ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., Petitioner, v.

LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Respondent

G.R. No. 217426, December 04, 2017

Facts

Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. On
the other hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved Medical
Centers Association (GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective

On January 10, 2008, respondent referred Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin), prospective applicant to
petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA.
After undergoing the required examinations, petitioner found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by
a Medical Report dated January 11, 2008 (Medical Report).

Based on the foregoing and relying heavily on the petitioner’s Medical Report, respondent deployed
Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41. Unfortunately,
when Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi
Arabia (General Care Dispensary) on March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the
hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a
re-examination of Raguindin, which the General Care Dispensary conducted on April 28, 2008. However,
the results of the re-examination remained the same, i.e., Raguindin was positive for HCV, which results
were reflected in a Certification dated April 28, 2008 (Certification). An undated HCV Confirmatory Test
Report likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such finding, thereby leading to
Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.

Subsequently, respondent LWV Construction Corporation filed a Complaint for sum of money and
damages against petitioner for its alleged negligent act. In ruling against the petitioner, MeTC, RTC and
CA bases their decisions respectively in the provisions of Article 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code instead
of Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Issues

I. Whether or not the courts were correct in applying Article 19, 20 and 21 on human relations to
this case.
II. Whether or not petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit
for employment" and hence, should be held liable for damages.

Ruling

I. No. Article 2176 should apply in this case. Article 2176 covers situations where an injury
happens through an act or omission of the defendant. When it involves a positive act, the
intention to commit the outcome is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a breach of an existing
law or a pre-existing contractual obligation. What will be considered is whether there is "fault or
negligence” attending the commission of the act which necessarily leads to the outcome
considered as injurious by the plaintiff.

Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore be discerned that Article
20 of the Civil Code concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an injury", whereas Article
 2176 applies when the negligent act causing damage to another does not constitute "a breach
of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation."

In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the provisions of
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. However, the claimed negligent act of petitioner was
not premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no pre-
existing contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties. Therefore Article 2176 -
instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the Civil Code should govern.

II. No, petitioner was not negligent. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is
the basis of her action. It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the
defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was
damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such
negligence.

The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to
establish petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification61 dated April 28, 2008; and (b) the
HCV Confirmatory Test Report. However, these issuances only indicate the results of the
General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own medical examination of Raguindin finding
him to be positive for HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the General Care Dispensary,
which was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at
least two (2) months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11, 2008. Hence, even
assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive
for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the same medical state at
the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, the
respondent failed to show that there was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was
issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not
carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness
for deployment at that time.
GF EQUITY, INC., Petitioner, v. ARTURO VALENZONA, Respondent
G.R. NO. 156841 : June 30, 2005

Facts

GF Equity, represented hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine
Basketball Association (PBA) under a Contract of Employment. Under the contract, it was stipulated that
Valenzona will receive a monthly salary of P35,000, a service vehicle with gasoline allowance upon
compliance to his duties. While thye employment period agreed upon was two years commencing, the
last sentence of paragraph 3 of the contract carried the following condition: ‘If at any time during the
contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or
competitive ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION may terminate this contract.’ Although, he
had consulted his lawyer for the stipulations in the contract and was pointed by his counsel that there is
an one-sidedness face still he agreed to the contract. Subsequently, he was terminated from being the
Head Coach on grounds that the management believes he did not comply of all his duties as coach.
Valenzona filed in RTC of Manila against the GF Equity of breach of contract with damages. The RTC
dismissed the complaint stating that the contract was valid and that he is aware of the bad bargain. In
the CA, where he appealed, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision and thus ordered GF Equity
liable for damages. Hence this petition.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to dismiss the respondent on the basis of their contractual
agreement.

Ruling

No. The petitioner has no right to dismiss the respondent on the basis of Article 1308 on mutuality of
contract and Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Article 1308 of the Civil Code provides for the mutuality of contracts where both parties are bound and
must adhere to the contract. The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract
containing a condition which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the
uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties. The stipulation wherein, the management, on its sole
opinion can terminate the employment of the defendant is violative and thus is null and void.

Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to law, and
GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that Valenzona breached
the contract by failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate
manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle
him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code.

However, the pre-termination of the contract was not willful as GF Equity based it on a provision therein
which is void. Malice or bad faith cannot thus be ascribed to GF Equity.

Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA, declares the assailed provision of the contract NULL and
VOID, and orders GF Equity to pay private respondent actual damages and attorney's fees (no moral
damages).