Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8392 June 29, 2010
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]
ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD)1 with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral
Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper 2 as follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover
and common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the
mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with
a religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines,
of which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became
scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to
Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where,
on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her
with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members
of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt
and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the
women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received
information that she was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the streets
in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial
Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women
volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to release her,
however, without the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee
(PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and
reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent.
Additionally, complainant charges respondent with bigamy for contracting
a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the
subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.
In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the
following: Affidavit3 of Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee
and PO1 Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate
of Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the
Marriage Contract6 between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National
Statistics Office Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage
of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and
the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue
City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution8 of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the Information9 lodged with
the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention
against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein
complainant.
Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order 10 of the
Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15 days
from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly make [his]
defense in a verified pleading,"11 he did not file any Answer.1avvphi1
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of
which the parties were duly notified, only complainant’s counsel was
present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report
and Recommendation12 dated September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting
two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no
civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention
and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast
may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed
severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar.
In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the
[Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-
marital relations with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the
instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting
marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the
respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his mistress and
subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances
showed the moral fiber respondent is made of, which [leave] the
undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty.
Danilo S. Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution14 dated December
11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating Commissioner’s findings and
APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioner’s
evaluation and recommendation well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 When
a lawyer’s moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet
the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in
the Roll of Attorneys.16
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the
hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges brought against him,
suggesting that they are true.17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008
manifesting that he would come up with his defense "in a verified
pleading," he never did.
Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyer’s Oath
reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as
to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God,
(underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial Prosecutor on
complainant’s charge against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious
Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the
complaint) has the effect of strengthening the allegations against Atty.
Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical
restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral.
Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by the
two women and police officers, complainant was already freely roaming
around the place and thus, could not have been physically detained.
However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically kept within
an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always
accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could be impossible for
her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the distance
between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is
a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association had the express
and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep
guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely. That can be gleaned
from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being
reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had
untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.19 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal
complaint against respondent, his therein co-respondent corroborated the
testimonies of complainant’s witnesses, and that the allegations against
him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him
by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.20

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts
which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the
qualifications of a lawyer.21

