G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
Bond — In case the decision of a Labor
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order
of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the
Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6.
Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the
POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the
case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because
they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to
post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000,
thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant
shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also
post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of
P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to
the Administration and duly accredited by the
Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer
for all valid and legal claims arising from violations
of the conditions for the grant and use of the
license, and/or accreditation and contracts of
employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee
 compliance with the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of the
Department and all liabilities which the
Administration may impose. The surety bonds
shall include the condition that the notice to the
principal is notice to the surety and that any
judgment against the principal in connection with
matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be
binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety
bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period
of license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum
of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance
with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily
answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result
of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal
bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC
are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of
the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are
governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and
POEA Rules:
placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The
appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period
as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be
under oath with proof of payment of the required
appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;
and a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision and/or award and
proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the
other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the
Administration involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal
bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that
in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money,
an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award
is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the
payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed
in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid
and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not
limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of
employment have been violated. The POEA can go against
these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions
of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the
POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the
recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to
provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last
resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of
every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against
the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover
such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a
monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee,
the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required
by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be
enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and
the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction
of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the
employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum
of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local
employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple
explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject
to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to
which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign
employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective
recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign
employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to
insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of
the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the
sent. working class, conformably to the mandate of the Constitution.
By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a
protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once
statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken
again its commitment to the interest of labor.
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against
conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner. It is so ordered.
the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it
has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and
Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible
as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations

of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II
of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17
of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond
required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules,
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the
POEA.
DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the
August 18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case
No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case,
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against
him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO
DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the
Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of
his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business
interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and
business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation
and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the
registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor
vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P.
DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With
Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7before
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP
alleged, he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary
Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A
No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division
hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch promulgated its Resolution, disposing: WHEREFORE, in the
occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant
compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27. Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of
Arrest be therefore issued against the accused.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4
(A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the SO ORDERED.14
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director
officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director
is one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has
and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term
jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was
"Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by the
opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally
conjunction "and," which signifies that these two positions are
provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of
different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together
the executive branch of the government occupying the position
"relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary
law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was
Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials
specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade
who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In
signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such
support of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand
position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and
Binay v. Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is
claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature
denied;16 Hence, this petition.
considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court required respondents to file a
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of
comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course
Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in
his rejoinder.
thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A.
(supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A.
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether,
No. 8249,29 and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.30
according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of
R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4
and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
not included among the public officials specifically enumerated
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks
jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional Director with
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls within the
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
merit in the petition.
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5,
the commission of the offense:
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers
vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
later amended by P.D. No. 1606,20Section 20 of Batas
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.24 Aside
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2)
officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades.31 While the first part of Section
4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32
That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher"
qualifies "regional director and higher" is apparent from the
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill
Nos. 1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975
and 8249, respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it only in
instances where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher
or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a
certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the
Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975
was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger fish"
and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution
to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials
whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving
thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials
whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over
other specific public officials holding important positions in
government regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis
supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its
time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called "big
fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of
limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called
"small fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its
dockets.35
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided
that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this
category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification
relating to "officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student
provides that if the accused is occupying a position lower than regent of the University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the
SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with
properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-
principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
not among those specifically included in the enumeration in and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g),
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or
regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly
SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts
argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with
"where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
Cuyco.1avvphi1Therein, the accused was the Regional Director
corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the
of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City,
entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in
but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his
statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and
position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.44It
phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
was opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order
position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over
to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a
the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all
possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to
We sustain petitioner's contention.
be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its
every word.39 The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of
Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the
unless committed by public officials and employees occupying
Sangguniang Panlungsod,40 a department manager of the
positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27"
or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division,
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner
admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade SO ORDERED.
"26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in
serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending
petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed
for.45

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant

Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although
petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is
classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.46

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was

prematurely filed on the ground that respondent court has not
yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records
disclose that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond
on September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14,
2010,prior to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for

certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and
G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992 Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections.
He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the
respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Parañaque
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He
vs.
claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166,
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
which requires the apportionment into districts of said
municipalities does not specify when the members of their
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately
validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission on succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members
Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to
rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular
in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the
elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be
for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by
elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However,
the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars
beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be
(Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the
elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists that the elected
Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque fall under
Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION
this category so that they should continue to be elected at large
UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first
until the 1995 regular elections.
sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May
11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court
observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the
reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
district, in Parañaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or
substantial interest. 1 He does not also allege any legal right
that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner
does not appear to have any cause of action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved,
concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters
affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of
discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We
resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even
as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We
so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras
in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections. 2
Now on the meat of the dispute.
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be
elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or
more legislative districts, the elective
members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall be elected by
legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1)
legislative district, the Commission
shall divide them into two (2) districts
for purposes of electing the members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . .
.

