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Resolved: The European Union should join the Belt and Road

Initiative.
“literal bridges can help build figurative ones”
- DEREK WATKINS, K.K. REBECCA LAI and KEITH BRADSHER (NYT)

Editor’s note: BRI is not a policy with a comprehensive plan, it is simply a mission statement. BRI to Xi Jinping is MAGA to Donald
Trump. The question is whether we should accept the broad impacts of accepting China’s increased trade, development, and political
hegemony.

Both statements seek to increase political power globally, benefit the domestic economy, and create jobs; simply in opposite manners.
(BRI massively expands trade while MAGA attempts to slow it)

For consistency:
Heading 1 is size 16 - Heading 2 is size 14 - Heading 3 is size 13 - Heading 4 is size 12 -
Heading 5 is size 11.5 - Card text is size 11 - Cut text is size 8 - Citation is size 8

Important Reads: https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-


/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/belt-
road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf?la=en

https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/14216.htm

Stats:
https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/hurry-how-belt-and-road-initiative-changes-trade-times-and-trade

NEUTRAL 4
1. Definitions 4
1.1 European Union 4
1.1.1 Members of the EU (28) 4
1.1.2 European Community 4
1.2 Should 4
1.3 Join 4
1.4 Belt and Road Initiative 4
1.4.1 Members of the Belt and Road Initiative (139) 5
1.4.2 Members of BRI and EU (17) 6
1.4.3 How China sees the BRI 6
1.5 Bargaining Power 7
1.6 The China-CEEC Initiative 7
1.6.1 CEEC 7
1.6.2 Members of the CEEC Initiative in the EU 7
1.7 Memorandum of Understanding 7

PRO 8
1. Bargaining Power 8
1.1 EU countries struggling in BRI 8
1.1.1 Economic struggles 8
1.1.2 Struggle to reform 8
1.1.3 Strong EU nations are not in BRI 8
1.2 EU can make reforms as a bloc 9
1.2.1 EU Nations want one voice against China 9
1.2.1.1 Precedent of “one voice” policy in trade 9
1.2.1.2 Germany wants this with China 9
1.2.2 Other blocs successful 9
1.2.2.1 Historical EU BP 9
1.2.2.2 EU bargaining power is stronger than America 9
1.2.2.3 Same BP in trade as China and US 10
1.2.3 China will give in 10
1.2.4 EU can help developing nations 10
1.3 A bloc is only logical 10
1.3.1 A majority of EU members are in BRI 10
1.3.2 Trade increase is inevitable 11
1.3.2.1 414bn € (471.52bn $) increase from 2012-2030 between China and EU 11
1.4 EU is crumbling 11
1.4.1 Examples 12
1.4.1.1 Brexit 12
1.4.1.2 Italy 12
1.4.1.3 Austria 12
1.4.1.4 Hungary 13
1.4.1.5 Czech Republic 13
1.4.1.6 Poland 13
1.4.2 Reuniting CEE with Western Europe 14
1.4.2.1 China-CEEC divides the EU 14
1.4.2.2 Double Standards in China Trade 14
1.4.2.3 CEE countries need help 14
2. Trade Increase 15
2.1 Trade times increase specialization 15
2.2 Increase Chinese Imports 15
2.3 WTO Compliance 15

CON 16
Debt 16
2. Job Loss 17
2.1 Infrastructure upgrades are inevitable 17
2.2 Belt and Road uses Chinese laborers 17
2.3 Chinese SOE Extension 17
2.4 Chinese workforce is extremely bloated 18
2.5 Job Loss in Current BRI nations 18
2.6 Effects of Job Loss 18
2.7 A2 Marshall Plan Analogy 18
3. Chinese Expansion 18
3.1 Debt traps 18
3.2 Stops Chinese Backlash 18
3.3 Sharp Power 18
4. Environmental Degradation 18
4.1 Coal plants 18
4.2 Low environmental standards 19
5. FDI is harmful 19
5.1 FDI increases under BRI 19
5.2 FDI has no regard for health and safety 19
6. Nothing new 19
6.1 China claims anything as “BRI” 19
6.2 China prefers to invest in infrastructure 19

Rebuttals 21
A2 Pro 21
A2 Infrastructure 21
A2 Job Creation 21
A2 Trade 21
A2 Bargaining Power 21
A2 Con 21
A2 “Just building infrastructure” 21
2. A2 Debt 21
3. A2 Job Loss 21
4. A2 Human Rights 21
5. A2 Corruption/Transparency 21
6. A2 Trade Deficit 22
7. A2 China Hegemony 22
7.1 A2 Renminbi Internationalization 22
8. A2 Individualism 22
NEUTRAL
1. Definitions

1.1 European Union


“Countries in the EU and EEA.” GOV.UK, United Kingdom, 24 July 2015, www.gov.uk/eu-eea.

The European Union (EU) is an


economic and political union of 28 countries. It operates an internal (or
single) market which allows free movement of goods, capital, services and people between member
states.

1.1.1 Members of the EU (28)


“Countries in the EU and EEA.” GOV.UK, United Kingdom, 24 July 2015, www.gov.uk/eu-eea.
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

1.1.2 European Community


Kenton, Will. “European Community (EC).” Investopedia, Investopedia, 17 Apr. 2019, www.investopedia.com/terms/e/european-
community.asp.
The European Community was a community formed in 1967 that consisted of three organizations
in the European Union (EU). They dealt with policies and governing, in a communal fashion, across
all member states. Understanding European Community (EC) The European Community was developed after World War II in the hopes
that a more unified Europe would find it harder to go to war with one another. The original European Community was comprised of three
organizations. The first was the European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the common market, and it worked to unify the
economies of Europe. The second was the European Coal and Steel Community, and it was put in place to attempt to regulate manufacturing
practices across the member states. Lastly, the European Atomic Energy Community was created to establish a market for nuclear power. These
treaty organizations worked together to ensure fair and even policies were enacted and enforced across participating countries.

1.2 Should
“Should.” Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should.
used in auxiliary function to express obligation

1.3 Join
“Join.” Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/join.

to come into close association or relationship: such as to become a member of a group or organization

1.4 Belt and Road Initiative


“Belt and Road Initiative.” Belt and Road Initiative, 2019, www.beltroad-initiative.com/belt-and-road/.
BRI is a
transcontinental long-term policy and investment program which aims at infrastructure
development and acceleration of the economic integration of countries along the route of the
historic Silk Road.

“Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2019,
www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (一带一路) is an ambitious programme to connect Asia with Africa
and Europe via land and maritime networks along six corridors with the aim of improving regional
integration, increasing trade and stimulating economic growth.

1.4.1 Members of the Belt and Road Initiative (139)


“The Belt and Road Initiative: Country Profiles.” HKTDC Research, HKTDC, china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-
and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Country-Profiles/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36I0.htm.

China
Other Belt and Road Countries
A-C
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei,
Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Republic of Congo, Cook
Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic
D-K
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan
L-N
Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives,
Malta, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia
O-S
Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Syria
T-Z
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Note: According to the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road, the Belt and Road covers – but is not limited to – the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to engagement with all
countries, and international and regional organisations. The above countries have been selected based on a list hosted by the
State Information Center.
1.4.2 Members of BRI and EU (17)
“The Belt and Road Initiative: Country Profiles.” HKTDC Research, HKTDC, china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-
and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Country-Profiles/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36I0.htm.

