----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and
nd their
UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or
SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005
Facts:
UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake
UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where
the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the
NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila.
After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize
“finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake
Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened
contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by
UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of theBureau of
Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then
filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items
are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were
seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the
respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup
and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.
Held:
It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine.
However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The
State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion
or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer
must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain
view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However,
the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to
contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the
enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof
were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the
NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the
petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
William Yao, Sr. vs People
GR 168306 June 19, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners William Yao, Sr. and several others were incorporators and officers of
Masagana Gas Corporation.
In 2003, the NBI, acting on reports that petitioners unlawfully and in violation of
intellectual property rights of Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell, produce, sell, distribute LPG
products using LPG cylinders owned by Petron and Shell and by virtue of search warrants, raided
the premises of Masagana and confiscated, among other things, the motor compressor and
refilling machine owned by Masagana.
Masagana Corporation intervened in the case and asked for the return of said pieces
of equipment. It argued that even if the same was being used by petitioners in their unlawful
activity, the equipment cannot be confiscated because having a personality separate and distinct
from that of its incorporators, directors and officers, said properties are owned by the
corporation and not by the petitioners.
The court denied Masagana’s motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity is applicable in
the case.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reiterated that it is a fundamental principle of corporation law
that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers.
However, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons
or in the case of two corporations merge them into one. Hence, in this case, liability will attach
personally or directly to the officers and stockholders.
The findings of the Court show that petitioners, as director/officers of Masagana were utilizing
the corporation in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. As such,
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity applies.
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- required that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises.
Where the
ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search
G.R. No. 166061, July 6, 2007, TINGA, warrant, it is
J. not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so
Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and that no
not for the discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.
search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit
and search -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
warrant does not invalidate the warrant. G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
 vs.
 HON.
Facts: JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
The Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) was tasked to implement a search Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
warrant to a certain Bernard Lim for probably possessing PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
shabu. The team was escorted to the unit by Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
security officer Punsaran, upon arrival at the place to be searched, Quelnan opened the door. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
The team JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
presented the search warrant and proceeded with the search. In the presence of Quelnan and
Punsaran, they
found on top of a bedroom table three pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form
crystalline were alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
substance which was later examined as Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants,
shabu. Quelnan was arrested for violation of Sec. 16 Art. III of RA directing any peace officer to search petitioners’ persons and/or premises of their offices,
6425.Quelnan in his defense averred that he is not residing in the said unit, but he is the warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
registered owner correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
of the said unit, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee; that he was there during the search for he documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
was collecting the balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
rent; that he was forced to sign some documents at gunpoint, handcuffed and brought to
PARAC Office. The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized
According to Quelnan, the CA erred in declaring that where a search warrant is issued for the in the offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.
search
of specifically described premises and not of a person, the omission of the name of the owner Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity
or occupant of the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants,
such property in the warrant does not invalidate the same. Petitioner contends that this were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
doctrine applies only petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in
if the search warrant does not indicate with all certainty the owner or occupant of the an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to
premises sought to be the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.
searched; on the contrary, the subject search warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the
person subject Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and
thereof is Kim. seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
Issue:
Whether the search warrant was validly implemented Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Ruling: Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill
Yes. Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it et. al. are not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their
corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said
corporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from
petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby
declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of
these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no
specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations
of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of
a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the
legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general
warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court: x
x x If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988
DECISION
(3rd Division)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting
searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged
that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by
the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI,
accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described
in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized
properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the
CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause
that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the
application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private
respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who was also a witness during the application stated
that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents
were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted
the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence
because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation
of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the
court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the
former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted
films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kho vs MakalintalG.R. No. 94902-06. April 21, 1999
Facts:
Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the objects seized by virtue of
such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately
the said items, including the firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio communication
equipment,hand sets, transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle. Petitioners question
the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause
therefor. They contend that the
surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to
the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in
the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the
commission of a crime by them (petitioners)
Issue:
Whether petitioners’ contention of the absence of probable cause in the given situation is
tenable.
