001. Calalas v. CA GR.
122039 Held:
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way,
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped
down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco
Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against
Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third
party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable
and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case
for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to
Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found
Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between
Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand,
is res judicata to the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence
required in the contract of carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for
quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that
case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present
case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether
Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual,
is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756
of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there
is no relation between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the
law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from
the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that
petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated
in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only
was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga,
but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought
to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing
that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney
being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the
following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach
is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury
to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of
parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is
not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger,
as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no
legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad
faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
002. La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739)
Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three
minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years
old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San
Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga.
Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant.
They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing
their personal belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three
tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child
Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both
were below the height which fare is charged in accordance with
plaintiff’s rules and regulations.
After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it
stopped to allow the passengers bound therefore, among whom
were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran,
carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down the
bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his
companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the
road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his
paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter
followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran
was on he running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to
hand him his bayong which he left under one its seats near the
door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading
suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to
the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when
the bus was again placed in a complete stop, it had traveled
about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately
jumped form the running board without getting his bayong from
conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board in
front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his children.
At that time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body
of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and
without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel,
who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together
her parent.
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit
against the defendant to recover from the latter damages.
Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of
the bus involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of
carriage was already terminated?
Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is
concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which
was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier
between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The
relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease
where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s
servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.
It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s
vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier’s premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel must
have followed her father. However, although the father was still
on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to
hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even
he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this
instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over
and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the
carrier’s agent had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very
cautious person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation
to transport safely its passengers. The driver, although stopping
the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to
run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go
and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggage of
the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said
passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier,
entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
003. Vergara v. CA GR. 77679
Facts: A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when
Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to
petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of
private respondent Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage
assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in
favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly
and severally with Traveller’s Insurance and Surety Corporation,
the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and
the costs. The insurance company was sentenced to pay to the
petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability
under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b)
P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for
certiorari.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict
Held: It was established by competent evidence that the
requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These
requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by
act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose
acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding
circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo
truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila
and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of
the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle;
and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the
plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied
the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by
defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident
preventable.
004. Coastwise Lighterage Corporation v. CA GR 114167
Facts: Pag-asa Sales Inc. entered into a contract to transport
molasses from the province of Negros to Manila with Coastwise
Lighterage Corporation (Coastwise for brevity), using the latter's
dumb barges. The barges were towed in tandem by the tugboat
MT Marica, which is likewise owned by Coastwise. Upon
reaching Manila Bay, one of the barges, "Coastwise 9", struck
an unknown sunken object. The forward buoyancy compartment
was damaged, and water gushed in through a hole "two inches
wide and twenty-two inches long". As a consequence, the
molasses at the cargo tanks were contaminated. Pag-asa filed a
claim against Philippine General Insurance Company, the
insurer of its cargo. Philgen paid P700,000 for the value of the
molasses lost.
Philgen then filed an action against Coastwise to recover the
money it paid, claiming to be subrogated to the claims which the
consignee may have against the carrier. Both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals ruled against Coastwise.
Issues:
(1) Whether Coastwise was transformed into a private carrier by
virtue of the contract it entered into with Pag-asa, and whether it
exercised the required degree of diligence
(2) Whether Philgen was subrogated into the rights of the
consignee against the carrier
Held: (1) Pag-asa Sales, Inc. only leased three of petitioner's
vessels, in order to carry cargo from one point to another, but
the possession, command mid navigation of the vessels
remained with petitioner Coastwise Lighterage. Coastwise
Lighterage, by the contract of affreightment, was not converted
into a private carrier, but remained a common carrier and was
still liable as such. The law and jurisprudence on common
carriers both hold that the mere proof of delivery of goods in
good order to a carrier and the subsequent arrival of the same
goods at the place of destination in bad order makes for a prima
facie case against the carrier. It follows then that the
presumption of negligence that attaches to common carriers,
once the goods it is sports are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
applies to the petitioner. This presumption, which is overcome
only by proof of the exercise of extraordinary diligence,
remained unrebutted in this case. Jesus R. Constantino, the
patron of the vessel "Coastwise 9" admitted that he was not
licensed. Coastwise Lighterage cannot safely claim to have
exercised extraordinary diligence, by placing a person whose
navigational skills are questionable, at the helm of the vessel
which eventually met the fateful accident. It may also logically,
follow that a person without license to navigate, lacks not just
the skill to do so, but also the utmost familiarity with the usual
and safe routes taken by seasoned and legally authorized ones.
Had the patron been licensed he could be presumed to have
both the skill and the knowledge that would have prevented the
vessel's hitting the sunken derelict ship that lay on their way to
Pier 18. As a common carrier, petitioner is liable for breach of
the contract of carriage, having failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence with the loss and destruction of
goods it transported, by proof of its exercise of extraordinary
diligence.
(2) Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled
principle of subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed or
damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other than
the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured will
be subrogated to the rights of the assured to recover from the
wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to
pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured operated as an
equitable assignment to the former of all remedies which the
latter may have against the third party whose negligence or
wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not
dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any private of contract
or upon written assignment of, claim. It accrues simply upon
payment of the insurance claim by the insurer.