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Afschin Gandjour
University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the rational foundation of
utilitarianism and the moral motivation to pursue utilitarianism. To this end, the
paper discusses a variety of theories including not only utilitarianism and theo-
ries of rationality, but also economic theory and evolutionary theories of coop-
eration. The paper shows that both the rational foundation of utilitarianism and
the motivation to pursue utilitarianism are questionable. Agent-relative theories
are a recent attempt to attenuate the problem of motivation for utilitarianism.
This paper shows, however, that agent-relative theories are also problematic
because they require suppression of evolutionary altruistic behavior.
INTRODUCTION
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 14, no. 2 (2007): 139-158.
© 2007 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.14.2.2023965
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brief, this paper argues that individuals have a natural desire to help
others who are like them, regardless of any expectations for a return
(Riolo et al. 2001). This behavior is rational from an evolutionary stand-
point (Stanovich and West 2003). Utilitarians, however, need to aban-
don this preference as everyone in society must receive the same weight.
Hence, there is a major conflict between the utilitarian requirement of
giving each individual the same weight and our natural desire for altru-
istic acts.
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decision under risk. The observer has an equal probability of being any
member in society. Although ignorant of her own identity, she has full
knowledge of everyone’s desires and situations. The observer accepts each
individual’s personal preferences except for antisocial and irrational ones.
Her rational judgment obeys the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms (and
the expected utility theory) (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944); thus,
the observer maximizes the expected utility of a von Neumann-Morgen-
stern utility function. To calculate the expected utility, the observer first
determines the expected utility of each person or member in society and
then calculates the weighted average of the individuals’ expected utilities
using equal weights as a reflection of equal probabilities. Thus, the observer
calculates an average utility.
A feature of the Equiprobability Model is that the observer is able to
understand through empathy the causal factors which determine each
individual’s preferences, such as biological inheritance, past life history,
and current environmental conditions (Harsanyi 1977). In other words,
the observer puts herself in someone else’s shoes and imagines herself to
live someone else’s life. Thus, she is able to rank all alternatives of all
people and hence to make interpersonal comparisons. Hence, all interper-
sonal utility comparisons could be reduced to intrapersonal ones. Prefer-
ences between the alternatives are called extended preferences (Broome
1998).
Similar to John Rawls (see “Reflective equilibrium”), Harsanyi uses
the idea of an impartial observer (representative) behind a veil of igno-
rance to arrive at a moral theory. Further, parties of both models are sin-
gle self-interested persons who are ignorant of their past. However, par-
ties behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance do not know the probability of
attaining a position in society. Thus, they decide under complete uncer-
tainty and not under risk, as in Harsanyi’s model. Further, the Rawlsian
parties are without knowledge of anyone’s desires and circumstances, and
thus are rendered incapable of empathetic identification, as well as mak-
ing interpersonal comparisons of utility.
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Reflective equilibrium
The reflective equilibrium forms the basis of the most widely discussed
social contract theory, the theory of justice by John Rawls (1971). In
contrast to utilitarian theories, social contract theories do not begin with
a conception of objective human good, but with a theory of rationality
and, specifically, rational agreement. They then construe moral require-
ments as the products of rational agreement; the moral rules are those to
which rational people would agree, and with which they would then
rationally comply, under appropriately specified conditions.
According to the theory of justice, rational parties behind a “veil of
ignorance” establish principles of justice using the reflective equilibrium
as a method. Here, rational does not mean selfish, but representative of
the interests of others. The reflective equilibrium is well summarized by
Norman Daniels (1989, xxii):
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Welfare theory
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Instrumental rationality
Background
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Pareto-inferior outcomes
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They will calculate that the costs of membership are high and that their
participation can have no significant effect on the organization’s bar-
gaining power, and so they will conclude that they have nothing to gain
from membership. Each potential member of a trade union, for exam-
ple, will judge that the sheer size of its membership gives it the neces-
sary bargaining power, one extra member will make no difference. This
leads to a paradox: if each potential member makes this same calcula-
tion, as rational choice theory expects them to do, then no one would
ever join the union. The union would have little or no bargaining
power, and so no one will receive any negotiated pay rises or improved
conditions of work.
