CIVPRO – RULE 42 – RTC TO CA – FROM EXERCISE OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently
d an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents’
G.R. No. 132197 August 16, 2005
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
In a Decision1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals
overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint
for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of
Appeals’ Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint,
petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged
respondent Elizabeth Ong’s ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty.
Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing
them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of
said lots, so petitioners alleged.
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands
from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears
that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers
of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a
complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate
Realty.2 Per record, this case is still pending resolution.
Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering
respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof
to petitioners.
On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTC’s decision in its
entirety.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed
a motion for reconsideration.
notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May
1997,3 and granted petitioners’ motion for immediate execution pending appeal.
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a
Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case
as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same
as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already
become final and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the
allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the
MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the
subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
The following sequence of events is undisputed:
(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the
MTC.
(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision.
(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order.
(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional
period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review.
(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for
appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of
the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary period
could not have been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration
because of the filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May
1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition
for review to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 4
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was
given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for
Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started
running from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May
1997.
Respondents, in their Comment,5 submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May
1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC
refused to subscribe respondents’ position. It justified the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The
Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.
Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED. 6
(Emphasis in the original.)
Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took
cognizance of respondents’ position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that
the RTC was correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the
filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be
filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or
of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file
the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows
the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee’s
brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be
deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run
again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for
Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-
day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on
time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it
cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual
circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of
appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of
appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is
considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaint
satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by
the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of
the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals
reversed the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based
on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract,
express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:
....
3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of
the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said
Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and
made an integral part hereof;
4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;
5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband
and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;
6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter
informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within
30 days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and
made an integral part thereof;
7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said
lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs
of the use of their lots;
8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have
suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of ₱10,000.00 a month
. . . .8
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.9
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners’ possession was
originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue
of any express or implied contract.
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to
qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on
the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there
was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer.
It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law.11
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express
or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.12 In Rosanna
B. Barba v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots,
thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of
the use of their lots;14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed
respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they
eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents
refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint
establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose
of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela
Paz v. Panis.15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 7016 of the Rules of Court.
The case doesid not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The
case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and
detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be
restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should
be carefully avoided.18
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the
annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to
question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this
case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an
accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly
claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their
Comment,19 respondents maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership
which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands, and
therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This
differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession
de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over
an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of
ownership is generally unessential.20 ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership
in the ejectment case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as
Neither the allegation in petitioners’ complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum.
province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a
means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.
pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of
respondents’ present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners,
in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject
mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding
of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents
can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.28
ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. 21 This
Court in Ganadin
With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the
third assignment of error which is related to the second issue.
v. Ramos22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not
matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January
of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No.
1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24
MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.
April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs
In Drilon v. Gaurana,23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over
against respondents.
the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC
of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale
being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case SO ORDERED.
and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief
prayed for are not the same.24

In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously
filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro
sale or equitable mortgage in the same

Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment
afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment
proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and,
therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.

