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Is it rational to pursue utilitarianism?

Afschin Gandjour
University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the rational foundation of
utilitarianism and the moral motivation to pursue utilitarianism. To this end, the
paper discusses a variety of theories including not only utilitarianism and theo-
ries of rationality, but also economic theory and evolutionary theories of coop-
eration. The paper shows that both the rational foundation of utilitarianism and
the motivation to pursue utilitarianism are questionable. Agent-relative theories
are a recent attempt to attenuate the problem of motivation for utilitarianism.
This paper shows, however, that agent-relative theories are also problematic
because they require suppression of evolutionary altruistic behavior.

KEYWORDS. Agent-relative theories, evolutionary theory, moral motivation,

rationality, utilitarianism

INTRODUCTION

“To preach morality is easy, to give it a foundation is difficult.”

Arthur Schopenhauer

U tilitarianism is a moral theory according to which the sum of indi-

vidual utilities ought to be maximized. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that utilitarianism is the preferred ethical theory of health economists and
economists working in other fields. After all, utilitarianism was the histor-
ical antecedent to neoclassical welfare theory. Moreover, utilitarianism has
a “rational appeal” that results from its means-end approach and brings
it in close proximity with economic thinking.
Still, those who support utilitarianism need to prove that utilitarianism
has a theoretical underpinning, i.e., a rational foundation which justifies the

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 14, no. 2 (2007): 139-158.
© 2007 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.14.2.2023965
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pursuit of a utilitarian ethic by society. A utilitarian may be tempted to define

rationality in a way that is implied by the definition of utilitarianism: what is
rational is what maximizes utility. This definition, however, begs the ques-
tion (“utilitarianism is rational because it maximizes utility because it is
rational to maximize utility”). Therefore, it is necessary to defend utilitarian-
ism by an independent rationality account.
Moreover, utilitarians need to show that it is equally rational for an
individual to reason in line with the utility maximizing principle. Other-
wise, they need to explain how rational individuals can be motivated to
do so. The purpose of this paper is to discuss both the rational founda-
tion of utilitarianism and the moral motivation for its pursuit. Our
approach to justify the pursuit of utilitarianism by society and individuals
searches for inter-theoretical coherence. Our reasoning is as follows: if we
have reason to believe the rationality accounts and if they support utili-
tarian theory, then we have reason to accept utilitarian theory. This pres-
ents an indirect proof of the rationality of utilitarianism. But our approach
also helps to trace disagreement about utilitarian principles: if we have
reason to believe that rationality accounts support utilitarian theory, then
disagreement with utilitarianism must be based on disagreement about
rationality accounts; otherwise, our reasoning is not consistent. Such an
approach may help to move the debate from a potentially emotional one
on the moral judgments of utilitarianism to a more objective one on
rationality accounts, a debate that helps to make underlying assumptions
more explicit. We acknowledge that our approach of inter-theoretical
coherence with rationality accounts makes only sense if we accept the
normative notion of rationality: it is good to be rational. The paper
enriches the existing literature by discussing apparently unrelated theories
in one context, demonstrating the multiple connections between the the-
ories. The links help the reader not to loose sight of research from other
disciplines analyzing related questions.
In this context, the paper discusses whether individuals who are
rational from an evolutionary standpoint pursue a utilitarian ethic. In

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brief, this paper argues that individuals have a natural desire to help
others who are like them, regardless of any expectations for a return
(Riolo et al. 2001). This behavior is rational from an evolutionary stand-
point (Stanovich and West 2003). Utilitarians, however, need to aban-
don this preference as everyone in society must receive the same weight.
Hence, there is a major conflict between the utilitarian requirement of
giving each individual the same weight and our natural desire for altru-
istic acts.

SOCIETAL RATIONALITY AND THE PURSUIT OF UTILITARIANISM

The purpose of this section is to analyze the question whether it is

rational for society to seek to maximize the well-being of its members.
To this end, we present three theories which take the view of rational
agents and derive an optimal allocation of resources. We examine
whether the allocation of resources suggested by the theories is compat-
ible with a utilitarian view. The three theories are the Equiprobability
Model for moral value judgments, the reflective equilibrium, and wel-
fare theory.