Evolutionary rationality
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as constraints and options (see Kagan (1989) for definitions). Special obli-
gations are duties specific to an individual given her particular circum-
stances and history. These include duties arising out of past acts (e.g., the
duty to keep one’s promises) and also those duties that come with occu-
pying certain roles (e.g., professional duties and familial obligations). An
example of the latter is the special obligation of a parent to her child;
while traditional utilitarianism requires a parent not to assist her child in
doing the homework, but rather to spend the time with another child
who benefits more from support, an accommodation of special obliga-
tions allows deviation from this unrealistic requirement. So-called agent-
relative theories reconcile utilitarianism with these features of common-
sense morality (see, for example, Scheffler (1982) and Portmore (2003)).
They do so by allowing to assign a larger weight to personal preferences
than to the preferences of others. In this sense, agent-relative theories
deviate from the classical utilitarian dictum that each person’s preferences
ought to receive the same weight. The purpose of this paper is not to dis-
cuss the validity of these theories. Rather, we would like to point out that
even agent-relative theories remain almost impracticable. The reason is
that evolutionary altruistic behavior goes much beyond our special obli-
gations towards family and friends. According to evolutionary theory, we
give preference to any person from the same racial background because
we feel a special obligation to people who are similar to us (Riolo et al.
2001). Extending special obligations to non-relatives with a common trait
also does also not provide a practicable solution because minorities will
have a lower probability of being preferred and hence are discriminated
(Sigmund and Nowak 2001). Hence, regardless of whether or not special obliga-
tions are extended to non-relatives with a common trait, agent-relative theories face
serious shortcomings and thus are caught in a dilemma too.
There is another line of literature arguing that our genes prevent us
not only from acting in accordance with utilitarianism, but with any pre-
scribed ethical theory. This literature includes postmodern ethics with per-
haps Zygmunt Bauman as its most well-known theorist (for an excellent
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overview see Michael Harmon (2005)). Bauman argues that ethical princi-
ples by themselves can hardly motivate action. To do so requires suppress-
ing our (inborn and intuitive) moral impulse to act in a particular way as
well as our moral responsibility. This would come at the price of “self-
denial and self-attrition.” In his view it is this pre-rational moral capacity that
defines us as social persons and creates society. In his own words: “We are
not moral thanks to society (…); we live in society, we are society, thanks
to being moral” (1993, 61). Suppressing moral responsibility to obey rational
laws can go as far as the Holocaust (Bauman 1989).
CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that rationality accounts do not support the notion that
it is rational for society to pursue a utilitarian theory. Harsanyi’s Equiprob-
ability Model, which was explicitly devised to demonstrate this link, suf-
fers from several shortcomings, notably the fact that the impartial
observer needs to use her own preferences to make interpersonal com-
parisons and that all individuals may not have the same preference for-
mation process. The alternative account of rationality presented here,
Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, has been criticized for a lack of moral neu-
trality and reliance on intuition. Finally, the pursuit of utilitarianism is in
most situations Pareto inefficient and thus cannot be considered rational
from the viewpoint of welfare theory.
Similarly, it is not (instrumentally) rational for individuals to pursue
a utilitarian ethic. A major reason is the Pareto-inferior outcomes that
occur when rational individuals interact. Evolutionary theory, in contrast,
suggests that it is rational to cooperate with people who have a common
or similar trait in order to improve the chances of survival. However,
accommodating concerns for others does not maximize the well-being of
all and leads to discrimination. On the other hand, suppressing evolution-
ary altruistic behavior as implied by agent-relative and some utilitarian
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NOTES
1. Suppose a bottle with a mixture of water and wine. All we know is that the mixture con-
tains at least as much water as wine, and at most twice as much water as wine. Consider first the
ratio of water to wine. It is between 1 and 2. So by the principle of insufficient reason the prob-
ability of the ratio lying between 1 and 1.5 is 0.50. Consider next the ratio of wine to water. It is
between 0.5 and 1. So by the principle of insufficient reason the probability of the ratio lying
between 2/3 and 1 is 2/3. These two results are not compatible, as the two probabilities concern
the same event: the event ‘the ratio water/wine is between 1 and 1.5’ is equivalent to ‘the ratio
wine/water is between 2/3 and 1.’ They are doxastically equivalent, so they should share the same
probabilities (Smets).
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