The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez26 when it ruled:
CIVPRO – RULE 42 – RTC TO CA – PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED
G.R. No. 115104 October 12, 1998
MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. and OMICO MINING AND
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated April 12, 1994, of the Tenth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42120, denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss the appeal of private respondent from a ruling of the trial court.1
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 16, 1992, respondent Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for
expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and
Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation. The complaint, entitled "Philex Mining Corporation v.
Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc., et al.," was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-CV-0727.
Based on §53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of petitioners'
mining areas where the latter's "Macawiwili claims" are located. Philex Mining likewise moved
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners from ejecting it (Philex
Mining) from the mining areas sought to be expropriated.
Although a temporary restraining order was initially issued by the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Branch X, on November 11, 1992, it denied respondent's application for a preliminary
injunction.
On February 18, 1993, the trial court, acting on the motion of petitioners, dismissed the
complaint of Philex Mining. In its resolution, the trial court
stated: 2
To better appreciate the incident submitted for resolution, a review of the antecedent facts
which gave rise to this case is in order.
The decision of the Supreme Court dated October 2, 1991 in Poe Mining Association vs.
Garcia, 202 SCRA 222 upheld the decision of the then Minister of Natural Resources which
was affirmed by the Office of the President. This decision recognized the possessory rights
of defendants Macawiwili and Omico over their mining claims located at Tuba and Itogon,
Benguet as against Poe Mining Association and plaintiff herein Philex Mining Corporation as
operator. However, on the surface of 21.9 hectares of these mining claims awarded to
defendants Macawiwili and Omico, we find improvements of the plaintiff consisting of a
network of roads, a motorpool facility, a tailings dam and three bunkhouses. The
Department of Environment and Natural Resources — Cordillera Administrative Region
(DENR-CAR), in pursuance of the Supreme Court decision is poised to order the removal or
demolition of plaintiffs improvements and to hand possession of the area to defendants
Macawiwili and Omico. Plaintiff, while admitting the possessory rights of defendant mining
companies, stresses that the improvements already existing thereon are vital to the conduct
of its mining operations particularly, its Nevada claims. Thus, it came to court seeking the
expropriation of this area pursuant to Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463.
The conflict between the plaintiff and defendant mining companies spans a period of almost
23 years until finally, it reached the Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all disputes. The
Supreme Court has spoken and it has awarded to defendants Macawiwili and Omico the
portion sought to be expropriated by the plaintiff.
Can this Court now grant to plaintiff the right to expropriate the very land which has been
denied it by the decision of the highest court of the land?
This Court believes not. To do so would not only be presumptious of this Court but a patent
defiance of the decision of the highest tribunal.
The plaintiff states that the expropriation is necessary in order for it to continue with the
operation of its Nevada claims. The improvements now existing on the land sought to be
expropriated consists of a network of roads constructed sometime in 1958, a motorpool
facility built in 1963, a tailings dam and three (3) two-storey concrete bunkhouses. It is thus
clear that these improvements have been existing for quite sometime now. Aware that
these improvements are essential to their mining operations, plaintiff should have initiated
expropriation proceedings long before it even started putting up said improvements. Why
exercise the right of eminent domain only now that the land has been adjudged in favor of
defendant mining companies by no less than the Supreme Court? It seems the plaintiff,
mindful of the Supreme Court decision, would now look for avenues of escape to evade the
repercussions of such a decision. What it has not achieved through the decision, it tries to
gain through the power of eminent domain. Clearly, this is forum-shopping, plain and
simple. Stripped of all its legal niceties, this expropriation proceeding is patently a last ditch
effort on the part of the plaintiff to overcome the adverse effects of the Supreme Court
decision.
Can this Court countenance such a procedure under the guise of the legal process of
expropriation?
No. To agree to it would be to encourage forum-shopping which is abhorred as there will no
longer be any end to any litigation.
Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that its right to expropriate is distinct and separate from the
rights of Macawiwili and Omico under the Supreme Court decision, anchoring said right on
Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 which states:
 Sec. 59. Eminent Domain. — When the claim owner or an occupant or owner of private
lands refuses to grant to another claim owner or lessee the right to build, construct or
install any of the facilities mentioned in the next preceding section, the claim owner or
lessee may prosecute an action for eminent domain under the Rules of Court in the Court
of First Instance of the province where the mining claims involved are situated. In the
determination of the just compensation due the claim owner or owner or occupant of the
land, the court shall appoint at least one duly qualified mining engineer or geologist to be
recommended by the Director as one of the commissioners.
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends either with
an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation. The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination by the court of the "just compensation for the
property sought to be taken" (Municipality of Biñan vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al., 180
SCRA 576 as quoted in National Power Corporation vs. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 94193-99, February
25, 1992, 206 SCRA 520).
Going to the first stage of the expropriation proceeding in the case at bar, the question is: Is
the right to expropriate granted to mining companies under Section 59 of P.D. No. 463 an
absolute right?
An examination of Presidential Decree No. 463 would readily show that Section 59 upon
which plaintiff asserts its right to expropriate is found under Chapter XI with the heading
"Auxiliary Mining Rights". From the title alone, it would seem that the right to expropriate
is not an absolute one but a mere auxiliary right. The right of eminent domain granted to
mining companies is given in aid of its mining operations and not as a matter of right. Thus,
it should be construed strictly against the mining company seeking the right. Thus, taking
into context the antecedent facts arising from this case, is it proper for plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain?
