Persons & Family Relations (October 1, 2018)
II. LEGAL SEPARATION
- Otherwise known as relative divorce.
- does not affect the marital status; It does not dissolve the marriage. A legal separation
decree involves nothing more than bed-and-board separation (a mensa et thoro) of the
spouses.
- terminable at the will of the parties by merely filing a manifestation in court
- FC does not admit absolute divorce except under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code
a. Grounds (Article 55)
Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
4. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
7. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion;
9. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (97a)
William Ong vs. Lucita Ong G.R No. 153206
FACTS: Respondent filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
Code alleging that her life with the petitioner was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation
and grossly abusive conduct. She claimed that after three years of marriage, they quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; petitioner would also shout invectives
at her. The causes of the fights were petty things regarding their children or their business. She also
claimed that the petitioner pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house, which she did.
However, the petitioner argued that the real motive of respondent and her family in filing
the case is to wrest control and ownership over their conjugal properties. He also argued that the CA
erred in relying on the testimonies of respondent and her witnesses, the findings of the trial court
that he committed acts of repeated physical violence against respondent and their children were not
sufficiently established; what took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and
disciplining the children. Since respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal
separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code.
ISSUE: W/N the evidences against the petitioner were credible enough to grant legal separation of
marriage.
RULING: The RTC granted the respondents petition for legal separation. It was also affirmed by
the CA and are adequately supported by the records. With all the evidences presented by the
1
respondent, the petitioner only offered denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents. Article
55 (1 & 10) and Article 56 (4) is applied in this case.
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz L- 19565
FACTS: The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She
further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal
properties. She suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the
conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
On the other hand, defendant contended that he had always visited the conjugal home
and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to
supervise the expansion of their business, which was affirmed by the plaintiff. When he transferred
his living quarters to his office, his intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and
children, but only to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every
woman and that that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support, in
fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office.
ISSUE: W/N the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitutes abandonment in law and
would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?
RULING: The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support
of the family. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the
wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. Furthermore, the plaintiff
failed to show whether defendant kept Nenita as a concubine. In conclusion, the defendant was
ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he
shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the meantime, be reduced or
increased in the discretion of the court a quo as circumstances warrant.
b. Defenses (Article 56)
Article 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act
constituting the ground for legal separation;
4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain the decree of legal separation; or
6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
i. Condonation
The act of forgiving the offense after its commission. However, it has been held that condonation
implies a condition of future good behavior by the offending spouse. subsequent offense on his or
her part revokes or nullifies the condonation and revives the original offense.
PP vs. Schnekenburger L-48183
FACTS: the accused and his wife agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live
separately from each other. For this purpose, they, executed a document in Spanish. The accused
without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Mexico and
contracted another marriage with the co-accused.
Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Court of Mexico, complainant herein
instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for concubinage. The first
Persons & Family Relations (October 1, 2018)
action culminated in the conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to a penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage, accused
interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal,
this Court held the dismissal before trial to be premature (this was under the former procedure) and
without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on
the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to
a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the accused should be acquitted of concubinage in view of the agreement executed
by the accused and complainant upon their separation.
RULING: Yes. The agreement constituted a consent given by the complainant to the accuses,
hence, the accused should be acquitted of concubinage. Judgment is reversed. The accused can be
prosecuted for the crime of adultery but not for the crime of concubinage since the document they
executed manifested their prior consent to the illicit acts like the ones committed by the accused.
Benjamine Bugayong vs. Leonila Ginez L-10033
FACTS: the respondent left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter
that she had gone to reside with her mother, from which place she later moved to another place and
study in a local college there. Eventually the plaintiff began receiving letters from her sister-in-law
and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. Later on, he went home
and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of defendant’ s godmother. The defendant came
along with him and they proceeded to the house of the cousin of the plaintiff and stayed for 2 nights
and 1 day as husband and wife. They repaired to the plaintiff’s house and again passed the night
therein as husband and wife. The plaintiff tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information
he received but the defendant, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he
took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that, the plaintiff still exerted
effort by locating the defendant but failed. Later on, the plaintiff filed a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. Plaintiff’s counsel announced that he was to present
6 witnesses but after plaintiff finished testifying in his favor, defendant’s counsel orally moved for
the dismissal of the complaint, but the Court ordered him to file a written motion to that effect and
gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same. The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the
Court, considering only the second ground of the motion to dismiss, ordered the dismissal of the
action. After the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff was denied, the case was taken up for
review to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in finding that there was condonation on the part of plaintiff.
