EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits
for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause
presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give
expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The
primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other
departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city
of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the
police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros,
and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders
from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled
some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for
an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to
depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco
Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who
appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of
Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest,
but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed
more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and
disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the
relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were
sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including
them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of
their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain
unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because
the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and
because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer
of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open
court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without
their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2,
1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners,
their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order,
December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has
been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and
the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand
taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor
of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau
then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to
return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the
women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or
signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and
that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated
a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor
explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by
respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily
made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the
respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the
provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court
the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for
all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and
agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who,
on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-
nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both
counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax,
members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al
memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now
proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at
night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on
board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and
gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of
Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We
turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order
the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the
Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a
common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of
vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a
quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in
vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city
to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly
authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and
considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has
no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a
sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of
motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of
the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the
same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could
be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club
over the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any
man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is
above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system
of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882],
106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],
118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2)
criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the
parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that
now before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who
shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine
of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this
provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same
official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no
bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a
monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished
therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance.
The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction,
and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of
the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the
women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way
the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was
consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been
made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast
rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine
Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before
the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular
circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had
any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated
in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown
that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The
failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of
the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties
in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor
and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination,
acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these
women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly
waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that
he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the
same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person
who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem,
a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very
persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under
guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme
Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the
question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that
the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English
decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages
from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
 I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid
before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the
Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his
speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension
of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that
evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so
easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the
proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems
to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court
of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the
right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served
upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person
who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the
oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the
means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording
relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is,
therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be
compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the
limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised?
And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193;
Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the respondent.
A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing
the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not
do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer
in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the
court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have
the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ,
together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be
obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by
reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no
longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce
the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts
have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what
was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue
of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the
child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish
case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D.,
283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the
circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated
on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the
District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his
custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ
of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and
Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he
should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released
upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced
the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also
Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar
to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ
of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the
persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were
thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila
waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the
parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies
of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or
infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the
bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the
return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila
is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were
produced at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty
of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons
were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude
a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of
the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences;
and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the
purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man
could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other
words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court
forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their
good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better
spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up
the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly
contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our
mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat
by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive
an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection
remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the
city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid
excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either
imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power
to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C.,
407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the
respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public
officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears
to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto
Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him
innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners,
which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the
official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as
the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo
Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for
disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400
each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the
court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the
second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful
view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the
court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as
extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is
P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez,
Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and
shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the
fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted.
Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to
bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result. –SEE SEPARATE OPINIONS-
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and
all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23,
193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
 court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of
the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or
more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell,
155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on
the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that
is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the
late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d]
as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can
be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one
such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent
is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a
departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and
other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of
action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because
of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business
issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-
time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does.
For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary
(in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he
is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's
work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas
jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations
of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
 Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context
of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on
on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of
the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June
18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services
to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL
in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such
as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law
of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (
Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
 discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums;
but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences
as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then
the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever
it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for
seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law
practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is
being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law,
or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the
fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different
from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that
he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that
he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such
an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise
clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of
the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.) Sarmiento, J., is on leave. Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J.,
took no part. -SEE SEPARATE OPINIONS-
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner,

vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.

Ramon Diokno for petitioner.

City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties
against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances
on the groun that the respondent refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation,
issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing later an extended and
reasoned decision.

The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is
the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws
regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.

The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which
according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the
Municipal Board, among others, the following legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots,
affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public
places" and "for the abatement of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."

Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and 1119. Section of the
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or
collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:

"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the
public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other
purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the
celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in
question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or
portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of
any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the
Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and
dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be
submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."

As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the holding of public meeting or
assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any
street or public paces may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to
grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject
only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the
view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.

After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is construe the
provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the
discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held.

Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the
statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2, providing that "no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon,
shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the town or from licensing
committee," was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion
to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision (1941) penned by Chief
Justice Hughes firming the judgement of the State Supreme Court, held that " a statute requiring pewrsons using the public streets
for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of
the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing
authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and
procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... ."

We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as conferring upon the Mayor power to
grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public
places for holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or
violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the
other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the
power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit"
(Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have. Besides,
the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of them is "to comply with and enforce
and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised
Administrative Code), the ligislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the excercise of
the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other
officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its
impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented.

