HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
It is
A. National Manpower Development Program- Government Machinery
(Art. 43-56)
B. Apprenticeship and Learnership (Art. 57-77)
1. Nitto Enterprises v. NLRC
Facts: Petitioner Nito Enterprises hired Capili as an apprentice machinist
under an apprenticeship agreement for six months for a daily wage, which
was 75% of applicable minimum wage. However, shortly 2 months after he
started work, Capili was asked to resign for the reason that he had been
causing accidents, that he has been doing certain things beyond the scope of
his duty, and that he had even injured himself in handling one of the
machines, to the financial prejudice of the company as his medication would
be shouldered by Nito Enterprises.
Capili later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which the Labor
Arbiter dismissed. This decision was reversed by the NLRC, holding that Capili
was a regular employee. With this, Nito came to the Supreme Court. Nito
Enterprises assails the NLRC decision on the ground that no apprenticeship 2. Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC
program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was
executed.
Issue: Is Capili a regular employee or an apprentice?
Held: Capili is a regular employee. Apprenticeship needs DOLE’s prior through reckless imprudence.
approval, or apprentice becomes regular employee.
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Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law.
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and
apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship
program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the
proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non
before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the
Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final
approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and
private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid
apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent’s
assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy
(“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves credence. He should rightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of
the Labor Code and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Facts: Kapunan, Sr. an 82 year old retired teacher, was struck by a jeepney
owned by Filamer Christian Institute and driven by its alleged employee,
Funtecha. Kapunan was hospitalized for 20 days. He thus instituted a criminal
case against Funtecha alone, who was convicted for serious physical injuries
 Thereafter, pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan instituted a civil case
for damages against Funtecha and Filamer and its president. The RTC and the
CA found Filamer, the school, liable for damages. Hence, this petition.
Filamer contends that it is not civilly liable because Funtecha was not
its employee, as he was only a working scholar assigned to clean the school
premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Filamer
anchors its contention on Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code,,
which excludes working scholars from the employment coverage as far as
substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is
concerned.
Issue: Is Funtecha an employee of Filamer?
Held: YES. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-
time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the
school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for
only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction
of Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a “frolic of his own” but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of
Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of
his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code,
on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering
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and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment.
Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which
the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should
be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of
working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the
substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds
that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It
invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently
negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer.
Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the
primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as
a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
3. Atlanta Industries v. Sebolino
Facts: Sebolino et al. filed several complaints for illegal dismissal,
regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims
as well as damages. They alleged that they had attained regular status as they
were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the
start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the
company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the
apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not
entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were
engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship
program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the
event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where
they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list
of employees (Master List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.
The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be illegal with respect to nine
out of the twelve complainants. Atlanta appealed the decision to the NLRC
which reversed the illegal dismissal decision with respect to Sebolino and
three others. They moved for reconsideration but this was denied. They then
brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which held that Sebolino and
the three others were illegally dismiised.
The CA ruled that Sebolino and the three others were already
employees of the company before they entered into the first and second
apprenticeship agreements. For example, Sebolino was employed by Atlanta
on March 3, 2004 then he entered into his first apprenticeship agreement
with the company on March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004. The second
apprenticeship agreement was from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004.
However, the CA found the apprenticeship agreements to be void because
they were executed in violation of the law and the rules. Therefore, in the
first place, there were no apprenticeship agreements.
Also, the positions occupied by the respondents machine operator,
extruder operator and scaleman are usually necessary and desirable in the
manufacture of plastic building materials, the companys main business.
Sebolino and the three others were, therefore, regular employees whose
dismissals were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.
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Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Sebolino and three others
were illegally dismissed.
Held: YES. The petition is unmeritorious.
The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision and in
affirming the labor arbiters ruling, as it applies toCostales, Almoite, Sebolino
and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally
dismissed because (1) they were already employees when they were required
to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
The following considerations support the CA ruling: Based on
company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite,
Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as
employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company
itself recognized the respondents status through relevant operational records
in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December
2003 which the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the
production and work schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 cited by the CA.
The CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational
documents, for the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these
documents before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate
court, thus, found the said documents sufficientto establish the employment
of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.
