Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 70203 December 18, 1987

SALVIO B. FORTUNO and CAMARINES SUR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (CASURECO

II), petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MERICIA B. PALMA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI,
Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, and JOEL DAVID S. ABANTE, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings involving the qualification for membership of the Board of Directors of an
electric cooperative.

Petitioner Salvio B. Fortuno and respondent Joel David S. Abante were candidates for the position of
director to represent District V of the Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II) at
the elections of February 9, 1985. On January 30, 1985, Abante filed with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) a petition to disqualify Fortuno as candidate alleging that he is not a resident of
the area coverage of District V as required by the By-laws of the corporation. The NEA directed the
CASURECO Board of Directors to take appropriate action on the petition in accordance with the By-
laws and Election Code. The Board indorsed the petition to the District Election Committee (DEC)
which is the body charged with the duty of deciding all election matters, including protests, quarries,
referrals, postponements and nullification. 1 In another letter of February 4, 1985 addressed to DEC,
Abante likewise sought the disqualification of Fortuno on the same ground of non-residence.

The DEC directed Fortuno to submit his comment thereto within 48 hours which was duly complied
with. After a hearing on February 9, 1985, the DEC denied Abante's petition to disqualify Fortuno
finding that he is a resident of the area coverage of District V.

On February 9, 1985, the election was held as a result of which Fortuno obtained 1,429 votes while
Abante received 637 votes. Accordingly, the DEC proclaimed Fortuno as the duly elected director for
District V.

On February 10, 1985, a quo warranto petition with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order was filed by Abante in the Regional Trial Court of Naga City docketed as No. RTC-
05-607 entitled "Joel David S. Abante vs. Salvio B. Fortuno, and CASURECO II." On the day of the
hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court over the case was
raised by said defendants. On March 13, 1985, an order was issued by the trial court upholding its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. A motion for reconsideration of said order was filed by
defendants but this was denied in an order of March 16, 1985.
On March 18, 1985, the trial court issued an order resetting the hearing for preliminary injunction on
March 25, 1985 to enable defendants to elevate the matter to the appellate court and issued the
restraining order enjoining Fortuno from assuming or otherwise performing the functions of a
member of the Board of Directors of CASURECO II until further orders of the Court and the
respondent CASURECO II to observe and implement the said restraining order.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed on March 18, 1985 with this Court wherein petitioners seek to set
aside said orders of March 16 and 18, both of 1985 of the trial court and that a restraining order be
issued against the trial court taking further action on the case until further orders.

On March 19, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed by petitioners informing the Court of the
restraining order the respondent court issued on March 18, 1985 which in effect restrains the
continuance in the performance of the duties of Fortuno as an incumbent member of the Board of
Directors who was elected in 1981 whose term of office will end on March 30, 1985 and that
assuming that he was not a resident of the area of coverage he represents he cannot be arbitrarily
suspended or removed from office so that petitioners pray for a restraining order against the
enforcement of said order and for the respondent Judge from taking further proceedings in the case.

On March 25, 1985, without giving due course to the petition the respondents were required to
comment thereon.

The comment thereon having been filed by the respondents, on October 9, 1985 the Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their simultaneous memoranda. Only
petitioners submitted their memoranda. The case is now submitted for deliberation.

The main thrust of the petition is that the respondent court has no jurisdiction over the case citing
Section 24 of P.D. 269 as amended, which vests in the National Electrification Administration (NEA)
the power of supervision and control over all electric cooperatives as follows:

Section 24. Board of Directors. — (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be

vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have
the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations
and to approve all policies and resolutions.

The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the
procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined in the By-
laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and regulations... 2

Thus petitioners argue that:

Pursuant to the authority granted it by law, the NEA promulgated a standard Electric
Cooperative Election Code which the CASURECO II Board of Directors adopted
under its Board Resolution No. 108, s. 1982, as amended by Board Resolution No.
84-141 (Exh. 2). This Election Cooperative Election Code provides for the creation of
a District Election Committee (DEC) which shall, among other things, 'decide on all
election matters including protests, queries, referrals, postponement and nullification'
(par. f, Sec. 26, Electric Cooperative Election Code), 'act as Board of Canvassers'
(Sec. 26-g, Ibid), and 'proclaim the winning candidate' (Sec. 50, Ibid). lt is likewise
vested with the 'sole jurisdiction' over all protests relating to the election of the
members of the Board of Directors, although its decision is appealable to the NEA
(Secs. 51, 52, Ibid).
 As already adverted to above, respondent Abante filed two formal complaints
questioning the residence qualification of petitioner Fortuno. These two complaints
were duly heard and resolved by the DEC in its Resolution No. 04 dated 8 February
1985 (Exh. 4). Abante did not appeal from this Resolution which upheld the
residence qualification of Fortuno.

In other words, the District Election Committee which is vested with authority to
decide questions of this nature has already ruled that petitioner Fortuno possesses
the necessary residence qualification, a decision which has long become final, no
appeal having been taken therefrom. The question, therefore, of Fortuno's alleged
non-residence within the area coverage of District V had finally been resolved by the
duly constituted and authorized administrative body in accordance with the internal
rules and regulations of both CASURECO II and the National Electric Administration.

Moreover, we earnestly underline the fact that immediately after the elections on the
afternoon of February 9, 1985, the DEC proclaimed Fortuno as the duly elected
Director for District V. No protest against petitioner's proclamation was filed with the
DEC, which has the sole jurisdiction to entertain the same, within the reglementary
72-hour period provided for in Section 51 of the Electric Cooperative Election Code.
Therefore, said proclamation may no longer be questioned.

These facts assume greater significance when it is remembered that private

respondent Abante himself, in his Certificate of Candidacy (Exh. 3), expressly agreed
to abide by the Electric Cooperative Election Code, thereby placing himself squarely
within the jurisdiction of the provisions thereof.

We respectfully submit, therefore, that inasmuch as the power to determine and decide
the residence qualification of petitioner Fortuno is vested in, and falls within the peculiar
function and competence of the NEA, acting through its duly created District Election
Committee, that the decision rendered by the latter had already become final, said
resolution may no longer be questioned elsewhere. The respondent Court thus is without
jurisdiction and authority to review and reverse the aforesaid decision of the District
Election Committee. 3

In support of petitioners' theory the cases of Lions Clubs International vs. Judge Amores 4 and
of Bataan Electric Cooperative vs. Judge Pedro T. Santiago are cited. 5

In the questioned order of March 13, 1985 of the respondent court it made the following disquisition:

The pleadings and motions filed by counsels disclose the following: 1) Petitioner Joel
David S. Abante and respondent Salvio S. Fortuno were the only candidates in the
election for District Director, District V, CASURECO II, Inc. for the towns of
Canaman, Magarao and Bombon held on February 9, 1985. 2) Few days before the
election, or on January 30, 1985 Abante in a petition to the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) sought the disqualification of respondent Salvio Fortuno on the
ground that the latter was not a resident within the area coverage of District V,
CASURECO II. The NEA endorsed the petition to the District Election Committee
which in resolution No. 04 dated February 8, 1985 denied Abante's petition. 3) A
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction to disqualify Fortuno on grounds of
non-residence and to enjoin the CASURECO II from proceedings with the election
scheduled on February 9, 1985 was filed before the RTC, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. RTC'85-599. After due hearing the Court denied the prayer for
postponement of the election and dismissed the petition. 4) The DEC proclaimed
Fortuno elected having garnered 1,429 votes as against Abante's votes of 637. No
protest was filed by Abante within the 72-hour reglementary period as allegedly
provided for in Section 51 of the Electric Cooperative Election Code.

The elected board of CASURECO II will assume their position for a term of 3 years
on March 30, 1985. Abante, convinced that Fortuno is disqualified because of non-
residence in the area, filed this present Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto
Respondent Fortuno in raising the issue of jurisdiction contends that judicial
intervention is not proper; that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
that this Court has no jurisdiction over the nature of subject matter of the action; that
it is the DEC who is vested with the "sole jurisdiction over all protests of directors,
although its decision is appealable to the NEA." It is claimed that Courts may not
intervene in the purely internal affairs of the cooperative and in this regard,
respondent cited the case of the Lions Club International vs. Judge Amores, et al.
(121 SCRA 628) where the Supreme Court opined that: "in accordance with the
general rules as to the judicial interference, the decision of an unincorporated
association on the question of an election to office is a matter peculiarly and
exclusively to be determined by the association and, in the absence of fraud, is final
and binding on the courts." But in the same case the Supreme Court also said "The
general rule on non-interference in the internal affairs of associations is, however,
subject to exceptions, but the power of review is extremely limited. Accordingly, the
courtshave and will exercise power to interfere in the internal affairs of associations
where law and justice so require, and the proceedings of the association are subject
to judicial review where there is fraud, oppression or bad faith, or where the action
complained of is capricious, arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory (underlining supplied,
p. 628, Vol. 121, SCRA). Paragraph 4 of the verified petition, last sentence thereof,
alleges "that the DEC with wanton disregard of the elementary rules of fair play-due
process-arbitrarily denied petitioners complaint for the disqualification of respondent
Fortuno." This Court finds that hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction would
not constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of the CASURECO II.

Respondent CASURECO II in support of its objection to the grant of preliminary

injunction has cited the case of Silon vs. Vera (64, Philippine 868) to wit:

In quo warranto proceedings instituted for the sole purpose of

questioning the legality of the election of the directors of a corporation
... preliminary injunction does not he to prevent said directors and
officers from discharging their offices and to restore the former
directors, and the issuance thereof constitute an excess of jurisdiction
and abuse of discretion.

The Court has read the case and found that the facts of the case has no parallel to
the case at bar. The doctrine laid down in said case cannot apply even by analogy to
the present case. The 'Reply to the objection' filed by petitioner's counsel has clearly
pointed out the striking difference between the two cases and the inapplicability of
said case to the case at bar.

The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute except

when there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a
condition precedent to taking action in court. This specially in point taking the fact
raised by the respondent that the position is not a public office which would be strictly
 subject to the hierarchy of higher administrative offices. Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies may possibly affect the cause of action but not the
jurisdiction of the Court. Another factor, in this particular case, is that the petitioner,
has no other immediate and adequate remedy than to go to court in view of the
forthcoming assumption of office of the new Board of Directors which would not
afford sufficient time to raise the matter to the higher NEA authorities in Manila.