China Other Belt and Road Countries A-C Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Chad, Chile, Republic of Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic D-K
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan L-N Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives,
Malta, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Niue, North Macedonia O-S Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia,
South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria T-Z Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe

1.4.3 How China sees the BRI


“The Belt and Road Initiative Progress, Contributions and Prospects.” Belt and Road Portal, 22 Apr. 2019,
eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.htm.

When visiting Kazakhstan and Indonesia in September and October of 2013, Chinese
President Xi Jinping raised the
initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
(hereinafter referred to as the Belt and Road, or B&R). The Chinese government then set up the Leading Group for Promoting the
Belt and Road Initiative with an administrative office under the National Development and Reform Commission. In March 2015, the Chinese
government published the "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road". In May
2017, the first Belt and Road Forum for International Co- operation was convened in Beijing. China also hosted the Boao Forum for Asia annual
conferences, the Shanghai Co- operation Organization (SCO) Qingdao Summit, the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), and the China International Import Expo. Over the past five years, the Belt and Road Initiative has won positive
responses from numerous countries and international organizations and has attracted worldwide attention. Its influence is growing.

The Belt and Road Initiative originated in China, but it belongs to the world. It is rooted in history, but
oriented toward the future. It focuses on Asia, Europe and Africa, but is open to all partners. It spans different countries and regions, different
stages of development, different historical traditions, different cultures and religions, and different customs and lifestyles. It
is an initiative
for peaceful development and economic cooperation, rather than a geopolitical or military alliance.
It is a process of open, inclusive and common development, not an exclusionary bloc or a "China club". It neither differentiates between countries
by ideology nor plays the zero-sum game. Countries are welcome to join in the initiative if they so will.

The Belt and Road Initiative upholds the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. It follows a Silk Road spirit
featuring peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit. It
focuses on policy
coordination, connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer
people-to-people ties. It has turned ideas into actions and vision into reality, and the initiative itself into a public product widely
welcomed by the international community.

When presiding over a symposium in August 2018 that marked the fifth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi said that in
advancing the initiative, we should transition from making high-level plans to intensive and meticulous implementation, so as to realize high-
quality development, bring benefits to local people, and build a global community of shared future.
1.5 Bargaining Power
Bush, Thomas. “What Is Bargaining Power in Business?” PESTLE Analysis, 26 July 2016, pestleanalysis.com/bargaining-power-in-business/.
Bargaining power is a
measure of the capacity of one party to influence another. It is an important topic in negotiation
because parties with higher bargaining power are able to leverage their circumstances to strike more
desirable deals with others.

1.6 The China-CEEC Initiative

Hart, Jessica. “From 16+1 to 17+1: The EU's Challenge from the Rebranded China-CEEC Initiative.” AICGS, 26 Apr. 2019,
www.aicgs.org/2019/04/from-161-to-171-the-eus-challenge-from-the-rebranded-china-ceec-initiative/.

The China-CEEC Initiative, colloquially known as 16+1 before Greece’s accession, was launched in 2012
to expand and intensify China’s cooperation with eleven EU member states and five western
Balkan countries focusing on transportation infrastructure, trade, and investment. One year after its
inception, Beijing revealed its One-Belt-One-Road strategy, making the CEE region an important station on its new silk road terminating in
western Europe.

1.6.1 CEEC

Central and Eastern Europe, abbreviated CEE, is a term encompassing the countries in Central
Europe (the Visegrád Group), the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and Southeastern Europe (Balkans), usually meaning
former communist states from the Eastern Bloc (Warsaw Pact) in Europe. Scholarly literature often uses the abbreviations
CEE or CEEC for this term.[1][2][3] The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development also uses the term "Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEECs)" for a group comprising some of these countries.

1.6.2 Members of the CEEC Initiative in the EU

“About - CEEC-China (16+1).” China-CEEC, China-CEEC, ceec-china-latvia.org/page/about.

The 16+1 format is an initiative by the People’s Republic of China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU Member States
and 5 Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia

“Nick Kampouris.” News from Greece, 12 Apr. 2019, greece.greekreporter.com/2019/04/12/greece-officially-joins-chinas-161-partnership-with-


central-and-eastern-europe/.

Greece officially joined the ”Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European
Countries” Group, which had been known as ”16+1,” on Friday.

1.7 Memorandum of Understanding


Kenton, Will. “Memorandums of Understanding: What You Need to Know.” Investopedia, Investopedia, 19 May 2019,
www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mou.asp.
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) is a formal document describing the broad
outlines of an agreement that two or more parties have reached through negotiations. It is not a
legally binding document but signals the intention of all parties to move forward with a contract.
Volume 0% Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) An MOU is an expression of agreement. It indicates that the parties have reached an
understanding and are moving forward. Although it is not legally binding, it is a serious declaration that a contract is imminent. [Important: An
MOU communicates the mutually accepted expectations of the people, organizations, or governments involved.] Under U.S. law, an MOU is the
same as a letter of intent. In fact, arguably a
memorandum of understanding, a memorandum of agreement, and a letter of intent
are virtually indistinguishable. All communicate an agreement on a mutually beneficial goal and a desire to see
it through to completion. MOUs communicate the mutually accepted expectations of the people,
organizations, or governments involved. They are most often used in international relations because, unlike treaties, they can be
produced relatively quickly and in secret. They also can be found in many U.S. and state government agencies, particularly when major contracts
are in the planning stages.

PRO
1. Bargaining Power
1.1 EU countries struggling in BRI

1.1.1 Economic struggles


Hurley, John, et al. “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” CGD Policy Paper 121 March
2018, Center for Global Development, Mar. 2018, www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-
perspective.pdf.
an $8 trillion-
Some public reporting has expressed alarm about the implications of BRI for debt sustainability. The primary concern is that
dollar initiative will leave countries with debt “overhangs” that will impede sound public
investment and economic growth more generally (see Box 1). There is also concern that debt problems will create an
unfavorable degree of dependency on China as a creditor. Increasing debt, and China’s role in managing bilateral debt
problems, has already exacerbated internal and bilateral tensions in some BRI countries, such as Sri Lanka, where citizens have regularly clashed
with police over a new industrial zone surrounding Hambantota port, and Pakistan, where Chinese officials openly appealed to opposition
politicians to embrace the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), BRI’s “flagship project” to bolster ties between
Beijing and Islamabad.

1.1.2 Struggle to reform

1.1.3 Strong EU nations are not in BRI


Tallberg, Jonas. Bargaining Power in the European Council . Stockholm University, 17 May 2007,
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.455.9528&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
One top-level official in the Council Secretariat observes: “There is a danger for the small and medium-sized countries in the new development.
If you as President want to come to a deal, who will you consult? The main actors [of the EU are]–
Germany, France, the UK.” Similarly, one small state representative concludes: “It is obviously the bigger countries [who are
benefiting from a move from multilateral to bilateral negotiations]. Their [The bigger countries’] relative weight is always
bigger in any bilateral discussion.”
1.2 EU can make reforms as a bloc

Meyer, Marshall. “China's Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High.” Wharton, University of Pennsylvania, 30 Apr. 2019,
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/.

But China could face tough negotiations elsewhere in Europe, Meyer predicted. “European countries, unlike
Italy, are not going to go singly to China,” he said. “They will go as a group, probably led by Germany, and again try to
negotiate volume discounts. At the end of the day there’s the possibility that the winners of this will
be the host countries and not China. Let’s see the terms of trade, then we’ll know.” Australia, Japan, and the U.S. have already
formed their own trilateral investment initiative to help meet infrastructure needs in the Indo-Pacific.

