G.R. No.
118151 August 22, 1996 especially ordered by private respondent for its exclusive use, with
WASHINGTON DISTILLERS, INC., MANUEL CO KEHYENG,
CHONGKING KEHYENG, QUIRINO KEHYENG, JASMIN
KEHYENG and PURITA KEHYENG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS,
INC., respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision,1 promulgated on June 27, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32752, reversing the order dated August 31, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XXVIII, Manila,2 which quashed the search warrant issued
against petitioners, and the appellate court's resolution dated December 1, 1994 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Washington Distillers, Inc., which is owned and operated
by petitioners Manuel Co Chongking, Quirino, Jasmin and Purita,
all surnamed Kehyeng, is a domestic corporation with principal
office and business address at Sta. Lucia, San Fernando,
Pampanga. It is engaged in the manufacture of liquor products,
under the labels Gin Seven, Washington Gin 65, Luzon and
Anisado, using as containers 350cc round white flint bottles with
blown-in marks of La Tondeña, Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel.
On the basis of Search Warrant No. 93-64 issued by Hen. Rosalio
G. de la Rosa, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation seized on May 26-27, 1993 from the premises of
petitioners in San Fernando, Pampanga, 314,289 pieces of 350cc
round white flint bottles, for alleged violation of Republic Act No.
623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700.3 The bottles were
seized upon complaint of private respondent La Tondeña
Distillers, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacture and sale of wines and liquors. Among private
respondent's products is a gin popularly known as Ginebra San
Miguel, which is bottled and sold in 350cc round white flint bottles
blown-in marks La Tondeña, Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel. The
trademarks are registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademark
and Technology Transfer under the provisions of Republic Act No.
623. 4
In a letter dated May 20, 1993 to the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, private respondent requested assistance
in prosecuting alleged illegal users, buyers, sellers or traffickers of
its registered bottles.5 In response to private respondent's request,
NBI agents Florencio Corpuz and Dante Jacinto, accompanied by
Atty. Jaime de la Cruz, private respondent's legal counsel,
conducted surveillance operations at the premises of petitioner
Washington Distillers in Sta. Lucia, San Fernando, Pampanga. In
his affidavit given in support of the application for a search
warrant, Atty. De la Cruz stated that by pretending to be dealers in
second hand bottles, he and the NBI agents were able to enter the
warehouse of Washington Distillers and discovered that petitioner
Washington Distillers had been buying the empty bottles from junk
dealers at a price higher than that offered by private respondent
for retrieving its bottles.6 NBI Agent Florencio Corpuz, on the other
hand, said in his affidavit that inside the warehouse they saw
empty bottles, estimated to be in the thousands, placed in sacks
and cartons, which they examined and found to be La Tondeña's
registered 350cc round white flint bottles.7 Based on these
affidavits, Atty. Dante C. Jacinto, Senior Agent of the NBI, filed
with Branch XXVIII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila an
application for a warrant to search the premises of Washington
Distillers and to seize empty and filled 350cc round white flint
bottles with blown-in marks of Ginebra San Miguel and La
Tondeña, Inc.
On May 25, 1993, Executive Judge Rosalio G. de la Rosa issued
a search warrant, pursuant to which agents of the NBI seized from
the premises of petitioners 314,289 pieces of 350cc round white
flint bottles,8 of which 3,708 were filled and 310,581 were
empty.9 The seized bottles were deposited in the warehouse of
private respondent La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. in Velasquez,
Tondo, Manila on the ground that there was no space for storage
in the court or in the NBI compound. 10
On June 9, 1993, petitioners filed a motion to quash the search
warrant on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had
no jurisdiction to issue a search warrant to be executed in San
Fernando, Pampanga. In addition, they claimed that there was no
probable cause for issuing the search warrant because R.A. No.
623 does not cover registered bottles of liquor manufacturers and
that even assuming that it does, under §5 of the law, no action
could be instituted against petitioners because the bottles had
lawfully been sold to
them. 11 Petitioners charged that the private respondent was guilty
of forum-shopping because twice it had applied for a search
warrant over the same subject to the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Indeed, it appears that the first search
warrant (Search Warrant No. 6) was issued on August 19, 1991,
and the second (Search Warrant No. 11) was issued on December
2, 1992 but it was later quashed for lack of probable cause.
On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the order of the trial court
was set aside. 12
On August 31, 1993, Hon. Antonio L. Descallar, who had been
designated assisting judge of Branch XXVIII, granted petitioners'
motion to quash. He found private respondent guilty of forum-
shopping and ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no
authority to issue a search warrant effective outside its territorial
jurisdiction. 13 He, therefore, directed the private respondent La
Tondeña to return the bottles to petitioners within 48 hours from
receipt of his order.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion
to suspend the execution of the order for the return of the bottles.
Both motions were denied by the court in its order dated
November 26, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration and
the motion to suspend the implementation of the
order of execution are hereby DENIED. The
Branch Deputy Sheriff of this Court is hereby
directed to serve a copy of this order upon counsel
for La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. (LTDI) and to
immediately carry out the order of August 31, 1993
for the return of 314,298 filled and unfilled bottles
seized from the respondents pursuant to the invalid
Search Warrant No. 93-64.
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appaels, contending that Assisting Judge Antonio Descallar had
no jurisdiction to quash a search warrant issued by another judge
because a motion to quash should be filed with the same court
which issued the search warrant, especially so in this case
because Judge De la Rosa allegedly issued Search Warrant No.
93-64 in his capacity as executive judge.
On June 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals set aside the orders of the
Regional Trial Court and held that, following the ruling of this Court
in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 14 a search warrant may be
enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. In addition, it was held that, as assisting judge,
the Hon. Descallar did not have authority to quash the search
warrant issued by Judge De la Rosa in his capacity as executive
judge. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied on June 1, 1994. Hence this appeal.
Petitioners contend that:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO
AUTHORITY OR CAPACITY TO FILE THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT
OF APPEALS BECAUSE IT IS NOT A PARTY TO
THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCEEDINGS,
SEARCH WARRANT 93-64 HAVING BEEN
ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES UPON THE APPLICATION OF THE
NBI. THEREFORE, THE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION
OUTRIGHT.
 B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
DECIDED THE PETITION ON AN ISSUE NO
LONGER DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES. THE
FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT JUDGE
DE LA ROSA HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A
SEARCH WARRANT OUTSIDE OF HIS COURT'S
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF
FORUM-SHOPPING SHOULD, THEREFORE, NO
LONGER BE DISTURBED IN
THE CERTIORARI PROCEEDING.
C. THE ONLY REMAINING POINT OF
CONTENTION IN THIS CASE IS JUDGE
DESCALLAR'S AUTHORITY AS ASSISTING
JUDGE TO QUASH THE WARRANT ISSUED BY
JUDGE DE LA ROSA.
First. Petitioners argue that private respondent had no personality
to bring the action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals because
the proceedings for a search warrant were brought by the NBI in
behalf of the People and private respondent La Tondeña Distillers,
Inc. cannot represent the People. As thus put, the contention
disregards rulings of this Court in several cases, 15 recognizing the
right of parties at whose instance search warrants are applied for
to question orders quashing the search warrants. However, there
is a sense in which petitioners' contention is correct. In those
cases in which private parties were allowed to bring suits, the
parties were the complainants or offended parties in pending
criminal prosecutions 16 or in cases where at least preparatory
steps had been taken to commence criminal prosecution 17 and
the search warrant was issued in those cases either as an incident
of the pending action or in anticipation thereof. But, in the case at
bar, there has been not even an attempt to prosecute for violation
of R.A. No. 623, pursuant to which the application for search
warrant was ostensibly made. The NBI, which applied for the
search warrant in 1993, did not file any case against petitioners.
When petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrant, the
NBI did not oppose the motion. Only private respondent La
Tondeña did.
Indeed, what is noticeable about this case is that possession of
the bottles was transferred to private respondent through the
expediency of a search warrant, so that instead of merely being an
ancillary writ issued either as an incident of criminal proceedings
or in anticipation of such proceedings, the proceedings for a
search warrant have become, for all intents and purposes, the
main proceedings by which private respondent have been able to
obtain possession of what it claims to be its property. Unlike in an
ordinary action, however, there was neither complaint by which
petitioners could have been informed of the charge against them
nor answer by which they could have been heard in their defense,
before property claimed by them was taken from them and given
to private respondent.
Contrary to the requirement of Rule 126, §11 that property seized
by virtue of a search warrant must be deposited in custodia legis,
the NBI delivered the bottles to the private respondent La
Tondeña. It is claimed that this was done because there was no
place for storage either at the NBI compound or in the premises of
the RTC. This is not a good excuse. Someplace could have been
found or rented for the purpose, but the delivery of the bottles to
private respondent cannot be made without giving the impression
that private respondent has been given possession of bottles
claimed by petitioners to have been lawfully acquired by them.
Indeed, it would seem that private respondent La Tondeña later
brought the certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals mainly
in order to keep the bottles in its possession and not really as legal
custodian, in anticipation of a criminal proceeding. Private
respondent had been frustrated not only in applying for a search
warrant to the RTC at San Fernando, Pampanga. As private
respondent La Tondeña admitted in its opposition to petitioners'
motion to quash:
True, that LTDI (La Tondeña Distillers, Inc.) had
been previously granted by the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga search
 warrants. However, to apply for a search warrant in
respondents' home base for the third time would be
an act in futility. 18
Private respondent filed a replevin case against petitioners
in 1987, but again it lost, and it had to bring an appeal
which, up to the time it applied for a search warrant to the
Manila RTC, was still pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 36971). 19
Private respondent's desire to maintain the search warrant would
be understandable if there was a criminal action. But there was
none. To make matters worse, when the deputy sheriff, Benjamin
Garrido, tried to recover the seized bottles from La Tondeña's
warehouse where they had been deposited, in view of the quashal
of the search warrant, the bottles could not be found. 20
Private respondent alleges:
12. While it is true that search warrants is (sic) in
the name of the "People of the Philippines,"
Respondent LTDI owns the subject property in
Search Warrant No. 93-64, pursuant to RA 623, as
amended by RA 5700. A reading of the law will
reveal that unauthorized use by Petitioners of LTDI
bottles with marks "Ginebra San Miguel" and "La
Tondeña, Inc." is illegal. Hence, having
been deprived of its property, Respondent LTDI,
with the assistance of the agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation applied for a search
warrant, in order to recover its own bottles, only to
find out later that the said search warrant was
quashed without giving LTDI the opportunity to
submit evidence in support of its opposition to
quash search warrant. (Emphasis added) 21
But private respondent's bare claim of ownership does not
entitle it to an award of the possession of the seized
bottles through the expediency of search warrant
proceedings. The title to and possession of the bottles are
very much disputed, petitioners having asserted ownership
of the same property by lawful acquisition for value, 22 in
addition invoking §5 of R.A. No. 623 as a defense. These
considerations preclude private respondent's possession
of the property under the search warrant.
Indeed in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 23 we held, through then Justice Narvasa, that if no
criminal case is instituted after the seizure made pursuant to a
search warrant, the property seized should be delivered "to its
rightful owner, or at least to the person from whom it had been
seized." The property "could not be permitted to stay in a perpetual
state of custodia legis. 24 To sustain the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case would be to keep the seized bottles
in a "perpetual state of custodia legis," if not to give their custody
to private respondent for an indefinite period of time, the effect of
which would be the summary adjudication of the possession of the
bottles in favor of private respondent without the benefit of a
proper action for that purpose. This certainly cannot be
countenanced under any regime.
A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, much less a
civil action. 25 It is a special criminal process, the order of issuance
of which cannot and does not adjudicate the permanent status or
character of the seized
property. 26 It cannot therefore be resorted to, as was done here by
private respondent, as a means of acquiring property or of settling
a dispute over the same. The proper remedy is for private
respondent or for the Government itself, assuming the role of a
stakeholder, to bring the appropriate action. 27
Second. Petitioners contend that, contrary to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals, Judge Descallar had authority to quash the
search warrant previously issued by Judge De la Rosa. This
contention is well taken. It is settled that a judge may revoke the
orders of another judge in a litigation subsequently assigned to
him. In this case, the fact that Judge De la Rosa was the executive
judge is not material, because jurisdiction is vested in the court,
not in him qua executive judge. 28 Applications for search warrant
are made to the executive judge only for administrative
purposes. 29 Judge Descallar, as assisting judge, was competent to
resolve the motion seeking to quash the search warrant.
Nor is there basis for private respondent's claim that Judge
Descallar did not conduct a personal examination of complainant
before he issued his order. The requirement of personal
examination refers to the determination of probable cause for
purposes of issuing a search warrant, 30 not to resolve a motion to
quash such warrant.
Third. The Court of Appeals, citing the ruling in Malaloan
v. Court* of Appeals, 31 held that the RTC of Manila had authority to
issue a warrant effective outside its territorial jurisdiction. This
issue was not raised by the private respondent in their petition
for certiorari. Although this is a question about jurisdiction it is not
a matter which could be raised in a certiorari proceeding. The RTC
may have erred in holding that the warrant issued by Judge De la
Rosa could not be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTC of Manila but this is not a jurisdictional error correctible
by certiorari. The fact is that Judge Descallar did not act without
jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. It cannot be said that, in ruling that the search warrant
could not be enforced in San Fernando, Pampanga, Judge
Descallar acted with grave abuse of discretion by disregarding a
decision of this Court. For Judge Descallar issued his order on
August 31, 1993, whereas our decision in Malaloan came down
only on May 6, 1994. What is more, as this Court said, the
question was ''primae impressionis." In fact there may be a serious
problem of retroactivity in applying the new ruling in this
case. 32 But for now it is enough to say that the error sought to be
corrected by certiorari by private respondent La Tondeña was not
an error of jurisdiction but, if at all, only an error of judgment.
Fourth. Petitioners finally contend that Judge Descallar's order
quashing the search warrant should have been upheld because
the warrant was obtained by forum-shopping. Judge Descallar
based his order not only on the theory that a search warrant
cannot be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court
which issued it but also upon his finding that private respondent
was guilty of forum-shopping. "There is forum-shopping whenever
as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. 33 This is exactly what private respondent did in seeking
the issuance of a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial
Court, after failing to obtain warrants from the Pampanga courts. It
is noteworthy that the ruling of Judge Descallar on this point was
not assailed in the certiorari proceeding before the Court of
Appeals. Hence, even though his ruling on the territorial reach of
the warrant issued by Judge De la Rosa was erroneous in light of
the subsequent ruling in Malaloan, the Court of Appeals should
have sustained Judge Descallar's order quashing the warrant on
the ground that private respondent La Tondeña was guilty of
forum-shopping.
It cannot be contended that the rule against forum-shopping
applies only to actions, but not to a search warrant because the
latter is simply "a process" incidental to a criminal action. Circular
No. 28-91 requires parties to certify under oath that they have not
"theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency" and that to the best of their
knowledge "no such action or proceeding is pending" in said
courts or agencies.
Indeed, the policy against multiple court proceedings clearly
applies to applications for search warrants. If an application for
search warrant can be filed even where there are other
applications pending or denied in other courts, the situation would
become intolerable. Our ruling in Malaloan recognized this
problem and implied that forum-shopping is prohibited even in
search warrant proceedings. 34 Therefore, although Judge
Descallar's ruling limiting the search warrant issued by the Manila
court to its territorial jurisdiction is erroneous, it should
nevertheless have been sustained on the ground of forum-
shopping.
To summarize, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed because:

(1) The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as
a result of the failure of the NBI to commence criminal prosecution
and the bottles seized from them should be returned to petitioners
in the absence of any civil action for their recovery.

(2) Respondent Judge Descallar, as assisting judge of Branch

XXVIII of the RTC of Manila, had authority to quash the search
warrant issued by the regular judge, Hon. De la Rosa.

(3) Although respondent Judge Descallar's ruling that the second

warrant could not be enforced in San Fernando, Pampanga is
erroneous in view of our later ruling in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals, his ruling should have been sustained on the other
ground on which it is based, i.e., violation by private respondent La
Tondeña of the rule against forum-shopping in obtaining the
search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated June 27, 1994 and the

resolution dated December 1, 1994 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the orders dated August 31,
1993 and November 26, 1993 of Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial
Court, Manila are hereby REINSTATED.
III.2 Savage v Typin
FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued
by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of
wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in
Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.
The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza,
president and general manager of Mendco Development
Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that Savage’s products are the
object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable
under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Savage
contends however, that there was no existence of offense leading to
the issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure of its products.
The court is are prevented from applying these principles, along with
the new provisions on Unfair Competition found in the IPR Code, to
the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent
infringement as defined by the same Code
Although the case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the
enactment of the IPR Code, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such
application would be beneficial to the accused. Since the IPR Code
effectively obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability attaching
to the acts alleged, then RPC provisions must be applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not unfair competition involving design patents

are punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: To provide a clear view, the Intellectual Property Code took

effect on January 1, 1998. The repealing clause of the IPC provides
that Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
Presidential Decree No. 49, are hereby repealed The issue involving
the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design
patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been
rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article. Hence, the
search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible
violation of the IPR Code.

There is no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving

design patents in the controlling provisions on Unfair Competition of
the RPC. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the
enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189
of the Revised Penal Code.
III.3 Ogayon v People
FACTS:
On October 2, 2003 Police Chief Inspector Ferrera, together with the
other police officers proceeded to Ogayon’s house to enforce Search
Warrant No. AEK29-2003. The warrant was for the seizure of shabu
and drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the house.
Barangay Tanod Lagana and Kagawad Tampocao assisted the police
team in conducting the search.
Upon reaching Ogayon’s house, the police team noticed several
persons inside a nipa hut located nearby. Suspecting that a pot
session was about to be held, the police team restrained 2 of the 5
persons and immediately proceeded to Ogayon’s house.
After introducing themselves as police officers, SPO4 Caritos
informed Ogayon that they had a warrant to search his place. Some
members of the police team went to the comfort room away from
Ogayon’s house. When they searched the area, they found an object
that fell from the roof. Upon SPO4 Caritos’ inspection, the paper
contained 2small, heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets suspected
to contain shabu. The search of the comfort room also uncovered 4
disposable lighters, 1 knife, used aluminum foil, 1 roll of aluminum
foil, and a "Dorco" blade. The police officers who searched Ogayon’s
house found live ammunition for an M-16 rifle. After conducting the
search, the police team prepared a Receipt of Property Seized.
The receipt was signed by the seizing officers, representatives from
the DOJ and the media, and 2 barangay officials who were present
during the entire operation. The police team arrested Ogayon and
the 2 other persons who had earlier been restrained. The seized
items were brought for laboratory examination. In his Chemistry
Report,Police Superintendent Arroyo reported that the 2 plastic
sachets seized from Ogayon’s place tested positive for the presence
of or shabu.
On the other hand, Ogayon disavowed any knowledge of the
prohibited drugs andclaimed that he saw the seized items for the
first time only when they were beinginventoried. Ogayon asserted
that the police team did not present any search warrantbefore
conducting the search, and it was only during trial that he saw a copy
of thewarrant. He recounted that the police officers, splitting into
two groups, conducted asimultaneous search of his house and the
comfort room located nearby. He noticedthat SPO4 Caritos, who was
part of the group that searched the comfort room, cameout and
went to the Barangay Hall. Shortly after, SPO4 Caritos
returned,accompanied by Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again went
inside the comfort room, leaving Tanod Lagana waiting outside. SPO4
Caritos thereafter came out from the comfort room and ran towards
Ogayon’s house while shouting "positive, positive."
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there was a personal examination by the judge of
the applicant and his witnesses.2. Whether or not the search warrant
was valid.3. Whether or not Ogayon made a valid waiver of his
constitutional right againstunreasonable searches and seizures.
HELD:
1. NO. No personal examination was made by the judge.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the
fundamentalconstitutional rights provided for under Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. Under such, the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant largely depends on the finding of
the judge conducting the examination. To substantiate a finding of
probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that:

Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record.
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statement together with the affidavits submitted.
Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is accorded great deference, so long as
there was substantial basis for that determination. "Substantial basis
means that the questions of the judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
manto believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects
in connection with theoffense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched."
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find
nothing in the records of this case indicating that the issuing judge
personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses.
The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination was
already admitted; the application for the search warrant and the
affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself, could not be
found in the records. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was not the one
who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not
know who applied for it.
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer
that the requisite examination was made, and from which the factual
basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional
requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void.
2. NO. The search warrant is not valid.
Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant
was issued after the requisite examination of the complainant and
his witnesses was made, the Court declares Search Warrant No. AEK
29-2003 a nullity.
3. NO. Ogayon did not validly waive his constitutional right.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to
make a timely objection against the search warrant’s validity before
the trial court. We find the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental
right distressing. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify
substantial rights; their non-compliance should therefore not serve
to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of the
constitutional requirements.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional
right was his failure to make a timely motion during the trial to quash
the warrant. This failure alone is not a sufficient indication that
Ogayon clearly and intelligently made a waiver. At this point, we note
the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1,
2000). The provision was "intended to resolve what is perceived as
conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search
warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue thereof." It was
certainly not intended to preclude belated objections against the
search warrant’s validity, especially if the grounds therefor are not
immediately apparent.
We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against search
warrants during trial is a procedural rule established by
jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance with this requirement
cannot in any way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a
search warrant should be issued upon a finding of probable cause.
Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection cannot serve to cure the
inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the validity of the void
warrant would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution.

In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the
search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void.

Under the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of a

person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. With the
inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon's home, there is no
more evidence to support his conviction.
III.4 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section
16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, under an Information1 whose accusatory
portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY
EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809)
GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding prescription or license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled
to Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic
Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc, and SPO4
Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its
witness and had prosecution witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to
be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the
witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February
1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound
for Saigon, Vietnam.2 When she passed through the metal
detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently,
Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action
Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying "Excuse me ma’am,
can I search you?"3 Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under
the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and
noticed that the package contained what felt like rice
granules.4 When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar
packages in front of SUSAN’s genital area and thighs. She asked
SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said:
"Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter to
SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.5
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner
Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough
physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies’ room,
Mylene touched something in front of SUSAN’s sex organ. She
directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN
obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually
wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN
voluntarily handed to them.6 The first was taken from SUSAN’s
abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital area; and
the third, from her right thigh.7 Mylene turned over the packages to
SPO4 De los Reyes.8 The latter forthwith informed his superior
officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident.
Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the
customs examination table, opened the same and found that they
contained white crystalline substances9 which, when submitted for
laboratory examination, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.10
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First
Regional Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever
conducted on SUSAN.11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the
following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100
grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994;
(3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control
number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles.12 He said that he
informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she
did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt.13 Yet he told
her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt.14
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely
reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest and search of
SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her
person.15
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court
rendered a decision16 finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial,17 alleging therein that the trial judge erred in (1) giving weight
to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena because it was not presented in court nor marked or
admitted, and is therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of police
officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police
officer; (3) making statements which gave the impression that the
burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and (4) deliberately
ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured.
SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure
without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in
plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of
the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G.
Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial.18
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve
appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well as
the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued an order19 on
26 November 2001 denying the motions. According to the trial
judge (1) he explained to SUSAN’s counsel the effects of the filing
of a motion for reconsideration, but the latter chose to magnify the
judge’s statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSAN’s
conviction was not based on the medical report which was not
presented in court; (3) there was no violation of SUSAN’s
constitutional rights because she was never interrogated during
her detention without counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from
her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and were
therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably
appealed to us, imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1)
in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the
alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was
caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went
beyond the limits of the "Terry search" doctrine; (4) in not ruling
that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5)
in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in
evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in
justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the
medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in
applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.20
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the
strip search conducted on her in the ladies’ room was
constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to
an arrest." The arrest could not be said to have been made
before the search because at the time of the strip search,
the arresting officers could not have known what was
inside the plastic containers hidden on her body, which
were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point
then, they could not have determined whether SUSAN was
actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore
nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to
say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following
the doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio,21 such stop and
frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her
outer garments in order to determine whether she was
armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security
of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the
moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her abdominal
area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained
her, and decided to submit her to a strip search in the
ladies’ room, she was under custodial investigation without
counsel, which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution.
 For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the
propriety of the admission of the medical report executed
by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was
neither testified on nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v.
Johnson22 because of its sweeping statement allowing
searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports
in view of the gravity of the safety interests involved. She
stresses that the pertinent case should have been Katz v.
United States,23 which upholds the Fourth Amendment of
the United States of America that "protects people and not
places."
In its Appellant’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
declares that SUSAN was found flagrante delicto in possession of
a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case
falls squarely within the exception, being a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily
submitted herself to the search and seizure when she allowed
herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further
inspection by airport security personnel. It likewise maintains that
the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from SUSAN during
the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that SUSAN’s conviction was
not solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact
that she was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated
drug without being authorized by law. Consequently, it supports
SUSAN’s conviction but recommends the reduction of the fine
from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSAN’s conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent
seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN,
were violative of her constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
…
Sec. 3….
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any
particular case is a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal
effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. 24
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence
are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest.25
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful
arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the
search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental
to a lawful arrest. SUSAN’s arrest did not precede the
search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN
was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the
latter felt a bulge on SUSAN’s abdomen. The strip search
that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what
 were the packages concealed on SUSAN’s body. If ever at
the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such
restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense."lawphi 1.ñet
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in
the ladies’ room, the airport security personnel had no
knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body;
hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being
committed. It was only after the strip search upon the
discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
substances inside the packages, which they believed to be
shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot,
therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful
arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made; the process cannot be reversed.26
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is
not confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry search"
doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to
a case where a police officer approaches a person who is
acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with
a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such person to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to
routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or
air carrier concerned shall contain among others the
following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his
hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and
seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the
aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by
SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-
quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers"
located at the final security checkpoint at the departure
lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search,
unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons.
Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited
materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN
consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of
packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to
refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the
packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled
by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false
statement that the packages contained only money,
aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was
hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No.
6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or
substances. To limit the action of the airport security
personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and
thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society."28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies’
room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant
case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar
facts and issues, finds application to the present case.
That case involves accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who
was also a departing passenger bound for the United
States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was
then the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing
passengers, employees and crew to check for weapons,
bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and
explosives. When Olivia frisked Leila, the former felt
something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Leila explained that she needed to wear two panty
girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result
of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation,
Olivia reported the matter to her superior, who then
directed her to take Leila to the nearest women’s room for
inspection. In the comfort room, Leila was asked "to bring
out the thing under her girdle." She acceded and brought
out three plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This
Court ruled that the packs of "methamphetamine
hydrochloride" seized during the routine frisk at the airport
was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures and are therefore admissible in evidence
against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified, since it was effected
upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person
flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should
these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSAN’s reliance on Katz v. U.S.29 is misplaced. The facts
and circumstances of that case are entirely different from
the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California of transmitting wagering information by
telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted,
over the accused’s objection, to introduce evidence of
accused’s end of telephone conversations, which was
overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On
certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States of America reversed the decision, ruling that
antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in
the instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the
kind of electronic surveillance involved. It ruled that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
house or office, is not a subject the Fourth Amendment
protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.
The maxim – stare decisis et non quieta movere – invokes
adherence to precedents and mandates not to unsettle
things which are established. When the court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the
same.30 There being a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz
v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case
the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was
lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
provides:
 SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-
quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted
in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing
white crystalline substances, which upon examination
yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such
warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the
airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-
bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her
subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in
her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under
custodial investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section
12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when
a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody
interrogation."31 Custodial investigation refers to the
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way."32 This
presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a
crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information
or a confession from him.33 And the right to counsel
attaches upon the start of such investigation.34 The
objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights.35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the
defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation
was conducted after SUSAN’s arrest. She affixed her
signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but
before she did so, she was told that she had the option to
sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the
packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove
its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her
during her detention and used in evidence against
her.36 Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel
has no leg to stand on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the
admission of the medical report on the physical and medical
examination conducted upon appellant’s request, which contained
the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and
cooperative. She related that she was an illegitimate daughter,
married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, "I gamble like an
addict. I gambled since I was young and I lost control of myself
when I played cards. When I lost control, I want my money back. I
owe other people lots of money. I lost all the cash of my husband.
This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the money." She
denied having any morbid thoughts and perceptual disturbances.
(Emphasis supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned
document was erroneous because it was not properly identified.
Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellant’s
conviction will stand, as the court’s finding of guilt was not based
on that document.
VII. SUSAN’s conviction and the penalty imposed on her are
correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure
conducted in this case to be valid, we do not hesitate to
rule that that the three packages of shabu recovered from
SUSAN are admissible in evidence against her. Supported
by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended,
provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or
use any regulated drug without the corresponding license
or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20
hereof.
… provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.37
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.--
The penalties for offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved
[are] in any of the following quantities
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride….
There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the
limits established by law. For possession of regulated
drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000
to P10 million. In view of the net weight of
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession
of SUSAN, the trial court’s imposition of fine in the amount
of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned
to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorizes the confiscation of the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN’s passport, plane tickets,
and girdles exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-
0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act
of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED.
The appellant’s passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby
ordered to be returned to her.
 III.5 Burgos v Chief of Staff bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he
FACTS: has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said news publications and other documents which were used and are all
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants issued by respondent cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano. of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis for the issuance
Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because: of a search warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent judge to
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the have done so.
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery,
receptacles, instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they
conducted surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient
basis for the finding of a probable cause.
Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only
impugned the search warrant six months later.