It is to be noted that this case does not involve the validity of the election
proceedings, or the number of votes cast but, simply the question of whether the
respondent is qualified or not under the residence requirement of the position for
which he was a candidate. it is therefore a justiciable controversy.

We agree.

Under Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court a quo warranto proceeding maybe instituted to
determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, if his claim is not well- founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the
privilege. 6 Where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be
ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action. 7

Under Section 6, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court it is provided:

SEC. 6. When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to

be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action therefore in his own name.

In this connection this Court held that an office in a private corporation is an office of public character
in such a sense and to such an extent as to render the remedy available to a person having an
interest which is injuriously affected. 8 The action may also be brought by a public utility whose rights
are invaded by another. 9

The Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings with the Regional
Trial Court in the province in which the defendant or one of the defendants reside, or when
defendant is a corporation, in the province in which it is domiciled or has a place of business; but
when the Solicitor General of the Philippines commences the action, it may be brought in a Court of
First Instance in the City of Manila or the Supreme Court. 10

From the foregoing provision of the rules and rulings of this Court, the conclusion is inescapable that
the quo warranto proceeding filed in the RTC of Naga City questioning the qualification of petitioner
Fortuno is within the jurisdiction of said Court. Nowhere in the law can We find any provision that
excepts the electric cooperatives from its coverage.

True it is that the NEA has supervision and control over the directors of CASURECO II and that
under its election code respondent Abante has the remedy of appeal to the NEA within 72 hours
which he did not avail of. Be that as it may, it does not deprive said respondent of the right to avail of
the right to file the quo warranto suit when it is shown that the DEC committed a grave abuse of
discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction in the resolution of the
qualification of Fortuno. 11

The ruling of this Court in Lions Club International that the "courts will not interfere with the internal
affairs of an unincorporated association" cannot apply to the present case as CASURECO II is
clearly a duly organized private corporation in the Philippines. Nevertheless, in said case this Court
held that its proceedings (Lions Clubs International) are nevertheless subject to judicial review
"where law and justice so requires, and ..." where there is fraud, oppression, bad faith, or where the
action complained of is capricious, arbitrary or unjust discriminatory. 12In the present case, Abante
alleged in the quo warranto petition that the DEC "arbitrarily denied petitioner's complaint for
disqualification of respondent Fortuno" warranting the intervention of the courts. 13

By the same token the case of Bataan Electric Cooperative is predicated on different environmental
facts. In said case, what is questioned is the qualification of the voters who voted for the member of
the board of directors and not of the one voted for and further the elections sought to be prevented
had already been held, so that the petition was considered moot and academic. 14

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 114795 July 17, 1996

LUCITA Q. GARCES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO
CONCEPCION,respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:p

Questioned in this petition for review is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA), as well as its
resolution, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court 3 (RTC) of Zamboanga del Norte
in dismissing a petition formandamus against a Provincial Election Supervisor and an incumbent
Election Registrar.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July
27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion who, in turn, was
transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. 4 Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service
Commission, 5 both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. 6Garces, on the other hand, was
directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. 7 But she was
not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor
Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not
vacant. 8

On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by the same Office of Assistant Director to defer her
assumption of the Gutalac post. On April 15, 1987, she received a letter from the Acting Manager,
Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of
polling booths. It was addressed "Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte" which
Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. 9 Meanwhile, since respondent
Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banccancelled his
appointment to Liloy. 10

On February 26, 1988, Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado 11 and Concepcion, among
others. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to
recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac, 12 and ordered that the
appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled. 13 In view thereof,
respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamusalleging that the same was
rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable
only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. The RTC, thereafter,
dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper
remedy, 14 and (2) that the "cases" or "matters" referred under the constitution pertain only to those
involving the conduct of elections. On appeal, respondent CA affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the
case. Hence, this petition

The issues raised are purely legal. First, is petitioner's action for mandamus proper? And, second, is
this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court?

On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post which was
deemed vacated at the time of her appointment and qualification. Garces insists that the vacancy
was created by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution. 15 On the contrary, Concepcion
posits that he did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did not accept the transfer to Liloy.

Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution provides:

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in the office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986. (Emphasis supplied).

The above organic provision did not require any cause for removal of an appointive official
under the 1973 Constitution. 16 The transition period from the old to the new Constitution
envisioned an "automatic" vacancy; 17 hence the government is not hard put to prove
anything plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it. 18 Mere appointment and
qualification of the successor removes an incumbent from his post. Nevertheless, the
government in an act of auto-limitation and to prevent indiscriminate dismissal of government
personnel issued on May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17. This executive order,
which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the issuance of Concepcion's transfer
order, enumerates five grounds for separation or replacement of elective and appointive
officials authorized under Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:

1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the

Civil Service Law;

2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;

3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;

4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;

5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain
in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.

Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner when
respondent Concepcion was transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion was
transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior appointment. 19 If the transfer was
made without the consent of the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal without valid
cause 20 contrary to the fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for
cause. 21 Concepcion's transfer thus becomes legally infirm and without effect for he was not
validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete because he did
not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, it is indispensable to complete an
appointment. 22 Corollarily, Concepcion's post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic
precept in the law of public officers that "no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is
for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. 23 There can be no
appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his
appointment validly terminated before one could be validly installed to succeed him. Further,
Garces' appointment was ordered to be deferred by the COMELEC. The deferment order,
we note, was not unequivocably lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac was even
cancelled by the COMELEC en banc.

These factors negate Garces' claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to the Gutalac
post. On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly doubtful and highly
questionable. As correctly ruled by respondent court, mandamus, which petitioner filed
below, will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioner's right is founded clearly in law
and not when it is doubtful. 24 It will not issue to give him something to which he is not clearly
and conclusively entitled. 25 Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed
position and exercises the corresponding functions therefor, the proper remedy should have
been quo warranto and not mandamus. 26 Quo warranto tests the title to one's office claimed
by another and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment,
while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles. 27

Garces' heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie 28 case is misplaced for material and different
factual considerations. Unlike in this case, the disputed office of "Assistant Provincial
Agriculturist" in the case ofTulawie is clearly vacant and petitioner Tulawie's appointment
was confirmed by the higher authorities making his claim to the disputed position clear and
certain. Tulawie's petition for mandamus, moreover, was against the Provincial Agriculturist
who never claimed title to the contested office. In this case, there was no vacancy in the
Gutalac post and petitioner's appointment to which she could base her claim was revoked
making her claim uncertain.

Coming now to the second issue.

The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado 29 contending that this
is a "case" or "matter" cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election
Registrar of Gutalac, he argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme
Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en
banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.

The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members

any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be
 brought to the supreme court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On
the contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered this controversy. The "case" or
"matter" referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that "decision,
rulings, order" of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of
itsadjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers 30 involving "elective regional, provincial, and city
officials." 31 In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an
agency. 32 The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this
matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely
burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC,
a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over "all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction over of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
orquasi-judicial
functions." 33

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED without
prejudice to the filing of the proper action with the appropriate body.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 2122 September 13, 1905

PEDRO T. ACOSTA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DAVID FLOR, defendant-appellee.

W.A. Kincaid for appellant.

Hartigan, Marple, Solignac and Gutierrez for appellee.

MAPA, J.:

It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections held on the 1st day of December, 1903,
in the town of Laoag, Province of Ilocos Norte, the plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for
the office of municipal president of the said town; that as a result of the said election the plaintiff was
elected to the said office by a majority of 100 votes, and that notwithstanding this fact the defendant
has usurped said office and unlawfully held the same since the plaintiff was the person entitled to the
exercise of said office. The complaint further sets out other acts in regard to illegalities alleged to
have been committed during the election. The prayer of the complaint is to the effect that judgment
be entered against the defendant, excluding him from the exercise of such office and that the plaintiff
be declared to be entitled to the same and that he be given possession thereof, and for such other
and further relief as the facts in the case would warrant in favor of the plaintiff.

The case having proceeded to trial, the plaintiff introduced various witnesses, all and each of whom
testified to facts which, if true, would more or less gravely affect the legality of the election. Not a
single witness, however, confirmed the allegations contained in the complaint, to the effect that the
plaintiff had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election, nor can it be inferred from the
evidence introduced by the plaintiff that he, as a result of the said election, or for any other reason,
was entitled to the office of municipal president of Laoag, now held by the defendant.

In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff, and before the defendant had
presented his, the court, on the latter's motion, acquitted the defendant, imposing the costs upon the
plaintiff. The court based its action upon the following grounds: (1) That the plaintiff could not
maintain the action brought by him because he had failed to establish his alleged right to the
exercise of the office in question; and (2) that there was no necessity to inquire into the right of the
defendant to hold the said office for the reason that this question had already been determined by
the provincial board after a consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to
irregularities committed during the last election held at Laoag for the office of municipal president
and other municipal officials, and for the further reason that the presumption is that a person holding
a public office was duly appointed or elected thereto.

The plaintiff excepted to his ruling of the court, moved for a new trial, and thereafter brought the case
to this court for review. An examination of the evidence of record supports the finding of the court
below to the effect that the plaintiff has failed to prove in any way, shape, or form that he was entitled
to the office in question, as alleged by him in his complaint. There is no dispute upon this question.
The appellant, himself, when the motion of the defendant to dismiss was argued, and from the
decision of which he appealed to this court, clearly admitted that he had failed to establish his right
to the exercise of the office in question. (Page 17 of the bill of exceptions.) And on page 52 of his
brief, he also assumes that he had been unable to establish his alleged right to the office in question.

The question that we have to decide, therefore, is whether, notwithstanding what has already been
said, and notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has failed to show that he had any right to the
office of municipal president of Laoag, he can maintain an action such as this for the purpose of
excluding the defendant from the exercise of said office on account of illegalities alleged to have
been committed in the elections.