Absolutely not. But, granting arguendo that the right of expropriation can be awarded to
plaintiff, a bigger question arises on whether a mining company can expropriate land
belonging to another mining company. It would be absurd if not ridiculous. In the first place,
the land would no longer be subject to expropriation. Expropriation demands that the land
be private land. When the Supreme Court awarded the possessory rights over the land
subject of this case to defendants Macawiwili and Omico, it has stripped said land of its
private character and gave it its public character, that is, to be utilized for mining operations.
Although property already devoted to public use is still subject to expropriation, this must
be done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to the
delegate (Constitutional Law by Isagani Cruz, 1989 edition, page 64). Section 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 463 is not a specific grant of authority given to plaintiff but a mere
general authority which will not suffice to allow plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain.
The plaintiff also states that it does not question the mining rights of defendant mining
companies over the area as it is only interested in the surface rights as this is where its
improvements are located. But this is an illusory dream which cannot be given reality by this
Court. It is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it to a reasonable height
(Art. 437, Civil Code of the Philippines). The surface area cannot be segregated from the
subjacent minerals. There is no dividing line between the surface and what is underneath
that one can categorically state that one belongs to the plaintiff while the other forms part
of the property of the defendant mining companies. For that is in effect what the plaintiff
wants, just the surface area where its improvements are. It would be like dismembering a
human body of a lady and awarding the upper part including her bosom to someone while
giving the lower part to another, making it a useless proposition to either one. For how can
defendant mining companies operate their mining claims when the surface belongs to
somebody else and for that matter, how will the plaintiff improve the surface area without
affecting what is underneath?
As the Supreme Court stated in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-43938, April
15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228: "Under the (no-conflict) theory of the respondent court, the surface
owner will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the mining
operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroys the crops above. How
deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's
right? Where is the dividing line between the surface and sub-surface rights? The Court feels
that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural
and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural."
All told it is clear that plaintiff has not shown that it has the right to expropriate the land
subject of this case. Moreover, that land has been placed out of its reach by the Supreme
Court decision when it awarded it to defendants Macawiwili and Omico. Both plaintiff and
defendants are engaged in mining, and the Supreme Court has adjudged defendant mining
companies to be the owner of the land. This Court now, on the ground of the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, cannot and will not overwhelm said decision by awarding it to
plaintiff.
As the other motions have become moot and academic, this Court will no longer delve into
them. However, as to the motion for reduction of deposit, the Court will make its last point.
In the case of National Power Corporation vs. Jocson, supra, the Supreme Court made this
pronouncement: "Presidential Decree No. 42 requires the petitioner, to deposit with the
Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or agencies, 'an amount
equivalent to the assessed valued of the property for purposes of taxation'. This assessed
value is that indicated in the tax declaration. P.D. No. 42 repealed the provisions of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court and any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent with it.
Accordingly, it repealed Section 2 of Rule 67 insofar as the determination of the provisional
value, the form of payment and the agency with which the deposit shall be made, are
concerned. P.D. No. 42, however effectively removes the discretion of the court in
determining the provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the
assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for that purpose. All that is
needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned".
 Thus, the plaintiff is right in depositing the assessed value of the property as appearing on
the tax declaration of defendant Macawiwili as the provisional value of the land sought to
be expropriated. While this case remains pending, the plaintiff may then withdraw the
balance of the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) from the Philippine National Bank after
deducting the provisional value of the land amounting to Forty Eight Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P48,600.00).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Macawiwili
Gold Mining and Development Mining Co., Inc. and Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation
is granted. This case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied. It then appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
On February 16, 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only
questions of law were involved and, therefore, the appeal should be to the Supreme Court.
However, the appellate court denied petitioners' motion in a resolution, dated April 12, 1994.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.
Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner
should have filed a motion for reconsideration giving the appellate court an opportunity to
correct itself.
Rule 65, §1 of the 1964 Rules of Court in part provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.
With some modifications, Rule 65, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, of such tribunal
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 3
It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of
certiorari is sought.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless, motion for reconsideration is
first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned
errors. 4
This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In Pajo v. Ago and Ortiz 5 we held:
Respondent contends that petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order in question, or asked for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court, before coming to us.
This is not always so. It is only when the questions are raised for the first time before this
Court in certiorari proceeding that the writ shall not issue unless the lower court had first
been given the opportunity to pass upon the same. In fine, when the questions raised before
this Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised in and passed upon by,
the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can
be instituted in this Court, is no longer prerequisite.
In Locsin v. Climaco 6 it was stated:
When a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and submitted to a lower court,
and the latter has decided the question, a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary
as a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari in this Court.