ISSUE:

WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at
III.6 G.R. No. 168773 October 27, 2006
ELIZA ABUAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726
and Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 41, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D,
convicting Eliza T. Abuan of violating Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Antecedents
A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Calasiao, Pangasinan charging Abuan with violating R.A. No.
6425, as amended. On May 8, 1998, she filed a motion to quash
the criminal complaint, praying that pending the resolution of her
motion, she be allowed to post bail without waiving her right to
question her arrest and assail Search Warrant No. 98-62.4 The
public prosecutor conformed to the motion. Thus, the motion was
granted and bail was fixed at P60,000.00.5
The MTC found probable cause against Abuan for violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
recommended the filing of an Information against her. It ordered
the elevation of the records to the RTC for further proceedings.
On November 12, 1998, an Amended Information was filed in the
RTC of Dagupan City, charging Abuan with violating Section 16,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The inculpatory portion of
the Information reads:
That on or about 8:45 o’clock in the morning of May 6,
1998 at Brgy, Lasip, [M]unicipality of Calasiao, [P]rovince
of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has
in her possession, custody and control of the following to
wit:
Fifty seven (57) small heat-sealed plastic sachets of
met[h]aphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
weighing 5.67 grams.
one (1) roll aluminum foil and assorted plastic (luminous)
sachets.
without authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Art. III, Section 16 of R.A. 6425, as
amended.6
During the arraignment on November 12, 1998, the accused,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.7 During the
pre-trial on November 19, 1998, Abuan rejected the prosecution’s
proposal for her to admit the validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62,
and that, in the enforcement thereof, 57 sachets of shabu were
found in her house and later confiscated by the policemen.8 She
maintained that the warrant was invalid and that any material
allegedly confiscated from her house was inadmissible in
evidence.
The court set the initial presentation of evidence by the
prosecution on December 3, 1998. However, on said date,
accused filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, alleging that there
was no probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-
62; the applicant, Cesar Ramos, had no personal knowledge of his
claim that she had in her possession methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and other drug paraphernalia; Marissa
Gorospe was a fictitious person, and her testimony was fabricated
to convince the Executive Judge to make a finding of probable
cause required for the issuance of a search warrant; and the
Executive Judge failed to ask searching questions and elicit from
"Gorospe" the particularity of the alleged paraphernalia in Abuan’s
possession. Abuan asserted that since the search warrant is void,
whatever evidence was discovered as a result of the search
conducted based on the warrant was inadmissible in evidence.9
Instead of allowing the accused to present her evidence in support
of her motion, the court declared that any such evidence may be
adduced at the trial.10
The Case for the Prosecution
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 5, 1998, SPO2 Marcelino Gamboa
and SPO2 Beliguer de Vera of the Calasiao Police Station
received information from a confidential informant that Abuan was
conducting illegal drug activities in her house at Barangay Lasip,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Acting on the said information, Gamboa
and de Vera conducted surveillance-monitoring operations on her
residence, three times for more than an hour. They saw more or
less 20 people who were coming in and out of Abuan’s house.
According to the informant, these people were drug addicts,11and
Abuan was a known drug pusher.12 On the same day, the officers,
through SPO3 Cesar Ramos, applied for a warrant13 with
Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos of the RTC in Lingayen,
Pangasinan, to search the house of Abuan for violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing scale,
aluminum foil, and burner.
The application was docketed as Search Warrant No. 98-62. To
establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant,
Ramos presented their informant, Marissa Gorospe, who was
subjected to searching questions by the Executive Judge.14
Gorospe testified that she was a resident of Barangay Sapang,
Manaoag, Pangasinan. She knew Abuan because they were
employed as dealers of Avon Cosmetics. Abuan was a prominent
personality in Barangay Lasip.15 Her unnumbered house is a green
bungalow-type, cemented and decorated with ornamental plants
up front. She visited Abuan in her house at least three to four
times a week.16 She first came upon the drugs in Abuan’s house
when the latter invited her to a "jamming" and drinking session.
She refused because she had to go home to Barangay Sapang,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, a place of considerable distance from
Calasiao.17 Abuan then suggested that they use the shabu that
she kept inside her bedroom instead. Abuan kept a substantial
amount of shabu in her house and sold it.18 The informant further
narrated that several people, including teenagers, arrived in the
house of Abuan and bought the substance.19 During her visits, she
observed that Abuan placed shabu inside plastic bags. She also
saw weighing scales and paraphernalias used in sniffing shabu.
Being a mother herself, she did not want teenagers and her
children to become drug addicts.20 Gorospe identified and affirmed
the truth of the contents of her deposition.21
The Executive Judge found probable cause and issued Search
Warrant No. 98-62 which reads:
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
examining under oath thru searching questions on the
applicant, SPO3 Cesar A. Ramos, PNP, and his witnesses
that there is probable cause to believe that the respondent
is in possession without any authority to do so in violation
of R.A. 6425 of the following:
Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
Tooter
Weighing Scale
 Aluminum Foil
Burner
which she keeps and conceals in her house premises at
Brgy. Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which should be
seized and brought to the undersigned.
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to make an immediate
search at any time of the day or night and take possession
of the above-described properties and bring them to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
This Search Warrant shall be valid only for ten (10) days
from its issuance, thereafter, the same shall be void.22
On May 6, 1998, police operatives composed of Col. Fidel
Posadas, Major Froilan Perez, SPO2 Gamboa, SPO2 Madrid,
SPO2 de Vera, PO2 Tomelden, PO2 Rosario, PO3 Ubando, PO1
Moyano and PO3 Vallo went to Barangay Lasip to enforce the
search warrant. However, before proceeding to Abuan’s
residence, the policemen invited Barangay Captain Bernardo
Mangaliag and Kagawad Miguel Garcia of Barangay Lasip to
witness the search.
Upon arriving at the premises, Officers De Vera, Gamboa and
Garcia and Mangaliag entered the house; the rest of the
policemen remained outside. Mangaliag introduced the police
officers to Abuan who presented Search Warrant No. 98-62 to her.
Abuan read the warrant and permitted the officers to conduct the
search.23
De Vera, Mangaliag, Gamboa and Garcia entered the bedroom
and found 57 sachets of suspected shabu, one roll of aluminum
foil and assorted luminous plastic sachets in the drawer just beside
Abuan’s bed.24 The police officers confiscated all these and
brought them, along with Abuan, to the police station where an
inventory of the items was made. Mangaliag and Garcia affixed
their signatures on the inventory/receipt,25 but Abuan refused to
sign it.26
The police officers prepared a certification of orderly search which
Garcia and Mangaliag also signed. Abuan likewise refused to sign
the certification.27 The police officers requested the PNP Crime
Laboratory Unit of Lingayen, Pangasinan to conduct a laboratory
examination on the confiscated substance.28 According to the
laboratory examination conducted by P/Supt. Theresa Ann
Bugayong CID, Regional Chief Chemist, the 57 sachets of the
suspected shabu weighing 5.67 grams gave positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.29
After presenting its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence
Search Warrant No. 98-62, the Receipt of the Property Seized, the
Physical Science Report and the articles confiscated from Abuan’s
house.30 However, Abuan objected to the admission of the search
warrant and the articles confiscated based thereon on the ground
that the warrant was issued without probable cause.31 The court
admitted the documentary evidence of the prosecution subject to
the comment or objection interposed by accused and the eventual
determination of their probative weight.32
The Case for the Accused
Abuan testified that she was jobless in 1998. Her parents and her
sister Corazon Bernadette sent her money from Canada once or
twice a month to support her and her daughters. It was her father
who spent for the education of her daughters.33 She was married
to Crispin Abuan, a policeman, but they separated in 1997.34 She
did not know any person by the name of Marissa Gorospe. She
did not work for Avon Cosmetics nor used any of its products.35
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 6, 1998, she was with her two
daughters, 21-year old Ediliza Go and 9-year old Mae Liza
Abuan.36 They were still in bed inside their room. Suddenly, four
armed men barged into their house and declared a raid.37 About
eight to ten others were outside her house. She inquired if they
had a search warrant but she was not shown any.38 The men
searched her house for about 10 to 15 minutes and turned up with
nothing.39 Some of the men went out of the house and boarded a
jeepney. The men outside again went into the bedroom and came
out with "powder placed in a plastic."40 At this
instance, Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag was brought to
the scene and was shown the "powder substance" recovered from
her bedroom. She refused to sign the inventory and receipt of the
property seized and the certification of orderly search. However,
Mangaliag signed the same.41
She declared that the sachets/substances which the policemen
claimed to have found in her house were merely "planted" to
implicate her. The raid as well as the charge against her were
instigated by her brother Arsenio Tana, who was enraged when
she refused his demand to entrust the properties of the family to
the care of his son. It appears that Tana carried out his threat to
have her house raided since the policemen did come to her house
on May 6, 1998.42 Her brother was by the gate of her house at the
time of the raid.
Abuan also testified that, during the raid, she saw Tana talking to
the police officers who arrested her. Abuan also declared that the
money kept inside a box in her room amounting to P25,000.00
(US$1,100.00) given by her sister Corazon Bernardino had gone
missing after the raid.43 She did not file any charge for the loss of
her money because she was scared. She did not know who took
it.
Barangay Captain Robert Calachan of Barangay Sapang,
Manaoag, Pangasinan and Mercedes Carvajal, an employee of
Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan holding the position of team leader,
testified for accused.
Calachan declared that he was born in Barangay Sapang and
never left the place. He was familiar with the residents of the small
barangay.44 He issued a certification45 stating that "as per record of
this barangay, a certain Marissa Gorospe is not a resident of
this barangay." Before he signed the certification, he inquired from
the barangay members if they knew a Marissa Gorospe, and he
was told that no one by that name was a transient.46
Carvajal, for her part, testified that, based on the certification dated
November 12, 1998 of Dagupan City Avon Branch Manager Gigi
dela Rosa, "Marissa Gorospe is not a registered dealer of Avon
Dagupan Branch based on our records." She did not know any
Avon Cosmetics employee or dealer named Marissa Gorospe in
Pangasinan. She further testified that she had been a team
leader/dealer of Avon Cosmetics for 21 years already, and that
Abuan was not such a dealer/employee. On cross-examination,
she declared that she was a team leader of Avon Cosmetics
(Dagupan Branch), and thus had no participation in the
preparation of the certification of Gigi dela Rosa and was not in a
position to know if the certification was correct.
On March 28, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding
accused guilty of the charge. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a violation of Section 15 (sic), Article 6425, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR
(4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of PRISION
CORRECTIONAL.
The prohibited drug and paraphernalia seized from the
accused are hereby confiscated in favor of the government
and should be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
for disposition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.47
The trial court declared that the testimonies of police officers
Gamboa and de Vera should be accorded great weight and
credence as they testified positively regarding what transpired
during the raid. In contrast, the testimony of accused was self-
serving, negative and feeble. She failed to prove that it was her
brother who manipulated the unfortunate events. Neither was she
able to prove ill motive on the part of the police officers who
conducted a search in her house; hence, the presumption is that
they regularly performed their duties. The failure of the accused to
present her two daughters as witnesses amounted to suppression
of evidence, giving rise to the presumption that if they had been
presented, their testimonies would be adverse to her.
On the issue of the validity of the search warrant, the court ruled
that there was probable cause for its issuance. The proceedings
conducted by the Execute Judge relative to the application of the
police for a search warrant, its issuance and implementation were
valid, regular, and in accordance with the requirements of the law
and Constitution.48 The trial court declared that Gorospe may have
lied about her address and being a dealer of Avon Cosmetics;
however, it does not necessarily mean that she was a fictitious
person. It explained that Gorospe may have lied "a little" in order
to conceal herself for her protection, but the rest of her testimony
constituted sufficient evidence of probable cause.
Abuan filed her motion for reconsideration dated April 16, 2001,
which the court denied in an Order49 dated May 10, 2001. She
appealed the decision to the CA, where she averred that:
I adduced by the prosecution.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED SHABU AND OTHER
PARAPHERNALIA AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED THEREBY DISREGARDING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHOBITION AGAINST
"FRUITS" OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY
MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE GLARING
DISCREPANCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
SUPPOSED EYEWITNESSES.
Abuan insisted that the applicant failed to show probable cause for
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62. "Marissa Gorospe" is a
fictitious person whose alleged testimony is fabricated and was
used by the police officers to convince the Executive Judge that
there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant
when, in fact, there was none. The Executive Judge failed to ask
Gorospe searching questions. Consequently, Search Warrant No.
98-62 is void and the substances and paraphernalia confiscated
by the policemen are inadmissible in evidence. She further
claimed that the testimonies of De Vera and Gamboa were
pockmarked with inconsistencies and as such, the trial court
should not have given them probative weight.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that
the trial court merely confirmed Executive Judge Ramos’ finding of
probable cause. Besides, appellant failed to file a motion to quash
Search Warrant No. 98-62, hence, was estopped from assailing it
and the search and seizure conducted thereafter. The OSG cited
the ruling of this Court in Demaisip v. Court of Appeals.50 It
likewise claimed that the inconsistencies adverted to by appellant
pertained merely to collateral matters and were not determinative
of her guilt or innocence. As gleaned from the evidence of the
prosecution, her defenses could not prevail over the evidence
The CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC decision.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated March 28, 1001
in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City convicting Eliza T. Abuan
of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.51
The appellate court ruled that the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt of Abuan’s guilt for the crime charged.
The alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of Gamboa and de
Vera were peripheral matters. Moreover, Abuan’s failure to assail
the legality of the search and seizure conducted by the policemen
before her arraignment was equivalent to a waiver of her right to
assail the search warrant. The CA cited the ruling of this Court
in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals.52
Abuan filed a motion for reconsideration,53 reiterating her argument
that the search warrant is not valid. She also argued that she did
not waive her right to assail the validity of the search warrant at
her arraignment and during the trial. She maintained that the CA
should not rely on the evaluation by the RTC of the witnesses’
credibility, and that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were on material relevant details.
The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution54 dated May
26, 2005 on its finding that no new and substantial matter was
presented to warrant reconsideration thereof.55
In the instant petition, Abuan, now petitioner, asserts that
I
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE SEARCH
WARRANT VALID DESPITE FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
II
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE
VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEEMED
WAIVED AFTER ARRAIGNMENT.
III
THE CA ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE SHABU AND
OTHER PARAPHERNALIA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM
THE PETITIONER AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
IV
THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
THE PETITIONER.56
Petitioner avers that the search warrant issued by the Executive
Judge was void because the circumstances leading to its issuance
were not based on probable cause but on mere fabrications. She
points out that according to Gorospe, she became acquainted with
petitioner and visited her in her house because of their
employment with Avon Cosmetics. However, considering that she
and Gorospe were never employed by Avon Cosmetics and were
not even acquainted, such testimony is false. Thus, the search
warrant should be declared invalid as it is based on the testimony
of a fictitious person, a "planted witness" with a fabricated
testimony and, consequently, any evidence discovered on the
basis thereof should be suppressed and excluded in accordance
with Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner points
out that with the inadmissibility of the shabu and other
paraphernalia, the appellate court should have acquitted her of the
charges by reason of the prosecution’s failure to prove the
commission of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner insists that, based on the records, she sought to
suppress the search warrant throughout the entire proceedings in
the trial court. She rejected the prosecution’s offer to admit the
validity of the search warrant and even filed a motion to suppress
the search. She was thus not proscribed from filing her motion to
suppress the search warrant even after the arraignment.
In its Comment,57 the OSG maintains that the search warrant is
valid. It insists that the CA correctly ruled that the requisites of a
valid search warrant were present, noting that the Executive Judge
conducted searching questions and answers on the person of
Marissa Gorospe. It asserts that, in applying for a search warrant,
a police officer need not possess personal knowledge regarding
an illegal activity; it is the witness who should possess such
personal knowledge, and upon whose testimony under oath
probable cause may be established. In this case, it was Gorospe
who narrated, under oath and before the judge, her personal
knowledge of (petitioner’s) criminal activities.58
The OSG maintains that petitioner in effect waived whatever
objections she had regarding the validity of the search warrant. It
points out that she never questioned the warrant before the court
which issued the same, never questioned nor moved for the
quashal of the warrant before her arraignment. And while
petitioner was allowed to present evidence on the alleged invalidity
of the search warrant, this did not cure her omission or inaction in
raising the issue at the proper time.
In her Reply,59 petitioner declares that a close scrutiny of the
judge’s investigation of Gorospe would reveal that her personal
circumstances are pivotal in her acquisition of personal knowledge
regarding the alleged possession of shabu by petitioner. If these
personal circumstances are fabricated, then such "personal
knowledge" regarding the possession bears no credit.
Petitioner likewise maintains that contrary to the allegations of the
OSG, she did not waive her right to question the validity of the
warrant. She could not have done any better under the
circumstances at that time because all the evidence against
Gorospe was made known and available to her only after her
arraignment.
The Court is tasked to resolve the following threshold issues: (a)
whether petitioner waived her right to question Search Warrant No.
98-62 and the admissibility of the substances and paraphernalia
and other articles confiscated from her house based on said
warrant; and (b) whether the prosecution adduced evidence to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Search Warrant No. 98-62
Is Valid; the Articles, Paraphernalia and Regulated
Drugs Found in Petitioner’s Bedroom and Confiscated
by the Police Officers are Admissible in Evidence
We agree with the ruling of the CA affirming, on appeal, the
findings of the trial court that based on the deposition and
testimony of Gorospe, there was probable cause for the issuance
of Search Warrant No. 98-62 for violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.71
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure enumerate the requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant, thus:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant, record. – The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine,
in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.72
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. Reasonable minds may differ on the question of
whether a particular affidavit/deposition or testimony of the
affiant/deponent establishes probable cause. However, great
deference is to be accorded to the Judge’s determination.73 The
affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant
is presumed to be valid.74
Affidavits/depositions for search warrants must be tested and
interpreted by Judges in a common-sense and realistic fashion.
They are normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of
a criminal investigation. Technical requisites of elaborate
specificity have no place in this area.75 The Judge in determining
probable cause is to consider the totality of the circumstances
made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,76 and
must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard.77 Probable cause exists if a practical, common-sense
evaluation of the facts and circumstances show a fair possibility
that dangerous drugs will be found in the asserted
location.78 There must be a factual showing sufficient to comprise
probable cause of particular facts and circumstances so as to
allow the Judge to make an independent evaluation of the matter.
It is sufficient if the information put forth in the affidavit/deposition
or testimony of the affiant/deponent are believed or appropriately
accepted by the affiant/deponent as true.79 Sufficient information
must be presented to allow a Judge to determine probable cause;
his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare/unsubstantiated
contention of others.
The general rule is that the task of a reviewing court is not to
conduct a de novo determination of probable cause but only to
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the records
supporting the Judge’s decision to issue the search warrant.80 The
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the Judge had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed,81 and
once ascertained that the Judge had substantial basis for
concluding that a search would unearth evidence of a wrongdoing,
the determination of probable cause must be upheld. In the
absence of any showing that the Judge was recreant of his duties
in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on
the affiants/deponent before him, there is no basis for doubting the
reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.82
However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set
aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding
may be quashed; the evidence seized by the police officers based
on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused
presents clear and convincing evidence that the police officers
and/or a government informant made a deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth in said affidavit/deposition or
testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable
cause. Such evidence must focus on the state of mind of the
affiants/deponents that he was conscious of the falsity of his
assertion or representation.83 The requirement that a search
warrant not issue but upon probable cause would be reduced to a
nullity if a police officer and his informant are able to use
deliberately falsehood allegations to demonstrate probable cause
and, having misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that
the ploy succeeded.84 However, innocent and negligent omissions
or misrepresentation of a police officer or government informant
will not invalidate a search warrant. And even if the police officer or
government informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth in his or her affidavit/deposition but
the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish probable
cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for lack of probable
cause.85
The evidence presented by petitioner that Gorospe was not a
resident or transient of Barangay Sapang, even if true and
credible, is not at all material or necessary to the determination of
probable cause. Whether petitioner and Gorospe were dealers of
Avon Cosmetics as of May 5, 1998 may be relevant to the issue of
whether there was factual basis for the finding of probable cause
by the Executive Judge against petitioner; however, petitioner’s
evidence to prove his claim is tenuous and does not warrant the
quashal of Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the suppression of the
evidence seized after the enforcement of the search warrant.
The evidence petitioner presented to disprove the testimony of
Gorospe that they were dealers of Avon Cosmetics are her
(petitioner’s) testimony and that of Carvajal. The certification
purportedly signed by dela Rosa, the Branch Manager of Avon
Cosmetics Dagupan Branch, is hearsay because she did not
testify. Carvajal admitted that she was not in a position to confirm
the veracity of the contents of the certification:
PROSECUTOR JAIME DOJILLO
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
q What is your position at Dagupan Avon Cosmetics?
a Team Leader, Sir.
q Do you have any participation in the preparation of this
certification?
a None, Sir.
q So, you had not in position to know the truth of this
certification, hence, you were not the one who prepared
the same?
a Yes, Sir.86
Carvajal was merely one of many team leaders of Avon Cosmetics
in Dagupan City. She did not testify nor did petitioner adduce
evidence that Gorospe was not such a dealer in places other than
Dagupan City or Pangasinan for that matter. In fine, petitioner
failed to adduce competent and credible evidence that Gorospe
was not a dealer of Avon products in the branches of Avon
Cosmetics other than Pangasinan. Other than the denial of
petitioner and the testimony of Carvajal, petitioner failed to present
evidence that she was not a dealer of Avon Cosmetics. On the
other hand, the testimony of Gorospe before the Executive Judge
was corroborated by the testimonies of police officers Gamboa
and de Vera.
In the present case, the Executive Judge found probable cause
after conducting the requisite searching questions on Gorospe for
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
The trial court reviewed the testimony of Gorospe before the
Executive Judge87 and confirmed that, indeed, there was probable
cause against petitioner for violation of said crime. The finding of
the Executive Judge was corroborated by the testimony of police
officers de Vera and Gamboa, who, in their surveillance operation,
partially confirmed Gorospe’s claim that, indeed, people had been
going to the house of petitioner to buy shabu. The findings of the
trial court were, in turn, affirmed by the CA.
The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court
affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing
evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied
facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered,
the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome
of the case. In this case, petitioner failed to establish any such
circumstance.
The trial and appellate courts ruled that petitioner possessed 5.67
gm of methamphetamine hydrochloride and sentenced her to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
The penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is
incorrect. As the Court ruled in People v. Tira:88
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, the imposable penalty of possession of a
regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu,
is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the
quantity of the regulated drug subject of the offense, the
imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

Considering that the regulated drug found in the

possession of the appellants is only 1.001 grams, the
imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants
are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its
medium period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum, for
violation of Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended.89