In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that, under Rev. ST. Ill. c. 24, article 5
section 1, which empowers city councils to regulate the use of public streets, the council has no power to ordain that no processions
shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such
permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by them.

The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W., 1104, held the following:

"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were also, in substance, the same, for the
ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the
rights of parties under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was held void
because "it lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented." and
that "when we remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity,
from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it
becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being wrought under cover of such a power,
for that becomes apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance which
clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it
inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such
rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing
so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised
within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority,
making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."
In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or persons, or associations or
organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical
instrument, banners, flags, ... without first having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said city;" was held by
the Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of the decision held:

". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it is not plainly unconstitutional,
as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in
accordance with the limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles
of law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under the constitution than under the common law."

"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in cities than in smaller towns
or in rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend
beyond the fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action
altogther can be granted at all. . . . ."

"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized countries, for people who are
assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or reasonable hours at night, with banners and other
paraphernalia, and with music of various kinds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are
resorted to for the express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce some effect on
the public mind by the spectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and
valuable factors in furthering them. ... When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private or
public security, they become unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . ."

"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or
create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief, that the law interferes."

"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and because it leaves the power of
permitting or restraining processions, and thier courses, to an unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if
regualted at all, must be permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."

In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city ordinance which made it unlawful for any
person, society or club, or association of any kind, to parade any of the streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums,
horns, or other musical instruments, without the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The appellants were members
of the Salvation Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance invalid said,
"Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so
framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion ... Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower the
right to assemble and worship accordingto the dictates of one's conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for
a lawful purpose, have been fostered and regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free
institutions allows great latitude in public parades and emonstrations whether religious or political ... If this ordinance is held valid,
then may the city council shut off the parades of those whose nations do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and
permit like parades of those whose nations do. When men in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise power so
arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ... Where the granting of the permit is left to the
unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than partial and discriminating in its practical
operation. The law abhors partiality and discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A., p. 861)

In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in construing the
provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of Walsenburg, which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or
persons or association to use the street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage without first
obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do," held the following:

"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets is conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter
163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets ... may be regulated in
the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be excercised in subordination to the general, be abridged or
denied." Hague, Mayor vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed.,
1423.

[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of public streets is found in the
recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569; 61 S. Ct., 762, 765; 85 Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which
the following appears; "The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience
of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of
the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is
 the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is
designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted excercise of
some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the
familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means
to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and
processions is a traditional excercise of control by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control
is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303
U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949 [953]; Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496,
515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of Irvington];
308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S.
Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."

[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the uncontrolled official discretion of the
chief of police of the municipal corporation to say who shall, who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its
public streets. No standard of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as drawn, the chief of
police may for any reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this privelege to any group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire,
312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed., 1049, 1054, said:

"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public streets in a lawful manner clearly
is apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and we therefore hold it null and void."

The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed.,
1423, declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets,
highways, public parks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots,
disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after investigation of all the facts and circumstances
pertinent to the application he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Said
Court in the course of its opinion in support of the conclusion said:

". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order;
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.

"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon its face. It does not make comfort
or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a
permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the
record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the
prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege
cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."

Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the Mayor shall have the
power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the
application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the
Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a specific or substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances
which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover "one of the settled
maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department
to any other body or authority," except certain powers of local government, specially of police regulation which are conferred upon
the legislative body of a municipal corporation. Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to regulate the use of
streets and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City
(section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon
the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise
of the same power by the Municipal Board.

Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the Mayor the power to
grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter, and
the provisions of section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding,
such grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places for
processions, parades, or meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases above quoted,
specially in Willis Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved was also the validity of a similar statute of New
Hamsphire. Because the same constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a
municipal ordinance which grants unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that confers unlimited
power to any officer either of the municipal or state governments. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. As stated in State
ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised within the
limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary authority making in its exercise a
petty tyrant."

It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative Code apparently in support of the
decision in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255- 261, but evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the
writer of the decision under a mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision
rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines was clearly an
unlawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the
meeting been held, it was his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844, which is punishable as
misdemeanor by section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and
principles advocated and urged in the Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches
uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they
suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that
similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition
was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful
assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of the
decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the use of streets
or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal
will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary
suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in
Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:

"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned
women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one . . .

