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ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO.

174689, 2007-10-19

Facts:

petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as
a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.

Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2]
in Bangkok, Thailand.

He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason
of sex... alteration.

the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.

Issues:

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Ruling:
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name was
not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an... improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.

The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts... and judicial decrees

These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by... any law, expressly or impliedly.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the... correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.

Principles:

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.[11] A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.[13] In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or... nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications... for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1)

The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2)

The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3)

The change will avoid confusion.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:[24]

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of... citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground... of sex reassignment.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term... status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.[28]
(emphasis supplied)

A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the... civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.

Facts:

On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also
alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma D. del
Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in relation to the charges against him,
respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied in
the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan
and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article
7, paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.

Held:

In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda.
Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in
a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article
8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court
finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a
period of six months

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v.

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007

Facts:

A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing the required marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract,
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their
child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the
Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually gave birth to two children, one as stated
by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27, 1992. Moreover, petitioner
filed the said case in order to evade prosecution for concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he
had three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed and that petitioner prays that the
annulment case be dismissed for lack of merit.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of

Appeals dismissed also the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no
marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage

Held:

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until
it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support
of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that
a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption
is of great weight.
Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did
not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they
decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted
ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of
her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied
by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to
the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other
witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.

Facts:

Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination, duress, and
intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He was forced to sign a marriage
contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he
alleged that there was no marriage license presented before the solemnizing officer as certified by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following
dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere
to be found.

On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of Jaime and claims
that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a church on May 31, 1969
at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar
and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for
25 years.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties based on the
petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing officer. And that
without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is void
from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that
marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trail
court in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due
effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar had already
retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals.
thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that Marriage License No.
2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare the marriage void
from the beginning

Held:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we can
not easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004.

Facts:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of one Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Bohol for four years. Their communication was broken after school year 1977-1978. In 1984, Lucio
received a letter from Lucia from Singapore. After an exchange of letters, the two became sweethearts.
Lucia later returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. Nonetheless, the
sweethearts maintained a constant communication. Lucia, later came back to the Philippines. The two
agreed to get married, thus, they were married at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving Lucio behind. Barely a year, August 19, 1991, Lucia
filed with Ontario Court a petition for divorce which was granted and took effect in February of 1992. On
October that year Lucia married Maria Lumbago also in Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993, Lucio filed
a complaint for nullity of marriage in Regional Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony actually took place. He was later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case invoking prejudicial question. The civil case
is a prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted unfortunately denied by the motion for
reconsideration of the prosecution.

The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in Court of Appeals, the trial
court granted the petition for nullty of marriage since no marriage ceremony took place. No appeal was
taken from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But the Court of Appeals denied the petition
for lack of merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

Held:

The first element of Bigamy as laid down in Bobis v. Bobis was not present.

No marriage ceremony. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The mere signing of the same bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.

The Supreme Court need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is moot and academic.

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.

BRION, J.:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to
solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church.
The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the
couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's
knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.

The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:

authority of the solemnizing officer; and

his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the Family
Code provides that it shall be necessary:

for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and

declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife.

The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise
present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law,
specifically Article 44, which states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of
the court.

As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. ALBIOS G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in
jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000
in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state
and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent summons to the husband but he failed
to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of
consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention
to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to
the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter
into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in
the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. None of these are present in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
v. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II,
respondents.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.

Facts:

Complainants Juvy n. Cosca, Edmund B. Eralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer
I, Interpreter I, Cler II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are
respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court;
(4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners;
and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.

Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage
licenses. Thus, the following couples were able o get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. In addition, respondent
judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason
being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was
usually several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month
of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that
respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but
the Notarial Registrar will show that there were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P 18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P 20.00
therefore and failed to account for the difference.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the Family Code.

Held:

On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the formal requisites
of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential requisites shall generally render
the marriage void ab initio and that, while and irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and
what the court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice
to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On
June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to
Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.

Case Digest: Macua vda. de Avenido v. Hoybia Avenido

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.

PEREZ, J.:

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the
same man, now deceased.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).

Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was recorded with
the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio
begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.

In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the
fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.

Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22
September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the marriage
contract between her and Eustaquio.

RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.

The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING: TECLA

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be
accepted.

The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties
have previously narrated the execution thereof.

In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party
to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law.

Mariategui vs. CA

GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He
acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife
Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.
Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s
second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married
for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment
of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.
The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute
or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.

CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]

FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol
Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When
he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with
another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree
took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He
went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage
certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a
judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out
that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can
institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino
citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to
institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

HELD:

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion
is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor
of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided
in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Fujiki vs Marinay (art.41)

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.

MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Issues:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave
v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.

Republic v. Manalo

G.R. No. 221029

April 24, 2018

Facts:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for
divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted.
Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and
to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,


Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:

1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead
of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration.
According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign
spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the
wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce
obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the
Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be
interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not
follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if
Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it
will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They
said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination
against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce
decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike,
and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would
give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family
but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect
abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the
application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces
initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree
is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese
law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Facts:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership,
it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24,
1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.
Ninal v. Bayadog

G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died
on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of EngraceNinal. 1 year and 8 months
later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack
of marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?

RULING:

1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. The two marriages
involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several instances recognized
by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns
the conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heir ship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v.

JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001

Facts:

Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit
of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could
be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.

Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with
Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize
a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August
1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed
a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH

GR 200233

July 15, 2015

Facts:

4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served
an information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was still married to Estela when
he entered into the 2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on
the fact that when she married him, she thought he was single. She soon averred that their marriage
was void due to lack of marriage license, wherein she should not then be charged with bigamy. 11 years
after inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged
that she had met petitioner and introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and
stated that she met Estela only after she had already married Nicanor.

Issue: W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.

W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid

Held:

Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the
totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a learned
person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was the more credible witness,
compared to petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v.
Archilla, knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
She is not co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m arresto mayor
to 4y prision correccional.

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