1.2.1 EU Nations want one voice against China

1.2.1.1 Precedent of “one voice” policy in trade

Rhinard, Mark. “‘The International Bargaining Power of the European Union in 'Mixed' Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.’” AEI Banner, 2005, aei.pitt.edu/3157/.

The European Union (EU) has emerged as an influential global actor over the decades since its
inception. On conventional trade-related matters, its 25 members negotiate with a ‘single voice’
through Commission negotiators, having entrusted the Community with exclusive competence to complete international
agreements. Using such leverage, the EU holds considerable sway on the international stage, as indicated by its influential role in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) over the years (Alter and Meunier, 2005; Meunier, 2000;
Meunier and Nicolaï dis, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999).

1.2.1.2 Germany wants this with China

1.2.2 Other blocs successful

1.2.2.1 Historical EU BP
Rhinard, Mark. “‘The International Bargaining Power of the European Union in 'Mixed' Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.’” AEI Banner, 2005, aei.pitt.edu/3157/.

The European Union (EU) has emerged as an influential global actor over the decades since its inception. On conventional trade-related matters,
its 25 members negotiate with a ‘single voice’ through Commission negotiators, having entrusted the Community with exclusive competence to
complete international agreements. Using
such leverage, the EU holds considerable sway on the international
stage, as indicated by its influential role in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
World Trade Organization (WTO) over the years (Alter and Meunier, 2005; Meunier, 2000; Meunier and Nicolaï dis, 1999;
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999).

1.2.2.2 EU bargaining power is stronger than America


Rhinard, Mark. “‘The International Bargaining Power of the European Union in 'Mixed' Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.’” AEI Banner, 2005, aei.pitt.edu/3157/.
The 2000 biosafety protocol is the first international agreement regulating the transboundary movement of GMOs. An offshoot of the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the agreement applies to genetically modified food and feed, allows importing nations to reject
GMOs based on the ‘precautionary principle’ and implicitly challenges the subordination of environment regulation to trade law in the global
legal order. Discussions on the protocol began as early as 1994, but did not start in earnest until 1998, with the EU taking a forward position in
advocating new global rules for biosafety. The
EU’s stringent internal rules on GMOs (agreed originally in 1990)
provided incentive to encourage the adoption of similar rules on a worldwide scale. The Commission’s
Directorate General for the Environment controlled the policy portfolio for GMOs within the Commission and joined with several key EU
Member States such as Denmark and Austria to push for an international agreement on GMOs (Rhinard, 2002). The
US led the
opposition in resisting such efforts, arguing through most of the negotiations that a protocol was both unnecessary and in possible
conflict with global trade rules. Early negotiations saw a largely ineffective EU negotiating team, hampered by a restrictive mandate and
Yet as negotiations proceeded and EU Member State support
operating under the internal decision rule of qualified majority voting.
converged, the situation changed. A unified EU negotiating team presented a strong front and forced the hand
of a recalcitrant US in final negotiations. The outcome in 2000 was a biosafety protocol very much in line with the EU’s policy
preferences and victory for the EU’s activist policy intentions.

1.2.2.3 Same BP in trade as China and US


Lombardo, Crystal. “18 Advantages and Disadvantages of the European Union.” Future of Working, 11 June 2019, futureofworking.com/11-
advantages-and-disadvantages-of-the-european-union/.

Because Europe comes together in the EU to become an economic force for trade, the value of the import-export industry all over the world
benefits from their presence. Smaller nations can take advantage of better market access since they can make one deal to trade with 28 countries
instead of separate contracts with each one. China
and the U.S. can trade with Europe as equal partners while
Europe benefits from a bigger scale and better pricing options.

This advantage makes it possible to add more value to each trade, increase job opportunities,
develop new international relationships, and have access to more opportunities.

1.2.3 China will give in

1.2.4 EU can help developing nations


Boucher, Richard. “China's Belt and Road: A Reality Check.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 30 Mar. 2019, thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-belt-
and-road-a-reality-check/.

A Western
Still, U.S. and European governments and investors remain the primary source of global capital both public and private.
presence offers opportunities for developing countries to balance out the Chinese offers.
While U.S. public money focuses more on humanitarian projects than infrastructure, the growing role of private finance provides this alternative.
Indeed, U.S. and European firms and governments can help recipients of Chinese flows demand more
transparency and better terms. As the Trump administration recognized in its underfunded Indo-Pacific Initiative, the Western
alternatives at the very least strengthen the hand of developing nations in negotiating with China.

1.3 A bloc is only logical

1.3.1 A majority of EU members are in BRI


“The Belt and Road Initiative: Country Profiles.” HKTDC Research, HKTDC, china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-
and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Country-Profiles/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36I0.htm.
China Other Belt and Road Countries A-C Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Chad, Chile, Republic of Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic D-K
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan L-N Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives,
Malta, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Niue, North Macedonia O-S Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia,
South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria T-Z Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe

“Countries in the EU and EEA.” GOV.UK, United Kingdom, 24 July 2015, www.gov.uk/eu-eea.
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

17/28 = 61%

1.3.2 Trade increase is inevitable

1.3.2.1 414bn € (471.52bn $) increase from 2012-2030 between China and EU


“Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU Meet the Challenges Ahead?” ESPAS, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2015,
ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/espas-report-2015.pdf.

1.4 EU is crumbling
1.4.1 Examples

1.4.1.1 Brexit
Wheeler, Brian. “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU.” BBC News, BBC, 10 May 2019, www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-32810887.
It is a word that is used as a shorthand way of saying the UK leaving the EU - merging the words Britain and exit to get Brexit, in the
same way as a possible Greek exit from the euro was dubbed Grexit in the past. Why is Britain leaving the European Union? A referendum - a
vote in which everyone (or nearly everyone) of voting age can take part - was held on Thursday 23 June, 2016, to decide whether the UK should
leave or remain in the European Union. Leave won by 51.9% to 48.1%. The referendum turnout was 71.8%, with more than 30
million people voting.

1.4.1.2 Italy
Fazio, Megan Iacobini de. “Italy on Collision Course with EU over Debt and Currency Plan.” News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 11 June 2019,
www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/italy-collision-eu-debt-currency-plan-190611100921805.html.

Roma, Italy - Tensions


are running high after the European Commission warned last week it was ready
to take disciplinary action against Italy for consistently breaching the EU's debt rules and flouting
warnings to cut its deficit and reduce its public debt. The commission in a June 5 report highlighted the fact that Italy is not expected to meet its
debt reduction targets in 2019 or 2020. "This should not come as a surprise," said Elsa Fornero, the Italian economist and former minister of
labour, social policies and gender equality. "It
is a result of the arm-wrestling that the government has chosen to
engage in with the EU, ignoring its warnings and rules, and taking a confrontational stance." Days before publication of the
report, Italy's far-right interior minister Matteo Salvini took to social media to criticise the EU's "obsolete" budget rules,
bragging he would not let Brussels tell Italy what to do.

1.4.1.3 Austria
Karnitschnig, Matthew. “Austria's (Not so) pro-European Government.” POLITICO, POLITICO, 19 Dec. 2017, www.politico.eu/article/austrias-
not-so-pro-european-government/.