RULING: A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff, clearly shows that there was a
condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed “acts of rank infidelity amounting to
adultery” committed by defendant. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her
and the plaintiff.
Alfredo Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao G.R No. 196842
FACTS: Rosa and Alfredo Busuego were married, but their marriage turned sour.
Alfredo, then, entered into extra-marital relationships.
Learning that, Rosa, at first, gave Alfredo the benefit of the doubt, but, later on, she filed a
complaint for concubinage before the Office of the Ombudsman.
2
The Ombudsman found Alfredo guilty.
Thus, in the case at hand, Alfredo filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman, contending that Rosa’s condonation of his supposed concubinage
was overlooked when she alleged in the complaint that she had known of his womanizing and
believed him to have changed his ways.
ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman overlooked Rosa’s condonation when she alleged that she believed
Alfredo to have changed his ways.
RULING: The SC agrees with the Ombudsman’s decision and dismissed Alfredo’s petition.
Rosa’s admission was that she believed her husband had stopped womanizing, not that she had
knowledge of his specific acts of concubinage. The SC finds nothing in the record which can be
construed as pardon or condonation. It is true that Rosa has been patient with her husband’s
shortcomings, but that seems to have been due to his promises of improvement. Nowhere does it
appear that she has consented to her husband’s immorality or that she has accepted in his relations
with his concubines.
ii. Consent
An agreement between the parties that they agree to live separately from each other, and that they
will not object to the other’s act of sexual infidelity, adultery or concubinage has been declared by
the Supreme Court as void but, though void, is nevertheless an expression of their clear consent to
the commission of the sexual infidelity. May be deduced also from the acts of the spouses.
PP vs. Sensano & Ramos L-37720
FACTS: Ventura left and lived away from the family for three years without writing or any support.
Respondent, for survival, lived with a certain Ramos. Roughly 5 years after (1924), Ventura
returned and filed a case of adultery against the respondent to which both have been convicted and
punished with arresto mayor. After serving her sentence, respondent- Sensano left her paramour
and begged for Ventura to take her back which the latter refused to pardon or to live with her and
said that she could go where she wished, and that he would have nothing more to do with her and
she could do as she pleased. With nowhere left to go, respondent- Sensano returned to respondent-
Ramos and cohabited with him ever since. Ventura, knowing of the cohabitation did nothing and
just flew to Hawaii where he stayed for 7 years. When he returned, he filed for a second charge of
adultery since he now wants to obtain a divorce decree under Act No. 2710. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ventura can still file for a second charge of adultery given the circumstances?
RULING: the SC held that he cannot file for legal separation on the ground that he consented to
the commission of the crime of adultery for not doing anything for 7 long years even though he
knew of the adulterous cohabitation.
Matubis vs. Praxedes G.R No. L- 11766
FACTS: petitioner filed a complaint for legal separation and change of surname against
respondent. She alleged that they agreed to live separately and entered into an agreement:
a) that both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife
b) that both of us free to get any mate and live with as husband and wife and neither can prosecute
the other for adultery or concubinage
c) the wife is no longer entitled for any support, and vice versa
d) neither can claim anything from the other
Persons & Family Relations (October 1, 2018)
Eventually, the respondent began cohabiting with another woman, and the said woman gave birth
to a child. It was shown that they are deported as husband and wife and were generally reputed as
such in the community.
ISSUE: W/N there is a sufficient ground for legal separation?
RULING: there is sufficient evidence presented as a ground for legal separation. HOWEVER,
while the legal ground exists because the defendant constituted concubinage, THE SUIT MUST
BE DISMISSED. As shown in their agreement, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of
concubinage by her husband. Her consent is clear from the agreement they entered into. This
stipulation is an unbridled license she gave her husband to commit concubinage. Having consented
to the concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation. Having condoned and/or consented
in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court’s sympathy.
iii. Connivance
Denotes direction, influence, personal exertion, or other action with knowledge and belief that such
action would produce certain results and which results are produced; corrupt consent.
iv. Mutual Guilt or Recrimination
Both parties are at fault or have given ground for legal separation.