The penalty imposed in the Tira case is the correct penalty, which
should likewise be imposed against petitioner herein.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to penalty. Petitioner is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium
period as maximum.
III.7 G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014 transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via
fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the
YU, Petitioners, destination country. The toll center would then meter the call,
vs. which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG complete the circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents. international long distance call services to any part of the world by
using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of
constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing
Court to set aside the Decision1 dated 20 August 2003 and the
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna
Resolution2 dated 27 November 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or
reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously issued by
domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
country where the call is originated."9
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by
Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine
PLDT and registered to WWC was used to provide a service called
National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC of
GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call service, which can
Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner
be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts."10 During a
Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM
test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone
Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well
number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt
as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation
required him to enter the user code and personal identification
(Planet Internet)5 located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
number (PIN) provided under a GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he
Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The
was then requested to enter the destination number, which
applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll
included the country code, phone number and a pound (#) sign.
bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of
The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However,
Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
when he checked the records, it showed that the call was only
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use
directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that the
of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT).6 Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is
registered to WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig
applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico
City.11 However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at
Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling
this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet
Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and
should pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.
network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international
gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the Philippines.8 The call is then
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz,
been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business
routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood
violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,13 on City, Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:
unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners
also committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT a) Computers or any equipment or device capable
phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, of accepting information, applying the process of
they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong to the information and supplying the results of this
PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of process;
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or
PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in
device used for recording or storing information;
its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities
and c) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from
billing statements, receipts, contracts,
international long distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross
communications and documents relating to
violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
securing and using telephone lines and/or
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of
equipment.
customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type
approval license from the latter. 2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of
P.D. 401 against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One,
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners,
Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be
PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT
Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business
likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange
address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald
revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and
Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
charges, to the prejudice of the government.
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the
that enables data terminal equipment such as
office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans
computers to communicate with other data terminal
showing the location of particular computers and servers that
equipment via a telephone line;
would be taken.14
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for
of accepting information applying the prescribed
search warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued
process of the information and supplying the
against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police
results of this process;
officers to seize various items:
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of
device capable of transmitting air waves or
paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
309 of the Revised Penal Code against WWC, Adriel S.
equipment;
Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III,
Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International
 d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that
enables two or more signals from different sources
to pass through a common cable or transmission
line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or
equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or
device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease
and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to
securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of
paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article
309 of the Revised Penal Code against Planet Internet
Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S.
Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita
Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient
Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device
that enables data terminal equipment such as
computers to communicate with other data terminal
equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable
of accepting information applying the prescribed
process of the information and supplying the
results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or
device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that
enables two or more signals from different sources
to pass through a common cable or transmission
line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or
equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or
device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease
and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to
securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO
operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15 central
processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.20 Planet Internet notes
that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated;
and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls,
such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken
computers, were also seized. Petitioners WWC and Cherryll
Yu,21 and Planet Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash
the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the
search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the
acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act
complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were
general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were
"fruits of the poisonous tree."
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s
appeal despite the following procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public
prosecutor, had no personality to question the
quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal
rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon
probable cause, considering that the acts complained of
allegedly do not constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the
assailed search warrants were not general warrants.
OUR RULING
II.
Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their
judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the
issuance of the search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are
enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires
"such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place
to be searched."42
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in
the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent
on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their
judicial function.44 They determine probable cause based on
"evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed" by the offender.45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by
reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly
performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as
there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized
are in the place sought to be searched.46
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the
application for search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that
Judge Percival Mandap Lopez asked searching questions to the
witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal
toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of
evidence presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the
finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for
the application for the search warrants.
However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence
of probable cause necessitates the prior determination of whether
a crime or an offense was committed in the first place. In support
of their contention that there was no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the adage
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when
there is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law
punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no
offense was committed that would justify the issuance of the
search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to
appear as local calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively
evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass
charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of
taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT
concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives
"legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT… of the compensation
which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed through its
network."47 As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft,
because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that
there is no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly
taken from PLDT partake of the nature of "future earnings and lost
business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative,
speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived
of such unrealized earnings and opportunities because these do
not belong to it in the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the
Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for
the search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll
bypass perse, but of theft of PLDT’s international long distance
call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass
operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must
be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s
personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of
PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.48
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing
the earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT.
However, in Laurel v. Abrogar,49 we have already held that the use
of PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes
theft of its telephone services and business:
x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be
stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it
cannot be said that such international long distance calls were
personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not
have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its
complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not
being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly
claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent
of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the
telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of
"subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended
Information describes the thing taken as, "international long
distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from
PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the
accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this
case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution
directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that
the property subject of the theft are the services and business of
respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not
necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which
would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule
110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated
as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure
that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and
cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights
under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the
generally accepted concept of personal property in civil law as
"anything susceptible of appropriation."50 It includes ownership of
telephone services, which are protected by the penal provisions on
theft. We therein upheld the Amended Information charging the
petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT inasmuch as the
allegation was that the former was engaged in international simple
resale (ISR) or "the unauthorized routing and completing of
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae,
and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to
the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls using its
complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of
these communications facilities without its consent constitutes
theft, which is the unlawful taking of telephone services and
business. We then concluded that the business of providing
telecommunications and telephone services is personal property
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said
article.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been
accomplished without the installation of telecommunications
equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also
be held liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone
or piped gas connection without previous authority from the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila
Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case may be,
tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters,
jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is
stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or
water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or
conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical
or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or
telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon
conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos,
or both . (Emphasis supplied)
The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to
rule further on the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of
the motions to quash the search warrants, the test calls conducted
by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF
of either Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the
search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be
quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued
presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police
officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are
essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that
case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial
judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or
misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a
search warrant.54 In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali
that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF
are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that
the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the
Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the
witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet
Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all
IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It
must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this
case based on lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue before
us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that
the search warrants are general warrants.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to
be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the
nature of general warrants because the descriptions therein of the
objects to be seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give
the implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to
seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search
warrants were not illegal per se, and that they were "innocuous
goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority to
determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact even
pieces of computer equipment not involved in telecommunications
or Internet service were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already
fulfills the requirement of particularity of description when it is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.56 Furthermore, it
cites Kho v. Makalintal,57 in which the Court allowed leeway in the
description of things to be seized, taking into consideration the
effort and the time element involved in the prosecution of criminal
cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed
with the CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the
search warrants in view of the OSG’s position that the scheme
was a case of electronic theft, and that the items sought to be
seized could not be described with calibrated precision. According
to the OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for
other legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were
used in the commission of an offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is
not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be
seized."59 It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the
warrant the discretion over which items to take.60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against
whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our1âwphi1
Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure
that people and their properties are searched only for the most
compelling and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3
and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding
the following places and items to be searched under a search
warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
 c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search
warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law
enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched,
especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the
extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them. Vallejo v.
Court of Appeals61 ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with particularity.
Technical precision of description is not required. It is only
necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to
the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that
the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the
law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule,
it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look
for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will
enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to
locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the
particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized is required "wherever and whenever it is
feasible."62 A search warrant need not describe the items to be
seized in precise and minute detail.63 The warrant is valid when it
enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be
seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to
be seized.64
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous
goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that
amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to
secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items
with one hundred percent precision. In
People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be
hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult
enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference."65
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the
description of the things to be seized when the things described
are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between
the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the
crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the
application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular
inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able to
confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas,
modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a
d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals
and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass
operations."67
In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT,68 we upheld
a s milady worded69 description of items to be seized by virtue of
the search warrants, because these items had been sufficiently
identified physically and s own to bear a relation to the offenses
charged. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of
Appeals decision dated 20 August 2003 and Resolution dated 27
November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED.
III.8 NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the
issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt.
Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our
continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered
information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and
explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess said
firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the
holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to
possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions
which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military
Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching
questions and answers
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to
be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath
and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in
connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before
issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with
any affidavits submitted.
“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
- This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and
of the complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on
mere hearsay.
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his
control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein,
and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact."
On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for
several days, they "gathered information from verified sources" that
the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to
possess them. Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit
In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for
issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof
only through information from other sources or persons.
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows
that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him
"in the form of searching questions and answers." Prudente vs. Judge
Dayrit
On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a
simple "yes" or "no" answer.
Read: Soliven vs. Makasiar
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for
search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner,
would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."
III.9 A.M. No. MTJ-05-1608 February 28, 2006
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-910-MTJ)
BERNARDO P. BETOY, SR.* , Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a Letter-Complaint dated July 12, 2000, signed by Bernardo
Betoy, Sr. (complainant) charges Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores
(respondent) with Grave Abuse of Discretion and Authority,
Conduct Unbecoming as a Judge and Gross Negligence Resulting
to Procedural Lapses (Dereliction of Duty).1 Complainant attached
to the Letter-Complaint an Affidavit executed by his wife Lucia
Betoy citing paragraphs Nos. 30. 32, 35 and 36 thereof to wit:
30. That the statements on page 4 of the said RESOLUTION
dated December 8, 1999 of the Honorable Prosecutor RUSTICO
D. PADERANGA is unfounded and arbitrary and perjured himself,
(sic) the fact that the Honorable Judge MAMERTO Y.
COLIFLORES have erred in issuing the SEARCH & SIEZURE
ORDER dated September 17, 1999 for not conforming to the strict
compliance with legal requirements (sic) on issuance and not even
bother to think and wonder how in reality my residence was
regarded as armory by the applicant and his witnesses for Search
Warrant but instead issued such warrant solely basing on the
affidavits of deponents police officers wherein during the search,
none from among the property seized in our residence can provide
proof of the allegations on the face of the Deposition and
Application for SEARCH WARRANT of which Police Inspector
CESAR KYAMCO ARQUILLANO, SPO2 REX LOMUSAD
CABRERA and SPO1 JESUS CORTUNA ROJAS are liable for
PERJURY. x x x
xxxx
32. That the SEARCH & SEIZURE ORDER (S/W #0854) dated
September 17, 1999 by the Honorable Judge MAMERTO Y.
COLIFLORES should be declared NULL & VOID because it
violates the CONSTITUTION, the fact issuance of it solely relies
(sic) on the mere affidavits of deponents police officers which
should be considered hearsay and not information personally
known to the responding (sic) judge as required by settled
jurisprudence through examination with probing and exhaustive
questions of witnesses in determining probable cause in order for
the Honorable Judge to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of
the WARRANT and therefore hold liable for PERJURY the herein
respondent police officers, CESAR KYAMKO ARQUILLANO et al.
for false declaration.
xxxx
35. That almost nine months had passed reckoned from
September 21, 1999 to date, but the Honorable Judge MAMERTO
Y. COLIFLORES did not even upheld (sic) his Search & Seizure
Order (S/W #0854) by not conducting a judicial inquiry from the
implementing law enforcement officers (Police of CCPO-
PNP/Agents of NBI Region 7) as to the whereabouts of the
contraband items (assorted high powered firearms) as alleged,
which is 48 hours upon served. x x x
36. That the Honorable Judge MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES
appears being not responsible of (sic) his issuance of Search &
Seizure Order (S/W #0854) by his inaction and therefore clearly
shows his gesture of consent on the arbitrary and indiscriminate
use of the said Warrant. x x x2
as his bases in filing the present administrative complaint.
On September 5, 2000, respondent filed his Comment, portions of
which read as follows:
With respect to Item No. 30 of the letter complaint of Bernardo
Padilla Betoy, Sr., by virtue of the affidavit complaint of and
executed by affiant-wife Lucia Udasco Betoy, that there was no
proof from the allegations on the face of the deposition of the
applicant Police Inspector Cesar Kyamko Arquillano, and its (sic)
witnesses, that said residence is an armory.
It should be noted that the Judge issuing the Search Warrant
could not go beyond what is not alleged in the application,
considering that what is nexessary (sic) is the existence of a
probable cause; and that they are probably guilty thereof, and that
the investigation on the application for Search Warrant was made
personally by the Presiding Judge thru searching questions and
answers in writing and sworn to before him complying [with]
statutory and constitutional requirements of the law.
With respect to item No. 32 of the Affidavit that the said Search
Warrant be declared null and void for it solely relies on the Affidavit
of the applicant and their witnesses, it should be remembered that
the same could only be declared null and void if a motion is filed in
Court and a hearing be conducted to that effect.
It should be noted that there was filed a Motion to Release
Shotgun dated September 24, 1999 by Atty. Cornelius Gonzalez
and Atty. Vicente Fernandez II which was granted by the
undersigned-respondent per Order dated September 27, 1999,
machine copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral
part of this rejoinder, and another Urgent Motion for Release of Air
Rifle filed by the same counsel, Atty. Vicente Fernandez II dated
June 5, 2000 which was also granted by the undersigned per
maching (sic) copy hereto attached.
With respect to Item No. 36 that the issuing judge, by his inaction
clearly appears to have consented in the arbitrary and
indiscriminate use of the Search Warrant. It should be
remembered that the issuing judge has no physical control on the
manner the Search Warrant was being implemented and
conducted; what the issuing judge did emphasixed (sic) and
applied (sic) was the statutory and constitutional requirements of
the law in the issuance of the Search Warrant.3
On August 28, 2002, the Court issued a Resolution referring the
instant case to Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Executive Judge,
MTCC, Cebu City, for investigation, report and
recommendation.4 In her Report dated December 2, 2004,
Executive Judge Tormis found that respondent judge is not guilty
of the charges filed against him relative to the issuance of the
subject search warrant.5
Meanwhile, respondent judge compulsorily retired on August 17,
2003.
On July 14, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
submitted to the Court a Memorandum6 wherein it found that
respondent judge was able to establish probable cause for the
issuance of the questioned search warrant; that however,
respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having
failed to conduct a judicial inquiry as to the whereabouts of the
seized firearms and ammunitions, in violation of Section 12(b),
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The OCA
recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of
₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
In support of its findings, the OCA states in its Memorandum, thus:
Records show that respondent judge personally conducted the
examination of the applicant for search warrant, P/Inspector Cesar
Kyamko Arquillano, and his two witnesses, SPO2 Rex Lomusand
(sic) Cabrera and SPO1 Jesus Cortuna Rojas. However, the
questions propounded by the respondent judge were not as
probing and exhaustive as the Rules require. As stressed in Roan
v. Gonzales, the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary or proforma, if the claimed probable cause is to
be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash
the contents of the affidavits but must take his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application. In this case, respondent
judge failed to ask follow-up questions on the circumstances
surrounding the possession of illegal firearms and ammunition by
complainants and two others during the examination. In fact, he
failed to elicit information as to said circumstances from the
applicant himself since the latter merely narrated that after their
asset reported the presence of persons armed with some short
and long firearms and ammunitions in the house of the
complainants, they conducted a surveillance and casing operation
on 30 August 1999 by renting a room in one of the neighboring
houses of the complainants where they visibly saw the suspects.
Despite the failure of P/Inspector Arquillano to categorically state
that he saw the firearms, which were the subject of the search
warrant, inside the house of the complainants, respondent judge
did not ask questions that could have elicited such information.
Nonetheless, while P/Inspector Arquillano cannot be said to have
gained personal knowledge of the fact of possession of firearms
by the complainants and two others, his two witnesses, SPO2
Cabrera and SPO1 Rojas, ably established said fact of
possession, having sworn before respondent judge that they
personally saw the suspects in possession of the firearms. These
circumstances belie the claim of complainants that the
declarations of the police officers in their affidavits are mere
hearsay and do not constitute personal knowledge that would
have otherwise made the issuance of Search Warrant No. 0894
(sic) irregular. With the first hand information on the fact of
possession of firearms by the complainants and two others coming
from the deponents themselves, particularly SPO2 Cabrera and
SPO1 Rojas, respondent judge rightly established probable cause
for the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
On the failure of respondent judge to conduct a judicial inquiry as
to the whereabouts of the seized firearms and ammunitions, it
appears that respondent judge failed to abide by the Rules in this
respect. Paragraph (b), Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires the issuing judge to ascertain ten
days after the issuance of the search warrant if the return has
been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the
warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. Nothing in the records shows that a return of the
questioned search warrant was made by the police officers.
Neither did respondent judge claim in his comment that he
complied with the above Rule. His lame excuse that the issuing
judge has no physical control on the manner the Search Warrant
was being implemented and conducted as his primordial concern
only is the compliance with the statutory and constitutional
requirements for the issuance of the search warrant betrays his
ignorance of the Rules. The Rule heretofore mentioned requires
the issuing judge, in case the return has been made, (a) to see to
it that the officer forthwith deliver to him the property seized,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath; and
(b) to ascertain whether Section 11 of Rule 126 has been
complied with. Should the issuing judge ascertain that the officers
seizing the property under the warrant failed to follow the
procedures mandated by the Rules, he may cite them in contempt
of court. It appears that despite the absence of a return of the
questioned search warrant, respondent judge failed to summon
and require P/Inspector Arquillano to explain why no return was
made.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was taken to task by
the Court for gross ignorance of the law and procedure. In Tugot v.
Judge Coliflores, the Court established that he did not observe the
period within which to conduct the preliminary conference, as what
he applied in an ejectment case was Rule 18 on pre-trial, instead
of the provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure. In imposing
a fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00 upon respondent judge, the
Court reminded him the judicial competence demands that judges
should be proficient in both procedural and substantive aspects of
the law. They have to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules and be conversant, as well, with
basic legal principles and well-settled authoritative doctrines. To
the end that they be the personification of justice and rule of law,
they should strive for a level of excellence exceeded only by their
passion for truth. Anything less than this strict standard would
subject them to administrative sanction. Respondent judge failed
to take heed of this exhortation.7
The Court does not fully agree with the findings of the OCA.
The Court finds that there is much to be desired in respondent
judge’s examination of the applicant for the search warrant,
P/Insp. Cesar Kyamko Arquillano (P/Insp. Arquillano) and his
witnesses namely, SPO2 Rex Lomusad Cabrera (SPO2 Cabrera)
and SPO1 Jesus Cortuna Rojas (SPO1 Rojas). Respondent judge
failed to thoroughly examine the applicant and his witnesses in a
manner that would sufficiently establish the existence of a In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in
probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms, the
elements of which are – (1) the existence of the subject firearm;
In Nala v. Judge Barroso, Jr.8 , this Court had occasion to explain and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does
and discuss the definition of "probable cause" in relation to the not have the license or permit to possess the same. Probable
issuance of a search warrant, to wit: cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms would therefore
be such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant has been defined
discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
of a firearm and that he does not have the license or permit to
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
possess the same. Nowhere, however, in the affidavit and
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense
testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L.
are in the place sought to be searched. This probable cause must
Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search warrant was it
be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant
mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm.
or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
While Alcoser testified before the respondent judge that the
In determining its existence, the examining magistrate must make
firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does
a probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro
not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only "personal belief"
forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses. Probable
because neither he nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a
cause must be shown by the best evidence that could be obtained
certification from the appropriate government agency that
under the circumstances. On the part of the applicant and
petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. This could have
witnesses, the introduction of such evidence is necessary
been the best evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner had no
especially where the issue is the existence of a negative ingredient
license to possess firearms and ammunitions, but the police
of the offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license required by
officers failed to present the same.9
law. On the other hand, the judge must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavits but must make his own extensive inquiry As in the Nala case, the search warrant in the present case was
on the existence of such license, as well as on whether the issued in connection with the alleged illegal possession of firearms
applicant and the witnesses have personal knowledge thereof. and ammunition by the present complainants.10 However, the
Court finds nothing in the depositions of P/Insp. Arquillano, SPO2
In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) v.
Cabrera and SPO1 Rojas to indicate that they had personal
Asuncion, we declared as void the search warrant issued by the
knowledge that herein complainant and his companions
trial court in connection with the offense of illegal possession of
mentioned in the search warrant had no license or permit to
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, on the ground, inter alia, of
possess firearms and ammunition.11 Despite the glaring
failure to prove the requisite probable cause. The applicant and
insufficiency of the allegations in their respective depositions,
the witness presented for the issuance of the warrant were found
respondent judge still failed to elicit the necessary information
to be without personal knowledge of the lack of license to possess
during his examination of the said applicant and his witnesses to
firearms of the management of PICOP and its security agency.
establish that complainant and his companions are indeed guilty of
They likewise did not testify as to the absence of license and failed
illegally possessing firearms and ammunition. During the taking of
to attach to the application a "no license certification" from the
the depositions of the applicant and his two witnesses, respondent
Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police.
judge asked them if they have personal knowledge of facts that
xxxx
complainant and his companions are illegally possessing firearms.
In response to respondent’s question P/Insp. Arquillano answered:
A – Yes, your Honor. Our "asset" went to our office and reported
the presence of persons armed with One (1) pc. Cal. 357 rev; Two
(2) pcs. M16 rifle; Four (4) pcs. Cal. 38 rev; Three (3) pcs. Cal. 45
pistol; Four (4) pcs. Shotguns and Assorted Ammunitions, that
these suspects are seen by him visibly going in and out of their
house. Our asset is one of the neighbors of the suspects. Through
this information and together with my operatives we conducted
surveillance and casing operation on August 30, 1999 and we
rented a room in one of the houses in the neighborhood and
thereat we can visibly saw (sic) the suspects.12
SPO2 Cabrera and SPO1 Rojas also answered in the same
manner, thus:
A – Yes, your Honor. Through the information given by our "asset",
we started casing and surveillance of the said area sometime on
August 30, 1999 and we decided to rent a room in the (sic) one of
the houses in the neighborhood and we saw personally the
firearms they illegally possess.13
Judging from the succeeding questions propounded by
respondent judge, it appears that he was satisfied with the
answers of the applicant and his witnesses. However, the fact
alone that complainant and his companions were seen wielding
guns does not confirm nor verify that they illegally possess such
weapons. The statement of SPO2 Cabrera and SPO1 Rojas in
their deposition that they personally saw the firearms illegally
possessed by complainant and his companions does not
constitute "personal knowledge" of the illegality of such
possession; instead, it merely qualifies as "personal belief."
However, this belief was partly proven wrong when it was later
found out that one of the seized firearms, a Shooter 12-gauge
shotgun with Serial No. Sam 01109, is duly licensed. In fact, this
compelled the respondent judge to release the same, together
with 50 rounds of shotgun ammunition, in favor of
complainant.14 Hence, respondent judge should not have simply
relied on the statements of the applicant and his witnesses. He
should have probed further. Respondent judge could have directly
asked the applicant and his witnesses if they have personal
knowledge of the particular fact that the complainant and his
companions do not have the necessary license or permit to
possess the firearms which are in their custody. In the alternative,
he could have inquired if the applicant, or the office which he
represents, was able to secure a certification from the appropriate
government agency to the effect that complainant and his
companions are, in fact, not given a license or permit to possess
firearms. As the Court held in Nala15 case, this certification is the
best evidence obtainable to prove that complainant and his
companions, indeed, have no license or permit to possess a
firearm. Unfortunately, respondent judge failed to ask any of these
questions. Thus, respondent judge fell short of the standard of
competence required of magistrates in the performance of their
functions. Specifically, he failed to observe Rule 1.01, Canon 1
and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 1.01. – A judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01. – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence.
which exhorts judges to be the embodiment of professional
competence.
As to respondent judge’s failure to conduct a judicial inquiry as to
the whereabouts of the seized firearms and ammunitions, this
Court agrees with the OCA that respondent judge was remiss in
his duty of ascertaining if a return of the warrant has been made,
and if there is none, to summon the person to whom the warrant
was issued and require him to explain why no return was made.
However, what has been violated by respondent judge is not
Section 12(b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, considering that the questioned warrant
was issued on September 17, 1999 while the amendments which
incorporated the present Section 12, Rule 126 took effect only on
December 1, 2000. Actually, the procedural rule violated by
respondent judge was Guideline No. 5(g) of Administrative Circular conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled
No. 1316 , issued by this Court on October 1, 1985, to wit: authoritative doctrines.18 He should strive for excellence exceeded
only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
xxxx personification of justice and the rule of law.19 To be able to render
substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal
g. The search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of
system, they are expected to keep abreast of all laws, legal
issuance, and after which the issuing judge should ascertain if the
principles and prevailing jurisprudence and to remain conversant
return has been made, and if there was none, should summon the
with them.20 Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know
person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain
the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.21 Judicial
why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge
competence requires no less. Ignorance of the law excuses no
should ascertain from the officer who seized the property under
one -- least of all, a judge.22 When the law is sufficiently basic, a
the warrant if a detailed receipt of the property seized was left with
judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that
the lawful occupants of the premises in whose presence the
would be gross ignorance of the law.23 In Dizon, Jr. v. Judge
search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such
Veneracion,24 the respondent judge therein was found guilty of
occupants, whether he left a receipt in the place in which he found
gross ignorance of the law for his failure to observe the rules
the seized property in the presence of at least two witnesses of
governing determination of probable cause. Thus, for failing to
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, and
observe the rules governing determination of probable cause and
should require that the property seized by virtue of the warrant
for non-compliance with the directives of Administrative Circular
shall be delivered to the judge who issued the warrant. The judge
No. 13, the Court finds herein respondent guilty of gross ignorance
should see to it that an accurate and true inventory of the property
of the law or procedure.
seized duly verified under oath is attached to the return and filed
with the court; x x x Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
Respondent judge should know that his duty as a magistrate does
charge. Section 11(A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty
not end when he issued the search warrant. While the Order of
to be imposed if a respondent is found guilty of a serious charge is
Search and Seizure issued by respondent judge directed the
either a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not more than
peace officers implementing the warrant to bring to him the
₱40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other
property seized, respondent judge did not refute complainant’s
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months,
allegation that he failed to inquire from the law-enforcement
or dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
officers implementing the subject warrant as to the whereabouts of
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
the seized firearms. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
respondent judge required the concerned law-enforcement officers
government-owned or controlled corporations.
to make an accurate and complete inventory of the seized firearms
and submit the same to him. From the foregoing, it is clear that The OCA recommendation of fine of ₱20,000.00 is deemed just
respondent judge failed to comply with the rules relative to the and reasonable.
issuance and implementation of a search warrant.
WHEREFORE, respondent retired Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores is
Verily, this Court agrees with the OCA in holding that a judge is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with is FINED ₱20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
statutes and procedural rules.17 It is imperative that he be
III.10 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the consolidated judgment1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated September 17,
1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, involving
violations of Section 8, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs
Law.2 Since appellant was acquitted in the second case, we focus
on the first case, where appellant has been found guilty and
sentenced to death and fined one million pesos.
The decretal portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 15800-R, the Court finds the accused
Modesto Tee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of marijuana of about 591.81
kilos in violation of Section 8, Article II of RA 6425 as
amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the
Information, seized by virtue of a search warrant and
sentences him to the supreme penalty of death and to pay
a fine of 1 million pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The 591.81 kilos of marijuana contained in 26 boxes and
one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to U-27) are ordered
forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately
in accordance with law.
2. In Crim. Case No. 15822-R, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused Modesto
Tee beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of
the charge of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of
Section 8, Art. 2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of
RA 7659 as charged in the Information since the marijuana
confiscated have to be excluded in evidence as a product
of unreasonable search and seizure.
The 336.93 kilos of marijuana contained in 13 sacks and
four boxes (Exh. B to S and their component parts)
although excluded in evidence as the product(s) of
unreasonable search and seizure, are nevertheless
ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed
immediately in accordance with law considering that they
are prohibited articles.
The City Jail Warden is, therefore, directed to release the
accused Modesto Tee in connection with Crim. Case No.
15822-R unless held on other charges.
COST(S) DE OFFICIO.
SO ORDERED.3
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and
a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National
Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly
leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of
marijuana.
On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the search warrant on
the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not
complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the
filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an
information dated July 24, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No.
15800-R, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto
Tee, alias "Estoy Tee," with illegal possession of marijuana,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in
his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately
contained in four (4) boxes; and
 2. One hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21)
blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried flowering tops
separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total
weight of 336.93 kilograms; and
3 Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops
separately contained in twenty-six (boxes) and a yellow
sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms,
all having a grand total weight of 928.74 kilograms, a
prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in
violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 7, 1998, the prosecution moved to "amend" the
foregoing charge sheet "considering that subject marijuana were
seized in two (2) different places."5
As a result, the information in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was
amended to read as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in
his possession the following, to wit:
- Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops
separately contained in twenty-six (26) boxes and a yellow
sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess,
in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
A separate amended information docketed as Criminal Case No.
15822-R was likewise filed, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in
his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops
separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21)
blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13)
sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms;
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess,
in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
On September 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to quash
the search warrant and ordered appellant’s arraignment.
When arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R,
appellant refused to enter a plea. The trial court entered a plea of
not guilty for him.8 Trial on the merits then ensued.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:
Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver,
and the appellant Modesto Tee are well acquainted with each
other, since Abratique’s wife is the sister of Tee’s sister-in-law.9
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him
a place for the storage of smuggled cigarettes.10 Abratique brought
appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a house for rent
in Bakakeng, Baguio City. After negotiating the terms and
conditions, Ballesteros agreed to rent out his place to appellant.
Appellant then brought several boxes of purported "blue seal"
cigarettes to the leased premises.
Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes
stored in his place were not "blue seal" cigarettes but marijuana.
Fearful of being involved, Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both
later prevailed upon appellant to remove them from the premises.11
Appellant then hired Abratique’s taxi and transported the boxes of
cannabis from the Ballesteros place to appellant’s residence at
Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City.12
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to drive him to La
Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext of buying and transporting
strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant
directed Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where appellant
proceeded to load several sacks of marijuana in Abratique’s taxi.
He then asked Abratique to find him a place where he could store
the contraband.13
Abratique brought appellant to his grandmother’s house at No. 27
Dr. Cariño St., QM Subdivision, Baguio City, which was being
managed by Abratique’s aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Nazarea agreed
to rent a room to appellant. Abratique and appellant unloaded and
stored there the sacks of marijuana brought from
Sablan.14 Abratique was aware that they were transporting
marijuana as some of the articles in the sacks became exposed in
the process of loading.15
Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of
the goods stored in the rented room. She confided to her
daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their predicament. As Alice
Fianza’s brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent, Alice
and Abratique phoned him and disclosed what had transpired.16
On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by information that
appellant would retrieve the sacks of prohibited drugs that day,
Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at
No. 27, Dr. Cariño St. While the NBI agents were conducting their
surveillance, they noticed that several PNP NARCOM personnel
were also watching the place.17 The NBI then learned that the PNP
NARCOM had received a tip from one of their informers regarding
the presence of a huge amount of drugs in that place. The NBI
and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.
As the day wore on and appellant did not show up, the NBI agents
became apprehensive that the whole operation could be
jeopardized. They sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau to
enter the room rented by appellant. She acceded and allowed
them entry. The NBI team then searched the rented premises and
found four (4) boxes and thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana, totaling
336.93 kilograms.18
Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with
Abratique as his witness, applied for a search warrant from RTC
Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence.19 Judge Reyes ordered the
NBI agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah Muñoz,
so the proceedings could be properly recorded. After Atty. Muñoz
arrived, Judge Reyes questioned Lising and Abratique. Thereafter,
the judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search appellant’s
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio City for
marijuana.20
The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow,
proceeded to appellant’s residence where they served the warrant
upon appellant himself.21 The search was witnessed by appellant,
members of his family, barangay officials, and members of the
media.22 Photographs were taken during the actual search.23 The
law enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of dried marijuana24 in
the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellant’s
residence.25 The total weight of the haul was 591.81
kilograms.26 Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of
marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI laboratory for
testing. NBI Forensic Chemist Maria Carina Madrigal conducted
the tests. Detailed microscopic and chromatographic examinations
of the items taken from appellant’s rented room at No. 27, Dr.
Cariño St., as well as those from his residence at Green Valley,
showed these to be marijuana.27
In his defense, appellant contended that the physical evidence of
the prosecution was illegally obtained, being the products of an
unlawful search, hence inadmissible. Appellant insisted that the
search warrant was too general and the process by which said
warrant was acquired did not satisfy the constitutional
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover,
Abratique’s testimony, which was heavily relied upon by the judge
who issued the warrant, was hearsay.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant
that the taking of the 336.93 kilograms of marijuana was the result
of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence against
appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of the charge.
However, the trial court found that the prosecution’s evidence was
more than ample to prove appellant’s guilt in Criminal Case No.
15800-R and as earlier stated, duly convicted him of illegal
possession of marijuana and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Before us, appellant submits that the trial court erred in:
1…UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF COMPLIANCE OF (sic)
SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ISSUED AND IT BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;
2….GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING ABRITIQUE
TO TESTIFY AGAINST APPELLANT;
3…GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ABRITIQUE;
4. NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES
AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH DESPITE THE
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE
FIRST CASE.28
We find that the pertinent issues for resolution concern the
following: (1) the validity of the search conducted at the appellant’s
residence; (2) the alleged prejudice caused by the reopening of
the case and absences of the prosecution witness, on appellant’s
right to speedy trial; (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence to sustain a finding of guilt with moral certainty; and (4)
the propriety of the penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and
Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the
peace officers to search for and seize "an undetermined amount of
marijuana," was too general and hence, void for vagueness. He
insists that Abratique could already estimate the amount of
marijuana supposed to be found at appellant’s residence since
Abratique helped to transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that a search warrant is issued if a judge finds probable
cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and
not that he believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The
OSG points out that, as the trial court observed, it is impossible
beforehand to determine the exact amount of prohibited drugs that
a person has on himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined amount of
marijuana" as used in the search warrant fails to satisfy the
requirement of Article III, Section 229 of the Constitution that the
things to be seized must be particularly described. Appellant’s
contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional
requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things
to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving
the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and
thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items;30 and (2) leave
said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be
seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and
seizures.31 What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search
warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping
descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a
fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to an offense.32 However, it is not
required that technical precision of description be
required,33 particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, since the
requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant
could issue.34
Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so
wanting in particularity as to create a general warrant.35 Nor is the
description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements,
paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use,
possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to
be unconstitutional.36 A search warrant commanding peace
officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin" has been held
sufficiently particular.37
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an
undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what
is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified
character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character
and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article
is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily
impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the
circumstances.38 Thus, this Court has held that the description
"illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried
marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized.39
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar
wording, "undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp," in
our view, has satisfied the Constitution’s requirements on
particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a
conclusion of fact – not of law – by which the peace officers may
be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the
things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.40 Said warrant
imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by
the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory
searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should
be searched, as he could be guilty of violation of Republic Act No.
6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement as said
statute lists a number of offenses with respect to illegal drugs.
Hence, he contends, said warrant is a general warrant and is thus
unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly
states that appellant has in his possession and control marijuana
or Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-
98),41 and we find that it is captioned "For Violation of R.A. 6425,
as amended."42 It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that
"there is probable cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659 has been and is being
committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6,
Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City by having
in his possession and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF
MARIJUANA or INDIAN HEMP in violation of the aforementioned
law."43 In an earlier case, we held that though the specific section
of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not pinpointed, "there is no
question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause."44 Appellant’s averment is, therefore, baseless. Search
Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one offense,
namely, illegal possession of marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No.
415 (7-98) for his failure to exhaustively examine the applicant and
his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate should not
have swallowed all of Abratique’s statements – – hook, line, and
sinker. He points out that since Abratique consented to assist in
the transport of the marijuana, the examining judge should have
elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive
for squealing on appellant. Appellant further points out that the
evidence of the NBI operative who applied for the warrant is
merely hearsay and should not have been given credit at all by
Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellant’s contention is
apparent. The OSG points out that Abratique personally assisted
appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the latter’s
house and to appellant’s rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St.,
Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates personal knowledge on
Abratique’s part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be
eyewitnesses to every crime; they are allowed to present
witnesses before an examining judge. In this case, witness
Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the
NBI did not rely on hearsay information in applying for a search
warrant but on personal knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution45 and
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure46 require that the
judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses
under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not be
merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and
exhaustive.47 In the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge
Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special Investigator III
Darwin A. Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as
his witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes of the proceedings were
taken by Atty. Delilah Muñoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio City,
Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In
the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio
City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of
"notes" at "pages 7-11."48 We have thoroughly perused the records
of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere find said "notes."
The depositions of Lising and Abratique were not attached to
Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the Rules of Court.
We must stress, however, that the purpose of the Rules in
requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining
magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.49 The Bill of
Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions
be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant.
Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there
is evidence on the record showing what testimony was
presented.50 In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes
required Abratique to confirm the contents of his affidavit;51 there
were instances when Judge Reyes questioned him extensively.52 It
is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly
performed,53 absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court,54 as long as
there was substantial basis for that determination.55 Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized
are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate
depositions to support Warrant No. 415 (7-98) in his motion to
quash before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague
generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions of
the applicant and his witness. Belatedly, however, he now claims
that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said witness.56 But it is
settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds
and objections then available, existent or known, should be raised
in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.57
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lising’s knowledge of the
illicit drugs stored in appellant’s house was indeed hearsay. But he
had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal knowledge
about said drugs and their particular location. Abratique’s
statements to the NBI and to Judge Reyes contained credible and
reliable details. As the NBI’s witness, Abratique was a person on
whose statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed
description of appellant’s activities with respect to the seized drugs
was substantial. In relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was
not depending on casual rumor circulating in the underworld, but
on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44
(1937), we held that:
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has
been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused.58
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant
did not clearly indicate the place to be searched. The OSG points
out that the address stated in the warrant is as specific as can be.
The NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the premises
prepared by Abratique, thus ensuring that there would be no
mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended59 and distinguish it from other places in
the community.60 A designation or description that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the
execution of the search warrant. Appellant fails, however, to point
to any evidentiary matter in the record to support his contention.
Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellant’s mother, testified on the
search conducted but she said nothing that indicated the use of
force on the part of the NBI operatives who conducted the search
and seizure.61 What the record discloses is that the warrant was
served on appellant,62 who was given time to read it,63 and the
search was witnessed by the barangay officials, police operatives,
members of the media, and appellant’s kith and kin.64 No breakage
or other damage to the place searched is shown. No injuries
sustained by appellant, or any witness, appears on record. The
execution of the warrant, in our view, has been orderly and
peaceably performed