Austria's incoming right-leaning coalition took pains over the weekend to reassure partners the country would remain firmly "pro-European,"
amid growing concern over the populist influence at Europe’s geographic and political crossroads. After two months of talks, Austria’s
center-right People’s Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) agreed to form a
government. The country’s president is expected to inaugurate the new coalition Monday, making Austria the only Western European
nation with a government that includes an anti-immigrant, populist force. “We have two parties forming a coalition here that want to actively help
shape Europe,” said Sebastian Kurz, the ÖVP's leader and the future chancellor, as he presented the new government on Saturday. But that’s
exactly what worries some European capitals. “It’s never good news when the extreme right joins a government,” said Sandro Gozi, Italy’s state
secretary for European affairs. Rome has been annoyed by Freedom Party calls to impose border checks on the Brenner Pass, Europe's key north-
south trade corridor, in order to keep out migrants. “Democrats that believe in European values must keep a watchful eye on the coalition that is
now in power in Austria,” said Pierre Moscovici, European commissioner for economic and financial affairs, on Twitter Sunday. The Freedom
Party, whose last foray into government in 2000 sparked censure from Austria’s EU partners, has flirted with anti-European positions for years
and considers France’s National Front a close ally. Europe’s political mainstream is concerned that Vienna will drift right on hot button issues
such as migration and the future of the EU, positioning Austria closer to the more nationalist stances taken by some Central and Eastern European
capitals. Over the weekend, FPÖ
leader Heinz-Christian Strache, who recently suggested Austria join
Central Europe’s Visegrad Group alongside EU renegades Hungary and Poland, struck a more conciliatory
note. “We stand by the European Union, we stand by Europe’s peace project,” he said standing alongside Kurz. “We view one or the other
position critically and have different positions that we will naturally articulate and look for partners on. That’s the democratic game.” Just what
game Strache is really playing isn’t clear, however. The
FPÖ belongs to the Euroskeptic Europe of Nations and
Freedom in the European Parliament, an affiliation critics say is inconsistent with a “pro-
European” philosophy. Even as Strache was intoning his allegiance to the EU, National Front leader Marine Le Pen and Dutch
populist leader Geert Wilders were calling for its dissolution at a far-right summit in Prague. An FPÖ
representative was also present. Le Pen called the party’s participation in the new government
“excellent news for Europe."

1.4.1.4 Hungary
McBride, James. “Europe Wrestles With Hungary's Populist Challenge.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 Sept.
2018, www.cfr.org/article/europe-wrestles-hungarys-populist-challenge.

The European Union has denounced Hungary for its self-styled “illiberal democracy,” but don’t expect a
turnaround from Prime Minister Viktor Orban anytime soon. The situation reveals just how much growing populism—driven in large part by the
On September 12, the
migration crisis—has shaken the bloc’s politics ahead of 2019 elections for the European Parliament.
European Parliament voted by a significant majority to initiate Article 7 against Hungary. This
part of the EU’s founding treaty provides for disciplinary action against member states that
threaten the bloc’s core values. The vote is the clearest example yet of the EU’s growing unease with Orban, who many warn has
launched a full-scale assault on the country’s democratic institutions. Since returning to power in 2010, he has strengthened his grip on the media,
stacked courts with his allies, and demonized both domestic and foreign critics. He has clashed most fiercely with German Chancellor Angela
Merkel over her open-door policy on migrants from Africa and the Middle East. He has built a fence on Hungary’s southern border and refused to
accept migrants as part of an EU-wide relocation plan.

1.4.1.5 Czech Republic


Lopatka, Jan. “Czech PM Found in Conflict of Interest by EU Commission: Report.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 31 May 2019,
www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-babis/czech-pm-found-in-conflict-of-interest-by-eu-commission-report-idUSKCN1T11FS.
The European Commission has determined that Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis is in conflict
of interest because of his business empire placed in trust funds, and the country may lose some EU funding as a
result, daily Hospodarske noviny reported on Friday. The findings, if confirmed in further proceedings, could mean that the Czech Republic
would have to return an unspecified amount of funding paid to the businesses, the daily said on its website www.ihned.cz. It would also be a
political blow to Babis, who has strongly denied violating any rules. It could close the route to future development funding for the firms, formerly
owned by Babis and now in the trust funds that list Babis as their beneficiary. A spokesman for the Commission declined to comment on the
report and on what he called “ongoing audit procedures”. Babis said in a text message to Reuters he strongly disagreed with the Commission’s
stance. “This
is only a preliminary proposal that will be thoroughly analyzed and the Czech
Republic... will make its comments. “Only then the Commission will send us a final report. I
resolutely reject its position and will fight for its change. “The Czech Republic will certainly not have to return any
subsidies. There is no reason for that because I do not violate Czech nor European legal rules regarding conflict of interest.” The finance ministry
confirmed it had received a preliminary report, but declined to confirm the conclusions, saying they could change after comments to be supplied
by the Czech side. Babis separately faces a criminal investigation in Prague for alleged abuse of two million euros in EU subsidies a decade ago.
He denies any wrongdoing in that case.

1.4.1.6 Poland
Boffey, Daniel. “Poland Threatens to Derail EU Summit over Donald Tusk Re-Election.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 9 Mar.
2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/eu-leaders-brussels-poland-donald-tusk-threat-european-council.

Poland has threatened to derail a summit of EU leaders in Brussels over the probable re-election of Donald Tusk as European council president.
The presidency was the first item on the agenda as leaders gathered in Brussels, but Poland has threatened to veto the summit’s conclusions if
leaders re-elect Tusk, a former Polish prime minister who has been in a long-running battle with the current government in Warsaw. The
country’s foreign minister, Witold Waszczykowski, speaking on the eve of the summit said: “We will inform our partners that the entire summit
is at risk if they force the vote today. We’ll do everything we can to ensure that the vote won’t take place today.”

Jordan, Freddie. “'Values THREATENED by EU!' Poland Demands Exit from Brussels at Rally -'We Are SOVEREIGN!'.” Express.co.uk, 2 May
2019, www.express.co.uk/news/world/1122153/EU-news-Poland-protest-Warsaw-European-Union-Mateusz-Morawiecki-Jean-Claude-Juncker-
latest.
THOUSANDS of Poles took to the streets of Warsaw on Thursday to revolt against Poland’s
membership of the EU and to demand sovereignty from Brussels. Poland: Thousands attend anti-EU rally in
Warsaw The demonstration took place to mark the 15th anniversary of the nation’s membership of the bloc. In video footage recorded by Ruptly,
Polish banners and flags were waved as bands played and a procession marched towards the European Commission offices in the centre of the
city. One protestor lamented to the camera: “The EU is more and more centrally politically. “So we have common foreign policy, there is a
discussion about a common army. “More and more laws are now organised, and bills are not presented in
Warsaw but in Brussels. “So we want a sovereign state which cooperates with western countries but is really separate. “We think that
our traditional values - family, property, Catholic values are threatened by very liberal European commissioners.” At the same time, Polish Prime
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki hosted a one-day summit with the leaders of the newest 13 EU member states after which he
urged Brussels to relinquish more power to national governments. Mr Morawiecki said: "Where it doesn't have to,
the European Union should leave member countries to their own competences. "We say this with a single Central European

voice." The march came less than a month after the European Commission launched fresh action against Warsaw over its controversial
judicial reform.

1.4.2 Reuniting CEE with Western Europe

1.4.2.1 China-CEEC divides the EU


Hart, Jessica. “From 16+1 to 17+1: The EU's Challenge from the Rebranded China-CEEC Initiative.” AICGS, 26 Apr. 2019,
www.aicgs.org/2019/04/from-161-to-171-the-eus-challenge-from-the-rebranded-china-ceec-initiative/.