Harsanyi’s Equiprobability Model for moral value judgments

John Harsanyi published in 1953 and extended in 1955 a theory of moral-

ity which in essence says that a rational society would pursue a utilitarian the-
ory. According to standard terminology, this is a preference, average-utility,
act-utilitarian theory. Also called the Equiprobability Model, it not only con-
siders egoistic preferences, but also moral value judgments about the utility
distribution in society. These moral judgments are made by an impartial and
rational observer behind a veil of ignorance. The observer’s judgments are
supposed to be representative of a rational society. Thus, the model trans-
forms moral judgments by a rational society into an individually rational

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decision under risk. The observer has an equal probability of being any
member in society. Although ignorant of her own identity, she has full
knowledge of everyone’s desires and situations. The observer accepts each
individual’s personal preferences except for antisocial and irrational ones.
Her rational judgment obeys the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms (and
the expected utility theory) (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944); thus,
the observer maximizes the expected utility of a von Neumann-Morgen-
stern utility function. To calculate the expected utility, the observer first
determines the expected utility of each person or member in society and
then calculates the weighted average of the individuals’ expected utilities
using equal weights as a reflection of equal probabilities. Thus, the observer
calculates an average utility.
A feature of the Equiprobability Model is that the observer is able to
understand through empathy the causal factors which determine each
individual’s preferences, such as biological inheritance, past life history,
and current environmental conditions (Harsanyi 1977). In other words,
the observer puts herself in someone else’s shoes and imagines herself to
live someone else’s life. Thus, she is able to rank all alternatives of all
people and hence to make interpersonal comparisons. Hence, all interper-
sonal utility comparisons could be reduced to intrapersonal ones. Prefer-
ences between the alternatives are called extended preferences (Broome
1998).
Similar to John Rawls (see “Reflective equilibrium”), Harsanyi uses
the idea of an impartial observer (representative) behind a veil of igno-
rance to arrive at a moral theory. Further, parties of both models are sin-
gle self-interested persons who are ignorant of their past. However, par-
ties behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance do not know the probability of
attaining a position in society. Thus, they decide under complete uncer-
tainty and not under risk, as in Harsanyi’s model. Further, the Rawlsian
parties are without knowledge of anyone’s desires and circumstances, and
thus are rendered incapable of empathetic identification, as well as mak-
ing interpersonal comparisons of utility.

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Criticisms of Harsanyi’s model

Harsanyi’s model makes some questionable assumptions which are dis-

cussed in the following and cast doubt on the ability of the model to
explain why a rational society should reason in accordance with utilitari-
anism (the assumptions are partly adapted from Philippe Mongin (2001)):
first, rational, self-interested, and impartial parties choose acceptable moral
principles; second, the observer assigns an equal probability to all posi-
tions in society; and third, different observers have uniform extended
preferences and no personal preferences.
All of the three assumptions of Harsanyi’s model have been chal-
lenged. Concerning the first assumption, Thomas Scanlon (1982, 122)
argues that to derive acceptable moral principles it is not sufficient
to consider what self-interested persons would decide upon. Instead,
acceptable moral principles also require taking into account what nobody
would reasonably reject. Focusing on the former tends to take one’s
advantage more seriously than the possible costs to others. Harsanyi’s
model ignores the fact that even a low probability of a poor position in
society does not prevent some members of society from occupying such
position.
The second assumption, the assumption of equiprobability, rests on
Laplace’s Principle of Indifference which raises well-known concerns,
including the Bertrand’s Paradox.1 The Paradox shows that we can derive
different equal probabilities depending on how “equally possible” situa-
tions are defined. Therefore, the principle of indifference is hardly
defended today.
With regard to the third assumption, Harsanyi argues that any differ-
ence in observer’s preferences is explained by different underlying causal
factors. But once observers show full empathy with others, they are able
to consider all causal factors and thus make the same inferences (Harsanyi
1977, 58f). Many critics have replied that observers do not have uniform
extended preferences (for example, John Broome (1998)). To begin with,

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imagining oneself to live a completely different life seems very difficult.