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio

City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, convicting appellant
MODESTO TEE alias "ESTOY" TEE of violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE MILLION
(P1,000,000.00) PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is
likewise directed to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 III.11 FACTS: hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.

Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by
GRANTING THE PHILIPPINE JAI-ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking
FRANCHISE TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A FRONTON FOR the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the
BASQUE PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA search warrant invalid.
AREA".
The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and Furthermore, While the SC held that the search warrant is illegal, the return
arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as of the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held that
‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the warrant is missing from the records of the Petition granted.
case.
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized
The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and
Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC
Co./Police District II INP and the court made a certification that the
documents were not attached immediately and that there’s nowhere in the
rules which specify when these documents are to be attached to the
records.
Petitioner’s MR was also denied
Hence, this petition praying, among others, that this Court declare the search
warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as
inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
 III.12 Quintero vs. NBI
162 SCRA 467
June 23, 1988
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
1. May 19, 1972 – Petitioner Eduardo Quintero was a delegate of the 1st District of
Leyte in the 1971 ConCon
2. He disclosed in his speech that certain persons had distributed money to some
delegates to influence them in the discharge of their functions.
3. Quintero delivered to the Concon the ‘payola” he himself received, for Concon’s
action. However, he did not reveal the names of those who gave him money.
4. Eventually, he was pressured to name them so he released a sworn statement
addressed to the Concon, mentioning the names of the persons who gave him the
“payola”.
5. In his statement, it appeared that varying amounts of money were being handed to
him by different people from different offices, some from other delegates, from
wives of representatives.
6. The then First Lady Imelda Marcos was among those implicated in Quintero’s
expose.
7. Due to this, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos denounced Quintero and made a statement
sayng that he will uncover the people behind this act making Quintero as a tool.
8. That same day/evening, NBI agents raided the house of Quintero on the basis of a
search warrant issued by the CFI Manila Judge Asuncion. NBI claimed to have
found bundles of money in Quintero’s residence.
9. NBI filed a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Quintero with the court
issuing a TRO enjoining the use in any proceeding of the objects seized by NBI
from his residence.
10. The search warrant delivered to the occupant of the searched premises was issued
in connection with the offense of “grave threats” and not “direct bribery” which was
the criminal complaint filed against Quintero.
11. The 1935 Constitution was enforced at that time of the issuance of the search
warrant which was being questioned.
The search itself that was conducted by the NBI agents who raided the house of
petitioner pursuant to the questioned search warrant was highly irregular as no members of the
household were in a position to watch them, thus they conducted the search on their own. This
procedure is held to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides that
“no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made, except in the presence of
at least one competent witness, resident of the neighborhood.”
Requirements of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were not complied with.
“The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the
person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must in
the presence of one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property.” In the case at bar, the one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party was
himself a member of the raiding party.
The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned warrant , and
the actual manner in which the search was conducted, strongly suggest that the entire
procedure ws an orchestrated movement designed to destroy Quintero’s public image with
“incriminating evidence” and that the evidence allegedly seized from his residence was
“planted” by the very raiding party that was commanded to seize such.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge is
declared NULL and VOID and of no force and effect. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by this Court on 6 June 1972 is hereby made PERMANENT. The amount of
P379,200.00 allegedly seized from the house of petitioner Quintero, now in the possession of
the Central Bank, and already demonetized, is left with Central Bank, to be disposed of, as
such, in accordance with the law and the regulations.
SO ORDERED.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned search warrant issued by the judge is null and void for
being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court

Ruling: YES. The Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search warrant issued by the
judge is null and void for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court

No relation at all can be established between the crime supposedly committed and
the evidence ordered to be seized. There was thus no ground whatsoever for the respondent
judge to claim that facts and circumstances had been established, sufficient for him to believe
that the crime being charged had been committed.

Statements of applicant and complainant did not provide sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause.
The respondent judge should have known that an application for search warrant if
based on hearsay cannot justify the issuance of a search warrant, before he issued the
questioned search warrant.
III.13 ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
petitioner

v
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent

Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent
Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command
respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts
and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso
Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn
application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition
of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in
connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification,
insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and
Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic
Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to
the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the
Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon
Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William
Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the
insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2)
carloads of documents, papers and receipts.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and
distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4)
insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section
3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search

warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the
respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents,
papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
 III.14 Stonehill v Diokno
FACTS:
Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged
to have committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace
officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as
the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the
constitution and the Rules of court by:
(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases
filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to
the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in
accordance with law; The defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners
consent; and in any event, the effects are admissible regardless of the
irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
However, by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as
paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD:
NO the search warrant is invalid.
The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the
case at bar, none of these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,”
— as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal.
Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that
the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the
search warrant issued against their corporation because petitioners are not
the proper party.

The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed,
it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.
III.15 Tenorio v CA
G. R. No. 110604 - October 10, 2003
BUENAVENTURA S. TENORIO, Acting Chief, Law Division,
MARIANO ABANILLA, Chief, Prosecution & Investigation
Division, ROMEO SARTE, Special Counsel, all of the Bureau of
Customs, P/LT. CHRISTOPHER TAMBUNGAN, Chief,
Investigation Branch RPIU-CAPCOM, P/LT. GILBERT CRUZ,
PNP-RPIU-CAPCOM, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO G. ESTRELLA, Presiding Judge,
Br. 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila,
HON. MANUEL L. VILLAMAYOR, Presiding Judge, Br. 57 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
ANTONIO COSENG, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the June 9,
1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CR No. 14090,
affirming on appeal, the January 22, 1993 Resolution2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila (now Pasig City), Branch
68, which affirmed with modification the April 7, 1992
Resolution3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Branch 57, citing the petitioners for indirect contempt in
People of the Philippines v. Antonio Coseng, Search Warrant No.
18-91 for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
This case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
On August 12, 1991, P/Lt. Christopher L. Tambungan of the RPIU
CAPCOM, Philippine National Police (PNP) applied with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of San Juan, Metro Manila, Branch
57, for the issuance of a warrant to search the dwelling of private
respondent Antonio Coseng. The private respondent was suspected
of having in his possession or control untaxed and smuggled goods,
said to be at No. 267 or 106, P. Guevarra St., San Juan, Metro
Manila. The application was docketed as People v. Antonio Coseng,
Search Warrant No. 18-91. Therein, it was prayed that a search
warrant issue to enable any agent of the law to take possession of
and bring to the Court the following articles:
1. Assorted 20 pcs. Hand-held radio (ICOM);
2. 30 pcs. of TV sets (Sanyo and Sony);
3. 40 pcs. stereo cassettes;
4. assorted betamax TV;
5. assorted radio components;
6. calculators; and
7. radio boosters.4
The court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No.
18-91 on August 12, 1991 with specific orders to the police officers
to search No. 267 or 106 P. Guevarra St., San Juan, Metro Manila,
for the articles therein described and to bring the same to the court
to be dealt with as the law requires:
ASSORTED 20 PIECES HAND-HELD RADIO (ICOM), 30 PIECES OF
TV SETS (SANYO and SONY), 40 PIECES STEREO CASSETTES,
ASSROTED (SIC) BETAMAX TV, ASSORTED RADIO COMPONENTS,
CALCULATORS, AND RADIO BOOSTERS.5
crä läwvirt ualib rä ry
The court authorized Tambungan to serve the warrant day and
night and directed that the search be made in the presence of
witnesses or barangay officials.6
cräläwvirtuali brä ry
At about 3:30 p.m. of the same day, Tambungan and some police
officers served the search warrant on a certain Johnny Corpuz who
was in the house to be searched. However, he refused to receive
the warrant. Nevertheless, the police officers conducted a search in
the presence of the barangay officials and counsel for the private
respondent Atty. Pedro Aguilar. The private respondent was
reportedly outside the country at that time.7 The search team
seized assorted articles, not only those described in the search
warrant but also other goods, enumerated and described as follows:
1. 372 pcs. Clarion Radio, packed in 21 boxes
2. 90 pcs. Tech WEM 17 microphones
3. 6 pcs. Maclin Songmate
4. 4 pcs. VM 200 HL Audio & Video Monitors
5. 104 pcs. Sony RM 50; 9 pcs. Wesstone; 38 pcs. Microphone 230
Sony RM 50; 34 pcs. VCR Stabilizer, 4 pcs. Western Playback
6. 2 pcs. ICOM Handheld Radios.8
Instead of bringing the seized goods to the court, Tambungan
called Senior Inspector Alex Bautista of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) on August 14, 1991, and reported the seizure of the goods.
Without authority from the court, Tambungan later turned over the
seized goods to P/Lt. Gilbert Cruz of the CAPCOM. He later turned
over the goods to Bautista who issued a receipt therefor:
1. 40 pcs. Sony RM 50;
2. 37 pcs. Mini-phone HD11-4;
3. 34 pcs. VCR Image Stabilizer VP-5010;
4. 34 pcs. Fuji Den Automatic Car Antenna;
5. 90 pcs. TECT Wireless Microphone Model WEM-17;
6. 21 boxes car radio AM;
7. 5 pcs. Bigstar Deluxe Car Stereo Speaker;
8. 13 pcs. Sanyo Model MW 323K;
9. 7 pcs. Maclin Karaoke;
10. 11 pcs. Weston T-2510 FM/AM StereoTuner/Amplifier;
11. 4 pcs. Weston Playback Stereo Deck PD-113;
12. 27 Boxes Sony Radio Cassettes;
13. 4 pcs. audio/TV system;
14. 2 pcs. ICOM handheld;
15. 1 pc. Opto-Electronics Inc.9
Bautista in turn turned over the goods to the Legal and
Investigation Staff Enforcement and Security Service of the BOC,
which then stored the goods at the Bureaus Warehouse No. 6.
In the meantime, Tambungan filed his return on the writ, including
an ex-parte motion praying for a post facto authority for Senior
Inspector Alex Bautista to retain custody of the seized evidence,
preparatory to the filing of a criminal complaint for violation of
Section 102 (Smuggling) of the Tariff and Customs Code against
private respondent Antonio Coseng.10 However, no such criminal
complaint for violation of the TCC was filed against the private
respondent.
On September 2, 1991, the court issued an order denying
Tambugans motion and directing him to turn over all the seized
articles to the trial court within ten days from notice of the said
order. The next day, the private respondent filed a motion with the
MeTC for the release of the seized articles, alleging that except for
13 pieces of Sanyo appliances, 27 pieces of long radio cassettes,
and 2 pieces of ICOM, the search team also seized articles from his
house which were not included in Search Warrant No. 18-91.11 In
his Answer to the Order dated September 16, 1991, Tambungan
alleged that:
3. Above-mentioned seized items were turned-over to the Bureau
of Custom for the following grounds:
a. This office has no secured and air-conditioned stock room for the
seized properties.
b. Further investigation and proper disposition of the case has been
consolidated with the legal and investigation service of the Bureau
of Custom who has jurisdiction on the implementation of the
Custom and Tariff Code of the Philippines particularly smuggling
offenses.
4. That I am aware that all evidences seized should be turned-over
to the competent authority or Bureau of Custom within a
reasonable time.12
In the meantime, seizure proceedings were instituted at the BOC,
docketed as Seizure Identification Case No. 91-379.13 On October
3, 1991, Acting District Customs Collector Buenaventura C. Maniego
issued a warrant of seizure and detention of the goods owned by
Tambungan for violation of Section 2530 of the TCC.
Acting on the motion of the private respondent, the trial court
issued an Order on October 4, 1991 directing Tambungan and the
Bureau of Customs to turn over all the seized articles to the court
within fifteen days.14 The hearing in SI No. 91-379 was reset to
October 25, 1991.
In the meantime, on October 21, 1991, during the hearing of
Cosengs motion for the return of the seized articles not included in
the search warrant issued by the trial court, it was manifested that
P/Lt. Gilbert Cruz turned over the said articles to the Chief
Enforcement and Security Service of the BOC, through Senior
Inspector Alex Baustista, who recommended that the goods be
placed in their custody. It was, likewise, manifested that a warrant
of seizure and detention over the goods had been issued by Acting
District Collector of Customs Buenaventura Maniego. The trial court
forthwith ordered Alex Bautista, Buenaventura Maniego and Gilbert
Cruz to appear before the court on November 6, 1991 at 9:00 a.m.
to explain why they should not be declared in contempt for their
failure to deliver the seized articles to the court.15 In its order, the
court stated that the seizure of the goods was made on the
strength of the search warrant issued by it; hence, the goods must
be turned over to the court. The BOC had no authority to take
custody of the seized goods until the court so ordered therefor.
During the November 6, 1991 hearing, the trial court learned that
the following articles were seized by the CAPCOM officers and
turned over to the BOC but were not included in the inventory
submitted to the court:
m) 4 pcs. Audio/TV System
n) 2 pcs. ICOM hand-held radio and
o) 1 pc. Opto-Electronics Inc.16
Consequently, Maniego and Bautista, represented by Atty.
Godofredo Bernardino, were ordered to account for the said articles
within ten days from receipt of the order of the court.17 Similarly,
the trial court ordered the BOC to surrender the seized items to the
court, including the additional missing items.18 The court warned
that failure to comply with the order would amount to indirect
contempt of court.
Maniego and Bautista failed to comply with the said order and failed
to appear during the hearing on December 2, 1991. On the said
date, the court issued an order requiring Maniego, Bautista and
their counsel to explain within five days why they should not be
declared in contempt of court for such failure to comply with the
order.19 The hearing for contempt was reset to December 17, 1991.
Maniego, Bautista and Bernardino once more failed to comply with
the order of the court. The hearing was again reset to January 30,
1992. On the said date, the court issued an order requiring
Tambungan and Cruz to explain within five days from notice why
they should not be punished for contempt for turning over the
custody of the seized goods to the BOC without court authority.
Again, Maniego was ordered to turn over the items to the court
within five days from notice thereof.20 On January 22, 1992,
Tenorio furnished the Chief of the Enforcement Security Service of
the Bureau of Customs with an undated and unsigned copy of the
decision purportedly rendered by District Customs Collector Emma
M. Rosqueta in Seizure Identification Case No. 91-379, forfeiting all
the goods kept by Tambungan in favor of the government to be
disposed of in the manner provided for by law.
During the hearing of the contempt incident on February 1, 1992,
Maniego, Bautista and their counsel failed to appear. The court
issued an order requiring them to explain why they should not be
held in contempt for such failure to appear. Attys. Buenaventura S.
Tenorio and Emma M. Rosqueta were likewise ordered to explain in
writing within five days why, notwithstanding BOCs lack of
jurisdiction, the confiscation of the seized items was ordered.21 On
February 18, 1992, Tambungan and Cruz filed their Joint
Manifestation that:
. . . [T]he reason why we have turned over because basically during
the search there was coordination with the Bureau of Custom
agents and the laws which we believed that being violated by the
accused lies upon the Tariff and Custom Code whose jurisdiction
confined with the Bureau of Custom to prosecute the same, unless
there is a written approval authorizing this unit to prosecute the
case hence, we have no alternative, but to turn-over the item
subject of this case; furthermore, in our command we have no
warehouse wherein which said item should be embarked thereof,
thereby exposing said item into damage if we have taken custody hand-held radios, all of the articles seized were not covered or
of the aforesaid item therefore we have turned over the item seized included in Search Warrant No. 18-91 issued by the Court.
thereof;
3.1. Of the total twenty-seven (27) boxes of SONY radio cassettes
2.) That the turn-over made to the Bureau of Custom does not and nine (9) pieces of SANYO radio cassettes seized, twenty-three
violate the provision of the Rules of Court and particularly under (23) boxes of the twenty-seven (27) Sony radio cassettes were part
Sec. 11, Rule 126 since the Bureau of Custom is the agency whom of the assorted electronics, together with the nine (9) pieces Sanyo
[sic] authorized to prosecute the case being the laws which is radio cassettes, bought by Mr. Antonio Coseng and his partner, Mr.
violated by the accused fall within the Tariff and Custom Code, and Eddie Uy, from Mr. Raul R. Estrella, a winning bidder in an Auction
that our personality were just witness to the said case hence this Sale held by the Bureau of Customs on 28 June 1984 under Lot No.
written manifestation in compliance to an order dated 30th January 11 of the Notice of Sale dated 13 June 1984. (Please see Exhs. "1"
1992.22cräläwvirtual ibrä ry to "1-I"). Four (4) of the twenty-seven (27) boxes were bought
from Mr. Eddie Uy, a winning bidder in an Auction Sale held on May
On February 28, 1992, the court again ordered the BOC to turn 31, 1990, under Sale Lot No. 3.
over the goods within 10 days.23 Solicitor Herminio R. Miranda,
counsel for the BOC, manifested to the court that the seized articles 3.2 The two (2) pieces of ICOM hand-held radios seized are duly
would be turned over to the court within the said period. In the registered with the National Telecommunications Commission.26
meantime, a warrant of arrest was issued against Cruz for his
failure to appear before the court during the hearing. 24 The private The private respondent also stated that the other articles seized by
respondent was likewise required to submit documents to prove Tambungan were acquired by him lawfully, thus:
that the seized goods were not acquired in violation of the law.
ARTICLES SOURCE
During the March 10, 1992 hearing on the contempt charge, Atty.
Sarte, special counsel of the BOC, manifested to the court that the
BOC would turn over the seized articles to the court. However, Atty. 1) 572 pcs. of Clarion a) Auction Sale
Sarte failed to do so, explaining that the BOC, after assessing the radio packed in 21 conducted by the
facts and in light of the opinion of Atty. Mariano Abanilla, BOC Chief boxes Bureau of Customs on 9
of the Prosecution Division, decided to retain custody of the goods.
July 1981. . . .
Thus, Atty. Sarte and Solicitor Miranda were ordered to submit to
the court their respective memoranda on the incidents prior to
March 31, 1992. Attys. Tenorio and Rosqueta were ordered to b) Some were bought
manifest whether they would adopt Solicitor Mirandas memoranda. from Bombay Bazar, a
The court also ordered Attys. Abanilla, Tenorio, Maniego, Rosqueta,
winning bidder in an
Cruz, Tambungan and Bautista to appear before the court on March
31, 1992.25 For his part, the private respondent filed a compliance
Auction Sale held on 7
stating that of the goods seized by Tambungan and the other police July 1981. . . .
officers the rest of the goods seized were not covered by the search
warrant issued by the court:
2) 90 pcs. TECT WEM 17 Bureau of Customs
3. On the face of the Return of the Writ, it is self-evident that microphone Auction Sale on 30 Sept.
except for nine (9) pieces of SANYO radio cassettes, twenty-seven 1987. . . .
(27) boxes of SONY radio cassettes and two (2) pieces of ICOM
 On April 8, 1992, the court issued a resolution holding the
3) 6 pcs. MACLIN 1 pc. Maclin Electronics. . . .
respondents therein guilty of indirect contempt. The decretal
Songmate portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the following are declared to have committed