Held:
Petitioners’ contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the
surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and
unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored
therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the
surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the
said witnesses personally saw the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to
the premises referred to. NBI agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being
unloaded from a Toyota Lite/Ace van and brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes,
Paranaque because he was there inside the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May
15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search
warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe, this court ruled that the question of whether or not a
probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in
the given situations. In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable
cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the
required examination of the applicants and the witnesses. After a careful study, the court
discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the respondent judge
after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity
to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
enough to create a probable cause. The judge was the one who personally examined the
applicants and witnesses and who asked questions vis/a/vis the applications for search
warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their
witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the
premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of
his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on
theaffiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability andcorrectness of his
findings and impressions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondent
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for
ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after
which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was
later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a
search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied
him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found
a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of
a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally
possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary
license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid
HELD/DECISION:
1. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person
who was arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any
weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the
welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to
find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid
arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within
the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the
petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the
gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be “in his
immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are
permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest
under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the firearm was not found accidentally
but was actually searched and therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was
illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.
 Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used
against him.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOLINA
FACTS:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information regarding
the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after
they were arrested. In the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called for
assistance at the PNP proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait
for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a “trisikad”
carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon pointed to the
accused-appellants as the pushers. The police officers then ordered the “trisikad” to stop. SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open
the bag. Molina replied, “
Boss, if possible we will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag,
which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina
were handcuffed by the police officers. Accused-appellants contended that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of
their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE:
W/N THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLANTS’CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
HELD:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion. The Constitution provides:
SEC. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations. As a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense(arrest in flagrante
delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
(arrest of escaped prisoners). In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward
indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-
appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed
a crime. The response of Molina that “Boss, if possible we will settle this” is an equivocal
statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in
the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants
could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1 Paguidopon only
learned Mula’s name and address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed
recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able
to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side
of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at
accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when
SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest. The Court holds that the
arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence,
the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized
by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence. WHEREFORE accused are ACQUITTED.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010.
FACTS:
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the
arrest, two police officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were transacting.
While the officers were coming, one of the officers saw Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag
with white substance in it. When asked, she fled but was eventually caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against her.
The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-
and-frisk doctrine.
ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid.
RULING:
The SC denied the appeal.
Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did not
quash it before arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the
appellate court.
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain
view doctrine was imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition and
requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People v. Chua - that he should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted from the bus, appellant was
about to board a tricycle when the team of police authorities approached him and invited him
to the police station. As he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope
slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.
Appellant was charged in two separate information, one for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165,
for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: (1)WON the warrant of arrest was violated.
(2) the evidence was admissible in evidence.
RULING: (1) No. “Reliable information” alone is not sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt act indicative of the
criminal design.
(2) No. This is an instance of seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence.
The 1978 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with
a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said
proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in ;plain view;
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: November 23, 2007
G.R. No. 170180
Valdez v PP
TINGA, J.:
Accused: Arsenio Vergara Valdez
Charged of: violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 [possession, control and custody
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page]
FACTS:
The three tanods conducted a routine patrol in the Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La
Union on March 17, 2003. They noticed Valdez alighting from a mini-bus carrying a bag. He
was looking for something. Thus the tanods, on suspicion, approached him. But Valdez
attempted to run away. The tanods chased him and put him under arrest. They brought him to
the house of Captain Mercado. Valdez was ordered to open his bag. The bag contained dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. Thereafter Valdez was brought to the
police station.
Issue:
- W/N the warrantless search was valid?
- W/N the warrantless arrest was valid?
- W/N the evidence seized from the warrantless search and arrest is admissible?
Ruling:
 [The warrantless arrest is not valid.] The search, conducted as it was
without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful
arrest.19 Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier
intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well. petitioner was not committing an
offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
committing an offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to
justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest. Flight per se is not synonymous with
guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.
 Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver [of his right to question his arrest] cannot
be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. Doubtless, the constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may
be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It is the State
which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
 Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for
being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates
 against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to
convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken
from petitioner’s bag.
 However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate
the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run
roughshod over an accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven to
the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to
establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome
the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable
doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s vindication from criminal liability.
ONLINE VERSION
Facts:
Arsenio Valdez was found guilty for violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165.