The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly governed by the provisions of
sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The code, after enumerating in sections 197 and 198 the cases in which such an action may be
brought and the persons against whom they may be brought, goes on to determine with careful
distinction those who have the right to maintain such action.

Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any province, when
directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands, must commence any such action; and when upon the
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding
sections can be established by proof, he must commence such action."

Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a province, may, at his
own instance, bring such an action, or he may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be
commenced, or a judge thereof in vacation, bring the action upon the relation of and at the request
of another person; but, if the action is brought at the request of and upon the relation of another
person, the officer bringing it may require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be
given to him by the party at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought, before
commencing it."

Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence such action," provides as
follows: "A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another,
may bring an action therefor."

If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation
of public office, he would have plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-
reaching importance. A simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose. Far from it, the
legislator has on the contrary especially and specifically provided in sections 199, 200, and 201 who
must and who may bring such actions; and it is very clear that it was his intention to give such right
to those expressly mentioned in the above-cited sections and to no other, following the well-known
rule of law "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." It has been noticed that the above referred to three
sections only mention the Attorney-General, the provincial fiscal, and the individual claiming to be
entitled to the office unlawfully held and exercised by another. It is to be inferred from this last
provision that the individual who does not claim to have such a right can not bring an action for
usurpation of public office.

This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says that when the action is
against a person for usurping an office, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who
claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the same. Why should this be required
as an essential requisite if it were not necessary that the individual bringing the action should claim
the right to exercise the office in question?
Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the
case may be, the right to bring such action, an in but one case does the law authorize an individual
to bring such an action, to wit, when that person claims to have the right to the exercise of the office
unlawfully held and exercised by another. Aside from this case an individual can not maintain such
action. The law, in our opinion, does not allow of any other construction. If an individual, whether or
not he has the right to the office alleged to have been usurped by another were to be permitted to
maintain such an action, it would serve no purpose and section 201 would be evidently superfluous.
It would be a useless and redundant provision of the code.

As a consequence of what has been said no individual can bring a civil action relating to the
usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a right to the same; and at any stage of the
proceedings, if it be shown that such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed
because there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such
action is destroyed as is the case here. This is what actually happened in this case. After all of the
evidence presented by the plaintiff had been introduced, it was found, and he himself so admitted
that he had failed to establish in any way, shape, or form that he had any right to the office of
municipal president of the town of Laoag as he had alleged in his complaint without foundation for
such allegation. Consequently the judge very properly acquitted the defendant of the complaint.

The appellant contends that the court below should have first inquired into the right of the defendant
to the office in question and that no other question can be raised or investigated until this point has
been determined, and alleges that the question of the right of the plaintiff to the said office does not
arise until it has been determined that the defendant is not entitled to the exercise of such office. In
support of his contention he relies upon the provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

This section provides as follows: "When the action is against a person for usurping an office, the
complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment
of his right to the same; and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same; and
judgment may be rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of the person so
averred to be entitled, or only upon the right of the defendant, as justice requires."

From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below should have first passed
upon the right of the defendant and afterwards upon the right of the plaintiff. In our opinion this
should be done at the same time and in the same judgment. It is immaterial what method the court
may follow in the statement and determination of the questions in the rendition of his judgment
because even though the court may pass upon the right of the plaintiff first, and the right of the
defendant afterwards, or vice versa, this procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the
court does not fail to state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are. But all of
this, of course, presupposes that the action has been properly brought and duly prosecuted to a
judgment. This, at the same time, presupposes that the plaintiff had a right to maintain his action
upon the evidence submitted by him at the trial. It is impossible to prosecute a suit without a cause
of action. Therefore, whenever before judgment it is conclusively proven that the plaintiff has no right
to maintain the action since he has not the essential conditions required by law in order to bring and
maintain such action, his complaint should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon
the right of the defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession of his office, unless
action is brought by a person having a right to maintain the same under the law.

It may be said that under section 202 the court may only pass upon the right of the defendant when
the justice of the case so demands. This is true, but this only refers to cases where the action is
brought by the Attorney-General or by the provincial fiscal, as the case may be. In such cases it is
not necessary that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office alleged to have been
usurped, because although there be no such person, as in the case of a vacant office, for instance,
the fiscal could and even should bring such action against the person usurping the office in
accordance with the provisions of sections 200 and 199, respectively, as the case may be. The
manner in which judgment should be rendered according to section 202 perfectly meets the various
cases provided for in the three preceding sections; and it becomes the duty of the court to pass upon
the rights of the defendants only whenever it is not an essential requisite for the due prosecution of
the action that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office thus usurped, something which
only happens where the Attorney-General or the fiscal of any province brings the action against the
usurper.

As a result of the foregoing, we can not here pass upon the validity or nullity of the election of the
defendant, for the reason, among others which it is not necessary to state here, that the defendant
has no right to maintain such an action as this.

The order of the court below appealed from, is hereby affirmed. After the expiration of twenty days
let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and let the case be remanded to the court from
whence it came for further proceedings in accordance with the law. So ordered.
 epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23752 December 31, 1965

SATURNINO LL. VILLEGAS, petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIANO DE LA CRUZ, respondent.

Lorenzo G. Teves and Associates, Tolentino Law Office and San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for
petitioner.
Respondent his own behalf.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for quo warranto seeking the declaration of petitioner as the duly appointed
Municipal Judge of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental.

Petitioner was appointed ad interim Justice of the Peace of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental, by
President Carlos P. Garcia on December 13, 1961. He took his oath of office on December 29,
1961, and on April 27, 1962 his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

From the time he took his oath of office petitioner immediately entered into the discharge of his
official functions, but when the new administration took over in 1962, petitioner was advised by the
Department of Justice that his appointment as such justice of the peace was included among those
recalled in Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.

Petitioner requested reconsideration contending that his appointment cannot be considered within
the ambit of said administrative order, but his request was denied by the Secretary of Justice, and so
on February 21, 1962 Pacifico S. Bulado was appointed in his place by virtue of Administrative Order
No. 9. Bulado assumed office up to September 15, 1964 when respondent took over as Justice of
the Peace of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental. However, on May 27, 1962, petitioner wrote to Acting
Justice of the Peace Bulado requiring him to turnover to him the office he was holding in view of the
Commission on Appointments but the request was disregarded by Bulado. And on November 4,
1964, petitioner commenced the present petition for quo warranto.

There is merit in the claim of respondent that the instant action is already barred by the statute of
limitations for the reason that more than one year had elapsed since its cause of action arose. Thus,
it appears that when petitioner was informed by the Secretary of Justice that his appointment was
one of those recalled by President Macapagal to his Administrative Order No. 2 he vacated the
same on February 21, 1962 on which date Pacifico S. Bulado was appointed in his place. Since then
he ceased to be in office, though he later claimed that his removal was illegal because it does then
more than one year had already elapsed. The following authorities uphold this view..

... in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within
the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having
been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this
provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right
 to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover
said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered
as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. (Unabia v. City Mayor, et al., 99 Phil. 253,
257; Pinullar v. President of the Senate, L-11667, June 30, 1958; Roque v. President of the
Senate, L-10949, July 25, 1958; Madrid v. Auditor General, et al., L-13523, May 31, 1960;
Mesias v. Jover, L-8543, November 22, 1955; Abella v. Rodriguez, L-10512, November 29,
1957; Eranda v. Del Rosario, L-10552, April 28, 1958; Quingco v. Rodriguez, L-12144,
September 17, 1958; Tabora v. City of Cebu, L-11574, October 31, 1958; De la Cerna v.
Osmeña, L-12492, May 23, 1959; Argos v. Veloso, 83 Phil. 929; Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil.
828; Bumanglag v. Fernandez, et al., L-11482, November 29, 1960; Cui v. Cui, L-18727.
August 31, 1964).

The rationale of this doctrine is that —

... the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person who claims to be
entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so
that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries,
one, for, the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not
actually rendering service although entitled to do so. (Unabia v. City Mayor, et al., Pinullar v.
President of the Senate, supra, Madrid v. Auditor General, et al., supra; Torres v. Quintos, L-
3304, April 5, 1951).

The claim of petitioner that the never ceased to discharge the duties of Justice of the Peace of
Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental because he informed the Department of Justice that he was not quitting
his position because his opinion was that his case was not covered by Administrative Order No. 2
cannot be sustained in the light of what appears in time record of this case. In effect, when petitioner
was advised by the Department of Justice that his appointment has been recalled he ceased to act
on February 21, 1962 and on that same date Pacifica S. Bulado was appointed in his place. As a
matter of fact, on May 27, 1962, petitioner wrote to Bulado requesting him to turn over to him the
office he was holding in view of the confirmation of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on
Appointments, but Bulado denied the request. This letter clearly reveals that Bulado was already
then holding the office which he occupied up to September 15, 1964 when respondent took over as
the last incumbent of the position. The reason for the rule in limiting the prescriptive period to one
year is that it is not proper that the title, to a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty for
the people's interest requires that such right be determined as speedily as possible (Tumulak v.
Egay, 82 Phil. 828).

WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988

DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
DR. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR. SOSEPATRO AGUILA, and THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH, respondents.

Oscar C. Fernandez for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Quo Warranto filed by petitioner, Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez, claiming
entitlement to the position of Assistant Director for Professional Services at the East Avenue Medical
Center (formerly Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan) alleged to be unlawfully held by private respondent,
Dr. Sosepatro Aguila.

The background facts follow:

On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics
at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical Center) by then Minister of Health
and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center, Jesus C. Azurin.

Previous to this appointment, petitioner, a career physician, occupied the positions of Medical
Specialist I in 1978, Medical Specialist II from October 1982 to April 1985, until her appointment as
Chief of Clinics on 1 May 1985. Even during her incumbency as Medical Specialist II, petitioner was
already designated as Acting Chief of Clinics since September 1983 up to her permanent
appointment to said position.

As Chief of Clinics, petitioner exercised direct control and supervision over all heads of departments
in the Medical Center

In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to
Assistant Director for Professional Services. In partial implementation of this new set-up, respondent
Dr. Adriano de la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, issued Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, on 8
August 1986, designating petitioner as Assistant Director of Professional Services (Annex 3,
Comment, p. 48, Rollo). As such, she continued to exercise direct control and supervision over all
heads of departments in the Medical Center.
On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of the Ministry of
Health" was promulgated.

