REPUBLIC VS IYOY

Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children.
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent
Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to
their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly
using the surname of her Americanhusband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus
filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus,
she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married
her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage
to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status
shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC
declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab
ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is
that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another
man and has established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

RULING:

1st issue:

The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos,
Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the allegedpsychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

2nd issue:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot
be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984,
after which she married her Americanhusband in 1985. In the same Answer,
she alleged that she had been an Americancitizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of nullity
of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City.
As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos –
who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered
that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might
not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with
her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no
more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36,
in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that
she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While
she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely
refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She exp//lained that she
was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent
Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of
sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could
not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely
left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning
as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left
all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as
well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A.,
except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce
from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting
him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to
her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself
was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage
to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his
own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the
recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds,
such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding
of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s surname,
Micklus.9

Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.
Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York
and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a
single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the
case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived
her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As

observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married
to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that
sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply
with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein.
It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently
residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY

CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL
LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and
unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the
case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can
not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered
as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.16

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds –

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity
was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because
the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition,
because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court
finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases,
this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…21

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job…

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering
the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.27

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and
her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration
of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.32

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted
in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.34

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence;
and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the
land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of
such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.35While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even
while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns
the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State…37

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of
its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other
pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies
of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by
filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds
to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates
with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless
marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch
22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC VS DAGDAG

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS:

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at
the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino
begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started
leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few
months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in
drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned
that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date.
In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was
served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for
presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law as her only witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in
writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file
said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor
conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the
investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground
that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest
whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the
evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a
married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

ISSUE:

Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the
ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

HELD:

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires
that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the
crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not
given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely
rendered.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY
No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case
No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years
old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on
October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and
Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the
house of their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear
again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and
would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused,
he would inflict physical injuries on her.5

On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was
constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children.
Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail
on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden
Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.

On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the
Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17,
1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on
December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.

Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo
City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She
testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.10

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating
prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be
deemed submitted for decision.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that
there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid
fabrication of evidence.11

On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated
December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:

"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares
the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino
Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.

The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of
Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .

SO ORDERED."

On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the
ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to
comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991
as follows:13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated
December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the
effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological
incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing
that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of
the marriage.’

In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children
since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are
unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly
indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of
 marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of
facts are uncontroverted. 1âwphi1.nêt

Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became
manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of
marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family
members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-
General, these are not common in marriage.

Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the
sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New
Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.

WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED"

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO

DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court,
disposing thus:

"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the
duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the
right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic)
destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16

Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of
the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the
facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.

At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides -

 "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.18

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June
13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
 integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code20 as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code21 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.

In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court
of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We
further explained therein that -

"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, supra. )"24

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS

This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.

FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American

citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to
the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in
turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of
a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized
from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it
only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA,
however, upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to
live as husband and wife or build a family.
REPORT THIS AD

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared

null and void.

RULING:

No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements
of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since
it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage
void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable

social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the
needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”
NINAL VS BAYADOG

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 monthsthereafter, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage
under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five
years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed
on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is,
unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have
no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that
the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion
of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public
is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and
is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just
an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in
the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no
third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
 Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being
one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that
their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
1âwphi1

heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a

criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
ARANEZ VS OCCIANO

On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia was not
recognized, because the marriage was a null. She also cannot claim the pension of her
husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February
2000. He was assured that all the documents were complete, thus he agreed to solemnize
the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the request of
Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a difficulty walking
and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting the ceremony he
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, thus he refused
to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to
the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the
occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also
feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for
the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render
the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license.
He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her
own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
confessing that she filed the complaint out of rage, and she realizes her own shortcomings.
She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage and that it
was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same.

From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5
January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed
it. Also, the Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur has no records of the
marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the
latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines
Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. The LCR informed the judge that they cannot
issue the same due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and
without the requisite marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for
he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be
faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when
he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by

petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action

WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN

WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent
judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left
by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a
retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. 1âwphi 1.nêt

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize
the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request
he acceded.

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery
of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo
but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to
his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered
by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize
her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her
prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed
this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge,
she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it
cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of
her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In
a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that
their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000,
found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license
and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be
imposed on respondent judge.

We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court. 1âwphi1.nêt

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office
and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We
held that:
 "A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
held that:

"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates
may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons."3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law. 1âw phi 1.nêt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This
Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters.
They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power
may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v.

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007

Facts:

A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without
securing the required marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local
civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child
Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed
that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the
Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the

validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She
had actually gave birth to two children, one as stated by the petitioner and the other was
Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27, 1992. Moreover, petitioner filed the said case in
order to evade prosecution for concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he had
three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed and that petitioner prays that
the annulment case be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court
of
Appeals dismissed also the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence
on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization
of the marriage

Held:

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted,
it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these,
petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona,
Cavite.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity
of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 167746 : August 28, 2007]

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner's
appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case
No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging
that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and
respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila,
on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license.
The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham,
as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the
local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann
Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6

Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage
and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the
Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's representation, respondent gave birth to their first
child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara
on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as
support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and cralawlibra ry

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner's appeal. His Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and
petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license
at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License
No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and
was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down
by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA
550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of
procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was
no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who
arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR
Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go
to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite,
was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that
"Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita
Almario"17 but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and cralawl ibra ry

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The
cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the
marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to
the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to
the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after
the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of
the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However,
the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made
in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he
nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to
annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage
does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.31

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while
the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once
more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical
error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such
that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our
conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend
that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without
the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated
it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at
his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad
faith.34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing
the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church
under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the
petitioner.
ςη αñ rοbl ε š νιr⠀ υα l lα ω l ιbrαrÿ

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit
Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall.
This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows'

WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit
church.

WITNESS

I don't remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License? cralaw lib ra ry

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don't know if it is
good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a
Marriage Contract? cralaw lib rary

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract
issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that
time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner - - that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of
the CDCC Br Chapel - - will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to
have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to
know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts
look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati
City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RONULO VS PEOPLE

MORIGO VS PEOPLE

NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY

BESO VS DAGUMAN

IMBONG VS OCHOA, JR.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO III

AMOR-CATALAN VS CA

BAYOT VS CA

CORPUZ VS STO. TOMAS

DACASIN VS DACASIN

FUJIKI VS MARINAY

LAVADIA VS HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

REPUBLIC VS MANALO

NINAL VS BAYADOG

SANTIAGO VS PEOPLE

REPUBLIC VS DAYOT