Many in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris see the [China-CEEC Initiative] 16+1 as Beijing’s attempt to divide and
conquer the EU by purchasing political influence in the CEE countries at the expense of internal
EU cohesion. Greece’s refusal to condemn China’s human rights record and Hungary’s bucking of
EU criticism of the BRI were promptly labeled as victories for Beijing’s influence campaign in
Europe.

1.4.2.2 Double Standards in China Trade


Hart, Jessica. “From 16+1 to 17+1: The EU's Challenge from the Rebranded China-CEEC Initiative.” AICGS, 26 Apr. 2019,
www.aicgs.org/2019/04/from-161-to-171-the-eus-challenge-from-the-rebranded-china-ceec-initiative/.

But when Angela Merkel urged Europe to speak with one voice to China, did she really mean the Franco-German voice? CEE leaders have long
resented western Europe’s dominance in defining the EU’s relationship with China. The advanced economies in western Europe are more
dependent on trade with China and yet when
Merkel and Macron interact with Beijing, they are credited for
acting in the best interests of their countries and the EU. In contrast, CEE leaders are increasingly
accused of diluting EU unity and acting as proxies for Chinese interests when they court Chinese
investment.

1.4.2.3 CEE countries need help


Hart, Jessica. “From 16+1 to 17+1: The EU's Challenge from the Rebranded China-CEEC Initiative.” AICGS, 26 Apr. 2019,
www.aicgs.org/2019/04/from-161-to-171-the-eus-challenge-from-the-rebranded-china-ceec-initiative/.

the EU needs to build


While leaders in western Europe and Brussels want member states to have one voice toward China,
consensus on common interests in dealing with China and actively support the regional economic
development of CEE countries.
Putting closer focus on leveling the playing field for trade relations with China would be a good
place to start. Many CEE countries are increasingly frustrated by the lack of market access in
China, which is likely a factor in their growing trade deficit with China. Growing amounts of cheap Chinese
imports are also increasing pressure on regional manufacturers. While the CEE countries often don’t possess advanced technologies and thus are
not primary targets for China’s strategic technology investments, their producers in industries such as textile and household appliances could be
at risk of displacement and reduce the region’s competitiveness in these sectors. Therefore, pushing Beijing for more reciprocity for China-bound
trade and investment could gather wide support from the CEE region.

2. Trade Increase

2.1 Trade times increase specialization


Rocha, Nadia. “Hurry up! How the Belt and Road Initiative Changes Trade Times and Trade.” World Bank Blogs, 28 Jan. 2019,
blogs.worldbank.org/trade/hurry-how-belt-and-road-initiative-changes-trade-times-and-trade.

Aggregate results suggest that BRI infrastructure improvements could increase total trade among
BRI economies by 4.1 percent.[1] Countries such as Uzbekistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Oman and Maldives benefit the most
after improvements in trading times, with an increase in their exports above 9 percent. Other countries, such as China, Saudi
Arabia and Thailand will benefit the most in terms of value of their exports given their already high trade within the BRI. 2. Improved trading
times can increase trade in time-sensitive sectors. Trading times are particularly important for time sensitive products and for products that rely
on time sensitive inputs in production processes. Reducing trade times will
therefore increase specialization in sectors
such as livestock, vegetables, fruits, nuts and crops, which will benefit the most from improving the
ability to transport the final products on time to the consumers or end users (direct effect). Specialization in
exports from meat products, chemicals, ferrous metals, rubber and plastics will also increase given the improvement in the ability to access the
intermediate inputs on time (indirect effect). As a result, countries
that are more integrated in regional and global
value chains tend to benefit more from reductions in trade times due to BRI projects.

2.2 Increase Chinese Imports


“Initiative on Promoting Unimpeded Trade Cooperation along the Belt and Road.” Belt and Road Portal, Yidaiyilu,
eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/14216.htm.

The participants emphasize their willingness to promote and expand trade through various facilitation measures, development of new business
models, and cooperation on trade in services. The participants also reaffirm their support for the multilateral trading system, with the WTO as its
cornerstone, and those that are WTO Members will push for positive outcomes at the WTO 11th Ministerial Conference (MC11). China will
continue to open up its market by implementing a proactive import policy and providing more
access for foreign products to enter the Chinese market through such measures as holding China
International Import Expo from 2018, supporting business people from relevant countries to
participate in trade fairs in China, and launching FTA negotiations with interested countries and
regions. It is estimated that China will import goods worth US$ 2 trillion from the countries and
regions along the Belt and Road in the coming five years.

2.3 WTO Compliance


“Initiative on Promoting Unimpeded Trade Cooperation along the Belt and Road.” Belt and Road Portal, Yidaiyilu,
eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/14216.htm.
The participants emphasize their willingness to promote and expand trade through various facilitation measures, development of new business
models, and cooperation on trade in services. The
participants also reaffirm their support for the multilateral
trading system, with the WTO as its cornerstone, and those that are WTO Members will push for positive outcomes at the
WTO 11th Ministerial Conference (MC11).

CON
1. Debt
1.1 Insane Debt
Tan, Weizhen. “About Half of China's Loans to Developing Countries Are 'Hidden,' Study Finds.” CNBC, CNBC, 12 July 2019,
www.cnbc.com/2019/07/12/chinas-lending-to-other-countries-jumps-causing-hidden-debt.html.

Between 2000 and 2017, other countries’ debt owed to China soared ten-fold, from less than $500
billion to more than $5 trillion, according to the study from Germany-based think tank the Kiel Institute for the World
Economy.For 50 developing countries which have borrowed from China, that debt has increased on
average from less than 1% of their GDP in 2015, to more than 15% in 2017, according to estimates by the
study’s researchers.The documentation of China’s lending has been at best “opaque,” the report said, with such transactions “missed
even by the most ambitious recent attempts to measure international capital flows.”

1.1.1 More than IMF


Tan, Weizhen. “About Half of China's Loans to Developing Countries Are 'Hidden,' Study Finds.” CNBC, CNBC, 12 July 2019,
www.cnbc.com/2019/07/12/chinas-lending-to-other-countries-jumps-causing-hidden-debt.html.

Between 2000 and 2017, other countries’ debt owed to China soared ten-fold, from less than $500 billion to more than $5 trillion — or from 1%
of global economic output to more than 5%, according to the study from Germany-based think tank the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
“This has transformed China into the largest official creditor, easily surpassing the IMF or the
World Bank,” the report’s researchers said.

1.2 Hidden Debt


Tan, Weizhen. “About Half of China's Loans to Developing Countries Are 'Hidden,' Study Finds.” CNBC, CNBC, 12 July 2019,
www.cnbc.com/2019/07/12/chinas-lending-to-other-countries-jumps-causing-hidden-debt.html.

China’s lending to other countries has surged in the past decade, causing debt levels to jump dramatically, and as much as half of such
debt to developing economies is “hidden,” a new study has found. Such “hidden” debt means that
the borrowing isn’t reported to or recorded by official institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or the Paris Club — a group of creditor nations.
2. Job Loss

2.1 Infrastructure upgrades are inevitable

2.2 Belt and Road uses Chinese laborers


Boucher, Richard. “China's Belt and Road: A Reality Check.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 30 Mar. 2019, thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-belt-
and-road-a-reality-check/.

What about the “Chinese Marshall Plan”? It’s not that either: the Marshall Plan was financed through and for foreign partners. While U.S.
contributions were recognized in most places, the operational side was local — even to the point that the French government, at times, refused to
advertise projects as financed by the Americans. The Marshall Plan brought machinery, goods, and food to Europeans who rebuilt their own
economies. Contrast that with the
Belt and Road which normally involves Chinese firms and workers
building projects in foreign lands and often does little to build local capacity and sustain
development.