Further, Harsanyi’s argument that consideration of all causal variables
leads to the same extended preferences essentially means that observers
are able to completely escape from their own causal factors and that they
are able to learn each individual’s desires and their intensity (Griffin 1986,
119). In addition, it means that all individuals (observers) have the same
preference formation process because observers make the same infer-
ences from the same causal factors. All three assumptions seem far-
fetched. It is questionable that Harsanyi’s model can perform intraper-
sonal comparisons without consideration of the observer’s preferences.
James Griffin (1986, 112-3) argues that it remains unclear how the
observer should bridge the preferences of individuals: Harsanyi’s observer
is supposed to have no personal preferences, yet she must be able to per-
form intrapersonal comparisons by portraying extended preferences on
her personal scale. Similarly, David Gauthier (1982, 156-7) argues that the
observer needs to calculate her personal expected utility because she deter-
mines the utility to herself of being another person.
Philippe Mongin (2001) provides an even more fundamental point of
critique. He points out that Harsanyi’s observer actually compares
extended utilities and not extended preferences. The observer’s utility
function depends on causal factors determining her preferences. But as a
matter of fact, the model does not require setting out the observer’s pref-
erences. Similarly, John Weymark (1991) remarks that the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function allows only an ordinal ranking of preferences
(see “Instrumental rationality”) and thus rules out any interpersonal com-
parison of utility. Only if utility is not simply a measure of preference, the
rational observer is able to make interpersonal comparisons.
Finally, with the principle of maximizing average utility, a duty to
exterminate those with low levels of utility seems to arise. Restricting util-
itarian theory to situations where the population size does not change
solves this problem, but at the price of excluding questions concerning
reproduction and population policy from moral considerations.

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Reflective equilibrium

The reflective equilibrium forms the basis of the most widely discussed
social contract theory, the theory of justice by John Rawls (1971). In
contrast to utilitarian theories, social contract theories do not begin with
a conception of objective human good, but with a theory of rationality
and, specifically, rational agreement. They then construe moral require-
ments as the products of rational agreement; the moral rules are those to
which rational people would agree, and with which they would then
rationally comply, under appropriately specified conditions.
According to the theory of justice, rational parties behind a “veil of
ignorance” establish principles of justice using the reflective equilibrium
as a method. Here, rational does not mean selfish, but representative of
the interests of others. The reflective equilibrium is well summarized by
Norman Daniels (1989, xxii):

The strategy is to begin with points of agreement we have about what

is just (“we are confident that religious intolerance and racial discrim-
ination are unjust” (Rawls 1971, 19)), uncover a deeper view which
accounts for those agreements, and then see if the underlying view also
helps us to resolve disputes about points of disagreement, especially
disagreements concerning the “correct distribution of wealth and
authority” (Rawls 1971, 20). Reflective equilibrium allows us to work
back and forth from such provisional points of agreement to the deeper
structure.

In other words, the reflective equilibrium requires a continual interaction

between the formulation of theoretical principles and the consideration of
initial judgments. Thus, it achieves coherence in our moral views. Note
that the reflective equilibrium only relates to rational deliberation and not
rational action. In contrast, definitions of instrumental rationality (see
below) often refer not only to deliberation, but also to action. This is not
a shortcoming of the reflective equilibrium, however, because an answer
to the question of this section, whether to pursue a utilitarian ethic, does

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not require rational action, but rational deliberation and, as a consequence,

rational decision.
Yet, Rawls has been charged with failing to show a deep connection
between moral principles and rational thought (see, for example, Gau-
thier (1986)). According to critics, initial judgments are not an adequate
basis for establishing the principles of justice; and second, the way coher-
ence has been achieved is not well described.
Concerning the first point, it has been argued that moral convictions
largely depend on the social environment. And even within a society the
social environment varies. Thus, the question remains based on which
principles to choose initial acceptable judgments. Critics argue that intu-
ition plays an important role here and that the Rawlsian reflective equi-
librium rather presents a technique for systematizing and organizing
antecedent moral intuition of Western societies. Even with widespread
agreement, it cannot be ruled out that everybody was wrong.
Against these counter-arguments, the point has been made that moral
convictions are the result of multiple experience – be it personal experience
gained inside and outside one’s society or historical experience of society
with different justice principles. Experience may be incomplete, but reduces
arbitrariness and subjectivity of moral convictions (see Roland Kley (1989,
337-44) for a detailed outline of arguments justifying experience).
In terms of the approach of achieving coherence, Rawls has been crit-
icized for not presenting a criterion to settle disagreement between conflict-
ing judgments as well as between theories that are coherent but present
conflicting results. Again, he has been criticized for relying on intuition. In
order to resolve such conflicts, Daniels (1979) introduced the concept of
the “wide reflective equilibrium.” In addition to the sets of moral judg-
ments and moral principles, wide reflective equilibrium appeals to “a set of
relevant background theories.” When we find some discrepancy between
moral judgments and principles, we refer to background theories to decide
what to revise. Among background theories, Daniels considers general
social theory, theory of moral development, theory of the role of morality