4) 4 pcs. VM 200 XL Pengson International
INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT and are therefore sentenced as
Audio/Video Monitor Trading Corporation. . . . follows:

P/LT. CHRISTOPHER L. TAMBUNGAN, for his utter disregard of

5) 104 pcs. Sony RM-50 Part of the Auction Sale
Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and his unwarranted turn
9 pcs. Weston held on 28 June 1984 over of the seized articles to the Bureau of Customs to suffer the
38 pcs. Mini-phone under Sale Lot No. 11 of penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS imprisonment (Aresto [sic] Mayor) and
230 pcs. Sony RM-50 the Notice of Sale dated a FINE of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;
34 pcs. VCR Image 13 June 1984. . . .27
Stabilizer P/LT. GILBERT CRUZ, for his participation in the illegal turn over to
4 pcs. Western suffer ONE (1) MONTH imprisonment (Aresto [sic] Menor);
playback
ATTYS. MARIANO ABANILLA and ROMEO SARTE, are each
5 pcs. Big Star sentenced to pay a FINE of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;
Speaker ATTY. ROMEO SARTE for his promise and failure to accomplish his
promise to turn over the articles to this Court and ATTY. MARIANO
Copies of documents showing how the aforesaid goods were ABANILLA, for his order of refusal to turn over the articles as
acquired were also appended therein. promised;

On March 18, 1992, the public respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed their Memorandum, contending that they
should not be cited for contempt for the following reasons:
a) No criminal complaint or information was filed with the court in
connection with the goods seized by virtue of the search warrant.
As such, there was no basis for the court to proceed criminally
against the claimants and/or the goods;
ATTYS. BUENAVENTURA S. TENORIO and EMMA M. ROSQUETA, as
Chief of the Prosecution Division, Bureau of Customs, Manila, and
District Collector, Port Area, Manila, respectively, for their
contemptous [sic] act of ordering the confiscation of the articles
sans jurisdiction or authority and while this case is being heard
before this Court; are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period of THIRTY (30) DAYS and to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND
(P2,000.00) PESOS.

b) It is the BOC alone that decides the course of action to take
against the claimants and/or the goods; and,
c) Since there was already a decision which validated the seizure
and forfeiture proceedings, the goods belonged to the government.
Until the reversal of the BOC decision, the court may not make any
disposition of the seized goods; hence, the failure of the public
respondents to turn over the goods to the court did not constitute
indirect contempt of court.
By reason of their continued refusal to surrender the seized articles
in defiance of the orders of this Court and being the ones capable
and responsible for the surrender of the seized articles; Attys.
Buenaventura S. Tenorio and Emma M. Rosqueta in addition and
independently of the foregoing, must be held in the custody of the
Court indefinitely until they shall have complied with the orders of
this court; but considering that only a superior court can order the
Warrant of Arrest for the indefinite detention of these Customs
Officials until they shall have obeyed the orders of this Court,
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; let the records of
this case be forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila, for the issuance of the proper Warrants of Arrest against
Attys. Emma M. Rosqueta and Buenaventura S. Tenorio.
...
Let a copy of this Order likewise be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever action they wish to take on the basis of
the foregoing.28
cräläwvirtuali brä ry
The trial court ratiocinated that there was a well-grounded fear that
the seized articles no longer existed. The court stated that it had
reason to believe that the respondents refusal to turn over the
articles seized was due to the fact that they had already been lost.
Thus, for their continued and contumacious failure to turn over the
goods as ordered, the respondents therein were held in contempt of
court.
Aggrieved, the therein respondents filed notices of appeal on April
10 and 11, 1992.29 On July 21, 1992, the RTC issued a resolution
affirming with modification the resolution of the MeTC. The RTC
explained its ruling, thus:
The acts of the public respondents in its deliberate failure to turn
over the seized articles to the inferior Court (which was the Court
that issued the search warrant) within the time frame mandated by
law is highly irregular. The public respondents particularly the police
officers who seized the items listed in the inventory instead turned
it over to the Bureau of Customs without any permission from the
issuing Court. This Court, however, takes note of the fact that the
Acting Collector of Customs, Port Area, Manila, thru respondent, the
appellant, Emma Rosqueta issued a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention on October 3, 1991 per Seizure Identification No. 91-379
while the order to turn over the seized items was issued by the
Court on October 4, 1991 or one day after the warrant of seizure
and detention was issued by the Bureau of Customs. Likewise, the
Court takes note of the fact that the Orders of the inferior Court
were received by the Bureau of Customs as of October 14, 1991
(Decision, p. 226, third par.). This readily explains the reason why
the public respondents herein could not have turned over the seized
goods to the inferior Court. While this maybe true, public
respondents, Emma Rosqueta and Buenaventura Tenorio should
have exercised prudence and the necessary precaution before
issuing the warrant of seizure and detention. They are presumed as
the Court perceives they are fully aware that the seized items which
were the objects of the warrant of seizure and detention issued
were seized as a consequence of the issuance of the search warrant
made by the inferior Court. Being lawyers, both respondents are
presumed to know that after any search warrant is implemented,
the same shall be returned to the issuing Court together with the
seized articles and an inventory shall be conducted. Likewise, both
respondents who are members of the Bar should know as they are
presumed to know that before any seized articles object of a search
warrant may be retained by any person or entity aside from or
apart from the issuing Court, Court approval must first be obtained.
It is for this reason that this Court feels that the public respondents
action as found by the inferior Court are plainly and simply
contumacious and was lone in complete disregard of the integrity
and authority of a judicial body.30
...
WHEREFORE, the Court finds nothing in the questioned resolution of
the inferior Court which may be considered reversible errors.
However, and because justice should be tempered with mercy, this
Court hereby affirms the findings of the inferior Court with the
following modifications:
1. As to respondent P/LT. CHRISTOPHER L. TAMBUNGAN, for his
utter disregard of Section 11, Rules 126 of the Rules and his
unjustified failure to turn over the seized articles to the Court, he is
hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency or failure to pay such fine;
2. As to respondent P/LT. GILBERT CRUZ, for his participation in the
unwarranted turn over of the seized goods to the Bureau of
Customs, he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or failure to pay the
same;
3. As to respondents Attys. Mariano [Abanilla] and Romeo Sarte,
each are sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency or failure to pay such fine for his
promise and failure to accomplish his undertaking and commitment
to turn over the articles to the lower Court and Atty. Mariano
Abanilla for his order of refusal to turn over the articles as
promised;
4. As to respondents Attys. Buenaventura S. Tenorio and Emma M.
Rosqueta, as Chief of the Prosecution Division, Bureau of Customs,
Manila, and District Collector, Port Area, Manila, respectively, for
their contemptuous act of ordering the confiscation of the articles
sans jurisdiction or authority are each sentenced to pay a fine
of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or
failure to pay said fine.
Costs against the respondents.31 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the said resolution. On January 22, 1993, the
RTC rendered a Resolution, granting respondent Rosquetas motion,
thus:
WHEREFORE, respondent Rosquetas motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED and she is hereby acquitted of the contempt charge. The
inferior courts resolution dated April 7, 1992 is reversed and set
aside insofar as it finds her guilty of contempt.32
cräläwvirtual ibrä ry
The RTC ruled that Rosqueta was not the signatory in the warrant
of search and seizure issued by the BOC. Likewise, it was found
that there was no restraining order which prevented Rosqueta from
exercising her statutory functions as Collector of Customs. The
court found that the January 20, 1992 Order of the MeTC was not
used as the basis for the declaration of contempt. Furthermore, the
said order was apparently not received by Rosqueta.33
cräläwvi rtual ibrä ry
Meanwhile, the other respondents filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14090, alleging
that:
I search and seizure of goods. Hence, it behooved the court to grant
The assailed Resolutions, including all the Orders to turn-over
seized items to court, are not only unlawful but also uncompliable.
II
Respondent court acted in excess of jurisdiction in the imposition of
penalties on petitioners. 34
On June 19, 1993, the CA rendered a decision denying the petition
with modifications:
WHEREFORE, except for the penalty in excess of P100.00 which is
hereby declared void, the petition is DENIED.35 c räläwvi rtua lib räry
The CA ruled that the goods seized by Tambungan were in custodia
legis. Tambungan was mandated by Section 11, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court to deliver the goods seized to the court that issued
the search warrant. The said warrant was applied for and issued for
the prosecution and conviction of the accused for possession of
smuggled goods, an offense under Section 3601 of the TCC.
According to the appellate court, the disposition of the seized goods
is but a consequence of the said criminal proceedings. Moreover,
only the court that rendered judgment in the criminal case may
order its release. Invoking the jurisdiction of the court and inducing
it to issue a search warrant on the ground that an offense had been
committed, only to later repudiate the authority of the court after
the warrant had already been implemented, and the goods seized,
is a reprehensible act, constituting an unlawful interference of the
courts custody of the goods seized as objects of the crime.
Petitioners Tambungan and Cruz had even promised to turn over
the goods to the court, only to later renege on such promise.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed the petition at bar, asserting that
contrary to the ruling of the CA, the search warrant was applied for
and issued by the court to enforce the administrative authority of
the Bureau of Customs over the res. Under the Tariff and Customs
Code (TCC), the role of the courts is merely to aid in the
implementation of the customs laws, via the issuance of a search
warrant, when the items are concealed in a house or dwelling.
According to the petitioners, the Collector of Customs (COC) had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases,
particularly on the determination of the legality or illegality of the
petitioner Tambungans motion to deliver the goods to the BOC. The
State had a lien over the goods seized, and the enforcement of the
said lien over the goods, which was covered by a judicial warrant
and/or warrant of seizure and detention, is a matter purely within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the BOC. The petitioners
assert that the MeTC may not interfere therein by ordering the
release of the goods especially after a decree of forfeiture had
already been issued, and a decision thereon already rendered by
the BOC. They insist that it was the COC who issued a writ of
seizure and detention to the exclusion of the court, and ordered the
release of the said goods; hence, petitioners Tambungan and Cruz
could not have complied with the orders of the court to turn over
the goods seized.
The petition is denied.
Rule 126, Section 11(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. - The
officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly
verified under oath.
The duty of petitioner Tambungan to deliver the items seized by
him to the court which issued the search warrant is mandatory in
character. This is evident by the use in the rule of the word "must."
The rule is not merely a piddling procedural rule. The requirement
is to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties
or the tampering thereof,36 or the loss of such goods due to the
negligence of the officers effecting the seizure or their deliberate
acts. On the face of the search warrant issued by the court,
petitioners Tambungan and Cruz were "commanded to bring the
goods described therein to the court to be dealt with as the law
requires." The officers enforcing the search warrant were acting on
orders of the court; hence, were under its supervision and
control.37 The Court has inherent disciplinary power over such
officers and can thus enforce its powers against them. Such officers
may not retain possession and custody of the items seized unless
with the approval of the court that issued the warrant.38 Absent
such approval, the said officers had no authority to deliver the
items seized to another person or agency of the government. If the
items seized are delivered to others or another government agency
without the approval of the court that issued the search warrant,
goods are not considered in the custody of the court.39 If the
officers enforcing the warrant refuse to turn over the goods, as
ordered by the court, they may be cited for indirect contempt under
Rule 71, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court which reads:
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts
or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;40
cräläwvirt ualib rä ry
Case law has it that the court which issued the search warrant
acquires jurisdiction over the items seized under the said warrant.
Goods seized lawfully on the basis of the said warrant or its
accepted exceptions are in custodia legis.41 Only that court which
issued the warrant may order the release or disposition
thereof.42 The jurisdiction, custody and control of the court over the
items seized cannot be interfered with even by the BOC via a
warrant of seizure and detention issued by the COC over the said
goods.
In this case, petitioner Tambungan and Cruz of the CAPCOM turned
over the seized goods to Senior Inspector Alex Bautista of the BOC,
who, in turn, delivered the goods to the Legal and Investigation and
Security Service of the BOC without any authority from the court.
Although petitioner Tambungan filed an ex parte motion for
Bautista to retain possession and custody of the goods, the court
denied the said motion and ordered him and Bautista to turn over
the goods to the court as mandated by the Rules of Court and as
stated in the warrant. Not only did the petitioner deprive the court
of its custody of the goods; the petitioner simply refused to comply
with the courts orders.
Petitioners Tambungan and Cruz secured the search warrant from
the court with full awareness of their concomitant duty under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure to turn over the goods described in the
said warrant to the court. By their acts, the petitioners defied the
Rules of Court, repudiated their mandate, and abused and
demeaned court processes. As aptly ruled by the CA:
Invoking the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court and
inducing the latter to issue a search warrant on the ground that an
offense has been committed, only to later on repudiate the
authority of the judge thereunder after a search and seizure
pursuant thereto has been made is reprehensible and constitutes an
unlawful interference with the Courts lawful custody of what has
been lawfully seized as objects of a crime. This should not receive
the sanction of this Court.
The refusal of petitioners to comply with the lawful and mandatory
obligation imposed by the search warrant which they themselves
obtained from the Court, to deliver the property seized to the judge
who issued the warrant after denial of their motion to retain
custody, and order for them to deliver the property to the judge
who issued the warrant as mandated by the rules constitutes not
only a gross abuse of the process of the Court but a defiance of the
authority, justice and dignity of the court which both respondent
judge properly found as contempt of court.43 cräläwvirtua lib räry
A search warrant may issue to respond to an incident in the main
case if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation
thereof.44 In this case, petitioner Tambungan secured the search
warrant in anticipation of the private respondents prosecution for
violation of the TCC (smuggling of goods) and not for the purpose
of enforcing the administrative authority of the BOC for the seizure
and confiscation of the goods in favor of the government. The
release and disposition of the goods seized were for the court in the
criminal case to delve into and resolve. Until the institution of the
appropriate criminal action with the proper court, the court which
issued the search warrant retained custody and control of the goods
seized. The issuing court had exclusive jurisdiction to delve into and
resolve issues thereon, such as the legality of the seizure of the
goods and the release and disposition of the goods seized.45 The
court may even receive evidence in connection with the motion filed
by the aggrieved party for the return of the goods seized.
As it was, the private respondent alleged that many of the goods
seized by petitioner Tambungan were not covered by the said
warrant. He procured some of them through a public auction sale
conducted by the BOC. Some of the items seized were not even
included in the inventory of the goods submitted by petitioner
Tambungan. This prompted the private respondent to file a motion
for the release of the goods to him, including the missing items.
Thus, the Court had to order the petitioner to account for the goods
seized based on the warrant and determine whether or not the
allegations of the private respondent were true. Only the court
which issued the warrant, and not the BOC, could resolve the
motion, absent any criminal action filed in connection with the said
warrant. To enable the court to resolve the private respondents
pending motion, it was imperative that the goods be brought before
it.
The petitioners intractable refusal to produce the goods and turn
over the same to the court generated veritable suspicion that the
items seized were no longer available, and that the seizure
proceedings in the BOC was merely an afterthought to cover up for
the their loss:
Parenthetically, the contumacious refusal of petitioners to deliver
the seized merchandise to the custody of the Court has generated
the suspicions that the merchandise is no longer available and that
the seizure proceedings is merely a cover-up. The MTC observed:
Acting on the well grounded fear that the seized articles may have
already disappeared, the Criminal Investigation Service of the San
Juan Police Department, PNP, is hereby ordered to conduct an
investigation leading to the filing of the corresponding criminal
charges for Theft or Infidelity against the parties concerned. ...
The private respondent, on the other hand , pointed out:
21. The trial court was correct in saying that the seized articles at
the time that they were ordered turned over to the Court, no longer
existed, hence, the overt cover-up. Consider this string of events:
a) The police officers, instead of turning over the articles to the
Court, immediately delivered the same to the Bureau of Customs
and only thereafter did they ask the Court for authority to retain
the same;
b) The Bureau, thru its lawyers, repeatedly promised in open court
that they will deliver the seized goods only to renege for [sic] the
flimsy and ridiculous reason that the Court had no air-conditioned
warehouse in which the goods could be kept; and,
c) The abrupt order of confiscation dated 20 January 1992 issued
by Rosqueta, the icing on the case, so to speak.
22. All the foregoing were part of a conspiracy to cover up the mess
created by the illegal seizure of the goods belonging to the accused
which, from all indications, appear to have been lost. Having
participated therein, nay, having given the coup de grace to that
conspiracy, petitioners were aptly held in contempt of Court. ...
The foregoing observations all the more render imperative the
surrender of the seized items to the custody of the court who
ordered their seizure upon application of one of the petitioner
himself. After all, the court may be presumed to know how to
properly dispose of the case in accordance with law, if said
merchandise are really smuggled items.46 cräläwvirtua lib räry

In People v. CFI, et al.,47 the Court held that "it is not for this Court
to do less than it can to implement and enforce the mandates of the
customs and revenue laws. The evils associated with tax evasion
must be stamped out."48 But the Court emphasized that the
campaign to stamp out tax evasion should be without disregard of
any constitutional right of private persons to unreasonable search
and seizure.49crä läwvirt uali brä ry

The petitioners aver that this Court has held that, conformably with
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the question of seizure and
detention as well as the forfeiture of imported goods is for the COC
to determine at the first instance, and may later be appealed to the
Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax
Appeals. The petitioners also assert that the Court has also ruled
that the COC has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and detention
as well as forfeiture cases, the determination of the ownership of
the goods and/or the legality of their acquisition, and the legality or
illegality of the warrant of seizure and detention issued by the
Collector. Thus, even the ordinary courts may not deprive the COC
of his jurisdiction therefor.

The contention of the petitioners is based on a wrong premise and

does not hold water. Indisputably, the Collector of Customs has
exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and detention
proceedings and that the regular courts cannot interfere with nor
deprive him of such jurisdiction. However, as correctly held by the
CA, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector on the said
goods pertains only to the goods seized pursuant to the authority
under the TCC. Goods seized on the basis of a search warrant
issued by the court under Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure are in custodia legis, subject to the control and
disposition of the court that issued the search warrant. The court
may not be divested of its jurisdiction over the goods by a warrant
of seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Customs; and of
its jurisdiction to dispose and release the goods as the Constitution,
the law and the Rules of Criminal Procedure so mandate.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
III.16 PDEA v Brodett
G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an
enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
(Republic Act No. 9165)that are the property of a third person are
subject to be returned to the lawful ownerwho is not liable for the
unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects
pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett)
and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation
to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-
208,the accusatory portion of the information for which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each
other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give away to
another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M)
logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another information
charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No.
9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the information
alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized
by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10)
transparent capsules containing white powdery substance
contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet
having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results
for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known
as "Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing white powdery substance with total recorded
net weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to
laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing white powdery substance, placed in a light-
yellow folded paper, with total recorded net weight of
2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of
COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of
54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009,
Brodett filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He averred
that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects from
him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-
551;and that PDEArefused to return his personal effects despite
repeated demands for their return. He prayed that his personal
effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to himupon
verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its
Comment and Objection,5 proposingthereby that the delivery to the
RTC of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there
throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the
Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary
value. The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of
the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the
commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its
being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous
drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized
officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the
abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its
rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be fully
documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this
Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to
this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion
was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of
the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of
Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders of
the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing
the petition for certiorari thusly:
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this
petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear
from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been
charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of
possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of
the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason
why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from
confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject
car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to
Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the
law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a
contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of
judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters
that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal
interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a
person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
 Issues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in
accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers
of R. A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its
ruling; that the Honda Accord car, registered under the name of
Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused
Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal operation and should not be
released from the custody of the law;that the Motion to Return
Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had
belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged
to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto
authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to
prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of
the crime.
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to
present any question of law that warranted a review by the
Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally
states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the
Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds or
instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the
third person must still prove in the trial court that he has no
knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to
exhaust all remedies before filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
orderfor the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court
having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon
conviction of an accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to
commit the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects
that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b)
contraband, the ownership or possession of which is not permitted
for being illegal. As justification for the first, the accused must not
profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or the right to
possession of property through his unlawful act.12 As justification
for thesecond, to return to the convict from whom thecontraband
was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or proper,
because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for
possessing the contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has theright to dispose of property
used in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an
accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the
property belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it
was used as the instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the
convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the
Government.15 But it is required that the property to be forfeited
must be before the court in such manner that it can be said to be
within its jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized
in connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search
warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If
the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property
that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense;
or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds,
or fruits of the offense; orthat which has been used or intended to
be used as the means of committing an offense.17 If the search is
an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous
proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be no
ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized
is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was
taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a
matter of course,19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A
proper court may order the return of property held solely as
evidence should the Government be unreasonably delayed in
bringing a criminal prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of
such property can be made only when the case is finally
terminated.21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal
discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as
evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to the manner of
proceeding in the event the accused claims the property was
wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial court has the
power to return property held as evidence to its rightful owners,
whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the
Government.24 Property used as evidence must be returned once
the criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated,
unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.25
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged
to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the
illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and
Joseph that were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the
RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation
and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the proceeds
and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not
limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the
instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was
committed unless they are the property of a third person not liable
for the unlawful act." Simply put, the law exempts from the effects
of confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third
person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this
petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear
from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been
charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of
possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of
the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason
why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from
confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear
and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the
same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be
resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject
car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to
Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the
law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a
contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of
judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters
that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal
interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee
that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of
the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act, including the
properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous
drugs and precursors and essential chemicals,is Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or
Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty
imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture
of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of
dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the
confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the
proceeds derived from unlawful act, including, but not limited to,
money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or
tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed, unless
they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful
act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of
this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate
criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing
for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense
and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or
held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall
be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful
income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a
vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days
upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no
property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated
and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the
same shall be in custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for
the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property
confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all
proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation,
forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending
disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs.
The proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall accrue to the
Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that
the text of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation
and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is
similar to that ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of theCrime. – Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it
was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of
a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which
are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised
Penal Codein People v. Jose,28 concerning the confiscation and
forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed
theforcible abduction with rape, although the car did not belong to
any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and
forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the
crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court
below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set
aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the
intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra.
To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a
third person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such
third person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less
than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and
instruments to the third person, for a mere suspicion of that
person’s participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order
the forfeiture of the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits
Comment and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the
RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for
safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial,
would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust
their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor
further objected to the return of the car because it appeared to
bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous
drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission of the
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in
accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers
of R. A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car should not be
released from the custody of the law because it had been seized
from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It
argues that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not
intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and
that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person,
her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because
she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no
knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists that the car is
a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return
Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal
proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be
completed. Ordering the release of the car at that pointof the
proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph
of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation,
or transfer of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has
been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165
during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or
income derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all that
time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a
part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of
whetheror not the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to
the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only
when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings.
Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to
the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTCas being in
custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to
ensure its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is
rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as
evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be
taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not
fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the
RTC’s assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in
contravention with the express language of Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the
RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It appears thaton August
26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in
Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209,
acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return
to the accused of all non-drug evidence except the buy-bust
money and the genuine money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in
the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot
merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official function in view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the
corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should
bow down to the presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence,
the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate
Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. this decision to all trial courts for their guidance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution SO ORDERED.

to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y
JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.