In Pari delicto- when two persons acted in bad faith, they should be considered as having acted in
good faith.
Arroyo vs. CA& PP G.R No. 96602
FACTS: Jorge led a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife and the petitioner. Both the
wife and her paramour pleaded not guilty but the RTC convicted them both of adultery. Petitioner
Arroyo and the Wife moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been
extended by her husband, and that her husband had later contracted marriage with another woman
with whom he is presently cohabiting. Both motions were denied by the CA. Eventually, Jorge, led
a manifestation, praying for the dismissal of the case against petitioners as he had “tacitly
consented” to his wife’s infidelity. Petitioners then led their respective motions praying for the
dismissal or for the granting of new trial of the case claiming Dr. Jorge’s manifestation as basis for
their motions.
ISSUE: W/N Dr. Jorge’s alleged extra- marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal
complaint on the ground of pari delicto;
RULING: In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into
any agreement with Dr. Jorge allowing each other to marry or co-habit with other persons; and Dr.
Jorge promptly led his complaint after discovering the illicit affair. ACCORDINGLY, the Motion
for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and this denial is
FINAL. The Petition for Review in G.R. No. 96715 is hereby similarly DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
v. Collusion
Refers to an arrangement between spouses to obtain a decree of legal separation by secret
maneuvers or pretensions by making it appear that a valid ground exists even if there’s none’ a
corrupt agreement.
3
Brown vs. Yambao L- 10699
FACTS: The petitioner was interned by the invaders, while his wife, the respondent, was allegedly
engaging in an adulterous relationship with another man. This affair fruited a child and the
petitioner only knew of after he was released. However, almost 10 years have passed since he
petitioned for the liquidation and assignment of the conjugal properties, custody of their children,
and that the respondent-defendant is disqualified to succeed the plaintiff, among others.
After the wife was unable to answer to the summons, the City Fiscal, represented by the
Assistant City Fiscal, directed to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties.
During the trial, the Assistant Fiscal questioned the petitioner and was able to elicit the fact that the
petitioner, after living separately from the respondent since his liberation, lived martially with
another woman and had children as well. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal
separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife’s adultery was established, Brown had incurred
in a misconduct of similar nature (cohabiting with a woman other than his wife) that barred his
right of action under Art. 100, that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown’s
action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code.
ISSUE: W/N the Assistant City Fiscal exceeded his powers by acting as a counsel for the
respondent and not the state.
RULING: The SC ruled that the petition was untenable. As mentioned, Brown’s cohabitation with
another woman other than his wife bars him from claiming legal separation. Additionally, the fact
that there was evidence of misconduct and the failure of the respondent to set up such misconduct
as a defense was a proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered circumstantial
evidence of collusion between the spouses. The SC also affirmed the ruling of the lower court with
relation to the barring of the petitioner’s action due to the lapse of the period to file the action for
legal separation.
vi. Prescription (Article 57)
The loss or extinction of the right to file an action due to the lapse of time fixed by the law. An
action for legal separation must be filed within five years from the occurrence of the cause. (The
discovery, however, could only serve to shorten but not to lengthen the period; The law assumes
that if you discover it after five years, forgiveness is already the order of the day, and no longer
recrimination). The time of discovery of the ground for legal separation is not material in counting
the prescriptive period
c. Procedure (Article 58-60)
The procedure is governed by Supreme Court Resolution En Banc, A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC
reproduced at the end of this chapter.
1. Article 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103a)
2. Article 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the court has taken steps toward
the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that
reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)
3. Article 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. In any case, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (101a)
4. Article 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled
to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement
Persons & Family Relations (October 1, 2018)
between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the
absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by
the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules
of Court. (104a)
5. Article 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of
Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support
of the common children. (105a)
*The six-month-cooling-off-period requirement can be dispensed with if the ground for legal
separation involves violence against the woman or the child.
* Unless, excepted by law, failure to observe the six-month cooling-off period is a ground to set
aside a decision granting legal separation.
* the determination of the custody of the children, alimony and support pendente lite may be heard
inside the six-month cooling-off period.
i. A.M No. 02-11-11-SC: Rule on Legal Separation
Pacete vs. Carriaga G.R No. 53880
FACTS: private respondent, filed a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between
her former husband and Clarita, herein petitioners, as well as for legal separation between her and
the petitioner-pacete, and accounting and separation of property. She stated in her complaint that
the petitioner subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita, and later on learned about
the marriage. Reconciliation between her and petitioner was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were served with summons and filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court granted. However, the courts denied the last motion for extension on the
ground that it was filed after the original period given as first extension had expired. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court granted. The court
received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the court followed the mandatory 6-month cooling-off.
RULING: In the case at bench, the Supreme Court set aside the decision on the ground that the
six- month cooling-off period was a mandatory requirement and its non- compliance made the
decision infirm. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in
the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements.
d. Effects (Article 63-64)
Article 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond
shall not be severed;
2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance
with the provisions of Article 43(2);
3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code;
4
4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse in the will of
the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)
Article 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the
donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the
latter as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable.
The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where
the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The
revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written
notification thereof to the insured. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be
brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation has become final. (107a)
* However, if the donation is void, the right to bring an action to declare the nullity of the donation
does not prescribe.
*Article 87 “every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on
the occasion of any family rejoicing.”
Saballones vs. CA G.R No. 106168
FACTS: when the petitioner went back to the Ph, he did not return to his wife and their children
but instead returned to another woman and their three children. Later on, the petitioner filed an
action for judicial authorization to sell one of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership.
Which was opposed by the respondent and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She
alleged that that property was being occupied by her and their 6 children and that they were
depending for the support on the rentals from another conjugal property. She prayed that the court
grant the degree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal partnership, with
forfeiture of her husband’s share therein because of his adultery. And also to prevent petitioner to
disturb the occupants of the property being leased and disposing any of their conjugal properties.
The respondent wife filed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner
from interfering with the administration of their properties. She alleged that petitioner harassed the
tenant who leased one of the properties and informed him that his lease will not be renewed. She
also complained that petitioner had disposed one of their properties in favor of his paramour, to the
prejudice of his legitimate wife and their children.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent wife can file for a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
petitioner from interfering with the administration of and disposing their conjugal properties.
RULING: the SC held that such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying
the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as
administrator). And that the designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it
issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction. With the allegations that the
husband was harassing the tenant of the properties and disposing of their conjugal properties to the
detriment of his legal wife and their children shows that the injunction was necessary to preserve
the conjugal assets while there is still no designation of the administrator by the court.
e. Reconciliation (Article 65-67)
Article 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly
signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)
Persons & Family Relations (October 1, 2018)
Article 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding article shall have the following
consequences:
1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated in whatever stage;
and
2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree
to revive their former property regime. The court’s order containing the foregoing shall be recorded
in the proper civil registries. (108a)
Article 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding article
shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and
3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same
proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After
due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measures to protect the interest of creditors and such
order shall be recorded in the proper registries of property. The recording of the order in the
registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-
spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor’s claim. (195a, 108a)
III. RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND & WIFE (ARTICLES 68-73)
a. Basic Obligations (Article 68)
Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a).
*Procreation
* Except for support, a court cannot validly issue a decision compelling the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
* Rape is also an act of violence against a woman, including the wife.
Marieta Azcueta vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R No. 180668
FACTS: the petitioner & respondent were married but separated after 4 years of marriage. The
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage on the ground that her
husband was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
She complained that despite her encouragement, her husband never bothered to look for a job and
always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was even her
mother-in-law who found them a room and paid their monthly rental. She claimed that she would
give him the newspaper so he can look for job prospects and even bought him work clothes and
shoes but the husband would use his age as an excuse for failing to get work. He pretended to have
found work and gave his wife money which actually came from his mother. Upon confronting him,
the husband cried like a child and he only did that so that she will not be nagging him anymore. He
told his wife that his parents could support their needs. When the wife asked if they could move to
another place, the husband did not agree and after four years of living together as husband and wife,
she was forced to leave and see if he would follow her. He did not.
To support the petition, the wife presented her husband’s cousin and a psychiatrist as
witnesses. The expert noted that the husband has Dependent Personality Disorder which explained
why he was too dependent on his mother so much disabling him from making decisions for himself
5
and for their marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he
will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was
incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his
personality. He grew up having his mother as a dominant figure in the family making decisions
because his father was a seaman. The RTC rendered the marriage void ab initio but SolGen
questioned the decision which was then reversed by the CA. According to the SolGen and CA, the
evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondent's alleged irresponsibility and over-
dependence on his mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.