On 29 May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, designated respondent Dr. Aguila,
who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant Director for Professional Services "vice Dr. Nenita
Palma-Fernandez, who will be transferred to the Research Office." (Hospital Order No. 21, series of
1987, Annex B, Petition). Said order was purportedly issued "in the interest of the hospital service."

On the same date, Hospital Order No. 22, series of 1987, (Annex C, Petition), was issued by
respondent De la Paz, whereby petitioner was relieved "of her present duties and responsibilities as
Chief of Clinic and hereby transferred to the Research Office. This order being issued in the interest
of the hospital service.

Upon receipt of Hospital Order No. 22, petitioner filed on 1 June 1987 a letter-protest with
respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to respondents De la Paz and Aguila, as well as to
the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization
Commission.

Failing to secure any action on her protest within a month's time, petitioner filed on 8 July 1987 the
instant Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against respondents Dr. de la Paz, Dr.
Aguila, and the Secretary of Health.

On 14 July 1987, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the implementation of
Hospital Orders Nos. 21 and 22, series of 1987.

After considering and deliberating on all Comments, the Reply, and the Rejoinder of the Solicitor
General to said Reply, the Court, on 17 March 1988, Resolved to give due course to the Petition,
and dispensing with memoranda, declared the case submitted for resolution.

The Solicitor General has aptly framed the issues for resolution as follows:

1. Whether or not respondent De la Paz has the power or authority to issue the two Hospital Orders
in question;

2. Whether or not petitioner has a valid cause of action; and

3. Whether or not the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes the filing of the instant
Petition.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Health, makes common cause with petitioner
and answers the first and third issues in the negative, and the second in the affirmative. For their
part, Respondents De la Paz and Aguila uphold the opposite views.

We rule for petitioner.

1. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities attached to the
Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees, like
petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the Medical Center Chief. The latter's function is
confined to recommendation. Thus, Section 79 (D). of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
 Section 79 (D). Power to appoint and remove.— The Department Head, upon the
recommendation of the Chief of the bureau or office concerned, shall appoint all
subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by
law in the President of the Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as
especially provided otherwise, in accordance with the Civil Service Law...

The Department Head also may, from time to time, in the interest of the service,
change the distribution among the several bureaus and offices of his Department of
the employees or subordinates authorized by law.

Executive Order No. 119, or the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health, likewise states:

SEC. 26. New Structure and Pattern...

The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shag be prescribed by
the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this executive
order subject to approval by the Office of Compensation and Classification and the
authorized positions created thereunder shall be filled thereafter with regular
appointments by him or the President, as the case may be as herein provided...

Respondent Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner was not appointed but was merely
transferred in the interest of the public service to the Research Office pursuant to Section 24 (c) of
Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines 1 will not alter the
situation. Even a transfer requires an appointment, which is beyond the authority of respondent
Medical Center Chief to extend, supra. Besides, the transfer was without petitioner's consent, was
tantamount to removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without any legal effect
(Garcia, et al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109 Phil. 116). A removal without cause is violative of the
Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law" (Article IX, B, Section 2(3),1987 Constitution).

Petitioner's "designation" as Assistant Director for Professional Services on 8 August 1986 in

accordance with the organizational structure of the Department of Health under Hospital Order No.
30, Series of 1986, issued by respondent Medical Center Chief did not make her occupancy of that
position temporary in character. It bears stressing that the positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant
Director for Professional Services are basically one and the same except for the change in
nomenclature. Petitioner's permanent appointment on 1 May 1985 to the position of Chief of Clinics,
therefore, remained effective.

Neither can respondent Medical Center Chief rely on Section 2, Article III of the Freedom
Constitution and its Implementing Rules and Regulations embodied in Executive Order No. 17,
Series of 1986. The relevant provision was effective only "within a period of one year from February
25, 1 986." 2 The Hospital Orders in question were issued only on 29 May, 1987.

Executive Order No. 119, or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health" promulgated on 30
January 1987, neither justifies petitioner's removal. The pertinent provision thereof reads:

Sec. 26. New Structure and Pattern. — Upon approval of this Executive Order, the
officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to
perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding
salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from government
service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom
Constitution.
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January
1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity and
could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The
occupancy of a position in a hold over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would
have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2 February
1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al. vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra,
et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of
tenure govern.

And while it may be that the designation of respondent Aguila as Assistant Director for Professional
Services and the relief of petitioner from the said position were not disapproved by respondent
Secretary of Health, it by no means implies that the questioned acts of respondent Medical Center
Chief were approved by the former official.

2. It follows from the foregoing disquisition that petitioner has a valid cause of action. Where there is
usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy. (Lota vs. Court of Appeals,
No. L-14803, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 715).

3. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner from seeking
judicial relief This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that (1)
the question in dispute is "purely a legal one" and (2) the controverted act is 'patently illegal" (Carino
vs. ACCFA, No. L-19808, September 29,1966,18 SCRA 183). The questions involved here are
purely legal. The subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to security of in
tenure and were, therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial intervention was called for to enjoin the
implementation of the controverted acts.

There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies since she had filed a letter-protest With the respondent Secretary of Health, with copies
furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization
Commission, but the same remained unacted upon and proved an inadequate remedy. Besides, an
action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule
66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the
running of the one-year period (Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice L-32818, June 24, 1974, 57 SCRA
663).

WHEREFORE, the Writ of Quo Warranto is granted and petitioner, Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez, is
hereby held entitled to the position of Assistant Director of Professional Services of the East Avenue
Medical Center up to the expiration of her term. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued
enjoining the implementation of Hospital Orders Nos. 21 and 22, both dated 29 May 1987, is hereby
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
 epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43203 December 29, 1980

JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO ARCALA, defendants-appellees.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In the Court's judgment of July 29, 1977, the incumbent public officials who succeeded the original
defendants-appellees, namely, Alejandro Melchor then Executive Secretary and Federico Arcala
then cash disbursing officer, Office of the President of the Philippines, were directed

1. To reinstate Jose Cristobal, either in the Office of the President or in some other
government office, to any position for which he is qualified by reason of his civil
service eligibility, subject to present requirements of age and physical fitness; and

2. To pay appellant Cristobal back salaries for a period OF FIVE YEARS at the rate
of Four Thousand, One Hundered Eighty-eight Pesos (P4,188.00) per annum without
qualification and deduction.

In a letter dated July 15, 1978, then Presidential Assistant Juan Tuvera informed that Court "that the
President has ordered the immediate reinstatement of Mr. Jose C. Cristobal and the payment of his
accumulated back salaries in accordance with the decision of the Court" and as of the same date
extended an appointment to petitioner Jose C. Cristobal as Assistant in the office staff of the
President with compensation at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum effective upon assumption of duty.

In his letter of November 19, 1978 and subsequent pleadings, petitioner complained, however, that
the position given him by way of supposed reinstatement was not in accordance with the President's
own guidelines for reinstatement of wrongly ousted officers, to wit: "in filling up vacancies in all
government agencies, priority should be given to employees separated from the service" and that
"the reinstates be given position he last held if possible otherwise, he should be appointed to at least
a comparable position in the same organization, 1 and that the compensation given him based on the
old rate of P4,188.00 per annum at the time of his wrongful dismissal 18 years earlier on January 1,
1962 by then Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc was lower than that of the lowest janitor
(amounting to P349.00 a month or P11.60 a day, not counting the mere cost of transportation, let
alone the cost of food, shelter and schooling for his family and children) and not a comparable
position to that then held by him of Private Secretary I in the President's private office; that he was
told by Mr. Felix Hidalgo, chief of Malacañang Personnel Division, that there was no place for him
inside Malacañang and he had to find a position for himself in 17 other offices under the President,
of which he was given a list but that the application letters he forthwith filed with said offices met with
either a reply of no vacancy or no reply. Petitioner specifically invoked the Court's judgment, to wit:
"the reinstatement order of the Supreme Court implies compensation corresponding to the present
existing rate under the law plus such increases of pay and financial aids that have been effected by
law and Presidential Decrees." 2
After receiving the required comment from the Solicitor General on behalf of respondents officials,
the Court issued its Resolution of June 20, 1979, as follows:

Upon consideration of petitioner's answer to the manifestation and comment of the

Solicitor General stating inter alia that petitioner should report to the Personnel
Division daily until a suitable permanent assignment could be found for him under the
appointment extended to him as Assistant in the Office Staff of the President of the
Philippines with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum, the Court Resolved: (1) to DIRECT
(a) the petitioner to COMPLY with the said instruction and assume his duty under his
appointment and report the said Personnel Division; and (b) the Chief of Office of the
Personnel Division, Mr. Felix Hidaldo, in the matter of reinstatement of said petitioner
as ordered by the President of the Philippines in the implementation of the Court's
judgment, to GRANT to petitioner the allowances and benefits that are granted and
paid to other regular employees of the government; and (2) to REQUIRE both
petitioner and respondent to SUBMIT a report on the action taken in compliance
herewith, within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

From the compliance-reports submitted by the Solicitor General, 3 petitioner was "temporarily
detained at the office of Mr. Hidaldo, Chief of the Personnel Division, until such time when a suitable
permanent assignment could be found for him; that in a conference with Atty. Rocamora of the
Office of Presidential Assistant Juan C. Tuvera and Mr. Hidaldo of the Presidential Personnel
Division, petitioner was informed that he cannot be entitled to any allowances because his
appointment as Assistant with compensation at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum does not qualify
him for any allowances, which are only given to positions higher than what petitioner presently
holds." Petitioner, on his part, prayed of the Court that

(a) That his backpay be paid as stated in the decision;

(b) That his reinstatement means that he be placed back into the service as of
January 1, 1962, when he was illegally dismissed;

(c) That his benefits for sick leave, vacation leave shall be counted from January 1,
1962, when he was illegally dismissed;

(d) That his benefits arising from automatic promotions and increases in salary be
considered as part of his reinstatement';

(e) That his allowances and benefits arising from presidential decrees be considered and
added to his basic salary. 4

Petitioner further complained in his letter of February 10, 1980 against having "to start life all over
again from the bottom by receiving the same compensation at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum
(same compensation as I had before [being] illegally dismissed from the service in 1962)" and that
even with the standard general increases in salary with no privileges or benefits, "I still remained to
be the lowest salaried employee in the Office of the President, Malacañang, adding that:

Whereas, my former co-employee (Mrs. Esperanza M. Gutierrez) who in 1962 held

the position of Stenographer with compensation at the rate of P1,980.00 per annum,
is now holding the position of Supervising Presidential Staff Officer with
compensation at the rate of P30,621.00 per annum; same with the woman (Mrs.
Leticia Nonato who took over my position as Private Secretary I (and Section Head in
charge of all the Tagalog Correspondence of the President of the Philippines), is now
 holding the position of Sr. Presidential Staff Officer with compensation at the rate of
P27,732.00 per annum — compared now to my present position as Assistant
(temporary) upon reinstatement in the service on July 25, 1978 (after 15 years of
legal fight in Court) with compensation at the rate of P5,528.16 per annum (after
such increases of 10% and 20% on the basic salary at the rate of P4,188.00 per
annum, same compensation as that of in 1962 when illegally dismissed from the
service), or P460.00 a month, or P15.35 a day. Can a man with a wife and children to
support and educate live in peace with this amount today?

