization’: Traditional values are replaced (or dominated)
by secular-rational values in the process of industrialization;
self-expression values become predominant during the
transition from industrial to postindustrial (postmodern)
societies. More recently, this approach has been further
expanded and modified into a ‘human development model’
(Welzel and Inglehart, 2010).
Inglehart’s ordering of countries from all continents along
these two analytical dimensions is, in its overall configura-
tion, pretty much what one might expect. European countries
with large portions of Protestants load high on both
analytical dimensions, those with large portions of Catholics
are located around the center, whereas South-Asian and
Islamic countries rank low on both dimensions. However,
it appears highly problematic (in some cases at least, e.g.,
when inquiring religious beliefs) to use identical
questionnaire items in very different cultural regions. More
generally, it is highly problematic to use questionnaire
items (as Inglehart does), which address different categories
of values on rather different levels of analytical abstraction
and specificity. Also, the rankings of a set of value items
(particularly if specified as political goals) might be
strongly influenced not just by the degree of desirability
ascribed to them, but also by the degree to which
respondents consider them to be at risk or rather fulfilled
under given circumstances. These assessments should
therefore also be explicitly measured in these surveys and
statistically controlled for when evaluating priority rankings
of values (cf Thome, 2003).
A theoretically and methodologically more elaborated
system of value categories and survey instruments applied in
cross-cultural studies has been worked out by the social
psychologist S. H. Schwartz (drawing on Hofstede, 1980).
He has proposed a system of 10 basic value types, each
specified by individual-level motivational emphasis and
translated into a set of more than 50 personal goals
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 47–53
(Schwartz, 1994): power, achievement, hedonism,
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence,
tradition, conformity, security. According to Schwartz, these
values represent three ‘universal requirements of human
existence,’ which he does not rank in advance: needs of
individuals as biological organisms, coordinated social
interaction, survival, and welfare needs of groups. Surveys
conducted in a set of 66 nations proved 45 of the 56
(occasionally 57) value items to have similar meanings
across nations (Schwartz, 2004). The 10 basic values are
grouped along two higher-order bipolar dimensions: the first
contrasts ‘openness to change’ (seeking stimulation and self-
direction) with ‘conservation’ values (seeking security and
conformity, upholding tradition), the second opposes ‘self-
transcendence’ (orientation toward universalism and
benevolence) with ‘self-enhancement’ (seeking achievement
and power); the tenth value, hedonism, cuts across the
borderlines between self-enhancement and openeness to
change. Thus, the 10 basic values can be ordered to be more
congruent or more opposing to each other, rather close or
rather remote in their meaning. Schwartz (1994: p. 97) sees
the cultural and the individual level of values conceptually
related, but he also points to specific cultural differences in
dealing with ‘critical issues that confront all societies.’ He
classifies these into three bipolar dimensions referring to the
relative weight given to (a): ‘embeddedness’ vs affective or
intellectual ‘autonomy’ (of individuals in relation to social
groups), (b) ‘hierarchy’ vs ‘egalitarianism’ (with respect to
social status and power distribution), and (c) ‘harmony’ vs
‘mastery’ (striving for peace and for unity with nature, or for
self-assertion in attaining group or personal goals)
(Schwartz, 2004: pp. 45f.). This scheme thus comprises
seven categories of opposed or supplementary cultural
orientations. Schwartz sees the validity of this scheme
confirmed by empirical analyses based on data collected on
those 45 value items that were found to have similar
meanings across nations and cultures. For 67 nations and
cultural groups (represented by teacher and student
samples), the mean scores for each of these items were
registered and pairwise correlated. Multidimensional scaling
analyses were then performed to map the cultural differences
between nations. In this way Schwartz identified seven
transnational cultural groupings, which show ‘striking
parallels’ with the clusters found by Inglehart (based on
different analytical dimensions). So, for example, West
European countries load high on autonomy, egalitarianism,
and harmony, whereas Confucian countries lean toward the
opposite pole on all of these dimensions: embeddedness,
hierarchy, and mastery.
Schwartz et al. (2001) also developed a second measurement
instrument, the 40-item ‘Portrait Values Questionnaire’ (PVQ),
which demands lower levels of abstract thinking so that it can
be used in large population surveys not limited (like the
original instrument) to samples of highly educated people.
This instrument, too, has been validated across many cultures.
To be included in the series of European Social Surveys (ESS)
starting (with 2 years interval) in 2002/03, a shortened,
21-items version of the PVQ has also been set up. In the
meantime it has been shown, however, that this instrument
 Author's personal copy
does not represent the full range of the 10 value types identified
before (Meuleman et al., 2012). A thoroughly conducted
comparative assessment of the validity of both the Inglehart
and the Schwartz value theories is offered by Datler et al. (2013).
See also: Anomie; Collective Beliefs, Sociological Explanation
of; Culture, Sociology of; Modernization, Sociological Theories
of; Norms; Public Opinion: Social Attitudes.
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Relevant Websites
http://ec.europa.eu/public-opinion – Eurobarometer.
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org – European Social Survey.
http://europeanvaluesstudy.eu – European Values Study.
http://worldvaluessurvey.org – World Values Study.
(They all refer to the last section: Empirical Research on Values and Value Change).