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and

his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is
immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent
in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-92-710 June 19, 2003
PEDRITA M. HARAYO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES, Respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Complainant Pedrita M. Harayo, former clerk-stenographer, Municipal
Trial Court, Minglanilla, Cebu, in a sworn complaint dated 15 September
1992, charged respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores, Presiding Judge of
the same court, with grave misconduct for (a) dismissing for monetary
consideration Crim. Case No. 2307 for violation of PD No. 1866 1 and Crim.
Case No. 2308 for violation of RA No. 6425;2 (b) assigning Court Aide Jose
M. Agosto as domestic helper and driver of respondent’s passenger
jeepney; (c) solemnizing illegal marriages and collecting fees therefor; (d)
allowing her name (complainant’s) to be placed as witness in a marriage
contract by forging her signature; (e) falsifying the date when he signed the
verification portion of the complaint and the joint affidavit of the arresting
officers in Crim. Case No. 2388; and, (f) changing for monetary
consideration the joint affidavit of arresting officers Jerome Abatayo,
Erasmo Gako and Eugene Hernani relative to Crim. Cases Nos. 2307 and
2308.
In a related letter-complaint dated 7 September 1992 complainant Pedrita
Harayo charged respondents Josefina R. Hermosa and Jose M. Agosto, Clerk
of Court and Court Aide respectively, of MTC, Minglanilla, Cebu, with
falsification of entries in their daily time record and daily attendance book.
By way of comment, respondent Judge denied the allegations in the
complaint and countered that complainant might have been prompted to
file the instant complaint after he indorsed Josefina Hermosa over
complainant for the position of Clerk of Court II. He added that complainant
likewise vented her ire on Hermosa and Agosto when Hermosa did not
accede to her request not to pursue her application for Clerk of Court, and
the latter, when he chided her about her belligerent attitude towards
Hermosa and his remark that after all she (complainant) was not qualified
for the position she was seeking and even as court stenographer since she
had no knowledge of steno-typing.
On the matter of the illegal marriage, charged in the complaint, respondent
claimed that he desisted from officiating the marriages upon discovery that
the documents were not complete despite assurances by complainant to
the contrary.
This Court in a resolution dated 23 February 1993 referred the instant case
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the OCA submitted its memorandum dated
29 March 1993 prepared by Deputy Court Administrator Eutropio Migriño
recommending the dismissal of the complaints for lack of merit.
On 11 May 1993 the Court again passed a resolution referring the instant
case to Executive Judge Generoso Juaban of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu,
for investigation, report and recommendation. In his report, Judge Juaban
recommended that respondent be exonerated on the first and third
charges, i.e., that he dismissed cases for monetary consideration, and that
he utilized Court Aide Jose Agosto as his domestic helper and personal
driver. However, on the charge that he performed illegal marriages, Judge
Juaban recommended that respondent be admonished and his salary
equivalent to one (1) or two (2) months be suspended for having signed
three (3) marriage contracts before the corresponding marriage licenses
were obtained by the parties. Judge Juaban reported that –
While there is no hard proof that respondent Judge demanded money in
the solemnization of these marriages, suspicion is strong that there could
be some monetary consideration. The investigator now seems to doubt the
verity of respondent’s denial. If the marriage contracts were signed by him
and no solemnization ever had, as he alleges, because he desisted from
doing so in the first instance, why did he repeat the same procedure in the
second and the third time? Signing the marriage contracts before the
marriage licenses were so obtained on these three (3) marriages is
indicative of respondent’s imprudence in this respect that calls for
appropriate measures of admonition.3
On 9 August 1994 this Court referred the report of Judge Juaban to the OCA
for further evaluation, report and recommendation. Accordingly, on 15
September 1994 the OCA submitted a memorandum essentially adopting
the recommendations of Investigating Judge Juaban but with the proposal
that with regard to the second charge, respondent be fined in the amount
equivalent to his one (1) month salary.
In an En Banc resolution dated 30 May 1995, the Supreme Court noted that
the report of Judge Juaban failed to address certain key issues which were
likewise raised in the complaint, namely: (a) that respondent allowed
complainant’s name to be placed as witness in the marriage contract
signed by Emmanuel Plantar and Elizabeth Nacor on 10 May 1989 by
forging her signature; (b) that he falsified the date when he signed the
verification portion of the complaint and the joint affidavit of the arresting
officers in Crim. Case No. 2388 by making it appear that he was in the office
and signed the documents on 15 August 1992 when in fact it was only on
20 August 1992 that he went to the court and signed the same; and, (c) that
for monetary consideration, he changed the joint affidavit of the arresting
officers in order to lay the groundwork for the dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos.
2307 and 2308.
In justifying the inclusion of the above-mentioned charges, the Court
opined that these accusations should have been included in the
investigation as they were embodied in the reply of complainant to the
comment of respondent Judge. Consequently, the Court directed the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Cebu City, to conduct an
investigation and submit its report and recommendation on the (a) alleged
forgery of complainant’s signature on the marriage contract signed by
Emmanuel Plantar and Elizabeth Nacor on 10 May 1989; and (b) purported
falsification of the joint affidavit of the arresting officers in Crim. Cases Nos.
2307 and 2308, and of the date affixed in the verification of the complaint
in Crim. Case No. 2388.
In partial compliance with the Court’s directive, the NBI through Regional
Director Florencio Villarin submitted a report on 2 November 1995 which
contained its findings and conclusions on the examination of the marriage
contract containing complainant’s alleged forged signature. It concluded
that "(t)he questioned signatures ‘Pedrita Harayo’ and the
standard/sample signatures and handwritings of one ‘Pedrita Harayo’
were not written by one and the same person."4
With respect to the alleged falsification of the joint affidavit of the arresting
officers, and of the date affixed in the verification of the complaint in Crim.
Case No. 2388, the NBI reports disclosed the following: " (a) as regards the
joint affidavit executed on 23 August 1991, ". . . indicative that they were
not typed from one and the same source/ typewriter; 5 (b) as regards the
joint affidavit executed on 15 August 1992 ". . . indicative that they were
not typed from one and the same source/typewriter;"6 and (c) "the
questioned and the standard sample/signatures (of) Jesus P. Carel were
written by one and the same person. The questioned typewritten
entries/figures reading ‘15’ is NOT altered."7
Upon receipt of the last report of the NBI, the Second Division of this Court
again referred the matter to the OCA which in turn recommended that the
matter be "REFERRED BACK" to the executive judge of RTC, Cebu, for a
more exhaustive investigation, report and recommendation, particularly
on those matters raised by the complainant but were not touched in the
investigation conducted by former Executive Judge Generoso Juaban.
On 8 January 2003, Investigating Judge Galicano Arriesgado, who replaced
Judge Generoso Juaban as Executive Judge, RTC-Cebu, together with Judges
Isaias Dicdican and Pampio Abarintos, First Vice–Executive Judge and
Second Vice-Executive Judge, respectively, submitted their report with the
recommendation that all the charges against respondent Judge be
dismissed for lack of merit.8 In arriving at their findings and conclusions,
the Investigating Judges said -9
On the charge that respondent judge allowed the forging of complainant’s
signature in the marriage contract x x x x no sufficient proof was adduced
that respondent judge had personal knowledge, much less, allowed the
commission of the forgery. While it is true that the NBI result impliedly
reported a forgery, however, the same cannot be directly pointed to
respondent x x x x
On the second charge of falsifying the date in the verification portion of the
joint affidavit of the police officers in Criminal Case 2388, the investigation
revealed a total lack of evidence to support the same x x x x In the absence
of proof to the contrary, the best evidence is the document, which has been,
for all intents, proven not only to be regular, but also to be without any
alterations. Hence, in the normal course of things, it is logical to presume
that the document was signed by respondent on the 15th and have been
filed with and received by the court on the 18th as appearing on the official
stamp x x x x
On the charge that respondent judge changed the joint affidavits of the
arresting officers in order to facilitate the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
2307 and 2308, the same June 1, 2000 report of the NBI did not yield
conclusive results that the questioned affidavits were typed at the MTC
Minglanilla x x x x
On the first charge, there is absolutely no proof, other than the
unsubstantiated allegation of the complainant, that respondent Judge had
received pecuniary consideration from a brother of the accused in
exchange for the dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos. 2307 and 2308. If we were
to believe complainant’s account of the incident, the payoff was supposed the instant case, respondent repeatedly committed these procedural
to have been made outside the chambers of respondent Judge and in the gaffes, a penalty more severe must be meted against him.
presence of lawyers and court employees; in other words, in open public
view – a venue which no sensible perpetrator of a crime would choose as
His serious negligence and irresponsibility in signing three (3) marriage
it would unnecessarily expose him to the dangers of eventual prosecution.
contracts, allegedly in blank, and without the requisite marriage licenses
Moreover, her allusion that respondent offered her ₱100.00, apparently as
are simply too palpable for this Court to assume an air of nonchalance and
goodwill money, becomes even more preposterous considering that a
suspend in midair the fall of the gavel when it should.
considerable amount, ₱15,000.00 or ₱20,000.00, was supposed to have
changed hands. As pointed out by respondent, ₱100.00 is an amount too
miniscule to buy the silence of a potential witness to a crime. WHEREFORE, the recommendations of Investigating Judges Generoso
Juaban and Galicano Arriesgado are APPROVED, particularly exonerating
respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores of the charges against him, with
On the second charge, we also find unpersuasive complainant’s allegation
the exception of his act of signing the three (3) marriage contracts without
that respondent improperly utilized the services of Court Aide Jose Agosto
the required marriage licenses for which the Court finds him
as domestic helper and driver of his passenger jeepney. This bare
administratively liable and is ORDERED suspended immediately for one
accusation, devoid of corroboration, cannot nudge this Court into
(1) month and to pay a fine equivalent to two (2) months salary which shall
precipitate belief.
be withheld from his retirement benefits when he retires.