My transportation expenses alone from the place I live [in Pasay City] to Malacañang
costs me P6.00 a day. And out of the remaining amount (P9.35) I was forced and
made to live. IS THIS JUSTICE? Our home is no longer a Home. It is now like Hell,
caused by long years of unending and fastidious miseries suffered by the family. Had
it not been perhaps for continuous prayers and great faith in God, it could have been
a Broken Home, a Broken Family or a Dead Family long time ago.

Petitioner reiterated his plea on September 4, 1980 in his "Urgent Motion for Implementation of the
Resolution dated June 20, 1979" and "Second Urgent Motion" of December 10, 1980.

Petitioner has been paid his backpay for 5 years computed at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of the Court's judgment which specifically fixed the old rate, supra.

The Court finds merits in petitioner's plea as a civil service eligible that his reinstatement be clarified
to mean that in accordance with the President's own guidelines, even if he is not reinstated to the
same position of Private Secretary I in the President's private office which was his position during the
administration of Presidents Ramon Magsaysay and Carlos P. Garcia and from which he has been
held by final judgment of this Court to have been wrongfully dismissed on January 1, 1962 upon the
assumption of office of President Diosdado P. Macapagal, he must be given a position and
compensation commensurate and comparable to that held by him. This means that the
compensation fixed for his position must be that prevailing at the time of reinstatement or issuance
of the appointment on July 15, 1978, for the position of Private Secretary I in the office of the
President or a comparable position, together with the allowances and benefits appurtenant thereto
as well as the standard or automatic general increases in salary decreed thereafter from time to time
by the President (not at the old outmoded rate of P4,188.00 per annum that he was receiving sixteen
[16] years earlier). This means likewise that petitioner's benefits for sick leave and vacation leave
shall be counted from the date of his illegal dismissal on January 1, 1962 as if he had not left his
office at all and that all benefits that arose from automatic promotions, if any, and increases in salary
during the 15 years-period of his illegal dismissal shall be considered in determining the comparable
position and compensation given him at the time of his reinstatement as ordered in paragraph 1 of
the Court's judgment, supra.

This is but in accordance with settled jurisprudence. As held by the Court in Tañala vs.
Legaspi, 5 "when a government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally
suspended or illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal
purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held. " What the Court ruled therein is fully
applicable, mutatis mutandis, to petitioner at bar, thus: "(I)n the case of the appellee, by virtue of the
order of the President reinstating him in office his suspension and separation from the service
effective as of May 6, 1954 was thereby declared illegal, so that for all intents and purposes he must
beconsidered as not having been separated from his office."
As likewise reaffirmed by the Court in Perez vs. Evite, 6 "Under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court
a judgment isnot confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto." 7 The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stressed for the
Court in Padua vs. Robles, 8 that "(T)he sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by
its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects
that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its
meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus,
a judgment rests on the intention of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the
situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances."

The said case of Padua rectified the trial judge's 'circuitous and ambiguous" reference in his
judgment of criminal conviction of a taxi driver for homicide through reckless imprudence, to a
previous civil judgment against the same taxi driver for damages based on culpa aquiliana, by ruling
that the trial judge thereby "intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in (the) civil
case .... as (the taxi driver's) civil liability in (the) criminal case," so as to allow the victims' heirs to
enforce the taxi owner's subsidiary responsibility therefor under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. As further stressed for the Court by the late Chief Justice Castro: — "even if the statement
were reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that which achieves moral justice should
be adopted, eschewing the other interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice." 9 The
now Chief Justice, in a separate concurrence, hailed the decision's stress on moral justice as
"deriving support from the viewpoint of lawas logic, justice or social control" stating that "precisely
recourse may be had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law from being rendered
illusory in fact," adding that "(T)here is thus the strongest policy consideration that buttresses the
conclusion reached by us. It would conduce to less respect for the law as an agency of social control
if there be recognition in the codes of the right of next kin to damages arising from the tragic
occurrence of young lives being snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what had been
accurately described as dealers of death on the road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge
assure that it is nothing more than a barren form of words. This is what Dean Pound referred to as
law in books as distinguished from law in action. 10

If more need be said, be it noted that the judgment at bar was one granted in equity and justice
wherein the Court applied the "better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided
or bounded strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong and injustice would result," and consequently the Court ruled that —

This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application
of the law, but rather its action should conform to the conditions or exigencies of a
given problem or situation in order to grant a relief that will serve the ends of justice.

To paraphrase then Chief Justice John Edwin Marshall of the United States Supreme
Court, let us do complete justice and not do justice by halves. Just as in Ingles vs.
Mutuc [26 SCRA 171] this Court gave justice to plaintiffs, so shall We do justice to
Jose Cristobal.

As we likewise reaffirmed in Air Manila, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 11 "(E)quity as the
complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through
the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances
of cases, are incompetent so to do. 'Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the
form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.'"

ACCORDINGLY, the respondents-officials are directed forthwith (a) to effect the full reinstatement of
petitioner as ordered by the President and in accordance with the criteria here in above set forth, viz,
by assigning petitioner a position and paying him a compensation comparable to the office of Private
Secretary I of the Private Office of the President held by him at the time of his illegal dismissal on
January 1, 1962, i.e. the compensation fixed for such office and prevailing at the time of
reinstatement or issuance of the appointment to petitioner as staff assistant on July 15, 1978 (not at
the old 1962 outmoded rate of P4,188.00 per annum) together with the allowances and benefits
appurtenant thereto together with all the standard or automatic general increases in salary as well as
other special allowances and benefits decreed thereafter from time to time by the President, that is
to say, without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and increases granted or recognized by law
during the period of his illegal dismissal corresponding to the position held by him; (b) to pay
petitioner the accumulated differential between such compensation as recomputed and the old rate
at P4,188.00 per annum actually paid petitioner from the time he reported for duty pursuant to the
Court's Resolution of June 20, 1979; (c) to include and count in petitioner's record and favor his
benefits for sick and vacation leaves from the date of his illegal dismissal on January 1, 1962 up to
the time of his reinstatement and thereafter, as if he had not left or been separated from office at all;
and (d) to submit a report on the action taken in compliance herewith within ten (10) days from
notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006

MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P. CALLEJA,

MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO NIXON C.
TABORA, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P.
MALLARI, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on July 13, 2005.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages
and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged that
from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who
are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of
armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents.

On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in
Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein
respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the action forquo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides.
However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject
case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents
below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative
defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto.
Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses.
All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.

On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc.
which originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory
and adjudicated functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19,
2000, otherwise known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the Commission’s jurisdiction over all
cases enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred ["]to the Court of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in
the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over these cases." Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the
exercise of said mandated authority, promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
which took effect 15 December 2000 designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try
and decide Securities and Exchange Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial
jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Region and within the respective provinces in the
First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC
Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as "special court" (Section 1,
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC).

Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect
on March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that "all SEC cases originally
assigned or transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the
Regional Trial Court specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC.

On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001.

From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try
and decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA
8799, it is evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try and decide
these cases to the "special courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .

Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On
the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from
the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide
intra-corporate dispute.

In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to

Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
(A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8)
and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this
case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate
controversies under R.A. 8799.

The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction set
on July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled.

For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the
court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon.

SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately
elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The petition raises the following issues:

WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO

JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE
SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON
VENUE AND JURISDICTION

II

WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED JANUARY 23, 2001
WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE
WHICH WAS FILED ON MAY 16, 2005. 3

In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and
dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because the
Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 is the wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides that "all decisions and final
orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court;" and (3) the petition was intended merely to delay the proceedings in the trial court because
when the case was transferred to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court, said court granted
petitioners’ motion to hold the proceedings in view of the present petition pending before this Court.

Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that on
January 12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men, assaulted the
premises of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking away the daily hospital collections estimated
at P400,000.00.

The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13,
2005. It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals
from judgments or final orders.4 The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein
petitioners’ prayer in their Answer for the dismissal of respondents’ case against them. As a
consequence of the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the case
to another branch of the Regional Trial Court that had been designated as a special court to hear
cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the order was merely interlocutory as it does not
dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. Such being the
case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a petition under Rule 45. As we held
in Tolentino v. Natanauan, 5 to wit:

In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
well-settled rule that:

. . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor
can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be
followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment.6

It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for
more violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the Court
proceeded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner
therein, stating thus:

While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an
interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error
committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to
ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the
Court were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by
the parties.8

In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of the
parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners’ technical lapse of filing a
petition for review on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper
court. Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.