"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty. . . .

"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential effective democracy,
unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it
would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and
punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly." Whitney vs. California, U.
S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable objection to the use of the
Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So
ordered.

Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur. -SEE SEPARATE OPINIONS-
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome"
(BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration
because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she
shot him.

Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke
down her psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby
entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.

Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum
period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.

The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City
(Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion
of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by
Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages."2

The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN
GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the
purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:

'Cadaveric spasm.

'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue
slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain,
spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and
meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.

'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."4

With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997. 6 In due course, she was
tried for and convicted of parricide.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this wise:

"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the
parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too.
Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte
where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2)
bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house
of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went
to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiaorunner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive
but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which
Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since
then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
 "On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from
her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda
to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.

"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant
going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the
waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and
her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to
him.

"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being
rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the
inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He
was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone,
Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of
Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head.
Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day,
Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.

"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte,
received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas' rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and
Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body
of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3
Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparadora metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2)
inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.

"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the
house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health
officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days
and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the
Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'

"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her
husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant
went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon
their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep in their house.

"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and
instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched
off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television.
According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled
her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes
because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged
appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You might as well be killed so
nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not
have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to
pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.

"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer
where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom." 7 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:

"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated
from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the
time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John
Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.

"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates;
and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to
stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In
the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often
and their fights would become violent.

"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that
when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said
that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was
covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In
another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood
from Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again
asked for Ben's forgiveness.

"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more
or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs.
Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was
when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when
Marivic struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the
ear' and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the
house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'

"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.

"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we collected our salary, we went to the
cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer –
allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not
there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the
masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and
runners so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They
were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas'
testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you',
whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.

"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and
Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was stricken
with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave
him 'so many times'.

"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben
'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.

"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he
provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.

"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek
her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek
medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by
Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a
week.

"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received
at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he
overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the
spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to
testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )

'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor
Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the
Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck
of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the
children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning.
(Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).

'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was
located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He
said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money
to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified 'if
somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go
to our house and he will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and
look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to
me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia
also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.

'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15,
1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns
and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the
Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the
evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of
his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again,
please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first
time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home
drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the
couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room
and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window
grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when
she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.

'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was
his patient 'many times' and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until
November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his
Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him
an expert witness.'

xxx xxx xxx

'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'

"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were directly
related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the
patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'

'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months
before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa
couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again
and assumed 'that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that
night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'

"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels
could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day,
November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field
researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a
safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.

'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know what happened to the
pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after
she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his
things.'

"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting
from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during
the trial.

"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and
among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and
the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in
1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer
and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door.
He was wearing only a brief.

xxxxxxxxx

"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the head' which she
described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as
to what caused his death.

"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.

"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE
committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'

"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November
1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.

"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of
the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate
penalty of DEATH.

"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's
trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary
measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed
to by her.

"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned
counsel.

"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing
the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted
her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.

"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000,
undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist
in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is
more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.

"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'

"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-
Branch 35, Ormoc City.

"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan
informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.

"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and
connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St.
Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology
from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD
from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the
American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68
countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She
is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research
about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and
Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case
of that nature.

"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families
involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and
discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to
psychiatric disorder.'

"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and
emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-
defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence
would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke
their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x
comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'

"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges
to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They
also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and
drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them
and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of
modeling of aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame
and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her
obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in another
room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital
relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an
'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization
on the victim and even death on the victim.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits
the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really
feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the
same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation
inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.

xxx xxx xxx

"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and testified before
RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a
Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being
in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on
psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V.
Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of
Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the
World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine
Association of Military Surgeons.

"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 –
1978' which was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines 2000', which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the
use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he
published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of
the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one
has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.

"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving
violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes
abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman
Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.

"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such
as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is
sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr.
Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the
psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
 "In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is
produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is
not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'

xxx xxx xxx

"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and
restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.

"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness, such as the deprivation of the
continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is around him within the
environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he
shows his strong façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the
battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in
her mind or in his mind.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and 'primarily with knives.
Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that
abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and
there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen
(17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out
with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.

xxx xxx xxx

"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband Marivic'c mental
condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-
experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that
things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was
more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is
involved.'

xxx xxx xxx

"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the
Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed
the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery,
because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe
at the back of his head.

The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
 Supervening Circumstances

On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa
and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of
the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the
experts' testimonies.