On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed (c) The number and election of
into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act elective members of the
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro
Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the proper Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of
interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides: Davao and any other city with two (2)
or more legislative districts shall
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang
continue to be governed by the
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and
provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of
Sangguniang Bayan. — The elective members of
Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
further, That, the Commission shall
 divide each of the municipalities in
Metro Manila Area into two (2)
districts by barangay for purposes of
representation in the Sangguniang
Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular
elections on May 11, 1992, elective
members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan
shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws.
However, beginning with the regular
elections in 1995, they shall be
elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking
authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A.
6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313
and the subsequent resolutions in question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the
meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3,
R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for
Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and the
other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which
are all single-district municipalities, would be elected by district
in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2379 approving the guidelines submitted by the Provincial
Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars
concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein
its purpose in recommending to Congress the
districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of
candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized
elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Parañaque together
with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective
councilors for each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for
Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the
election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by
district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND.
92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received
copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third
Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition
asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang
Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall
be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would
include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at
large those of the municipality of Parañaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to
COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No.
2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to
his view, that the district apportionment of the municipalities in
the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular
elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3,
R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on synchronized elections,
Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize
the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in
the language of the law. Some framers of the law were even
fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions,
particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said
provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne
by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the
Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why
petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we pursue
his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there
would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the
single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second
proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2)
districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian
after all would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988
elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless,
much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its
meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been
held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended
which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its
purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If
the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case,
the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the
act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to
be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and
they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. 6 A construction should be rejected that gives to the
language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish
the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the
enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the
explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part:
 This bill proposes to set the national and local
elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the
necessary implementing details. It also endorses
reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the
number of positions to be voted for by providing
therein that the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent
of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting
the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus —
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order
to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for
in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections
recommended, among others, to the Congress of
the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan
seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines
passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the
President of the Philippines on November 26,
1991, adopting among others, the
recommendation of the Commission on Elections
aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of
Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof,
the Commission promulgated Resolution No.
2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors
and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after
consultation, public hearings, and consensus-
taking with the different sectors in the community,
the Project of District Apportionment of single
legislative-district provinces and municipalities in
the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in
the determination of the district apportionment are
as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and
adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be
based on the 1990 census of population; c. no
municipality, in the case of provinces, and no
barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities,
shall be fragmented or apportioned into different
districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by
district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected
shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative
sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall
voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par.
ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the (c); and (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro
single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2)
Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall
and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11,
will henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang 1992.
Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-
single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila
municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-
Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to continue
districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of
electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod
R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in
and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned.
the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all
But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to
be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter
be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had
and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d).
enough time to apportion the single-district cities and the
Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must
municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.
fall.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave,
local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of
on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant
R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more
petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue
to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative
SO ORDERED.
districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2)
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO
SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE
RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and
WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal
and setting aside of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge
Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte
and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure
question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise
as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free
Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses,
Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original
certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the
Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On
February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an
Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the
petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino
Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena
Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the
aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of
the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the
name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No.
P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the
property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank
of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on
November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of
P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again
mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine
National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a
loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted
by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the
property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest order but their motion was denied.
bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the
"Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex
case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition
Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July
for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted
12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated
private respondent.
October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a consideration.
writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent
Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on
appellate court gave due course to the petition; required the
September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of
parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their
possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy
respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the
sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November
private respondent from executing, implementing or otherwise
17, 1983, to place the property in the possession of the private
giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further
respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the
orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on
possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it
September 17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984,
dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate
another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of
court:
possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial
court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private
It must be noted that when the original owner,
respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to
Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248,
repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners'
was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of
opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12,
absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the property
1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private
covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas
 and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to
repurchase the property provided for in Section
119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended
could have already started. Prom this fact alone,
the petition should have been dismissed.
However, granting that the transfer from parent to
child for a nominal sum may not be the
"conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will
rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the
appellate court went on to hold that the five-year period of the
petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land
Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the
respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the date the
petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus,
when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on
August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved
for reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught
because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of
the courts below, their right to repurchase within five years
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed.
To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases
of Paras vs. Court of Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine
National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the
appellate court's decision, states that the sale of the contested
property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter
from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they
(the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under
the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are:
whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the
contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act;
and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative,
whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right
to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in
full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired
under the free patent or homestead provisions,
 when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period
of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three
classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase — the
applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs.
Consequently, the contention of the private respondent
sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners
do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because
they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale,
has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter
and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested
property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a
child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and
even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase.
This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in
speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private
respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene the
very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to
give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for
himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously
given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating
it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the
spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no
gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to
repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit
of the law. We have time and again said that between two
statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of
the law should prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the
other issue here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the
petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority
by the respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the
present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially
different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance
involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale.
More importantly, the question raised there was whether the
five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted
from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to
repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has
become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the
homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore
understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale
on pacto de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and,
generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro,
subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase
within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a
resolutory condition.
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their
position, on the other hand, present facts that are quite identical
to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the
titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free
patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral
for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both
instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to.
repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure
sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the
period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is
executed thereby formally transferring the property to the
purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that the
mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a
public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981,
with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two
offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17,
1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both
made within the prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should
reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase
price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per
centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together with the
amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the
private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest
on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the
purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of
the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22,
1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional
Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the
private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to
execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in
favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the
purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or
taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on
both amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ,
LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL
GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO
OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA,
CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM,
CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA,
COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and
MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO
GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA,
LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO
OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO
VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO
PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT
AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR
GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO
OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT
SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT.
ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT
JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT
JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT
HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
CRUZ, J.: In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve
the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no
practically the same parties and related issues arising from the
authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private
same incident.
respondents.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition
Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
for habeas corpus directing the release of the private
alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on
respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in
December 1 to 9, 1989.
G.R. No. 95020.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW)

I
67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial
248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office
Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued
and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-
a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually
Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the
addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
charges against them and the creation of the General Court
Martial GCM convened to try them. You are hereby directed to appear in person before the
undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the
9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City,
legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying
then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the
them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18
affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
of Com. Act No. 408.
investigation of the charge/charges against you for
 violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A
MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits
on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
your right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a
copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and
death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the
proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to
grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing
This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated
February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied
the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit
their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave
them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This
was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial
investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71,
which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and
specifications must be signed by a person subject to
military law, and under the oath either that he has
personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters
set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the
best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for
trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made. This investigation will
include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in
said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of
the case should be made in the interest of justice and
discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be
given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against
him if they are available and to present anything he may
desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation,
and the investigating officer shall examine available
witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are
forwarded after such investigation, they shall be
accompanied by a statement of the substance of the
testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of
merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the
summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration
provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin
remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to
Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and
submit their counter-affidavits.
later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. Manuel Ison.
96948 manifested that they were exercising their right to raise
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
peremptory challenges against the president and members of
GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the
this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with
challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
the defined exception is applicable and covers all military
men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5,
assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying
1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He
bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing
petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and
petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and
void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby
members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued
directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of
an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to include other persons facing charges before General
enforce the order for his release and to declare in contempt the Court-Martial No. 14.
commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said
order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and
 Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail
before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates
its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner
Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and
Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No.
97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio
P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had
been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after
their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as
follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948
were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-
trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12,
1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February
21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal
motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to
submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion
was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to
recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court
Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied
due process because the investigation was resolved against
them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits.
They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them
that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on
the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their)
right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed
the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI
Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14
without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an
opportunity to be heard.1âwphi1 If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War
71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a
failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a
general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v.
Espino,1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does
not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is
that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects
the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith,
336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation
procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-
part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408)
can properly be construed as an indispensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General
court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards
to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a
defendant could object to trial in the absence of
the required investigation. In that event the court-
martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities
could consider the same contention, reversing a
court- martial conviction where failure to comply
with Article 70 has substantially injured an
accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial
investigations fall short of the standards prescribed
by Article 70. That Congress has not required
analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-
martial is an indication that the investigatory plan
was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the
Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial investigation,
court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But
this holding has been expressly repudiated in later
holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not
mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of
a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention
of Congress in 1947 after which Congress
amended Article 70 but left unchanged the
language here under consideration. compensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-
martial jurisdiction
 A trial before a general court-martial convened without
any pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of
course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is
similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the
civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court
but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, that issue was resolved more than two years ago
in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of
petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War
and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The
amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their
co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an
officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person
subject to military law, after he had investigated the
matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records,
including the reports of respondent AFP Board of
Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the
testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to
by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the
manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War.
Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the
charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided
under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the
oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.
Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D.
No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were
subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit.
However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled
pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against
them. That petitioners were not able to confront the
witnesses against them was their own doing, for they
never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said
witnesses so that they may be made to answer
clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been
constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War
because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened
the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of
Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
 Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that
Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the this was originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No.
Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June
empowered by the President, the commanding officer of 12, 1948, to wit:
a major command or task force, the commanding officer
Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special
of a division, the commanding officer of a military area,
courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the
the superintendent of the Military Academy, the
trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The
commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of
court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof,
troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any
and shall not receive a challenge to more than one
such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the
member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate
person or persons to be tried, the court shall be
shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by
appointed by superior competent authority. ...
the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court
Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it because shall not be challenged except for cause.
the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v.
Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by
Alejandro,3 thus:
the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed
that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army,
GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is
after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1
significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or
(otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except
revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would
for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of
certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked.
the United States military and naval academies who were
On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177,
on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete
he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for
dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the
him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General.
fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly that "the law member of court shall not be challenged
military aspects of the national defense program. except for cause.
Because of these considerations it was then felt that
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General
peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be
Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any
to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.
of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on
September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act,
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing
made no mention or reference to any peremptory
the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other
challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-
matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed
martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958,
the peremptory challenge, thus:
when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine
Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing for cause may be entertained to insure impartiality and
and intensive program of training and education in good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and
military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the determined by a majority of the members excluding the
Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. challenged member. A successfully challenged member
After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, shall be immediately replaced.
the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No.
had expanded to a very large number, and a great many
1498, or the National Security Code, which was a compilation
of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It
and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies
was in these environmental circumstances that Article of
intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence,
War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each
security and stability of the State." The modified rule on
side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045
proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout
the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8
and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created
pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending
therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and
the other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination
of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason
of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the
maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to
peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when
the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and
now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that
the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D.
No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn
when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if
not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer
operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as,
in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments
of martial law. It is curious that the present government should
invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action
against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory
challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial
trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved
Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at
bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com.
Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter
addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary
can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own
misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the
political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the
propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the
petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with
the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since
the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent
courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29,
the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of
Appeals4 where this Court held that "appeals from the
Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively
cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case
cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies
employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision
or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-
martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not
open to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is
jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of
their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit
such an abuse of discretion — what in the language of
Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as
to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is
precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its
nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpusand quo
warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions,
orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of
Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can
exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents
in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in
Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does
not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the
Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough
reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that
mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of
democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of
firearms by the government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues
collected from the people. All other insurgent elements
carry out their activities outside of and against the
existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress
upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of
respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine
a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of
the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990
Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer
number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their
heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this
Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and
justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This
guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things
similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from others. The accused
officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members
of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454
that they had not been charged after more than one year from
their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy
trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court
on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was
heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the
petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and
specifications against the private respondents dated January 30,
1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-
91, the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was
scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991,
the private respondents received the copies of the charges,
charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit
their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was
indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and
preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to
complete it pre-charge investigation only after one (1)
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of
enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them,
as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish.
The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly
difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed
and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases,
command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have
already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and
approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must
reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must
stress the point that if the participation of petitioner in
several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders
of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established
and no charges can be filed against him or the existence
of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then
Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release
petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even
if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of
then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that
immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused
or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer
who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating
or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be
punished as a court martial may direct.6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered
by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a
notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration,
the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991.
The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the
Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was
received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the
private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not
yet become final and executory when the special civil action in
G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.
 III and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to
exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to
the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula:
are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the

the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED
exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on
jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent SO ORDERED.
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an
error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected
only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177

have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in
excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and
the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such
action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find
that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been
denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private
respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED

for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED,
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992 Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however,
vs. denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing
ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission
MANAGEMENT, respondents. yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April
1989 pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

PADILLA, J.:

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy,
Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform
Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for
with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely
benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
requires that a government employee whether regular,
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those
consecutive years of government service in order to be
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement.

Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and

officials and employees of the National Government, contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides

including government-owned or controlled corporations that the Department of Budget and Management will

with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to

government units. The benefits authorized under this Act government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these

shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits,

emergency employees, regardless of age, who have such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like.

rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA

government service as of the date of separation. 6683.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the

xxx xxx xxx 2
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded
from the coverage of this Act.
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No.
(CSC) emphasized: 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:

xxx xxx xxx "2.3 Excluded from the benefits under

R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be
granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC a) Experts and Consultants hired by
Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant agencies for a limited period to perform
to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of specific activities or services with a
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to definite expected output: i.e. membership
be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular in Task Force, Part-Time,
employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of Consultant/Employees.
enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate
contractual employees in the coverage. b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including those
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, of the Philippine Constabulary and
the date of your separation from the service, is co- Integrated National Police (PC-INP).
terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in
nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision. c) Appointive officials and employees who
retire or elect to be separated from the
xxx xxx xxx3 service for optional retirement with gratuity
under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended
civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an
granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments: amended, or vice- versa.

It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of d) Officials and employees who retired
the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an voluntarily prior to the enactment of this
applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or law and have received the corresponding
regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of benefits of that retirement/separation.
 e) Officials and employees with pending
cases punishable by mandatory
separation from the service under existing
civil service laws, rules and regulations;
provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the
prescriptive period for the availment of the
benefits herein authorized, shall be
allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all
charges and their application accepted
and approved by the head of office
concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not
belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time
employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a
permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position
which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals
and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A.
6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was
holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and
has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous
service in the government should be similarly rewarded by
the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment
petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683,
because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per
appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office
of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management
and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The
project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December
1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position
is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career
service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary
and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for
a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the
expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even
qualified to retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent,
security of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of
project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation
or retirement benefits but reorganization 5to streamline government
functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the
purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the
law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to
special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and
definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no
necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce
voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no
need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-
span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a
local government units. qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior
employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492,
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly
as amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has
technical in nature; these include the faculty and
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975,
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own
which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in
merit systems;
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated
on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector. Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
classified as follows:
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are

1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of appointed by the President.

the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career
provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards
Executive Service, who are appointed by the President,
promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of

2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes Foreign Affairs;

necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed
should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
 (6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career
service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or
unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual
tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service;
and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold
their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards
with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential
staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in
the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job requiring special or
technical skills not available in the employing agency, to
be accomplished within a specific period, which in no
case shall exceed one year and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision
from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual — where and when employment is not permanent
but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature
(Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco
Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December
1974 designated as a laborer holding emergency status
with the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R
Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she
was a research aide with temporary status on the same
project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she
was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1
January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR
IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems)
DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P.
 (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project)
retaining the status of temporary employee. While with
this project, her designation was changed to personnel
assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the
status became permanent until the completion of the
project on 31 December 1988. The appointment
paper 12attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as
co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted
projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered
employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or
cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27
June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total
of two (2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated
June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged
with the function of determining creditable services for
retiring officers and employees of the national
government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order
No. 966 provides that all previous services by an
officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment to a position in the Civil Service are
considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof
states that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid
provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or
casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services
rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status,
irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor
shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes
subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by
approved appointments, official records
and/or other competent evidence.
Parties/agencies concerned shall submit
the necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and
rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the
effectivity date of Executive Order No.
966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years
period prior to retirement are continuous
and fulfill the service requirement for
retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency,
seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial
employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May
1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment
as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in
nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991)
characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee —
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person
whose entrance in the service is characterized by
confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is
subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further
classified into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project — When
the appointment is co-existent with the
duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject
to the availability of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing
authority — when appointment is co-
existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent —
when appointment is co-existent with the
appointee, in that after the resignation,
separation or termination of the services
of the incumbent the position shall be
deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g.
"co-terminous for a period of 3 years" —
the appointment is for a specific period
and upon expiration thereof, the position is
deemed abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications
(c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position,
and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the
security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during
his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a
specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the
latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the
former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends
its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-
INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had
not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and
benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these
legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where,
workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from
one project to another were considered non-project-regular and
permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive
projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the
existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be
disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled
that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical
to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only
to those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would
violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents'
submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by
said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not
be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary
implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission
that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought,
at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as
the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory
construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which
is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication,
to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective
rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences
as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right
or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right
or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper
inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early
Retirement Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation
on coverage of state university employees who are extended
appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3)
years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early
retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of
the actual status or nature of the appointment one
received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is
covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No.
33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its
wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed
overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill,
on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the
national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all
local government units. The benefits authorized under this
Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of
two (2) consecutive years government service as of the
date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as
used in this Act does not include experts and consultants
hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are excluded
from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to
trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished
upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion
of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In
their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project
personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered
expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish
two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates
the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project employment is
inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement
presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals
are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of
early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of
trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement
benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions?
There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or
streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess
personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be
made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have
rendered years of continuous service should be included in the coverage
of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to
the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC
regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990)
implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for
the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of
government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No.
6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.

career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,

seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police
service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A
similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No.
6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would
be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to
promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants"22 After
all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for
GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general
disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the
respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement
within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.
While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give
allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own
without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her
application must be granted; after all she served the government not only
for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for
almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

 G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,
vs. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent
(%) realty tax imposed by the City of Manila.
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No.
409, which took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the annual realty
tax at one and one-half percent (1- %).
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund
Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1,
1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on
the assessed value of real property in addition to the real
property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but
"the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of
three per centrum.c
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea
of fixing the realty tax at three percent. So, by means of
Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December
26, 1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the
board imposed an additional one-half percent realty tax. The
ordinance reads:
SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent
(1/2%), or in short a total of three percent (3%) realty tax (1-%
pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act
No. 5447; and % per this Ordinance) on the assessed value ...
is hereby levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69
as additional one-half percent realty tax for the third quarter of
1972 on its land and machineries located in Manila.
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the said amount. It
contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void
because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law
(Civil Case No. 88827).
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and
ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said
tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court). The only issue is the validity of the tax
ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty
tax.
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent
that the said tax ordinance is still in force; that Ordinance No. realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972
7566, which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a up to the second quarter of 1974.
two percent tax on commercial real properties (like the real
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory
properties of Esso and that that two percent tax plus the one
construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that the
percent tax under the Special Education Fund Law gives a total
additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the
of three percent realty tax on commercial properties. library
provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of
manifestation of March 2, 1981, revealed that up to this time it three per centum.
has been paying the additional one-half percent tax and that
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly
from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as
implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as
three percent tax on its real properties.
that which is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45,
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).
Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at
took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council may, by
one and a half percent, on the other hand, the 1968 Special
ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of one
Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as
percent but not more than two percent of the assessed value of
the maximum real property tax of which one percent would
real property".
accrue to the Special Education Fund.
Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax
real property for the Special Education Fund in addition to the
could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that
basic two percent realty tax.
law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent or municipality.
realty tax is valid under the Real Property Tax Code. What is in
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically the amount thereof, whether one and one-half percent only or
fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)
intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education
proper. That was also the avowed intention of the questioned
Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code, in
ordinance. In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld
prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly
the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the Special Education
authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-
Fund Law refers to a contingency where the application of the
existing one and one- half percent realty tax.
additional one percent realty tax would have the effect of raising
the total realty tax to more than three percent and that it cannot
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set
be construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax
aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the
beyond the one percent fixed by the said law.
realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.

At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable

SO ORDERED.
contention. But the fact remains that the city charter fixed the
realty tax at 1-% and the later law, the Special Education Fund
Law, provides for three percent as the maximum realty tax of
which one percent would be earmarked for the education fund.

The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the

imposition of an additional one-half percent realty tax since the
contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not
arise in the City of Manila.

It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a

municipal corporation to levy a tax should be expressly granted
and should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to
impose a realty tax is not controverted. What is disputed is
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information
against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts,
as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and
accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that
Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged
with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
A preliminary investigation conducted by said court
resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime
charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial
started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that
a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A
second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in
support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in
People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off.
Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the
peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion
to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the
defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower
court dismissed the information against the accused upon
the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of
this single question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any
province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member
of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police
force and no classified civil service officer or employee
shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if
 entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words,
peace officer. justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of
the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not
therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and
comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of
justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no
the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section
necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code,
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the
which provided the following:
more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not
modified by any word or phrase and was intended to
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.
comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First
— No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or
Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any
Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the
of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who,
right to vote.
by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v.
Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code
Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to
omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed
decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive
the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace
sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated
from its operation.
questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
noted that under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to
Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase
justify and clarify the above conclusion.
"of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by
the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was later
amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4
amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the
discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No.
1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on
incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the
Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through
the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these
last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case
at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the
Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357,
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised
Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions
are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605,
666, 657. The present Code was further amended by Republic
Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of
Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038.
In the history of our election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for
elections, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he
holds said public office to election at any municipal,
provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to
the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of
the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner or take part in any municipal,
provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of
being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold
any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide,
however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be
construe to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the
right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907;
Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace
provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any
municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person
violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of
his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold
any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5
years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions
shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise
qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on
August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the
Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in
question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.
— No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any
Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the
right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was
Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the
election. — Any judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of
the police of any municipality, or any officer or employee
of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any
candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this
section or takes part in any election otherwise by
exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of
not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by
imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2
years, and in all cases by disqualification from public
office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period
of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was
enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and
Employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or
assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, the Constabulary of the national, provincial,
municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert
influence in any manner in any election nor take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the
legislative development or history of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the
peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-
appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances
when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act
No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which
preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of
the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge"
was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words
"justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply
said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology
would seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature
omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it
did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation.
Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had
destroyed congressional records which might have offered
some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which
legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time
the words "justice of the peace." Having been completely
destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications
from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions
drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is
sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said
section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase
"of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant
submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the
latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true
that the phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices
of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are
municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may
be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of
Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt
that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals
are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and
logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals,
treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial
officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise
invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable
to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held
to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the
operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim
"casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did
not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration
of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In
the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code,
justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to
this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that
the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular
application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is
pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against
the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature
and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be
strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation
of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play
and due process demand such strict construction in order to
give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line
is passed, in language that the common world will understand."
(Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed
from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the
present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has
been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not
the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws;
instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to
be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal
laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of
various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.)
Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle
that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215
U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not
be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute
(Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider
the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers
(Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal
District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not
mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the
meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in
the sense which best harmonizes with their intent and
 purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as
Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.) judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of
language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed the peace court, and to so construe the law as to allow a
where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities
legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On
Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the
129.) Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace
should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is
Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of
the fact that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers
First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction
within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-
Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of
123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and
Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are
etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old
permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective
statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident
office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases
purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the
would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that
peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained
the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election
in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation.
(pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the
phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is
peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised
the fact that the administrative or executive department has
Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the
regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54
obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term
of the Revised Election Code.
not just one class of judges but all judges, whether of first
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual
Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly
give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute
preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376),
aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's
the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is
contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the
worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the
injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to
petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in
render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down
electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.
by the legislature.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the
No. 2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed
peace from participating in partisan politics. They were
legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already
prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582
expressly included among the officers enjoined from active
and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the
political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the
Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the
said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing
prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No.
laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political
357.
activities.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No.
court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius"
2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a
in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not
whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In
covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway,
other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification
guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio
of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides,
unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to
the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be
considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the
infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of
the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to

exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54,
neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the
reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for
the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est
exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation

of its provisions to particular persons or things by
enumerating them, but no reason exists why other
persons or things not so enumerated should not have
been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion
alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p.
307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by

the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for
trial on the merits.
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A.
TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and
SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA
AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much
controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the
Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail
with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively
(Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a
complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be
declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara,
Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by
Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on
the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang
Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-
three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their father by means
of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No.
8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered
that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No.
735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered
in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio
and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued
on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived
from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its
land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the
land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription,
laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion.
The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss
were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents
that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land
registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and
upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues
Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the
raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower
disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the
court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those
case.
cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of
the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order
action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their
requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in
action in court.
court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer
certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the
court required the production in court of the plan of the land
validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom
covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of
was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara
determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the
vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided
intervenors are included therein.
on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in
filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition
Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471.
praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After
in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No.
the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary
735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs.
injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed
Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago
memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman,
99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil.
110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil.
1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil.
42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972,
43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non

quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial
and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943
without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT
No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the

merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's
time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be

meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No.
8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines could run for and
hold elective public office.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Per
Curiam Resolution2 dated December 9, 2013 of respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-
309 (DC), which affirmed the Resolution3 dated September 6,
2013 of the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying on
our ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,4 disqualified
petitioner Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May
13, 2013 elections, set aside his proclamation as elected mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and declared respondent
Florante T. Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said
municipality.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the
United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in
preparation for his plans to run for public office in the
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
No. 92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even
date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re
acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on
the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen
because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and
exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of
Renunciation.
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010
elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was
proclaimed the winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a
Resolution holding that Arnado's continued use of his US
passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office
for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The
Comelec First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and
held that the rule on succession should be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan
Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in
the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division erred in
applying the rule on succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a
Resolution reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It
held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to
revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En
Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he continued to
use his US passport because he did not yet know that he had
been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the relevant
foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after
receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his
subsequent trips.
Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition
docketed as G.R No. 195649.
While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of
CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections
officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for
the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for
the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. xxxx
Voting 10-5, it annulled and set aside the Comelec En Banc's
February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
for elective position, and declared Maquiling as the duly elected renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
opined that in his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of candidate in the May 2010 elections.7
Renunciation. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
stage for the present controversy.
Division that "Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills does not
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision
mean that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under
in Maquiling, Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C.
R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the
Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April3,
requirements that he perfonned positive acts which effectively
2009."8cralawrednad
disqualified him from running for an elective public office
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone
1991.
rival for the mayoralty post, filed a Petition9 seeking to disqualify
him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual
cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling.
citizens from running for any elective public office would be
The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced
raffled to the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of said
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself
petition was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections
as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes
cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes cast)
votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning
candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to
nullify Arnado's proclamation. He argued that with the April 16,
2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that
Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective office.
Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and without any legal
effect.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division
promulgated a Resolution granting the petition in SPA No. 13-
309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado from running in the May 13,
2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the
time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to
comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While
he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the
same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently
traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in Maquiling.
The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to
execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the
May 13, 2013 elections. While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming
Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3,
2009" was submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice
because it should have been executed on or before the filing of
the CoC on October 1, 2012.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's
Resolution reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
granted. Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified
from running in the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.12 He argued that the Comelec Second Division
erred in applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is not on
all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition
was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from
the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the
Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of
Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming
support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec
Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed
and that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor
ofKauswagan.
On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling
of the Comelec Second Division. It accordingly annulled the
proclamation of Arnado and declared Capitan as the duly
elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the
Comelec En Banc's Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for
reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED. The Proclamation of
Private Respondent Rommel C. Arnado as the duly elected
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte inthe May 13, 2013 Elections.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition
with ancillary prayer for injunctive relief to maintain the
status quo ante. On December
26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status
Quo Ante Order or Temporary Restraining Order14 in view of the
issuance by the Comelec En Banc of a Writ of Execution to
implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring
the respondents to file their respective comments on the
petition. In the same Resolution, this Court granted Arnado's
ancillary relief for temporary restraining order.
Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order dated January 14,
2014,16 contending that the acts sought to be restrained by
Arnado are already fait accompli. He alleged that the
Comelec En Banc had already issued a Writ of Execution17 and
pursuant thereto a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was
convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office.
Since then, he has assumed and performed the duties and
functions of his office.
In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered
the issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to
allow Arnado to continue performing his functions as mayor of
Kauswagan pending resolution of this case.
Issues
In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following
issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS
THE PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE FILING,
ETC.
II
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE
PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM. ELIAS YUSOPH TO
REVIEW THE DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF
THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013
ELECTIONS.
IV
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER
WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON
OCTOBER 1, 2012.19
DIVISION
Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion and violated his right to procedural due process in not
dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers
that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter
subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-019.
In addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day
prescriptive period reckoned from the time of the filing of his
CoC on October 1, 2012.
Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec
is peppered with procedural infirmities. He asserts that the
Comelec violated its own rules in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate; that SPA
No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial and no hearing for the
reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the
Comelec did not follow its own rules requiring the issuance of a
notice of promulgation of resolutions.
Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only
committed grave abuse of discretion but also violated his
constitutional right to due process when it allowed
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to
participate in the review of the Decision he penned for the
Second Division. Furthermore, the Comelec En Banc committed
grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified him from running
in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of
the voters of Kauswagan who all voted for him.
Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the
notarial register of his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M.
Quijano, revealed that he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
with Oath of Allegiance20 on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the
time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the
Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country
and, therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the
May 13, 2013 elections.
Our Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Petition for certiorari is limited to the
determination of whether the respondent
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is
whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will
not interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is
shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion.21 Thus,
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition
will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave
abuse of discretion as the "capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."22 "Mere abuse
of discretion is not enough; it must be grave."23 Grave abuse of
discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.24cralawrednad
In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing
that the Comelec En Banc acted capriciously or whimsically in
issuing its December 9, 2013 Resolution. Neither did it act
contrary to law or jurisprudence.
Arnado's allegations that Capitan
violated the rule against forumshopping
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
unsubstantiated and erroneous.
There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or
proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a
party on the supposition that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition.25cralawred It exists when the elements
of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is
forum-shopping when in both actions there exist: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.27cralawrednad
Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping.
He merely made a general averment that in resolving the
petitions of Capitan in SPA No. 13-309 (OC) and SPC No. 13-
019, the Comelec En Banc, as well as its Second Division, failed
to comply with this Court's Revised Circular No. 28-91,28without
demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to be
present. He has not shown that the petitions in SPA No. 13-309
(DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved the same parties, issues,
and reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even bother to submit to this
Court a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of
proclamation case). As the party insisting that Capitan
committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of
establishing the same. After all, it is settled that he who alleges
has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not
sufficient.29cralawrednad
Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the
parties in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the
same. In the first case, the parties are only Capitan and Arnado.
In the second case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as respondent.
There is also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case
sought to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC while the
latter case prayed for the annulment of Arnado's proclamation
as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's
Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), it appears that Arnado either
failed to grasp the import of Capitan's allegations therein or he
made a deliberate partial misrepresentation in stating that the
same is one for cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof annexed
to Arnado's herein petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify
and/or cancel the certificate of candidacy" of Arnado. The
allegations therein state in no uncertain terms that it is one for
disqualification based on Arnado's failure to comply with the
requisites of RA 9225 and on the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second Division appropriately
treated it as a petition for disqualification with the alternative
prayer to cancel Arnado's CoC. It is elementary that the nature
of the action is determined by the allegations in the
petition.31cralawrednad
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure,32 a petition for disqualification should be filed "any
day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was
proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013.33 Thus,
the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on
May 10, 2013.34cralawrednad
The other procedural lapses allegedly
committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's
motion to consolidate likewise lacks substantiation. In the first
place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to his
petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his
Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto.35 Also, it was Capitan who filed
the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant, Arnado is
not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the Comelec
on said motion. And even assuming that he has, by filing a
Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec En
Banc and subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still
unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado effectively
abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon.
Lina,36it was held that once a party elevates the case before the
appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned
the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal
of origin. "[I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure
an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny
that same jurisdiction."37cralawrednad
In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, consolidation is only permissive. It is not mandatory.
Section 9 reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding
involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or
common with that of another action or proceeding, the same
may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the
lower docket number.
In Muñoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term
'may' is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an
option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or
faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to
exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached
thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be
consolidated must involve similar questions of law and fact."39 In
this case, the consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC
No. 13-019 does not appear to be necessary. As earlier
mentioned, said cases do not even involve the same parties and
reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the Comelec in not consolidating them.
Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules
when it decided SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial
likewise deserves scant consideration. The proceedings in a
special action for disqualification of candidates under Rule 25 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in nature where
a trial type proceeding may be dispensed with.40 In Diangka v.
Comelec,41 this Court held that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of
evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative
proceedings specially where the law calls for the proceeding to
be summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for
disqualifications are subject to summary hearings. In relation
thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said Rules provides that it
remains in the sound discretion of the COMELEC whether
clarification questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants,
and whether the adverse party is to be granted opportunity to
cross-examine said witnesses affiants. Furthermore, when the
COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or
as in the case at bar, a party's answer and the supporting
papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount to a fair
"hearing" of his case.42
Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc
committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.
Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the
September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division
and the December 9, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec En
Banc is not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with
Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito F.
Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which
would indicate that Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or
the ponente of said Resolution. The September 6, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division does not state who
the ponente is. The same goes true with the questioned
December 9, 2013 Per Curiam Resolution43 of the Comelec En
Banc. As a per curiam resolution, it was arrived at by the
Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any
particular ponente. Hence, we need not belabor Arnado's claim
of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks factual
moorings.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.
of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship
and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with
the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office
in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing
of their CoC. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall

Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person
meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
elective local position. In Mercado v. anzano,44 it was clarified
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
understood as referring to "dual allegiance.''45 Subsequent,
officer authorized to administer an oath;
Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed
by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with
the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as
held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he
used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012
for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to
comply with said second requirement. The Comelec also noted
that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013,
affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same
would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse
of discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the Comelec
Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public
office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's
disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections
— being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The
Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of
discretion had it departed therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be
given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his qualification
because at the time this Court promulgated its Decision
in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for
local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D.
Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that
Arnado was denied the chance to submit a replacement oath of
renunciation in 2013, then there was an unfair and abusive
denial of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion."
Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's April 16, 2013
ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially
complied therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was
the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign
passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-
born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and
subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was
settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to
repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Yet,
despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the
fact that Arnado could not have divined the possible adverse
consequences of using his US passport, the Court
in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards
Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied
with. Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider
the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly
complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office
or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his
qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it
is with more reason that in this case, we should similarly require
strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local elective
office.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to
run for public office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013
elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use
of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation
resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in
the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in
his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and
applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
established.48 Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where facts are substantially the same."49 It enjoins
adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the
same issue.50cralawrednad
It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when
Balua filed a petition to disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind
that the use of his US passport might pose a problem to his
candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC on
October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that the use of his
US passport after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation
might have an impact on his qualification and candidacy. In fact,
at that time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But
despite the petitions filed against him questioning his
qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed his CoC
on October 1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in
his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without executing
another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the argument that
Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency
in his CoC since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of
the period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections, is totally bereft
of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling,
Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his
inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed his
CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law
prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every
election period if only to avert possible questions about his
qualifications.
The alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.
As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance, the same is
highly suspect. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the original or certified true copy thereof was not presented. In
addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the outcome of
the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in
the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time
in this petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this Court disallowed the
belated presentation of similar evidence on due process
considerations. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court, administrative agency or quasi- judicial body need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for
the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness
and due process impel this rule. Courts have neither the time
nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to
trial haphazardly.
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission
of evidence. Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7
February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that "In the absence of any applicable provisions of
these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory
character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence
not formally presented:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the
COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and
controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due
process. Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is
not in accord with orderly justice.52
Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his
US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 201 0, certifying that the name With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J.
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Leonen is not only reviving an issue that had already been
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going
2010, with the following pertinent travel beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity,
records:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Arnado's argument in this case-that he is qualified to run for
mayor as he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA
DATE OF Arrival:01/12/2010
9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections- is premised only on
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit.
PASSPORT :057782700
Nothing more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US
DATE OF Arrival:03/23/2010
passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J.
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
Leonen insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja,54 it was held that courts
PASSPORT :05778270053
do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are
pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the
puzzled why Arnado never bothered to correct or refute it. He
parties. They cannot render judgment based on issues that have
neither alleged nor presented evidence in this petition to prove
never been raised before them. Equally settled is the rule that
that he did not travel abroad on those dates using his US
"points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to
passport.
the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be, and ordinarily
will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains
raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations
the same position he had taken in Maquiling that Arnado's use
of due process underlie this rule."55 The same goes true with J.
of his US passport in 2009 is an isolated act justified by the
Brion's theory that what was cancelled by virtue
circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use
of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
his Philippine passport in his travels abroad beginning
where Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not
December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J.
the July 10, 2008 Oath of Allegiance which carried with it an
Leonen, is borne out by Arnado's Philippine passport.
implied abdication of foreign citizenship. For J. Brion, "[t]he
requirement of an express renunciation x x x does not negate
the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit
renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the
oath of allegiance." Again, this was never raised in this petition.
At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required
by Section 356 of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of
RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof
provides the additional requirement of making a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or
at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of
Section 5(2) are not useless or meaningless surplusage. When
the law expressly requires an explicit renunciation, an implicit
one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that
Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has
also been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009,
following the ruling in Maquiling.
Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied
renunciation than to an express one specifically required by law.
Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that
Arnado's use of his US passport effectively recanted his
Affidavit of Renunciation has already become final and
immutable. We can no longer resurrect in this case the issues
that have already been resolved there with fmality.
In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in
travelling abroad in the first quarter of 2010, J. Leonen relies on
the copy thereof attached to the rollo of the Maquiling case. But
said copy of Arnado's Philippine passport57 is a mere
"CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM THE MACIDNE COPY ON
FILE" as attested to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of
the Comelec.58 This is clearly stamped on aforesaid copy of
Arnado's Philippine passport. A machine copy or photocopy is a
mere secondary evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in
evidence until and unless the offeror has proven the due
execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the
original.60 In this case, however, Arnado's Philippine passport is
not missing. Thus, said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine
passport cannot sway us to depart from the uncontroverted
certification of the Bureau ofimmigration that Arnado used his
US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010.
Consequently, even assuming that the recently discovered
November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance is true and authentic, Arnado once more performed
positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010, which
effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit
resulting in his disqualification to run for an elective public office.
Landslide election victory cannot
override eligibility requirements.
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not
cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Iloilo in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007 without first
garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot override making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign
the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections,
and disqualifications."61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court this Court still affmned the Resolution of the Comelec
pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a local elective position
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, for his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of
certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become RA 9225. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath
Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of
and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his
local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that
victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the
popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under
most number of votes does not validate the election of a
Section 39,63a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should
disqualified candidate because the application of the
not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
enumerated under Section 4064 of the same law. After all, "[t]he
matter of popularity.67
qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the
requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is
In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part
contained in the succeeding section which lays down the
of the Comelec En Banc in sustaining the Resolution of the
circumstances that disqualify local candidates."65cralawrednad
Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running in
the May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside his
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v.
proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
Comelec.66 In that case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-
and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said
born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became
municipality.
a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and
candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio,
the assailed Comelec Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status
Quo Ante Order issued by this Court is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.