It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make
out a case for an intra-corporate controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court,
adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1,
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons
who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo
warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No.
902-A as amended)."11

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been
transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an
office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

xxxx

As explained in the Unilongo12 case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains
the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old
Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It
is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A.
No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warrantofiled by
respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners
to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

The Interim Rules provide thus:

Section 1. (a) Cases covered. – These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in
civil cases involving the following:

xxxx

(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations,

between and among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders,
members, or associates, respectively;

(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or

managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;

xxxx

SEC. 5. Venue. – All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation,
partnership, or association concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours)

Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
(effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and
decide cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial
Region, this Court designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:

Camarines Sur (Naga City) Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.
Albay (Legaspi City) Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta
Sorsogon (Sorsogon) Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor

Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, 2003, which provides
that:

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a)
Resolutions of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9
July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M.
 No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are
hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and
decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their
jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission;

xxxx

4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within
their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region
and within the respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial
Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official
station of the designated Special Commercial Court; (Emphasis ours)

The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present
action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be
commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines
Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial
Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction
over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents.

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’
petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving
an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a
Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC.

Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer
of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take
on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and
Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association,13 the Court held that the
trial court, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same
so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed
with jurisdiction.

Note, further, that respondents’ petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-03-
03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that such petitions
shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court. Since the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for
Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents should have filed their petition
with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC having been in effect for four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-
SC having been in effect for almost two years by the time respondents filed their petition, there is no
cogent reason why respondents were not aware of the appropriate court where their petition should
be filed.

The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial court to
order the transfer of respondents’ petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is specious
because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases
formerly cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official
station of the designated Special Commercial Court, had been in effect for almost two years.
Thus, the filing of the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, which had
no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and
VOID. The petition for quo warrantoin Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No.
RTC 2005-0001), entitled "Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al." is
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 146528.February 6, 2001]

JAIME SORIANO, et al. vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 6 2001.

G.R. No. 146528(Jaime N. Soriano, Philip Emmanuel C. Penaflor, Cesar B. Chavez, Sal G. Dumabok, Samuel
Julius B. Garcia, Sandra P. Torresyap, Cherrie B. Belmonte, Mario S. Araos, Rodylyn Tingzon-Manzano,
Fidelino A. Austria, Angelito M. Villanueva, Isabelo M. Banez III, Paul Y. Chua and Cesar C. Villariba, all
officers and members of the Movement for National Security Advancement (MNSA), vs. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada.)

G.R. No. 146549 (In the Matter of the Declaration of her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the
constitutionally instituted 14th President of the Republic of the Philippines; Eduardo B. Inlayo, petitioner.)

G.R. No. 146579 (Concerned Citizens for effective and responsible Government, Inc.; SulongBayan
Movement Foundation, Inc.; Institute of Continuing Legal Studies and Education Inc.; Eliseo P. Ocampo;
Editha A. Santos; and Armando A. Ricarte, Jr., petitioners.)

G.R. No. 146631 (Oliver O. Lozano vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.)

These cases pertain to the oath-taking on 20 January 2001 of then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as President of the Philippines.The Court ordered these consolidation because they involve the same subject
matter.

In G.R. No. 146528, petitioners Jaime N. Soriano, et al., ask the Court to enjoin Joseph Ejercito Estrada
"from exercising the powers and authority of the President under the Constitution" and "to yield the
Presidency to his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo."

In G.R. No. 146549, petitioner Eduardo Inlayo prays that the Court declare that "the occupation of the office
of [the President] of the Philippines by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional and legal
with the full support of the Filipino people and other foreign countries."

In G.R. No. 146579, petitioner ask the Court to issue a "definitive ruling on whether or not Joseph Estrada is
still the President" and is "exempt from all criminal suits."

In G.R. No. 146631, petitioner Oliver Lozano prays "that the proclamation and oath-taking of Madame
Arroyo" be declared null and void or that she be "declared acting President and President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, President-on-leave."

All four Petitions are plainly without merit.

First, the four Petitions are essentially for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court had no original
jurisdiction. 1 Remotigue v. Osmeña, 21 SCRA 837 [1967]; Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794 [1981]; Sundiang v. Estrada and the Philippine Senate, G.R. No. 146131,
16 January 2001.Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this special civil action falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. 2 Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983].

Although the Petition in G.R. No. 146528 is captioned as a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus," it fails to
allege, much less show, lack or excess jurisdiction, or grave abuse of jurisdiction on the part of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, which
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires to be alleged and proved before the extraordinary writ of prohibition
may be issued.Neither have petitioner sufficiently alleged, much less shown, that respondent or anyone else
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, to entitle them to
the writ of mandamus.In any case, petitioners themselves admit that their plea is really one for declaratory
relief, (par. 6.1. of Petition) and that they "fully understand the well-settled doctrine that this Honorable
Court is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain cases for declaratory relief."

Second, petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits.They have not shown any direct and personal
injury as a result of President Arroyo's oath-taking. 3 See Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 562-
563 [1995]; Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603 [1999].Specifically, Petitioner Lozano's alleged interest as a
taxpayer is far too detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition, i.e., to nullify the oath-taking of
Arroyo and declare Estrada as "President-on-leave." The other petitioners have not even alleged, not to say
shown, any prima facie legal interest to qualify them as proper parties.Kibitzers, however well-meaning,
have no locus standi.

Third, none of the Petitioners can be treated as actions for quo warranto.Under Rule 66 of the rules of Court,
a plea for quo warranto may be commenced by (1) the solicitor general, (2) a public prosecutor, or (3) a
person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.None of the petitioners qualify in law to commence the action.Their Petitioner do not even remotely
allege that they are.

At bottom, the Court stands by its Resolution in A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC, promulgated on 22 January 2001,
which reads as follows:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC. - In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take her Oath of Office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the ChiefJustice. - Acting on the urgent request of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed
to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was
treated as an administrative matter, the Court resolved unanimously toCONFIRM the authority given by the
twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the
Oath of Office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January
20, 2001.

This Resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case which may be filed by a
proper party.

Clearly, the herein Petitions have miserably failed to present justiciable controversies brought by the proper
parties to deserve further considerations by this Court.The appropriate case for the resolution of the issues
raised by petitioners may be G.R. Nos. 146710-15 entitled H.E. Joseph E. Estrada vs. Honorable Aniano
Desierto, etc., et al., filed on 05 February 2001.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions at bar are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
 EN BANC

ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO, G.R. No. 174929

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

- versus - TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,*

REYES,

DE CASTRO, and
 BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

NESTOR P. VILLASIN,
Respondent.
June 27, 2008

x---------------------------- ----------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the following: (1) the Order[1] dated 28 July 2006 of Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Leyte, dismissing petitioner Ranulfo C.
Feliciano’s Petition for Quo Warranto against respondent Nestor P. Villasin in Civil
Case No. 2006-03-29; and (2) the Order[2] dated 8 September 2006 of the same
court denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The following are the antecedent facts of this case:

 Petitioner Feliciano was appointed General Manager (GM) of Leyte
Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) on 11 June 1975 by the LMWD Board of
Directors through Resolution No. 14, Series of 1975.[3]

On 6 March 1990, the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) took over
the management and policy-making functions of LMWD owing to LMWD’s default
on the payment of its obligations to LWUA. Said move was made pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 198, otherwise known as THE PROVINCIAL WATER
UTILITIES ACT OF 1973,[4] issued on 25 May 1973. The LWUA appointed an Interim
General Manager and Chairman of the Board of Directors, as well as its members.

After the LWUA took over the management and policy-making functions of
the LMWD in March 1990, Engineer (Engr.) Cayo U. Emnas was appointed as take-
over General Manager. Emnas thereafter filed administrative charges against
Feliciano for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an LMWD
Official, docketed as Administrative Case No. LMWD-OGCC-01-01.[5] Feliciano was
accused of authorizing payment of his backwages amounting to P134,721.64, for
the period 6 March 1990 up to23 October 1990, although he did not report for
work during said period.

The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) handled the

investigation of the charges against Feliciano. In a Resolution dated 16
September 1991, the OGCC found Feliciano guilty as charged and recommended
the penalty of dismissal. Pertinent portions of the OGCC Resolution reads:

The action of respondent in authorizing, causing and receiving the

aforesaid disbursement of P134,721.64 in payment obstensibly of his
backwages for the period starting 6 March 1990 up to and until 23
October 1990, knowing that during the said period he did not report for
work nor rendered service to LMWD as testified to by complainants
witnesses, is not only irregular but unlawful. Worse, respondent being
 the General Manager, necessarily had taken advantage of his position
and abused the confidence reposed in his office in the perpetration of
the said rank dishonesty. As a consequence thereof, LMWD was
defrauded and suffered damage in the sum of P134,721.64.

Accordingly, undersigned finds respondent Ranulfo C. Feliciano

guilty, as charged, of GRAVE MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY, AND
CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF AN LMWD OFFICIAL.

In view of the grave nature of the offense committed by

respondent, the large sum which LMWD has been defrauded of, and
the existence of aggravating circumstances occasioned by respondent’s
taking undue advantage of his position and abusing the confidence of
his office, undersigned recommends the imposition of the penalty of
DISMISSAL on respondent.[6]

On 11 November 1991, the Interim LMWD Board of Directors approved in

toto the findings of the OGCC including its recommendation to dismiss Feliciano.[7]

On 1 October 1993, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Memorandum

Circular No. 41, Series of 1993, directing Board Chairpersons and GMs of water
districts to submit personnel appointments for approval by the CSC.

On 20 July 1998, the take-over of the management and operations of the

LMWD by the LWUA was lifted by the LWUA Board of Trustees in its Resolution
No. 138, Series of 1998.[8]
 On 25 September 1998, the new regular LMWD Board of Directors
unanimously approved Resolution No. 98-002 ordering Feliciano to re-
assume[9] the post he had vacated as GM of LMWD. The position was accepted by
Feliciano on 27 September 1998.[10]

As GM, Feliciano appointed Edgar R. Nedruda, Milagros A. Majadillas and

Edgar B. Ortega as Division Manager, Quality Control Assurance Officer and Plant
Equipment Operator E, respectively, at the LMWD.[11] In compliance with CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1993, Feliciano submitted the same to
the CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) for approval. The CSCRO, however, disapproved
Feliciano’s LMWD personnel appointments in its Order issued on 8 June
1999 since GM Feliciano did not possess the required CSC-approved appointment
pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, S. 1993.[12] Feliciano appealed the
Order to the CSC.