On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for
the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower
court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.

Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad
Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence,
were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the
case.12

The Issues

Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:

"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as
to self-defense.

"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was
therefore liable for parricide.

"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.

"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that
Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben
Genosa was a battered husband.

"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.

"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of
guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.

"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.

"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the existence of self-
defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and
condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death."13

In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and
(2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Collateral Factual Issues

The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As
consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the
outcome of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that
would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of
the trial court.

First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as
to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the
prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent
substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.

Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The Information had been filed with
the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial
judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case
with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with
which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional
obligation.15

Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the non-
presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:

"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage
certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected
to."

Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben
had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination,
appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2)
no admission was in fact made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no
proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable
mistake.

Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a
pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant
has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his
head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the
victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.

Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater.
Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for
which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute
vital evidence at the time.

Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by the
solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the
discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to present. 20 As the former further points out, neither the trial
court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court
for not requiring them to testify.

Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her
brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's
appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.

First Legal Issue:

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus

Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When
the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.22

The Battered Woman Syndrome

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence,
the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time." 24

A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by
a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or
women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a
second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman." 25

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the
female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions;
and false hopes that the relationship will improve.26

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence,"27 which has three phases: (1)
the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 28

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile
behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his
way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her
"placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.

However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or
physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from
the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the
more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control"
and leads to an acute battering incident.29

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman
deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to
the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.

At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every
detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt. 30

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows
that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On
the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will
change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and
despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving
professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional
help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are
indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable
cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may
really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other. 31

History of Abuse
in the Present Case

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She herself described her heart-
rending experience as follows:

"ATTY. TABUCANON

Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?

A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.

Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this
abusive and cruelty manifested to you?

A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes
beat me.

Q How many times did this happen?

A Several times already.

Q What did you do when these things happen to you?

A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.

Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?

A He is following me, after that he sought after me.

Q What will happen when he follow you?

A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he said 'sorry'.

Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to
see a doctor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who are these doctors?

A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who inflicted these injuries?

A Of course my husband.
 Q You mean Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

[Court] /to the witness

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from
that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?

A Three times a week.

Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?

A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32

Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing
testimony on chronic battery in this manner:

"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?

A I did.

Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.

A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician:
Dr. Lucero;

2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora;

3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;

5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and

6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.

Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion
furuncle left axilla?

A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force is applied.

Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?

A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.

Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness.
When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

xxx xxx xxx

Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did she tell you?

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by
her husband.

Q You mean, Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this
incident happened?

A As per record, yes.

Q What was the date?

A It was on November 6, 1995.

Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?

A Yes, sir.

Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?

A Yes, sir.

Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?

A Eight (8) months pregnant.

Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings?

A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?

A Yes, sir.

Q For how many days?

A One day.

Q Where?

A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her personally on
November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.

What is this all about?

A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the
same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.

Q For what?

A Tension headache.

Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?

A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response when the medication
was given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.

Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?

A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of giving the root cause
of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.

Q You mean problem in her household?

A Probably.

Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does not
response to the medication.

Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused?

A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.

 Q Is this considered hypertension?

A Yes, sir, severe.

Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?

A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34

Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple
quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted
upon her by Ben.35

Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the
latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about
ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy … and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came
running into Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.

On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They
returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep
at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.

On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple
quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the
process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:

"ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?

A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded the service bus and
went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second child said,
'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting
for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.

Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?

A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.

Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you come back to your house?

A Yes, sir.

Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?

A Bilwang.

Q Is this your house or you are renting?

A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?

A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.

Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?

A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was
again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted
because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.

Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?

A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.

Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?

A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.

Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

A Yes, 8 months.

Q How advance was your pregnancy?

A Eight (8) months.

Q Was the baby subsequently born?

A Yes, sir.

Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?

A Marie Bianca.

Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time?

A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.

Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?

A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.

Q What was he yelling all about?

A His usual attitude when he got drunk.

Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any?

A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.

Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and
he would beat me again.

Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?

A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me
again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to
him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children who
were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a
bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.

Q What did he do with the bolo?

A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.

Q What else happened after he cut the wire?

A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already holding the bolo.

Q How do you described this bolo?

A 1 1/2 feet.

Q What was the bolo used for usually?

A For chopping meat.

Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?

A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.

Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?

A I screamed for help and then he left.

Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?

A Yes, sir.

Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?

A Outside perhaps to drink more.

Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?

A I packed all his clothes.

Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?

A I wanted him to leave us.

Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again
of the bedroom holding my neck.

Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT INTERPRETER:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(At this juncture the witness started crying).

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not
have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to
kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a
pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other
room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment
was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?

A Outside.
 Q In what part of the house?

A Dining.

Q Where were the children during that time?

A My children were already asleep.

Q You mean they were inside the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
look like?

A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

Q Is it a flexible blade?

A It's a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a
battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the
former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:

"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's term describe to this Court what
her life was like as said to you?

A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were
a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager
income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices,
going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will
trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the
husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she
was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or
even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39

In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional
supporting evidence as shown below:

"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three hours, what was the
most relevant information did you gather?

A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information were escalating abuses
that she had experienced during her marital life.
 Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the case or at least you
have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?

A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of battering their wives?

A I also heard that from her?

Q You heard that from her?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering their wives?

A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.

Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her
and battered [her] several times in that room?

A She told me about that.

Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?

A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.

Q Several times in that room?

A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.

Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we have
this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?

A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that
there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction
because of all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time
and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she
had experienced from her husband.

Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?

A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40

Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:

"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?

A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out about the
lying prone[ne]ss of the person.

Q What do you mean by that?

A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a
lie[?]

Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
 A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the data that I'm gathering
from her are the truth."41

The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report, 42 which was based on
his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben,
everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was
also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees."

The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued:
"At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the
viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she
suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight
years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk."

Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the
advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But
incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x." 43

From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely
abused person.

Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining
her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the appellant be
appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization?
We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life
for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.'"44

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person.
What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute
common myths and misconceptions about battered women.45

The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the
United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the
killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of
escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women
are in greater danger of dying then."47

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has
x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they
provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally
and even sexually abusive to them."48

According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty,
self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact
at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change. 49

The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits involving violent family
relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical
abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness. 50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis
or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially
helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development
of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect." 52

A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has control
over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than
trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of
beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may
seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone
else does will alter their terrible circumstances."54

Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also
believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety,
and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically
lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.57

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse
she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however,
failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quohow the fatal incident that led to the
death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail
the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words,
she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to
Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more
violent) stage?

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would
usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change;
and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope
for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she
on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully
demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit
merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of
repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were
culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and
thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To
repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested
specifically in the case of the Genosas.

BWS as Self-Defense

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the
battered woman at the time of the offense60 -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed
in the need to kill him in order to save her life.

Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's life; and
the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the
following requisites and effect of self-defense:62

"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an
imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic
herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his
attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was
a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her
life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the
battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by
installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's
use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger.66Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the absence of such aggression,
there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not
completely justified under the circumstances.

Mitigating Circumstances Present

In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we
deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that
an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties. 69

From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated
November 29, 2000, opined as follows:

"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband
constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is
very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic
truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act
of violence on her part." 70

Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering,
[and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:

"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?

 A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged
administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of
the victim and another one is the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will
go to that disorder....

xxx xxx xxx

Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder,
Dr. Pajarillo?

A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging
of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others
are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing
the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is
very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is
heightened to the end [sic] degree.

Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?

A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.

Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?

A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a severe emotional
instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.

Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?

A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months.
The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is
abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic
stress disorder." 72

Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:

"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?

A Of course obfuscated."73

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment
of memory."

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise
by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts.There was, thus, a resulting diminution
of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a
result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. 78

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had
further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled
that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. 79 His abusive and violent
acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and
obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state
continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her
baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon
and used it to shoot him.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could
have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a
victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered."
She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must
have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity.
Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from
the same set of facts.

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse
upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to
an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That
the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life,
but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.

Second Legal Issue:

Treachery

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 81 In order to qualify an act as
treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.82Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. 83

Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this
qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed,
circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the
prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:

"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag me'

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER

(At this juncture the witness started crying)

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not
have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to
kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a
pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other
room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment
was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
look like?

A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.

Q It is a flexible blade?

A It's a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
 xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?

A Yes, because I smashed him.

Q What happened?

A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.

Q What else happened?

A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood
pressure.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same time pointed at the
back of her neck or the nape).

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?

A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die
also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.

COURT

/to Atty. Tabucanon

Q You shot him?