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal,
that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that
the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest was validly made?
HELD:
NO. When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a
person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he
appear to be then committing an offense.The tanoddid not have probable cause either to
justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Here,
petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his
way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached
him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with
personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not
run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be
viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring
based on petitioners behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v.
Ohio,must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should
be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: September 29, 1989
G.R. No. 83988
Valmonte v De Villa
PADILLA, J.:
Petition: petition for prohibition - the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or
elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same
FACTS:
the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a
supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold
blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at
Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Question/Issue:
W/N the installed checkpoints to make warrantless search and seizures are violations of the
Constitution?
Ruling:
- The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. [It
cannot be just a general allegation and it must be specific.]
- Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail. [Because at that time there were threats/alarms in the public
security. Increased killings caused by NPA Sparrow Units; abundance of unlicensed firearms;
rise in lawlessness and violence in the urban centers.]
ONLINE VERSION:
FACTS:
The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated on January 20, 1987
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintain peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. The NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not checkpoints are illegal as they violate the people’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
RULING:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but it is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpointsmay
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
Petition is DISMISSED.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ONLINE VERSION
PEOPLE VS. DORIA
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-handed of
selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers searched for the marked
bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened to be in the house of Gaddao,
according to Doria. When they reached her house, the police officers came upon a box. He saw
that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by
"Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the
box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to
be dried marijuana leaves.
Both accused were convicted of the crime chared. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid.
HELD:
We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a),
a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an
offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant.
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule
is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-
handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule
113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article
is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have
been excluded and never considered by the trial court.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MALACAT vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a
group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around
Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men. When the
policemen approached the group of men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the
police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a search was made on his
person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein
petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and
the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it
erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible because it was a
product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order
to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to
certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as
a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5)
a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of
the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

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February 22, 2007
G.R. No. 170233
PP v Nuevas
TINGA, J.:
Accused: Jesus Nuevas, Reynaldo Din, Fernando Inocencio
Charged of: Illegal possession of marijuana
FACTS:
Police Officers Fami and Cabling conducted a surveillance in Brgy Pag-asa Olongapo of illegal
drug trafficking. They received information that a male person would make a delivery of dried
marijuana leaves. They saw Nuevas alighting from a motor vehicle carrying a plastic bag. He fits
the description of the tip given to them. So they went to him and informed Nuevas they were
police officers. Nuevas told Fami that there were other stuff in the possession of Vangie and
two other male persons. He gave the plastic bag to Fami which contained marijuana leaves and
bricks wrapped in blue cloth. He also disclosed that two other male persons would deliver 5
kilos of marijuana.
The three went to Purok 12, Old Cabalan and found Din and Inocencio. Din was carrying a light
blue plastic bag and said that they were owned by Nuevas. Fami took the bag from Din which
contained marijuana packed in newspaper. Thereafter, the three accused were brought to the
station.
- the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary
in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search. the search conducted in
Nuevas’s case was made with his consent. He voluntarily surrendered the bag to the officers in
attempt to exculpate himself. In Din’s case, he did not, the bag was taken by Fami.
- the validity of consented search, the police authorities expressly asked for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof. Which is not in Din’s case because it cannot be established by the inconsistent
testimonies of the officers.
- Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Din’s conviction cannot be sustained based
on the remaining evidence. Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be
admitted in evidence against the appellants, Din more specifically, as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Thus, the acquittal.
- in Inocencio’s case, he was wrongly convicted. His supposed possession of the dried
marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that
Din was carrying. Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held
by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. Inocencio did not know of the
contents nor conspired to possess them. Thus, his acquittal.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue:
Was the warrantless search made by the officers valid?
[Yes with respect to Nuevas but not to Din and Inocencio]
Can the evidence obtained thru the warrantless arrest be admissible?
[Yes with respect to Nuevas but not to Din and Inocencio]

Ruling:
- the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless
searches incidental to lawful arrests. the arrest must precede the search; in this case the
search preceded the arrest. Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. [it
was only a tip and not a personal reliable information that was given to the officers]
- neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine. An object is in plain
view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. Records show that the dried
marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that were not readily apparent or transparent to
the police officers.