On 8 September 2000, the CSC through its Chairperson Corazon Alma G. de

Leon, issued CSC Resolution No. 002107 denying Feliciano’s appeal of his
disapproved LMWD personnel appointments on the ground that he was only a de
facto officer.[13] It found that Feliciano had no authority to make appointments
since he himself lacked the required CSC-approved appointment pursuant to CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998, and Memorandum Circular No. 41,
Series of 1993.[14] The CSC thus resolved:

WHEREFORE, the Order issued by the Civil Service Commission

(CSCRO) Regional Office No. VIII, Palo, Leyte, disapproving the
appointments of Nedruda, Majadillas and Ortega on the ground that
Ranulfo Feliciano lacks the authority to appoint, is hereby affirmed.

Accordingly, the Human Resource Management

Officer/Personnel Officer of the Leyte Metro Water District (LMWD)
may re-submit the appointment of Ranulfo Feliciano to the position of
 General Manager of the LMWD, to the CSC Leyte Field Office for
attestation.

Feliciano may likewise re-appoint Nedruda, Majadillas and

Ortega to the same positions. (Emphases ours.)

Feliciano filed a Motion for Reconsideration citing as main argument the

fact that the LMWD was not a government-owned and controlled corporation,
but a special type of non-stock, non-profit private corporation imbued with public
interest, and therefore, not covered by the civil service rules.

The CSC denied Feliciano’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution No.
010218, issued on 22 January 2001, which reiterated that Feliciano’s argument on
the private character of water districts had long been put to rest in Davao City
Water District v. Civil Service Commission, which declared water districts to be
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, falling under
the jurisdiction of the CSC and Commission on Audit (COA).

Not satisfied, Feliciano appealed CSC Resolutions No. 002107 and 010218
to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The case was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 63325. On 1 September 2005, the Court of Appeals in Cebu City, through
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., denied the petition.[15] Feliciano filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied per Resolution dated 15
August 2006.[16] Feliciano thereafter appealed to this Court on 15 August
2006 via petition for review oncertiorari in G.R. No. 174178. In an en
banc Decision issued on 17 October 2006, this Court denied the petition for its
failure to sufficiently show that the CSC committed any reversible error in issuing
the challenged decision and resolution. Feliciano’s Motion for Reconsideration
thereof was denied on 23 January 2007.
 On 12 January 2005, the CSC issued a Memorandum directing its Regional
Director (for Region 8) Rodolfo Encajonado (RD Encajonado) to submit an update
on the status of Feliciano’s appointment as GM of LMWD.

In his Memorandum submitted to the CSC on 14 January 2005, RD

Encajonado reported that the LMWD Board of Directors had not yet submitted
the required appointment of Feliciano as GM of LMWD for attestation, as
required by CSC Resolutions No. 002107 and No. 010218. On account thereof, the
CSC, through its Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, issued on 28 February
2005 CSC Resolution No. 050307, declaring Feliciano to be a mere de facto officer
of LMWD and ordering him to vacate the position of GM, to wit:

With the promulgation on September 13, 1991 of the above-

mentioned Supreme Court decision,[17] the issuance on October 1, 1993
of the aforestated CSC Memorandum Circular, and the adoption on
January 22, 2001 of CSC Resolution No. 01-2018 denying Feliciano’s
motion for reconsideration, Feliciano is under legal obligation to comply
by submitting his appointment to the Commission for
attestation/approval. This, he did not do. He instead stubbornly
maintained his personal stand that water districts are private
corporations, not government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charter. For all legal intents and purposes, effective upon his
receipt on February 6, 2001 of CSC Resolution No. 01-0218 denying his
motion for reconsideration, Feliciano is a mere usurper or intruder who
has no right or title whatsoever to the position/office of General
Manager. His further occupancy of the position after said date holds
him criminally liable for usurpation of authority.

xxxx
 WHEREFORE, the Commission resolves as follows:

1. Between June 8, 1999 (the date when the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order disapproving the
appointments of Edgar R. Nedruda, Milagros A. Majadillas and Edgar
B. Ortega on the ground that Ranulfo C. Feliciano does not possess a
CSC-approved appointment) and February 6, 2001 (the date when
Feliciano received a copy of CSC Resolution No. 01-0218 denying his
motion for reconsideration and affirming CSC Resolution No. 00-
2107), Feliciano shall be treated as a de facto officer whose acts are
valid and binding only as regards innocent third persons. Insofar as
Feliciano himself is concerned, his acts are void, hence, he is not
entitled to the emoluments of the office. Regarding the three (3)
issued appointments, the same are all void, since Feliciano has no
authority to issue the same.

2. Starting February 6, 2001, Feliciano is a mere usurper or intruder

without any right or title to the office/position of General Manager
of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD). His further
occupancy of the position of General Manager after February 6,
2001 holds him criminally liable for usurpation of authority. Effective
upon receipt of this Resolution, he is ordered to vacate the position
of LMWD General Manager.[18]

On 22 March 2005, Feliciano again sought recourse at the Court of Appeals

where he filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with application for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Injunction, seeking to enjoin the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 050307, Series of 2005. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00489.[19]

On 30 March 2005, while CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 was still pending with the
Court of Appeals, with no injunction having been issued by the appellate court,
the LMWD Board of Directors declared the GM position occupied by Feliciano
vacant by virtue of LMWD Resolution No. 050307.[20]

The Court of Appeals subsequently issued on 12 April 2005 a Resolution in

CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 granting a TRO effective for sixty days. After the lapse of the
TRO, the LMWD Board of Directors appointed Villasin as the new GM of LMWD
on 14 June 2005. On 16 September 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R.
SP No. 00489 which reached this Court via petition for review in G.R. No. 172141.
This was eventually denied by this Court and entry of judgment was made on 14
November 2006. On 28 December 2005, the LMWD Board of Directors
unanimously approved LMWD Resolution No. 05-145 certifying that Villasin was
the GM of LMWD pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198 and
the CSC Rules and Regulations.

On 28 March 2006, Feliciano thus filed with the RTC a Petition for Quo
Warranto against Villasin under Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-03-29.

Feliciano asked the RTC to restore him to his position as GM of LMWD, and
to remove Villasin therefrom. In particular, he prayed for the following in his
Petition for Quo Warranto:

1. To order [Villasin] to vacate the Office of General Manager of LMWD

and for [Feliciano] to be seated to such office;
 2. To mandate [Villasin] to pay the salaries and other emoluments of
[Feliciano] which as of this date amounts to more than One Million
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00);

3. To direct [Villasin] to pay [Feliciano] attorney’s fees comprised of

Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as acceptance fees and
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) appearance per hearing;

4. To command [Villasin] to pay the cost of herein Petition for Quo

Warranto.

[Feliciano] also prays for such other reliefs as may be necessary

under the circumstances.[21]

Citing the Court’s ruling in Villaluz v. Zaldivar,[22] Feliciano argued that since
the LWUA had no power to remove a GM appointed by a regular Board of
Directors, it should follow then that an interim Board of Directors neither had the
power to discipline or remove a regular GM of LMWD.

Villasin countered by filing a Comment/Answer with Motion to Dismiss the

Petition for Quo Warranto, on the following grounds:

(a) Forum shopping;

 (b) Feliciano is disqualified from government service due to his
dismissal from office on 11 November 1991;

(c) Petitioner’s claim that LMWD is a private entity defeats his petition
since quo warranto is a remedy of a person claiming a public office;

(d) Quo warranto case was filed more than a year from the time the
cause of action arose or beyond the reglementary period;

(e) The Court of Appeals had already denied his petition for Review
on Certiorari on CSC Resolution No. 050307.

A hearing with notice to the parties was set for 2 June 2006 but Feliciano
failed to attend the same.[23] The RTC then ordered Civil Case No. 2006-03-29
submitted for Resolution.

On 28 July 2006, the RTC issued an Order dismissing Feliciano’s Petition

for Quo Warranto, finding that:

The scope of the remedy of quo warranto instituted by an

individual is that he, the petitioner, has prior right to the position or
office held by the respondent. Where there is no legal ground or where
the fundamental basis of the petition is none or destroyed, it becomes
unnecessary to pass upon the right of the respondent.
 xxxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the aforegoing (sic), for lack of cause of

action amounting to want of jurisdiction, this petition shall be, as it is
hereby ordered, dismissed.[24]

Feliciano filed his Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the Order issued
by the RTC was conjectural, presumptuous and specious. However, the Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 8 September
2006. According to the RTC, the Quo Warranto Petition was prematurely filed
considering that Feliciano’s Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, involving CSC Resolutions No. 002107 and No. 010218, was still pending
with the Court of Appeals. Hence, the issue of whether Feliciano is holding the
GM position in a de facto or a de jure capacity is yet to be resolved. The RTC
therefore decreed:

WHEREFORE, with prematurity in the institution of the present

petition as duly admitted by herein petitioner-movant coupled with the
fact that the rest of the arguments raised in the motion have already
been considered and rejected by this court in the order dated, July 28,
2006, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.[25]

On 14 October 2006, Feliciano went directly to this Court via the instant
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, raising the
following arguments:
 I.
RESPONDENT COURT HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AS ITS DISMISSAL
OF THE PETITION IS SO WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY
AMOUNTING THEREFORE TO A PATENT AND GROSS EVASION OF A
POSITIVE DUTY OR VIRTUAL REFUSAL TO PERFORM JUDICIAL DUTY.

II.

RESPONDENT COURT HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AS ITS DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, BASED ON GROUNDS NOT SOUGHT
AND PRAYED FOR IN THE MOTION TO DISMISS, CONSTITUTES A DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS.

As hereinbefore stated, CA-G.R. SP No. 00489, Feliciano’s Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to enjoin the implementation of CSC
Resolution No. 050307, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated
16 September 2005. Feliciano appealed said Court of Appeals Decision before this
Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
172141. This Court, however, in an En Banc Resolution dated 6 June 2006, ruled
to:

b) DENY the petition for failure thereof to sufficiently show that

the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in issuing the
challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.[26]
 The Court En Banc denied with finality Feliciano’s Motion for
Reconsideration on 22 August 2006, and entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
172141 on 14 November 2006.