A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the victim's position relative to
appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.85

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the
thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in
order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor. 87

Proper Penalty

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall
be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by
one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. 90 Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision
mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8
months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be
released from detention on parole.91

Epilogue

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize
vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took
great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to
the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and
abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person.
Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have
helped it in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given
facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up
our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable --
not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the
present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau
of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is
being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice Santiago in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL,
INC., respondents.

William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.

Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of
herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school
authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed therein
as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was
enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such
instructions in school by petitioner. 1 In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a
civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo.2 Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age
but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion
Ong.3 Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at
Bacolod City on January 10, 1976. 4

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application
for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of
a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral
values, of the school." 5

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6 Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution, required the parties to submit
their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits 7 were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that
petitioner, "defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy
under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8 More specifically, private respondent raised issues
on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with
one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing, rendered an "Award"
in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held
therein that —

The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed out that before the
marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during her employment with petitioner, an
amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written
testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances under which such amorous relationship
was manifested within the premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within the sight of some employees.
While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it is
however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during these
times. . . . 9

Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to. 10

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of due process for not having
been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended that there was nothing
immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful
wedlock with her student.11

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered
petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:

Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a classroom
after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were
sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.

xxx xxx xxx

Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not
deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on and
with the door open.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by immoral acts which did not
lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by herein
appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the
sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to
the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of evidence that could have proved
detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come to our attention. . . . 12

The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance. 13

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines. 14 After the corresponding
exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision
reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual
reinstatement. 15

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think that this decision of public
respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a
motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private respondent and despite opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the
aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of
petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in
this Court in the present case:

That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to view the matter from
the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of children whose interest must be
held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment and
action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the belief
of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which
was considered by them as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school teacher should at all times act
with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above suspicion; 19

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid resolution of public
respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the contrary, was actually
based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.

2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of Laddy
Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in evidence without
presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine them.
 3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached the trust
reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282)
of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment. 20

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There is no denial of due process
where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved based on position
papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have
insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was convinced that
the case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings before the
Ministry of Labor.

Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers and to strengthen the
educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an
immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It
argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had
moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it
charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a
"school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student." 21

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher
falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued that she was dismissed because
of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission thus:

. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was filed only after
more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated
application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged immoral
acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified conduct that triggered the intended
separation, then why was the present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged demoralizing
effect was still fresh and abrasive?22

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the legality of the dismissal
hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the
marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the
circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and
the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question, the
resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.

Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual conclusions arrived at by public
respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not
bound thereby.23

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by him in his original
decision:

Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are the affidavits
attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration
proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many question unanswered
by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off school hours when
appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records of the case
present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most
convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific immoral
acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very important at that, the alleged acts
complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but the disciplinenary action imposed by
appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only in August, 1976
and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are
clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over one month
after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much earlier, is open to basis of the action
sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we
 are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to
itself. 24

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were
committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and credible
mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times." 25 In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations
Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support
such claim, 26 a finding which herein public respondent himself shared.

We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned resolution, which we hereby
reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that the reversal of his original
decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in
this wise:

. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the classroom it
seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the
classrom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which
confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those times of the day. . . . 27

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of
Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of
her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only
lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this
gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage
from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily bannered
to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security
of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being
apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we
believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages
equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every
year of service.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and
MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by
their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE
LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI
QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their
parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it
touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
"so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
 (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other
uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of
rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests,
(j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water
for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise
known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed
their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour —
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the
end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
 matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection
by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was
the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained,
the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda
after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does
not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the
said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question
of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class
suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the
said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but
to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization
be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged
order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant.
For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with
sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they
are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle
of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation
to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired
between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water
and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent
with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of
the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it
makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for
the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention
to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy)
and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on
the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
— under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No
other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down
the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order.
The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well
as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
 enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place,
the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had
done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter
a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of
Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot
as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the
same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such
as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to
be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin
the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases
of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part. –SEE SEPARATE OPINIONS-
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521,
528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-
1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188,
192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269,
271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362,
367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594,
599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547,
1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-
1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-
1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966,
1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-
532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677,
679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners
are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
 SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that
while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some
private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party
to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to
apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the
rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is
not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law
officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any
other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent
the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
 Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and
legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people
are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force
and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional,
was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for
the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S.
559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination,
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered
in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
 is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative
fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration
... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until
the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

-SEE SEPARATE OPINIONS-