And in Central Bank v. Cloribel, 7 it was explained:
It is true that Petitioner herein did not seek a reconsideration of the order complained of,
and that, as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not be entertained unless the
respondent has had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the error
imputed to him. This rule is subject, however, to exceptions, among which are the following,
namely: 1) where the issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved;
and 3) in case of urgency. These circumstances are present in the case at bar. Moreover,
Petitioner herein had raised — in its answer in the main case and in the rejoinder to the
memorandum of the Banco Filipino in support of the latter's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction — the very same questions raised in the Petition herein. In other
words, Judge Cloribel has already had an opportunity to consider and pass upon those
questions, so that a motion for reconsideration of his contested order would have served
no practical purpose. The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an exercise
in futility.
The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are substantially the same as those asserted by
them in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated February 14, 1994, before the Court of Appeals.
The argument that respondent has no right to expropriate petitioners' mineral areas under
Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been raised, argued, and submitted by petitioners for
resolution by the appellate court in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further file a motion
for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments.
For this reason, we hold that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal
to the allowance of their action.
We therefore come to the main question: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Appeal? We find that it did.
To begin with, the writ of certiorari lies when a court, in denying a motion to dismiss, acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 8 By "grave abuse of
discretion" is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. 9
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying their
motion to dismiss the appeal. According to petitioners, respondent's appeal raises only
questions of law and, therefore it should be brought to the Supreme Court by means of a
petition for review on certiorari and not, as Philex Mining did, by bringing an ordinary appeal
to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that the question whether respondent has a right to
expropriate petitioners' mining areas under §59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 is a question
of law.
On the other hand, Philex Mining maintains that the issues raised in its appeal are factual and,
therefore, the appellate court is the proper forum for the ventilation of such issues.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which is based on the Resolution of the Court En Banc in
UDK-9748 (Anacleto Murillo v. Rodolfo Consul), March 1, 1990, provides in §4(c) thereof:
c) Raising issues purely of law in the Court of Appeals, or appeals by wrong mode. — If an
appeal under Rule 41 is taken from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals and
therein the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal shall be dismissed, issues
purely of law not being reviewable by said Court. So, too, if an appeal is attempted from the
judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction by
notice of appeal, instead of by petition for review, the appeal is inefficacious and should be
dismissed.
Thus, judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to
be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional
trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme
Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law.
This procedure is now embodied in Rule 41, §2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
distinguishes the different modes of appeal from judgments of regional trial courts as follows:
Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court to Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules
so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45.
On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts
in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the Court of Appeals, whether
the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
The rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be
summarized as follows:
(1) Original Jurisdiction — In all cases decided by the regional trial court in the exercise of
their original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to:
(a) Court of Appeals — where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law, by filing a mere notice of appeal.
(b) Supreme Court — where the appellant solely raises questions of law, by filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(2) Appellate Jurisdiction
All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, shall be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
The question is whether the issues raised in the appeal of respondent Philex Mining are
questions of law or of fact.
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-
known: There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 10
Respondent's assignment of errors 11 before the appellate court should therefore be
considered in order to determine the nature of the questions therein raised. Respondent
Philex Mining argued before the Court of Appeals:
A. The trial court erred in finding that Philex has no right to expropriate; P.D. 463 expressly
grants to Philex, as operator of the Nevada claims, the right of eminent domain.
B. The trial court erred in finding that Philex cannot expropriate land belonging to a mining
company; Section. 59 in relation to Section 58 of P.D. 463 allows an operator of a mining
claim to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other persons or
claim owners.
C. The trial court erred in finding that Philex is attempting to subvert the Supreme Court
decision and is engaged in forum-shopping. Philex is merely exercising its rights under the
law.
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding respondent's alternative cause of action, even on the
assumption that respondent does not have the right to expropriate, for the reason that an
alternative statement in a pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the insufficiency of the other
alternative statements. 18
The first four arguments advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether
it has, under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining
areas where petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other hand, its final argument raises
the issue of whether the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of action in one pleading
under Rule 8, §1 of the Rules of Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are legal
questions whose resolution does not require an examination of the probative weight of the
evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what the law is on the given state of
facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals committed a
grave error in ruling otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the challenged resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET
D. The trial court erred in finding that the expropriation of the land will divide the surface
ASIDE, and the appeal of respondent Philex Mining is DISMISSED.
from the subsurface.