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in society, theory of persons, and theory of procedural justice. However,

background theories have themselves been criticized for lacking agreement
and rationality. Further, there is no basis for choosing between coherent,
but non-equivalent moral theories (Little 1984).
In summary, the dispute on the rationality of Rawls’s reflective equi-
librium cannot be easily resolved. Therefore, it does not seem justifiable
to assume that the reflective equilibrium represents what society consid-
ers rational. This renders a compatibility analysis of utilitarian principles
with the Rawlsian justice principles pointless.

Welfare theory

According to welfare theory, a rational society strives for a Pareto opti-

mum, a situation where it is impossible to make someone better off with-
out making anyone else worse off. In order to show that a rational soci-
ety reasons in accordance with utilitarianism, the Pareto optimum and the
utilitarian optimum must coincide. There are several reasons why this may
not be the case. Whereas welfare theory defines utility as the degree of
satisfaction of one’s preferences, classical utilitarianism defines utility by
true happiness. Obviously, what we prefer might not be what makes us
truly happy. On the other hand, preference utilitarianism does define util-
ity in the same way as welfare theory. But whereas preference utilitarian-
ism typically considers not only egoistic preferences, but also external
preferences, i.e., preferences for assigning goods and opportunities to oth-
ers, traditional welfare economic models rule out external preferences (i.e.,
interdependent preferences). The underlying assumption is that individ-
ual utility is a function only of the goods individuals consume (for criti-
cism, see Holcombe and Sobel (2000)). Hence, welfare theory may over-
look values such as environmental and social conditions as well as
character traits and respect for others (Russell 2002). A Pareto optimum
may even rest on antisocial values. In addition, welfare theory considers
all actual preferences while preference utilitarianism often takes into

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account only rational and well-informed preferences. A final difference is

that welfare theorists and utilitarians start from different initial distribu-
tions of income and goods (Gauthier 1986, 105). Whereas welfare theo-
rists regard the initial distribution as given, utilitarians justify a redistrib-
ution based on the diminishing marginal utility of income and goods. For
all these reasons, the pursuit of utilitarianism can hardly be considered
rational from a welfare theorist’s standpoint.

INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND THE PURSUIT OF UTILITARIANISM

In the previous section we discussed whether it is rational for society to

pursue a utilitarian ethic. We showed that theories which define what
a rational society aims at – the Equiprobability Model for moral value
judgments, the reflective equilibrium, and welfare theory – do not support
this notion. Below we discuss whether it is rational for individuals to pur-
sue a utilitarian ethic. To this end, we present the concept of simple instru-
mental rationality, which, according to Robert Nozick (1993, 133), pro-
vides a powerful and natural description of rational human behavior. Any
broader description of rationality includes instrumental rationality in it.
We also discuss a rationality account based on evolutionary theory. As we
will show, both theories cannot explain why rational individuals are moti-
vated to pursue a utilitarian ethic.

Instrumental rationality

Background

According to the instrumental-rationality account, rational action is goal-ori-

ented and uses the most adequate means to achieve the desired end. In
practical terms, it is synonymous with efficiency. This approach envisages an
agent who maximizes expected utility and is best described by the term