Chandran, Nyshka. “China Can Make Its Belt and Road Project More Successful If It Taps Locals, Experts Say.” CNBC, CNBC, 14 Sept. 2018,
www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-must-do-more-to-tap-locals-in-belt-and-road-initiative-panel.html.

“A common lament of recipient nations is that despite all the investments from huge infrastructure projects,
there’s a lack of local employment opportunities,” said Robin Hu, head of sustainability and stewardship at Singaporean
sovereign wealth fund Temasek Holdings. One of the biggest complaints around the initiative is an excessive
reliance on Chinese employees for on-the-ground projects, which deprives participating countries
of jobs. That’s triggered anti-Beijing sentiments in places such as Laos and Turkmenistan. In instances where locals are employed, complaints
about dire working conditions are rampant, with public demonstrations being held from Vietnam to Sri Lanka.

2.3 Chinese SOE Extension


Chandran, Nyshka. “China Can Make Its Belt and Road Project More Successful If It Taps Locals, Experts Say.” CNBC, CNBC, 14 Sept. 2018,
www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-must-do-more-to-tap-locals-in-belt-and-road-initiative-panel.html.

“A common lament of recipient nations is that despite all the investments from huge infrastructure projects, there’s a lack of local employment
opportunities,” said Robin Hu, head of sustainability and stewardship at Singaporean sovereign wealth fund Temasek Holdings. One of the
biggest complaints around the initiative is an excessive reliance on Chinese employees for on-the-ground projects, which deprives participating
countries of jobs. That’s triggered anti-Beijing sentiments in places such as Laos and Turkmenistan. In instances where locals are employed,

complaints about dire working conditions are rampant, with public demonstrations being held from Vietnam to Sri Lanka. Beijing

basically replicated its traditional state-owned enterprises (SOE) model in other developing nations, Hu
said. These enterprises “tend to air drop the entire ecosystem, from their engineers to the
construction workers to the chefs, into the countries to do the project,” he said. A McKinsey study in 2017 found
that among 1,073 Chinese firms across eight African countries, only 44 percent of the managers on
average were local. “We may be missing the bigger point of the BRI, which is that it’s simply an avenue for Chinese
entrepreneurs to go forth and conquer,” said Jonathan Woetzel, director of the McKinsey Global Institute, at Thursday’s panel.
2.4 Chinese workforce is extremely bloated

2.5 Job Loss in Current BRI nations

2.6 Effects of Job Loss

2.7 A2 Marshall Plan Analogy


Boucher, Richard. “China's Belt and Road: A Reality Check.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 30 Mar. 2019, thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-belt-
and-road-a-reality-check/.

What about the “Chinese Marshall Plan”? It’s not that either: the Marshall Plan was financed through and for foreign partners. While U.S.
contributions were recognized in most places, the operational side was local — even to the point that the
French government, at times, refused to advertise projects as financed by the Americans. The Marshall Plan brought
machinery, goods, and food to Europeans who rebuilt their own economies. Contrast that with the
Belt and Road which normally involves Chinese firms and workers building projects in foreign
lands and often does little to build local capacity and sustain development.

3. Chinese Expansion
3.1 Debt traps
Beech, Hannah. “'We Cannot Afford This': Malaysia Pushes Back Against China's Vision.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 20 Aug.
2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/world/asia/china-malaysia.html.
A Pentagon report released last week said “The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries,
shape their interests to align with China’s and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues.” “ Countries
participating in BRI could develop economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China could
leverage to achieve its interests,” the report said. Malaysia’s new finance minister, Lim Guan Eng, raised the example of Sri
Lanka, where a deepwater port built by a Chinese state-owned company failed to attract much business. The indebted South Asian island
nation was compelled to hand over to China a 99-year lease on the port and more land near it, giving
Beijing an outpost near one of its busiest shipping lanes. “We don’t want a situation like Sri Lanka where they couldn’t
pay and the Chinese ended up taking over the project,” Mr. Lim said. In a recent interview with The New York Times, Mr. Mahathir made clear
what he thought of China’s strategy. “They know that when they lend big sums of money to a poor country, in the end they may have to take the
project for themselves,” he said.

3.2 Stops Chinese Backlash


3.3 Sharp Power

4. Environmental Degradation
4.1 Coal plants
Watkins, Derek. “The World, Built by China.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 18 Nov. 2018,
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/18/world/asia/world-built-by-china.html.
South Africa turned to China for $1.5 billion for a coal-fired power plant. It is one of at least 63 such plants financed by China
around the world, which collectively pollute more than Spain.

4.2 Low environmental standards


Watkins, Derek. “The World, Built by China.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 18 Nov. 2018,
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/18/world/asia/world-built-by-china.html.

China has a different view when it comes to labor and environmental strictures. To staff overseas projects,
Chinese companies have flown in their own workers by the thousands, drawing complaints that they are doing little to create local jobs. Safety
standards have been uneven.
And Beijingcontinues to export polluting technologies like coal-fired power plants, even as such
projects have become unpopular in China.

5. FDI is harmful
5.1 FDI increases under BRI
5.2 FDI has no regard for health and safety

6. Nothing new
6.1 China claims anything as “BRI”
Boucher, Richard. “China's Belt and Road: A Reality Check.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 30 Mar. 2019, thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-belt-
and-road-a-reality-check/.

In fact, it’s
debatable to what extent the Belt and Road is actually a new phenomenon. The Belt and
Road largely involves a massive rebranding of existing projects to please the leader. For example,
Gwadar, the port built in Pakistan from 2001 to 2007, became a centerpiece of Belt and Road with
Xi Jinping’s 2013 announcement. As Chinese wages go up and the global middle class expands, Chinese and foreign firms
operating in China have long been looking overseas for new middle-class markets and new workers. Today, any Chinese investment almost
anywhere in the world becomes a star in the Belt and Road firmament. From shoe factories in Ethiopia to auto production in Hungary, whether
begun under the earlier “Go Out Policy” of 1999 or after Xi’s 2013 announcement, everything gets tagged Belt and Road.

6.2 China prefers to invest in infrastructure


Elmer, Keegan. “EU Envoys Hit out at China's 'Unfair' Belt and Road Plans.” South China Morning Post, 16 July 2018,
www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2142698/eu-presents-nearly-united-front-against-chinas-unfair.

smaller Central and Eastern European nations were “sobering up” after their initial hopes
Weidenfeld said some
that the Belt and Road Initiative might fund major new infrastructure projects, whereas Beijing had
just relabelled some existing projects as being part of the project.
“Chinese firms prefer to invest in existing infrastructure, primarily in utilities and the energy sector, but there has not been anything new,”
Weidenfeld said. “There
have been lots of investment and financing promises, and few of them have
actually come to fruition.”
7. A2 European Investment
7.1 China doesn’t accept FDI
Edelberg, Paul. “Is China Really Opening Its Doors to Foreign Investment?” China Business Review, 8 Nov. 2017,
www.chinabusinessreview.com/is-china-really-opening-its-doors-to-foreign-investment/.