SO ORDERED.
E. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Philex's alternative cause of action was
disregarded.

The respondent's arguments may thus be summarized as follows:

(1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 463, expressly grants
respondent the right to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other
persons once the conditions justifying expropriation are present. The power of eminent
domain expressly granted under Sections 58 and 59 of P.D. No. 463 is not inferior to the
possessory right of other claimowners. 12

(2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to expropriate land belonging to
another mining company. Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v.
Republic, 13 land covered by mining claims may be the subject of expropriation. Moreover, a
general grant of the power of eminent domain only means that the court may inquire into the
necessity of the expropriation. 14

(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme Court's
decision in Poe Mining v. Garcia. 15 Forum-shopping, which refers to filing the same or
repetitious suits, is not resorted to in the present case since respondent seeks to expropriate
petitioners' mining areas, not as operator of the Poe mining claims, but as operator of the
Nevada mining claims. 16

(4) Respondent's expropriation of the land will not divide the surface from the subsurface for
the reason that respondent seeks to expropriate all rights that petitioners, as well as the Pigoro
heirs, have over the 21.9 hectare area. 17
CIVPRO – RULE 42 – RTC TO CA – PETITION DISMISSED FOR LATE FILING AFTER FINDING THE
SAME PRIMA FACIE MERITORIOUS
G.R. No. 109834 October 18, 1996
CECILE SAN JUAN DITCHING and MA. CORAZON I. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ADRIANO MOTAS, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
If a motion for extension of time — to file a petition for review with respondent Court of
Appeals — was filed more than fifteen days from receipt of the order assailed, should the
petition itself, when subsequently filed, be rejected outright for being filed late? On the other
hand, should the merits of the case be looked into first to ascertain whether to allow relaxation
of the strict application of the rules?
Assailed in this petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision 2 of respondent Court of Appeals 3 promulgated August 25, 1992, and its Resolution 4
of April 16, 1993 denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. In the assailed
Decision, respondent Court dismissed their petition for review for being filed late, considering
that their motion for extension was filed twenty (20) days from their receipt of the order of
the trial court.
The Antecedent Facts
The antecedent of the present petition was an ejectment case 5 filed in July 1989 with the
Municipal Trial Court in Calamba, Laguna by herein petitioner Ditching and Zonette San Juan
Bacani, seeking to eject herein private respondent Motas and another occupant named Vidal
Batalla from the lot owned by the petitioner and her co-owners. Said case was tried under the
old Rules on Summary Procedure.
The Municipal Trial Court found that the plaintiffs in said ejectment case were co-owners of
parcels of land situated at Barangay Pansol, Calamba, Laguna covered by various transfer
certificates of title. However, in 1975, a contract of tenancy entitled "Kasunduan Buwisan sa
Sakahan" was entered into by private respondent Motas and Dr. Eduardo San Juan, the
predecessor-in-interest of petitioners. Then, in 1978, respondent Motas constructed his house
on the lot covered by TCT No. 57823 without the consent of petitioners, who, upon learning
of such fact, demanded that he vacate the property. The last demand to vacate having been
made in September 1988, and respondent Motas having refused to vacate, petitioners lodged
a complaint at the barangay level, but no amicable settlement was arrived at , hence the suit
for ejectment.
For his part, respondent Motas alleged that he could not be ejected from his tenanted
landholdings (including the lot where his house was located) because of the existing tenancy
agreement, and that he had been giving rentals/share to petitioners' overseer who without
justifiable reason stopped receiving said rentals or share of the harvests, forcing respondent
Motas to deposit the same with a bank. 6
After due consideration of the pleadings and evidence presented, the Municipal Trial Court
found that there existed a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent Motas.
Then, based on Section 24 of Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Reform Code, as
amended, which provides that "(t)he agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the
exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the
effectivity of (RA 3844), which shall be considered as included in the leasehold", the MTC held
7 that the portion of the land where respondent Motas' house was erected was considered
included in the leasehold, hence the "ejectment" case was actually a tenancy case over which
it had no jurisdiction. The court thus dismissed the case.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, 8 which rendered a