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“homo economicus.” The advantage of instrumental reasoning is its famil-

iarity with our ordinary reasoning. Robert Bass and Shatzel Hall give an
example: “We say, for example, that people are mistaken to rely on the pur-
chase of lottery tickets as a retirement plan or that they must regularly change
motor oil if they want their automobiles to work properly.”
The original account of instrumental rationality was based on hedo-
nistic theory: an agent would be considered rational if she chose options
that delivered the greatest pleasure to her. Due to the problem of incom-
mensurability of values (Robbins 1932), rationality was defined through
ordinal preference theory in the 1930s. According to ordinal preference
theory, rationality requires complete and transitive preferences (complete-
ness and transitivity axioms). Thus, utility is an agent’s relative or ordinal
ranking of commodity bundles. Ordinal preference theory, however, is
neither able to measure the absolute magnitude of preferences nor able
to ensure comparability across individuals.
A decade later, John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern were
able to construct a utility function which measures utility on a cardinal
scale, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1944). In order to ensure cardinality, von Neumann and
Morgenstern introduced two additional axioms, the continuity and the
independence axiom. By obeying the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms,
the agent would maximize her expected utility. The von Neumann-Mor-
genstern utility function measures strength of preferences under uncer-
tainty, by assigning numbers to the expected utility of lottery tickets.
These utility numbers are then compared on a cardinal scale, but only
with the goal to “rank lottery tickets correctly in accord with a person’s
preferences” (Baumol 1958). In other words, “from a preference per-
spective, NM [Neumann-Morgenstern] utility theory is ordinal in that it
provides no more than ordinal rankings of lotteries” (Schoemaker 1982).
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is not able to compare
the utility of lottery tickets among individuals because each individual has
a different”marginal subjective utility of an increase in the probability of

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winning [a prize in the lottery]” (Baumol 1958). The type of cardinality

provided by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is thus dif-
ferent from the cardinality sought by earlier generations of utilitarians.
Note that no assumption is required concerning the shape of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, i.e., regarding an individual’s risk
attitude.
But how does instrumental rationality explain cooperative behavior
such as altruism or caring for the young and sick? Such behavior seems
to be at odds with the concept of the self-interested utility-maximizing
agent. Rational choice theorists who assume that individual choices are
driven by instrumental rationality argue that cooperative behavior ulti-
mately results in individual utility maximization. Altruism, for example,
could make oneself feel good or raise one’s social standing.

Pareto-inferior outcomes

Let us return to the question posed in the introduction whether it is

rational for an individual to reason in accordance with utilitarianism.
For this to be the case, rational behavior would need to lead to a utilitarian
optimum. According to the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem, utility-
maximizing behavior (instrumental rationality) will lead to a Pareto opti-
mum only if there are perfect competition and no market externalities.
This is explained by Adam Smith’s invisible hand: each individual strives
to become wealthy “intending only own gain” but to this end she must
exchange what she owns or produces with others who sufficiently value
what she has to offer; in this way, by utility-maximizing behavior, division
of labor, and a free market, public interest is advanced. As discussed under
“Welfare theory,” a Pareto optimum and a utilitarian optimum are unlikely
to coincide, however, so that even under perfect market conditions it is
usually irrational to pursue a utilitarian ethic. In addition, situations need
to be considered where rational behavior certainly leads neither to a Pareto
nor to a utilitarian optimum. A well-known situation is the Prisoner’s

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Dilemma. In such a situation, players would be better off by acting “irra-

tionally” and co-operating with each other. Another situation where util-
ity-maximizing behavior leads to Pareto inferiority occurs in the presence
of market externalities. Externalities occur when one person’s actions affect
another person’s well-being and the relevant costs and benefits are not
reflected in market prices (The Library of Economics and Liberty). Exter-
nalities are positive when others benefit from our actions and lead to the
“free-rider problem.”
Pareto-inferiority is a consequence of all public goods because pub-
lic goods are characterized by market externalities and free-ridership. John
Scott (1999) gives an example of free-ridership that refers to the collec-
tive action of a trade union:

They will calculate that the costs of membership are high and that their
participation can have no significant effect on the organization’s bar-
gaining power, and so they will conclude that they have nothing to gain
from membership. Each potential member of a trade union, for exam-
ple, will judge that the sheer size of its membership gives it the neces-
sary bargaining power, one extra member will make no difference. This
leads to a paradox: if each potential member makes this same calcula-
tion, as rational choice theory expects them to do, then no one would
ever join the union. The union would have little or no bargaining
power, and so no one will receive any negotiated pay rises or improved
conditions of work.

Evolutionary rationality

As the preceding section on Pareto-inferior outcomes has shown, (instru-

mentally) rational individuals are not motivated to act in a way that leads
to a utilitarian optimum. A major reason is the lack of cooperative behav-
ior in situations where it would contribute to utility maximization. But in
real life, people deviate from instrumentally rational behavior and regu-
larly participate in costly cooperative activities like warfare and big-game
hunting. Such behavior describes “what is” and not “what should be”

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according to the instrumental-rationality framework. The question then

appears whether a utilitarian society could arise in the future based on
such behavior. John Stuart Mill (1863) strongly supports this notion:
“But there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment [for utilitarian moral-
ity]; and this it is which, when once the general happiness is recognised
as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian moral-
ity. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the
desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a power-
ful principle in human nature (…). They [people] are also familiar with the
fact of co-operating with others and proposing to themselves a collective,
not an individual interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of their
actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with
those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of
others are their own interests.”
For the discussion below it is important to consider the reasons for
cooperative behavior. Evolutionary biology suggests the following (Sachs et
al. 2004): (i) directed reciprocation – cooperation with individuals who give
in return; (ii) shared genes – cooperation with relatives; and (iii) byproduct
benefits – cooperation as an incidental consequence of selfish action. Hence,
a major reason (ii) is our desire to help others who have a common trait and
hence are like us, regardless of any expectations for a return (Riolo et al.
2001). Such behavior may not improve our chances of survival but the
chances of those similar to us. Note that cooperative behavior does not
need to be restricted to relatives and family, but can also be shown towards
non-relatives with a similar trait. This behavior is called evolutionary altru-
istic and can be considered rational in an evolutionary sense (Stanovich and
West 2003). In summary, evolutionary rationality solves a major problem of
the account of instrumental rationality, i.e., a lack of cooperative behavior
in situations where it would contribute to utility maximization. Still, it has
been pointed out that “in the vast majority of mundane situations, the evo-
lutionary rationality (…) will also serve the goals of normative rationality”
(Stanovich and West 2000).

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But let us return to the question of whether evolutionary rationality

leads to a maximization of well-being. The obvious answer is no: being con-
cerned only about people with a common or similar trait is not equivalent
to being concerned about the well-being of all. On the other hand, sup-
pressing our concern for others to maximize the well-being of all seems
unfeasible. But this is what a more recent utilitarian variant by Dworkin
(1977) requires. To explain in more detail, Dworkin distinguishes between
two types of preferences: “a personal preference for his own enjoyment of
some goods or opportunities” and “an external preference for the assign-
ment of goods and opportunities to others.” External preferences may be
moral, political, malevolent, or benevolent. Ronald Dworkin (1977) and late
Harsanyi (1998) have argued to exclude external preferences from the cal-
culation of total utility because utilitarianism requires to assign the same
weight to each individual’s interests. To count external preferences, Dworkin
argues, would “be a form of double counting.” In addition, inclusion of
malevolent preferences “would imply that it was desirable from a social point
of view to help malevolent people in satisfying their preferences to hurt
some innocent people for no good reason” (Harsanyi, 1998). Some contro-
versy exists regarding the exclusion of moral and political preferences (for a
discussion, see Howard Chang (2000)). The exclusion of external prefer-
ences based on malevolence is probably least contentious, although some
paradoxes remain (Kaplow and Shavell 2000). The purpose of this paper,
however, is not to discuss whether or not to exclude external preferences.
Rather, the point we would like to make is that regardless of whether preferences based on
malevolence and benevolence are included or excluded, utilitarian theory faces serious short-
comings. Therefore, utilitarian theory is caught in a dilemma. Contrary to what
Mill claims, our “natural sentiment” does not accept a utilitarian theory which
assigns the same weight to each individual’s interests. In fact, given the rel-
evance of evolutionary altruistic behavior in daily life, the natural inclination
not to reason in accordance with utilitarianism is quite strong.
There have recently been some attempts to make utilitarianism a more
practical theory of morality by accounting for special obligations as well