The fact that Sebolino and the three others were already rendering
service to the company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as
established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements
irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the
CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator,
scaleman and extruder operator – tasks that are usually necessary and
desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade as manufacturer of plastic
building materials. These tasks and their nature characterized the four as
regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they
were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without
the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.
DENIED.
C. Employment of Aliens (Art. 40-42)
1. General Milling Corp. v. Torres
Facts: May 1989, the NCR-Dept.Labor and Employment issued Alien
Employment permit in favor of petitioner earl cone, a US citizen as sports
consultant and assistant coach for GMC. Dec. 1989 then GMC and Cone
entered into a contract of employment. Then January 1990, the board of
special inquiry of the commission and deportation approved Cone's
application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor to pre-
arranged employee. On Feb. 1990, GMC requested for renewal of Cone's
alien employment permit which was granted by DOLE regional director. The
alien employment is valid until December 1990.
Private respondent BCAP appealed the issuance of said alien
employment permit to the secretary of labor who issued a decision ordering
the cancellation of Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was
no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able
and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of Cone
redound to the national interest.
GMC filed a motion for reconsideration and 2 supplemental motions
for reconsideration but were bothe denied by acting secretary Laguesma.
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Issue: (1) Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked
the alien employment permit and (2) labor code does not empower secretary
to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national
interest
Held: Petition dismissed. Court considers that petitioners have failed to show
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of secretary. The alleged failure to
notify petitioners of the appeal filed by BCAP was cured when petitioners
were allowed to file their motion for reconsideration before secretary of
labor.
GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative
has no legal basis at all. Under article 40 of labor code, an employment
permit is required to hire a foreigner, as it applies to "non-resident aliens".
GMS can't claim that Secretary's decision would amount to an
impairment of the obligations of contracts because Labor code requires alien
employment permits to enter a contract of employment for foreigners.
GMC's contention that Secretary of labor should have deferred to the
findings of Comm. On Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of
employing Cone is also without basis. The labor code specifically empowers
secretary to make a determination as to the availability of the services of a
person in the Philippines.
2. International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) v. Quisumbing
Facts: Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and
management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from
Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment,
except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-
hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner
ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of
all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise
in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence
this petition.
Issue: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of
local- hires.
Held: NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that
labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the
Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
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The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution
mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not
merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as
the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent
with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit
are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated
their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also
shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have
limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires
perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-
hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is
hereby GRANTED IN PART.
3. McBurnie v. Ganzon
Facts: On October 4, 2002, Andrew James McBurnie (McBurnie), an
Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and other
monetary claims against Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc., and E. Ganzon,
Inc., (respondents). McBurnie claimed that on May 11, 1999, he signed a 5-
year employment agreement with the company EGI as an Executive Vice-
President who shall oversee the management of the company hotels and
resorts within the Philippines. He performed work for the company until
sometime in November 1999, when he figured in an accident that compelled
him to go back to Australia while recuperating from his injuries. While in
Australia, he was informed by respondent Ganzon that his services were no
longer needed because their intended project would no longer push through.
The respondents contend that their agreement with McBurnie was to
jointly invest in and establish a company for the management of the hotels.
They did not intend to create an employer-employee relationship, and the
execution of the employment contract that was being invoked by McBurnie
was solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work
permit in the Philippines, and that McBurnie had not obtained a work permit.
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On September 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) declared McBurnie as
having been illegally dismissed from employment. The respondents filed their
Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted an appeal
bond in the amount of P100,000.00. They claimed that an award of more
than P60 Million Pesos to a single foreigner who had no work permit and who
left the country for good one month after the purported commencement of
his employment was a patent nullity.
On March 31, 2005, the NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond
explaining that in cases involving monetary award, an employer seeking to
appeal the LA decision to the Commission is unconditionally required by Art.
223, Labor Code to post bond equivalent to the monetary award.
The motion for reconsideration was denied, the respondents appealed
to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with extremely urgent
prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90845.