decision 9 dated June 28, 1991, in Civil Case No. 1607-90-C affirming in toto the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court made the following findings supporting the
existence of a tenancy relationship: 10
In the case at bar, the fact appears to be uncontroverted that plaintiffs (petitioners herein)
became the registered owners of the property mentioned in the complaint only on May 8,
1978. This is quite evident from a reading of a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57823
(Annex "D" of complaint). Moreover, the land sought to be recovered by them clearly
appears to be a part of a larger tract of land identified as Lot 1416 of the subdivision plan
(LCR) Psd-266142, the latter being also a portion of Lot 1416-X-2, Psd 58615, LRC Rec No.
8418. Furthermore, this Court's analysis of the other Transfer Certificates of Titled attached
to the complaint as Annexes "A" to "C" and "E" to "I", inclusive, will clearly show that the
parcels of land mentioned and described in the same certificates of title issued in the names
of plaintiffs and their co-owners are the results of a previous subdivision of Lot 1416-X. Since
Annexes "A" to "C" and "E" to "I" appear to have been issued to the plaintiffs and their co-
owners also on May 8, 1978, there is no doubt at all that the parcels of land covered by such
titles, including the land in question, came from one (1) tract of land.
The foregoing circumstances appear to be very significant because plaintiffs never denied,
much less controverted the fact that defendants, more particularly Adriano Motas (private
respondent herein), have occupied a much bigger parcel of land belonging to Dr. Eduardo
San Juan as tenants of the latter. Neither did plaintiffs dispute the defendants' claim that
the land in question was a part and parcel of Dr. Eduardo San Juan's land being tenanted by
defendants.
On the other hand, there is sufficient and uncontroverted proof offered by defendants that
they have been tenants of Dr. San Juan's land since 1972; and that on October 7, 1975,
defendant Motas even executed Annex "1" with Dr. San Juan, plaintiffs' predecessor-in-
interest.
Plaintiffs' contention that defendants are not tenants of the property in question has no leg
to stand on. Having secceeded Dr. Eduardo San Juan on the same property, they are bound
 to observe and respect the rights of defendants as tenant. Their claim that they never
intended defendants to be their tenants cannot be given merit.
As expected, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. In
order to resolve the same, Judge Eleuterio Guerrero set the case for clarificatory hearing on
August 30, 1991, on which date a representative from the Register of Deeds of Laguna
(Calamba Branch) appeared and testified on the records and/or other paper and documents
relative to the ownership and/or disposition of the land subject of the controversy. 11
Afterwards, Judge Eleuterio Guerrero issued an order dated January 8, 1992 granting
reconsideration and setting aside his earlier order, thus: 12
WHEREFORE, this Court finds merit to plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration and
accordingly the decision of this Court dated June 28, 1991, is hereby reversed as set aside
and another judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellees and/or any persons claiming rights under them to vacate
immediately the premises of the land owned by plaintiffs-appellants located at Barangay
Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, and to surrender possession thereof to the latter; and
2. Defendants-appellees are further ordered to pay the costs.
On March 5, 1992, Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero who took over as presiding judge of Branch
34 issued another order (this time upon motion for reconsideration of respondent Motas)
reversing the earlier order of Judge Eleuterio Guerrero, as follows: 13
The rule on the exercise of the Appellate Jurisdiction by Regional Trial Courts mandates that
cases appealed from the Metropolitan Trial Court "be decided on the basis of the entire
record of the proceeding had in the Court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as
may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trail Court" (vide. Sec. 22, Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129). The fact that the Court then presided by the Hon. Eleuterio Guerrero
conducted hearings and admitted testimonial evidence to clarify points on the decision of
the Court a quo, is beyond the purview of the rule. This being the case, the motion for
reconsideration must perforce be GRANTED.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated January 8, 1992 is hereby ordered
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the Order of the Municipal Trial Court dated June 14,
1990 is AFFIRMED en toto.
On April 13, 1992, petitioners filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of fifteen (15) days from April 18, 1992, or up to May 3, 1992, within which to file a
petition for review, alleging the following material dates: 14
2. On March 5, 1992, the said court issued an Order adverse to herein petitioners, a copy of
which was received by petitioners thru counsel on March 17, 1992, please see Annex "A".
3. From the adverse order, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 27, 1992