ISSUE: W/N the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
RULING: SC ruled in favor of the petitioner declaring the husband psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. The wife sufficiently
discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. What matters is whether
the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of PI.
Erlinda Ilusorio vs. Erlinda Bildner, Sylvia Ilusorio, John and Jane Doe G.R No. 139789 &
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO vs. CA and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO G.R No. 139808
FACTS: Erlinda Ilusorio is the wife of Potenciano Ilusorio but was then legally separated. When
Potenciano went back from US, he lived with his wife Erlinda for 5 months. During this time, their
children, alleged that their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft,
an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor which resulted to Potenciano’s health deterioration.
Later on, the wife filed a petition for the guardianship over the persons and property of her husband
due to the latter’s health condition. When Potenciano attended a corporate meeting, he never
returned to his wife which leads to the wife filing for habeas corpus to have his custody. She alleged
that respondents (her children) refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited her
husband from returning to her. After due hearing, the CA rendered a decision ordering the
respondents to allow the wife to visit her husband AND dismissed the writ of habeas corpus filed
by the wife. Both parties elevated the case to the SC. Wife sought the reversal of the dismissal of
her petition for HC, while the husband wanted to annul the visitation rights of his wife as ordered
by the CA.
ISSUE: W/N May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss.
RULING: This Court ruled that the evidence showed that there was no actual and effective
detention or deprivation of the husband’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. In this
case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. With
his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, the husband may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Finally, no court is
empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. 9. Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free
choice.
Tenchavez vs. Vicenta Escano L- 19671
FACTS: the respondent is married to the petitioner. However, the two were unable to live together
after the marriage and eventually became estranged. Respondent left for the United Stated in 1950.
Persons & Family Relations (October 1, 2018)
On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of
Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final
and absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with
him in California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
Later on, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent and her parents whom he
charged with having dissuaded and discouraged respondent from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages. The respondents parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE: W/N the divorce sought by respondent is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
RULING: the court held that the petitioner and respondents marriage remain existent and
undissolved under the Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed
valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree
was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for
the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again
are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal
separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
b. Fixing the Domicile
Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption
shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
* the spouses can only have one domicile but many residences. The domicile is the place where the
parties intend to have their permanent residence with the intention of always returning even if they
have left it for some time. A minor follows the domicile of his or her parents. The fixing of the
family domicile should be by agreement between the husband and the wife.
c. Support of Family
Article 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such
support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or
absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties.
(111a)
d. Management of Household
Article 71. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The
expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
Article 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits
acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
may apply to the court for relief. (116a)
* The relief may take on so many forms like:
1. filing a case for legal separation if there are grounds for the same
2. nullifying the marriage based on Article 36 if the neglect is such that
it does not create a functional marital life
3. petitioning the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be
the sole administrator of the community property or the conjugal partnership subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose
e. Exercise of Legitimate Profession
Article 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1) The objection is proper, and
2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior
to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the
spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good
faith. (117a)
* if the husband compels the wife to desist from pursuing a profession or any other conduct which
the wife has the right to engage in, or prevent the wife from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting her
movement or conduct, these are considered acts of violence against women under RA 9262 (Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Law) which is punishable.
f.
Republic Act No. 10572 amending Article 73 & 111of the Family Code
(Approved: May 24, 2013)
EITHER SPOUSE MAY EXERCISE ANY LEGITIMATE PROFESSION, OCCUPATION,
BUSINESS OR ACTIVITY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER. THE LATTER MAY
OBJECT ONLY ON VALID, SERIOUS, AND MORAL GROUNDS.
IN CASE OF DISAGREEMENT, THE COURT SHALL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT:
(1) THE OBJECTION IS PROPER, AND
(2) BENEFIT HAS ACCRUED TO THE FAMILY PRIOR TO THE OBJECTION OR
THEREAFTER. IF THE BENEFIT ACCRUED PRIOR TO THE OBJECTION, THE
RESULTING OBLIGATION SHALL BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY. IF BENEFIT ACCRUED THEREAFTER, SUCH OBLIGATION SHALL BE
ENFORCED AGAINST THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSE WHO HAS NOT
OBTAINED CONSENT.