In the instant Petition, which actually arose from the appointment by the
LMWD Board of Directors of Villasin as the new GM of LMWD after the CSC
ordered Feliciano to vacate the same in its Resolution No. 050307, Feliciano prays
that this Court set aside and declare null and void the Orders dated 28 July 2006
and 8 September 2006 of the RTC dismissing his Petition for Quo Warranto in Civil
Case No. 2006-03-29.

Petitioner raises several issues in this Petition, which all boil down to the
sole question of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Feliciano’s Petition for Quo
Warranto.

Worthy to note is the failure of Feliciano to implead herein the RTC, the
tribunal that rendered the assailed Orders, as a nominal party (public respondent)
in the instant Petition for Certiorari. One of the requisites of an independent civil
action for Certiorari is that it must be directed against a tribunal, a board, or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Feliciano failed to comply
with said requirement and this failure is sufficient to dismiss this Petition.

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply with any of the
aforesaid requirements for filing an independent civil action for Certiorari is
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. This rule accords sufficient
discretion to the court hearing the special civil action whether or not to dismiss
the petition outright for failure to comply with said requirement.
 Evidently, the function of this Court is merely to check whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing Feliciano’s Petition for Quo Warranto before it.

In a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
following essential requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.[27]

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility,[28] and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.[29]

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will prosper only
if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent tribunal. In the absence of such a showing,
there is no reason for this Court to annul the decision of the respondent tribunal
or to substitute it with its own judgment, for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for Certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.

Nonetheless, even as this Court delves into the merits of the present
Petition, it still must fail.
 Feliciano’s Petition for Quo Warranto centers on his alleged right as the one
legally entitled to occupy the position of GM of LMWD. He presented two main
issues therein:

(1) Whether or not the LMWD Board of Directors, through

Resolution No. 05-037, legally and validly ousted him; and

(2) Whether or not the LMWD Board of Directors legally and validly
appointed Villasin.

Contending that his appointment as GM on 11 June 1975 by the LMWD Board of

Directors and subsequent assumption of office bestowed on him a legal right to
the said position, Feliciano argues that Republic Act No. 9286,[30] which further
amended Presidential Decree No. 198, and was approved on 2 April 2004, vested
him with security of tenure. Feliciano adds that the Interim LMWD Board of
Directors, in fact, had no power to dismiss him when he was dismissed on 11
November 1991.

It is well-established that Quo Warranto proceedings determine the right of

a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or an office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment, if the latter’s claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited
his right to enjoy the privilege. According to the Rules of Procedure:

The action may be commenced for the Government by the

Solicitor General or the fiscal against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise; a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or against an association which acts as a
 corporation without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority to so act.[31]

The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own

name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)

The possible outcome of a Petition for Quo Warranto can be any of the
following:

If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state
that the respondent is entitled to the office. If, however, the court
finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment
may be rendered as follows:

"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When

the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that
such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded
therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case
may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be
rendered determining the respective rights in and to the
office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires."
 If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or
intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court may
order:

(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from

office;

(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;

(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to

the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires.[33]

In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by an

individual in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the
controverted public office, position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the
same has a right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo
Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in
form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office.[34] In Garcia v.
Perez,[35] this Court ruled that the person instituting Quo Warrantoproceedings on
his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be
able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment
or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage.[36]

Due to the recent turn of events, Feliciano lost any legal standing to
pursue via Quo Warranto proceedings his claim to the position of GM of LMWD
considering this Court’s En Banc Resolutions dated 6 June 2006 and 22 August
2006 in G.R. No. 172141 which denied with finality his Petition for Review
on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 16 September 2005 and
Resolution dated 31 March 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 upholding the legality of
CSC Resolution No. 050307. To recall, CSC Resolution No. 050307 treated
Feliciano as a de facto officer with regard to his acts as GM of LMWD; and
declared him to be a usurper of or an intruder to the said position beginning 6
February 2001, and thus ordered him to vacate the same.

Considering that entry of judgment was already made in G.R. No. 172141 as
of 14 November 2006, there is therefore no more obstacle to the appointment by
the LMWD Board of Directors of Villasin as the new GM of LMWD.

Feliciano imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for
allegedly failing to afford him due process, since his Petition for Quo
Warranto was dismissed based on its face and without having been heard. In
granting Villasin’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Quo Warranto, the RTC
ratiocinated:

Inferred, in the year 1999, petitioner herein already knew that his
appointment as General Manager of LMWD was placed in doubt and
declared ineffective. So his acts as such since then were void.
Petitioner, in fact was ordered by the Civil Service Commission to vacate
the position of LMWD General Manager since he assumed the position
without completed appointment (General Manager, Philippine Ports
Authority, et al. vs. Julieta Monserat, 381 SCRA 200.)

x x x As of the moment, without the CSC approved appointment,

he is, the law points, a de facto officer. He held the position of General
Manager of LMWD without the completed appointment. Over this, but
for the creed petitioner avows, the court believes that while the
 necessary intent is there, the sporting idea of fair play, is not sufficient
for the petition to succeed. Petitioner surely is a de facto officer.[37]

The Court emphasizes that an action for Quo Warranto may be dismissed at
any stage when it becomes apparent that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
disputed pubic office, position or franchise.[38] Hence, the RTC is not compelled to
still proceed with the trial when it is already apparent on the face of the Petition
for Quo Warranto that it is insufficient. The RTC may already dismiss said petition
at this point.

Feliciano presents as an alternative argument the fact that as GM of

LMWD, he is not part of the personnel of the water district, arguing that his
appointment does not need CSC attestation. He explains that:

[E]ven granting that the CSC can declare him a de facto officer and
usurper, the same has already prescribed, since as early as September
8, 2000 in its Resolution No. 002107 or four (4) years before its
Resolution No. 050307, it has already known about petitioner being
a de facto officer, that being the GM of LMWD, he is not part of the
personnel of LMWD, thus, his appointment is not subject to attestation
under CSC Resolution No. 41, S. 1993 x x x.[39]

We find his argument untenable.

 To determine whether personnel of the LMWD, particularly the GM, are
subject to CSC Rules and Regulations, we must delve into the pertinent laws
affecting the management and policy-making functions of the LMWD.

The provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198 read:

Chapter VI
Officers and Employees

Section 23. Additional Officers. - At the first meeting of the board, or as

soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote,
a general manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall define their duties and
fix their compensation. Said officers shall service at the pleasure of the board.

xxxx

Section 25. Exemption from Civil Service. - The district and its
employees, being engaged in a proprietary function, are hereby exempt from the
provisions of the Civil Service Law. x x x.

On 15 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 768 amended Section 23 of

Presidential Decree No. 198 to read:

SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the board, or as
soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a
general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer
shall serve at the pleasure of the board.

On 11 June 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1479[40] amended Presidential

Decree No. 198, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 768, removing Section 25
of the latter, which had exempted the district and its employees from the coverage
of the Civil Service. Thus, with such amendment, officers and employees of water
districts were put under the mantle of Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
 On 2 April 2004, Republic Act No. 9286 further amended Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 198, to read:

Sec. 23. The General Manager. – At the first meeting of the Board, or as
soon thereafter as practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a
general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said
officer shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due
process.

From the foregoing, as early as the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1479
on 11 June 1978, it is clear that the LMWD GM is covered by Civil Service Rules
and Regulations.

As we have held in Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton,[41] Davao City Water

District v. Civil Service Commission,[42] and Hagonoy Water District v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[43] water districts are government
instrumentalities[44] whose officers and employees belong to the civil service.
These rulings are in consonance with the provisions of Article IX-B, Section 2 of
the Constitution, whose provisions read:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,

and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.

The position of General Manager being unequivocally part of the personnel

of the water district whose officers and employees are covered under the civil
service, an appointment thereto requires the attestation of the CSC for it to be
valid.

Moreover, this Court cannot ignore the fact that petitioner Feliciano
violated the rule on forum shopping[45] in his quest for a favorable opinion on his
cause of action.
 Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely by, some other court.[46]

The following elements of forum shopping have been established:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the

same interests in both actions;

(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same set of facts; and

(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[47]

The prohibition on forum shopping is embodied in Rule 7 of the Rules of

Court, which provides, viz:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or

principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
 same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be

curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

What is pivotal to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or

not is the vexation caused to courts and the parties-litigants by a party who asks
appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same or related
causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different
courts upon the same issues.[48]

Feliciano has evidently trifled with the courts and abused their processes in
improperly instituting several cases and filing multiple petitions, cases or
proceedings, and splitting causes of action – all of which focused on the legality of
his termination as LMWD GM. While a party may avail himself of the remedies
prescribed by the Rules of Court for the myriad reliefs from the court, such party
is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his pleasure or caprice.

It is pertinent to note that at the time Feliciano filed G.R. No. 174929 on 14
October 2006, the legality of his termination as LMWD GM has, in fact, been
resolved with finality with the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 172141. To recall,
this Court En Banc denied G.R. No. 172141 and affirmed CA-G.R. SP No. 00489
which upheld CSC Resolution No. 050307. With the denial of G.R. No. 172141, the
validity of CSC Resolution No. 050307 declaring Feliciano to be a de facto officer
from 8 June 1999 to 6 February 2001, and a mere usurper thereafter, has been
laid to rest.

Feliciano, however, insisted on pursuing this petition for certiorari, being

fully aware of the finality of G.R. No. 172141 and the consequences resulting
therefrom.

This Court reiterates the raison d’etre for the proscription against forum
shopping. The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping
is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory
decisions – unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several fora until a favorable
result is reached.[49]

IN ALL, we find that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing Feliciano’s Petition for Quo Warranto.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition

for Certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Orders dated 8 July 2006 and 8 September
2006 issued by Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court in Tacloban, Leyte, in Civil
Case No. 2006-03-29, dismissing petitioner Ranulfo C. Feliciano’s Petition for Quo
Warranto, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Feliciano and his counsel are hereby REPRIMANDED for FORUM SHOPPING,
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.