The NLRC dismissed their appeal due to respondent's failure to post
the required additional bond. The respondents motion for reconsideration
was denied on June 30, 2006. This prompted respondents to filed with the CA
the Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R SP No. 95916, which was later
consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 90845
The CA granted the respondent's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction on February 16, 2007. It directed the NLRC, McBurnie, and all
persons acting for and under their authority to refrain from causing the
execution and enforcement of the LA decision in favor of McBurnie,
conditioned upon the respondents posting of a bond in the amount of
P10,000,000.00. The reconsideration of issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction sought by McBurnie was denied by the CA.
McBurnie filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 178034 and 178117) assailing the CA resolutions that
granted the respondent's; application for the injunctive writ. On July 4, 2007,
the Court denied the petition. A motion for reconsideration was denied with
a finality on October 7, 2007.
McBurnie filed a Motion for Leave (1) To File Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and (2) to Admit the Attached Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 56 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, the motion for leave was denied by the Court and the July 4,
2007 became final and executor on November 13, 2007.
On October 27, 2008, the CA ruled on the merits of CA-G.R. SP No.
90845 and CA-G.R. SP No. 95916 and rendered a decision allowing the
respondent's motion to reduce appeal bond and directing the NLRC to give
due course to their appeal. The CA also ruled that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in immediately denying the motion without fixing an
appeal bond in an amount that was reasonable, as it denied the respondents
of their right to appeal from the decision of the LA.
McBurnie filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondents moved
that the appeal be resolved on the merits by the CA. The CA denied both
motions. McBurnie then filed with the Supreme Court the Petition for Review
on Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 186984-85)
The NLRC, acting on the CA order of remand, accepted the appeal
from the LA decision and reversed and set aside the decision of the LA, and
entered a new on dismissing McBurnie complaint.
On September 18, 2009, the third division of this court rendered its
decision granting respondents motion to reduce appeal bond. This Court also
reinstated and affirmed the NLRC decision dismissing respondent's appeal for
failure to perfect an appeal and denying their motion for reconsideration. The
aforementioned decision became final and executor on March 14, 2012.
The respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Third
Motion for Reconsideration, with an attached Motion for Reconsideration
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with Motion to Refer These Cases to the Honorable Court En Banc. The Court
En Banc accepted the case from the third division and issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of the LA Decision.
McBurnie filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he invoked that the Court
September 18, 2009 decision had become final and executor.
Issue: Whether or not McBurnie was illegally dismissed?
Held: NO. There was no employer-employee relationship.
Considering that McBurnie, an Australian, alleged illegal dismissal and sought
to claim under our labor laws, it was necessary for him to establish, first and
foremost, that he was qualified and duly authorized to obtain employment
within our jurisdiction. A requirement for foreigners who intend to work
within the country is an employment permit, as provided under Article 40,
Title II of the Labor Code.
In WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. v. Galera, we held that a
foreign national failure to seek an employment permit prior to employment
poses a serious problem in seeking relief from the Court.
Clearly, this circumstance on the failure of McBurnie to obtain an
employment permit, by itself, necessitates the dismissal of his labor
complaint.
McBurnie failed to present any employment permit which would have
authorized him to obtain employment in the Philippines. This circumstance
negates McBurnie claim that he had been performing work for the
respondents by virtue of an employer-employee relationship. The absence of
the employment permit instead bolsters the claim that the supposed
employment of McBurnie was merely simulated, or did not ensue due to the
non-fulfillment of the conditions that were set forth in the letter of May 11,
1999.
 McBurnie failed to present other competent evidence to prove his
claim of an employer-employee relationship. iven the partiesconflicting
claims on their true intention in executing the agreement, it was necessary to
resort to the established criteria for the determination of an employer-
employee relationship, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control the employee conduct.
The rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on the claimant to
establish or substantiate the claim by the requisite quantum of evidence.
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish
his or her right thereto. McBurnie failed in this regard.As previously observed
by the NLRC, McBurnie even failed to show through any document such as
payslips or vouchers that his salaries during the time that he allegedly worked
for the respondents were paid by the company. In the absence of an
employer-employee relationship between McBurnie and the respondents,
McBurnie could not successfully claim that he was dismissed, much less
illegally dismissed, by the latter. Even granting that there was such an
employer-employee relationship, the records are barren of any document
showing that its termination was by the respondents dismissal of McBurnie.

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