which was denied by the court per Order of even date.
4. The Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was received by petitioners
thru counsel on April 3, 1992, please see Annex "B", thus, petitioners have until April 18,
1992 within which to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
5. That petitioners will file a petition for review on certiorari of the said adverse order.
6. Due however, to volume and pressure of work from equally important cases, undersigned
cannot file the petition within the time allowed by law, thus, needs a period of fifteen (15)
days from April 18, 1992 within which to file said petition.
In response thereto, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting extension and stating:
15
Petitioners' motion for an extension of fifteen (15) days from April 18, 1992 or up to May 3,
1992 within which to file a petition for review is GRANTED, conditioned upon the timeliness
of said motion. (Emphasis ours)
The petition was filed on April 29, 1992.
Finding the petition to have been filed late as can be readily ascertained from the recitation of
material dates, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with the following
discussion:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing undisputed facts that from March 17, 1992 the date
petitioners received the order of March 22 (should be "05"), 1992 (Annex A, petition), to
March 27, 1992 when they filed their motion for reconsideration of said order, ten (10) days
were consumed. From April 3, 1992 the date petitioners received the order denying their
motion for reconsideration up to April 13, 1992 when they filed their motion for extension
of time to file a petition for review, another ten (10) days had elapsed. A total of twenty (20)
days had already run from the time petitioners received a copy of the questioned order up
to the time they actually filed on April 13, 1982 their motion for extension of time to file the
petition. Clearly, the order of March 22 (should be "05"), 1992 had already become final and
executory when petitioners filed on April 13, 1992 their motion for extension of time to file
a petition for review. For this reason, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for review except to dismiss it. (Sumbilo vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 232).
Their motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision having been denied by Court of
Appeals, petitioners hastened to this Court.
The Issues
The issues initially presented by petitioners in the petition before us were subsequently
simplified and re-stated in their memorandum thus: 16
. . . (1) whether or not respondent Adriano Motas is a tenant of that parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 57923 (and) (2) whether or not the dismissal of the case on sheer technicality by
the Court of Appeals notwithstanding its merit, is valid.
Disregarding for the nonce the factual nature of the first issue raised, and the rule of long
standing that only questions of law may properly be raised in petitions for review on certiorari
such as this, we shall first determine whether the respondent Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the petition before it, seemingly on "sheer technicality". If the answer is in the
affirmative, then regardless of the merits of the petitioner's cause, assuming it to be
meritorious, the judgment of the RTC having become final and executory, then this appeal may
no longer be entertained.
Petitioners allege that the late filing of the motion for extension and the petition was due to
their counsel's "honest mistake in computing the period to appeal." Citing cases 17 decided by
this Court, petitioners allege that respondent Court committed serious error and "grave abuse
of discretion" in dismissing the petition on a mere technical ground. 18
On the other hand, private respondent alleges that petitioner's failure to file their petition on
time due to mistake of counsel was "not excusable." Likewise citing numerous cases, 19 private
respondent alleges that this Court has consistently held that "perfection of an appeal within
the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement and failure to do so renders the questioned
decision or decree final and executory and no longer subject to review." 20
The Court's Ruling
The petition before us is plainly without merit.
In Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 this
Court had set the allowable extension to file petition for review with the Court of Appeals at
fifteen (15) days, to wit:
3. APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final judgment
or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court,
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with
Section 22 of BP No. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through
a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for extending the period for the filing of a
record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for
reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only (the)
remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to
file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for
review. (Emphasis supplied)