This article will discuss the evolution of China’s opening-up policies, paying close attention to regulations regarding partial or full foreign
ownership of Chinese enterprises. The issue is topical, as China has recently been involved with intense negotiations between both the U.S. and
the European Union (EU). On the one hand, the U.S. and the
EU have pushed for increased access to China’s
markets, which would simultaneously increase investment opportunities for the involved parties. Conversely, China has attempted
to minimize foreign presence within key industry sectors, until it is deemed that its domestic companies have become
efficient enough to compete with outside forces. Although the World Trade Organization requires China to allow foreigners some access to its
markets, this opening has been at a pace too gradual to satisfy the U.S. and EU. Importantly, the
country has strictly regulated
foreign investment, permitting only some FDI through Chinese entities with partial or full foreign
ownership, commonly known as foreign-invested enterprises (“FIEs”).This article will review the historical regulation of FIEs and the recent
dramatic changes in this regulatory scheme.

7.1.1 FIEs are regulated


Chen, James. “Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE).” Investopedia, Investopedia, 12 Mar. 2019, www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fie.asp.

A foreign invested enterprise (FIE) is any one of a number of legal structures under which a company
can participate in a foreign economy. FIEs tend to have tight government regulation at several
important junctures, which can limit how much a company can profit from foreign ventures, as well as the
amount of control that a foreign parent has over the FIE.
Rebuttals
A2 Pro
A2 Infrastructure
A2 Job Creation
A2 Trade
A2 Bargaining Power

A2 Con
1. A2 “Just building infrastructure”

Boo, Bee Chun. “Belt & Road: Opportunity & Risk.” Silk Road Associates, Baker McKenzie, 2017, www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/belt-road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf?la=en.

The BRI is better understood as a mission statement rather than a policy document, since it lacks a
list of member countries and a precise definition of what a BRI project is. The initiative may, however, develop a more
structured form over time, but for now, the initiative simply recognises that China needs to both strengthen its
engagement with the Silk Road region, home to two-thirds of the world’s population and half its
GDP, as well as assume a leadership role. The BRI does have broad strategic aims; the most
important one for foreign companies being China’s ambition to build world-class companies, which
will be an extension of the 1990s “Go Global” policy. The Chinese government also expects that BRI will support
industrial restructuring as Chinese companies learn to compete on the global stage, adopting
international best practice, acquiring world-class technologies, and building scale in foreign
markets.

2. A2 Debt
3. A2 Job Loss
4. A2 Human Rights
5. A2 Corruption/Transparency
Perlez, Jane. “China Retools Vast Global Building Push Criticized as Bloated and Predatory.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 25
Apr. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/business/china-belt-and-road-infrastructure.html.

The head of China’s Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, which helps finance projects
around the world, told a seminar of Chinese contractors on Monday that they needed to improve
their business practices.
The Beijing-led bank, whose more than 90 members include Western European nations but not the United States, is seen as a counterweight to
the World Bank in Asia, as well as an extension of China’s economic heft into what has been a traditionally American-influenced region.
The new port in Trieste, Italy, which the city is preparing to open to China after Italy became the first major European country to sign on to the
Belt and Road Initiative.The new port in Trieste, Italy, which the city is preparing to open to China after Italy became the first major European
country to sign on to the Belt and Road Initiative. “As
Chinese contractors, I urge you not to be involved in any
corruption, even if you have to give up some projects,” the head of the bank, Jin Liqun, said.
People in other countries are “still doubtful” about the Belt and Road Initiative, he said. “As long
as we assure quality, they will welcome the projects.” In an interview, Mr. Jin said that some recent Chinese
infrastructure projects had “achieved good things” and that “mistakes had been blown out of proportion.” To enhance its reputation, China is
also trying to dispatch workers who are better prepared to work in troubled regions. After attacks in Pakistan, security companies are now
training Chinese workers in antiterror tactics before they deploy.
China’s State Grid, for example, is building power transmission lines in remote parts of Pakistan. And its workers do safety training in Beijing —
how to avoid getting shot or hurt in a terror attack — run by a company known as China’s Public Security Guard Training Center.
“Pakistan is the hardest hit by terror attacks,” said Lu Wei, a security expert at the company. It is also the country with the biggest Belt and Road
program. China has also sought to work more closely with other countries, with varying success.
China has reached out to the major multinational financial institutions, including the World Bank,
to help develop best practices for infrastructure projects. The idea was to form a working group
inside the Chinese bank to jointly consider proposals for Belt and Road, according to officials from
two of the invited institutions.

6. A2 Trade Deficit
7. A2 China Hegemony

7.1 A2 Renminbi Internationalization


Boo, Bee Chun. “Belt & Road: Opportunity & Risk.” Silk Road Associates, Baker McKenzie, 2017, www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/belt-road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf?la=en.

For example, officials talk of the BRI helping China to sell more products overseas and reduce its excess capacity, but this overlooks the fact that
China’s largest provinces are bigger than 60+ BRI economies and recent
capital controls have also slowed the pace of
renminbi internationalisation, with little evidence to date of EPC contracts or acquisitions being
funded in renminbi. Nevertheless, China’s influence over the region’s supply chain will grow. Chinese equipment manufacturers have
enjoyed increased exports to BRI countries supporting both infrastructure-related projects and more general demand. Chinese developers are
building industrial parks, from Malaysia to Ethiopia, as Chinese manufacturers look to lower cost jurisdictions for production, avoid high import
tariffs, and meet local content requirements.

8. A2 Individualism
Rhinard, Mark. “‘The International Bargaining Power of the European Union in 'Mixed' Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.’” AEI Banner, 2005, aei.pitt.edu/3157/.