On the charge that respondent Judge solemnized civil marriages for

SO ORDERED.
exorbitant fees without the requisite marriage license, the records would
reveal that on three (3) different occasions he had indeed signed marriage
contracts, which were undated as to the time the marriages were Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
solemnized and with the space provided for the license number left blank. Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

In his comment, respondent Judge denied having solemnized marriages

without a license.1âwphi1 He explained that in the first instance involving
the marriage between Didier and Basan, he signed the marriage contract
only after assurances were made by complainant that the papers were in
order but collected said documents back and kept them inside his drawer
soon after learning that the marriage license was indeed missing. In the
other two (2) instances, he also denied having officiated at the marriage
between Bin Osman and Librea and that of Cabreros and Batto when
informed that the contracting parties could not produce their respective
marriage licenses.

Indeed, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that respondent
had in fact solemnized the marriages without the mandated license. After
all, who could best prove the existence of this fact other than the
contracting parties themselves? Nonetheless, there is an inescapable
showing that in at least three (3) different occasions respondent Judge
actually signed the marriage contracts, admittedly prior to the issuance of
the licenses.

Be that as it may, we cannot reject outright, in the absence of a more

convincing evidence en contra by the complainant, the verity of
respondent’s assertion that he desisted from performing marriages upon
learning of the contracting parties’ failure to produce the requisite
marriage licenses, which was corroborated by other defense witnesses.
But we cannot also help but register our strong suspicion that there are
more serious irregularities than meet the eye behind respondent’s
actuations. Committing the same act of imprudence three (3) times is one
too many for comfort, casting respondent’s motives in serious question. In
the absence however of clear and convincing proof that he actually
solemnized the three (3) marriages without the marriage licenses, no
culpability of such nature can be ascribed to him.

Nonetheless, respondent’s admission of signing the marriage contracts

before the issuance of the requisite marriage licenses, although not
necessarily fraudulent, amounts to gross negligence, if not gross
irresponsibility, in performing his official functions.

On the charge of forgery by respondent of complainant’s signature as

witness in a marriage contract, there appears to be sufficient basis for the
conclusion of the NBI of an implied forgery on the documents in question
although there is no direct evidence on who actually committed the
forgery. But the fact is that it happened with respondent’s apparent
tolerance, if not acquiescence, for which he should be held accountable.

As regards the allegation of complainant that respondent falsified the date

when he signed the verification portion of the complaint and the joint
affidavit of the arresting officers in Crim. Case No. 2388, and that he
changed for monetary consideration the joint affidavit of the arresting
officers in connection with Crim. Cases Nos. 2307 and 2308, we can only
rely, in the absence of proof to the contrary, on the findings of the NBI that
no alterations were made on the subject documents.

In sum, respondent, for gratuitously signing marriage contracts in utter

disregard of its legal effects, had been remiss in his duty of exercising due
care and circumspection in the performance of his official duties. In doing
so, he exhibited a cavalier proclivity of ignoring the norms of diligence,
efficiency, competence and dedication expected of a man donning a judicial
robe. Thus, he deserves a more severe disciplinary sanction than that
recommended.

Although the accusations against respondent Judge do not appear to have

been fully substantiated, the Court cannot let him go unpunished. In Negre
v. Rivera,10 we admonished a municipal judge for signing a marriage
contract where no marriage license had been issued. Considering that in
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind!
North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the
reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit
open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other
was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does
the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP
Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to
the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4,
1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts
to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when
he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for
three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner.
Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition
would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground
to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor
of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the
Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of
the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law).
In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in
any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as
the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048.
It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a
mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408
of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those
acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the
sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration
of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in
default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
 register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to
the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone;
(d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to
be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege
to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to
enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when
a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
error,30 is immutable.31
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be Costs against petitioner.
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
SO ORDERED.
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex
that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a
statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows
a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
"female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be

Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition
would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage
to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do

so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-
based.
FIRST DIVISION she was actually trying to be helpful in expediting the couple’s application
for a marriage license.2
A.M. No. P-99-1312 July 31, 2002
Appended to respondent’s affidavit were the affidavits3 of Ma. Elvie N. Cruz
and Luzviminda C. Sional, who both claimed to be present when the
ERMELINDA ESCLEO, complainant,
January 9, 1998 encounter between complainant and respondent took
vs.
place. Affiants stated that complainant shouted at respondent, spewing
MARITESS DORADO, Court Stenographer II, Metropolitan Trial
unpleasant words. Respondent calmly tried to explain to complainant but
Court, Branch 66, Makati City, respondent.
the latter continued yelling at her.

KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Resolution dated June 9, 1999, the Court resolved to refer the case to
Sandiganbayan Justice Romulo Quimbo (Ret.), consultant of the OCA, for
Before this Court is an administrative complaint instituted by Ms investigation, report and recommendation.
Ermelinda Escleo against Ms Maritess Dorado, Court Stenographer II,
Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Makati City. Respondent is
Justice Quimbo related in his Report the proceedings that transpired in his
alleged to have solicited from complainant’s sister the amount of P2,000.00
investigation:
as down payment of an unauthorized "facilitation fee" to expedite the
latter’s marriage.
We set the first hearing on September 13, 1999. Subpoenas were
sent to both complainant and respondent. Only the respondent
Complainant narrates that on January 8, 1998, her sister, Ma. Phoebe Q.
appeared. It does not appear on record whether the
Carbon went to the City Hall of Makati to secure a marriage license. Ms.
complainant received the subpoena mailed to her.
Carbon was then engaged to a Korean citizen. She approached respondent
who asked her to fill up some forms and to pay the amount of P5,000.00.
After some bargaining, the amount was reduced to P4,000.00. Ms Carbon The respondent sought the postponement of the hearing as she
made a down payment of P2,000.00, and was informed that the marriage wanted to retain the services of a lawyer. For this reason, we
ceremony was scheduled for January 12, 1998 at 1:30 p.m. reset the hearing to October 6, 1999 but because respondent
suffered a miscarriage and could not be present, we cancelled
said hearing. On October 20, 1999, respondent appeared with
Upon returning home, Ms. Carbon informed complainant of the
Atty. Editha Miña of the Public Attorney’s Office. Complainant
arrangements. Finding the amount paid by her sister exorbitant,
was again absent.
complainant went to respondent’s office the following day. She demanded
that respondent return the down payment of P2,000.00 and the document
evidencing the legal capacity of her sister’s fiancé to marry, which had been The undersigned asked respondent whether she made answers
given to respondent for processing. Respondent, however, refused to to questions propounded by Hon. Leticia Querubin-Ulibarri,
return the money and the document allegedly because she had given them Executive Judge of the Makati MeTC and contained in two
to a certain Caloy of Imus, Cavite. transcripts of stenographic notes taken at an investigation of the
complaint of the present complainant which the said Judge
Ulibarri conducted on January 13 and 14, 1998. These two
A shouting match ensued between the parties. The commotion caught the
transcripts now form part of the record of this case having been
attention of respondent’s superior, MeTC Judge Estella Bernabe, who
transmitted by Judge Ulibarri. Respondent’s counsel manifested
inquired as to the cause of the argument. Complainant explained to the
that the said answers were given under duress. We, therefore,
Judge the events that had just transpired. Judge Bernabe informed
called Judge Ulibarri to appear and testify in the investigation.
complainant that no fees are supposed to be charged for the solemnization
On December 1, 1999, Judge Ulibarri, under oath, assured the
of marriage and instructed her to put her complaint in writing. Judge
undersigned that the answers which respondent gave and
Bernabe referred complainant to MeTC Executive Judge Leticia Ulibarri.
which appear in the two transcripts were voluntarily made and
that no compulsion was exerted to extract the same.
When complainant returned the next day, January 11, 1998, respondent
still failed to return the money as well as the document. Respondent even
After the declaration of Judge Ulibarri, the respondent opted not
told complainant that they should consider themselves fortunate that they
to testify in her own behalf nor to present evidence. Instead she
were charged on P4,000.00, considering that the so-called "japayukis"
prayed for time to file a "position paper" which the undersigned
were ordinarily charged P15,000.00. Complainant said she did not care and
received on December 21, 1999.4
demanded the document evidencing the Korean’s legal capacity to marry.
Respondent told her to withdraw her complaint first. Complainant refused
however.1 In her Position Paper dated December 15, 1999, respondent prayed that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence. She argued that the failure
of the complainant to attend the investigation violated her right to cross-
Ms. Escleo registered her complaint before Executive Judge Ulibarri. On
examine her accuser. She added that the complaint is based merely on
January 13 and 14, 1998, Judge Ulibarri conducted an investigation of the
hearsay, complainant not having personal knowledge of the transaction
charges against respondent. Both complainant and respondent were in
between respondent and complainant’s sister.
attendance on both dates. Phoebe Carbon was also present in the
investigation held on January 14, 1998. The proceedings before Judge
Ulibarri were transcribed and the case was subsequently referred to the Respondent likewise contended that she was deprived of her right to due
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). process. In the investigation by Judge Ulibarri, which was conducted a day
after the complaint was filed, respondent was not given the opportunity to
answer the complaint in writing. Neither was she given the usual three
Directed to file an answer, respondent submitted an affidavit vehemently
days to prepare for trial. Moreover, the Judge not inform her of her right
denying the charges. She related that on January 8, 1998, while she was
against self-incrimination.
busy transcribing her stenographic notes, a certain Ma. Phoebe Q. Carbon,
together with her foreigner-fiancé, approached her. Ms. Carbon sought her
assistance on how they could be married at the soonest possible time The acts complained of, respondent also pointed out, are not within her
without having to await the lapse of the 10-day period of publication of duties and hence, could not be punished therefor. Finally, it was
their application for a marriage license. Ms. Carbon explained that the complainant’s sister who solicited respondent’s help and respondent
urgency of the wedding was due to the fact that they were already deemed should not be penalized for merely helping one in need.
overstaying in the country. Since respondent was allegedly busy at work,
she directed Ms Carbon to proceed to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
Respondent attached, as Annex 1 to her Position Paper, an Affidavit
to secure a marriage license and to return to her only after she already had
executed by one Felicitas Sanje, who claimed to be a Minister/Reverend of
in her possession the necessary document. Since Ms. Carbon, then almost
the Spiritual Filipino Catholic Church and, as such, was authorized to
in tears, was quite insistent in her request for assistance, respondent
conduct marriages within Metro Manila. The authority was evidenced by a
decided to seek the help of a friend from Cavite in securing a marriage
Certificate of Registration and Authority to Solemnize Marriage5 signed by
license for Ms Carbon and her fiancé.
the Civil Registry Coordinator (for the Civil Registrar General).

The next day, a very angry complainant came to respondent’s office.

Sanje alleged that he frequents he City Hall of Makati. He is regularly
Respondent explained to her that, "hindi ako ang naglalakad ng kasal at
approached by those who wish to get married but whose papers are not in
wala na sa akin ang legal capacity dahilan sa ipina-process na ni Phoebe ng
order and, hence, cannot be married by a judge. He stated that he usually
madalian, at babalik na lamang si Phoebe para magbayad at magpakasal
charges P2,000.00 for Filipinos and P5,000.00 for foreigners. The fee
sa January 12 or 13." Complainant proceeded to report the matter to MeTC
covers the processing of the marriage license, counseling, and other
Executive Judge Ulibarri, who then ordered respondent to return the
requirements, including a certified photocopy of the marriage certificate.
documents of complainant’s sister.

On January 8, 1998, at around 2:30 to 3:00 p.m., Sanje saw respondent

Respondent denied having done anything wrong or having received money
talking to two persons. One of them, the woman, was on the verge of tears
from either complainant or Ms Carbon. On the contrary, she asserted that
as she talked to respondent who was then busy with her typewriter. Sanje - yung pong license.
claimed that he overheard the woman pleading for respondent to help Court
them. The woman said that they needed to get married (right away), - Bakit, na-a-antidate ba yon?
otherwise, they would be deemed overstaying in the country. Sanje heard Maritess Dorado
respondent say, "[A]ng alam ko P5,000.00 ang bayad kapag foreigner ang - Hindi ko po alam, kasi hindi po ako ang naglalakad, basta yon lang ang
ikinakasal, kasama na ang lahat ng papeles, pero hindi ako masyadong inaano niya.
sigurado, kaya bahala ng kayong mag-usap." The couple then handed Court
respondent the document evidencing the Korean’s legal capacity to marry - So yung P2,000.00 ibinigay mo kay Raquel?
and their application for a marriage license. They asked respondent to wait Maritess Dorado
for them while they had their money converted to local currency. - Yes, Ma’am.
Respondent and Sanje waited for the two until 5:00 p.m. but the couple did Court
not return. As Sanje had overheard their conversation, respondent gave - Ngayon, ang sabi eh di P2,000.00, pero may balance pang P2,000.00 dahil
him the documents. Sanje had the papers processed since he would be P4,000.00 ang usapan ninyo, bakit nag-sisingil ka ng ganoong kalaki, eh
conducting the marriage ceremony. wala namang bayad ang… eh ang alam ko singkwenta pesos lang, bakit
nagsisingil ka ng ganoong kalaki?
Maritess Dorado
When Sanje returned to City Hall the next day, he learned that the couple
- Siya lang naman po ang nag-ano, sinabi ko naman sa kanila na pwede
had not returned. Instead, one Esmerlinda (sic) Escleo demanded from
mura dahil dito.
respondent the document evidencing the foreigner’s legal capacity to
Court
marry. Respondent informed her that the document had already been filed
- Mura ang singil mo, P1,500.00, ang sinabi mo P1,500.00?
in Imus, Cavite, where the marriage license was to be obtained. Sanje
Maritess Dorado
subsequently discovered that Escleo had filed a complaint against
- Hindi ho syempre Ma’am, may-agent naman yan tsaka tatawad pa naman.
respondent for charging exorbitant fees, although no money had been even
Court
actually paid. Despite such failure to pay, Sanje gave the couple their
- Bakit kailangan may-agent pa ang kasal?
marriage license. He did not solemnize their marriage, however, because
Maritess Dorado
they were "magulong kausap."
- Hindi ko naman ho kilala, kung baga ini-refer lang sila sa akin.