And in the same case, the Court explicitly ruled that a motion for extension must be filed
within the reglementary period of appeal:
6) PERIOD OF EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision (August 26, 1986), an
extension of only fifteen days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the Court
of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid
within the reglementary period of appeal.
Copies of the motion for extension of time and of the subsequent petition for review must
be served on the regional trial court and on the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied)
It should be observed that in this case, it was not only the petition which was filed late, but
also the motion for extension of time. This distinguishes the instant case from those cited by
petitioners. It is obvious and unarguable (and it was not only in Lacsamana that this Court held)
that a motion for extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the expiration or
lapse of the period fixed by law, and beyond dispute, if the motion for extension is filed after
the expiration of the period sought to be extended (i.e., the reglementary period to appeal),
then there is no longer any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from
will have become final and executory. The error of herein petitioners and their counsel goes
into the very validity of the appeal, and cannot simply be brushed off as an honest mistake in
computing the period to appeal. It should be stressed that a lawyer has the responsibility of
monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal. He cannot escape
from the rigid observance of this rule which is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with as "mere
technicality" to suit the interest of a party. The rule as to periods for filing appeal are to be
observed religiously, for it is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. "These
rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary
period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business." 22
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement. 23 If an
appeal be not taken within the reglementary period, the judgment becomes final and the court
loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it has no alternative but to order the execution of the
final judgment. 24
Although this Court had in a number of instances relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice, there is no reason to do so in this case. Quite beyond cavil, the delay incurred by
petitioner's counsel was simply inexcusable. As correctly cited by private respondent, this
Court has already held that "(a)n erroneous application of the law or rules is not an excusable
error." 25
At this juncture, we deem it useful to reiterate this Court's ruling in Galima, for the guidance
of members of the bar and bench alike, that "the miscomputation by counsel of the appeal
period will not arrest the course of the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment.
Otherwise, the definitive and executory character of the judgment would be left to the whim
of the losing party, when it is to the interest of everyone that the date when judgments
become final should remain fixed and ascertainable. 26

The respondent Court cannot also be faulted for stating in its resolution 27 dated June 23, 1992
that the petition filed with it was prima facie meritorious, only to dismiss it thereafter for being
filed out of time. 28 Where no timely appeal was taken, the judgment becomes final, and the
legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the
appellate court. 29 Further, the respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing the
petition on the ground that it was filed late, inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the
petition did not carry with it any assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed.

Under Section 1 (a) of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals motu proprio
or on motion of the appellee may dismiss the appeal for, inter alia:

(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected within
the period fixed by these rules.

Having disposed of the foregoing issue, we shall not pass upon and consider the other issue
raised by petitioners, challenging the factual findings of the trial court as to the existence of
the tenancy relationship. Otherwise, we would be violating that time-honored and oft-
reiterated rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are
not disturbed except
for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence. 30 Indeed,
we recently held in Sintos vs. Court of Appeals 31 that:

The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial court on
the basis of evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be reversed on appeal
except for the most compelling reasons (Macaraeg v. Court of Appeals 169 SCRA 259
[1989]).

Petitioners have utterly failed to show any such compelling reason. And equally as
significant, they are asking us to review a judgment which had long since become final and
executory — something we cannot and ought not do.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioners having failed
to show that respondent Court committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.