The European Union (EU) has emerged as an influential global actor over the decades since its inception. On
conventional trade-
related matters, its 25 members negotiate with a ‘single voice’ through Commission negotiators,
having entrusted the Community with exclusive competence to complete international agreements.
Using such leverage, the EU holds considerable sway on the international stage, as indicated by its influential role in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) over the years (Alter and Meunier, 2005; Meunier, 2000; Meunier and
Nicolaï dis, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). On defence and security issues, the EU has been slower to develop a unified front, although
recent progress on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) suggests the EU is moving beyond simple declarations towards operational
forces and a heightened role in global crisis management. The CFSP remains essentially an intergovernmental policy area, however, with the
Commission and other EU officials playing a subordinate role. In such cases, the EU is represented in global settings primarily by its Member
States, acting through the presidency and the three Member States in the ‘Troika’. Yet for many of the EU’s external policy
activities, the institutional balance of power falls somewhere in between these high-profile extremes. Policy competence for
international negotiations does not lie solely with the Community, nor is it the exclusive preserve of
Member States. Instead, competence is shared or, in legal terminology, ‘mixed’ (Young, 2002; Leal-Arcas,
2001; Sheridan, 2001, p. 15). International negotiations over such issues require the direct participation of
both Community and Member State officials and result in mixed agreements.1 Mixed competence
issues have grown more prominent in recent years, largely as the result of ‘new’ international trade
agendas (Young, 2002), but also because of the EU’s increased activism in international social accords, environmental treaties and consumer
protection agreements. Considering the growing participation of the EU in such mixed issue areas, there is a critical need to understand its
corresponding negotiating behaviour on the world stage. One way to improve our understanding is to model the EU’s bargaining capabilities in
international negotiations.
Where do i put this i dont know where to put this help
DJANKOV, SIMEON. “CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE MOTIVES, SCOPE, AND CHALLENGES.” PIIE Briefing 16-2: China's
Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope, and Challenges, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Mar. 2016,
www.piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-2_1.pdf.
China has several reasons to promote its new Silk Road plan. As the world’s biggest trading nation, China’s main interest is to reduce the costs of
transporting goods. Projects that are already funded under the initiative all report statistics on how much travel time and cost will be reduced as a
result of their completion. Because such improvements will affect all cargo using these transport routes, they will benefit world trade. The success
of the Belt and Road Initiative is thus of interest to countries beyond the designated Silk Road routes, as their exporters will also use the upgraded
infrastructure. Besides reducing trade costs, there are four other goals for the initiative. First, China is attempting to decrease the economy’s
Chinese
dependence on domestic infrastructure investment and the associated growth that comes with such investment. This means that
construction companies, equipment makers, and other businesses that have thrived on the country’s building boom
have to look elsewhere for opportunities. A key motivation for the Belt and Road Initiative is to find
outlets for these companies overseas. China expects that its own companies will plan, construct, and supply the projects it funds,
and this expectation is borne out in the analysis of existing projects. A study of loan practices by the China Development Bank and the
ExportImport Bank of China in 2013–15 showed that 70
percent of overseas credit was made on the condition that at
least part of the funds be used to purchase Chinese equipment and involve Chinese labor. Second, the
infrastructure focus helps China in its quest for greater international stature for the renminbi, to achieve the status of a global reserve currency. In
this effort China has the backing of Russia and other emerging markets, as the volatility of their currencies has troubled politicians. With the aim
of financing projects where the Chinese currency is used in loans, China in 2015 joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. These steps yielded success, and the International Monetary Fund added the renminbi to
the basket of global currencies. The third motivation for the Belt and Road Initiative is to secure China’s energy supply through new pipelines in
Central Asia, Russia, and Southeast Asia’s deepwater ports. Energy sufficiency has been a consistent worry for Chinese enterprises, and for good
reason. The number of privately owned vehicles in the country shot up from 8 million in 1990 to about 115 million in 2015. And with the growth
of the economy, China’s energy demand has increased more than 500 percent since 1980. The country is now the world’s largest energy
consumer and, as of 2014, largest net importer of oil. Its reliance on coal for about 40 percent of its heating and electricity has contributed to
pollution in its cities. The Chinese government has set ambitious goals for dealing with the pollution problem, including switching from coal to
cleaner—but so far mostly imported— energy sources. Fourth, infrastructure development in countries along the Belt and Road routes may
increase growth in their economies and thus contribute to a growing demand for China’s goods and services. In March 2015, China’s president Xi
Jinping stated that annual trade with the countries along the Belt and Road Initiative would surpass $2.5 trillion by 2025. In smaller countries
such as Georgia, projects funded by the initiative may increase annual economic growth by 1.5 percent for the next decade, a considerable boost.
Data are not yet sufficient to suggest the extent of this growth effect in other countries, but the
initiative clearly represents an
interest in finding work for Chinese construction and equipment companies and their engineers.
I dont know where to put this but i think this is what you wanted???

Gorbatenko, Daniil. “Chinese Construction Boom Wastes Resources on Massive Scale.” Atlas Network, 25 Feb. 2015,
www.atlasnetwork.org/news/article/chinese-construction-boom-wastes-resources-on-massive-scale.
This economic disaster has implications far beyond immediate economic considerations. By
misallocating resources and
impeding real growth, China’s construction boom has made millions of people around the world
poorer. By bidding up the worldwide price of key resources, the boom may have frustrated economic calculations
behind long-term investments and hampered recovery after the 2008 crisis in many regional
economies. And, by riding an unsustainable bubble, the boom has positioned the Chinese economy for a rough landing.
We negate, resolved in response to the current crisis a government should prioritize the Humanitarian needs of refugees over its national interests

We have two observations.

First, Dr. Yan Xue-Tong of Tsinghua University explains that because a nation contains both a government and a population, the idea of
national interest includes both the interests of the ruler and the ruled.

Second, according to the UNHCR, developing nations host 86% of the world’s refugees. Thus, we should primarily consider the standpoint of
developing nations in this debate.

Our sole contention is that nations should prioritize infrastructural development over the needs of refugees.

Infrastructure is the most relevant and universally shared national interest in the world.

Richard Threlfall of BBC News writes that there is no bigger question for public policy worldwide than the need for infrastructure
development.

Martha Garcia-Murillo of Syracuse University furthers that, “modern economies cannot [function] without efficient and adequate
infrastructures.”

The prioritization of infrastructure investment has never been more important than it is now.

According to the World Health Organization, “Globalization, population growth, and urbanization are placing considerable strains on
infrastructure around the world…the developing world [specifically] faces the daunting task of creating new transportation,
communication, water, and energy networks to … reduce poverty.”

Poor countries and their lenders are currently jump-starting efforts to make these necessary improvements a reality.

According to the World Economic Forum, developing country spending on infrastructure has overtaken spending by developed nations, a
marked increase in investment that will only continue growing in years to come.

Author Alexis Crow furthers that “in recent months, key players in the industry have poured billions of dollars into global infrastructure
funds.”

In fact, Matthew Alabaster of Pricewaterhouse Coopers observes that in the Middle East and Northern Africa, infrastructure investment has
become a priority.

Problematically, prioritizing the needs of refugees trades off with effective infrastructure.

The UN Refugee Agency explains that helping refugees necessitates diverting considerable resources and manpower from the pressing
demands of development.

In fact, according to the World Bank, reports on refugees and public spending in Malawi found that expenditures to help refugees
empirically reduced the government’s investments in infrastructure.

The World Bank furthers that from 2012 to 2014, the fiscal cost of Syrian refugees on Lebanese infrastructure was almost 600 million
dollars.
These costs are especially problematic because, as the World Bank furthers, “With a plethora of competing demands, prioritizing
[infrastructure] investment… is crucial.”

This is true for three reasons.

First, fostering economic growth.

As the International Labour Organization explains, infrastructure creates jobs directly and indirectly by both requiring jobs to build
infrastructure and increasing access to local goods and services, stimulating the economy, and creating a multiplier effect.

In fact, Cesar Calderon of the World Bank finds that a one standard deviation increase in all infrastructure sectors increases GDP growth
rate by 5.7 percentage points.

This increase is crucial because countries with higher GDP can afford to spend more on social welfare for the poor.

Christina Wieser of Vienna University finds that increasing a country’s GDP by 1% decreases its poverty rate by .86%.

Second, improving roads.

As the UNDP explains, one of the underlying causes of rural poverty is poor access to goods and services.

They further that improving the quality and the extent of road networks in rural areas alleviates this poverty by providing rural poor with
the means to reach goods and services and alternative sources of income.

This is confirmed empirically by Ifzal Ali of the Asian Development Bank who finds, in a study of Vietnam, that access to paved roads
increases the likelihood a rural household escapes poverty by 67%.

Third, electrification.

Bryan Walsh of TIME Magazine observes that “lack of electricity does more than almost anything to keep the poor poor” … because it
limits the ability to study, grow crops, and craft goods.

Problematically, Rebecca Winthrop of the Brookings Institute explains that “A lack of public infrastructure including roads, transportation
and construction has prohibited the extension of the power grid to remote rural areas.”

Infrastructure investment, by increasing access to electricity alleviates poverty.

Shahidur Khandker of the World Bank finds in a study of India that household electrification decreases poverty by 13 percentage points.

Ultimately poverty reduction through increasing GDP and improving roads and electricity is the most important impact in the round.

Julia Griggs of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation finds that children from poor families are 13 times more likely to die from injury than those
who are well-off.

Thus,

we negate.

1. Hegemony and economic damages


2.

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