The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust money
and the genuine money are ordered returned to the accused.

The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the
genuine money confiscated from both accused are ordered
escheated in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted
to the National Treasury for proper disposition. (emphasis
supplied)33

The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the

petition for review as to render further action upon it superfluous.
Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to
formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation and forfeiture of
non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not
liable for the offense, in order to clarify the extent of the power of
the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.34 This the Court
must now do in view of the question about the confiscation and
forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition in the
future.351âwphi1

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply

strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and
should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the
duration of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even
if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.

III.17 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JOSE RUBIO, defendant-appellant.
Guillermo B. Guevara for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Judge Moran presiding, denying appellant's motion to
declare null and void a search warrant issued on December 26,
1930, and to have returned to him the books of account, invoices,
and records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. The case
was originally assigned to a Division of Five and was there
decided, but subsequently, on representations being made that
the interpretation of an Act of Congress was involved, the Division
ordered its decision set aside and the transfer of the case to the
court in banc.
The Administrative Code, section 1434, grants police power to
internal revenue agents. Acting pursuant to this authority, the chief
secret service agent and a supervising agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue gave testimony under oath before Judge Revilla,
in which they specified the premises situated at No. 129 Calle
Juan Luna, District of Binondo, City of Manila, occupied by Jose
Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, which it was
desired to search. The witnesses, among other things, stated:
It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered
reliable that in said premises there are fraudulent books,
invoices and records.
I have watched personally the foregoing house for several
times in company of the complainant and I can assert
positively and with a probable case that the prohibited
fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being
conducted in the said house, and the occupant of the
same keeps in his possession effects and devices to wit:
Fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation & to
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation &
New York Trading Corp.
Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search warrant was
issued in the usual from, reading as follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE
CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff, }
VERSUS
JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex Trading
Corporation, Paramount Corporation and
New York Trading
Corporation, defendant. }
The People of the Philippine Islands, to the Internal
Revenue Agents of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made
before me, E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
by the complainant on oath of Juan Evaristo and
Augusto Piccio of the City of Manila, P. I., that the
defendant Jose Rubio keeps illegally and
feloniously fraudulent books, invoices and records,
and that he verily believes upon probable cause
that the said books, invoices and records, at No.
129, Calle Juan Luna in the City of Manila, P. I.,
and the said (personal) property is now being used
in the commission of felony.
 You are therefore commanded to take with you the
necessary and proper assistance and to enter, in
the day time or in the night time, into the said
dwelling house and there diligently search for
fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that
you seize and bring them before this court, to be
disposed of according to law.
Given under my hand this 26th day of December,
1930.
(Sgd.) E. P. REVILLA
Judge, Court of First Instance
On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place
indicated in the warrant, searched the premises, and took
therefrom books, invoices, and documents belonging to the
Simplex Trading Corporation of which Jose Rubio was the
manager. Thereafter, as indicated, a motion was presented on
behalf of Rubio to secure a pronouncement of nullity of the search
warrant, which motion, after receiving memoranda in support and
in opposition but without taking evidence, was denied.
The particular portions of the Act of Congress which are relied
upon are found in the Philippine Bill of Rights, being paragraphs 3
and 11 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
commonly referred to as the Philippine Autonomy Act. These
portions of the Organic Act Provide: "That the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated"
(sec. 3, par. 11); and "That no person shall . . . be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself" (sec. 3, par. 3).
The applicable statutory provisions are sections 95, 96, 97, 98,
and 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reading as follows:
SEC. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in
the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by
a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court.
SEC. 96. It may be issued upon either of the following
grounds:
1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.
2. When it was used or when the intent exists to
use it as the means of committing a felony.
SEC. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except for
probable cause and upon application supported by oath
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized.
SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the
warrant, examine on oath the complaint and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in writing.
SEC. 99. If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the
existence of facts upon which the application is based, or
that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
following form:
The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the order of the
trial court, the statement of the case, and the law as herein set
forth, are the following:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search
warrant was illegal and void for failure to observe the
constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its
issue.
2. The lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant
were illegal and void appellant's books and papers might
be retained because they were proper subjects for seizure
under a search warrant.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the seizure of
appellant's books and papers was made solely for the
purpose of using them as evidence against him in a
criminal prosecution and was, therefore, unlawful.
The point made in the first error was not originally passed upon
the trial court, and is plainly without merit. The requirements of the
law were substantially, and even literally, complied with in this
case. Appellant's contention that the search warrant was issued
without the complainants or any witnesses having been examined,
is untenable. The depositions speak for themselves. It is also
contended that the application and the warrant did not particularly
describe the things to be seized. The verified statements of the
two internal revenue agents and the warrant issued by the Court of
First Instance of Manila all describe the property sought to be
seized as "fraudulent books, invoices and records". While it is true
that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder,
yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow. It has been held that, where, by
the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant
has not shown that the internal revenue agents exceeded their
powers under the warranty by seizing property other than that
described in the warrant question. The list of books, invoices, and
records seized by said officers is the best evidence to show that
they strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing those
things, and only those described in the search warrant.
Under the second error, it is claimed that "the books, invoices, and
records seized are property which one may lawfully possess; they
were searched and seized solely for the purpose of using them as
evidence to prove an offense supposed to have been committed
by appellant against the internal revenue customs laws, which
search and seizure for the purpose intended is prohibited by law."
Reliance is placed on the Philippine cases of Regidor vs.
Araullo ([1904], 5 Off. Gaz., 955); Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real
([1920], 42 Phil., 886); and United States vs. De los Reyes and
Esguerra ([1911], 20 Phil., 467). An examination of the first two
cited cases reveals that the seizures made under the warrants
issued therein were irregular and manifestly in violation of law. In
the first case, for instance, the court observed:
A causal examination of the property mentioned in the
affidavit and the list of books, papers, and documents
actually seized by the said officers, as represented by their
signed statement, above quoted, will show that the
officers, in executing the said search warrant, did not limit
themselves, in seizing property, to that which was
described in the affidavit or search warrant.
(Regidor vs. Araullo, supra.)
In the second case, the court said:
The important question that remains to be decided is
whether, under a search warrant for opium, the officers of
the law were authorized to seize books, personal letters,
and other property having a remote or no connection with
opium. (Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, supra.)
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the seizures made
were in excess of the authority given to the seizing officers. In the
case at bar, however, it has been shown that the internal revenue
agents strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing no
other property than that described therein.
In the third case cited by the appellant, that of United
States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, supra, the holding was that
no public officer has the right to enter the premises of another for
the purpose of search or seizure against the will of the occupant
and without the proper search warrant. This case is entirely foreign
to the point under discussion, inasmuch as in the instant case a
search warrant was issued. From the above, it will be seen that the
three Philippine cases relied upon by the appellant rest upon
different facts from those in the case at bar.
After the decision in Division had been promulgated, the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court of April 11, 1932, delivered in
the case of United States of America vs. Daniel M. Lefkowitz and
Pauline Paris was received, and it is now urged that this opinion is
controlling. Of course, if the opinion, on examination, be found to
support the views of the appellant, it would become our duty, even
as against any pride which one might have in maintaining a
position previously taken, to change front to conform to the
pronouncements of the higher court. Turning to the opinion just
mentioned, we find it said: "All the searches and seizures were
made without a search warrant" — in contrast, the searches and
seizures in the case at bar were made with a search warrant.
Further, it was said: "The only question presented is whether the
searchers of the desks, cabinet and baskets and the seizures of
the things taken from them were reasonable as an incident of the
arrests" — an entirely different state of facts from those before us.
Again, it was said: "The Fourth Amendment forbids every search
that is unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the
right of privacy" — an admonition which should be respected in
this jurisdiction where constitutional rights are as sacred as in the
United States proper. Finally, a contrast was suggested between
the search of one's house or place of business made
contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid
warrant of arrest and a search warrant, and it was said:
Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely
for use as evidence of crime of which respondents were
accused or suspected. They could not lawfully be
searched for and taken even under a search warrant
issued upon ample evidence and precisely describing such
things and disclosing exactly where they were.
(Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 310.)
xxx xxx xxx
Here, the searches were exploratory and general and
made solely to find evidence of respondents' guilt of the
alleged conspiracy or some other crime. Though intended
to be used to solicit orders for liquor in violation of the Act,
the papers and other articles found and taken were in
themselves unoffending. The decisions of this court
distinguish searchers of one's house, office, papers or
effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime from
searches as such as those made to find stolen goods for
return to the owner, to take property that has been forfeited
to the Government, to discover property concealed to
avoid payment of the duties for which it is liable, and from
searches such as those made for the seizure of counterfeit
coins, burglars' tools, gambling paraphernalia and illicit
liquor in order to prevent the commission of crime.
We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on previous
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Gouled vs. United
States ([1920], 255 U. S., 298), and Go-Bart Importing Co. vs.
United States ([1930], 282 U. S., 344). In the first case, it was said:
. . . search warrants . . . may not be used as a means of
gaining access to a man's house or office and papers
solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence
to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding,
but . . . they may be resorted to only when a primary right
to such search and seizure may be found in the interest
which the public or the complaint may have in the property
to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when
a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of
the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it
may be taken. (Boyd Case, 116, U. S., 623, 624, L. ed.,
748; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 524.)
There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished
from other forms of property, to render them immune from
search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the
principles of the cases in which other property may be
seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit
and warrant. . . . we cannot doubt that contracts may be so
used as instruments or agencies for perpetrating frauds
upon the Government as to give the public an interest in
them which would justify the search for and seizure of
them, under a properly issued search warrant, for the
purpose of preventing further frauds.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the contract with Steinthal, also a stranger to the
indictment. It is not difficult, as we have said, to imagine
how an executed written contract might be an important
agency or instrumentality in the bribing of a public servant
and perpetrating frauds upon the Government so that it
would have a legitimate and important interest in seizing
such a paper in order prevent further frauds, . . . .
As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a general
exploratory search of premises, the seizure of papers therefrom,
and their retention for use as evidence in a criminal proceeding
cannot be sustained where made at a time when no crime was
being committed and under a false claim of possession of a
search warrant, by one making of an arrest of persons on the
premises under color of an invalid warrant, who required one of
them, by pretention of right and threat or force, to open a desk and
safe. It was further ruled that, there is no formula for the
determination of the reasonableness of a search and seizure, but
each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
This brings us in logical order to the third error and the point often
made that the seizure of appellant's books, invoices, and records
was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence
against him in a criminal prosecution. The question, in its final Wherefore, the judgment will be affirmed, with the costs of this
analysis, is, were appellant's books, invoices, and records seized instance against the appellant.
solely for use as evidence of a crime of which the appellant was
accused or suspected? — or were the books, invoices, and
records seized in order to prevent the further perpetration of
fraud? In the first place, it is to be observed that the public has an
interest in the proper regulation of appellant's books. (Act No.
3292, section 4.) In the second place, the books belonged to a
corporation of which the appellant was simply the manager. And in
the third place, the search warrant only issued on a showing of
probable cause — to adopt the language alike of section 96 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the search warrant — that
"fraudulent books, invoices, and records" were "now being used in
the commission of a felony."

Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the books, invoices,

and records were taken solely for the purpose of being used as
evidence against Rubio, we find no support for this contention in
the record. In the trial court, the assistant city fiscal said: "As we
have stated above, the search and seizure in this case were made
under the provisions of the internal-revenue laws and the authority
of a search warrant, and not for the purpose of obtaining evidence,
but with a view to seize the instruments used in the violation of
said laws committed by the defendant." On appeal, the
prosecution persistently maintains its position that the seizure was
made with the object of preventing the use of the books of
account, documents, and papers in the commission of further
offenses or fraud or against the Government. Not a scintilla of
evidence is to be found in the record to prove that the Government
has used the books of account, documents, and papers as
evidence against the appellant, or that the Government ever had
the intention of so doing. All we know is, that an information was
filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of the Customs
Law, and that he compromised another case with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of P100,000. On this
showing, we perforce cannot deduce that the books of account,
documents, and papers were wanted solely for use as evidence of
a crime.

A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the arguments

presented and the authorities cited, leads us to the same
conclusion as before, namely, that no constitutional right of the
appellant was violated; that the letter of the law was followed, and
that the order of the trial judge was correct in all particulars.
III.18 Al ghoul v CA
FACTS: Judge Mangay, presideing judge of the RTC, issued search
warrants 5 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment
No. 2 in Kalookan City. Subsequently, the police searched Apartment
No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.
Found in Apartment No. 2 were various firearms, ammunitions,
explosives and other incendiary devices. The said items seized were
acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 De La Cruz.
Petitioners Yousef Al-Ghoul et al. were charged with illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to PD No. 1866.
Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. The petitioners
filed a motion for bail. They also objected to the admissibility of the
evidence obtained.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2
and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched
and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue
that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was
ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties
seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at the
trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the
implementation of the search warrant was rebutted by the defense
during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WON the items obtained in the said search are admissible as evidence.
(2) WON there was lack of particularity in the description of objects to be
seized pursuant to the warrants.
(3) WON the two-witness rule under Sec. 10, Rule 126 ROC applies.
HELD:
(1) Evidence from Apartment No. 2 is admissible however, the search
made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken
thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners since there was
no mention of the said apartment in the search warrants issued.
(2) No, the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the
same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search
warrants.
(3) No, the two-witness rule does not apply since the petitioners were
present when the search and seizure operation was conducted.
RATIO:
(1)Upon perusal by Court of the said search warrants 54-95 and 55-95, it
specified the place to be searched, namely Apartment No. 2 in
Kalookan City however, there was no mention of Apartment No.
8. The search conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections
2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.
PICOP v. Asuncion: the place to be searched cannot be changed,
enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained
from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be
taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded.
Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Hence, the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal
and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence
against petitioners.
(2) The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No.
2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein
petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules
of Court. They alleged lack of particularity yet, the Court held that the
articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same
kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrants.
The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with
specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered
to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part
of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible
for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know
exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, the
articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as
to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized
and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those
articles described as a class or species would suffice.
One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects
to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued. A careful examination of search warrants
show that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated
items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of
violation of Section 1 and 3 of PD 1866, as amended, penalizing
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the
warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that
decree, and no other.
(3) SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.—The officer seizing property
under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the
lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and
seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he
found the seized property.

Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful
occupants of the premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners
were present when the search and seizure operation was conducted
by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner Nabeel
Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident of
Apartment No. 2. Hence, there is no violation of Section 10, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court.
III.19 Roan v Gonzales
FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by
the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but
none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge
against the petitioner.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no
need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search
warrant on the basis of the information provided by
the witnesses whose depositions had already been
taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the
issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to
him, as required by settled jurisprudence.

Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P.

Quinosa personally filed his application for a
search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before
him in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise
presented to him their respective affidavits taken
by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As
the application was not yet subscribed and sworn
to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the
contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he
knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he
subscribed and swore to the same before him.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to

comply with the proper procedure in issuing the
Search Warrant.

HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and

his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking
the depositions in writing and attaching them to
the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
 III.20 Columbia pictures v CA
I. THE FACTS
As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc., NBI agents
conducted surveillance operations on certain video
establishments, among them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc.
(FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or
disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent was able to
have copyrighted motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by
20th Century Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned
by Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the
NBI applied for and was able to obtain from the
respondent judge the subject Search Warrant No. 45
which reads:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining
under oath NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr.
Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that there is a
probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as
amended by P.D. No. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on
Protection of Intellectual Property) has been committed and that there
are good and sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network,
Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan
Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible and have in
control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner
Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch
and list of MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to
wit:
(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles
of which are mentioned in the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles
being reproduced or retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips,
delivery slips and books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the
pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or otherwise used in the
reproduction/retaping business of the defendants;
(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines and
paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the
unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of
sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the
above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described, which should be
seized and brought to the Undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any
time in the day between 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to
the undersigned immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as
the law directs.
In the course of the implementation of the search warrant
in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found and seized various
video tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively distributed
by petitioners. Also seized were machines and equipment,
television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders,
tape head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints,
flyers, production orders, and posters.
FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets,
video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia
seized by virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed
video reproducer, it had the right possess the seized reproduction
equipment, which are not illegal per se, but are rather exclusively
used and intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale,
lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.”
Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed
distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions
and conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its
right to possess and use the seized equipment had been placed in
serious doubt, the lower court ordered the return of the “television
sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia” to
FGT.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the
search warrant? The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No.
45 is thus too all-embracing as to include all the paraphernalia of
FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in
III. THE RULING the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.

[The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and
AFFIRMED the order of the respondent Judge Flores.]
NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by
virtue of the search warrant.
Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality.
This is more so because the Court has previously decided a case
dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant.
In 20th Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the
order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under
circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar. A
striking similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox is the
fact that Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof
describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost identical
description as the warrant issued in the 20th Century Fox case, to
wit:
The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not
gravely abuse his discretion in ordering the immediate release of
the enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own
erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can
be gleaned from his statement that “. . . the machines and
equipment could have been used or intended to be used in the
illegal reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion
pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the
machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the
mere fact that pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion
pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video
Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in
certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of
videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession,
maintain and operate reproduction equipment(s) and
paraphernalia(s).”

(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders,

tape head cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines
used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale,
rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which
she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.

On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-

described, the Court held in 20th Century Fox:

Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape

cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape store
engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected
with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving
piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws.
Hence, including these articles without specification and/or
particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-
Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in
the confiscation of all items found in any video store.
III.21 G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for
Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing
the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated December
13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged
in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido
Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at
the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC
and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the
same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City
to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and went
directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the
petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was
staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met
petitioner's wife and informed her that they will implement the
search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3
Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small
structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him
but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the
entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely
guarded the place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3
Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and
the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, searched the
house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of
the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was
able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four
(4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four
(4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to
laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner,
charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425,
as amended. The Information5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00
p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did
then and there have in his possession and control four (4) packs of
white crystalline powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally
known as "shabu," all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any
competent authority.
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the
search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the
police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the
alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted
prior to the application of the same search warrant. The OSG,
however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the
necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section
14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not
introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon
was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine,
in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.12 According to petitioner, there was no
probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.13 A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and
not by a fixed and rigid formula,15 and must employ a flexible,
totality of the circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to
a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting
the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb
the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the
search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.17 Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with
the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.18 A review of the records shows that in the present case,
a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be
remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order
for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search Warrant
No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa
hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues
that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place
not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still
be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them
was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The
contention is devoid of merit.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded
negative what did you do? A They went downstairs because I
was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his shop, so
we searched his shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the shop? A The
barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano,
Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben
del Castillo were together in the shop? A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop? A One of the barangay tanods
was able to pick up white folded paper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision dated
March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt.
III.22 People v. Garaygay
G.R. No. 135503 July 6, 2000
WILLIAM A. GARAYGAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
FACTS:
Executive Judge of RTC Manila issued search warrant (SW). The warrant
authorized a search of the house of petitioner Garaygay located in Lapu
Lapu city, a place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
Thereafter, the Regional Task Group conducted a raid on the house of
Garaygay resulting in the seizure of several items of firearms, explosives,
ammunition and other paraphernalia.
An information for violation of PD 1866 was filed before RTC of Lapu-Lapu
who pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, petitioner filed with RTC of Lapu-
Lapu a Motion to Quash SW and to Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence on the
ground that the SW was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 19
and that it was a general warrant. On the other hand, prosecution argued
that the motion to quash should have been filed with RTC Manila, which
issued the warrant.
ISSUE: Which court should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a
case where the court that issued it is not the court with which the case is
filed? Court where the criminal case is filed (RTC Lapu-Lapu)
HELD:
In 1967, in Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, we ruled that relief from a SW claimed
to be invalid should be sought in the court that issued it. Subsequently,
however, in Nolasco v. Pano, we declared that the pendency of the SW case
and of the subversive documents case before 2 different courts is not
conductive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable
that, whenever a SW has been issued by one court or branch and a criminal
prosecution is initiated in another Court or branch as a result of the service
of the SW, the SW case should be consolidated with the criminal case for
orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the SW
proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the
right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
People v. Bans substantially restated the doctrine in Nolasco v. Pano: when
a SW is issued by one court, if the criminal case by virtue of the warrant is
raffled off to a branch other than the one which issued the warrant, all
incidents relating to the validity of the warrant should be consolidated with
the branch trying the criminal case.
We clarified the principle in People v. Court of Appeals:
x x x x Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action
based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another
court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve
things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a
motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in
which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative,
not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to
the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the
Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly
stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to
the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash SW was filed in or resolved by the issuing
court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case
is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized
under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two
separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum
shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of
the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper
remedy in the appropriate higher court.
III.23 People v CA
FACTS:
– A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of
Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by Judge
Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items
seized under the warrant.
– An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp
Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt
1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan.
– The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was
served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately
adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4
Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different
explosives and firearms.
ISSUE:
1. WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the
apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment
had been specifically described in the warrant.
HELD:
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their
mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of
ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of
their search.
The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the
warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY
DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.
As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is
different from that indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the
absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the
same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the
Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the
executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been
done.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant —
is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant
and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material
in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of
the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized.
It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place
to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It
would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and
grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which
the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may
properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself;
it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting
the search.
III.24 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNABELLE FRANCISCO y DAVID, @ ANNABELLE
TABLAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant
Annabelle Francisco, were placed under surveillance after the
police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they were
engaged in selling shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride.
SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan of OADDI-WPDC,
U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search warrant before Branch
23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to
search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report1 of
SPO2 Teneros. It stated that Dante Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St.,
corner Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one of
Federico Verona’s runners in the illegal drugs operations,
allegedly sought the assistance of SPO2 Teneros for the arrest of
Verona.2 The search warrant3 was subsequently issued by Judge
Bayhon authorizing the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No.
122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.
Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine
months pregnant, was resting inside the second floor master’s
bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street,
Caloocan City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if
somebody forcibly opened the front door. Eight policemen
suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for about
an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but they
refused to answer. It was only at the police station where she
found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros.
The police team, along with Barangay Chairwoman Miguelita
Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64, Zone-
6, District 2, Caloocan City, enforced the warrant and seized the
following:4
1. One (1) Salad Set marked Pyrex wrapped in a plastic
containing white crysthalline (sic) substance or
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with markings
by the undersigned inside the house of subjects’ residence
weighing (230) two hundred thirty (sic) grams of
methampetamine hydrochloride or shabu by Aida Abear-
Pascual of NBI Forensic Chemist;
2. Several plastics in different sizes;
3. Two (2) roll of strip aluminum foil;
4. Five (5) tooter water pipe and improvised and two
burner improvised;
5. Two (2) pantakal or measuring weight in shabu;
6. Two (2) cellular phone motorola with markings;
7. One (1) monitoring device with cord and with markings;
8. Several pcs. with strip aluminum foil;
9. Two (2) masking tip (sic) with markings;
10. Twentee (sic) two thousand nine hundred ninetee
(sic) pesos.
The police team also allegedly seized the amount of P180,000.00,
a Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys, an ATM card, bank books and car
documents.
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of
Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Plainly, the basic issue submitted for resolution is the
reasonableness of the search conducted by the police officers at
accused-appellant’s residence.
The trial court, in upholding the validity of the search, stated that:10
Re 3rd argument - the fact that the search warrant in question was
served at apartment No. 120 and not at the specific address stated
therein which is 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not by itself
render as illegal the search and seizure of subject stuff seized by
the operatives pursuant thereto. While it is true that the rationale
behind the constitutional and procedural requirements that the
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched
is to the end that no unreasonable search warrant and seizure
may not be made (sic) and abuses may not be committed,
however, this requirement is not without exception. It is the
prevailing rule in our jurisdiction that even a description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended
(People vs. Veloso, G.R. No. L-23051, Oct. 20, 1925).
Significantly in the case at bar the implementing officer SPO2
Teneros was principally the concerned official who conducted an
active surveillance on the Accused and subject house
(Surveillance Report, Exh. "9") and pursued this case by filing the
corresponding application for the issuance of a search warrant.
Perforce, SPO2 TENEROS was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to have prior and personal knowledge of particular
house intended in the warrant which definitely refer to no other
than the very place where the same was accordingly served.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search
was grossly infirm as the subject search warrant authorized the
police authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan
City. However, the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M.
Hizon St., Caloocan City.
The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity of
a person, his home and his possessions against unreasonable
intrusions of the State is articulated in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution
For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that
there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized." The rule is that a description
of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community.
Any designation or description known to the locality that leads the
officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional requirement.11
Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them;
and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.12
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright
nullification of the search warrants. The proceedings upon search
warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of
process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites
such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of
the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.13
The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros
requested for authority to search specifically the premises of No.
122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application was
accompanied by a sketch14 of the area which bears two parallel
lines indicated as 10th Avenue drawn vertically on the left-hand
side of the paper. Intersecting these lines are two other parallel
lines drawn horizontally and indicated as M. Hizon. Above and on
the left-hand side of the upper parallel line of the lines identified as
M. Hizon, is a square marked as "Basketball Court." A similar
drawing placed near the right-hand side of the upper parallel line is
another square marked as "PNR Compound". Beneath the lower
parallel line of the lines marked as "M. Hizon" and right at the
center is also a square enclosing an "X" sign marked as "122",
presumably No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
During the hearing for the application of the search warrant, police
asset Dante Baradilla described the house to be searched as:
Bale dalawang palapag po, semi concrete, color cream na ang
mga bintana ay may rehas na bakal at sliding at sa harap ay may
terrace at may sasakyan sila na ginagamit sa pagdeliver ng
shabu.15
The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It
turned out that No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was a
concrete two-storey residential building with steel-barred windows
and a terrace. It was owned by a certain Mr. Joseph Ching. The
house, however, bore no house number. The house marked No.
122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was actually two houses away
from accused-appellant’s house at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting
of three apartments enclosed by only one gate marked on the
outside as No. 120. The different units within No. 120 Hizon St.
were not numbered separately. Accused-appellant rented the third
unit from the entrance which was supposedly the subject of the
search. The entire compound had an area of approximately ninety
(90) square meters. The second unit was located at the back of
the first unit and the third unit was at the rear end of the
compound. Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street
was only through the first two units and the common gate
indicated as No. 120. The occupants of the premises stated that
they commonly use No. 120 to designate their residence.
In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that "even a description of
the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended."16 The description of the building in the application for a
search warrant in Veloso as well as in the search warrant itself
refer to "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands" which was considered "sufficient designation of
the premises to be searched."17
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely
different from those in Veloso. At first glance, the description of the
place to be searched in the warrant seems to be sufficient.
However, from the application for a search warrant as well as the
search warrant itself, the police officer serving the warrant cannot,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
precisely because it was wrongly described as No. 122, although it
may have been located on the same street as No. 120. Even the
description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that
house located at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance
of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers
of discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the
actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their
alleged knowledge of the place. The controlling subject of search
warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not the
place identified by the police.18
It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St.
as the subject of the actual search. However, as indicated in the
witness’ affidavit19 in support of the application for a search
warrant,20 No. 122 M. Hizon St. was unmistakably indicated.
Inexplicably, a few days after the search warrant was issued by
the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon St., SPO2 Teneros
informed Judge Bayhon in the return of search warrant21 that the
warrant "was properly served at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City,
Metro Manila as indicated in the search warrant itself."
SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that
he thought the house to be searched bore the address 122 M.
Hizon St., Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St.22 But as
this Court ruled in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
v. Asuncion,23 thus:
The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the
store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they
really intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the
place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by
the police, viz.:
"x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the Act No. 6425 and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 as well as the costs,
absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Annabelle
same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Francisco y David @ Annabelle Tablan is ACQUITTED and is
Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement, unless she is
executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been lawfully held in custody for another cause.
done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search
a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that
the place actually searched—although not that specified in the
warrant—[was] exactly what they had in view when they applied
for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officer’s theory, in
the context of the facts of the case, all four (4) apartment units at
the rear of Abigail’s Variety Store would have been fair game for a
search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be

amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of
the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers
the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of
the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge,
and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of
the police officers conducting the search."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City, convicting
accused-appellant of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic
III.25 Laud v People
CRIMPRO
Title
LAUD v. PEOPLE
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD–
Petitioner
Nature of the case: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
FACTS
PNP, through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto Fajardo, applied with the
Manila-RTC for a warrant to search three caves located inside the Laud
2.
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains
of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may
be found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola was
presented to the RTC and testified therein that he personally witnessed the
killing of six persons in December 2005. Judge William Simon Peralta, acting
as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407
which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded
positive results for the presence of human remains.
Herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud, filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the ground
that, among others, the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search
Warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City. Manila-RTC granted the
motion. The People filed a petition for certiorari which the CA granted. Laud
moved for reconsideration, but was later denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta
invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407— NO.
2. Whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite
non-compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section
2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court—YES.
3. Whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description
were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated—YES.
RATIO
1. NO. While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative
penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice-
Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of such
authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be considered
to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.
The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality that
third persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold
an important office and, as such, have a right to assume that officials
apparently qualified and in office are legally such. Public interest
demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office
created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public
– as distinguished from the officer in question – is concerned. Indeed, it
is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been
formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but
rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers.
YES. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the
requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases
by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These special criminal cases
pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs
Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be
enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court." Search
warrant applications for such cases may be filed by "the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-
Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of
such agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The
Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official
leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall
issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts."
As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed
before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP
Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous crime of
Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as
2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the rules
state, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special
criminal case" excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on search warrant
 applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-
mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search
warrant is being applied for in connection with a special criminal case as
above-classified already presumes the existence of a compelling reason;
hence, any statement to this effect would be superfluous and therefore
should be dispensed with.
3. YES. In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of
Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the
commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the group
that buried the victims.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. In light of the foregoing, the
Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence of
probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time"
attended the search warrant’s appliycation from the crime’s commission
does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or
the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the
delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural
reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in determining
the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a
judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities
attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the
search warrant’s application does not dilute the probable cause finding
made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been
sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of "the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." A
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that points out the place
to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Search Warrant No. 09-
14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it particularly
describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located
inside the Laud Compound.
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note,
was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those
which are issued for more than one specific offense. Hence, given that
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific offense –
that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be said that Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and
the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Notes
 Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that “[t]he
imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an
administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to
divest him of his position as such.”
 (Rule 126) SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be
filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: x
xx
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced. x x x
 Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution: he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
 Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court: Requisites for issuing
search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
III.26 FACTS:
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine
patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger
jeep unusually covered with “kakawati” leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two
police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by
appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not
answer, and appeared nervous.
With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo
and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized
conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NPC). When asked where the wires came from, appellant
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft.
The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging
down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol,
merely on “suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,” does
not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
and seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is
admissible against the appellant.
RULING:
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the
police officers in the case at bar was not authorized by a search
warrant.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground
that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles
is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made
at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like checkpoints near the
boundary lines of the State.
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the
police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory
and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important
thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s
right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks
into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s
doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check
is conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at
bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or
visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle.They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be
considered a simple routine check.
The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police
officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they
saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves
which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant.

Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an

implied acquiescence to the warrantless search.

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence

on record are insufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. His guilt
can only be established without violating the constitutional right of
the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

The impugned decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and

accused Rudy Caballes was ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
III.27 G.R. No. 191023 : February 06, 2013
DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision 1 dated September 30, 2009 and Resolution2 dated January
27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942. The CA
upheld the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 231 finding petitioner Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of marijuana.
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
under an Information which states: cralawlib rary
That on or about the 24th day of May 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused DON DJOWEL A. SALES, without authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control 0.23 gram of dried Marijuana fruiting
tops, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. x x x4
?r?l1 ???ñ r?bl?š ??r†??l l ?? l ?b r?rÿ
Upon arraignment, petitioner duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty to the charge.
Evidence adduced by the prosecution at the trial established that on
May 24, 2003, petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane
bound for Kalibo, Aklan at its 9:45 a.m. flight. He arrived at the old
Manila Domestic Airport (now Terminal 1), Domestic Road, Pasay City
at around 8:30 in the morning. As part of the routine security check at
the predeparture area, petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal
Detector Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a body
search by a male frisker on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed
personnel (NUP) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation Security
Group (ASG).5
?r?l1
While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging inside
the right pocket of his short pants. When Soriano asked petitioner to
bring the item out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his hands.
Soriano struggled with petitioner as the latter was nervous and
reluctant to show what he brought out from his pocket. Soriano then
called the attention of his supervisor, PO1 Cherry Trota-Bartolome who
was nearby.6 ?r?l1
PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked him to open his
hands. Petitioner finally opened his right hand revealing two rolled
paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After informing
petitioner of his constitutional rights, PO1 Trota-Bartolome brought
petitioner and the seized evidence to the 2nd Police Center for Aviation
Security (2nd PCAS), PNP-ASG Intelligence and Investigation Branch
and immediately turned over petitioner to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Airport Team at the Ramp Area, Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex, Pasay City.7 The
investigating officer, POII Samuel B. Hojilla,8 placed the markings on
the two marijuana sticks: "SBH-A" and "SBH-B."9
?r?l1
The specimens marked "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" when subjected to
chemical analysis at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon
City yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous
drug.10
?r?l 1
Denying the charge against him, petitioner testified that on May 24,
2003, he, together with his girl friend and her family were headed to
Boracay Island for a vacation. While he was queuing to enter the
airport, he was frisked by two persons, a male and a female. The two
asked him to empty his pockets since it was bulging. Inside his pocket
were a pack of cigarettes and cash in the amount of P8,000.00 in 500
peso-bills. His girl friend told him to get a boarding pass but he asked
her to wait for him as he will still use the comfort room. On the way to
the comfort room, he was blocked by a male person who frisked him for
a second time, asking for his boarding pass. This male person wearing a
white shirt without an ID card, asked petitioner to empty his pockets
which he did. The male person then said it was "okay" but as petitioner
proceeded to go inside the comfort room, the male person called him
again saying that "this fell from you" and showing him two "small white
wrappings which seemed to be marijuana." Petitioner told the male
person that those items were not his but the latter said they will talk
about it in the comfort room.11?r?l1
At that point, petitioner claimed that his girl friend was already shouting
("Ano yan, ano yan?") as she saw PO1 Trota-Bartolome approaching
them. PO1 Trota-Bartolome then told petitioner to explain at the ground
floor while the male person (Soriano) was showing to her the marijuana
sticks saying "Maam, I saw this from him." Petitioner went back to the
comfort room and there he saw his girl friends father (the Mayor of
their hometown, Camiling, Tarlac) talking with a police officer.
However, his girl friend and her family left him and he was investigated
by the police officers.12
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following: PO1 Trota-
Bartolome, P/Insp. Sandra Decena-Go (Forensic Officer, Chemistry
Division, PNP-Crime Laboratory) and NUP Soriano.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads: cralawl ibra ry
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused,
Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known
as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 0.23 gram of dried marijuana fruiting tops confiscated from the
accused is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government. The
officer-in-charge of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately
turnover the same to the appropriate government agency for proper
disposition in accordance with law.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13 ?r?l1 ???ñ r?b l?š ??r†??l l ?? l ?b r?rÿ
On appeal, the CA ruled that the body search conducted on petitioner is
a valid warrantless search made pursuant to a routine airport security
procedure allowed by law. It found no merit in petitioners theory of
frame-up and extortion. On the issue of the integrity and probative
value of the evidence used to convict petitioner, the CA held that there
is no hiatus or confusion that the marijuana that was marked at the
airport, then subjected to qualitative examination on the same day and
eventually introduced as evidence against petitioner, is the same
prohibited drug that was found in his custody and possession when he
was apprehended at the pre-departure area of the airport in the
morning of May 24, 2003.
The CA also explained that while the "marijuana leaves" referred to by
Soriano in his testimony was otherwise called by the public prosecutor
and the Forensic Chemical Officer as "dried marijuana fruiting tops" in
both the criminal information and the Laboratory Report, these do not
refer to different items. Both marijuana leaves with fruiting tops were
?r?l 1 rolled in two papers which were actually found and seized from
petitioners possession in the course of a routine security search and
frisking.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner is now
before us alleging that the CA failed to address the following assigned
errors:c ralawl ibra ry
IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT
THE ITEMS SUPPOSEDLY TAKEN FROM THE APPELLANT WERE THE
VERY SAME ITEMS THAT REACHED THE CHEMIST FOR ANALYSIS;
THIS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROSECUTIONS IMPROBABLE
SCENARIO AT THE AIRPORT WHERE, FOR NO SPECIAL REASON GIVEN,
THE APPELLANT HAD TO BE METICULOUSLY BODILY SEARCHED EVEN
AFTER HE HAD TWICE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED THROUGH THE
DETECTOR.14 ?r?l1 ???ñ r?b l?š ??r† ??l l ?? l ?b r?rÿ
The petition has no merit.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.15 ?r?l1
In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport
security officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting
tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at
the airports pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the
contents of his short pants pocket to Soriano who became suspicious
when his hand felt the "slightly bulging" item while frisking petitioner.
In People v. Johnson,16 which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug
from a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled
that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures, thus: cralawl ibra ry
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the
nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems,
signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice
that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.17
Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the airport is a standard
genital area, which felt like packages containing rice granules, accused
was subjected to a thorough physical examination inside the ladies
room. Three sealed packages were taken from accuseds body which
when submitted for laboratory examination yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused was forthwith
arrested and prosecuted for illegal possession of a regulated drug.
Affirming accused Cantons conviction for the crime of illegal possession
of shabu, we ruled that accused-appellant was lawfully arrested without
a warrant after being caught in flagrante delicto. We further held that
the scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not
confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry
search"19 doctrine. The more extensive search conducted on accused
?r?l1
Canton was necessitated by the discovery of packages on her body, her
apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused the suspicion of
the frisker that she was hiding something illegal. Thus: cralawlib ra ry

procedure but assails the conduct of Soriano and PO1 Trota-Bartolome

in singling him out by making him stretch out his arms and empty his
pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous search was unnecessary
because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound when
petitioner walked past through the metal detector and hence nothing
suspicious was indicated by that initial security check. He likewise
mentioned the fact that he was carrying a bundle of money at that
time, which he said was not accounted for.
We find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was
x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for
prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport
security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving
them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further
search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society." Thus, the strip search in the ladies room was
justified under the circumstances.20 (Emphasis supplied) ???ñ r?b l?š ??r† ??l l?? l ?b r?rÿ

asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon the friskers reasonable
belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioners short pants
was a prohibited or illegal substance.
Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said provision
reads:cralawl ib rary
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,"
which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and
the air carrier. (Italics in the original)
???ñr?b l?š ??r† ??l l?? l ?br?rÿ
The ruling in People v. Johnson was applied in People v. Canton18 where
the accused, a female passenger was frisked at the NAIA after passing
through the metal detector booth that emitted a beeping sound. Since
the frisker noticed something bulging at accuseds abdomen, thighs and
The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets being a
valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal
substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in
evidence. Petitioners reluctance to show the contents of his short pants
pocket after the friskers hand felt the rolled papers containing
marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the
arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material
subject to confiscation by the said authorities.
The trial and appellate courts correctly gave credence to the
straightforward and candid testimonies of PO1 Trota-Bartolome and
NUP Soriano on the frisking of petitioner at the pre-departure area,
during which the two rolled papers containing dried marijuana fruiting
tops were found in his possession, and on petitioners immediate arrest
and investigation by police officers from the 2nd PCAS and PDEA teams
stationed at the airport. As a matter of settled jurisprudence on illegal
possession of drug cases, credence is usually accorded the narration of
the incident by the apprehending police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner.21 ?r?l1
Petitioner reiterates his defense of being a victim of an alleged frameup
and extortion. However, the CA found his claim unworthy of belief
considering that there is no evidence that the apprehending police
authorities had known petitioner before he was caught and arrested for
possession of marijuana. The CA aptly observed: c ralawlib ra ry
It bears stressing that while the defense of Sales is anchored heavily on
his theory of purported frame-up and extortion, nonetheless Sales
testimony is without any allegation that the police and security
personnel who participated in his arrest, investigation and detention
have demanded money in exchange for his freedom, the withdrawal of
the drugs charge against him, or otherwise their desistance from
testifying against him in court. True enough, Sales himself admitted in
the course of the trial that the security and police personnel demanded
him to turn over and surrender all his possessions, to wit: cellular
phone, pla[n]e ticket and boarding pass, except his money (TSN,
April 16, 2008, p. 18). This, to the mind of this Court, strongly belied
Sales imputation of frame-up by the police to secure monetary
gain.22 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original) ???ñ r?b l?š ??r†??l l ?? l ?b r?rÿ
Petitioner questions the integrity of the drug specimen supposedly
confiscated from him at the airport by PO1 Trota-Bartolome. He
maintains that there was no evidence adduced to assure that those
items that reached the Chemist were the same items which were taken
from him. This is crucial since the Chemist had said that the items were
brought to her, not by the PNP officer, but another person (SPO2
Rosendo Olandesca of PDEA) who was not presented as witness.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the presentation and admission of the seized prohibited
drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This
requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as well
as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are
removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements and
custody of the seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the police,
to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its presentation in
evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony
about every link in the chain or movements of the illegal drug, from the
moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in evidence. It cannot be
overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is
almost always impossible to obtain.23 ?r?l1
The identity of the seized substance in dangerous drug cases is thus
established by showing its chain of custody. Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined the concept of
"chain of custody" as follows: cralawl ib rary
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition[.]???ñ r?b l?š ??r† ??l l ?? l ?b r?rÿ
The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) expressly demands the identification of the
persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly
monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the
time they are presented in court.24 We have held, however, that the
failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the procedural
requirements provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its
IRR is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellants
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.25 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.26 As long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt
of the accused will not be affected.27 ?r?l 1
After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the prosecution in
this case has established by facts proved at the trial that the chain of
custody requirement was not broken.
During her direct-examination, PO1 Trota-Bartolome narrated clearly
and consistently how she obtained initial custody of the seized
dangerous drug while on duty at the airports pre-departure area. Said
witness identified Exhibits "G" and "H" with markings "SBH-A" and
"SBH-B" presented in court to be the same dried marijuana fruiting tops
in two rolled papers that they found in the possession of petitioner
while the latter was being frisked by Soriano. She also testified that
petitioner and the confiscated marijuana were promptly brought to the
PDEA team stationed at the airport where it was marked in her
presence by the assigned officer, Samuel B. Hojilla, using his own
initials.28 The two rolled papers containing marijuana fruiting tops with
markings "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" was submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory on the same day by SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca.29 Police As to the penalty imposed by the R TC, we find the same in order and
Inspector Engr. Sandra Decena-Go, Forensic Chemical Officer at the proper.
PNP Crime Laboratory likewise testified that on the same day, she
personally received from SPO2 Olandesca the letter-request together WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
with the seized dried marijuana fruiting tops in two rolled papers (sheet Decision dated September 30, 2009 and Resolution dated January 27,
cigarette wrapper) like improvised cigarette sticks, marked as "SBH-A" 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942 are
and "SBH-B" and wrapped in white bond paper.30 After describing the hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
condition of the specimen at the time she received it, P/Insp. Decena-
Go confirmed the findings of the chemical analysis of the said substance
already presented in court, and identified her Initial Laboratory Report
and Certification, both dated May 24, 2003, stating that the qualitative
examination gave positive results for the presence of Marijuana.31 ?r?l 1

We find no merit in petitioners argument that the non-presentation of

SPO2 Olandesca and PO2 Hojilla as witnesses is fatal to the
prosecutions case. As this Court held in People v. Amansec32: cra lawlib rary

x x x there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing

rules, which requires each and everyone who came into contact with
the seized drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of custody of
the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and
the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is
not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession
of the drugs should take the witness stand." This Court, in People v.
Hernandez,33 citing People v. Zeng Hua Dian,34 ruled: c ralawlib ra ry

After a thorough review of the records of this case we find that the
chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this
case. The nonpresentation as witnesses of other persons such as SPO1
Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on duty, is
not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation
of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The
prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has
the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.35 ?r?l1