In his Report, dated January 7, 2000, Justice Quimbo found respondent

Respondent was not deprived of due process in the investigation
guilty of misconduct, "although it may not be characterized as gross
conducted by Judge Ulibarri. What is repugnant to due process is the denial
misconduct." He recommended that respondent be suspended for a period
of the opportunity to be heard.8 In administrative proceedings, moreover,
of three (3) months, without pay, and that she be warned that the
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 9 Respondent cannot
commission of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
deny that she was accorded, and indeed availed herself of, the opportunity
punishment.6
to be heard in the proceedings before Judge Ulibarri.

The Court concurs with the Hearing Officer’s findings and

Respondent also claims that she had a right to be informed of her right
recommendation, save for the penalty.
against self-incrimination, pursuant to Section 12 (1), Article III of the
Constitution:
Whether or not the complaint is hearsay, and whether or not respondent
was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant, who failed to
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
attend the hearing called by Justice Quimbo, are largely immaterial.
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
Respondent’s purpose in raising these issues is obviously to exclude the
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
evidence presented by complainant. But assuming these arguments are
his own choice.
meritorious, there is still ample evidence to establish respondent’s guilt –
evidence provided by respondent herself.
This provision is not applicable because respondent was not under
"investigation for the commission of an offense"; hence, the rights granted
In the investigation conducted by Judge Ulibarri, respondent bared that she
by said provision did not attach. Judge Ulibarri was under no constitutional
had the papers processed, handing the document and the amount of
obligation to inform respondent of such right.
P2,000.00 to a certain Raquel from the "property." She also revealed that,
by merely antedating the marriage license, the 10-day posting requirement
could be skirted. The "agent" or go-between justified the large fee. Lastly, respondent insists that the acts complained of have no connection
with her duties as court stenographer and that she was merely helping
complainant’s sister, for which punishment is undeserved.
Maritess Dorado
- Kasi Ma’am, magpapakasal daw sila. Tapos, sabi ko, dito pwede ten days,
sabi ko sa kanila, tapos sabi ko… The law prescribes certain requirements for a valid marriage license to
Court issue.10 By agreeing to make it appear that complainant’s sister and her
- Tapos sabi niya, magkano ang sisingilin mo? fiancé complied with these requirements, specifically by the antedating of
Maritess Dorado the marriage license, respondent abetted the circumvention of the law.
- Sabi ko, pwede na ang P1,500.00 kasi foreigner. Tapos sabi niya, eh kasi Worse, she did this for a fee. If respondent believes such to be an act of
uuwi na sila sa Iloilo. Tapos sabi ko, kasi pwede nating iano yan, kaya lang kindness, she certainly has a skewed notion of charity.
mahal, maybayad kasi hindi tayo makakakuha tsaka hindi ka makaka-aalis,
sabi kong ganon sa kanya, pumayag naman sila, Huwebes yon Ma’am,
Clearly, respondent may be held for her acts although they do not involve
nagmamadali sila, eh di pinalakad ko na po, Ma’am nung Huwebes.
her functions as stenographer. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
Court
for Public Officials and Employees11 mandates all public officials and
- Kanino mo pinalakad?
employees "to refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
Maritess Dorado
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
- Duon po sa naglalakad ng license, kay Raquel.
interest."12 The conduct especially of court personnel must always be
Court
beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
- Sino yung Raquel, saan [sic] nagtatrabajo?
responsibility as to let them be free of any suspicion that may taint the
Maritess Dorado
judiciary.13
- Sa Property ata yon.
Court
- Property ng? For abetting the circumvention of the legal requirements in the issuance of
Maritess Dorado a marriage license, respondent is guilty of Simple Misconduct punishable
- Ng Makati. by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. This
Court appearing to be her first offense, a one month and one day suspension is
- Property o licensing? deemed sufficient as her penalty.14
Maritess Dorado
- Property.
WHEREFORE, respondent Maritess M. Dorado is found guilty of Simple
Court
Misconduct and is SUSPENDED for a period of ONE (1) MONTH AND ONE
- Ano ang full name niya?
(1) DAY, without pay. She is WARNED that a repetition of the same or
Maritess Dorado
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
- Basta Raquel ang alam ko.
Court
- Eh tapos binigay mo yung pera, yung P2,000.00? SO ORDERED.
Maritess Dorado
- Ma’am, kailangan ng license, dahil kasi i-a-anti-date yung ano ng kapatid
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
niya, dahil yuon ng ang request nila para makasal sila dahil aalis sila daw.
Court
- I-a-anti-date, alin ang i-a-antidate?
Maritess Dorado
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were
thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to
their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his
death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a
pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article
58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and
case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein
a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband
and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction
as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them
on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify
their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
for purpose of remarriage.
"husband and wife".

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639,
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file
SO ORDERED.
a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied
upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment
suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source
of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages
is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father

extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was
a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is

necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance
be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as
for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether
before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death
of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent
Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As
ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to
them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer.
Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married
in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge
of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March
1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided
to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4)
months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro
gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter,
Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the
States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding
the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to
the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil
Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS
and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970
under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on
June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license
no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before
June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any
application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage
contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license
prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that
the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate
court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar
sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the
trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null
and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject
marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate
court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar
that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately
proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the
respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that
the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity
of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as
null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption
that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed
his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license
no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the
subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private
respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides
that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first
issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a
valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its
non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is
sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement
signed by an officer having custody of an official
record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The
failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that
the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city
court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret
marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a
civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that
the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial
cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly
served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite
receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was
properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was
absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between
private respondent and her husband Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a
marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may
have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any

reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared
the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a
sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them
had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna,
Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing
of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the
latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece
of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early
part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded
that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out
to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the
above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
[Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was
valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and
rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall
to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces
of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion
that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission,
[Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that
the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this
Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up
on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is
now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote
the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency.
This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written
in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but
a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded
wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage
in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she
further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot
was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and
when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had
prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that
the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained
by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false
marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose
and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as
a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did
not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond
the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down
Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed
on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file
an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993
that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as
one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. 23
the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave
credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to I
their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that
neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the
OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect.
The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code II
which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the
III
case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY
marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false. OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally,
Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after
a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration
of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa.
Pasay City.19
To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related
arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this
Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise
to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa.
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic
together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning
fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement
– that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City,
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
Felisa’s name as his wife.
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local prevailing rules is in order.
civil registrar.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly,
a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out
from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license. 21
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
Felisa’s motion.

(2) Their consent, freely given;

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R.
No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
 (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that
the license is the essence of the marriage contract. 30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages
are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace
or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under
Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications
of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each
other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in
truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the
rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule
is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76
to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the
law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum
requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not
as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that
Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in
February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court
also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied
the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact
arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make
contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative
body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or
based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by
Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license,
is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,
since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court
holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially,
when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the
prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The
present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the
presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and
Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment
of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the
parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the
law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate
the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as
a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for
it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without
force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that
based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the
fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration
of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he
sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is

imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void
ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-
year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is
unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the

Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio,
is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and
APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and
Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process
Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same
court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with
the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of
an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their
respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by
complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David
C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant
Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for
the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of
this administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out
under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even
without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were
able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As
a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for
the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were
not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who
prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the
lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the
latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court
II, the employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially
complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest
against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she
discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody
of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the
marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and
that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for
this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file
copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the
latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by
the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but
he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between
Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code,
hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave
strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the
marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter
failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing
their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar;
that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint
were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not
signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that
copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido,
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga,
and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him
since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to
avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign
their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven
(7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or
at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise
made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred
thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and
that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document,
although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all
marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the
exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is
the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein;
that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as
solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She
further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial
Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged
difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those
payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she
collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is
remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary
Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court
which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were
manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in
charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of
marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that
the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization
fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized
in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6)
documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the
official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be
held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he
is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by
complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed
as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is
not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he
merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court,
respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of
Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were
surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on
October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one
appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she
purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of
court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the
air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The
installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent
of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the
position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority
over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of
respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought
from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after
Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be
that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a
matter of honor and prestige.
 4. Cash bod issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza,
et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to
change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of
P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to
appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of
two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it
has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the
former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and,
later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is
deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to
withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for
failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite
notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as
this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention
prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is
accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former
escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the
case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated
April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never
employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate household help;
and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for
more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by
law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding
receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the
Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal
account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon
Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed
her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank
issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine
National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit
the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the
same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted
P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and
Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative
matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably
impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the
facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for
his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which,
being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical
illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the
material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B),
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the
marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was
solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed
their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his
signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate
as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of
the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family
Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with
them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started
living together as husband and wife believing that the formal
requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a
marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the
marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized
the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains
that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It
was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real
one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one
of the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to
show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that
the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors
were already invited and the place of the parties where the
reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers
away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The
fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract,
the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do
not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage.
His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony
of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya
and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had
not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-
4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot
possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage.
One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge
Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he was
solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he
did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an
instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and
Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did
not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B),
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but
he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh.
AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when
it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen
(18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost
six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their
joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13)
years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this
is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of
this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might
ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a
marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple
for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage
he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage
at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage
certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license
already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage
license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage
under exceptional character where a marriage license was not
required, why did he already require the parties to have a
marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the
second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of
Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
certificate did not state the date when the marriage was
solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a
copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not
any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning.
Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage
certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64
Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the
Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a)
copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G),
Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint
affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage
(Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize
their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-
examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who
prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain
Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to
just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits
there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their
two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs.
F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June
7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license.
On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage
was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign
the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought
the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge
Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga
as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to
believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also
the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting
parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and
paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor
of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina,
however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no
probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have
been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter
his chamber in order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and
their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to
Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His
purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN,
p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are
supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare
that they take each other as husband and wife before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses
before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as
to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a
marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the
testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the
practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that
he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages
everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July,
1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending
cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole
month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992
shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the
whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs.
12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however,
did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not
charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is
not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having
falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme
Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of
the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the
complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and
September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for
said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to
H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred
thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the
said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the
monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six
(6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged
official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6)
documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with
respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based
on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees,
but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying
and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports
because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court
and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the
records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he
is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper
discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.
Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it
was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency
or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the
falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo
whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly
report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her
own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she
was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out
the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-
93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter
as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the
data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check
whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as
clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full
control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p.
11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge
of falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those
documents notarized during the month of July and September,
1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that
she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a
bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued
temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have
been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents
notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992,
there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that
month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-
six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document
notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50.
Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually
being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that
P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she
really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for
each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for
considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees
were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later.
Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances
where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage
license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless
the contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn
over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It
was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the
minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac
dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed
the personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions
she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees
(Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over
to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and
September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand
she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in
his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on
this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings
and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W,
FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-
S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash
bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office
and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh.
Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the
alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond
was deposited informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,
after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28;
12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy
opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26,
1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One
Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash
bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself
the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one
year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the
filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of
Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost
three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said
cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28,
1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in
Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy
issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1).
Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash
bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with)
the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in
Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case
amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later
when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash
bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash
bond deposits and other payments and collections she received.
She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she
issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that
receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that
she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the
Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case
was already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in
cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was
brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge
Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought
and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated
May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both
respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It
was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the
vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office
of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt
could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in
this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of
the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60
SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash
bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her
affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that
this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and
this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of
detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped
while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact,
the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge
Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular
charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the
municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-
3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was
confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon
is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former
utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
complainants should have presented records from the police of
Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in
Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without
basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against
the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for
the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The
records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return
of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991
showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused
who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested.
Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of
Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take
custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case
archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped.
This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the
case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former
should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not
brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from
jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on
when he could not be arrested when the case should have been
ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that
he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which
gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while
in his custody only that the complainants could not present
records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing
fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying
filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the
bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the
Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection
against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited
Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural
Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of
money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment
of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was
respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4,
1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank
paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated
January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she
would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,
comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank
of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening
the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to
have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made
on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was
only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992.
Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her
obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by
the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license,
and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court,
particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it
has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or
similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a
marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage
contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting
parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local
Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage
contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone
a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing
officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying
(with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3)
of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58
SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report
of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same,
cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check
and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk
of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge
cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of
court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the
monthly report of cases for the months of July and September,
1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for
having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said
two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized,
but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized
issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued
unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29,
1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which
she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it
with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or
after one year and five months in her possession and after this case
was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court
order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for
receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered
temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with
a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered
released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed
against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos,
but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on
March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said
respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed
from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the
clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city
or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised
Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.
127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit
intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial
treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper
receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968;
p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum
 Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental
deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of
any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the
court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing

circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally
violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and
functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross
neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case
of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch
I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that
"The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her
custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited
immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated
November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent
Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected
constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said
funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was
found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her
immediate dismissal (from) the service.

xxx xxx xxx

We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee
should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently

provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected
by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to
the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished
in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law."9 This is of course,
within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be

imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with
respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear
that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern
for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status.
This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as
hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of
misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as
to ineludibly require a higher penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on

respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be
severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent
judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have
been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The
same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC,
which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation
from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan,
a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that
he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have
not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo
and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the
case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon.
The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice
and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite
this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent
judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr.
and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes
C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they
knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne
five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia,
Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven
years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit
is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason
for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In
fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order
to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has
been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage
has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead,
in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage
shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not
falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family
Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification
for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and
Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted
provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense
that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is
a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or
place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of

Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding
of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance

of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude
that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at

least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the
system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the
errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may
at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered

bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to

the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that
one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent
judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is

hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.