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as constraints and options (see Kagan (1989) for definitions). Special obli-
gations are duties specific to an individual given her particular circum-
stances and history. These include duties arising out of past acts (e.g., the
duty to keep one’s promises) and also those duties that come with occu-
pying certain roles (e.g., professional duties and familial obligations). An
example of the latter is the special obligation of a parent to her child;
while traditional utilitarianism requires a parent not to assist her child in
doing the homework, but rather to spend the time with another child
who benefits more from support, an accommodation of special obliga-
tions allows deviation from this unrealistic requirement. So-called agent-
relative theories reconcile utilitarianism with these features of common-
sense morality (see, for example, Scheffler (1982) and Portmore (2003)).
They do so by allowing to assign a larger weight to personal preferences
than to the preferences of others. In this sense, agent-relative theories
deviate from the classical utilitarian dictum that each person’s preferences
ought to receive the same weight. The purpose of this paper is not to dis-
cuss the validity of these theories. Rather, we would like to point out that
even agent-relative theories remain almost impracticable. The reason is
that evolutionary altruistic behavior goes much beyond our special obli-
gations towards family and friends. According to evolutionary theory, we
give preference to any person from the same racial background because
we feel a special obligation to people who are similar to us (Riolo et al.
2001). Extending special obligations to non-relatives with a common trait
also does also not provide a practicable solution because minorities will
have a lower probability of being preferred and hence are discriminated
(Sigmund and Nowak 2001). Hence, regardless of whether or not special obliga-
tions are extended to non-relatives with a common trait, agent-relative theories face
serious shortcomings and thus are caught in a dilemma too.
There is another line of literature arguing that our genes prevent us
not only from acting in accordance with utilitarianism, but with any pre-
scribed ethical theory. This literature includes postmodern ethics with per-
haps Zygmunt Bauman as its most well-known theorist (for an excellent

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A . GANDJOUR – IS IT RATIONAL TO PURSUE UTILITARIANISM ?

overview see Michael Harmon (2005)). Bauman argues that ethical princi-
ples by themselves can hardly motivate action. To do so requires suppress-
ing our (inborn and intuitive) moral impulse to act in a particular way as
well as our moral responsibility. This would come at the price of “self-
denial and self-attrition.” In his view it is this pre-rational moral capacity that
defines us as social persons and creates society. In his own words: “We are
not moral thanks to society (…); we live in society, we are society, thanks
to being moral” (1993, 61). Suppressing moral responsibility to obey rational
laws can go as far as the Holocaust (Bauman 1989).

CONCLUSIONS

This paper shows that rationality accounts do not support the notion that
it is rational for society to pursue a utilitarian theory. Harsanyi’s Equiprob-
ability Model, which was explicitly devised to demonstrate this link, suf-
fers from several shortcomings, notably the fact that the impartial
observer needs to use her own preferences to make interpersonal com-
parisons and that all individuals may not have the same preference for-
mation process. The alternative account of rationality presented here,
Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, has been criticized for a lack of moral neu-
trality and reliance on intuition. Finally, the pursuit of utilitarianism is in
most situations Pareto inefficient and thus cannot be considered rational
from the viewpoint of welfare theory.
Similarly, it is not (instrumentally) rational for individuals to pursue
a utilitarian ethic. A major reason is the Pareto-inferior outcomes that
occur when rational individuals interact. Evolutionary theory, in contrast,
suggests that it is rational to cooperate with people who have a common
or similar trait in order to improve the chances of survival. However,
accommodating concerns for others does not maximize the well-being of
all and leads to discrimination. On the other hand, suppressing evolution-
ary altruistic behavior as implied by agent-relative and some utilitarian

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theories severely limits the motivation to act in accordance with these

theories.

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NOTES

1. Suppose a bottle with a mixture of water and wine. All we know is that the mixture con-
tains at least as much water as wine, and at most twice as much water as wine. Consider first the
ratio of water to wine. It is between 1 and 2. So by the principle of insufficient reason the prob-
ability of the ratio lying between 1 and 1.5 is 0.50. Consider next the ratio of wine to water. It is
between 0.5 and 1. So by the principle of insufficient reason the probability of the ratio lying
between 2/3 and 1 is 2/3. These two results are not compatible, as the two probabilities concern
the same event: the event ‘the ratio water/wine is between 1 and 1.5’ is equivalent to ‘the ratio
wine/water is between 2/3 and 1.’ They are doxastically equivalent, so they should share the same
probabilities (Smets).

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