In the light of the testimonial, documentary and object evidence on

record, the CA correctly concluded that the identity, integrity and
probative value of the seized marijuana were adequately preserved.
The prosecution has proved with moral certainty that the two pieces of
rolled papers containing dried marijuana fruiting tops presented in court
were the same items seized from petitioner during the routine frisk at
the airport in the morning of May 24, 2003. Its presentation in evidence
as part of the corpus delicti was therefore sufficient to convict
petitioner.
III.28 G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review through this appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 28 August
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-I I C. No. 03316,
which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant Hadji
Socor Cadidia (Cadidia) of violation of Section 53 of Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
The prosecution presented Marilyn Trayvilla (Trayvilla), a Non-
Uniformed Personnel of the Philippine National Police, who
testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while
performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at the Manila
Domestic Airport Terminal I (domestic airport) in Pasay City, she
frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure
area4 and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of
Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was
only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness.5 Not
convinced with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-
employee Leilani M. Bagsican (Bagsican) brought the accused to
the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check. When she
and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they
discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu . The two
sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor SPO3
Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang).6 Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia
denied that the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she
was only asked by an unidentified person to bring the same.7 The
accused was identified and found to be bound for Butuan City on
board Cebu Pacific Airline as evidenced by her confiscated airline
ticket.8 In open court, Trayvilla identified the two sachets
containing shabu previously marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3."
She also identified the signature placed by her co-employee,
Bagsican, at the side of the items, as well as the picture of the
sanitary napkin used by the accused to conceal the bags of
shabu.9
The second prosecution witness, Bagsican, corroborated the
testimony of Trayvilla. She testified that together with Trayvilla, she
was also assigned as a frisker at the departure area of the
domestic airport. While frisking the accused, Trayvilla noticed
something bulky in her maong pants.10 As a result, Trayvilla asked
for her help and with the accused, they proceeded to the comfort
room inside the domestic airport. While inside the cubicle of the
comfort room, Bagsican asked the accused to open her pants and
pull down her underwear. Inside the accused’s sanitary napkin
were two plastic sachets of shabu which they confiscated.
Thereafter, she reported the incident to their supervisor SPO3
Appang, to whom she endorsed the confiscated items. They then
proceeded to their office to report to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group.11 In open court, she identified the accused
Cadidia as the one whom they apprehended. She also identified
the two plastic sachets of shabu they confiscated from Cadidia
and pointed to her initials "LMB" she placed on the items for
marking as well as the picture of the napkin likewise marked with
her initials.12
Finally, the prosecution presented domestic airport Police
Supervisor SPO3 Appang who testified that on 31 July 2002 at
around 6:40 in the morning, the accused passed the walk-thru
machine manned by two domestic airport friskers, Trayvilla and
Bagsican. When Trayvilla frisked the accused, she called his
attention and informed him that something was kept inside the
accused’s private area. Accordingly, he instructed Trayvilla and
Bagsican to proceed to the comfort room to check what the thing
was.13 Trayvilla and Bagsican recovered two plastic sachets
containing shabu from the accused. The plastic sachets together
with the sanitary napkin were turned over to him by the friskers
Trayvilla and Bagsican. Subsequently, he turned over the two
plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to the Intelligence and
Investigation Office of the 2 nd Regional Aviation Security Office
(RASO), Domestic International Airport.14 The seized items were
then turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of NAIA-DITG.15 SP03
Appang placed his initials on the confiscated items at the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Office (PDEA) located at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport.16
The specimens in turn were referred by PO2 Samuel B. Cobilla
(PO2 Cobilla) of the NAIA-DITG to Forensic Chemist Elisa G.
Reyes (Forensic Chemist Reyes) of the Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame, Quezon City for examination.17
Due to the loss of the stenographic notes regarding the latter part
of the direct testimony of SPO3 Appang and of Forensic Chemist
Reyes, the prosecution and the accused agreed to dispense with
their testimonies and agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
a. The prosecution will no longer recall SPO3 Appang to
the witness stand in view of his retirement from service;18
b. The parties agreed on Forensic Chemist Reyes’
competence and expertise in her field;19
c. That she was the one who examined the specimen in
this case against Hadji Socor Cadidia, consisting of one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, previously marked
as Exhibit "1" containing 48.48 grams of white crystalline
substance of Shabu, and, one (1) knot-tied transparent
plastic bag with marking "Exhibit-2 LMB, RSA containing
98.29 grams white crystalline substance of Shabu or
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;20
d. That after conducting laboratory examination on the two
(2) specimens, she prepared the document and reduced
her findings into writing which is Chemistry Report No. D-
364-02 which is the Initial Laboratory Report marked as
Exhibit "C"21; and,
e. That thereafter, Forensic Chemist Reyes likewise
prepared the Final Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit
"D."22
The accused, of course, has a different story to tell.
Cadidia testified that on 31 July 2002, at around 8:15 in the
morning, she proceeded to the departure area of the domestic
airport at Pasay City to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for
Butuan City. When she passed-by the x-ray machine, two women,
whom she later identified as Trayvilla and Bagsican, apprehended
her.23 Trayvilla and Bagsican held her arms and asked her if she
was a Muslim. When she replied in the affirmative, the two women
said that she might be carrying gold or jewelries.24 Despite her
denial, Trayvilla and Bagsican brought her to the comfort room
and told her she might be carrying shabu. She again denied the
allegation but the two women told her to undress.25 When she
asked why, they answered that her back was bulging. In reply, she
told them that she was having her menstrual period. Trayvilla and
Bagsican did not believe her and proceeded to ask her to remove
her underwear. They later frisked her body but failed to recover
anything.26 Thereafter, the two women asked for money as they
allegedly recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from
her.27 At this moment, Cadidia became afraid and called her
relatives for money, particularly her female relative Dam Bai.28 Her
relatives arrived at the airport at around 1 o’clock in the afternoon
of the same day but she failed to talk to them because she has
already been brought to Camp Crame for drug examination.29 She
called her relatives again to ask for ₱200,000.00 and to bring the
amount at 7 o’clock in the morning of the next day. Her relatives
arrived on the agreed day and time but managed to bring only
₱6,000.00 which the police officers found unacceptable.30 As a
consequence, Cadidia was subjected to inquest proceedings.31 In
her re-direct, she testified that at that time, she was engaged in
selling compact discs in Quiapo, Manila. She recalled that the
names of the relatives she called for money were a certain Lani
and Andy.32
The defense presented its next witness Haaji Mohamad Domrang
(Domrang) to corroborate the statement of accused Cadidia that
she called up her relatives including him to bring money to the
airport and give the same to the police officers.33 Domrang testified
that he knew Cadidia as a jeweller with a place of business in
Greenhills. He recalled at around 9 o’clock in the morning of 31
July 2002, he was with his nephew when the latter received a call
from Cadidia and was told by the accused that she needed money
amounting to ₱200,000.00.34 His nephew told him that he would go
to the airport, so he accompanied him. They arrived there at
around one o’clock in the afternoon but failed to see Cadidia.
However, they were able to talk to the police officers at the airport
and inquired about the accused. The police officers replied that
she was brought to Camp Crame but will be brought back to the
airport at 7:00 o’clock in the evening.35 The police officers told
Domrang and Andy that if they would not be able to raise the
₱200,000.00, they would file a case against Cadidia. Since they
were able to raise ₱6,000.00 only, the police officers rejected the
money.36
After the arrest, the following Information was filed in Criminal
Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of Republic Act No.
9165:
That on or about the 31st of July 2002, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport 146.77
grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.37
Upon arraignment on 12 August 2002, Cadidia entered a plea of
"not guilty."38
On 7 April 2008, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty
as charged. The disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act [No.] 9165, she is hereby sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay the fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00).
The methamphetamine hydrochloride recovered from the accused
is considered confiscated in favor of the government and to be
turned to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its
disposal.39
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court
gravely erred when it failed to consider the conflicting testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses’ Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who
among them instructed the accused-appellant to bring out the
contents of her underwear.40 Another contradiction pressed on by
the defense was the recollection of Bagsican that when she and
Trayvilla found the illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her
blazer for safekeeping, in contrast with statement of SPO3 Appang
that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of the comfort room,
they immediately handed him the shabu allegedly taken from the
accused-appellant.41 Appellant likewise argued against her
conviction by the trial court despite the fact that the identity of the
illegal drugs allegedly seized was not proven with moral certainty
due to the broken chain of custody of evidence.42
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
countered that the inconsistencies of the prosecution’s witnesses
did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be disregarded
for they failed to affect the credibility of the evidence as a whole.
The alleged inconsistencies failed to diminish the fact that the
accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the departure
area of the domestic airport transporting shabu. The defenses of
frame-up and alibi cannot stand against the positive testimonies of
the witnesses absent any showing that they were impelled with
any improper motive to implicate her of the offense
charged.43 Finally, the OSG posited that the integrity of evidence is
presumed to be preserved unless there is any showing of bad
faith, and accused-appellant failed to overcome this presumption.44
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. The appellate court ruled that the alleged contradictory
statements of the prosecution’s witnesses did not diminish their
credibility as they pertained only to minor details and did not dwell
on the principal elements of the crime. It emphasized that the more
important matter was the positive identification of the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime of illegal transportation of
dangerous drug.45 Further, it upheld the trial court’s ruling that the
prosecution satisfactorily preserved the chain of custody of
evidence over the seized drugs as well as the integrity of the
specimen confiscated from the accused-appellant.46
In this instant appeal, the accused-appellant manifested that she
would no longer file her Supplemental Brief as she had
exhaustively discussed her assignment of errors in her Appellant’s
Brief.47
Before this Court for resolution are the two assigned errors raised
by the accused-appellant:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN
OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.48
We uphold the ruling of both the trial and the appellate courts.
At the outset, We find it unnecessary to discuss the propriety of
the charge of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
against Cadidia for illegal transportation of 146.77 grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride by the prosecution. As
elucidated by the trial court, "there is no doubt that the accused
had the intention to board the flight bound for Butuan as per her
plane ticket and had submitted herself to body frisking at the final
check-in counter at the airport when she was found to be carrying
prohibited drugs in her persons (sic). In like manner, considering
the weight of the "shabu" and the intention of the accused to
transport the same to another place or destination, she must be
accordingly penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, x
x x.49"
Now to the issues presented before this Court.
As to the first assignment of error, the accused casts doubt on the
set of facts presented by the prosecution particularly the narration
of Trayvilla, Bagsican and SPO3 Appang. She alleges that since
the testimonies given by the witnesses were conflicting, the same
should not be given credit and should result in her acquittal. She
cited two instances as examples of inconsistencies. First, Trayvilla
in her testimony recalled that she was the one who asked the
accused to bring out the contents of her underwear. However, in
her re-direct, she clarified that it was Bagsican who asked the
accused. Bagsican, in turn testified that she was the one who
asked the accused while Trayvilla was beside her.50 Second,
Bagsican in her testimony recalled that after confiscation of the
alleged illegal drugs, she placed the items inside her blazer for
safekeeping. However, SPO3 Appang testified that when the two
female friskers came out from the comfort room, they immediately
handed to him the seized illegal drugs allegedly taken from
Cadidia.51
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.52 Further, the evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight
and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to
observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are
telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the
findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and
credibility of the witnesses.53
Upon review of the records, we find no conflict in the narration of
events of the prosecution witnesses. In her direct testimony,
Trayvilla testified that both of them asked Cadidia to remove what
was inside her underwear when she and Bagsican brought the
accused to the comfort room to check what was hidden
inside.54 However, in her re-direct, she clarified that it was really
Bagsican who particularly made the request but she was then also
inside the cubicle with the accused.55 This clarification is sufficient
for the Court to conclude that the two of them were inside the
cubicle when the request to bring out the contents of the
underwear was made and the concealed illegal drug was
discovered.
The other inconsistency alleged by the accused pertains to what
happened during the confiscation of the illegal drug at the cubicle.
The accused alleges that Bagsican and SPO3 Appang differed in
their statements. Upon review, We find no such inconsistency.
Bagsican testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic
sachets of shabu in her blazer for safekeeping. She further
narrated that afterwards, she turned over the accused and the
plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang.56 SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified
that when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room,
they handed to him what was taken from the accused. The
statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken
recollection of events.
Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting
statements, We have consistently held time and again that minor
inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As
long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and
believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld. What is
essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one
another on material details surrounding the commission of the
crime.57
The accused also assails the application of presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties of the witnesses. She
claimed that the self-serving testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican
failed to overcome her presumption of innocence guaranteed by
the Constitution.58
Again, we disagree.
In People v. Unisa,59 this Court held that "in cases involving
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on
the part of the police officers."
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-
motive for the police to impute the crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla
was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled
the accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area.
There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the
accused especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of
the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to
notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The
subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two
female friskers were just doing their usual task when they found
the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by
the fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on
the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they harbour
any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and
denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on
circumstances surrounding the apprehension.
As final attempt at acquittal, the accused harps on the alleged
broken chain of custody of the confiscated drugs. She casts doubt
on the identity of the drugs allegedly taken from her and the one
presented in open court to prove her guilt.60 She also questions the
lack of physical inventory of the confiscated items at the crime
scene, the absence of photographs taken on the alleged illegal
drugs and the failure to mark the seized items upon confiscation.61
The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and
substances is discharged when the arresting law enforcer ensures
that the chain of custody is unbroken. Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines the chain
of custody as:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody was of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody made in the course of safekeeping and
use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.62
In Mallillin v. People,63 the requirements to establish chain of
custody were laid down by this Court. First, testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence. Second, witnesses should describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the item.
The prosecution in this case was able to prove, through the
testimonies of its witnesses, that the integrity of the seized item
was preserved every step of the process.
As to the first link, Trayvilla and Bagsican testified that upon
confiscation of the two plastic sachets of illegal drug from the
accused, the seized items were transferred to SPO3 Appang, who
himself confirmed such transfer. The second link pertains to the
point when SPO3 Appang turned over the two plastic sachets and
sanitary napkin to the RASO of the Domestic International
Airport.64 As to the marking, Bagsican testified that she put her
initials and signature on the plastic sachet and the sanitary napkin
at the Investigation Office. Afterwards, the seized items were
turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of the NAIA-DITG.65 SP03
Appang signed the confiscated items at the PDEA Office which is
also located at the airport.66
As evidenced by the Initial Laboratory Report,67 the specimens
were referred by PO2 Cobilla of the NAIA-DITG to Forensic
Chemist Reyes of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon
City for examination. Finally, based on the Chemistry Report68 of
Forensic Chemist Reyes and stipulation69 of facts agreed upon by
both parties, the specimen submitted by PO2 Cobilla tested
positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride after qualitative
testing. The same specimens contained in the two plastic sachets
previously marked were identified by two female friskers Trayvilla
and Bagsican in open court as the same ones confiscated from
the accused.70
As to non-compliance of all the requirements laid down by Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 regarding the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered
dangerous drugs,71 the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165 states that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds shall not render void and
invalid such seizure of and custody over said items as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team. What is important is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.72 The successful
presentation of the prosecution of every link of chain of custody as
discussed above is sufficient to hold the accused liable for the
offense charged.
On a final note, we held that airport frisking is an authorized form
of search and seizure. As held in similar cases of People v
1âw phi1
Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this Court affirmed the
conviction or the accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton
for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in
their body illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both
cases explained the rationale for the validity of airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure or their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation s airports. Passengers attempting to hoard
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches arc
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity or the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed. travellers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that the are subject to search and. if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would he subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.75

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED Accordingly, the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 August 2009 in CA-G.R.
CR.-H. C. No. 03316 is hereby AFFIRMED.
III.29 G.R. No. 199042 November 17, 2014
DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition1 filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from
the Decision2 dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution3 dated 18 October
2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Information4 reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram knowing the
same to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-
cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5
PROSECUTION’S VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior
Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan
Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones.6 Their testimonies reveal that a
Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for
allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After
recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde,
SPO3 Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony
Asiones, together with Resco, proceeded to the house of
Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged
against him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was
subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of
shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. PO3
Coralde marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and
PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the National Police
District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for
examination.7 DEFENSE’S VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at
home watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others,
invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he
had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the
accused was then frisked and detained at the police station.8
RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its
Decision9 dated 6 April 2009, convicted petitioner of the offense
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of
Section 11, Article II,R.A. 9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8)
months as the maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS
ILLEGAL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S WARRANTLESS
ARREST AND SEARCH.11
RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case
No. 70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,13 which the CA denied in a Resolution14 dated 18
October 2011.
Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following
lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE
PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF THE
CONFISCATED DRUG.15
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of
valid warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the
alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct
without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is,
consequently, inadmissible. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Comment16 stating that the shabu confiscated from
petitioner was admissible in evidence against him; that the search
conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue
regarding the apprehending officers’ non-compliance with Section
21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal.
OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his
arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the
basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer
or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and
the arresting officer show none of the above that would make the
warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that
accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest.17
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by
law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal
search.18 Records have established that both the arrest and the
search were made without a warrant. While the accused has
already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is
not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality
of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a
warrantless search can be conducted. These searches include:
1âwphi1
(1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3)
customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk
situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstance.19
The search made was not among the enumerated instances.
Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a
seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside
the left pocket of accused-appellant’s pants. Neither was it a stop-
and-frisk situation. While thistype may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence."20
Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise
illegal search; that is, the consent mustbe unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.21 In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out
the contents of his pocket. The testimony of the police officer on
the matter is clear:
Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring
out the thing which I felt.
Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to
bring out the contents of his pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic
containing shabu.22
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item
is thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in
evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."23 Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of
accused appellant cannot be sustained. This being the case, we
see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in
the handling of the confiscated drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and
to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with · deliberate care and within the
parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end
never justifies the means."24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated
4 May 2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
III.30 G.R. No. 138382-84 : February 12, In Criminal Case No. 95-1009 accused-
2002 appellant Aspiras and accused Lorenzo were
charged with violation of Section 4, Article II
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The
appellee, vs. ROLANDO
information reads:
ASPIRAS, Accused-Appellant.
That on or about the 27th day of December
DECISION
1994 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
BUENA, J.: Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named
This is an appeal from the decision of the
accused, conspiring and confederating
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Metro
together and both of them mutually helping
Manila, Branch 259 finding accused-appellant
one another, not being lawfully authorized to
Rolando Aspiras and accused Rodolfo San
possess or otherwise use any prohibited
Lorenzo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
unlawfully selling marijuana, a prohibited
and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
drug, in violation of Section 4, Article II of
another for P50.00 dried marijuana flowering
R.A. 6425, as amended, and sentencing each
tops wrapped in five (5) separate aluminum
of them to suffer imprisonment ranging from
foils weighing 9.7034 grams, which is a
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
prohibited drug.
minimum, to six (6) years
of prision correccional as maximum. For CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
cräläwvirt uali brä ry

violation of Section 8 thereof, only accused-

appellant Aspiras was found guilty of
possessing prohibited drugs and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred
thousand pesos P500,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 95-1010 the
information against accused-appellant
Aspiras alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of December
1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any prohibited
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and
under his control and custody 1.4440
kilograms of dried marijuana flowering tops
in two bricks which is a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 cräläwvirtual ib räry
In Criminal Case No. 80148, accused Lorenzo
was similarly charged with possession of
1.440 kilograms of dried marijuana, to wit:
That on or about the 27th day of December,
1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any prohibited
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and
under his control and custody 1.440
kilograms of dried marijuana flowering tops
in two bricks which is a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 cräläwvirtual ib räry
Upon motion of the defense counsel, the
cases were consolidated and jointly tried.4
On February 9, 1995, in Criminal Case No.
95-1009, only accused Lorenzo was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge.5 Meanwhile, the arraignment of
accused-appellant Aspiras in Criminal Cases
Nos. 95-1009 and 95-1010 was deferred
pending the ascertainment of the quantity of
prohibited drug stated in the information.6 cräläwvirtua lib räry
On February 21, 1995, accused-appellant
Aspiras was arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty in both criminal cases.7
cräläwvirtua lib räry
At the trial, police aid Jerry Sabino and PO3
Jose Soreta testified for the prosecution. The
testimony of Forensic Chemist Edwin
Purificando was dispensed with since the
parties adopted his testimonial and
documentary evidence given before MTC
Branch 77 in Criminal Case No. 801488 prior
to its consolidation with Criminal Cases Nos.
95-1009 to 95-1010. For the defense,
accused-appellant Aspiras and accused San
Lorenzo testified.
The prosecution established the following
facts:
On December 26, 1994, Sr. Inspector Valdez
of Paraaque Philippine National Police Drug
cräläwvirtuali brä ry
Enforcement Unit received a telephone call,
informing him that a certain alias Rolly, later
identified as Rolando Aspiras, herein
accused-appellant, of Tambo Paraaque was
peddling prohibited drugs. Upon such
information, Sr. Insp. Valdez constituted PO3
Jose Soreta, Police Aides (P/A) Abelardo Soto
and Jerry Sabino to conduct a surveillance
operation on Rolando Aspiras. On the same
day, surveillance was conducted at J. Puyat
Compound where the house of the suspected
peddler was located. Afterwards, the
surveillance team went back to the police
station and planned a buy-bust operation.
On December 27, 1994, at around 7 in the
evening, P/A Jerry Sabino acted as the
poseur-buyer while PO3 Soreta, P/A Soto
and Crisanto Cruz positioned themselves
approximately ten meters away from Aspiras
house. When Sabino called for Aspiras,
Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo alias Bukol went
out and inquired what Sabino wanted. Sabino
related to San Lorenzo that he wanted to
score or buy marijuana for P50.00 pesos.
Sabino then gave to San Lorenzo the marked
5 pieces of ten peso bills worth P50.00. Upon
receipt of such amount, San Lorenzo entered
Aspiras house. Soon after, Aspiras came out
and asked Sabino if he was the one who
wanted to score. When Sabino confirmed,
Aspiras handed five (5) pieces of aluminum
foils. Upon verifying its contents as
marijuana, Sabino signaled his companions
to make the arrest. When Aspiras saw the
rest of Sabinos companions, he rushed inside
his house and the police team sought after
him. Thereat, the marked money was
recovered from Aspiras while PO3 Soreta
seized two bricks of marijuana flower tops
wrapped in plastic bag under a table.
Afterwards, Aspiras and San Lorenzo were
brought to the headquarters and the
marijuana flower tops were sent to the NBI
for examination. Charges were then filed
against Aspiras and San Lorenzo for violation
of Sections 4 and 8 of R.A. 6425, as
amended.
The defense told an entirely different story.
Accused-appellant Aspiras testified that
on December 27, 1994 at around 5:00 in the
afternoon, he was in his house at 16th St.
Puyat Compound Tambo, Paraaque with his
wife and five (5) children. At around 7 in the
evening, PO3 Soreta, wearing a police
uniform, and his three (3) companions, in
civilian clothes, forcibly entered his house
while one (1) stayed outside. At gunpoint, he
was ordered to stand and was handcuffed by
Soreta. He asked what the problem was and
the police asked him where he hid the shabu.
Upon responding that there was none, the
police began searching but nothing was
found. Soreta instructed him to bow his
head. Thereafter, P/A Sabino proceeded to
the kitchen. Aspiras noticed that there was
something bulging in P/A Sabinos jacket as
the latter approached the kitchen. After less
than 2 minutes, Sabino came out and
uttered: Sir, meron pa lang itinatagong
marijuana dito. Aspiras denied ownership of
the marijuana. He was informed that the
marijuana bricks were taken from the ceiling.
Afterwhich, Aspiras was brought out of his
house and walked more or less 20 meters
towards Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzos residence.
When they arrived at San Lorenzos house,
accused-appellant Aspiras saw San Lorenzo
in handcuffs and both of them were brought
to the Coastal Police Headquarters.
For his part, accused Rodolfo San Lorenzo
testified that on December 27, 1994 at
around 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. while he was
resting in his house with his wife and
children in Puyat Compound, he heard
someone knocking at his door. When he
opened the door, he saw P/A Soto who
invited him to go to the police station at
Coastal. Upon inquiring for the reason, P/A
Soto asked if he was selling shabu. When he
told him that he has no knowledge thereof,
P/A Soto pushed him inside his house and
PO3 Soreta and P/A Sabino immediately
followed and forced their way in and started
to search the house. While the search
ensued, P/A Sabino asked accused San
Lorenzo about his source of the prohibited
drugs. San Lorenzo replied that he could not
show any shabu. Thereafter, he was brought
out of his house where he saw accused-
appellant Aspiras in handcuffs. They were
brought to the Coastal police headquarters
and detained. The following day, both him
and accused-appellant Aspiras were
investigated by Chief Inspector Valdez and
charges for violation of R.A. 6425, as
amended were filed against them.
On January 30, 1996, the trial court
rendered its judgment convicting accused-
appellant Aspiras and accused San Lorenzo
of selling marijuana in violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended. With
respect to the charge of possessing
prohibited drugs under Section 8 thereof,
accused San Lorenzo was acquitted while
accused-appellant Aspiras was convicted.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
Court finds both Rolando Aspiras y Layuga
and Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Sec. 4
Article II, R.A. 6425 as amended.
Section 4 reads as follows:
Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution
and transportation of Prohibited Drugs The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as
a broker in any of such transactions.
Section 17, R.A. 7659 further reads:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation
and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for
offenses under Sections 3,4,8 and 9 of Art. II
and Sections 14, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved in any of the following
quantities:
1. 40 grams or more opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more shabu or
methilamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or
marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine
hydrocholoride;
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the
quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board,
after public consultations/hearings conducted
for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less
than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correctional to
reclusion perpetua depending on the
quantity.
Both accused Rolando Luyaga Aspiras and
Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo are therefore
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty
of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as the
minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correctional as the maximum thereof.
Further, this Court finds Rolando Aspiras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Sec. 8 Art. II R.A. 6425 as
amended by R.A. 7659, Sec. 13 of R.A. 7659
reads as follows:
xxx Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited
Drugs The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.
Accused Rolando Aspiras is therefore
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA there being no
aggravating circumstances and to pay a fine
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00)
PESOS.
There being no sufficient evidence against
San Lorenzo as regards his knowledge or
participation with respect to the marijuana
bricks found in the house of Rolando Aspiras
the Court pronounces him NOT GUILTY of the
crime of Violation of Section 8 Article II R.A.
6425 as amended in Crim. Case No. 80148.
SO ORDERED.9 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry
Only Rolando Aspiras appealed his conviction
to the Court of Appeals raising the following
errors:10
cräläwvirtuali brä ry
I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE PUT UP BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROLANDO ASPIRAS;
and
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF
SEC.8 ARTICLE II OF R. A. 6425, AS
AMENDED
On March 31, 1999, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision affirming the conviction
of accused-appellant Aspiras in Criminal Case
No. 95-1009 for violation of Sec 4, Art. II of
R.A. 6425, as amended. As for violation of
Sec. 8 thereof, considering that the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the
cases were certified to this Court for final
determination and appropriate action. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PURSUANT TO Section 13, Rule
124, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures and
Article 8, Section 5 of the Constitution of the
Philippines and finding the appealed decision
in Criminal Case No. 95-1009 to be in
accordance with law and the evidence, the
same must be affirmed; and further, finding
Rolando Aspiras y Luyaga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Section 8, Article II, R.A. 6425 as amended
by R.A. 7659 with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, we certify these cases to the
Honorable Supreme Court for final
determination and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.11 cräläwvirtua lib räry
In this appeal, accused-appellant Aspiras
questions the existence of the buy-bust
operation, imputes ill-motive on the police
officers and asserts that the evidence against
him is planted.
Is the evidence presented before the trial
court sufficient to warrant accused-
appellants conviction?
The evidence shows that upon an
information of alleged involvement of
accused-appellant in the sale of prohibited
drugs, the PNP-Drug Enforcement Unit
surveyed the area and identified accused-
appellants residence. After the surveillance,
a buy-bust operation was planned and the
serial numbers of five (5) pieces of P10.00
bills were written in the office logbook. Then,
the day after the surveillance, the buy-bust
operation was conducted.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers to catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. It has been
defined as the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker. The idea to commit
the crime originates from the accused;
nobody induces or prods him into committing
the offense.12
cräläwvirtual ibrä ry
The testimonies of P/A Sabino and PO3
Soreta had sufficiently established how the
crime was committed. The fact that accused-
appellant handed to P/A Sabino the five
marijuana aluminum foils amounting to
P50.00 pesos constitute the illegal sale of
marijuana. There is no fixed procedure for
conducting buy-bust operation and no rule of
law requires the simultaneous exchange of
the marked money and the prohibited or
regulated drug between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher or seller. The well-
entrenched principle is that the crime of
illegal sale is committed as soon as the sale
transaction is consummated, whether
payment precedes or follows delivery of the
drug sold.13
cräläwvirtua lib räry
The trial court found the version offered by
the defense to be totally without merit and
unworthy of belief. The prosecution has
established that the buy-bust team was able
to buy from accused-appellant five pieces of
aluminum foils containing dried marijuana
flower tops worth P50.00 pesos. Through the
buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was
caught in flagrante selling marijuana.
The trial court correctly pointed out that
there is no improper motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses to testify against
accused-appellant. The buy-bust operation
was formed by the police officers precisely to
test the veracity of the tip and in order to
apprehend the perpetrator. The testimonies
of the apprehending officers who caught
accused-appellant red-handed should be
given full faith and credence since they are
presumed to be in the regular performance
of their official duties as police officers.
Basically, accused-appellants assignment of
errors is focused on the issue of credibility.
The rule is settled that the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent any
clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which
could have affected the result of the
case.14 We do not find any such oversight on
the part of the trial court.
While the conviction of accused-appellant in
selling prohibited drugs is warranted,
accused-appellant should be liable only for
such crime and his acquittal for possessing
two bricks of marijuana flower tops is called
for.
It appears that the police officers justification
for the seizure of the prohibited drugs was
rooted from the fact that the intrusion and
search was pursuant to accused-appellants
lawful arrest after selling marijuana to a
member of the buy-bust team. A search
incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the
person of one arrested and the premises
within his immediate control. 15
cräläwvi rtual ibrä ry
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful
objects within the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented in
evidence.16 Nonetheless, the seizure of
evidence in plain view must comply with the
following elements: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further
search.17cräläwvirt ualib rä ry
The record shows that the two bricks of
marijuana flower tops with the total weight
of 1.440 kilograms were recovered under the
table, wrapped in a plastic bag. On this note,
PO3 Jose Soreta testified:
FISCAL RAMOLETE:
Q: At whose house were you able to recover
the said marijuana flowering tops?
A: From the house of Alias Rolly.
Q: Rolando Aspiras, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you inform this Honorable Court
the quantity of the dried marijuana flowering
tops which you recovered inside the house of
Rolly Aspiras?
A: One and a half bricks, sir.
Q: Showing to you a brick of dried marijuana
flowering tops marked earlier for the
prosecution as Exh. D-1 and another half
brick marked as Exh. D on May 18, 1995
with markings RLA, dated December 27,
1994, 7:00 pm, will you please go over these
two items and inform this Honorable Court
what relation has these got to do with the
bricks of marijuana flowering tops recovered
inside the house of Rolando Aspiras?
A: These are the bricks of marijuana I
recovered under the table in the house of
Rolando Aspiras.
Q: Why did you say that those are the very
ones that you recovered from or inside the
house of Rolando Aspiras?
A: It was wrapped in plastic placed
under the table.
Q: And you are referring to a plastic
marked Uniwide Warehouse Club with
markings DDM-94-824 Ecp/NM. By the way,
there are markings on the half brick 27
December 1994 RLA, would you happen to
know, whose marking are these?
A: Those are the markings of SPO2 Nestor
Serona.
Q: What was his participation?
A: He was the investigator.18 cräläwvirtuali brä ry
In the recent case of People vs.
Salanguit,19 we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered that was wrapped in
newsprint. We likewise reiterated our
previous decision that rendered inadmissible
the marijuana seized by the NARCOM agents
because the said drugs were contained in a
plastic bag which gave no indication of its
contents. As explained by this Court-
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the
plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents.
They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where
the marijuana was visible to the police
officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this
case could not have recovered the
inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag
had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their plain view, what
may be said to be the object in their plain
view was just the plastic bag and not the
marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the plain view of
said object. It cannot be claimed that the
plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer.
While it is true that the police officers had With the foregoing facts duly established,
prior justification for intrusion, permitting a accused-appellant must be, and is hereby
warrantless seizure of any piece of evidence held liable, only for the sale of marijuana.
incriminating an accused, nonetheless,
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
applying the plain view doctrine, such must
finding accused-appellant Rolando Aspiras
be limited to those evidence that the police
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
officer came across inadvertently. The
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
prosecution failed to show whether or not the
as amended is hereby AFFIRMED. For
plastic bag was transparent that would prove
violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425,
beyond reasonable doubt that the plain view
as amended, accused-appellant Aspiras is
of such plastic bag would readily disclose
hereby ACQUITTED.
that its contents are marijuana. In our
criminal justice system, the overriding It appearing that accused-appellant has been
consideration is not whether the court doubts detained since December 27, 1994 per Order
the innocence of the accused but whether it of Judge Zosimo V. Escano dated January 30,
entertains a reasonable doubt as to his 1996,22 much beyond the maximum range of
guilt.20 If the inculpatory facts and his indeterminate sentence, his immediate
circumstances are capable of two or more release from custody is hereby ordered,
explanations, one of which is consistent with unless he is being held for some other lawful
the innocence of the accused and the other cause.
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and
is not sufficient to support a
conviction.21 Corollarily, the two bricks of
marijuana are inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant.